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a54dca859478c2f0d532685574590c57c216422b | January 28, 1997
Mr. John Pereira
Director
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16
(Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)
Dear John:
Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority to "direct a Government office to . . . investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and] records . . . ." Section 7(f)(1)(C)(ii). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CIA may have held prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and comprehensive answers to the questions identified below.
On May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding CIA's records on Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. Gates testified that "[p]rior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages . . . ." (The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added) (copy enclosed). It is the Review Board's current understanding, however, that at the time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of
Mr. John Pereira
January 28, 1997
Page 2
Security file.¹ We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and CS/LSN.
1. Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.
2. Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.
3. For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination.
4. To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.
For each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available information related to the destruction of the records or files.
These queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request, please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA’s Final Compliance Statement.
¹One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security “MS-” file on Oswald.
Mr. John Pereira
January 28, 1997
Page 3
We request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
[Signature]
David G. Marwell
Executive Director
Enclosure
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
S. J. RES. 282
TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY
MAY 12, 1992
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs.
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1992
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-039035-4
denied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the postponement will be. Will it be until the national security or privacy are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory review every two years?
Going along, some of the language is fairly broad. We had the exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence agent. Then there is another section that gives us an exception—"an intelligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized."
The one that troubles me most, although I know there is a reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, is ". . . an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that person is identified in the material or not." I am concerned about that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclosure.
So I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section 6 of this proposed Act.
Chairman Glenn. Thank you.
Senator Cohen?
Senator Cohen. No further questions.
Chairman Glenn. Good. Thank you very much. We may have additional questions. It has been a long session this morning here, and we have additional questions from other members or questions after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it could be included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate.
Mr. Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much.
Chairman Glenn. The next panel is the Honorable Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Honorable William Sessions, Director of the FBI. Gentlemen, you have been very patient here this morning. I know we had told you you would be on by about 10:00 here. We are about an hour late on that, or a little over. We appreciate your forbearance this morning. We look forward to your testimony this morning.
Mr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very much.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and to describe the nature of the documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
Senator Sasser. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could pull the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you.
Mr. Gates. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.
Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists and, most importantly, the public access to government years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.
Even before the introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older.
In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the history staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.
Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.
This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we hold, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. Indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are that many of these will be released shortly.
As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our historical review program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward-leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency today will make publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification.
To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.
These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages, some of which originated with the FBI, the State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the National Archives.
The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald, some 83,000 pages, most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.
The Committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere.
Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 78 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.
Although our documents do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway.
A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.
The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act which protect the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure, the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA.
However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.
While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give an example of this type of material.
During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of CIA employees. These files contain fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential.
Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.
If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.
The effort required to declassify the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the intelligence community, I have allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the
I was a college student at William and Mary, and I can remember how the word spread like wild fire between classes of that horrible event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood at the intersection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, where I waited for hours to watch the President's funeral cortège. I will never forget it.
I entered public service less than three years later, hearing President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I think many in my generation heard. He said then, "Now, the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to battle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, a struggle against the common enemies of man—tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself."
Mr. Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the assassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of the American Government, that my own Agency, had some part in it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession, in the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or without legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to my memory.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gates follows]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GATES
Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter.
Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution—that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.
Even before the passage of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 50-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records.
Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to
begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.
As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our Historical Review Program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart.
To support the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and one box of microfilm provided to the Warren Commission by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, not organized, and highly disorganized. This makes the process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings.
These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.
As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 38 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and military intelligence. The documents in this file were not organized along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. This file is the only one that we have on Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald—some 33,000 pages—most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.
You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains the microfilm. The microfilm, in this file, is part of the collection. We estimate that within the 68 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent of the documents include material from a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.
By way of example, I include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they are primarily concerned with activities concerning Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.
The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.
While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were released to a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports, (performance evaluations), and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the privacy concerns of the individuals in keeping the information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of anonymity. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to protect the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.
If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.
The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have allocated additional personnel to the JFK files and to the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK files and other documents of historical interest.
I believe these efforts are consistent with the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, we have prepared our technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution.
First, we are outside the body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.
Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearance for document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.
Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or the Executive Branch agencies.
Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time.
Fifth, and finally, Section 8 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing attorney work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed.
These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.
But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material.
Chairman GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Gates.
Mr. Sessions.
TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM S. SESSIONS, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I have a complete statement which I will file, and there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the record, and a photograph of the files themselves.
Chairman GLENN. Without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record.
Mr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to meet the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some 29 years ago.
From the outset, I would like to state emphatically that I favor maximum disclosure consistent with the law and the legitimate need for protection of certain small but highly sensitive categories of information. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperatively through the Department of Justice with both the Senate and the House to develop a comprehensive approach to these important issues.
As you know, the Government has conducted a number of reviews of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House Assassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducted reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. It is my understanding that the FBI provided massive amounts of information to those entities to help ensure that they accomplished their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are able.
Immediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Related investigations were conducted and much information was exchanged, as Director Gates has noted, between the various agencies. As is the case with all major investigations, thousands of pages of documents were created to record the results of these efforts and to facilitate the investigations.
Many different kinds of information were recorded in the FBI files. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other individuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with confidential informants were memorialized. Communications between the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were included, as were communications between the FBI and other agencies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents, with a few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new allegation or a new issue arises.
After Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the assassination. By 1978, four years later, over 200,000 pages of material had been processed and made available to the public through the FBI's public reading room. Many authors, journalists, historians, and others have visited and revisited these materials, which remain available today as a valuable source of historic information.
I would like to briefly describe to the Committee a breakdown of FBI records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBI has four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assassination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby—those are the four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these files, 263,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed, third agency records, and some FBI records that have not been processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.
Approximately 223,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we have processed, have already been released to the public. In addition, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000 pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed pages. Fifteen percent of these pages processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act have been released to the public.
Of the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent, are available in their entirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act.
This includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly personal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable to those particular agencies.
While I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there are certain types of information that are particularly critical to successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for example, information that is properly and appropriately classified, information that would identify confidential sources, and information that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the types of information the disclosure of which could negatively impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these descriptions of information.
In any case, I believe it is extremely healthy for the country to have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic-
MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham
DO Focal Point
for JFK Board
Lee Strickland
DA Focal Point
for JFK Board
FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical
Review Group
SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16
from JFK Board
1. Attached is "Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)", which was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on 29 January 1997. The request is for additional details related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed in the Office of Security and in the DO.
2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to this request. We are asked to make the information available to the Board by 24 February 1997.
John Pereira
Attachment
MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security
SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board
REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997
1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald.
2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.
**Question 1:** (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.
**Response:** (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald,
and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.
(U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files.
(U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.
**Question 2:** (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.
**Response:** (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:
- #0077826 Opened approximately July 1952
- #0090079 Opened approximately February 1953
- #0093466 Opened approximately July 1953
- #0119144 Opened approximately May 1955
(U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations.
(U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:
a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960
c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961
f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.
(U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful.
(U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name.
(C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC).
(C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing.
(U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:
a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959
b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"
c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959
d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959
e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959
f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"
g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960
i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961
j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter
k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas
l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961
m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961
n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure
o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961
p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962
q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure
r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'"
s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.
(U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.
t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald
u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963
x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963
y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).
**Question 4:** (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.
**Response:** (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.
(U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.
(U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.
(U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.
3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame.
4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552.
Attachment
8
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
On 8 April 1994, the complete set of SRPOINTER and HTLINGUAL security support files and indexes held by the Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the approved Records Control Schedules 31-76 and 31-83 and by the Office of General Counsel.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Terri Bagal
Information Review Team
Office of Security
VIA: Robert J. Batinger
Assistant General Counsel
Litigation Division
FROM: Stephen K. DiRubio
Information Management Officer
Office of General Counsel
SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction
1. This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994 requesting confirmation that the security support files of the HTLINGUAL project are not the subject of a current litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for records of this type. A review of OGC files located no currently active cases involving the HTLINGUAL project. Therefore, OGC poses no objection to destruction of the files if authorized by your approved records disposition schedule.
2. For your information I have attached a copy of a March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided guidance to the DO regarding destruction of MECHAOS and HTLINGUAL project files. According to that memorandum, files pertaining to HTLINGUAL may be destroyed only if: (1) they meet the criteria for destruction on the applicable NARA approved records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being processed by the office concerned; and (3) do not document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, or constitute files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain. As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already been met.
SECRET
SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction
3. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance.
Attachment:
As Stated
Stephen K. DiRubio
SECRET
SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction
DCI/OGC/REG/SKDiRubio;skd/76195 (6 Apr 94)
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - OGC Registry
MEMORANDUM FOR: C/OIT/IMB
FROM: W. George Jamason
Chief, Litigation Division, OGC
SUBJECT: Destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Project Files
REFERENCE: Request for Authorization to Retain or Destroy Questionable Records: 14IC's for MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, from IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989
1. The referenced request seeks concurrence for the destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL files in accordance with routine records destruction schedules approved by the National Archivist. Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the proposed destruction can proceed without legal objection.
2. On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMS has proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL records in accordance with routine records destruction schedules. The major reason not to do so has been the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention of those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers' Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records destruction appears to have been eliminated.
