Split (1)

train · 242 rows

id stringlengths 40 40	text stringlengths 200 731k	source stringclasses 1 value	added timestamp[s]	created timestamp[s]	metadata dict	attributes dict
a54dca859478c2f0d532685574590c57c216422b	January 28, 1997 Mr. John Pereira Director Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, DC 20505 Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) Dear John: Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (Supp. V 1994), the Review Board has the authority to "direct a Government office to . . . investigate the facts surrounding, additional information [and] records . . . ." Section 7(f)(1)(C)(ii). Pursuant to this authority, the Review Board is seeking to resolve in a complete and comprehensive manner certain questions related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that CIA may have held prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Accordingly, we request that CIA provide complete and comprehensive answers to the questions identified below. On May 12, 1992, Director Robert M. Gates testified to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs regarding CIA's records on Oswald prior to the assassination. Mr. Gates testified that "[p]rior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages . . . ." (The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1972: Hearing Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1992) (emphasis added) (copy enclosed). It is the Review Board's current understanding, however, that at the time of the assassination, CIA held at least three separate files (including soft files) on Lee Harvey Oswald: a 201 file (201-289248), an HTLINGUAL file, and an Office of Mr. John Pereira January 28, 1997 Page 2 Security file.¹ We have identified references to one or more other possible Oswald files including possible soft files designated as follows: CI/SI, CI/SIG, CI/LSN, and CS/LSN. 1. Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. 2. Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination. 3. For the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please identify which records (and the total number that) were in the file at the time of the assassination. 4. To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files. For each question, please explain the basis for the answer and the sources (records or persons) whom you consulted to answer the question. To the extent that you are not able to answer a question completely, please so indicate and provide the best reasonable answer. If, during the course of your research, you learn that any record relating to a pre-assassination file or record has been destroyed, please provide us with all available information related to the destruction of the records or files. These queries should be interpreted in their broadest reasonable sense. To the extent that you question whether certain responses may be within the scope of our request, please let us know and we can advise you whether we would wish to include it. We anticipate that the responses to these questions will be referenced in CIA’s Final Compliance Statement. ¹One Office of Security file on Oswald (or relating to Oswald) may have been numbered 351-164. In addition, Margaret Stevens may have held an Office of Security “MS-” file on Oswald. Mr. John Pereira January 28, 1997 Page 3 We request that you make this information available to us by February 24, 1997. If this does not provide you with sufficient time, please let us know, in writing, by what date you believe you will be able to answer the questions fully. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely, [Signature] David G. Marwell Executive Director Enclosure THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992 HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS SECOND SESSION ON S. J. RES. 282 TO PROVIDE FOR THE EXPEDITIOUS DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS RELEVANT TO THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY MAY 12, 1992 Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs. U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1992 For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402 ISBN 0-16-039035-4 denied, you say postponed. I am curious as to how long the postponement will be. Will it be until the national security or privacy are no longer threatened? Do we want to require a mandatory review every two years? Going along, some of the language is fairly broad. We had the exchange here a few moments ago about an intelligence agent. Then there is another section that gives us an exception—"an intelligence method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized." The one that troubles me most, although I know there is a reason for it, but I just am concerned about the doors it may open, is ". . . an invasion of privacy of a living person, whether that person is identified in the material or not." I am concerned about that being used as a ground for requesting postponement of disclosure. So I think, consistent with all that you have said here, I hope that you will give us the benefit of your second look at that Section 6 of this proposed Act. Chairman Glenn. Thank you. Senator Cohen? Senator Cohen. No further questions. Chairman Glenn. Good. Thank you very much. We may have additional questions. It has been a long session this morning here, and we have additional questions from other members or questions after we review. We would appreciate an early reply so it could be included in the record. Thank you very much. We appreciate. Mr. Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator Specter. Thank you very much. Chairman Glenn. The next panel is the Honorable Robert Gates, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Honorable William Sessions, Director of the FBI. Gentlemen, you have been very patient here this morning. I know we had told you you would be on by about 10:00 here. We are about an hour late on that, or a little over. We appreciate your forbearance this morning. We look forward to your testimony this morning. Mr. Gates, if you would lead off, we would appreciate it very much. TESTIMONY OF THE HON. ROBERT M. GATES, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Mr. Gates. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and to describe the nature of the documents held by the Central Intelligence Agency that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Senator Sasser. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if the Director could pull the mike just a little bit closer? Thank you. Mr. Gates. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter. Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution, that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists and, most importantly, the public access to government years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy. Even before the introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible, consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the history staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we hold, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. Indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are that many of these will be released shortly. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our historical review program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward-leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency today will make publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification. To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized, all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings. These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents amounting to 124 pages, some of which originated with the FBI, the State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see firsthand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald, some 83,000 pages, most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963. The Committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 78 reels of microfilm. The microfilms, in part, overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent originated with a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. Although our documents do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities. The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act which protect the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure, the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give an example of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of CIA employees. These files contain fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping the information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual. If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings. The effort required to declassify the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the intelligence community, I have allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the I was a college student at William and Mary, and I can remember how the word spread like wild fire between classes of that horrible event. I made my way to Washington that weekend and stood at the intersection of Constitution and Pennsylvania Avenues, where I waited for hours to watch the President's funeral cortège. I will never forget it. I entered public service less than three years later, hearing President Kennedy's inaugural call, a call I think many in my generation heard. He said then, "Now, the trumpet summons us again, not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need, not as a call to battle, though in battle we are, but as a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation, a struggle against the common enemies of man—tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself." Mr. Chairman, the only thing more horrifying to me than the assassination itself is the insidious, perverse notion that elements of the American Government, that my own Agency, had some part in it. I am determined personally to make public or to expose to disinterested eyes every relevant scrap of paper in CIA's possession, in the hope of helping to dispel this corrosive suspicion. With or without legislation, I intend to proceed. I believe I owe that to my memory. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Gates follows] PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. GATES Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter. Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution—that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible Government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy. Even before the passage of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 50-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved a new CIA declassification guideline for our Historical Review Program which specifically directs a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. To support the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and one box of microfilm provided to the Warren Commission by the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, not organized, and highly disorganized. This makes the process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings. These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point. As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 38 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and military intelligence. The documents in this file were not organized along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. This file is the only one that we have on Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald—some 33,000 pages—most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963. You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40 percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20 percent originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains the microfilm. The microfilm, in this file, is part of the collection. We estimate that within the 68 boxes of paper records, approximately 27 percent of the documents include material from a variety of other U.S. Government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. By way of example, I include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require considerable effort to review, and as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they are primarily concerned with activities concerning Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities. The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. While I expect a large amount of the material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were released to a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports, (performance evaluations), and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the privacy concerns of the individuals in keeping the information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on individuals where the information is based on gossip and rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of anonymity. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to protect the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual. If legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of Government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings. The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in a time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have allocated additional personnel to the JFK files and to the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK files and other documents of historical interest. I believe these efforts are consistent with the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, we have prepared our technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution. First, we are outside the body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearance for document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or the Executive Branch agencies. Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time. Fifth, and finally, Section 8 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing attorney work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed. These are the technical problems that I believe can be solved and that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material. Chairman GLENN. Thank you, Mr. Gates. Mr. Sessions. TESTIMONY OF THE HON. WILLIAM S. SESSIONS, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; ACCOMPANIED BY DAVID G. LEITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Mr. Sessions. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. I have a complete statement which I will file, and there are some diagrams which I will also make available for the record, and a photograph of the files themselves. Chairman GLENN. Without objection, your entire statement will be included in the record. Mr. Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to appear before you to testify about FBI investigative records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I applaud this process and your efforts. It is fundamental that Government exist to meet the needs of its citizens. An examination of these issues is directly related to satisfying the intense interest and concern of our citizens about the circumstances surrounding that tragic event some 29 years ago. From the outset, I would like to state emphatically that I favor maximum disclosure consistent with the law and the legitimate need for protection of certain small but highly sensitive categories of information. I can assure you that the FBI will work cooperatively through the Department of Justice with both the Senate and the House to develop a comprehensive approach to these important issues. As you know, the Government has conducted a number of reviews of the assassination. The Warren Commission, the House Assassinations Committee, and the Church Committee all conducted reviews that I believe can be best categorized as exhaustive. It is my understanding that the FBI provided massive amounts of information to those entities to help ensure that they accomplished their missions. Once again, we desire to be as helpful as we are able. Immediately following the shooting of President Kennedy, the FBI began a massive investigation. An intense effort was made. Related investigations were conducted and much information was exchanged, as Director Gates has noted, between the various agencies. As is the case with all major investigations, thousands of pages of documents were created to record the results of these efforts and to facilitate the investigations. Many different kinds of information were recorded in the FBI files. The results of thousands of interviews of witnesses, other individuals with possible helpful knowledge, and contacts with confidential informants were memorialized. Communications between the FBI headquarters and our field offices, and vice versa, were included, as were communications between the FBI and other agencies. Forensic reports were recorded. In all, FBI files relating to the assassination contained over 499,000 pages of documents, with a few more pages added every time the FBI follows up on a new allegation or a new issue arises. After Congress amended the Freedom of Information Act in 1974, the FBI began receiving requests for information relating to the assassination. By 1978, four years later, over 200,000 pages of material had been processed and made available to the public through the FBI's public reading room. Many authors, journalists, historians, and others have visited and revisited these materials, which remain available today as a valuable source of historic information. I would like to briefly describe to the Committee a breakdown of FBI records relating in some way to the assassination. The FBI has four core files that relate directly to the investigation of the assassination. Our cooperation with the Warren Commission and the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby—those are the four core files. There are approximately 499,000 pages in these files, 263,000 of which are duplicate pages that were cross-filed, third agency records, and some FBI records that have not been processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. Approximately 223,000 pages, or 94 percent of the records we have processed, have already been released to the public. In addition, the FBI has several other much smaller files as a result of other directly related investigations, such as the investigation of Marina Oswald, and these files comprise approximately 22,000 pages, 13,000 of which are duplicate, third agency, or unprocessed pages. Fifteen percent of these pages processed pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act have been released to the public. Of the pages available in the FBI reading room on the main floor at FBI headquarters, approximately 189,000 pages, or 94 percent, are available in their entirety. The remaining 12,000 pages in the reading room reflect some degree of redaction. The information that has not been disclosed or that has been redacted to some degree falls within the exemptions that are enumerated in the Freedom of Information Act and the protections of the Privacy Act. This includes information that, one, is classified on the basis of national security; two, would disclose the identities of individuals who specifically requested confidentiality; three, would disclose the identities of confidential informants or sources; four, is highly personal information about individuals; or, five, originated with other Government agencies and those agencies specifically requested that the information not be released based upon exemptions applicable to those particular agencies. While I strongly favor maximum disclosure under the law, there are certain types of information that are particularly critical to successful law enforcement investigations and national security; for example, information that is properly and appropriately classified, information that would identify confidential sources, and information that would disclose sensitive investigative techniques or the types of information the disclosure of which could negatively impact upon our ability to fulfill our mission. Information in FBI files that has not been disclosed publicly falls largely within these descriptions of information. In any case, I believe it is extremely healthy for the country to have these issues aired and to be resolved. The public interest dic- MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham DO Focal Point for JFK Board Lee Strickland DA Focal Point for JFK Board FROM: John F. Pereira Chief, Historical Review Group SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board 1. Attached is "Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files)", which was received from the Assassination Records Review Board on 29 January 1997. The request is for additional details related to files on Lee Harvey Oswald that may have existed in the Office of Security and in the DO. 2. Please advise how you would like us to respond to this request. We are asked to make the information available to the Board by 24 February 1997. John Pereira Attachment MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence FROM: Janet A. Ecklund Chief, Information Management Branch Office of Personnel Security SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board REFERENCE: CSI 97-062 dated 31 January 1997 1. (U) The Office of Personnel Security has researched this request from the Assassination Records Review Board relating to the existence of pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. 2. (U) In response to the specific questions listed in Mr. Marwell's letter to the Historical Review Group, the following responses are provided to those three questions pertaining to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994. Question 1: (U) Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. Response: (U) At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A file entitled Defectors File (#0341008) contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the Office of Security also had a subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS. (U) In your request specific mention is made of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. A search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. (U) Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from Lydia Hoffman of the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files. Question 2: (U) Other than for the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination. Response: (U) As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as: - #0077826 Opened approximately July 1952 - #0090079 Opened approximately February 1953 - #0093466 Opened approximately July 1953 - #0119144 Opened approximately May 1955 (U) HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project that involved opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In OS this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. OS conducted the actual opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information referred to the Directorate of Operations. (U) The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This compilation of information was received from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are: a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15" b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960 c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961 f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic. (U) The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors which reflected limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of OS. Efforts to locate this listing or determine the disposition have been unsuccessful. (U) Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. Katie Nakai of this office at one time was assigned to the Security Analysis Group and recalls the Defector Machine Listing. From her recollection, this machine listing was approximately one and one-half inches thick and was in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained limited information on each name. (C) The Special Investigations Branch of Investigations Division is the current operating component encompassing most of the Security Analysis Group functions still conducted in OPS. Gail Jewell of this office was queried regarding office holdings relating to the Defector Machine Listing. Ms. Jewell had no knowledge of the listing and suggested William Gilbert as a resource. Mr. Gilbert, CIC Liaison Officer, could not recall the listing, opined it may have been destroyed, and suggested contacting Zachary Filis of the Counterintelligence Center (CIC). (C) CIC assumed many of the functions previously conducted by the Security Analysis Group. Mr. Filis was queried regarding the possibility the Defector Machine Listing may have been transferred to CIC during the realignment of duties. Mr. Filis advised the Defector Machine Listing could not be located in CIC holdings; and he has made inquiries with Directorate of Operations counterparts regarding the listing. (U) The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows: a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959 b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship" c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959 d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959 e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959 f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed" g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15" h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960 i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961 j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961 m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961 n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961 p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962 q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'" s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962. (U) In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy. t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald) v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald) w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963 x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963 y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald). Question 4: (U) To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files. Response: (U) It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents on this person increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald. (U) Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information. (U) The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security. (U) Don Staton of the OPS/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. Mr. Staton made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer Ronda Allen retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens. 3. (U) For your information, a page-by-page review of the documents contained in the Defectors File (12 volumes) and Lee Harvey Oswald's file (7 volumes) has not been conducted for the purposes of this request. Our efforts were concentrated on the pre-assassination time frame. 4. (U) This review was conducted by Katie Nakai, OPS/CD/IMB, secure 40552. Attachment 8 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD On 8 April 1994, the complete set of SRPOINTER and HTLINGUAL security support files and indexes held by the Office of Security were destroyed in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the approved Records Control Schedules 31-76 and 31-83 and by the Office of General Counsel. MEMORANDUM FOR: Terri Bagal Information Review Team Office of Security VIA: Robert J. Batinger Assistant General Counsel Litigation Division FROM: Stephen K. DiRubio Information Management Officer Office of General Counsel SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction 1. This responds to your memo of 9 February 1994 requesting confirmation that the security support files of the HTLINGUAL project are not the subject of a current litigation, investigation, or other inquiry that would preclude their destruction pursuant to normal guidelines for records of this type. A review of OGC files located no currently active cases involving the HTLINGUAL project. Therefore, OGC poses no objection to destruction of the files if authorized by your approved records disposition schedule. 2. For your information I have attached a copy of a March 1990 memorandum in which OGC provided guidance to the DO regarding destruction of MECHAOS and HTLINGUAL project files. According to that memorandum, files pertaining to HTLINGUAL may be destroyed only if: (1) they meet the criteria for destruction on the applicable NARA approved records disposition schedule; (2) are not responsive to a FOIA or Privacy Act request currently being processed by the office concerned; and (3) do not document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, or constitute files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain. As the attachment indicates, NARA's requirement that the SSCI concur in any proposed destruction has already been met. SECRET SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction 3. I apologize for the delay in responding to your request. Please let me know if I may be of further assistance. Attachment: As Stated Stephen K. DiRubio SECRET SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL/SRPOINTER File Destruction DCI/OGC/REG/SKDiRubio;skd/76195 (6 Apr 94) Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 - OGC Registry MEMORANDUM FOR: C/OIT/IMB FROM: W. George Jamason Chief, Litigation Division, OGC SUBJECT: Destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Project Files REFERENCE: Request for Authorization to Retain or Destroy Questionable Records: 14IC's for MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL Projects, from IMS/MPG/IRMB, dated 18 December 1989 1. The referenced request seeks concurrence for the destruction of MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL files in accordance with routine records destruction schedules approved by the National Archivist. Subject to the qualifications set forth below, the proposed destruction can proceed without legal objection. 2. On several occasions over the past 12 years, DO/IMS has proposed that the Agency identify and destroy MHCHAOS and HTLINGUAL records in accordance with routine records destruction schedules. The major reason not to do so has been the existence of litigation that has necessitated retention of those records. With the settlement of the National Lawyers' Guild litigation, a major obstacle to routine records destruction appears to have been eliminated. 3. That case alone, however, does not govern the records retention or destruction of MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files. In addition, destruction may proceed only in accordance with the records disposition authorization provided by the Archivist on 17 March 1978. (Job Nos. NCI-263-77-18 and NCI-263-78-1). The approval given by the Archivist is subject to essentially the following conditions: (1) files and documents that are the objects of FOIA and Privacy Act requests, or those involved in any other litigation, are not to be destroyed; (2) files that document the initiation, implementation, and termination of the projects, and other files on U.S. persons of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence value which the Agency is required to maintain, are not to be destroyed; (3) no disposal will occur prior to review and concurrence of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 4. In reviewing the materials you have provided, I have been able to conclude that then SSCI Chairman, Birch Bayh, in several separate letters dated 6 April 1978, informed the DCI that the Committee had no objection to the implementation of the records disposal lists approved by the Archivist. In my view, therefore, condition number (3) has been satisfied. Accordingly, with the exception of the case of Hurwitz v. United States, there appear to be no ongoing court cases relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL files that necessitate the retention of those materials. All HTLINGUAL materials relating to Leo T. Hurwitz, therefore, should be retained. In addition, any records pertaining to Dr. Sidney M. Peck (Peck v. CIA) should be retained. I am not aware of any other matters that would require retention of the files at the present time, but you should contact the Agency's FOIA Coordinator to determine if there are any outstanding FOIA or Privacy Act requests relating to MHCHAOS or HTLINGUAL that should not be destroyed. If so, materials should be retained in accordance with the requirements of the Records Disposal List. Finally, of course, information that the Agency must maintain that is of foreign intelligence value also should not be destroyed. 4. I would also point out that the terms of the National Lawyers Guild settlement require that all agencies of the Federal Government, including the CIA, shall not use, release or disclose, within or outside the Government, certain information relating to the National Lawyers Guild and its subunits. Accordingly, if there is CIA information derived from the FBI's investigation relating to the National Lawyers' Guild, Agency records, files or indices must be appropriately marked so as to permit implementation of the settlement agreement. This means that, to the extent MHCHAOS records are not isolated but are contained in other Agency files, some means of ensuring that the information is not disseminated must be made. 5. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions. W. George Jameson cc: C/ALD/OGC 9 February 1994 MEMORANDUM FOR: OGC/Litigation STEVE FROM: Terri Eagal Information Review Team SUBJECT: Files Scheduled For Destruction 1. On 7 February 1994, this office was given direction by Mr. Archibald, Legal Advisor for the Office of Security, to deal directly with your office in reference to the attached. 2. If you have any questions about the attached, please feel free to call on 40615. Your prompt assistance in this matter is greatly appreciated. 3. Thank you for your coordination and cooperation in assisting the Records Control Schedule Analysts; Terri Eagal 40615 and Lydia Hoffman 40616. Terri Eagal Information Review Team MEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald Office of Security, Legal Advisor FROM: Terri Eagal Information Review Team SUBJECT: HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files 1. On 7 December 1993, this office coordinated with Barry Zeeman of DO/IMS, on 47411, in reference to the HT LINGUAL Security Support Files/SR POINTER Files. I asked Mr. Zeeman if his office had any problems with our office destroying these files as they were within our guidelines for destruction. He responded by saying that they had retired their files in 1991 and would have to look into it further. On 8 December 1993, Mr. Zeeman called to say that his office, DO/IMS, had no problem with us destroying our support files to their HT LINGUAL project as they destroyed their files in the late 1980's. The few files they retired in 1991 were on the Administrative and Policy issues of HT LINGUAL. 2. Since the DO no longer has a need for the information in these files (list is attached) and has essentially approved their destruction, we have supplied to you copies of our own Security Records Control Schedule which verifies that these files meet destruction criteria. As you can see though, by the comment on the SR POINTER Files, we need to be sure there is no litigation open before we destroy. 3. In light of paragraph 2, our office now awaits OGC approval. Your coordination with OGC in this effort is greatly appreciated. Please note, destruction of these files include the SR POINTER name index which is currently utilized by this office for the Freedom Of Information Act (FOIA) and Privacy Act (PA) cases. Destruction of this index will aid in decreasing unnecessary review and research on part of FOIA and PA. 4. Thank you. If we can be of any assistance to you, please call either Barbara Deavers on 40268, Terri Eagal on 40615 or Lydia Hoffman on 40615. Terri Eagal Information Review Team Distribution: Original - Jim Archibald cc - Len Kaplan CL BY 2039256 DECL OADR DRV FM SEC 13-87 SECRET 28 Security File Review Log. Lists of security files received by External Activities Branch personnel in connection with external activities, requests, and cover and documentation matters. 29 Security Duty Office Reporting Files. Security Duty Office events reports. Duplicate copies of reports prepared by Security Duty Officers concerning individuals who contact the Agency. (Published in the Federal Register, CIA-51, Notification of Systems of Records, Privacy Act of 1974). The Federal Register must be amended for any data changed or discontinued. 30 Security Duty Office Operational and Instruction Files. a. Copies of duty reports, guard post instructions, and duty officer rosters. b. Records copies of requests for telephone background checks. 31 Security Reports Files. Records copies of correspondence and reports on operational activities in connection with Office of Security projects. TEMPORARY. Destroy when 6 months old. TEMPORARY. Destroy 5 years after cutoff. Cut off at end of each calendar year, hold in current files area for 2 years, transfer to AARC for 3 years, then destroy. TEMPORARY. Destroy when superseded obsolete, or no longer needed. TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off when backstop arrangement is terminated, hold in current files area for 3 years, then destroy. TEMPORARY. Destroy 3 years after cutoff. Cut off at termination of project, hold in current files area for 1 year, transfer to AARC for 2 years, then destroy. \| SPECIAL PROJECT MATERIAL \| \|--------------------------\| \| Record copies of reports pertaining to the SRPOINTER Project. (Discontinued). \| Temporary. Hold in current file area until litigation concluded then destroy. Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files David G. Ellis Mail Intercept Program McAuley, Peter F. SFN 156003 McAuley, Peter F. 99358 PROJECT CHAPERON OS-PROJECT POINTER PROJECT SETTER SFN 159144 PROJECT SETTER SRINDIAN SFN 507356 PROJECT SRINDIAN SR POINTER/REDSKIN SR POINTER PROJECT SR POINTER PROJECT SR POINTER Cuban Watch List SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL Material Duplicated from CI Staff. Report JAN 29 75 Draft Memorandum on Background of SR POINTER Prepared 23DEC74 OS Personnel Directly and Indirectly Involved with SR POINTER WESTPOINTER SFN 583870 PROJECT WESTPOINTER SSD Mail Cover U.S. Post Office Liaison File with no name related to Mail SR POINTER INDEX VOL 1 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL VOL 2 SFN 93466 SR POINTER GENERAL VOL 3 Record of BANJOES Received VOL 4 PROJECT HT LINGUAL Clearance #90079 29NOV56-29NOV63 VOL 5 SR POINTER General Admin and Policy April 63 VOL 6 Original SR POINTER Documents VOL 7 Documents Reviewed by George Clark OGC VOL 8 SR POINTER SFN 119144 Informant BANJO VOL 9 PROJECT SR POINTER Admin 11JUN52-5FEB58 #77826 VOL 10 HT LINGUAL Statistics SFN 119144 VOL 11 SR POINTER GENERAL SFN 93466 VOL 12 PROJECT Outline and Chronology #77826 VOL 13 Record of BANJOES Received (VOL 6) VOL 14 SR POINTER Statistics JAN68-MAR70 VOL 15 SR POINTER VOL 16 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 18JAN62- 29MAR63 VOL 17 SR POINTER 13MAR70 #90079 VOL 18 SR POINTER GENERAL File Admin and Policy 27JUL54- 19DEC61 VOL 19 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 1FEB56-2SEP58 Memos to CI Staff VOL 20 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 9SEP58-15AUG60 Memos to CI Staff Security Support Files for HT LINGUAL / SR POINTER Files VOL 21 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 26AUG60-6JUN62 Memos to CI Staff VOL 22 PROJECT HT LINGUAL #90079 25JUN62-25MAR64 Memos to CI Staff VOL 23 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 2JUL53-27DEC57 VOL 24 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 8JAN58-22DEC58 VOL 25 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 7JAN59-22DEC60 VOL 26 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 3JAN61-27DEC61 VOL 27 PROJECT SR POINTER Informant BANJO SFN 119144 Special BANJO File 23JAN63-2MAR64 VOL 28 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 25MAR64-23DEC64 VOL 29 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 4JAN66-29MAR67 VOL 30 PROJECT HT LINGUAL SFN 119144 BANJO 30MAR67 VOL 31 FANFOLD Coding System #90079 VOL 32 Watch List JAN66 VOL 33 #90079 DC Survey VOL 34 #94866 Radio Moscow VOL 35 SFN 77826 PROJECT SR POINTER Post Office Department, Relations With VOL 36 PROJECT DAYLIGHT SFN 243550 VOL 37 Review of HT LINGUAL Project Outline 10AUG59 VOL 38 POINTER SR POINTER Information HT LINGUAL- A DO project. Opening U.S. citizen's mail going to other countries (mostly Soviet Union) & mail incoming from other countries (1950's). Most mail was opened in NY. Actual opening & monitoring of mail assigned to OS with info turned over to the DO. SR POINTER- OS name for HT LINGUAL WESTPOINTER- Opening mail in San Fransico (also known as MK SOURDOUGH). Targeted the Chinese. PROJECT INDIAN- Targeted mail to/from Pakistan. BANJO- Actual letters (copies) intercepted. PROJECT SETTER- Mail opened in New Orleans, targeting South America. Project was exposed in Rockefeller Commission report. Project names release with JFK info. 06 December 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: Phil Boycan Services Team Leader FROM: William Marshall Services Team SUBJECT: Transfer of POINTER and related files REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993 from Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) to Jim Archibald (OGC) Memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, from Jim Archibald (OGC) to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) 1. On 30 November 1993, Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB) received a copy of an Office of General Counsel (OGC) memorandum, dated 23 November 1993, wherein Jim Archibald advised that it would be prudent for I&SB to transfer the below list of files to the Information Review Team (IRT). 