3. That case alone, however, does not govern the records retention or destruction of MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files. In addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on 17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NCI-263-77-18 and NCI-263-78-1). The approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the following conditions: (1) files and documents that are the objects of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, or those involved in any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, and other files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal will occur prior to review and concurrence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
4. In reviewing the materials you have provided, I have been able to conclude that then SSCI Chairman, Birch Bayh, in several separate letters dated 6 April 1978, informed the DCI that the Committee had no objection to the implementation of the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my
view, therefore, condition number (3) has been satisfied. Accordingly, with the exception of the case of Hurwitz v. United States, there appear to be no ongoing court cases relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files that necessitate the retention of those materials. All HTLINGUAL materials relating to Leo T. Hurwitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition, any records pertaining to Dr. Sidney M. Peck (Peck v. CIA) should be retained. I am not aware of any other matters that would require retention of the files at the present time, but you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine if there are any outstanding FOIA or Privacy Act requests relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL that should not be destroyed. If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the requirements of the Records Disposal List. Finally, of course, information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign intelligence value also should not be destroyed.
4. I would also point out that the terms of the National Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the Federal Government, including the CIA, shall not use, release or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its subunits. Accordingly, if there is CIA information derived from the FBI's investigation relating to the National Lawyers' Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately marked so as to permit implementation of the settlement agreement. This means that, to the extent MHCHAOS records are not isolated but are contained in other Agency files, some means of ensuring that the information is not disseminated must be made.
5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions.
W. George Jameson
cc: C/ALD/OGC
9 February 1994
MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC/Litigation STEVE
FROM: Terri Eagal
Information Review Team
SUBJECT: Files Scheduled For Destruction
1. On 7 February 1994, this office was given direction by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security, to deal directly with your office in reference to the attached.
2. If you have any questions about the attached, please feel free to call on 40615. Your prompt assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated.
3. Thank you for your coordination and cooperation in assisting the Records Control Schedule Analysts; Terri Eagal 40615 and Lydia Hoffman 40616.
Terri Eagal
Information Review Team
MEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald
Office of Security, Legal Advisor
FROM: Terri Eagal
Information Review Team
SUBJECT: HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files
1. On 7 December 1993, this office coordinated with Barry Zeeman of DO/IMS, on 47411, in reference to the HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files. I asked Mr. Zeeman if his office had any problems with our office destroying these files as they were within our guidelines for destruction. He responded by saying that they had retired their files in 1991 and would have to look into it further. On 8 December 1993, Mr. Zeeman called to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no problem with us destroying our support files to their HT LINGUAL project as they destroyed their files in the late 1980's. The few files they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues of HT LINGUAL.
2. Since the DO no longer has a need for the information in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment on the SR POINTER Files, we need to be sure there is no litigation open before we destroy.
3. In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OGC approval. Your coordination with OGC in this effort is greatly appreciated. Please note, destruction of these files include the SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) cases. Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA.
4. Thank you. If we can be of any assistance to you, please call either Barbara Deavers on 40268, Terri Eagal on 40615 or Lydia Hoffman on 40615.
Terri Eagal
Information Review Team
Distribution:
Original - Jim Archibald
cc - Len Kaplan
CL BY 2039256
DECL OADR
DRV FM SEC 13-87
SECRET
28 Security File Review Log.
Lists of security files received by External Activities Branch personnel in connection with external activities, requests, and cover and documentation matters.
29 Security Duty Office Reporting Files.
Security Duty Office events reports. Duplicate copies of reports prepared by Security Duty Officers concerning individuals who contact the Agency. (Published in the Federal Register, CIA-51, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974). The Federal Register must be amended for any data changed or discontinued.
30 Security Duty Office Operational and Instruction Files.
a. Copies of duty reports, guard post instructions, and duty officer rosters.
b. Records copies of requests for telephone background checks.
31 Security Reports Files.
Records copies of correspondence and reports on operational activities in connection with Office of Security projects.
TEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 months old.
TEMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after cutoff. Cut off at end of each calendar year, hold in current files area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for 3 years, then destroy.
TEMPORARY. Destroy when superseded obsolete, or no longer needed.
TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off when backstop arrangement is terminated, hold in current files area for 3 years, then destroy.
TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off at termination of project, hold in current files area for 1 year, transfer to AARC for 2 years, then destroy.
| SPECIAL PROJECT MATERIAL |
|--------------------------|
| Record copies of reports pertaining to the SRPOINTER Project. (Discontinued). |
Temporary. Hold in current file area until litigation concluded then destroy.
Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files
David G. Ellis
Mail Intercept Program
McAuley, Peter F. SFN 156003
McAuley, Peter F.
99358 PROJECT CHAPERON
OS-PROJECT POINTER
PROJECT SETTER SFN 159144
PROJECT SETTER
SRINDIAN SFN 507356
PROJECT SRINDIAN
SR POINTER/REDSKIN
SR POINTER
PROJECT SR POINTER
PROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List
SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff.
Report JAN 29 75
Draft Memorandum on Background of SR POINTER Prepared
23DEC74
OS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR
POINTER
WESTPOINTER SFN 583870
PROJECT WESTPOINTER
SSD Mail Cover
U.S. Post Office Liaison
File with no name related to Mail
SR POINTER INDEX
VOL 1 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL
VOL 2 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL
VOL 3 Record of BANJOES Received
VOL 4 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56-29NOV63
VOL 5 SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63
VOL 6 Original SR POINTER Documents
VOL 7 Documents Reviewed by George Clark OGC
VOL 8 SR POINTER SFN 119144 Informant BANJO
VOL 9 PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUN52-5FEB58 #77826
VOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144
VOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SFN 93466
VOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Chronology #77826
VOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6)
VOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70
VOL 15 SR POINTER
VOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62-
29MAR63
VOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079
VOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 27JUL54-
19DEC61
VOL 19 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI
Staff
VOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI
Staff
Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files
VOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to CI Staff
VOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 25JUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI Staff
VOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC57
VOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58
VOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60
VOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61
VOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64
VOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64
VOL 29 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR67
VOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67
VOL 31 FANFOLD Coding System #90079
VOL 32 Watch List JAN66
VOL 33 #90079 DC Survey
VOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow
VOL 35 SFN 77826 PROJECT SR POINTER Post Office Department, Relations With
VOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SFN 243550
VOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59
VOL 38 POINTER
SR POINTER Information
HT LINGUAL- A DO project. Opening U.S. citizen's mail going to other countries (mostly Soviet Union) & mail incoming from other countries (1950's). Most mail was opened in NY. Actual opening & monitoring of mail assigned to OS with info turned over to the DO.
SR POINTER- OS name for HT LINGUAL
WESTPOINTER- Opening mail in San Fransico (also known as MK SOURDOUGH). Targeted the Chinese.
PROJECT INDIAN- Targeted mail to/from Pakistan.
BANJO- Actual letters (copies) intercepted.
PROJECT SETTER- Mail opened in New Orleans, targeting South America.
Project was exposed in Rockefeller Commission report. Project names release with JFK info.
06 December 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR: Phil Boycan
Services Team Leader
FROM: William Marshall
Services Team
SUBJECT: Transfer of POINTER and related files
REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) to Jim Archibald (OGC)
Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, from Jim Archibald (OGC) to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT)
1. On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (OGC) memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein Jim Archibald advised that it would be prudent for I&SB to transfer the below list of files to the Information Review Team (IRT).
2. In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3S04 Stafford) transferred the below list of files, on 06 December 1993, to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) via Barbara Deavers (G20 Stafford).
3. Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the responsibility as custodian of the files.
FILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT:
1. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) ......................... 0119144
2. WESTPOINTER .................................. 0583870
3. SR POINTER .................................... No case number visible
4. (DAVID G. ELLIS FILE) ..................... No case number visible
5. PROJECT INDIAN ............................... No case number visible
(Continued on next page)
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
CL BY 0701140
DECL OADR
DERV FRM COV 1-82
CONFIDENTIAL
| | Description | Case Number |
|---|--------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 6 | HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |
| 7 | SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL | No case number visible |
| 8 | HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |
| 9 | PROJECT HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |
| 10| HT LINGUAL | 0090079 |
| 11| SR POINTER | 0077826 |
| 12| SR POINTER | 0093466 |
| 13| SR POINTER (BANJO) | 0119144 |
| 14| SR POINTER (BANJO) | 0119144 |
| 15| WATCH LIST | No case number visible |
| 16| HT LINGUAL | 0119144 |
| 17| DC SURVEY | 0090079 |
| 18| PROJECT DAYLIGHT | 0243550 |
| 19| SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST) | No case number visible |
| 20| HT LINGUAL (BANJO) | 0119144 |
| 21| HT LINGUAL | No case number visible |
| 22| SR POINTER (BANJO) | 0119144 |
| 23| RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR | No case number visible |
| 24| FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM | 0090079 |
| 25| SR POINTER (MAPS) | No case number visible |
| 26| RADIO MOSCOW | 0094866 |
| 27| PROJECT CHAPERON | 0099358 |
| 28| SR POINTER | No case number visible |
| 29| MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM | No case number visible |
| 30| SR POINTER | 0090079 |
| 31| PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER | 0077826 |
| 32| PETER MEAULEY | 0156003 |
| 33| US POST OFFICE LIAISON | No case number visible |
| 34| SSD MAIL COVER | No case number visible |
| 35| PROJECT SETTER | 0159144 |
| 36| SR POINTER/REDSKIN | No case number visible |
| 37| SR POINTER | No case number visible |
| 38| OS PROJECT POINTER | No case number visible |
| 39| RECORD OF BANJOES | No case number visible |
| 40| SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL | No case number visible |
| 41| SR POINTER | No case number visible |
| 42| HT LINGUAL | No case number visible |
| 43| SR POINTER | 0090079 |
| 44| ORIGINAL SR POINTER | No case number visible |
| 45| SR POINTER/BANJO | 0119144 |
| 46| SR POINTER/BANJO | 0119144 |
| 47| SR POINTER/BANJO | 0119144 |
| 48| HT LINGUAL | 0119144 |
| 49| SR POINTER | No case number visible |
50. PROJECT HT LINGUAL ........................................... 0090079
51. PROJECT SR POINTER ........................................... 0077826
52. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0093466
53. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0093466
54. SR POINTER ..................................................... No case number visible
55. BANJO ............................................................. No case number visible
56. CLAUDETTE BOUFFARD ........................................... No case number visible
57. CLARE LENK ..................................................... No case number visible
58. STOLEN AGENCY CREDENTIAL ................................ No case number visible
59. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0090079
William Marshall (C)
OS/I&SB
Barbara Deavers (C)
OS/IRT
**SUBJECT:** REMOVAL OF SRPOINTER FILES FROM 3S04 STAFFORD TO G20 STAFFORD
**FROM:** Leonard M. Kaplan
C/IRT
(G20 Stafford)
**DATE:** 23 Nov 93
**TO:** (Officer designation, room number, and building)
| OFFICER'S INITIALS | DATE RECEIVED | DATE FORWARDED | COMMENTS |
|--------------------|---------------|----------------|----------|
| 1. OS/Legal Advisor | 11-24 | 11-27 | 8 SA |
| 2. | | | |
| 3. | | | |
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| 14. Please call when signed. Thank you. | | | |
| 15. | | | |
**Comments:**
Dear [Name],
I have been informed that the SRPOINTER files are a subset of the HTLWHT files. I recently recommended to OS that it continue with the DO's IMA, and the Agency's Form Office to determine the ultimate disposition of these files.