2. In accordance with this memorandum, I&SB (3S04 Stafford) transferred the below list of files, on 06 December 1993, to Leonard Kaplan (C/IRT) via Barbara Deavers (G20 Stafford). 3. Therefore, as of 06 December 1993, I&SB considers itself absolved of the responsibility as custodian of the files. Conversely, as of 06 December, IRT assumes the responsibility as custodian of the files. FILES TRANSFERRED FROM OS/I&SB TO OS/IRT: 1. HT LINGUAL (BANJO) ......................... 0119144 2. WESTPOINTER .................................. 0583870 3. SR POINTER .................................... No case number visible 4. (DAVID G. ELLIS FILE) ..................... No case number visible 5. PROJECT INDIAN ............................... No case number visible (Continued on next page) WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED CL BY 0701140 DECL OADR DERV FRM COV 1-82 CONFIDENTIAL \| \| Description \| Case Number \| \|---\|--------------------------------------------------\|-------------------\| \| 6 \| HT LINGUAL \| 0090079 \| \| 7 \| SR POINTER/OS PERSONNEL \| No case number visible \| \| 8 \| HT LINGUAL \| 0090079 \| \| 9 \| PROJECT HT LINGUAL \| 0090079 \| \| 10\| HT LINGUAL \| 0090079 \| \| 11\| SR POINTER \| 0077826 \| \| 12\| SR POINTER \| 0093466 \| \| 13\| SR POINTER (BANJO) \| 0119144 \| \| 14\| SR POINTER (BANJO) \| 0119144 \| \| 15\| WATCH LIST \| No case number visible \| \| 16\| HT LINGUAL \| 0119144 \| \| 17\| DC SURVEY \| 0090079 \| \| 18\| PROJECT DAYLIGHT \| 0243550 \| \| 19\| SR POINTER (CUBAN WATCHLIST) \| No case number visible \| \| 20\| HT LINGUAL (BANJO) \| 0119144 \| \| 21\| HT LINGUAL \| No case number visible \| \| 22\| SR POINTER (BANJO) \| 0119144 \| \| 23\| RADIO AMATEURS IN USSR \| No case number visible \| \| 24\| FANFOLD CODING SYSTEM \| 0090079 \| \| 25\| SR POINTER (MAPS) \| No case number visible \| \| 26\| RADIO MOSCOW \| 0094866 \| \| 27\| PROJECT CHAPERON \| 0099358 \| \| 28\| SR POINTER \| No case number visible \| \| 29\| MAIL INTERCEPT PROGRAM \| No case number visible \| \| 30\| SR POINTER \| 0090079 \| \| 31\| PROJECT OUTLINE CHRONO/SR POINTER \| 0077826 \| \| 32\| PETER MEAULEY \| 0156003 \| \| 33\| US POST OFFICE LIAISON \| No case number visible \| \| 34\| SSD MAIL COVER \| No case number visible \| \| 35\| PROJECT SETTER \| 0159144 \| \| 36\| SR POINTER/REDSKIN \| No case number visible \| \| 37\| SR POINTER \| No case number visible \| \| 38\| OS PROJECT POINTER \| No case number visible \| \| 39\| RECORD OF BANJOES \| No case number visible \| \| 40\| SR POINTER/HT LINGUAL \| No case number visible \| \| 41\| SR POINTER \| No case number visible \| \| 42\| HT LINGUAL \| No case number visible \| \| 43\| SR POINTER \| 0090079 \| \| 44\| ORIGINAL SR POINTER \| No case number visible \| \| 45\| SR POINTER/BANJO \| 0119144 \| \| 46\| SR POINTER/BANJO \| 0119144 \| \| 47\| SR POINTER/BANJO \| 0119144 \| \| 48\| HT LINGUAL \| 0119144 \| \| 49\| SR POINTER \| No case number visible \| 50. PROJECT HT LINGUAL ........................................... 0090079 51. PROJECT SR POINTER ........................................... 0077826 52. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0093466 53. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0093466 54. SR POINTER ..................................................... No case number visible 55. BANJO ............................................................. No case number visible 56. CLAUDETTE BOUFFARD ........................................... No case number visible 57. CLARE LENK ..................................................... No case number visible 58. STOLEN AGENCY CREDENTIAL ................................ No case number visible 59. SR POINTER ..................................................... 0090079 William Marshall (C) OS/I&SB Barbara Deavers (C) OS/IRT SUBJECT: REMOVAL OF SRPOINTER FILES FROM 3S04 STAFFORD TO G20 STAFFORD FROM: Leonard M. Kaplan C/IRT (G20 Stafford) DATE: 23 Nov 93 TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| DATE RECEIVED \| DATE FORWARDED \| COMMENTS \| \|--------------------\|---------------\|----------------\|----------\| \| 1. OS/Legal Advisor \| 11-24 \| 11-27 \| 8 SA \| \| 2. \| \| \| \| \| 3. \| \| \| \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| \| 14. Please call when signed. Thank you. \| \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| \| Comments: Dear [Name], I have been informed that the SRPOINTER files are a subset of the HTLWHT files. I recently recommended to OS that it continue with the DO's IMA, and the Agency's Form Office to determine the ultimate disposition of these files. In the interim, I agree that it would be prudent to allow your office to retain these files. Please call me if you'd like to discuss this matter further. Sincerely, [Signature] 23 November 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR: James Archibald, OS Legal Advisor 6N20 Stafford Building FROM: Leonard M. Kaplan Chief, Information Review Team Office of Security SUBJECT: Removal of SRPOINTER Files from 3S04 Stafford (I&SB) to G20 Stafford (IRT) 1. Per a telephonic conversation with Will Marshall of the OS/Investigations and Services Branch (I&SB), this memo will formally request a transfer/relocation of the noted SRPOINTER files to OS/Information Review Team (IRT). 2. I&SB is currently holding the SRPOINTER files as Mr. John Daley, formerly an I&SB Security Officer, served as the OS referent, as well as for his historical perspectives of the files. Mr. Daley has since retired and it has been informally agreed that IRT will serve as the focal point holder of the files. 3. A formal transfer will serve to alleviate I&SB's role as an "intermediary" in the occasional to frequent use of the SRPOINTER files for IRT's formal responses to Freedom of Information and Privacy Act requests. Additionally, as IRT serves as the focal point for other public and Agency requests, it is necessary to reference these files. 4. Your concurrence is required per C/I&SB instructions for a formal move of the SRPOINTER files from 3S04 Stafford to G20 Stafford. Leonard M. Kaplan Concurrence: * See note on reverse James Archibald WARNING NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED CL BY 2129112 DECL OADR DERV FRM COV 1-82 CONFIDENTIAL \| FROM \| Extension NO. \| DATE \| \|------\|---------------\|------\| \| J. Barry Harrelson \| CSI 97-210 \| 9 May 1997 \| \| TO \| DATE \| OFFICIAL'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS \| \|----\|------\|---------------------\|----------\| \| John Pereira, C/HRG \| 9 May 1997 \| \| \| \| Janet A. Ecklund \| \| \| \| \| C/MB, OPS \| \| \| \| \| 1S12 Stafford \| \| \| \| \| J. Barry Harrelson \| \| \| \| \| CSI/HRG \| \| \| \| \| 2E20 IPB \| \| \| \| MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Management Branch Office of Personnel Security VIA: Chief, Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence FROM: J. Barry Harrelson Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board REFERENCE: A. Memo for C/IMB, dtd 27 Feb. 97, Same Subject B. Memo for DA/DO IROs (CSI 97-062), dtd 31 Jan 97 The following actions need to be taken to complete the Agency’s response to the JFK Board’s Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files): a. Response to Request: CIA has to provide an official response that will become a part of the public record. The response should be a releasable version of your memorandum of 27 February 1997; according to the classification markings, most of the text is unclassified. I recommend that you send me an annotated copy indicating what can be released. I will prepare the response and coordinate it with you. Also please review the attachments to the memorandum for possible release. The JFK Board may consider documentation of the destruction of potentially relevant files as assassination records. HRG will handle any additional coordination (OGC, DO, etc.) required. b. Transfer of Oswald’s OS File(#0351164): The original Office of Security subject file on Oswald currently held by the Office of Personnel Security should be transferred to the Historical Review Group. The file will be incorporated into the Agency’s JFK Assassination Collection and reviewed for release under the JFK Act of 1992. Most documents in this file will probably be duplicates of documents in the HSCA sequestered material held by HRG, however, under the JFK law all “Oswald” files are considered assassination records. The ARRB staff has asked for access to the file when practical. SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board - c. Defectors File (#0341008): The ARRB staff has requested access to the parts of the Defector File that contain the Oswald documents, items a-f, listed in your 27 February memorandum. (We were unable to locate documents "e" and "f" in the HSCA sequestered collection.) Assassination- and Oswald-related documents in this file will most likely be declared assassination records. HRG will handle any third Agency coordination required. Please let me know when it will be possible to give the ARRB staff access to the files. The access is considered for background purposes only, and any notes taken will be reviewed by your staff and HRG. If a file is considered sensitive, access can be restricted to one ARRB staff member and monitored by your staff. The review can take place either at your office or in HRG. If you any questions, please give me a call, secure 31825. J. Barry Harrison SUBJECT: Request No. CIA-16 from JFK Board DC\CSI/HRG/JBHarrelson:bas/x31806 (9 May 97) g:hrg/req#160S.doc Distribution: Original - Addressee 1 C/IP&CRD 1 [Linda Cipriani], OGC 1 - C/HRG 1 - B. Harrelson 1 - HRG File 5 June 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Review of OS Records on LHO and Defectors FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC 1. Over the course of three half days, 29 May, 2 and 4 June, 1997 ARRB Staff member Michelle Combs reviewed the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald and a multi-volume file collection entitled "Defectors." These were made available by Ms. Janet Ecklund in OS offices in Stafford Building. 2. At the request of OS, the undersigned was present during the review. Mrs. Combs took notes of items of interest and put yellow stickies on a number of documents. She advised Ms. Ecklund that she (Mrs. Combs) would write a memorandum on what she had done and pass it to Mr. Gunn. Further, she advised that Mr. Gunn might want review the files personally. 3. Ms. Ecklund stated she would keep these files segregated within her office for quick retrieval if we wanted to see them again. Gary M. Breneman 27 October 1997 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD FROM: Janet A. Ecklund Chief, Information Management Branch Office of Personnel Security SUBJECT: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY AIN: 0351164 1. The Office of Personnel Security was tasked on 31 January 1997 by the Historical Review Group/Center for the Study of Intelligence (HRG/CSI), via the Directorate of Administration/Information Review Office, with researching pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The tasking was generated by the John F. Kennedy Board's desire to review and declassify relevant material. The results of this review were forwarded to the HRG/CSI on 27 February 1997. 2. During the Information Management Branch's (IMB) research in response to the above tasking it was noted that Volume V of the Oswald files was not on the shelf where Volumes I-IV and VI-VII were located. A search of the entire area where the volumes had been maintained failed to locate Volume V. The IMB Files Section was subsequently charged with conducting an all out search for the missing volume. The search failed to find Volume V. 3. In July 1997, the Oswald files were reviewed page by page prior to being turned over to HRG/CSI and another attempt was made to locate Volume V or to locate persons who might know what happened to it. Volume V was not located nor were any persons located who were knowledgeable of its status. 4. During the complete review of the Oswald files no time gap was apparent and no one was located who could recall ever seeing Volume V. This would suggest that either Volume V had been consolidated into other volumes or that Volume V never existed, but that a numbering error resulted in what should have been Volume V being labeled as Volume VI. The use of Roman numerals on the cover of the volumes might have caused this error to occur. 24 December 1997 Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board 600 E. Street, N.W. (2nd Floor) Washington, D.C. 20530 Dear Dr. Gunn: Re: Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-16 (Oswald Pre-Assassination Files) and No. CIA-IR-24 (Defector File) This is a partial response to the ARRB's referent request for pre-assassination files this Agency may have had on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is believed the following comments and two enclosed documents fully respond to the Office of Security questions. The DO response is pending. 1. At Tab A is a 22 December 1997 memorandum containing information from the Agency's Office of Personnel Security which provides details about the files it had on Oswald prior to the assassination plus when and why they were created. These include the Office of Security file on Oswald, a general file on Americans who had defected to another country and information about HTLINGUAL files. 2. Also enclosed at Tab B is a 27 October 1977 memorandum from the Office of Personal Security which explains the numbering of that Office's file on Oswald. In particular, it explains why the "missing" volume V may never have existed. 3. An ARRB staff member has reviewed the Oswald Security file and the file on American defectors. 4. The Oswald Office of Personnel Security file and those pages of the defector file deemed relevant by the ARRB staff member have been forwarded to HRG for review and will be processed according to current release guidelines. If you have any questions about this response, please advise. Sincerely, J. Barry Harrelson MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD 1. Pursuant to ARRB "Resquet No. CIA-16, the Office of Personnel Security conducted research for and existing pre-assassination files on Lee Harvey Oswald. The following responses are provided to those questions which pertain to the Office of Personnel Security (OPS). These responses are the best reasonable answers based on available information. Please note OPS was known as the Office of Security prior to 1 October 1994. Question 1: Please identify, as specifically as possible, each file held by CIA on Oswald at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy. Response: At the time of the assassination, the Office of Security (OS) held two files which contained information on Lee Harvey Oswald. One file entitled "Defectors File" (#0341008), contained a reference to Lee Harvey Oswald, and the second file was Office of Security subject file on Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164). This information was reflected in the automated security database known as the Management Data Program/Personnel Security (MDP/PS). These files were originally miscellaneous files which were converted to the above numbers circa 1964. A hand search was also conducted of microfiche records which were superseded by the automated system. This hand search produced the same results as the automated search of MDP/PS. 2. Within the ARRB request is specific mention of an HTLINGUAL file. MDP/PS reflects OS maintained four official files under this project--#0077826 (an administrative file), #0090079, #0093466 (a general file), and #0119144. All of the HTLINGUAL files were destroyed on 8 April 1994 along with numerous soft files. Since this material has been destroyed, OPS cannot definitively state whether these files contained any information on Lee Harvey Oswald. The search of Oswald's name did not produce an index reference to any of these files. Attached is all of the available information regarding the destruction of the HTLINGUAL files. This information was retrieved from the Information Management Branch/Records Control Section and from a review of general office administrative files. Question 2: For other than the 201-289248 file on Oswald, please explain when each Oswald file was opened, the purpose for the opening of the file, and the documents that were in the file at the time of the assassination. Response: As noted above, all HTLINGUAL files have been destroyed. Since OS files are usually set up in chronological sequence, a search of files with numbers in close proximity to those recorded for HTLINGUAL was undertaken. This search revealed the approximate opening dates for the four official HTLINGUAL files as: #0077826 Opened approximately July 1952 #0090079 Opened approximately February 1953 #0093466 Opened approximately July 1953 #0119144 Opened approximately May 1955 3. HTLINGUAL was a Directorate of Operations project involving the opening incoming and outgoing mail destined to and from the Soviet Union, China, Pakistan, and South America. In the Office of Security this project was known as SRPOINTER with subprojects identified as WESTPOINTER, INDIAN, BANJO, and SETTER. The Office of Security actually conducted the opening and monitoring of mail with the acquired information being referred to the Directorate of Operations. 4. The Defectors File (#0341008) was established circa 1950 for the purpose of recording information on US citizens defecting to other countries and information regarding foreign nationals considering defection to the United States. This file contained information was from press clippings, Directorate of Operations reporting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, and the various armed services. The pre-assassination documents located in this file relative to Lee Harvey Oswald are: a. Washington Star press clipping of 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15" b. Department of State memorandum dated 25 October 1960 with attached list of American "defectors" from May 1959 to October 1960 c. Memorandum for Chief/Security Research Staff dated 31 October 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors d. Memorandum for Deputy Director of Security dated 1 November 1960 from M. D. Stevens, subject: American Defectors e. Handwritten chart of defectors dated 26 August 1961 f. Defector outline prepared in October 1961 listing known defectors to the USSR, Red China, Cuba, and United Arab Republic. 5. The index reference to the Defectors File identifies a list dated 13 September 1966 which was known as the Defector Machine Listing. This listing was a computer printout of defectors and provided limited biographic data on each name. This listing was maintained separately from the actual Defectors File; notations within the Defectors File show the Defector Machine Listing as permanently charged to the Security Analysis Group of the Office of Security. Efforts to locate this listing or determine its disposition have been unsuccessful. 6. Information regarding the purpose of the Defectors File was gleaned from a quick review of selected holdings. An employee of this Office was, recalls the Defector Machine Listing as being approximately one and one-half inches thick and in two parts. One part consisted of an alphabetical index of defector names with assigned numbers. The second part listed the assigned numbers in numerical order and contained the limited biographic data on each name. 7. The subject file pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) was established circa 1960. It appears this file was created as a separate repository for the numerous press clippings and reports received from other government agencies on the defection of Lee Harvey Oswald to the USSR and his activities following his return to the United States. The first volume of this file appears to have been preserved as the pre-assassination file, and the documents contained in this file are as follows: a. Department of State telegram #1304 from Moscow dated 31 October 1959 b. The Washington Post press clipping dated 1 November 1959 entitled "Ex-Marine Asks Soviet Citizenship" c. Department of State Dispatch #234 from Moscow dated 2 November 1959 d. Department of State telegram #1448 from Tokyo dated 9 November 1959 e. Department of State telegram #1358 from Moscow dated 9 November 1959 f. The Washington Post press clipping dated 16 November 1959 entitled "Rebuffed" g. Evening Star press clipping dated 26 November 1959 entitled "U.S. Defector to Reds Turned to Marx at 15" h. Report Summary prepared by Soviet Russia Division forwarded to Office of Security in March 1960 i. Department of State Instruction A-273 dated 13 April 1961 j. Department of State Dispatch from Moscow dated May 1961 with enclosure of Oswald letter k. Federal Bureau of Investigation report dated 3 July 1961 from Dallas, Texas l. Note to CI/SI dated 28 September 1961 m. Form 745 "Indices Search Request" dated 12 October 1961 n. Department of State Dispatch #317 from Moscow dated 12 October 1961 with enclosure o. Form G-135a Immigration and Naturalization Service name check form to Central Intelligence Agency dated 5 December 1961 p. Navy Department message to Moscow dated 3 March 1962 q. Department of the Navy memorandum to the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated 26 April 1962 with enclosure r. The Washington Post press clipping dated 9 June 1962 entitled "Third American in 2 Months Leaves Soviet 'Home'" s. Federal Bureau of Investigation transmittal of report from Dallas, Texas, dated 30 August 1962. 8. In addition to those documents listed above, the following documents were located in a subsequent volume of the Oswald file and also appear to predate the assassination of President Kennedy. t. Undated summary of file information on Lee Harvey Oswald u. Incoming cable #83858 from Mexico City dated 20 July 1963 (no mention of Oswald) v. Incoming cable #01325 from Mexico City dated 17 August 1963 (no mention of Oswald) w. Incoming cable #36017 from Mexico City dated 9 October 1963 x. Outgoing cable #74830 to Mexico City dated 10 October 1963 y. Incoming cable #47041 from Mexico City dated 24 October 1963 (no mention of Oswald). Question 4: To the extent that Counterintelligence and the Office of Security maintained pre-assassination files on Oswald, please explain why those offices maintained files on Oswald prior to the assassination. In answering this question, please make appropriate references to the Clandestine Services Handbook (CSHB) and to any other materials (including organizational charts) that would help explain the jurisdictional and organization reasons for which CI and OS would have maintained such files. Response: It is believed that OS holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald began in 1959 with his travel to Russia during which he renounced his US citizenship. Oswald was in contact with the American Embassy in Moscow, and the Department of State prepared reports on these contacts. Most likely because of counterintelligence concerns, the Central Intelligence Agency was included in the distribution of these reports. In the beginning this material was probably retained in the Defectors File. As the number of documents increased, a separate file was created to be the repository of information on the alleged American defector. There is a notation in the Defectors File that a separate file exists on Oswald. 9. Both the Defectors File (#0341008) and the file of Lee Harvey Oswald (#0351164) were handled by Marguerite D. Stevens of the OS/Security Research Staff during the pre-assassination time frame. Of the documents listed above, a majority of them contain a notation or the initials of Marguerite D. Stevens, leading one to believe she was the officer responsible for the collection, analysis, and filing of this information. 10. The Security Research Staff (SRS) was the component responsible for collecting, developing, and evaluating information of a counterintelligence nature to detect and/or prevent penetration of the Agency's organization, employees, and activities by foreign or domestic organizations or individuals. SRS conducted research in connection with employee loyalty cases and maintained records identifying personalities, environments, and personal traits of individuals who had been of counterintelligence interest over the years. SRS maintained liaison with various government agencies in connection with counterintelligence activities and coordinated the counterintelligence effort throughout OS. Using organizational charts of this time period, SRS reported directly to the office of the Director of Security. 11. A representative of the Office of Personnel Security/Management Staff was queried regarding the mission and functions of SRS during the pre-assassination time period. He made inquiries relating to the above request, and the OPS/Information Management Officer retrieved retired policy records for review. The information on the mission and function of SRS was retrieved from the archived Office of Security administrative and historical files as well as a review of the security file on Marguerite D. Stevens. 16 September 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk Executive Director, ARRB FROM: J. Barry Harrelson JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM SUBJECT: CIA-16, Oswald Pre-Assassination Files 1. This is further to my letter of 24 December 1997 in response to referent request. 2. That letter, was a partial response which provided the Office of Personnel Security's information. The Directorate of Operations' (DO) response was still pending. The DO response was provided on 2 September 1998 and it is attached. 3. Please note that both responses are contained in the Agency's Compliance Declaration dated 2 September 1998 at Attachment V(2). 4. This completes the Agency's action on CIA-16. If you have any questions about this matter, please advise. Sincerely, J. Barry Harrelson Encl. A/S DO Response to Board Request CIA - 16 Oswald Pre-Assassination Files The Directorate of Operations reviewed the DO records to determine if there were any additional files containing pre-assassination records relating to Oswald. Research identified a document in the Oswald 201 which appeared to be a file inventory. The document identified CI Staff as the file custodian. CIC has confirmed that all CI Staff holdings were incorporated into the 201. Prior to establishing a 201, any documents received would have been placed in an operational interest file. We found no reference to the existence of an operational file. If such a file had existed, however, it might not have been registered in the central index. It was standard procedures that upon opening a 201, the documents from an interest file would be transferred to the 201. Given that Oswald was a subject of the HTLINGUAL operation, it is reasonable to believe that there was a file on him. We destroyed all of the HTLINGUAL files under court order, and no record was made of what files existed. We did not review all of the DO record system to destroy all copies of material which may have been derived from HTLINGUAL material. We know, for instance, that there are HTLINGUAL items related to Oswald in the HSCA sequestered collection. In sum, the 201 on Oswald contains all the information we are aware of that we had prior to the assassination.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10335-10014.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 51, "total-input-tokens": 59366, "total-output-tokens": 23927, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1663, 1 ], [ 1663, 3922, 2 ], [ 3922, 4325, 3 ], [ 4325, 4899, 4 ], [ 4899, 10938, 5 ], [ 10938, 17467, 6 ], [ 17467, 21475, 7 ], [ 21475, 31421, 8 ], [ 31421, 37916, 9 ], [ 37916, 38648, 10 ], [ 38648, 39887, 11 ], [ 39887, 41925, 12 ], [ 41925, 43522, 13 ], [ 43522, 45571, 14 ], [ 45571, 46908, 15 ], [ 46908, 48114, 16 ], [ 48114, 49991, 17 ], [ 49991, 51680, 18 ], [ 51680, 51989, 19 ], [ 51989, 53590, 20 ], [ 53590, 53802, 21 ], [ 53802, 53953, 22 ], [ 53953, 56201, 23 ], [ 56201, 57985, 24 ], [ 57985, 58642, 25 ], [ 58642, 60629, 26 ], [ 60629, 62113, 27 ], [ 62113, 62332, 28 ], [ 62332, 63918, 29 ], [ 63918, 65000, 30 ], [ 65000, 65671, 31 ], [ 65671, 67208, 32 ], [ 67208, 70803, 33 ], [ 70803, 71696, 34 ], [ 71696, 73479, 35 ], [ 73479, 74928, 36 ], [ 74928, 75314, 37 ], [ 75314, 77161, 38 ], [ 77161, 78097, 39 ], [ 78097, 78317, 40 ], [ 78317, 79242, 41 ], [ 79242, 81057, 42 ], [ 81057, 82677, 43 ], [ 82677, 84803, 44 ], [ 84803, 86849, 45 ], [ 86849, 88824, 46 ], [ 88824, 90141, 47 ], [ 90141, 91920, 48 ], [ 91920, 93868, 49 ], [ 93868, 94654, 50 ], [ 94654, 96066, 51 ] ] }
c87a1ccc1172b796e733f479ea03a568eb22bd29	5 December 1996 MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO DO JFK Focal Point FROM: J. Barry Harrelson CSI/HRG JFK Project Officer SUBJECT: Priority Requests from ARRB Staff REFERENCE: REQUESTS: 1. The ARRB Staff is planning to interview Russ Holmes about his JFK Ancillary (working) Files. Dave Marwell has requested that Holmes be given on one day clearance so that he can look to the files. How do you want to handle? 2. Has David Vance Vanek (SSN 482-38-5577) ever worked for the Agency (DO)? Vanek is an army officer who served in Thailand and Vietnam; could have been detailed to Agency. He figures in one of the conspiracy theories that the ARRB staff is currently taking depositions on. Can DO check or is this an OP issue - we have not had a lot of luck with OP. Initially the ARRB staff was going to make this a formal request, but agreed to hold off for the moment. The theory involves counter-terrorism training and the death of an American with knowledge of JFK assassination. 3. Agency Officers in Moscow: The ARRB staff is researching Oswald's contacts in Moscow. The records shows that he came into contact with other Americans besides Snyder (the Consular Officer). Gunn requested a list of the CIA officers in Moscow a few weeks ago. Based on discussions with Ellie, etc., I told him a list did not exist and would be considered very sensitive if we did prepare one. I ask him to be more specific; if he had names, we would check against Agency records. Since then his staff has located a list of senior officers in Moscow prepared for the HSCA (Eileen has copy). He has now resurrected his requests. Let discuss the next step. 4. Did Mrs. G. Stanley Brown (Verna Deane Stebbens Brown, born 12 August 1928) work for the Agency; what was her status when she was in Moscow as Embassy receptionist/secretary? She is the wife of George Stanley Brown, an Agency employee from 1952-1962. According to the ARRB staff, she had contact with Oswald (see item #3). I will give you a call on Friday to discuss our responses to the above request. CC: October 27, 1996 Mr. Barry Harrelson Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 02505 Re: Status of Assassination Records Review Board Requests to CIA for Additional Information and Records Dear Barry: I am writing to follow-up on our letter of October 7, 1996, regarding the status of Assassination Records Review Board requests for information and records from the CIA. Formal Requests: CIA-1 Review Board staff review continues. No CIA action needed at this time. CIA-6 (Cables and dispatches) CIA has agreed to make records available (or to have a response) by November 1, 1996. CIA-7 (Histories) Counterintelligence. CIA has made material available and Review Board staff examination is ongoing. Mexico City. The Review Board awaits CIA's compilation of the portion of the Mexico Station history that was shown to G. Robert Blakey. Mr. Barry Harrelson October 27, 1996 Page 2 Other Histories. No response has been received to our agreement that CIA identify within two weeks the histories that can be made available and those that should be subject to further discussions. CIA-8 (Intelligence community staff) CIA had promised to provide a report to the Review Board within two weeks. Nothing has been made available. CIA-9 (Publications and analytical materials) We have received no materials responsive to this request. Additionally, no response has been received from CIA regarding the list of publications that are identified in an LBJ Library finding aid that the Review Board staff provided. CIA-10 (Interagency source register) CIA has not yet made available the records that it had agreed to provide within two weeks. (was Oswald on) CIA-11 (Duran’s original statement) CIA has agreed to make some further attempts to locate Duran’s original statement. CIA-12 (JMWAVE materials) CIA has agreed to make materials available on a rolling basis. Informal requests: Spas Rankin. CIA has made the Spas Rankin file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff will discuss issues with CIA. Marilyn Murrett. CIA has made the Marilyn Murrett file available to the Review Board. Review Board staff research continues. When research is complete, staff Mr. Barry Harrelson October 27, 1996 Page 3 will discuss issues with CIA. HTLINGUAL. It is the Review Board staff's understanding that CIA continues its search for HTLINGUAL records and will provide an oral briefing on the subject. It is also our understanding that some HTLINGUAL records have been located, but that they have not yet been made available to the Review Board. Recent and additional informal requests that we have discussed with you: Operational Reports for Cuban Exile Groups. The Review Board staff has been unable to locate in the collection monthly operational reports for the DRE, CRC, or MRR for the period between March 1963 and March 1964. Please advise us whether these records exist and when we may review them. Moscow. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding Mosco as discussed with Michelle Combs on October 24, 1996. Tape. CIA has been asked to search for additional information regarding a tape as discussed with Irene Marr on October 24, 1996. Please let me know of any inaccuracies in this letter or any suggestions that you have. Thank you for your help and cooperation. Sincerely, T. Jeremy Gum General Counsel and Associate Director for Research MEMORANDUM To: Barry Harrelson From: T. Jeremy Gunn Subject: Requests to CIA for Records-Related Information - UPDATE Date: January 9, 1997 The following is a list of our current requests for information. These should be considered informal requests for which we await your response. If you have any additional questions or responses, you should call either Bob Skwirot or the analysts identified below. We are willing to formalize any of the requests into our numbered series if you would so prefer. \| Date \| Request Description \| Responsible Party \| \|------------\|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\|-------------------\| \| 9/6/96 \| Spas/Raikh files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them. \| Combs \| \| 9/6/96 \| Spas/Raikh file in Box 15 folder 34. Who is the person signing the DCD messages? Did Raikh work for CIA? Did he work for DCD/OO? What is relationship between documents in file and Raikh? \| Combs \| \| 9/6/96 \| Location of cable identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:550630 (Box 34, F 22) p. 2. Cable number (IN 24738) 7 July 62. We can send fax if helpful. \| Legaspi \| \| 9/6/96 \| Marilyn D. Murrell files. Are all files in collection? If CIA has any additional files (e.g., personnel, 201, etc.), we would like to request them. \| Combs \| \| 9/6/96 \| Information on HTLINGUAL \| Combs \| \| 9/6/96 \| Information on Angleton's filing system at CI \| Combs \| \| 10/17/96 \| Location of DRE, CRC, MRR(?) monthly operational reports \| Legaspi \| \| 10/24/96 \| Tapes \| Marr \| \| 10/24/96 \| Moscow \| Combs \| \| 11/06/96 \| Tapes of Alvarado Interrogation \| Marr \| \| 12/10/96 \| New Orleans, Hunter Leake, Clay Shaw, QKENCHANT, and ZRCLIFF \| Legaspi \| \| 12/10/96 \| Claude Barnes Capehart \| Skwirot \| \| 01/07/97 \| Howard Guebler \| Gunn \| December 18, 1997 Mr. John Pereira Chief Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 02505 Re: Status of CIA Responses to Assassination Records Review Board’s Requests for Additional Information and Records Dear John: I am writing to follow-up on our telephone call earlier today and to convey my serious concern about the status of CIA’s responses to the Review Board’s requests for additional information and records. Although CIA has completed its responses to several requests, and many others have been answered in part, a significant number of requests have not been answered — including some that were made more than two years ago. On many occasions we have been assured that responses would be forthcoming, only to have promised dates come and go without answers. It is now extremely important that these requests be answered promptly so that we may conduct a proper follow-up if necessary. The issues that we can now identify as being of the highest priority are identified in the text below by double asterisks () and we request that they be answered within the next month. We request that the remaining requests be answered by April 1, 1998. The remainder of this letter is divided into two parts: first, a listing of the formal requests for information and records, and second, a listing of the informal requests for information and records. Please let me know if your understanding of any of the following points differs from ours so that we can resolve any potential discrepancies. --- 1As identified more fully below, the issues are: CIA-1 Organizational Material, CIA-6 Cables and Dispatches, CIA-13 Backchannel Communications, CIA-IR-03 HTLINGUAL Documents, CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton Files, CIA-IR-07 Claude Barnes Capehart, CIA-IR-15 Electronic “take” from Mexico City, CIA-IR-21 DRE Monthly Operational Reports, CIA-IR-22 “A” Files on Clay Shaw and Jim Garrison. Informal Requests Each of the following informal requests was previously made to CIA. For future reference, they will be referred to by the "Informal Request" (IR) number provided below. CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 (see RIF 104-10065-10199). This request is complete. CIA-IR-02 Location of Cable Identified in JFK 1993.07.20.10.18:29:650630. This request is complete. CIA-IR-03 Full Computer Search for List of Documents in HTLINGUAL File. CIA agreed to undertake a computer run for all HTLINGUAL documents in April 1997. To date, no response has been received by ARRB. All computer searches for these documents should be documented in a formal letter for the record. **CIA-IR-04 Disposition of Angleton's Files. The Review Board seeks to ensure that it has taken all reasonable steps to account for any files that James Jesus Angleton possessed or controlled that related to the assassination and to Lee Harvey Oswald. Because of the perceived controversy surrounding the disposition of Angleton's files, the Review Board believes it prudent to obtain a clear understanding of the types of files that he maintained and their ultimate disposition. (The Review Board does not seek to explore any subjects in Angleton's files beyond those that may have pertained to the assassination.) To date, CIA has made available certain documents provided by the CIC and the case files for Mangold v. CIA. The Review Board requests any additional information in the possession of CIA that would explain the disposition of Angleton's files. In addition, the ARRB staff's review of the Mangold v. CIA files designated additional documents from those files as assassination records. These documents are: Tab D, documents Nos. 95, 109-116, 120, and 121; and from the Denied MEMORANDUM July 20, 1998 To: Jeremy Gunn Executive Director cc: Bob Skwirot CIA Team Leader From: Michelle Combs Associate Director for Research and Review Subject: CIA-IR-01 Personnel Assigned to Post in 104-10065-10199 from 1959-1964 In response to ARRB's first informal request, CIA provided several documents from the Directorate of Operations which contained lists of the CIA employees assigned to the country post found in record number 104-10065-10199. These lists of CIA employees were not designated as assassination records. MEMORANDUM FOR: Laura Denk Executive Director, ARRB FROM: J. Barry Harrelson JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM SUBJECT: CIA-IR-1, CIA Personnel Assigned to Post from 1959-64 1. This is in response to referent request. 2. Searches were made for information responsive to the request and materials were provided for examination by ARRB staff. No documents were selected for the JFK Collection. 3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any question, please advise. J. Barry Harrelson	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10336-10000.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 9, "total-input-tokens": 10620, "total-output-tokens": 3523, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2065, 1 ], [ 2065, 2977, 2 ], [ 2977, 4370, 3 ], [ 4370, 5589, 4 ], [ 5589, 8197, 5 ], [ 8197, 10158, 6 ], [ 10158, 11949, 7 ], [ 11949, 12503, 8 ], [ 12503, 13014, 9 ] ] }