In the interim, I agree that it would be prudent to allow your office to retain these files. Please call me if you'd like to discuss this matter further.
Sincerely,
[Signature]
23 November 1993
MEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald, OS Legal Advisor
6N20 Stafford Building
FROM: Leonard M. Kaplan
Chief, Information Review Team
Office of Security
SUBJECT: Removal of SRPOINTER Files from 3S04 Stafford (I&SB) to G20 Stafford (IRT)
1. Per a telephonic conversation with Will Marshall of the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo will formally request a transfer/relocation of the noted SRPOINTER files to OS/Information Review Team (IRT).
2. I&SB is currently holding the SRPOINTER files as Mr. John Daley, formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as the OS referent, as well as for his historical perspectives of the files. Mr. Daley has since retired and it has been informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point holder of the files.
3. A formal transfer will serve to alleviate I&SB's role as an "intermediary" in the occasional to frequent use of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests. Additionally, as IRT serves as the focal point for other public and Agency requests, it is necessary to reference these files.
4. Your concurrence is required per C/I&SB instructions for a formal move of the SRPOINTER files from 3S04 Stafford to G20 Stafford.
Leonard M. Kaplan
Concurrence: * See note on reverse
James Archibald
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED
CL BY 2129112 DECL OADR DERV FRM COV 1-82
CONFIDENTIAL
| FROM | Extension NO. | DATE |
|------|---------------|------|
| J. Barry Harrelson | CSI 97-210 | 9 May 1997 |
| TO | DATE | OFFICIAL'S INITIALS | COMMENTS |
|----|------|---------------------|----------|
| John Pereira, C/HRG | 9 May 1997 | | |
| Janet A. Ecklund | | | |
| C/MB, OPS | | | |
| 1S12 Stafford | | | |
| J. Barry Harrelson | | | |
| CSI/HRG | | | |
| 2E20 IPB | | | |
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security
VIA: Chief, Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board
REFERENCE: A. Memo for C/IMB, dtd 27 Feb. 97,
Same Subject
B. Memo for DA/DO IROs (CSI 97-062),
dtd 31 Jan 97
The following actions need to be taken to complete the
Agency’s response to the JFK Board’s Request for Additional
Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination
Files):
a. Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official
response that will become a part of the public record. The
response should be a releasable version of your memorandum of
27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most
of the text is unclassified. I recommend that you send me an
annotated copy indicating what can be released. I will prepare
the response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the
attachments to the memorandum for possible release. The JFK
Board may consider documentation of the destruction of
potentially relevant files as assassination records. HRG will
handle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required.
b. Transfer of Oswald’s OS File(#0351164): The original
Office of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the
Office of Personnel Security should be transferred to the
Historical Review Group. The file will be incorporated into the
Agency’s JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release
under the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will
probably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered
material held by HRG, however, under the JFK law all “Oswald”
files are considered assassination records. The ARRB staff has
asked for access to the file when practical.
SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board
- c. Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested access to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum. (We were unable to locate documents "e" and "f" in the HSCA sequestered collection.) Assassination- and Oswald-related documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required.
Please let me know when it will be possible to give the ARRB staff access to the files. The access is considered for background purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by your staff and HRG. If a file is considered sensitive, access can be restricted to one ARRB staff member and monitored by your staff. The review can take place either at your office or in HRG. If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825.
J. Barry Harrison
SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board
DC\CSI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806 (9 May 97)
g:hrg/req#160S.doc
Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 C/IP&CRD
1 [Linda Cipriani], OGC
1 - C/HRG
1 - B. Harrelson
1 - HRG File
5 June 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors
FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC
1. Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4 June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi-volume file collection entitled "Defectors." These were made available by Ms. Janet Ecklund in OS offices in Stafford Building.
2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present during the review. Mrs. Combs took notes of items of interest and put yellow stickies on a number of documents. She advised Ms. Ecklund that she (Mrs. Combs) would write a memorandum on what she had done and pass it to Mr. Gunn. Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the files personally.
3. Ms. Ecklund stated she would keep these files segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we wanted to see them again.
Gary M. Breneman
27 October 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Janet A. Ecklund
Chief, Information Management Branch
Office of Personnel Security
SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
AIN: 0351164
1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence (HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997.
2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB) research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V.
3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status.
4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur.
24 December 1997
Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor)
Washington, D.C. 20530
Dear Dr. Gunn:
Re: Request for Additional Information and Records
No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and
No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File)
This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending.
1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files.
2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed.
3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors.
4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines.
If you have any questions about this response, please advise.
Sincerely,
J. Barry Harrelson
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16, the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994.
**Question 1:** Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy.
**Response:** At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS.
2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files.
Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination.
Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as:
#0077826 Opened approximately July 1952
#0090079 Opened approximately February 1953
#0093466 Opened approximately July 1953
#0119144 Opened approximately May 1955
3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations.
4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are:
a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960
c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors
e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961
f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic.
5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful.
6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name.
7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows:
a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959
b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship"
c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959
d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959
e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959
f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed"
g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15"
h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960
i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961
j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter
k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas
l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961
m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961
n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure
o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961
p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962
q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure
r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months
Leaves Soviet 'Home'"
s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962.
8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy.
t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald
u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald)
w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963
x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963
y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald).
**Question 4:** To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files.
**Response:** It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of
documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald.
9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information.
10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security.
11. A representative of the Office of Personnel Security/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens.
16 September 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM
SUBJECT: CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files
1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in response to referent request.
2. That letter, was a partial response which provided the Office of Personnel Security's information. The Directorate of Operations' (DO) response was still pending. The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is attached.
3. Please note that both responses are contained in the Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at Attachment V(2).
4. This completes the Agency's action on CIA-16. If you have any questions about this matter, please advise.
Sincerely,
J. Barry Harrelson
Encl. A/S
DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16
Oswald Pre-Assassination Files
The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201.
Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201.
Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection.
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c87a1ccc1172b796e733f479ea03a568eb22bd29 | 5 December 1996
MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
DO JFK Focal Point
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
CSI/HRG
JFK Project Officer
SUBJECT: Priority Requests from ARRB Staff
REFERENCE:
REQUESTS:
1. The ARRB Staff is planning to interview Russ Holmes about his JFK Ancillary (working) Files. Dave Marwell has requested that Holmes be given on one day clearance so that he can look to the files. How do you want to handle?
2. Has David Vance Vanek (SSN 482-38-5577) ever worked for the Agency (DO)? Vanek is an army officer who served in Thailand and Vietnam; could have been detailed to Agency. He figures in one of the conspiracy theories that the ARRB staff is currently taking depositions on. Can DO check or is this an OP issue - we have not had a lot of luck with OP. Initially the ARRB staff was going to make this a formal request, but agreed to hold off for the moment. The theory involves counter-terrorism training and the death of an American with knowledge of JFK assassination.
3. Agency Officers in Moscow: The ARRB staff is researching Oswald's contacts in Moscow. The records shows that he came into contact with other Americans besides Snyder (the Consular Officer). Gunn requested a list of the CIA officers in Moscow a few weeks ago. Based on discussions with Ellie, etc., I told him a list did not exist and would be considered very sensitive if we did prepare one. I ask him to be more specific; if he had names, we would check against Agency records. Since then his staff has located a list of senior officers in Moscow prepared for the HSCA (Eileen has copy). He has now resurrected his requests. Let discuss the next step.
4. Did Mrs. G. Stanley Brown (Verna Deane Stebbens Brown, born 12 August 1928) work for the Agency; what was her status when she was in Moscow as Embassy receptionist/secretary? She is the wife of George Stanley Brown, an Agency employee from 1952-1962. According to the ARRB staff, she had contact with Oswald (see item #3).
I will give you a call on Friday to discuss our responses to the above request.
CC:
October 27, 1996
Mr. Barry Harrelson
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505
Re: Status of Assassination Records Review Board Requests to CIA for Additional Information and Records
Dear Barry:
I am writing to follow-up on our letter of October 7, 1996, regarding the status of Assassination Records Review Board requests for information and records from the CIA.
Formal Requests:
CIA-1
Review Board staff review continues. No CIA action needed at this time.
CIA-6 (Cables and dispatches)
CIA has agreed to make records available (or to have a response) by November 1, 1996.