f4d8bfd8bf4272776309e4147d961bcea3786ab4	17 September 1998 MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk Executive Director, ARRB FROM: J. Barry Harrelson JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number 104-10151-1-206 1. The following is in response to subject request. 2. Searches were made for information responsive to subject request and materials were provided for examination by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members selected a number of documents. Those documents have now been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be processed and released to NARA. 3. This concludes the Agency's action on this request. If you have any questions, please advise. J. Barry Harrelson MEMORANDUM September 12, 1998 To: Laura Denk Executive Director cc: Bob Skwirot CIA Team Leader From: Michelle Combs Associate Director for Research and Review Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206 In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the Review Board requested additional information on a source identified in RIF number 104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA provided the source’s 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald’s 201 file. All of these materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK Collection at the National Archives. Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review Board agreed to protect the source’s true name and cryptonym. Documents from this source are identified as the product of “a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts.” MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director Assassination Records Review Board FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland Chief, Information Review Group Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER/Cryptonym] 1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I respond to the Assassination Records Review Board ("ARRB" or "Board") regarding their current deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source ([IJDECANTER]). It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US intelligence interests. 2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym [IJDECANTER] in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable. 3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the conclusion of your deliberations. 4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IJDECANTER] Cryptonym information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source [(identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER)]. It concludes by stating that this source [IJDECANTER] has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is critical to our request. By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- and by otherwise having [IJDECANTER] known to the public in true name and crypt, we must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised. 5. (C) The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions: - what information was compromised? - what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information? - what understanding of the information did the service(s) have? - what information did the intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the United States? 6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service. 7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the import), they will be able to exploit the information fully and the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational manual for a SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of Cryptonym satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other information they had acquired through signals intelligence, concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e., concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was directly and immediately lost. 8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment of the United States; if they do not, the United States may escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold. 9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success. 10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion, we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period of time. SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of IJDECANTER/Cryptonym 11. (S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media. 12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are three additional points of relevance vis-à-vis harm: - First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions. - Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain. - And third, there is an equitable issue. The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; the CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that it is publicly known at least to some degree. However, because his wife, child and father remain in Russia today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and consider postponement also for this reason. Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons. SECRET SUBJECT: (S) Protection of Cryptonym 13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that this important information can be postponed from public release. Lee S. Strickland CIA TALKING POINTS re Protection of "IJDECANTER" Cryptonym Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) 26 AUGUST 1998 • The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of Operations and the CIA. • We request the postponement of certain very limited information in one document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER). • It is our considered judgment that the release of this cryptonym, in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997, would: • provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-intelligence effort, • result in concomitant damage to US counter-intelligence interests, and, • have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence. • Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and objectives, we propose however: • a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g., "TRUSTED") for the actual cryptonym (IJDECANTER) in this or any other document where it appears and would otherwise be releasable, and/or, • if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., "a valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for internal counter-intelligence efforts." • As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released almost in its entirety. • The released version reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. • It continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source. • It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is supported by reporting from another source (identity redacted but, in fact, IJDECANTER). • It concludes by stating that this source (IJDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]." • It is this final fact which is critical. • By having released this substantive information -- "bona fides ... established" -- AND by otherwise having IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt, THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised. • I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment. The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four basic questions: - what information was compromised? - what foreign intelligence service(s) received the information? - what understanding of the information did the receiving intelligence service(s) have? - what information did the receiving intelligence service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the detriment of the other party? The first two questions are largely factual and can be acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target intelligence service. Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not really an issue here since the US fully understood the information presented. Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for exploitation. - If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset (e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the detriment of the other service. • If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully or to some degree. • This is the critical question that a foreign country must answer and it is the critical information that we must protect vis-à-vis defectors in our fold. • In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially released document and the Los Angeles Times article. • The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to the United States; • they know or suspect what he told the US; • they know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he said; • they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus incorporated his information into our operational practices and activities. • And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a US intelligence success. • In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. • The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. • But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when they assess this new information in light of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including, of course, information on the public record via the media. - There is additional damage that will accrue from not officially protecting the identity of [IJDECANTER]. - Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence organization. - It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at some future point in time. - Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current assets or public statements by inactive ones). - Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA. Indeed, we know from experience that this complicates our ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism). - There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in the interests of the Board's time. They are not insignificant, however. - ONE, is foreign relations. - In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of reprisal. - This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions. SECRET - TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the Russian service. - This specific release could arguably provide them with insights into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors. - The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not know this for certain. - THIRD, is an equitable issue. - The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a defector in our custody and under our control; - The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship; - While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial action the current government might take. - Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether the Russian government today would take action against the family from this proposed release. - But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably harmful to living persons. SECRET g:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc (last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10336-10034.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 14, "total-input-tokens": 16113, "total-output-tokens": 4556, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 686, 1 ], [ 686, 2437, 2 ], [ 2437, 4038, 3 ], [ 4038, 5956, 4 ], [ 5956, 8292, 5 ], [ 8292, 10327, 6 ], [ 10327, 10580, 7 ], [ 10580, 11844, 8 ], [ 11844, 13362, 9 ], [ 13362, 14504, 10 ], [ 14504, 15983, 11 ], [ 15983, 17408, 12 ], [ 17408, 18460, 13 ], [ 18460, 18557, 14 ] ] }
dd1f7341042156551533bf506ecf9914d9693e59	The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Chairman Committee on Government Operations House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law. I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information. To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter. Sincerely, Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs Enclosure The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. SUBJECT: Agency Records on the JFK Assassination OCA/LEG/DMPearline:rw 23 April 1992 (OCA 1123-92) (OCA 1123-92/1) (OCA 1123-92/2) Original - Addressee (w/enclos) 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ExDir 1 - ER 1 - D/OCA (w/enclos) 1 - DMPearline Signer (w/enclos) 1 - OCA/LEG Subject File (w/enclos) 1 - OCA Record (w/enclos) 1 - D/Center for the Study of Intelligence (w/enclos) 1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records? Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority of documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement. 2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages. The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency were asked to explore newly advanced theories, the search for documents could be a rather large undertaking involving the review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines describing the kinds of records sought. 3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many? We believe that between 40 percent and 50 percent of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the FBI. 4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers. A small number of CIA's records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA. 5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests? CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA. 6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454? It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because consideration for protection of classified information and other sensitive categories of information would be required on a document by document basis. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of individuals involved. TRANSMITTED TO: NAME: JOHN PEREIRA ORGANIZATION: OGC BLDG, ROOM TELE/EXT: 76160 (FAX 574 3208) SUBJECT: OCA LETTER (W/ENC) & INR MEMO (W/O ATT) & CIA NS DRAFT MOU WITH STATE TRANSMITTED FROM: NAME: KEN MCDONALD BLDG, ROOM: 316 AMES TELE/EXT: 80147 (FAX 522 9280) MESSAGE: John - The OCA letter (which Doned Pease sent us yesterday) has many suggested changes on it. I think I sent you an earlier draft of our proposed access memo of understanding with State, to which the Wilcox memo refers. Ken The Honorable John Conyers, Jr. Chairman Committee on Government Operations United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of 6 April requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolution 454 were enacted into law. I should also point out that the Central Intelligence Agency is currently embarking on its own review of assassination records. I would expect that this review will result in the public release of a significant body of information. To help the committee understand the nature and number of CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing the answers to the specific questions you raised in your letter. Sincerely, Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs Enclosure 1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of these records? Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 pages of such records which consist of CIA's Oswald file (originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records collected in response to specific requests from the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of names trades requested by the HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the civil rights movement. 2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and the approximate number of pages. The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA would require specific guidelines of the kinds of records sought. 3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If so, approximately how many? We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 4. Did any of these records originate with any other Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please describe which agencies and the approximate numbers. A small number of CIA's JFK assassination records, probably less than 5%, originated with the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA. 5. How many of these records have been reviewed for release under the Freedom of Information Act? How many of these records have been released pursuant to such requests? CIA has released 7,432 pages of JFK assassination records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination records CIA has reviewed under FOIA. 6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many records would be released under the standards contained in House Joint Resolution 454? It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed. We would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. April 14, 1992 The Honorable Robert M. Gates Director Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Director Gates: I am pleased to learn that you will be testifying before the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12, 1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room 342 of the Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of the hearing will be the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation proposes to create an independent review board to govern and coordinate the release of government information relevant to the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy. As required by Committee rules, please have 100 copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by close of business, Friday, May 8, 1992. While your written testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length. Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee and to the Congress as it considers this important legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the records and resources of your agency, the Committee would appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects: What are the reasons which the Central Intelligence Agency has records related to the assassination of President Kennedy? What have the methods been to date for the identification and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as material related to the assassination of President Kennedy? What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to assess the scope of relevant documents outside of materials requested by earlier investigative or other official committees or commissions, or through the Freedom of Information Act? What is the volume of material which you might recommend be released to the public without concern for further postponement? Would you be opposed to a provision requesting agencies, whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may released without agency objection? What recommendations can you make with regard to the need for interagency working groups to identify third-agency records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the public? What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns that you have with regard to the review and release of assassination material? Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your staff has already been very helpful to the Committee in its preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard Weiss, Staff Director, or Steven Katz, Counsel, at 202-224-4751. Sincerely, John Glenn Chairman HEARING before the SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS on S.J. Res. 282: THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992 Tuesday, May 12, 1992 9:00 a.m. Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building WITNESS LIST * * * * Panel 1: The Honorable David L. Boren United States Senator (D-OK) The Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senator (R-PA) The Honorable Louis Stokes United States Representative (D-OH) * * * * Panel 2: The Honorable Robert M. Gates Director Central Intelligence Agency The Honorable Williams Sessions Director Federal Bureau of Investigation * * * * Panel 3: James Lesar President Assassination Archives and Research Center Washington, D. C. Professor Ernest May Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts Professor Athan Theoharis Department of History Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin * * * * HEARING before the SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS on S.J. Res. 282: THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992 Tuesday, May 12, 1992 9:00 a.m. Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building WITNESS LIST * * * * Panel 1: The Honorable David L. Boren United States Senator (D-OK) The Honorable Arlen Specter United States Senator (R-PA) The Honorable Louis Stokes United States Representative (D-OH) * * * * Panel 2: The Honorable Robert M. Gates Director Central Intelligence Agency The Honorable Williams Sessions Director Federal Bureau of Investigation * * * * Panel 3: James Lesar President Assassination Archives and Research Center Washington, D. C. Professor Ernest May Kennedy School of Government Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts Professor Athan Theoharis Department of History Marquette University Milwaukee, Wisconsin * * * * OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION A. Agreement with Principles of Legislation. 1. Favor disclosure of as much material on JFK as is consistent with protection of intelligence sources and methods. 2. Established own declassification program. Presumption will be in favor of disclosure. 3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable mechanism to declassify documents. B. Describe Nature and Amount of Records. 1. Reasons for having records. 2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs to. 3. How we have identified material related to JFK assassination. C. How Much Material Can be Released? 1. Give estimate of amount of material to be released under CIA program or resolution. 2. Describe material that could not be disclosed. a. Example of Intelligence Sources and Methods that would require withholding. b. Example of material the release of which would invade privacy. 3. Describe resources—manpower and funds—to achieve results. D. Concerns with Resolutions. 1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns. Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections. 2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents should conduct initial review of material to determine whether it can be released. Material withheld from public release could then be made available to Review Board. 3. Agencies that originate information should be allowed to review it for release even if that information is contained in a document prepared by another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency working group to handle coordination issues likely to arise with disclosure of third agency documents. 4. Will cooperate with any request by the Board for additional material that has a reasonable relationship to the assassination. 5. Would hope that the Board will consult with DCI before using subpoena power to compel production of material that involves sensitive intelligence sources and methods. 5. Exemptions need to be clarified so as to ensure that deliberative process information and identities of covert employees are protected. E. Conclusion: Pledge to cooperate with whatever mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK assassination. MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution) 1. On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation and National Security Subcommittee. Majority Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents "at a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached. 2. The hearing was well attended by the public and attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie "JFK"s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris, Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History, Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea, American National Government Specialist at the Congressional Research Service. 3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that "after much negotiation," the Director of Central Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution) received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work together to release the documents to the American people. 4. The general tone of the session was strongly in favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might be some materials that required postponement of disclosure, but the bias was clearly toward disclosure. Even Oliver Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years, conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone thought 98 percent of the material could be released. Several witnesses, including Congressman Stokes and Church Committee counsel, suggested that most national security information should be released under the resolution, but that privacy interests posed greater concerns. Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up the bill," which is why he said that review by an independent board was so important. 5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the hearing. Several congressmen and witnesses credited his movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today." Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone, describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize Garrison; how much research did he do for the movie and did he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government as part of his research process? However, there was no aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's "research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as a proponent of the lone gunman theory.) 6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more than five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point. Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution) He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence, and also said that a closer look should be taken at an operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Lansdale. He also posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact, spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see Kennedy go because he was an agent of profound change embarking upon several courses that disturbed that "Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In response to a later question about various theories, Stone called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible deniability" and that it was important to look behind the Mafia at "who pulls the strings." 7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying" to the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH in connection with a Castro assassination plot, but did not make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of government disclosure and FOIA with the subcommittee, the ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure" as the mechanism to "vindicate the public's right to know." (On 18 March Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government Secrecy After the Cold War.") 8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite the need to make the documents publicly available, the Administration would not support the resolution and it could be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such an action would be problematic for the Administration, because much Executive branch information is contained in House records, and the House also probably considers documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution) records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to avoid a constitutional confrontation with the Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the Advisory Committee established in connection with the State Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act. 9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent on general propositions like the fact that the documents ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core issues raised by H.R. 454. Victoria L. Pepper Assistant General Counsel Office of Congressional Affairs \| Pages \| Date \| Description \| \|-------\|----------\|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------\| \| 1 \| 6 Mar 64 \| Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA \| \| 4 \| 30 Jan 76\| CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s. \| \| 1 \| 6 Mar 64 \| DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding. \| \| 4 \| 6 Mar 64 \| Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents. \| \| 5 \| 6 Mar 64 \| Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin. \| \| 1 \| 31 Oct 59\| State Cable from Moscow to SecState. \| \| \| \| " Redacted copy of same. \| \| 1 \| 1 Nov 59 \| Press clipping \| \| 1 \| 2 & 4 Nov\| Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query \| \| 3 \| 2 Nov 59 \| Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept \| \| 1 \| 9 Nov 59 \| State Cable, Moscow to SecState \| \| \| \| " Redacted copy of same \| \| 1 \| 9 Nov 59 \| State Cable, Tokyo to SecState \| \| \| \| " Redacted copy of same \| \| 1 \| 16 Nov 59\| Press clipping \| \| 1 \| 26 Nov 59\| Press clipping \| \| 1 \| 25 May 60\| Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms \| \| 7 \| 12 May 60\| Attachment to above \| \| 2 \| 12 May 60\| FBI report, fr Dallas \| \| 2 \| 25 Oct 60\| State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors \| \| \| \| " Redacted copy of same \| \| 1 \| 3 Nov 60 \| DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming) \| \| \| \| " Redacted copy of same \| \| 1 \| 18 Nov 60\| Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming \| \| \| \| Handwritten descrip of letter cited above \| \| 2 \| 21 Nov 60\| Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors \| \| \| \| Declassified version of Oswald info from ff \| \| \| \| List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter \| \| 1 \| 18 Nov 60\| Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell \| \| 9 \| 21 Nov 60\| Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above \| \| 2 \| 9 Dec 60 \| 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201 \| \| 3 \| 11 Jul 61\| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept \| \| 4 \| 26 May 61\| 2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept \| \| 1 \| 13 Apr 61\| DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship. and passport (signed Rusk) \| \| 1 \| 26 Jan 61\| State MemCon re Oswald \| \| \| \| " Redacted copy of same \| \| 14 \| 13 Jul 61\| Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible \| \| 1 \| 28 Sep 61\| Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201 \| \| 4 \| 13 Oct 61\| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow \| \| 1 \| 7 Dec 61 \| Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald \| 1 3 Mar 62 Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives 5 26 Apr 62 Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items 9 7 Sep 62 Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas 2 " Redacted pages from above 7 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas 3 24 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans 3 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (appearingly different from above) 2 8 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report 20 7 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff 20 25 Oct 63 FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above 14 31 Jan 64 Report, not really contemporary with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..." 28 Sep--3 Oct 63 14 " Redacted copy of same MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz Director of Congressional Affairs SUBJECT: JFK Testimony 1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines require us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel presentation before the Committee. 2. Please let me know whether you have any objections to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The Committee has requested that an advance copy of your statement be provided to them by 8 May. Stanley M. Moskowitz Attachment: as stated CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE IN FULL 2010 STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE 12 MAY 1992 Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter. Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution—that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger even 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that the CIA participated in the murder of John F. Kennedy. Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. As we speak, this Group has already begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, which includes all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, we will use a presumption in favor of releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to do so. To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of information provided to the House Select Committee on Assassination between 1977 and 1979, and over 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald, accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. At first blush, you might think that this is an enormous amount of material for the CIA to have on the assassination. It is important to recognize, however, that virtually all of these are essentially "secondary" documents collected after the assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. There were some documents that did exist before the assassination, but they were only brought together in response to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this very point. As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination, the CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (less than 150 pages), of which 28 documents consisted of material originated by the State Department, the Navy, the FBI, and newspaper clippings. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities in the U.S. after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA collected all the rest of the material on Oswald—some 33,000 pages in total. I should emphasize that much of the material held by CIA originated from other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. However, we estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 16% originated from the FBI, and a smaller number of records (less than 1%) originated from the State Department or elsewhere. A variety of other government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review. A preliminary review of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation, Cuban exile activities, copies of FBI reports about Oswald, and even information about Watergate. The CIA cannot simply act to declassify or release documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to proceed to review for declassification these documents. While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although largely irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose this information in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will be willing to make redactions, substitute generic information, or summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual. The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff, and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest. While we are in complete agreement on the need to declassify documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, I do have certain technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution. My primary concern with the joint resolution, as currently drafted, is that it directs the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board to make the initial determination as to whether materials related to the assassination held by all Executive Branch agencies, including CIA, can be released to the public. Vesting this review authority in an outside body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. In addition, I am concerned that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a Review Board that has no particular expertise in making intelligence classification determinations and is unfamiliar with the assassination material is bound to result in delays in releasing the material. It will also result in a duplication of effort since originating agencies will have to review the decision of the Executive Director to release particular documents. I share your belief that the review of documents be done in an expeditious and efficient manner. To that end, I propose that the initial review of assassination materials be made by the originating agencies and completed within a reasonable period of time. As I have indicated, the CIA has already begun this process. Documents that an agency determines cannot be released to the public would then be reviewed by members of the Review Board, who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an agency and the Review Board over the release of a document could then be resolved by the President or his designee. This arrangement would ensure that the initial review of documents is accomplished quickly by individuals who are in place and have the necessary substantive experience to declassify documents while at the same time providing an independent review of all decisions made to withhold information. Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. As Director of Central Intelligence, I have an obligation to protect intelligence sources and methods, and to uphold that obligation I could not make classified information available to the Board until it took the necessary steps to safeguard that information. Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Once again, this provision conflicts with my statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods; that duty should not be delegated to an outside body. I believe that the joint resolution should provide that an agency that originated information found in another's document should have the opportunity to review the information and raise necessary objections prior to its release to the public. An interagency working group should be established to coordinate the review and release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion. Fourth, the joint resolution defines "assassination material" broadly to include any records that relate "in any manner or degree to the assassination." I believe we have already identified these documents as a result of previous inquiries from investigative bodies, such as the Warren Commission and House Select Committee on Assassinations. These investigations were thorough, and any additional requests for information should bear some reasonable relationship to the JFK assassination. Perhaps a panel of distinguished historians could be formed to provide advice to the Review Board as to what, if any, additional material should be reviewed. Fifth, the joint resolution provides only a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information. This may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large volumes of material at one time. If the initial review of documents is done by the Executive Director, the joint resolution should be amended to provide that an agency may request a reasonable extension of time to determine whether documents may be released. Finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, may not be adequate to protect Agency interests in certain respects. For example, there is no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. I also believe that "intelligence agent" under section 6(1)(A) of the joint resolution should be defined to include covert employees of an intelligence agency, or former employees who retired undercover from an intelligence agency. While I believe that the joint resolution can be improved, I want you to know, Mr. Chairman, that the CIA will cooperate with whatever reasonable mechanism is established to declassify the assassination material. As Director of Central Intelligence and as Robert Gates, private citizen, I am committed to making this process work. It is my hope that the declassification of this NOTE FOR: DCI FROM: Neal Wolin, SA/DCI Re: JFK Testimony Attached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by OCA. The draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow. Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality) that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectives relating to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of material consistent with your statutory obligations. In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your "statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the definition of "assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other "technical" criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make (especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material declassification to death. Neal MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC FROM: David M. Pearline Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA SUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony 1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's 15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached. 