CIA-7 (Histories)
Counterintelligence. CIA has made material available and Review Board staff examination is ongoing.
Mexico City. The Review Board awaits CIA's compilation of the portion of the Mexico Station history that was shown to G. Robert Blakey.
Mr. Barry Harrelson
October 27, 1996
Page 2
Other Histories. No response has been received to our agreement that CIA identify within two weeks the histories that can be made available and those that should be subject to further discussions.
CIA-8 (Intelligence community staff)
CIA had promised to provide a report to the Review Board within two weeks. Nothing has been made available.
CIA-9 (Publications and analytical materials)
We have received no materials responsive to this request. Additionally, no response has been received from CIA regarding the list of publications that are identified in an LBJ Library finding aid that the Review Board staff provided.
CIA-10 (Interagency source register)
CIA has not yet made available the records that it had agreed to provide within two weeks. (was Oswald on)
CIA-11 (Duran’s original statement)
CIA has agreed to make some further attempts to locate Duran’s original statement.
CIA-12 (JMWAVE materials)
CIA has agreed to make materials available on a rolling basis.
Informal requests:
Spas Rankin. CIA has made the Spas Rankin file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff will discuss issues with CIA.
Marilyn Murrett. CIA has made the Marilyn Murrett file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff
Mr. Barry Harrelson
October 27, 1996
Page 3
will discuss issues with CIA.
HTLINGUAL. It is the Review Board staff's understanding that CIA continues its search for HTLINGUAL records and will provide an oral briefing on the subject. It is also our understanding that some HTLINGUAL records have been located, but that they have not yet been made available to the Review Board.
Recent and additional informal requests that we have discussed with you:
Operational Reports for Cuban Exile Groups. The Review Board staff has been unable to locate in the collection monthly operational reports for the DRE, CRC, or MRR for the period between March 1963 and March 1964. Please advise us whether these records exist and when we may review them.
Moscow. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding Mosco as discussed with Michelle Combs on October 24, 1996.
Tape. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding a tape as discussed with Irene Marr on October 24, 1996.
Please let me know of any inaccuracies in this letter or any suggestions that you have. Thank you for your help and cooperation.
Sincerely,
T. Jeremy Gum
General Counsel and Associate Director for Research
MEMORANDUM
To: Barry Harrelson
From: T. Jeremy Gunn
Subject: Requests to CIA for Records-Related Information - UPDATE
Date: January 9, 1997
The following is a list of our current requests for information. These should be considered informal requests for which we await your response. If you have any additional questions or responses, you should call either Bob Skwirot or the analysts identified below. We are willing to formalize any of the requests into our numbered series if you would so prefer.
| Date | Request Description | Responsible Party |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------|
| 9/6/96 | Spas/Raikh files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them. | Combs |
| 9/6/96 | Spas/Raikh file in Box 15 folder 34. Who is the person signing the DCD messages? Did Raikh work for CIA? Did he work for DCD/OO? What is relationship between documents in file and Raikh? | Combs |
| 9/6/96 | Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:550630 (Box 34, F 22) p. 2. Cable number (IN 24738) 7 July 62. We can send fax if helpful. | Legaspi |
| 9/6/96 | Marilyn D. Murrell files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them. | Combs |
| 9/6/96 | Information on HTLINGUAL | Combs |
| 9/6/96 | Information on Angleton's filing system at CI | Combs |
| 10/17/96 | Location of DRE, CRC, MRR(?) monthly operational reports | Legaspi |
| 10/24/96 | Tapes | Marr |
| 10/24/96 | Moscow | Combs |
| 11/06/96 | Tapes of Alvarado Interrogation | Marr |
| 12/10/96 | New Orleans, Hunter Leake, Clay Shaw, QKENCHANT, and ZRCLIFF | Legaspi |
| 12/10/96 | Claude Barnes Capehart | Skwirot |
| 01/07/97 | Howard Guebler | Gunn |
December 18, 1997
Mr. John Pereira
Chief
Historical Review Group
Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 02505
Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board’s Requests for Additional Information and Records
Dear John:
I am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious concern about the status of CIA’s responses to the Review Board’s requests for additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of requests have not been answered — including some that were made more than two years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks (**) and we request that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests be answered by April 1, 1998.
The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies.
---
1As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material, CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic “take” from Mexico City, CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports, CIA-IR-22 “A” Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison.
Informal Requests
Each of the following informal requests was previously made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below.
CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 (see RIF 104-10065-10199).
This request is complete.
CIA-IR-02 Location of Cable Identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630.
This request is complete.
**CIA-IR-03 Full Computer Search for List of Documents in HTLINGUAL File.
CIA agreed to undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents in April 1997. To date, no response has been received by ARRB. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record.
**CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's Files.
The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for Mangold v. CIA. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files.
In addition, the ARRB staff's review of the Mangold v. CIA files designated additional documents from those files as assassination records. These documents are: Tab D, documents Nos. 95, 109-116, 120, and 121; and from the Denied
MEMORANDUM
July 20, 1998
To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader
From: Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review
Subject: CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post in 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964
In response to ARRB's first informal request, CIA provided several documents from the Directorate of Operations which contained lists of the CIA employees assigned to the country post found in record number 104-10065-10199. These lists of CIA employees were not designated as assassination records.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM
SUBJECT: CIA-IR-1, CIA Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64
1. This is in response to referent request.
2. Searches were made for information responsive to the request and materials were provided for examination by ARRB staff. No documents were selected for the JFK Collection.
3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any question, please advise.
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f4d8bfd8bf4272776309e4147d961bcea3786ab4 | 17 September 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM
SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number 104-10151-1-206
1. The following is in response to subject request.
2. Searches were made for information responsive to subject request and materials were provided for examination by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents. Those documents have now been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be processed and released to NARA.
3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any questions, please advise.
J. Barry Harrelson
MEMORANDUM
September 12, 1998
To: Laura Denk
Executive Director
cc: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader
From: Michelle Combs
Associate Director for Research and Review
Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206
In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source’s 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald’s 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives.
Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source’s true name and cryptonym. Documents from this source are identified as the product of “a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts.”
MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board
FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER/Cryptonym]
1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source ([IJDECANTER]). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests.
2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym [IJDECANTER] in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable.
3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations.
4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER] Cryptonym
information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source [(identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER)]. It concludes by stating that this source [IJDECANTER] has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- and by otherwise having [IJDECANTER] known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.
5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:
- what information was compromised?
- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
- what understanding of the information did the service(s) have?
- what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States?
6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.
7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of Cryptonym
satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost.
8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.
9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.
10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time.
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER/Cryptonym
11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media.
12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm:
- First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
- Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.
SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of Cryptonym
13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release.
Lee S. Strickland
CIA TALKING POINTS
re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
26 AUGUST 1998
• The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA.
• We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER).
• It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would:
• provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort,
• result in concomitant damage to US counter-intelligence interests, and,
• have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.
• Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however:
• a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER) in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or,
• if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts."
• As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety.
• The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source.
• It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.
• It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER).
• It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]."
• It is this final fact which is critical.
• By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.
• I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.
The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions:
- what information was compromised?
- what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information?
- what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have?
- what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party?
The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.
Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service.
Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented.
Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation.
- If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service.
• If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree.
• This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold.
• In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article.
• The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States;
• they know or suspect what he told the US;
• they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said;
• they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities.
• And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success.
• In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.
• The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document.
• But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
of course, information on the public record via the media.
- There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of [IJDECANTER].
- Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization.
- It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time.
- Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones).
- Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know from experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
- There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however.
- ONE, is foreign relations.
- In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal.
- This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.
SECRET
- TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service.
- This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the *bona fides* of defectors.
- The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain.
- THIRD, is an equitable issue.
- The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control;
- The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;
- While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take.
- Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release.
- But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons.
SECRET
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dd1f7341042156551533bf506ecf9914d9693e59 | "The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.\nChairman\nCommittee on Government Operations\nHouse of Representat(...TRUNCATED) | olmocr | 2025-03-20T00:00:00 | 2025-03-20T00:00:00 | {"Source-File":"../pdfs/104-10337-10001.pdf","olmocr-version":"0.1.60","pdf-total-pages":261,"total-(...TRUNCATED) | {"pdf_page_numbers":[[0,1152,1],[1152,1554,2],[1554,3966,3],[3966,5474,4],[5474,5979,5],[5979,7139,6(...TRUNCATED) |
34705faa973e7ee1ad14110d01e8d3aebf7c550a | "25 August 1993\n\nNOTE FOR: All HRG Members\n\nSUBJECT: Briefing of HPSCI on Denied JFK Documents\n(...TRUNCATED) | olmocr | 2025-03-20T00:00:00 | 2025-03-20T00:00:00 | {"Source-File":"../pdfs/104-10337-10002.pdf","olmocr-version":"0.1.60","pdf-total-pages":27,"total-i(...TRUNCATED) | {"pdf_page_numbers":[[0,861,1],[861,1807,2],[1807,2201,3],[2201,2981,4],[2981,4339,5],[4339,5602,6],(...TRUNCATED) |
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54ec4b0b1cdcf05d3549bc20b039c4c3ea0c5ad1 | "CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\n\nSUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America\nSince July 1963\n\n1(...TRUNCATED) | olmocr | 2025-03-20T00:00:00 | 2025-03-20T00:00:00 | {"Source-File":"../pdfs/104-10338-10018.pdf","olmocr-version":"0.1.60","pdf-total-pages":24,"total-i(...TRUNCATED) | {"pdf_page_numbers":[[0,1530,1],[1530,3815,2],[3815,6243,3],[6243,8386,4],[8386,9260,5],[9260,10803,(...TRUNCATED) |
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