2. The following specific questions require follow-up action: a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? (p. 5) b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection? (p. 5) c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5) d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that you can shed some light on? (p. 5) e. [W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald file] that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? (p. 14) f. [W]ould the establishment of such a panel of outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence of legislation] . . . violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16) 3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate components, will take the lead on all questions except for the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the record. Attachment David M. Pearline Draft: 14 May 1992 STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15 MAY 1992 Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter, just as I did before your Senate counterparts last Tuesday. Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution—that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy. Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible. consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification. In connection with these historical review guidelines, I have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records. To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized—all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings. These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point. As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. (Although I reported slightly smaller numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed these exact numbers.) Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963. There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this is but the first installment--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded. The committee has asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle. Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities. CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual. If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings. The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest. I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence-Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution. First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time. Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material. Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law Committee on the Judiciary U.S. House of Representatives 20 May 1992 Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide our views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter. Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, we believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy. Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the Director recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, he announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have, but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin review for declassification of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released shortly. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as possible. In fact, the Director recently-approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. The Director believes that we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly available these new guidelines for historical review and declassification. In connection with these historical review guidelines, the Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and release of Agency records. To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized—all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings. These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 of these documents originated within CIA. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963. There has been some comment on this pre-assassination Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material that we will review--an example of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded. We have been asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. We have also been asked about assassination materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy assassination focused upon foreign order of battle. Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review, and, as I said earlier, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities. CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If necessary, in the absence of legislation, we will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. We hope to work with you, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents. While we expect that a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual. If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, the Director has stated that he would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings. The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and both the Director and I are personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, the Director has allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest. I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to the committee's request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution. First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with the Director's statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. Second, we are concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. Third, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time. Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and, in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. These are technical problems that we believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material. The Honorable John Glenn Chairman Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. Chairman: I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act. I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations. In addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective." The Honorable John Glenn To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement: In response to a request from the US embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective." I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Ranking Minority Member Roth. Sincerely, Robert M. Gates Director of Central Intelligence cc: Senator Cohen Senator Boren Senator Murkowski The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr. Ranking Minority Member Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. Roth: I am writing to correct for the record two statements I made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act. I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations. In addition, I was asked at your hearing by Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State Department might have requested those files, but I was not certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January 1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective." The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr. To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of correcting the public record, I suggest the following unclassified statement: In response to a request from the US. embassy in Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that they had nothing that would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special on this issue, which they termed "detailed and objective." I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful. A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Glenn. Sincerely, Robert M. Gates Director of Central Intelligence cc: Senator Cohen Senator Boren Senator Murkowski The Honorable John Glenn The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr. SUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee on Governmental Affairs OCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92 Distribution: Original - Addressees 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ExDir 1 - DDO 1 - D/OCA 1 - D/CSI 1 - C/DCI History Staff 1 - ER 1 - OCA Records 1 - Leg Subj File 1 - SMD Signer File 1 - SMD Soft File Statement of Senator John Glenn Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing on S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act" May 12, 1992 The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the "Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes. The legislation would require the government to release records to the American public which are "relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would establish an independent review board within 90 days of enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to release the records to the public through the National Archives and the Government Printing Office. The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny. It is also important to stress that the legislation does not authorize any official investigation of the assassination. Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American public may be given the most complete access to review relevant records, and make their own observations and assessments. The Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to this purpose. This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs, and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly improved by the release of these records. Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive Branch national security information. Declassification schedules remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same practice. It is likely that more government documents related to the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past 12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions, have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by the FBI. The public interest in the history of the assassination of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films, or television programs were produced on the subject between the years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250 holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports, allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas police officers who were not previously interviewed by government investigators. The speculation about the assassination of President Kennedy may be more cruel than the truth itself. It is arguable whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made available will answer many questions and provide many history lessons. I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the process for review and release of the records is fair and appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of assassination related records that will be efficient and effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate. The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for working quickly to propose an independent and accountable mechanism to release records related to the assassination. However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill. I believe that the major issues include: First, how will agencies and others who hold records define the universe of "relevant" Kennedy assassination materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees, but the question must be asked: Where will the search for documents end? Second, the definition and search for "relevant assassination material" also raises important questions of human resources and costs to organize and make material available to the Review Board. How much will this cost? Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review and release of records in an independent, accountable, and credible manner. The tension between management and public confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff. Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers necessary? Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review? Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages of material will be released, the bill contains national security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and administrative records relating to past official inquiries. I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress, which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and congressional officials are to release their records. If even some of the material can go out the door without further adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly thereafter. Today we are fortunate to have several experts and authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work represents the track record on public access to Kennedy assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He will speak to the nature and limitations of current access arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of the intelligence and federal law enforcement communities. We welcome all of you to the Committee. 1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It should be made clear that section 5 of H.J.Res. 454, which requires that records not provided to the Archivist for public disclosure be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as much information available as possible before the Review Board conducts its review of assassination materials. Suggested clarifying report language: The Committee notes that some agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to review and release assassination materials. Section 5(a)(2), which requires that all records of an official investigation for which an agency is custodian be made available to the Review Board within 60 days of enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives for public release wherever possible. In fact the Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch as they can provide for more expeditious release of assassination materials to the public. 2. "Third agency rule" adhered to in review of documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily provide that the agency or department that originated the information will have any input into a decision to disclose the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language: The Committee understands that existing regulations within the Executive Branch require that classified information originated in one agency may not be disseminated outside another agency to which it has been made available without the consent of the originating agency. The Committee expects that agencies that are custodians of records will follow this practice before providing information to the Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release pursuant to section 4. Section 5(a)(2) requires agencies that are custodians of records of official investigations to make such records available to the Review Board. The Board will then make a determination of whether the material qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records and the originating body of the record of its determination. The Committee expects that the Review Board also will consult with the agency or department that originated the information in reaching its determination as to whether public disclosure of the material must be postponed to ensure that it is apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that information. For example, the Review Board should consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that provided information incorporated into a Congressional document before making a decision to release that document and shall inform the originating agency of a decision to release that information. 3. Identities of covert employees qualify for postponement. "Intelligence agent" is something of a term of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to protect information that would reveal the identity of covert employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested clarifying report language: The term "intelligence agent" as used in section 7(a)(1)(A) is intended to permit postponement of release of information that would reveal the identity of a domestic or foreign intelligence or counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States intelligence organization, where the identity of any of these currently requires protection. 4. Board access to "any record" of an Executive agency. In addition to adding language to section 10(1)(1) to clarify that requests for additional records must be made by the Review Board itself, report language should make clear that the Committee does not intend the Board's discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report language: Section 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may request "any record" from an Executive agency. The Committee intends to give the Review Board wide latitude to determine what additional records may be held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee attempting to define what records should be requested, the Committee believes that this judgment is best left to the Board, which will develop expertise in assassination-related issues and documents as its work proceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to request any and all records of agencies without regard to their relationship to the assassination. The Committee expects that the Board will request only documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods is to be avoided. 1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries 2. Pages released (227,000) - Percentage of pages redacted; 70 % 3. Process of declassification - Former senior officers in HRG review - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG) 4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992 - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records -- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be presented to the Board E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection - Source or method currently utilized - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection 5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days - Options available: substitute language e.g., "Northern European station" - Also, summary of a record - Board has access to every document in full 6. Issues raised by Board's decisions: - Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations - Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki - Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US - Liaison, joint operations in Mexico - Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others - Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover, ability to conduct operations 7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination - President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information -- President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination -- This is published in the Federal Register 8. Current appeal (now resolved) - Issues: identification of Agency asset liaison relationship identification of station - Potential appeal: Tokyo station 9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records CSI 1997-552 10 December 1997 NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence Deputy Director Office of Congressional Affairs FROM: John Pereira Chief, Historical Review Group SUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from Congressman Burton to EXDIR Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the JFK Board. Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton’s staff last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the review of documents by 1 September 1998. Gunn showed the staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers, Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the impression that Burton’s strong interest will prompt him to write to the Agency. During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him the Agency’s clear commitment to declassifying all assassination records. We also explained that we have shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing down or stopping other declassification efforts. John Pereira The Honorable George J. Tenet Director of Central Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Dear Director Tenet: As Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, I have a great interest in ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee, completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this year I introduced H.R. 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended the authorization of the Review Board for one additional year, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Review Board was included in President Clinton's fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress. During consideration of H.R. 1553, I stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of authorization for the Review Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all federal agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order that documents may be processed and transferred to the National Archives, in compliance with the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526). The Review Board has advised me that while it perceives that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board nevertheless believes that the CIA is not transferring records to the Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to use its legal powers to order a transfer of records to the Board which would then vote to open the records without benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it does not wish to take this step, but that it is fully prepared to do so if necessary to complete its work by its September 30, 1998, termination date. I urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CIA promptly fulfills its obligations under the law by expeditiously reviewing and transferring the relevant records to the Review Board. Sincerely, Dan Burton Chairman The Honorable Dan Burton Chairman Committee on Government Reform and Oversight House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) processing of records related to President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board’s concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure you, as I did to the Review Board’s Executive Director in the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the Agency’s assassination-related materials. As the Review Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board and its staff in this effort. We share the Review Board’s goal of declassifying and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive information that might warrant continued protection can be identified to the Board. For the past several years a team of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National Archives. The Honorable Dan Burton I understand the importance that the Congress and the President have placed on disclosing to the American people all available information about the assassination. To this end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material and are working diligently to complete our review of the remaining records. If you or your staff require any further information or would like a briefing on our declassification program, please have your staff contact Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional Affairs, at (703) 482-8796. Sincerely, David W. Carey Enclosure The Honorable Dan Burton DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 INTERIM) OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc) Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97) Distribution: Original - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC 1 - EXDIR/CIA (Follow-up to SCI 97-536) 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER (ACTION ITEM: ER 97-5851) 1 - DCI/OGC 1 - DCI/CSI 1 - DDO 1 - DO/IMS 1 - DA/OIM 1 - DA/OIM/IRG 1 - DA/MS 1 - D/OCA 1 - AO/OCA 1 - OCA Records (ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697) 1 - JPMeehan Chrono Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on this important matter. Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy. Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as possible consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are 10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records focusing on particular events of historical importance, including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of declassifying the records. Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction, already has begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest of my commitment to begin review for declassification immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents, and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly. As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in making these documents available to the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to heart. To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes 64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination. Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized—all of which makes the review process more difficult. The material contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news clippings. These records include documents that CIA had in its files before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I should emphasize that these records were assembled into the present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point. As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the CIA. I have brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions, and we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA received from other agencies after November 22, 1963. You have asked about documents in our possession generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going through the material compiled at the request of the Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations, which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that contains 72 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press. Although our holdings do include many documents from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided us some indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities. The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. While I expect a large amount of material can be declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and personnel files were requested on a number of Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual. If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings. The effort required to declassify the documents related to the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting. However, it is an important program, and I am personally committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK documents and other documents of historical interest. I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is against this background that, in response to this Committee's request, I cite our technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems posed by the joint resolution. First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff. Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution, documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review Board without any review by the President or other Executive Branch agencies. Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time. Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a document, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed. These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate with any mechanism established by the Congress and the President to declassify all of this material. Added comment on personal reaction at the time. As termed personally to make available every way. \| Pages \| Date \| Description \| \|-------\|---------\|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------\| \| 1 \| 6 Mar 64\| Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA \| \| 4 \| 30 Jan 76\| CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15 Jan 75 on deleting #s. \| \| 1 \| 6 Mar 64\| DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding. \| \| 4 \| 6 Mar 64\| Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents. \| \| 5 \| 6 Mar 64\| Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin. \| \| 1 \| 31 Oct 59\| State Cable from Moscow to SecState. \| \| 1 \| 1 Nov 59\| Redacted copy of same. \| \| 1 \| 2 & 4 Nov\| Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query \| \| 3 \| 2 Nov 59\| Fon Sv Despatch, fr Moscow to Dept \| \| 1 \| 9 Nov 59\| State Cable, Moscow to SecState \| \| 1 \| 9 Nov 59\| Redacted copy of same \| \| 1 \| 16 Nov 59\| Press clipping \| \| 1 \| 26 Nov 59\| Press clipping \| \| 1 \| 25 May 60\| Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms \| \| 7 \| 12 May 60\| Attachment to above \| \| 2 \| 12 May 60\| FBI report, fr Dallas \| \| 2 \| 25 Oct 60\| State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors \| \| 2 \| 3 Nov 60\| Redacted copy of same \| \| 1 \| 18 Nov 60\| Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany draft reply to Cumming \| \| 1 \| undated \| Handwritten descrip of letter cited above \| \| 2 \| 21 Nov 60\| Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US defectors \| \| 1 \| \| Declassified version of Oswald info from ff \| \| 7 \| \| List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter \| \| 1 \| 18 Nov 60\| Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell \| \| 9 \| 21 Nov 60\| Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above \| \| 2 \| 9 Dec 60\| 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald 201 \| \| 3 \| 11 Jul 61\| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept \| \| 4 \| 26 May 61\| 2 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept \| \| 1 \| 13 Apr 61\| DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship and passport (signed Rusk) \| \| 1 \| 26 Jan 61\| State MemCon re Oswald \| \| 1 \| \| Redacted copy of same \| \| 14 \| 13 Jul 61\| Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several FBI reports, much of which is illegible \| \| 1 \| 28 Sep 61\| Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion in Oswald 201 \| \| 4 \| 13 Oct 61\| Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow \| \| 1 \| 7 Dec 61\| Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info on Oswald \| 1 3 Mar 62 Note saying Navy message of this date is missing from CD 692 sent from Archives 5 26 Apr 62 Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus Navy, USMC, and press items 9 7 Sep 62 Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas 2 " Redacted pages from above 7 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas 3 24 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans 3 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas (apparently different from above) 2 8 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans report 20 7 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff 20 25 Oct 63 FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material above 14 31 Jan 64 Report, not really contemporay with this file, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..." 28 Sep--3 Oct 63 14 " Redacted copy of same CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT June 14, 1966 MR. TOLSON: Justice Fortas returned my call of midday, 6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss matters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e., the Jenkins case, [redacted] boyfriend, and other items which Mr. Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention. The Black case was then brought up and he was told that although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this matter. Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time. He then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning. Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat of the problem. I gave him a complete rundown on the exchange of corres- pondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He was told specifically of Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby Kennedy. I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed. Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent, had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if facts, as possessed by the FBI concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely destroy Kennedy. CDD:amr (2) CONTINUED.....OVER Memorandum to Mr. Tolson Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall had ineptly and inadequately presented the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting. At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed around" regardless of the politics involved. Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memoranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI gave him in answer to the questions posed by the Supreme Court. After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought the best thing to do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney General. I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court. He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that CONTINUED.... OVER Memorandum to Mr. Tolson he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts. He stated the next problem would be to find this particular man. He said he had in mind somebody like Ken Royall, former Secretary of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone like Ross Malone, former President of the American Bar Association, would be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was an immediate past President of the American Bar Association from the State of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak. Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man. Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however, he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two weeks. He stated he thought this could be done. Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with the Hoffa case. I replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances CONTINUED.....OVER - 3 - Memorandum to Mr. Tolson he would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the other Justices. Justice Fortas next inquired if I had known a former Bureau employee by the name of Courtney Evans. I told him that I did know Evans. He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his "ace in the hole." I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated, "Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard. The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans had replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone coverage. Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans' background. I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was the worst news he had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's. CONTINUED.....OVER Memorandum to Mr. Tolson At this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnell had immediately advised Bobby Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical of Kennedy. Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed down by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraignment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no alternative but to pat the FBI on the back. Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father. I told the Justice that the Director had received information pointing out that despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man," he nevertheless could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr. The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case. CONTINUED.....OVER Memorandum to Mr. Tolson At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters. ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans. (2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator." RESPECTFULLY, C. D. DE LOACH [Handwritten note: "Certainly Royal would be impossible." [Handwritten note: "I find it most unusual when a Secretary of War is so instrumental in moving an out of the way setting up a "C. D. DE LOACH" [Handwritten note: "I have some idea of what can be another Warren Commission." [Handwritten note: "Hoover"] Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following statements, where indicated, explain this deletion. ☐ Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material available for release to you. \| Section 552 \| Section 552a \| \|-------------\|--------------\| \| ☐ (b)(1) \| ☐ (b)(7)(A) \| ☐ (d)(5) \| \| ☐ (b)(2) \| ☐ (b)(7)(B) \| ☐ (j)(2) \| \| ☐ (b)(3) \| ☐ (b)(7)(C) \| ☐ (k)(1) \| \| \| ☐ (b)(7)(D) \| ☐ (k)(2) \| \| \| ☐ (b)(7)(E) \| ☐ (k)(3) \| \| \| ☐ (b)(7)(F) \| ☐ (k)(4) \| \| ☐ (b)(4) \| ☐ (b)(8) \| ☐ (k)(5) \| \| ☐ (b)(5) \| ☐ (b)(9) \| ☐ (k)(6) \| \| ☐ (b)(6) \| \| ☐ (k)(7) \| ☐ Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your request. ☐ Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only. ☐ Documents originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you. ☐ Pages contain information furnished by another Government agency(ies). You will be advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation with the other agency(ies). Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s): ☐ For your information: The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages: 65 - 6165 - 25, 26 March 16, 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL In connection with a possible unauthorized leak of official Government information, it is believed desirable to institute a technical surveillance of Henry William Grunewald, a prominent figure in Washington, D.C. I therefore recommend that you grant authority to place a technical surveillance on the residence of Grunewald, Apartment 625B, The Westchester, 4000 Cathedral Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., telephone: Woodley 7-5700, or any other residence or office space which he might occupy in the future. Respectfully, John Edgar Hoover Director The Attorney General on February 13, 1953, requested that we cover the activities of Grunewald and asked that a technical surveillance be instituted on his residence. This memorandum is being submitted in accordance with the Attorney General's suggestion. (ERW/rh) Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO: Mr. Tolson FROM: L. B. Nichols DATE: April 28, 1953 SUBJECT: TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD KEAN COMMITTEE I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session, Tobin then outlined the following particulars: 1. Tobin stated he had ascertained this was probably 2. This was the point which Tobin stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in the report of Special Agent dated at New York on July 20, 1951, in the investigation on 3. Tobin outlined this was 4. Tobin stated that Grunewald had the habit of passing out ties at Christmas and that as late as 1951 Grunewald had sent ties to the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hotel. I told Tobin if he was inferring that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have furnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because I knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director has not appreciated the manner in which Grunewald has thrown the Director's cc: Mr. Ladd Mr. Rosen RECORDED: 58 INNOCENT: 58 65-6165-147 name around and I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on With reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly, all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned; that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District Committee. Tobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from the Bureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on Grunewald was a fairly good investigator and it would have been a simple matter for him to find out that with reference to the information on that this itself was a matter of public record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investigation of a lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and with the Grievance Committee; that anybody could have gotten this. Further, I inquired whether he had any information to the effect that Grunewald assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated Grunewald stated he assisted him. I told him undoubtedly knew personally; that was in the Department for many years himself and no doubt had friends in the Department. I asked whether he had any information indicating was close to McInerney. The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily concerned about [redacted] I told him the investigative reports on [redacted] went to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951; Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was furnished the AG under date of February 29th on [redacted] and [redacted]. He then inquired as to why G-2 would want the information. I told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the answer. I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald made his investigation. He stated it was shortly after the time when the committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in November or December, 1951. I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired regarding [redacted] and [redacted] stating he had heard there were a couple of Communists on the staff and that the evidence was supposed to be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case and it would appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we furnished no information; that there was some indication from the source that [redacted] had been helping Grunewald and [redacted] might be in contact with McInerney. I told him he was at liberty to do so. I told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted the information and let him know, which is being done. In my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was information over in the Senate similar to that furnished by Grunewald. I asked him where in the Senate and he said it came out of Senator McCarran's Office. Inasmuch as [redacted] told me that a member of the King Committee had told the Senator about [redacted] and [redacted] I think it might be well the next time I see [redacted] to confidentially inquire as to whether she recalled what member of the Committee furnished them this information. I, of course, see no point in talking to [redacted] any further about this matter. May 13, 1953 The Attorney General cc Mr. Ladd Mr. Rosen Mr. Valley Mr. Pennington Director, FBI PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL JUNE HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD INFORMATION CONCERNING The following information concerning Henry William Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known reliability on May 11, 1953. [Redacted text] DECLASSIFIED BY ON 12/24/71 [Redacted text] MAILED 11 MAY 14 1953 [Redacted text] Complete details concerning the information developed in connection with the request of Deputy Attorney General Rogers will, of course, be furnished to him upon the completion of the investigation of these matters. NOTE: This is a condensed version of information received from the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable form as possible for the information of the Attorney General. It is to be noted an attempt has been made to furnish the Attorney General with only pertinent information which appears would be of interest to him. (5) Bureau file 67-322 also reflects that, in April 1929, the Bureau conducted an investigation entitled, "William H. Vander Pool, Henry W. Grunewald, Application for Commission in Officer's Reserve Corps." It is noted that Vander Pool had served as an Agent of the Bureau of Investigation during World War I. At the time of the investigation, both were seeking to obtain a commission in the United States Army. The Bureau's investigation reflected that Grunewald was not trustworthy, possessed a bad reputation and had been indicted for violation of the National Prohibition Act, although he was not convicted of this offense. This information was furnished to the Military Intelligence Service by memoranda to the Department dated May 6, 1929, and September 10, 1929. (6) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that at the request of Mr. Stephen T. Early, Secretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in June and July, 1940, entitled, "Harry H. Woodring; Henry William Grunewald, also known as Henry Grunewald, Frederick Wilhelm Grunewald, and Henri Grunewald; Misconduct in Office, Espionage." Mr. Early's request was based on allegations received from [redacted] that Grunewald was believed to be "in cahoots" with Senator Gerald P. Nye and that [redacted] had told [redacted] that Grunewald, on two occasions, had given the secretary a check in the sum of $4,000 for Senator Nye. It was alleged that Grunewald had intimated this money came from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in connection with War Department negotiations. On June 25, 1940, the Bureau received a memorandum from the Military Intelligence Service reflecting that Mr. Smith K. Brookhart had informed that Service that he had learned through [redacted] an alleged employee of the French-English Intelligence Service in 1917-1918 that the head of Nazi espionage in Washington, D. C., was Frederick Wilhelm Grunewald, also known as Henry William Grunewald, Westchester Apartments, Washington, D. C. It is noted that McDonald at that time was also residing in the Westchester Apartments and during 1937 and a portion of 1938, Grunewald shared offices with McDonald and former Senator Arthur K. Robinson, in the Hansey Building, Washington, D. C. (1) (1) 65-6165-3 Memorandum to Mr. Tolson At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator." He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters. ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions I will advise Marvin Watson today of the background and current employment of Courtney Evans. (2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best man to serve as an "arbitrator." RESPECTFULLY, C. D. De Loach [Special Intelligence Service, setting up a "arbitrator" practicality for the "arbitrator" practice." "Warden Commission" went in a "taco." "Hoover" "Certainly Royal" MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR With further reference to Henry Williams Grunewald, in whom we are presently interested, I am attaching a memorandum for Mr. Carson from For your approval, there is attached hereto a letter for the Attorney General's signature, to the Secretary of the Treasury. Respectfully, P. E. Forsyth The investigation in this matter, which was closed July 4, 1940, revealed that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and suspicion and not on any definite knowledge of the complainants. Whether the conditions alleged nor any irregularity on the part of Grunewald or former Secretary of War Woodring were discovered. There was no evidence developed that Grunewald was engaged in any activity for the German government. The result of the investigation in memorandum form were furnished to Mr. Early on July 9, 1940. (1) (7) Bureau file 65-6165 also reflects that in May, 1941, the Military Intelligence Service advised the Bureau that information had been received by one of its informants that Grunewald was the pay-off man for German agents in the United States and was also contact man for various American peace and subversive organizations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant of the Military Intelligence Service was and it was felt that the Military Intelligence Service was merely resurrecting old information in view of the fact that the Bureau had previously investigated the same allegations made by . However, on May 15, 1941, a technical surveillance of Grunewald was authorized and from June 4, 1941 through August 1, 1941, such surveillance was maintained on his apartment in the Westchester Apartments. No definite information was developed, indicating that Grunewald had violated any specific Federal statute. (2) (8) Bureau file 65-6165 reflects that on September 15, 1942, the Omaha Office of the Bureau received a complaint from the Military Intelligence Service that Henry William Grunewald had, on the previous evening, given $110.00 in currency to two Army Privates attached to Headquarters, Seventh Service Command, while Grunewald were drinking at a bar in the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying intelligence work, and becoming suspicious of Grunewald's apparent generosity with his money, reported the matter to the Omaha Office. They indicated that had approximately $16,000 in her purse. This money was observed when she opened her purse in order to furnish currency to Grunewald to pass out to the crowd. Grunewald was interviewed by two Agents of the Omaha Office on September 15, 1942, regarding the matter and he identified himself as being connected with the Alien Property Custodian's office in Washington, D.C., by exhibiting travel authority $50, signed by James E. Kirkham, of the Alien Property Custodian's Office in Washington, D.C. Grunewald claimed to receive $8000 per year as salary from the Alien Property Custodian's Office. He admitted passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that he did not wish the matter reported to his superiors in Washington although he was willing to furnish information about the incident confidentially to the Bureau. He stated (1) 65-6165-8 (2) 65-6165-22; 65-6165 Sub 1, Serial 1 to 122 Subject HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD This serial, the original memorandum from the FBI to the Attorney General dated 3/16/53, which was returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveillance, has been permanently removed for retention in the upper memorandum to dated 7/13/73. See 62-115687-1 for details and where maintained. Removed By 343 Date 1/21/74 Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN DECLASSIFIED DATE 5/17/82 BY sp22apless 12-27-89 sp3244t Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated April 7, 1953, from the Chief Counsel of the House Subcommittee on Administration of the Internal Revenue Laws, requesting permission to inspect the Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the personal files relating to Henry W. Grunewald including his service with the Office of Alien Property and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Immigration and Naturalization Service files and the Alien Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any FBI reports, in accordance with policy. Advice would be appreciated whether the Bureau has a personal file on Grunewald, and, if so, whether the Bureau would have any objection to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for examination by a Subcommittee representative. If the Bureau has such a file and no objection to its examination, please advise whether the Bureau would prefer to make it available for examination in one of the Bureau's offices or in this office. 14 May 1992 Note For: David Pearline, OCA Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination Documents (Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following lines) Q. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the Archives previously. Is this correct? Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies had previously released. Q. There appears to be little information of interest in the Oswald file that was released. Is this true? Ans. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith commitment to release as many documents related to the assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible. John Pereira x (76160) ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution 454, the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday. I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as possible government documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. Further, I believe that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his murder. I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to accelerate the declassification of historical materials, creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified, or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old, and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago. I've asked them to take as their first priority the review for declassification a review of the documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation. And I've indicated earlier this week, we've declassified the first set of these records, the pre-assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred to the National Archives for release. It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to declassify these documents and to get them before the public as quickly as possible. I've also made publicly available this week the agency's new guidelines for historical review and declassification. In connection with these guidelines I have recently commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I've described for historical declassification. Although the task force will have to explore the difference between current documents and those that are often requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward declassification and the release of government or CIA records. The chart that I've brought along with me describes the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to 300,000 pages of material. And I don't need I think to go into any further detail on that. As I indicated, only about 11 of the pre-assassination documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show how thin it was before that time. It was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on Oswald alone. There has been some comment on the pre-assassination Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all the material we will review; merely an earnest of our intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified documents to the archives as they are completed without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed. Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination materials that may be held by other intelligence community agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security Agency and the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the assassination focused on foreign military order of battle. I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and the fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we've already taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. As I indicated earlier in the week, if necessary, and in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman, to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents. I also have indicated in my statement for the record that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns, or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods. And let me again take a moment to give an example of this type of material. During the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping it confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing derogatory information on particular individuals, where the information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain the names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such information to the public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of information is released while still protecting the identity of an agent, or the privacy of an individual. As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week, if legislation is not passed by the Congress and signed by the president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. And they would then issue an unclassified report on their findings. I believe that these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent to get these documents declassified and released, and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental review. It is against this background that I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this result. First, vesting in a body outside—in an outside body the determination whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods. Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure document handling by the assassination materials review board or its staff. Third, I'm concerned that the joint resolution does not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the release of CIA information contained in documents originated by the Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution documents originated by these entities can be released directly by the executive director of the assassination materials review board, without any review by the president or the executive branch. Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the executive director to release information may not provide sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of material at one time. Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution, which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information. While such privileges could be waived in the public interest, and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly relating to the assassination, they would be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they might be needed. These are technical problems, and I believe they can be solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again, whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the president to declassify this material. That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr. Chairman. *** * The Reuter Transcript Report Assassinations/hearing May 15, 1992 MORE LLLEnglish REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much, Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a couple of observations. Putting them altogether, I'm interested in how much material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about? Why the Lee Oswald file was opened at the CIA 14 months after his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there something involved in that that you can shed some light on? GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing appallingly ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I don't know the answers to any of those questions. But I will take them for the record and respond quickly to the committee. REP. CONYERS: Well, thank you so much. We're here against the background of history and the fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the United States, sitting president. And I thought it was exemplary of the CIA—I never thought I'd be saying this this morning, either—to find out that you had permitted your representatives to discuss the subject matter with various think tanks around the city, one of which was included was the Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin. And I was told that there was a very candid exchange about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting. Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with them. And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd say what I am saying today. But one of the parts of that discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has been parading around the country saying that you will not meet with him. And as a conciliatory member of this Congress, could I facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on this subject? GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I think that the agency has in many ways set a standard in terms of its willingness to release these documents, and our determination to do so whether or not there is legislation. Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government, and to a number of people who were in office at that time from the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on down. It is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone. REP. CONYERS: Can you tell me about the sympathy and understanding that you may have for the American people's confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president? GATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view, Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the assassination; I have not read the many books that have been written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea of a single individual, a single irrational individual, committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is enormously difficult to--for them to accept at face value. And in many respects, it is similar to the continuing controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies and so on in that respect. And by the same token, and with all due respect to his memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy about the assassination of President McKinley. And so I think it is the inability of a lot of people to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept it at face value but rather than particularly young people who may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may not read what historians have to say that is critical about the movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must have been some sort of conspiracy. And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see the movie, and they came back and the reaction was not that they accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the suspicions that had been created. REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Schiff. REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy schedule, and I'm sure all the members of the committee do appreciate that. I have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert. I do know this, though. I do know that it's because of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the CIA. And I'm quite-positive that his movie has caused all of that to happen today, and I personally give him the credit for that. Second of all, I note your observation that there is not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the government, your agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or information which for any reason are not being released with respect to the assassination of President McKinley? GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not. REP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's the central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever resolve all the questions about the assassination of President Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved all the questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave reasons for that. But the difference between the assassination of President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our country's history is, this is the one situation where the government, for whatever reason, and for whatever circumstances, still holds information which it considers to be confidential. And that's the root of this controversy now, and that's the root of this hearing, I think. And I made a note of items that you as director of the CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality today. And I made notes of three. If there were more, I apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the procedures, which you made observations about, and which I think you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive branch. But three classifications of records. The first is personnel records involving, I gather, government agents, perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of all. Second of all, the privacy issue because government files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular informant. Before I ask you about those three, can I just ask, are there any other areas of documents that you as director of the CIA believe should not be released in terms of a generic category like these? GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I think you've captured it. REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these briefly. On protection of personnel records, why would those have gotten—I understand what you're talking about. I think we all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would those records have gotten into the assassination records on President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know? GATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this part of it: These files contain everything from the most mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified, or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources. And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through these documents is that they are not indexed; they are not catalogued; and they really have no organization to them. So when I started asking some months ago what was in the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of what kinds of records were in there. But I assume that these kinds of things were just swept up with a lot of other material. * * The Reuter Transcript Report Assassinations/hearing (first add) May 15, 1992 MORE LLLEnglish REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other categories, and that is, where the government has given a promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that. Can't the information be released without revealing the informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired here, not necessarily the identity of who provided it. GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should be the case in almost every instance. REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence methods, I understand that there's a national security point there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago, approximately. Are our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in 30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and collect and evaluation information would present a national security risk today if revealed? GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method is no longer in use, then I think it no longer--and there's little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to protect it. I think here again, though, that the focus should be on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather than the identification of the sources and methods themselves. The only reason I would seek to protect them is in those instances in which those techniques are still being used, or we think there is a good chance they will be used again. With respect to sources, I think that we have a much longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence business review any of that material that we had held back to see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so. REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director Gates, is that everything that can be released should be released? GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff. REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff. The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton. REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming and positive testimony before this committee. I think that it is important to emphasize that we share an interest in disclosing all of the information related to the substance of this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct its business. And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says that disclosure to the general public of assassination material or particular information in assassination material may be postponed if its release would—and there's a whole list—but among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the United States government is involved. And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us, and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods would be revealed or compromise by the information which is released? GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for the protection of sources and methods and that allow us ultimately the president to have the final say would provide adequate safeguards. REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for intelligence-related information then are sufficient? GATES: Yes, sir. I've indicated in my testimony we would ask the Congress to consider I think two additional categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information. Again, we think that there would be very little information that would be withheld under those circumstances, but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied. The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert employees of U.S. intelligence agencies. REP. THORNTON: I appreciate those suggestions. But in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the general outline contained in this resolution would not damage any current CIA operations; is that correct? GATES: No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards. REP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel Castro in the late '50s and early '60s? GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation Mongoose, AMFlash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the documents that will be reviewed in the-- REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question as to whether those files would be included in the material. GATES: Yes, sir. REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your testimony. Like you I have not seen the movie, and that is not the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make sure that all of the information that is in government possession relating to this assassination be released. Because in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy, that there were allusions to the possibility of an external conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of that time. Would you agree with that, sir? GATES: I agree with that totally, Mr. Thornton. REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time. REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mr. Thornton. The chair recognizes Ms. Mink. REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to release important documents that will contribute to the better understanding of the public at large as to what exactly happened. I also agree with my colleagues that while the conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day. And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to the content of that movie, because what we need now is an informed basis upon which to look at it. I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to evaluate it, as most of the people in the country. And therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely important. Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that you indicate that some of the documents which are relevant to this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in fact documents which belong to other agencies. Would you comment on that and clarify that particular statement in your testimony? GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post assassination investigations, a great deal of information was shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made available for information to CIA. About 20 percent originated with the State Department or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on. Under the third-agency rule, it is our obligation to leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same practice with us. REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are considering now make it possible for your agency, as the custodian of records that you have been given by other agencies, be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible? GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that, Mrs. Mink. I think that it would simply require those other agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of reviewing for declassification the documents that they originated. We don't hold the record copies of those documents. We simply have copies of them. REP. MINK: Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they were documents that your agency had been provided by other governmental agencies? GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file, of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies had all already been declassified. That's correct. REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with reference to Oswald now in the public domain? GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession. REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now available public documents? GATES: I don't know whether that's the case or not. Only the documents that we had from them have been released as part of the file we released. They may have other documents pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have. REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald everything that you had in your possession, regardless of whether it belonged to other agencies, because you found them to be declassified, have all been released? GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am. REP. MINK: Now, there is a Washington Post article of May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you released to the archives? GATES: As I indicated earlier, I am certainly no student of this material. I do not know the answer to that question. * * The Reuter Transcript Report Assassinations/hearing (second add) May 15, 1992 MORE LLLEnglish x x x that question. REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your agency have an answer to that question? GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been released, so would have represented new information. REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new items that had not been released previously? GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the director of our center for the study of intelligence. DAVID GREASE (director, center for the study of intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been previously released. About half of those that are--originated at the CIA. Among the documents of other agencies that were in our files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be verified, that almost all of them, if not all of them, had been previously released. REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that the public had not already had in its published files somewhere? GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you precisely which documents were new. I do know that the new ones are not of much consequence. They do not contain any information that is particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the hearing what those are. REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October 31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did not open a file until 14 months alter? GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs. REP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the Soviet Union? GATES: I just don't know. REP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the agency to determine that 14-month lapse? GATES: I don't believe so. GREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in addition, we gained no information. We don't know. REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals, as the article says, that the materials turned over had been altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were released to the archives. Is that a true statement? GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we had. That file contained copies of original documents. Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we had. What might be characterized as alterations by some by us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I can assure you, nothing of any consequence. These are Privacy Act considerations and things of that nature. REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree to that would be inconsistent with your statutory responsibility. I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body? GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions that provide that the president can have the final say, normally I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part of the bill that we could find a way to work around. REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from outside the government to do the exact same function for your agency? GATES: No, ma'am, what I would appoint that panel to do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to examine all of the documents that we decided could not be declassified, and then provide a report to the American people on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld documents had a bearing on the assassination. They would not make the decision to declassify. REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition violate the Privacy Act? GATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have to have—I would have to have our attorneys look at it. REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've touched on some very important areas. There are just two related considerations that I'd like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I bring it to your attention for your future consideration. And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you will elevate those as high up on your agenda for reconsideration for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter to your attention as well. GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman. REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us today. GATES: Thank you, sir. END GATES TESTIMONY *** The Reuter Transcript Report Assassinations/hearing (third and final add) May 15, 1992 REUTER LLLEnglish January 30, 1998 The Honorable Dan Burton Chairman Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 2185 Rayburn House Office Building House of Representatives Washington, DC 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board’s sixth monthly progress report, as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R. 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until September 30, 1998. At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately 3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly 5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meeting. In addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military records regarding U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-63. Additional military records related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960’s will be ready for public release in the coming months. The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased The Honorable Dan Burton January 30, 1998 Page 2 willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA bodes well for the completion of these requests in a timely manner. Since our December report, the Board’s FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000 pages of records from the FBI’s HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is completed in a timely manner. As I reported in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to complete their work in a timely manner. In particular, recent meetings and communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law. I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board’s federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be completed and appropriately documented by early March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress. Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226. Sincerely, T. Jeremy Gunn Executive Director T. Jeremy Gunn Executive Director and General Counsel Assassination Records Review Board Prepared Statement for Senate Governmental Affairs Committee Hearing on S. 712 March 25, 1998 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee — I appreciate the opportunity to testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although I serve as the Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, I wish to emphasize that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim, Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a century. The Review Board's official positions on matters related to declassification will be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year. I applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee to reduce government secrecy. One of the tragic consequences of government secrecy has been the widely held belief that the government has known much more about the assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help alleviate the suspicion of government — some of it being justifiable suspicion — that has festered since the assassination of President Kennedy. Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, I will focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial classification. I. Background Although the word "unique" is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of President Kennedy. In accordance with the declassification standards articulated in Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) ("JFK Act"), the Review Board has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments, including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice, as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and the National Security Council. Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in full, or to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies' evidence, the Review Board deliberates and makes "formal determinations" as to whether the records should be opened. The Board's determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening records. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately involved approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have been released in accordance with Board decisions. It has now been almost two years since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board's work has been a success. Although I do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable lessons that may be of use to you as you consider S. 712. II. The "Four Noble Truths" of Declassification In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the significant institutional impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to change the secrecy system should take into account what I will call the "Four Noble Truths" of declassification: first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final decision maker on declassification; second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed, and skeptical; third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal institutional incentives to declassify information; and fourth, the key to successful declassification is not the articulation of the List of Exhibits Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn Exhibit A. Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963. This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. Exhibit B. Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960. Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - Internal Security. This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained foreign government information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of the information. In December 1995, the document was released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government. Exhibit C. Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31, 1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba. The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Exhibit D. (a) Vietnam January-August 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3. pp. 265-270. (b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this exhibit includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign Relations of the United States) and part (b) includes the title pages of the full 213-page Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic regrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989, and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRB declassification session in July 1997. Exhibit E. Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963. The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. This document is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. The attached form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 and postponed in its entirety. It was opened in full in 1995 after a Board vote. Exhibit F. NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963. The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was released with sanitizations by Board vote. Exhibit G. Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, June 15, 1964. Subject: Assassination of Castro. This document from the files of the National Security Council was originally classified "Secret" and was exempted from declassification in 1976. The NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1993. categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the party that seeks to exempt information from release. Because these four points are inextricably interconnected, I will discuss them in reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this testimony. During the past four years, I have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials from more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the release of certain types of classified information. It has been my general impression that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated, institutional reluctance to release information -- particularly on the part of those institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and preserving secrets. In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example, Section 4(c)(2)(A) would require the agency to "provide in writing a detailed justification for [an initial classification] decision." Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, agencies would "certify to the President at the end of such 30-year period that continued protection of the information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the national security of the United States . . . ." (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are able to articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial justifications for withholding information did not withstand scrutiny. Illustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November 27, 1963, that has now been released in full. As you can see, the second line of typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) "RYBAT" and "GPFLOOR." These crypts appear in what is called the "slug line" and they are routing and sensitivity indicators. "GPFLOOR" is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLLOOR could not be released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable. I had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. I could not understand their explanations. At that time I was new to the work and I did not know whether I was simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being offered. I again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that covered other topics. Finally, an official said: "I don't see why it can't be released. This is an issue for COMMO [COMMO is the Communications Office.] Someone ask COMMO whether it cares." COMMO was subsequently asked — and it had no objection to the release. I now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant questioning by a skeptical interlocutor. Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service, the Board identified for the Secret Service a record it intended to open in full and the agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently voted to open the record. Illustration 3. In several FBI documents that were subject to appeal to the President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J. Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open. Illustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily redacted but provocative document pertaining to an FBI "Internal Security" inquiry into Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the information, arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign government and that the government had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Government and requested that it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal Police provided to the FBI to track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and the record is now open in full. Illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been "excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification." The Review Board staff arranged for a group of declassifiers from several military and other national-security entities to meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being completely closed to completely open. Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the material that had been publicly released on the conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page Record [of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of Top Secret was continued. The document was opened in full at a declassification session in July 1997. Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The Review Board voted to open the record in its entirety. Illustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA's intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from declassification. After Board action, the important information has been released. Illustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a National Security Council document that pertains to an alleged plot to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally classified "Secret" and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board. I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK Act, agencies have little internal or external incentive to take an energetic approach to declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: once agencies come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith with the requirements established by Congress. III. The Mechanics of Declassification Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of information. It also calls for the establishment of effective mechanisms to move records through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering legislation. I would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of declassification. First, the "referral process" is one of the most significant, government-wide bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release information in its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the record to the agency from which it derived that information. Although this procedure is a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process. The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the referral process: (a) establishing joint-declassification sessions where several agencies convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that unless records were reviewed by a certain date, the Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the declassification process must take into account this referral bottleneck by giving to the independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables. The ability to bring agencies together, such as in the joint-declassification sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly. Surprisingly, agencies typically assumed that another agency would not release information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other agencies from releasing information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1 above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the need to keep records closed. Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to "direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . ." JFK Act, § 7(l)(1)(C)(ii). This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate, and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain the information it needs to accomplish its work. Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the declassification process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken. Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary prelude to more efficient and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board, as I understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take into account the initial costs and, importantly, take advantage of the lessons learned by the Review Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run. When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions, require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success. I strongly urge this Committee to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK Act and by ISCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring independence, consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and accountable to the people who have paid for it. IV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective With regard to S. 712, I wish to summarize the following recommendations that have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above: First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies, but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof. Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable timetables by which an agency must complete the declassification review (or referral review). The Independent entity should be empowered to release information on its own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that is essential for completing its work. Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification for an initial period (e.g., between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information. Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere "detailed justifications" (see, e.g., S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify records. The written explanations must be more than "justifications," they must be able to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of the writing. Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the National Declassification Center), with the authority to make binding requests to agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled. Finally, there is one additional recommendation that I would make that presumably goes beyond the scope of today's hearing and so I will raise it only in passing. I believe it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the "sources and methods" exemption, inasmuch as it is used too casually and it covers a multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee is interested, I would be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue. * * * * I would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of the American people to better understand how their government functions. I would be pleased to answer your questions. STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE* NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION before the COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE March 25, 1998 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am very pleased to appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order 12958, entitled "Classified National Security Information." This Order took effect on October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance. The Information Security Oversight Office, or ISOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, "Classified National Security Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program." ISOO is also responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978, ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance from the National Security Council. Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions; (5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and (8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council. On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens. Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results: - In the last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records. - Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since 1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years. - Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units. - The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency decisions to keep those same documents classified. - Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have decreased to historic lows. - Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased threat to our national security. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I can state with total confidence that the United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner, timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after conversation that I have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with foreign students, researchers, and journalists, one visitor after another has expressed great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws, and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so. These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our security classification system or that there aren't tremendous hurdles to clear. For example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be noteworthy. I recognize that the focus of today's hearing is the legislation before the Committee. I will try to answer any questions you may have concerning the similarities and differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and declassification programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs. However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. The Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the Administration to support S. 712. Statement of Steven Aftergood Director, Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists before the Committee on Governmental Affairs United States Senate Hearing on S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act March 25, 1998 Introduction Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee on the subject of government secrecy. I believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected officials accountable. At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities. A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a responsible and appropriate balance between the imperatives of open, accountable government and the requirements of national security secrecy. Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often failing to protect genuine secrets. My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information policy that better serves the national interest. In the following remarks, I will first present several assertions about secrecy policy by way of background, and I will then draw some specific conclusions concerning the Government Secrecy Act. BACKGROUND I would like to emphasize several points that I believe should form the foundation for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system. 1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive. One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as well as a small cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case. Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996 consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that "the government protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET.\textsuperscript{1} In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply the province of "special interest" groups; it is shared throughout the general public. Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of "public interest." Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and again around specific issues— the JFK assassination, POW/MIA's in Southeast Asia, UFOs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth. 2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it. Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive, they could conceivably be mistaken. But they are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true that government agencies classify too much and fail to declassify information that no longer warrants protection. This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals to declassify records are frequently overturned— within the executive branch itself— by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, CIA, NSC and the National Archives: We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70 documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, in each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its highest level of appeal....\textsuperscript{2} \textsuperscript{1}Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor "a high level of secrecy" for technology with military applications. "Public Attitudes Towards Security and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996" by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security Research Center, November 1996. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.html>. \textsuperscript{2}Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel, March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.html>. The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing a thankless job the best they can. The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed, "The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as much as possible, and for as long as possible." If they go unchecked, agencies will hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today. Fortunately, Ms. Mazer's remarks also reveal a solution to this unavoidable problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by "outsiders" who share the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy. Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. I believe that this is a crucial principle which should inform Congressional action in this area. 3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy. The Justice Department "strongly opposes a statutory framework for the safeguarding of national security information," arguing in effect not only that the President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has exclusive authority to do so.4 The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its own freedom of action. But I believe the Justice Department overstates its case. --- 3Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy ("Commission Report"), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in searchable "html" format at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>. 4"Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees fit." Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of 1997, September 15, 1997. There is no question that Congress has the right and, I would say, the obligation to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of the Congressional Research Service has pointed out: Pursuant to its constitutional authority "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" (Article I, Section 8, clause 14), as well as the "necessary and proper" clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower Congress with authority to legislate policy and procedure comparable to that prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.$^5$ The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly recognized by the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted, the Court also found that: Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures or it could have established its own procedures—subject only to whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional ordering.$^6$ And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President) assigned the Director of Central Intelligence the responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring $^5$Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 48ff. $^6$410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on "A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information," March 16, 1994, page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that "the only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret." disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's Foreign Relations of the United States series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.$^7$ Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before Congress, including: S. 1220, "The Human Rights Information Act"$^8$; S. 1232, a bill to declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg$^9$; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act."$^10$ Each of these bills was introduced because the public had no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to be taken at face value, all of these bills— as well as the Freedom of Information Act itself— would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely unchecked power to withhold whatever information they chose. In short, while the executive branch is entitled to advise Congress to stay out of national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past. 4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be. A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself. In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving. In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were inaugurated with President Clinton's executive order 12958, and which have already produced some impressive results. Most important, from my point of view, is the order's automatic declassification provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable 25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone.$^11$ $^7$See Senate Resolution 400, section 8. $^8$<http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1220.html>. $^9$<http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.html>. $^10$<http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>. $^11$1996 ISOO Report to the President <http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.html>. So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum. It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and "first, do no harm." Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is positive in current policy— and then building on it. THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997 The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations— a "balancing test" and a National Declassification Center— are also the ones that have elicited the strongest opposition from the executive branch. I will comment briefly on each of these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration. 1. The balancing test and judicial review. Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or "balance" the potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt about the need to classify the information, it shall not be classified. From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government information, this is the Act's single most important provision. In the abstract, the idea of "balancing" is unexceptionable and is almost built into the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a "significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b) for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902.13(c)].) This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its balancing requirement per se, but because it would allow judicial review of agency balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would presume to "second guess" agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned. This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt. Similar concerns contributed to President Ford's decision to veto the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether information had been "properly" classified.12 Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto and it turned out that the opponents' fears were not realized. 12See President Ford's veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4. To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the courts are not sufficiently diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions.\textsuperscript{13} The CIA has warned of "costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of DCI/CIA judgments." This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld. But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are in need of the checks and balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation of "sources and methods." Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that: the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be protected thus appears at times to have been applied not in a thoughtful way but almost by rote.\textsuperscript{14} Federal court judges will never reject a "thoughtful" or even a merely plausible argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible "rote" classification. Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted with a balancing test. I would add that any suggestions of a "flood" of lawsuits resulting from this provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge "barriers to entry" to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive, and pro bono assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years I must have filed hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once. The absence of effective "checks and balances" on executive branch classification actions has helped to produce today's bloated and highly arbitrary classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most \textsuperscript{13}"National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial Enforcement," Boston College Law Review 25: 611-643 (1984). \textsuperscript{14}Commission Report, Chapter III, page 70, emphasis added. appropriate solution.\textsuperscript{15} 2. A National Declassification Center The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight, which the Secrecy Commission described as "the critical missing link."\textsuperscript{16} As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example: - The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order. - The Center could be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the efficiency of the declassification process. Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP). ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel's leadership, has a profound understanding of the intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not. But ISOO's staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a message throughout the executive branch that "we're not going to take secrecy oversight seriously." \textsuperscript{15}The characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in Security Classification of Information, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April 1993, Chaps. 5, 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for weighing evidence that are already part of the judicial process—such as "beyond a reasonable doubt," "clear and convincing evidence," and "preponderance of the evidence"—could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69). \textsuperscript{16}Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42. The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate sharply in coming years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted, When I consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, I fear that to a considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes— and the caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP’s staffing structure may very well prove too much to bear.$^{17}$ Therefore, one straightforward “fix” that Congress might consider, at least in the interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these two organizations so as to help fill in the “missing link” of executive branch oversight. But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission: Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization, independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies.... Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying agencies.$^{18}$ 3. What About the “Other” Classification System? If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory secrecy system— we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing. The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo separate declassification reviews under each system. $^{17}$Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above. $^{18}$Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44. Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer, information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy declassification review. Moreover, there appears to be no system in place to get this information declassified, even though the Departments involved—Energy, Defense, and State—acknowledge that it is innocuous.19 The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act’s goal of “a more stable and cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and procedures.” Therefore, I would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of consolidating both classification systems into one. CONCLUSION Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we still face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day. Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges. It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have confidence in the traditional American mechanism of “checks and balances.” By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more efficiently protecting genuine national security information. 19Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added. H.R. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD [Page: E876] HON. DAN BURTON in the House of Representatives THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997 - Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992—Public Law 102-526—to provide 1 additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. This legislation would extend the Review Board's September 30, 1997, termination date under current law to September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased that the Honorable Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable Louis Stokes, who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of H.R. 1553. - The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI, the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held assassination records, and records have also been in the possession of certain State and local authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of records compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the Kennedy assassination, and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992 law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to Americans that the Government has nothing to hide. - As a result of the Review Board's efforts, over 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. The Review Board was in the news last month when it voted to make public the Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination. - The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a 3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately, there were lengthy delays in the appointment of Board members, and as a consequence the Review Board was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996. The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the Review Board's authorization. - I support the Assassination Records Review Board's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly intended to be temporary in nature. The Review Board has informed me that it is confident that it will be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional year, until September 30, 1998. TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS PROFESSOR OF HISTORY MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN on S.J. Res. 282 "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act" Before the SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS MAY 12, 1992 STATEMENT OF ATHAN G. THECHARIS I am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing in U.S. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researched classified and nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records. I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the release of relevant Government records? There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, as amended in 1974, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholding agency records. The congressional response to the so-called Nixon-Sampson agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the so-called Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the Brownell Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential records were public records, and not a president's personal property, Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition and release of all presidential records. As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists widespread public suspicion about the Government's disposition of the Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FOIA in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority to review and if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents. There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branch. It might not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren Commission). The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing program, CIA officials advised that the relevant program file had been destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which provided additional information about the scope of this program. During the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times, distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official Oliver North admitted to having employed a "do not log" procedure to ensure that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive information could be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting and authorizing "black bag jobs," blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative" matters in which case was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from "sources illegal in nature" or from "most secretive" sources such as "Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such officials and their attitude;" and administrative pages/cover letters for reporting "facts and information" which could "cause embarrassment to the Bureau, if distributed." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos were to be maintained in "office files" of senior FBI officials (and were to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under lock and key" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FBI headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any agency outside the Bureau." S.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all relevant Kennedy assassination records and how and where they might have been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review Board "all assassination materials" even if "uncertain if a record is assassination material" and the Executive Director is authorized to "inquire as to the existence of further records" and then recommend that the Review Board "subpoena such records in the event of denial." Properly placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination materials on agency officials who are most knowledgeable about their agency's records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading of cross references in the "available" documents. Section 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure, the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold categories of information when releasing FOIA-requested documents. Particularly during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to individuals identified directly or indirectly with the Kennedy assassination. Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure—notably President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984 totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislation of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but, at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require release unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in its disclosure." My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover, is based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure. In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately 6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right to appeal these withholdings, I eventually (in 1985) received approximately 2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this time I offered a detailed folder by folder challenge, arguing that much of the withheld information was already in the public domain and further that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory information on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent personalities the question of what use had been made of this information required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in 1989 the FBI released approximately 15,000 pages including information formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases. The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985. When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release would reveal FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha DeLoach in 1966 and the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's "clear and convincing" standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World Report which devoted its "1984" issue of December 1983 to summarizing the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989, if not 1985, FBI officials were no longer willing to risk FOIA litigation challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions. My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first disclosed by the House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders, notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a "contract" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in 1963 and then from the Warren Commission in 1964? The answers to these questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as well as other FBI memos recording how the FBI dealt with these transcripts. My experience involving how the FBI has processed my requests for other FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be so redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which distinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff, and lawyers. This case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewald, a Washington, D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance executive Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressman, former New Dealer Thomas Corcoran, and Washington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested in Grunewald's activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration, became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during the early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941 wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White House. Accordingly, I filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix B) either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departments' failure to have processed as yet documents which they originated the wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved. The heavily redacted Grunewald files further disclosed that Grunewald became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. This inquiry proved embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested in Grunewald, the so-called Keen Committee sought assistance from the Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however, preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap. The released transcripts of this 1953 wiretap, in contrast to those released to me involving the 1941 and 1945 tapes, were heavily redacted—the FBI withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.) I have gone into detail on the Fortas and Grunewald matters as I think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the "culture" of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny. The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountability. At the same time, the Board's independence can undercut public suspicions that claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons. While I doubt that the release of the Kennedy assassination records will conclusively resolve the question "Who killed Kennedy," I am convinced that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld. Release of the Kennedy assassination records, moreover, will service other significant research interests of the scholarly community. Let me conclude by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions (the purpose for creation, the level of agency cooperation, and the responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable national leaders (Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities" information. TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992 May 12, 1992 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992. The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all materials held by the United States Government regarding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr. Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this legislation. We have had at least four substantial federal government investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson in 1963; the second, by the President's Commission on CIA Activities -- the Rockefeller commission -- in 1975; the third by the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and 1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation of the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979. Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation, produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy assassination. In addition, literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject. Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain. The recent release of the controversial film "JFK" has raised them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by our Government. Even prior to the release of "JFK," in fact, there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as concerned legislators to open these files for public review. Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain. Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous investigations or not. But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate conclusions. As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should make available its records after the passage of a reasonable amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be compromised. The American people have a right to assure themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the historical record of our government. The timely release of all documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that even the most secret programs of our government will be operated in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the lifetime of many of those who administered the programs. This is not to say that all of the files should simply be pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests, that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be especially compelling. What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under the auspices of an impartial, independent board. It may be useful to state precisely what these records are. First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential libraries. These presidential library records are administered by the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be subject to this Joint Resolution. I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a single small room at the National Archives. There is a rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive, and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has examined some of these files, and we believe the process of separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy assassination investigation was only a small component of the Church committee's work and the investigation conducted concerned only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those interviews, among other materials originated by the Church committee, are an important part of the J.F.K. files. Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the internal files generated by the Warren Commission are still sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been released have been so extensively redacted that their informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the year 2029. To date, these records have been withheld from the public due to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations and military defense, the concern for disclosing the identities of confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records, not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government. We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed new light on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic crime of this century. The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also create a process by which many records could be promptly released. Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure. The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a strong presumption in favor of disclosure. In addition, to address the problem of heavily redacted and therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials. Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy assassination from a document even where references to private matters or crucial national security secrets would render the document itself mostly unreleasable at present. In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing release is essential to a vital interest. Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards. The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of government who have had no prior involvement with previous inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board, aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board would be required to complete its work within two years of its first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed expeditiously, while still doing a careful job. We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on the special three-judge federal court division that appoints independent counsels for criminal investigations. The Justice Department, in an April 27, 1992, letter to Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition, some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very small staffs and other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the appointment process is constitutional under the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to appoint independent counsels to investigate executive branch misconduct. If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration, conceding that both are also susceptible to possible constitutional objection. The first would be for the President and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department, namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria, i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the members coming from lists submitted by designated professional associations. Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first step in the process would be to make available to the Executive Director all Government assassination materials. Where the Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review Board to obtain any additional records. The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the Government, would undertake the initial screening of these records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this manner, many records could be promptly released without formal Review Board deliberations. If the Executive Director determined that a particular record was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she would automatically be required to refer that decision to the Review Board. The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further investigation, to the Review Board. In deciding on appeals and referrals from the Executive Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct hearings and subpoena records and witnesses. The Review Board would have final say as to the release or non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive branch materials, the President would have the authority to supersede the Board's determination and postpone release. But each time the President did so, he would be required to explain his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress. Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of records would also have to be explained to the public and Congress. Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work, would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time or a specified occurrence following which the item could be released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives, where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution. Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would be available in the Archives for public review and copying. Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers under the law to release a particular record even if the Joint Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to request from the agencies documents related to the assassination. Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents. In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so, will help restore confidence among the public in our Government. Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting the need for change. With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of government information. The whole point of this legislation was to create new criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence of the American people. It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man" defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with solving the problem. I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes me as preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If Congress wants to release information it has developed, the President should not be able to stand in the way. Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate. Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in touch with me, which I believe merit further consideration by the Committee. 1. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the boundaries of "assassination material." The Joint Resolution defines "assassination material" as "a record that relates in any manner or degree to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy...." But given the wide range of theories that have developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination. What records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnam, and organized crime should be covered? This matter requires careful consideration. The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the definition of "assassination material," apparently to only those records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid records that might shed light on activities linked to such an alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early 1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full review is probably appropriate. I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the Review Board to do so promptly after it is established. Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the various records agencies and committees as to what documents should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director. 2. As the Justice Department's letter to Chairman Glenn noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or committee control over release of a record it originated even if that record contained information obtained from another agency or committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give agencies authority over release of their own information. However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a lengthy congressional report, may contain both information developed by the body that created the record and information originated by an executive agency. Instead of letting either of these two "originating bodies" have veto power over the release of an entire document, we should work out language that give an agency or committee control over release of that portion of a document for which it was responsible even if other information in the document was originated elsewhere. 3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and to make the Board's proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased government openness should not itself establish an exception from general standards for accountability. I still strongly believe, however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under the Freedom of Information Act. 4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear that the Joint Resolution's provisions take precedence not only over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations. 5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are released instead of actual records or information: "Any such summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when released to the public." 6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint Resolution. I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my views on this measure. Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, May 12, 1992 Ernest R. May It is an honor to be invited to testify on this bill. I am a professor of history at Harvard University, where I teach both in the history department and in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. While I have done research on the history of intelligence agencies and have served in Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak as an expert on the matter before the committee. My comments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation designed to unearth historical source material. The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts about President Kennedy's murder. The Warren Commission had the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the public. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost within months, books challenging its findings hit best-seller lists. Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this particular set of theories has found new life. Two books of this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992, and Oliver Stone's film, "JFK," became a box office hit. The bill now under consideration would open records so that the public can be reassured that these theories are fantasies. The stated aim is to "contribute to the trust of the people in their government." To achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five-person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too partisan; besides, it might bring to mind Chief Justice Warren.) The bill says that members of the Board are to be "distinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that they not be currently in government employ and that they never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy murder. The Board and its Executive Director would have wide powers. They would look at all materials relating to the murder. If they suspect any agency of withholding material, they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witnesses, and to punish defiance. The Board's decisions are to be final unless the President himself intervenes to insist that some piece of information not be released. The bill giving the Board its powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial decision ..., or common law doctrine" that might be in conflict. My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I question whether any legislation can achieve all that this bill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-appointed Review Board such broad responsibilities and powers. I believe that a Review Board differently selected, with a more limited mandate, could do a better job. The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a story that all Americans will accept. Why should it? Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl Harbor attack, new conspiracy theories continue to be woven. One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain! Despite more than a century of research, new theories still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be true for Oswald and Kennedy. After another decade or so, however, Kennedy's murder will probably become, like Lincoln's, more an interest of buffs than of the public at large. The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not be released. This bill itself speaks of protecting secret agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by these criteria, would have to remain secret. In fact, still more material may be kept from the public. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feelings, it may extend protection to families and friends. Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording old accusations against some Cuban-American. Even if the person is dead, anyone ever connected with that person could suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and false, will it not choose to leave the files secret? Also, it has to be assumed that some files will turn out to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review Board would thus have to confess not only that it chose to leave some material under wraps but that other material was simply missing. Would spinners of conspiracy theories take the Board's word? Would they not instead accuse it of colluding in concealment of "smoking guns"? The Review Board would meanwhile be under pressure not to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and docudrama producers would hammer at it. So would scholars, including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy murder. So would others with axes to grind. Some material sought might have only a remote relationship to the murder. The clamor would be no less ferocious. How much of the central files of the FBI and CIA would have to be opened, for example, to persuade disciples of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI nor CIA officers participated in a murder plot? The Review Board would surely be urged to pursue data on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Obvious items would include not only FBI files but also tax returns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in fairness, the Review Board also sought data on financial transactions by individuals associated with Vice President Lyndon Johnson! I forecast, in other words, that new evidence will not dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of the more adventurous theorizing. I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is managed as this bill proposes, one of two results will follow. If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and possibly harmful information will be made public. Alternatively, the Review Board will resist pressure. It will define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it reveals. It will then be accused of a "whitewash." The latter result could make matters worse rather than better. Suspicion could be fed, not allayed. There may, however, be better means of doing what needs doing. The current bill would have the Review Board and its Executive Director examine all materials to be released. They would be charged with ferreting out undisclosed material, and they would have effective responsibility for deciding what would and would not be released. An alternative would be a bill simply enjoining holders of records to identify and locate materials that, in the language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or de- gree" to the murder of President Kennedy. The injunction would apply to all congressional committees and all executive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the National Archives. The bill could direct these record-holders to make the materials public. It could specify that the only materials to be held back would be those itemized in the current bill — agents, intelligence sources and methods, etc. Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a statute could urge voluntary action. The current bill asks such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign governments. A statute that sought to avoid constitutional disputes could ask the same of the President regarding records of the White House and Executive Office. This alternative bill could require or request public reports describing materials withheld from release — their characteristics and quantities, the general reasons for non-disclosure, and plans for eventual release. A Review Board could be created with a limited — and more workable — mandate. Its first duty could be to review record-holders' guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency. Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of communications intercepts might not be the same as those for searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches. The Board could try also to ensure comparative uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It might urge, for example, that the intelligence sources and methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in current use, not just to any ever used. The Board's second duty could be to scan materials that record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board might question record-holders' decisions. If so, it could ask that the agency or committee think again. If differences continued, the Board could appeal to the President or, for Congressional documents, to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House. In a final public report, the Board could describe any still unresolved differences. While the description would be in generalities, the issues would become publicly known. The broad purpose of the Board's report would be to validate the record-holders' non-disclosure decisions. Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the American Bar Association, the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, or kindred bodies. Appointments could be made by the President, with advice and consent of the Senate. Unless the quantity of material withheld proved to be much larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be kept small. It could probably manage with minimal staff. I believe that this alternative statute would accomplish all that can be accomplished. It would leave the onus for release or non-release of records on those already familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would make rules for their files. The President, the heads of departments; the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, and the Archivist of the United States would make rules for theirs. This alternative statute would limit the powers and responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of criteria for disclosure and non-disclosure. Since the invitation to testify included questions reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to respond to that concerning general declassification policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be applied much more widely. A statute could declare that all government records more than thirty years old would become public unless the originating agency showed specific cause for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate could have authority to review all such materials and to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates practice in the United Kingdom. In conclusion, I repeat a warning against expecting any legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to the trust of the people in their government." Inventors of conspiracy theories will always be more ingenious than assemblers of evidence. The immediate result of releasing records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the theorists' mills. Even if everything were released tomorrow, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy builders would be picking out those bits and pieces of evidence that suited them. In the long run, release of documents will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed, that long run probably stretches beyond any of our lifetimes. TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. LESAR PRESIDENT ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER ON S.J. RES. 282 "THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992" BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE May 12, 1992 Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you on the legislation to require the government to release its records pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center ("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation, and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits. I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have also read the letter which you received from the Department of Justice. I have heard that the Administration may seek to achieve its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. Legislation is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal of full disclosure which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1 by drastically altering the standards for classifying information in the interests of national security. The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive order on national security classification. If you support release of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially liberalize the existing standards and make it stick. A few illustrations from my practice will show the inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues to those who attempt to use it to obtain information about the Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay, costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government. Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of information, with little significant information being released. Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the results of the spectrographic tests which had been conducted on bullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court, relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not in the national interest to release the results of these scientific tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA "forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms. In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years and involved three trips to the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests, including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request, the legal battles lasted fourteen years. Case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release all of the records it had made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request. I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four threshold issues raised by the Government. Had my client lost any one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to release a single page from its 300,000 page collection. By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents. Although the CIA told the court that it had assigned seven people to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus, he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some of the subjects discussed in the report of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that previously had been released, or documents that were heavily redacted. Case 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969 investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly told Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed, Hoch received such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-year period. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed, evidence was developed which indicated that all the CIA had done over the previous six years was to number the documents. It had numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a hundred documents that month. A few months after Hoch filed his complaint in district court, the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a considerable volume of materials; mostly on grounds of national security or because disclosure allegedly would identify intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11-page memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself. Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J. Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg submitted a new request for King assassination records. He specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg. During the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When finally located, most of the file had been gutted. Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted 15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's. These stories that I have related are unusual only because the requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their FOIA requests against these agencies. You might be tempted to conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of decisions in the Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded the amount of material which can be withheld from the public. Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the National Security Agency. I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any "smoking gun," which will "solve the case." Rather, this legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The American people want to know the details of their history, however painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right. The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses. I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes. To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release of information. The standards for postponement are critical because they determine the amount of material which may be withheld. Before discussing the limitations on the term "assassination material" as related to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA") conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy. Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a movie has been made about them, there is no justification for excluding the King assassination records from this legislation. The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los Angeles Police Department engaged in "willful and corrupt misconduct" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material evidentiary leads, cannot account for important missing evidence, engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's assassination should also be included in this legislation. The term "assassination material" is broadly defined, but it falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the documents which they need in order to properly study the subject. It should include policy documents which provide the context of decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all documents obtained or created by any previous official investigation. It should include materials on those persons who have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its investigations. Finally, it should also include information records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant to the study of the assassination. The current provision defining assassination materials contains an exemption for "personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of Government." I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren Commission records on this subject have been publicly available through the National Archives for many years and should not now be made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees is a perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath, others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or executive branch commission or committee. This provision would also be used to prohibit release of information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis T. Blahut, surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet" that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally. According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too. Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully available to the public. A second problem with this legislation is that it proposes to exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy." I believe this is too broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official" investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent materials if the panel does not include experienced and knowledgeable Kennedy researchers. A third and critically important area that needs refinement is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term "intelligence source" and the term "intelligence method." Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official acknowledgement, and sources who are willing to have their identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are disclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term "confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded methods, methods which are known to the public or methods which may be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known to other hostile intelligence services. New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air, it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best of reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to increase. I ask that additional comments be placed in the record. Sec. 3. Definitions (2) "Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement. It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material" includes any material which any member of the Assassination Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOIA"), can plausibly contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its investigations. The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to personnel matters or other administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of the Government. . . . " This language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination. The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created right of legal action by family members rather than denial or public access. Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board (b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to serve as members of the Review Board." Query: Is this language designed to exclude private citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only those persons who participated in official investigations or inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not likely to inspire trust. Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset." This must be qualified. It should only apply to living, covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can reasonably be expected to result from disclosure. Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government. . . ." This provision also must be modified. The first problem is that there is no limiting definition of "intelligence source of method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such "intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement agencies, etc., as well as the personnel affiliated with them. Research in a public library is an "intelligence method," and it, too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency thereof, it should be released. "Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it applies only to methods that are unknown to the public or to foreign intelligence agencies. Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its release would (C) reveal "any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States; and the threat to the military defense or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure. The chief problem with this provision is that there is no standard for what constitutes a "public interest" of sufficient moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the substantive content of the material at issue be shown? Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public interest in its disclosure." This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies "whether the person is identified in the material or not." This phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption 6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely to have profound adverse impact on an individual. Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent and a witness or a foreign government. . . ." This provision needs to be amended to include only those promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign government--made in writing. Among the reasons for this are the fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own desire for secrecy. This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a requirement that the foreign government officially object to each such disclosure in writing. Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or in the legislative history, that it is not a "substantial and unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness can be concealed." Section 8. Determinations by the Review Board Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review." Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than litigation under the FOIA. Subsection (h)(2) provides that the President may certify that material "qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to section 6, in which case release of the material shall be postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial review." There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion of the President's term which remains. Section 11. Rules of Construction Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA. One problem here is that transferring all agency records to the Review Board may mean that they are no longer "agency records" within the meaning of the FOIA." A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy. A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOIA. Additional Notes It may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller Commission as subject to the Act. Judge John R. Tunheim Chairman Assassination Records Review Board Prepared Testimony In Support of H.R. 1553, To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board until September 30, 1998. Before the National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee, House Government Reform and Oversight Committee June 4, 1997 I. Introduction Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical FBI and CIA records, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the Congress and the President, and make available to the American public as much information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing H.R. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history, and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity. Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff, Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr. William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee and answer any of your questions. I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G. Marwell, a professional historian who gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local governments that were not previously available to the American public. I believe that we assembled exactly the type of professional and diversified staff that Congress envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment. II. Accomplishments to Date As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public. The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by researchers from all over the United States. By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review Board will have reviewed and processed nearly all of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30 different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted information will have been made public by the Review Board. III. Release of Government Records Related to the Assassination Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has made public. They include: Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy that made up the CIA's Oswald File and detail the agency's investigative activities following the assassination; * Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, including the controversial Staff Report on Oswald's trip to Mexico City; * Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and * The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination. The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most graphically demonstrated by showing you the "before" and "after" versions of one of the pre-assassination FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has released to the public. Prior to the Review Board's review, this FBI document (JFK Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, "October 12, 1960," that it was to the "Director, FBI," from "Legat, Paris" (the FBI representative in Paris), that the subject was "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security," and that it had to do with a "Paris letter 9/27/60." The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the provocative subject title. The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state, the document could have meant anything that a researcher’s imagination and speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says. IV. Identification and Location of Additional Assassination Records One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records that are relevant to the assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline, much remains to be done before it can be confident that it has completed this responsibility. I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional assassination records. Some examples: * Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence. As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved in President Kennedy’s autopsy, as well as other individuals who had knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records. * Identification and Location of Additional FBI Records and Information. The Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested information. * Identification and Location of Additional CIA Records and Information. The Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional information and records. The Review Board expects that these requests will be promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year. Identification and Location of Additional Secret Service Records and Information. Time consuming and careful review of Secret Service activities by the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional records and information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board’s first eight requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than 1,500 pages of material. Identification and Location of Additional Military Records and Information. The Department of Defense (including its many components and the military services) (collectively “DOD”), identified few assassination records on its own initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located, DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions. Additional work would be required in our last year to ensure that all assassination records in the military archives have been made a part of the JFK Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage for accomplishing this task. V. Release of Private and Local Records In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government’s vast files, and consistent with the Board’s mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and local governments, including: * The original personal papers of Warren Commission-Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin that give further insight into the operations of the Commission; * Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s investigation of the assassination; * The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969 against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy. * Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans, including records on District Attorney Garrison’s investigation and prosecution of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures; Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney Frank Ragano, as well as others. I am also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney Garrison's investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this particular chapter of the assassination story. All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future generations of Americans. Once these records are processed and described by the National Archives, they will be available for research. VI. The Need For Additional Time Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons: First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we have taken in fulfilling our mandate. Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact, many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking their compliance. Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable for the storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year. We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job we began, and with one additional year we can. VII. The Job Ahead The additional year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by completing several major areas of our work. Please be assured that these are identifiable projects that are critical to ensuring that the JFK Collection is as complete as possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year on the following: * CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the Oswald “201 file,” the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the assassination. The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the agency’s “Sequestered Collection,” the large collection of files that was assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970’s. These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others cannot be identified. * FBI Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two general categories. The first is the “Core and Related Files,” consisting of nearly 600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers to as its “HSCA records,” is a large collection of records that were identified as being of interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the CIA's Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately 280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination. * The Records of Some Federal Agencies and Congressional Committees. Additional time will allow the Board to finish its work with several agencies, including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee. * Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board. * Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress and the American public that the goals of the JFK Act have been accomplished to the greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies' statements of compliance will be included in the Review Board's final report to the Congress. The one-year extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully documented in the final report. It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board's work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an additional year. VIII. An Approach to the Review of the Remaining CIA and FBI Records It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task. However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year. Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, required a time-consuming early phase. At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. In a progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed postponements can be released through a “consent” process. In this consent process, the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the release of the information. In our review of the FBI’s “Core and Related Files” and the CIA’s “Oswald 201 File,” the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information? In considering our review of the CIA and FBI “Sequestered Collections,” the Board recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized that some categories of records did not require the intensive word-by-word review that had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board’s attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996 Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or “NBR”). Applying these new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant remaining records in order of priority. These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents that have a remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word. These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK Collection at the National Archives. The fruits of our labor from the first three years would be realized in our last year, one in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. I am happy to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our task can be completed. IX. Conclusion In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may have a self-preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to assure you in the clearest and most unambiguous manner that our recommendation is motivated strictly by our desire to complete the job. My colleagues and I were appointed as private citizens and have many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means. I would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our final report. Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22, 1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on the assassination. I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up in a letter we received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following: "In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JFK assassination." These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why we hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task. The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in the future—at even greater cost. The additional year that we recommend will allow for a confident conclusion of this important task. Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional information that may be required. Thank you. JUNE 4, 1997, WEDNESDAY SECTION: IN THE NEWS LENGTH: 12335 words HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION CHAIRMED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL) 2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, DC BODY: REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today, also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations. In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records compiled by official investigations still had been not made public. Congress decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October 26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September 30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the statute to continue operating for one additional year. The review process has proved to be more complex and time-consuming than anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total accountability to the people of this country. At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett. REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to welcome my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this area. Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor or the bombing of Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the government about that assassination. The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access to government information. That legislation was necessary because administration after administration had failed to release documents. That should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting with our government to allow public access to government documents. Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more. I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished. It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in that process, but there is much more work to be done. Thank you. REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement? If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976 to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill. And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in this area. And please proceed with your opening statement. REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr. Turner, Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony. REP. HASTERT: Without objection. REP. STOKES: Thank you. It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20 years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two days of public policy hearings. Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released, would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy. A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these sealed files. As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in keeping with the memory of this great president. Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL 102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every agency, every court record, anywhere they existed — that those records be released to the American people. Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus an additional year, at the board's discretion. We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by the Congress — a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we were very fortunate to have persons such as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff, Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding executive director, David Marwell. Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 previously secret government documents. They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive amount of work in which they have been involved. They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released. Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people, that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the original co-sponsors. I'd be pleased to answer any questions. REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman — or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually, three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly now? REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one additional year that they will complete the work. REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals of your original legislation in 1992? REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998. REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that — in projecting the fact that they can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say to you when they appear, this'll be one final year. REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony. REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin. REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment you, Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done. REP. STOKES: Thank you. REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish? REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort. And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the assassination of our president. However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things. For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before we went out of existence. And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people. REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much. The gentleman from Ohio. REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on 1553, and give praise to the co-sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman, and also to Congressman Stokes. The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have, and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland, here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the things that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and this country. Just as an example, the other day I found out — and I don't know if you're a lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes -- well, you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer. I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that, and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his expertise with the country. Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony, and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public polls. And you still run into people -- as I'm sure -- I still run into people that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in Dallas. And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait 34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some of those rumors? REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks. But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not -- when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that one also. But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought things to the head. REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the Assassination Records Collection Act -- obviously, now we collect records differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy -- God forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date of event and the eventual release of documents for public review? REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons. Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and that will help us, I think, tremendously. But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this sort and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in their testimony — for instance, there's a very interesting document that they will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and the name of a country — everything was redacted. And under their work, that whole page has been released, and everyone can read that. What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind of rumors and myths that grow up around it. And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future — which all of us hope would never occur — that our agencies will realize that this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct this type of thing. REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise — REP. STOKES: Thank you. REP. LATOURETTE: — and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. REP. HASTERT: Thank you. And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas. REP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of service and your contributions to this body. REP. STOKES: Thank you. REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for the years of service you've provided not only on this issue, but on many other issues to which you've contributed. And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Stokes. REP. STOKES: Thank you. REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please. Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives. We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state. And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time. So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and — (witnesses are sworn in). Thank you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative. And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim. JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today. I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President Kennedy. The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing this hearing today and assisting in this effort. One of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well. The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995, pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages' worth of material. I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version, the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27-60. And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly, a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The speculation that individuals had about this was great. Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president. Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it. And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was, indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information that has long been redacted from the public. The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have been released. The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens and local governments. Just a couple of examples: The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission, have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released. And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March 1st, 1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day. Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and at the FBI — records sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you and the members have. REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the testimony. MR. TUNHEIM: Very well. REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley? STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf — for the National Archives in support of HR 1553. I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, I am charged with implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be brief in my remarks. Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives. Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since. When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals. The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship through the three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review board. NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's authorization. The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the assassination of President Kennedy. I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately 3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task. For the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI records. Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by private entities are also available in the collection. This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their own personal computer through the Internet. Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30 percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has been accessed over 100,000 times by the public. Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size, quality or public demand witnessed today. However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this important work can be completed. That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any questions. REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman. Mr. Holland? MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony. Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was Lincoln Murdered?" Eisenschiml claimed one of the most important events in American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South. When pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president. Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least, they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now. I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made; in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ever created by the federal government. These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries, compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance, simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and manage to do the right thing. Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources. The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources and methods. With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power. The last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods. While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during the Cold War. Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board, serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman. And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this afternoon. You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to your testimony. BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the record and I will briefly summarize. REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the record. MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you. My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education. My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history, American government, and international relations. And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only as a citizen, but as an educator. In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional research. From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work, it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged. What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists, in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the government. In his recent book, "The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception of events that is crucial." Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be assembled? It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in some small way -- or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK assassination means. We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56 students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963. The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the public and students can relate. It touches people. As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project. Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering 500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information. The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination. I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and truly educational opportunity. I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for students. In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively involved in learning. Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still and could not be fully appreciated. An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when? After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford to miss. In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said, we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence. Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective of our students' interest in this event, I have my honors government classes perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year — they could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett. REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the record. MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r. REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any information in here that you find particularly interesting? MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he played in the trial. We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted him. REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was so difficult to get this information? MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be. Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take from people, so we have to find where they are. Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw, and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was developed. REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose now and which just have to wait? MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the material. The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly. Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there personal privacy considerations that are involved. I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board made on earlier records. REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination. Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released? MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record. The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some continuing national security concern. So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now. REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how many more records need to be reviewed? MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs. Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up the records they've located. So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the collection before this process is finished. REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages? MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and years ahead. REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research? MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board. He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially, encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support. REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin reviewing the CIA and FBI records? MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a million pages of records. What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm. In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next year, if we get the extension. REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998? MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next year. We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to be a temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long time. We need to get the information to the American public. REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that folks like yourself can have the availability for students? MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and they pay their own way and they do their own research on their own time. But it has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for the government. I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk, nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis. It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university, students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American citizens. I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work. REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio. REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that your learned demeanor was that of a -- REP. HASTERT: Not at all. REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm glad you brought that up. Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part of a conspiracy. When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall semester of 1960 and didn't show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all. The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI originally appealed the decision to not—or to withdraw the redaction of this particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume. Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be appropriately publicly released? MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer — the question is, no, we're not receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process going for one additional year. The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite well. The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no. Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important materials. REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board — should another review board setting be required in the future to review another situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the release of documents in the future? MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency, to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed. There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time simply to trust the American people with access to important information about their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this process. It's a process that, while time-consuming, has worked very well for this set of records. REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left behind for future such endeavors? MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have — virtually all of our work has been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas if the Congress so wishes. REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. REP.: Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland; were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before this commission existed, before these documents came out? MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know, credible is in the eye of the beholder. But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you have to -- it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did. Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about -- to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be inserted into historical context. That's probably been the element that's been missing all this time. REP.: So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than any questions they had remaining about the assassination. MR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being an investigation of three crimes -- the murder of President Kennedy, the assault on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding mandate. But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great — and the FBI had not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time. And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI. REP.: One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point. In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think, can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's still some — can we accelerate the process? What have we learned from this as to — obviously this is one that particularly anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so, presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things. MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to release any of that information. I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen approach of the past. REP.: We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank. And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations. That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this will have silenced most critics? MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps provoke others. We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I think that will be a very significant development. Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing. We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found. REP.: I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the status of that? MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this collection. Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So, therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to the American public. We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP.: Do you have any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for — REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one more question, if I may. Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be, it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by this legislation? MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time. It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no impediments among any of the agency partners that we're dealing with to completing the review of the records on a timely basis. REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence. REP.: I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing — the hearing is adjourned — and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open. If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in favor say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye. REP.: Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye. REP.: Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work. ~END~	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10337-10001.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 261, "total-input-tokens": 305797, "total-output-tokens": 101526, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1152, 1 ], [ 1152, 1554, 2 ], [ 1554, 3966, 3 ], [ 3966, 5474, 4 ], [ 5474, 5979, 5 ], [ 5979, 7139, 6 ], [ 7139, 9357, 7 ], [ 9357, 10628, 8 ], [ 10628, 12550, 9 ], [ 12550, 13466, 10 ], [ 13466, 14341, 11 ], [ 14341, 15216, 12 ], [ 15216, 16330, 13 ], [ 16330, 17462, 14 ], [ 17462, 19621, 15 ], [ 19621, 22231, 16 ], [ 22231, 24893, 17 ], [ 24893, 25908, 18 ], [ 25908, 30068, 19 ], [ 30068, 30947, 20 ], [ 30947, 31811, 21 ], [ 31811, 31998, 22 ], [ 31998, 33304, 23 ], [ 33304, 34781, 24 ], [ 34781, 36326, 25 ], [ 36326, 37936, 26 ], [ 37936, 39516, 27 ], [ 39516, 41038, 28 ], [ 41038, 42562, 29 ], [ 42562, 44108, 30 ], [ 44108, 45626, 31 ], [ 45626, 47141, 32 ], [ 47141, 49192, 33 ], [ 49192, 50937, 34 ], [ 50937, 51167, 35 ], [ 51167, 52480, 36 ], [ 52480, 54051, 37 ], [ 54051, 55427, 38 ], [ 55427, 56911, 39 ], [ 56911, 58389, 40 ], [ 58389, 59864, 41 ], [ 59864, 61330, 42 ], [ 61330, 62940, 43 ], [ 62940, 64417, 44 ], [ 64417, 65724, 45 ], [ 65724, 66769, 46 ], [ 66769, 68004, 47 ], [ 68004, 69581, 48 ], [ 69581, 71042, 49 ], [ 71042, 72477, 50 ], [ 72477, 73927, 51 ], [ 73927, 75435, 52 ], [ 75435, 77030, 53 ], [ 77030, 78628, 54 ], [ 78628, 80098, 55 ], [ 80098, 81354, 56 ], [ 81354, 82400, 57 ], [ 82400, 84013, 58 ], [ 84013, 84931, 59 ], [ 84931, 86555, 60 ], [ 86555, 87470, 61 ], [ 87470, 87861, 62 ], [ 87861, 89934, 63 ], [ 89934, 92538, 64 ], [ 92538, 95262, 65 ], [ 95262, 95959, 66 ], [ 95959, 98196, 67 ], [ 98196, 100467, 68 ], [ 100467, 100966, 69 ], [ 100966, 102115, 70 ], [ 102115, 103473, 71 ], [ 103473, 104963, 72 ], [ 104963, 107201, 73 ], [ 107201, 108754, 74 ], [ 108754, 109336, 75 ], [ 109336, 109873, 76 ], [ 109873, 111184, 77 ], [ 111184, 112704, 78 ], [ 112704, 114046, 79 ], [ 114046, 115538, 80 ], [ 115538, 117070, 81 ], [ 117070, 118569, 82 ], [ 118569, 120105, 83 ], [ 120105, 121494, 84 ], [ 121494, 122781, 85 ], [ 122781, 123168, 86 ], [ 123168, 126790, 87 ], [ 126790, 127665, 88 ], [ 127665, 129848, 89 ], [ 129848, 132612, 90 ], [ 132612, 135401, 91 ], [ 135401, 138003, 92 ], [ 138003, 140750, 93 ], [ 140750, 142892, 94 ], [ 142892, 144304, 95 ], [ 144304, 145176, 96 ], [ 145176, 146552, 97 ], [ 146552, 148211, 98 ], [ 148211, 149769, 99 ], [ 149769, 150358, 100 ], [ 150358, 150779, 101 ], [ 150779, 151339, 102 ], [ 151339, 153616, 103 ], [ 153616, 155614, 104 ], [ 155614, 155936, 105 ], [ 155936, 158892, 106 ], [ 158892, 159430, 107 ], [ 159430, 160433, 108 ], [ 160433, 161279, 109 ], [ 161279, 162758, 110 ], [ 162758, 165926, 111 ], [ 165926, 168954, 112 ], [ 168954, 171292, 113 ], [ 171292, 173202, 114 ], [ 173202, 176355, 115 ], [ 176355, 179198, 116 ], [ 179198, 181278, 117 ], [ 181278, 183122, 118 ], [ 183122, 185657, 119 ], [ 185657, 188138, 120 ], [ 188138, 190737, 121 ], [ 190737, 191708, 122 ], [ 191708, 193232, 123 ], [ 193232, 195642, 124 ], [ 195642, 197471, 125 ], [ 197471, 199387, 126 ], [ 199387, 201664, 127 ], [ 201664, 204278, 128 ], [ 204278, 206962, 129 ], [ 206962, 209344, 130 ], [ 209344, 211585, 131 ], [ 211585, 214771, 132 ], [ 214771, 217772, 133 ], [ 217772, 220621, 134 ], [ 220621, 223696, 135 ], [ 223696, 226551, 136 ], [ 226551, 228396, 137 ], [ 228396, 230591, 138 ], [ 230591, 231946, 139 ], [ 231946, 233234, 140 ], [ 233234, 234658, 141 ], [ 234658, 234932, 142 ], [ 234932, 235166, 143 ], [ 235166, 237494, 144 ], [ 237494, 240157, 145 ], [ 240157, 242703, 146 ], [ 242703, 245458, 147 ], [ 245458, 247892, 148 ], [ 247892, 250521, 149 ], [ 250521, 253221, 150 ], [ 253221, 255788, 151 ], [ 255788, 258148, 152 ], [ 258148, 260136, 153 ], [ 260136, 262731, 154 ], [ 262731, 264373, 155 ], [ 264373, 264601, 156 ], [ 264601, 267678, 157 ], [ 267678, 271032, 158 ], [ 271032, 274133, 159 ], [ 274133, 277322, 160 ], [ 277322, 280393, 161 ], [ 280393, 281213, 162 ], [ 281213, 282307, 163 ], [ 282307, 283604, 164 ], [ 283604, 285063, 165 ], [ 285063, 286540, 166 ], [ 286540, 288157, 167 ], [ 288157, 289587, 168 ], [ 289587, 291024, 169 ], [ 291024, 292551, 170 ], [ 292551, 293996, 171 ], [ 293996, 295303, 172 ], [ 295303, 296667, 173 ], [ 296667, 298104, 174 ], [ 298104, 299455, 175 ], [ 299455, 300849, 176 ], [ 300849, 302314, 177 ], [ 302314, 303779, 178 ], [ 303779, 304207, 179 ], [ 304207, 305503, 180 ], [ 305503, 306657, 181 ], [ 306657, 307902, 182 ], [ 307902, 309145, 183 ], [ 309145, 310388, 184 ], [ 310388, 311589, 185 ], [ 311589, 312820, 186 ], [ 312820, 314085, 187 ], [ 314085, 315319, 188 ], [ 315319, 316571, 189 ], [ 316571, 316811, 190 ], [ 316811, 318400, 191 ], [ 318400, 320006, 192 ], [ 320006, 321695, 193 ], [ 321695, 323324, 194 ], [ 323324, 324896, 195 ], [ 324896, 326532, 196 ], [ 326532, 328149, 197 ], [ 328149, 329779, 198 ], [ 329779, 331362, 199 ], [ 331362, 332945, 200 ], [ 332945, 334578, 201 ], [ 334578, 336157, 202 ], [ 336157, 336897, 203 ], [ 336897, 338135, 204 ], [ 338135, 339685, 205 ], [ 339685, 341165, 206 ], [ 341165, 342698, 207 ], [ 342698, 344275, 208 ], [ 344275, 345742, 209 ], [ 345742, 347092, 210 ], [ 347092, 349487, 211 ], [ 349487, 352425, 212 ], [ 352425, 355016, 213 ], [ 355016, 357603, 214 ], [ 357603, 359909, 215 ], [ 359909, 362341, 216 ], [ 362341, 365125, 217 ], [ 365125, 367687, 218 ], [ 367687, 370736, 219 ], [ 370736, 373350, 220 ], [ 373350, 374929, 221 ], [ 374929, 376807, 222 ], [ 376807, 377838, 223 ], [ 377838, 380591, 224 ], [ 380591, 381677, 225 ], [ 381677, 384428, 226 ], [ 384428, 385319, 227 ], [ 385319, 387992, 228 ], [ 387992, 388971, 229 ], [ 388971, 391773, 230 ], [ 391773, 392848, 231 ], [ 392848, 395143, 232 ], [ 395143, 396190, 233 ], [ 396190, 399157, 234 ], [ 399157, 400198, 235 ], [ 400198, 402823, 236 ], [ 402823, 403803, 237 ], [ 403803, 406546, 238 ], [ 406546, 407713, 239 ], [ 407713, 410634, 240 ], [ 410634, 411653, 241 ], [ 411653, 414144, 242 ], [ 414144, 416951, 243 ], [ 416951, 418021, 244 ], [ 418021, 419020, 245 ], [ 419020, 421663, 246 ], [ 421663, 422661, 247 ], [ 422661, 425286, 248 ], [ 425286, 426374, 249 ], [ 426374, 429172, 250 ], [ 429172, 430197, 251 ], [ 430197, 432923, 252 ], [ 432923, 433992, 253 ], [ 433992, 436798, 254 ], [ 436798, 437812, 255 ], [ 437812, 440613, 256 ], [ 440613, 441730, 257 ], [ 441730, 444484, 258 ], [ 444484, 445476, 259 ], [ 445476, 448282, 260 ], [ 448282, 448567, 261 ] ] }
34705faa973e7ee1ad14110d01e8d3aebf7c550a	25 August 1993 NOTE FOR: All HRG Members SUBJECT: Briefing of HPSCI on Denied JFK Documents This is to let everyone know that HRG has been asked to brief the HPSCI staff on the 10,000 pages of JFK materials that we have denied in full (so far). The request came from HPSCI Chairman Dan Glickman, who apparently anticipates questions from others in Congress about the denied documents. Among the questions we are asked to address in the briefing are the following: - How many documents are involved (as opposed to pages)? - What specific types of sources and methods are we protecting? - What is the review process? - Who made the judgments to deny the documents? - Are there provisions for continuing review of the denied documents? We've asked that the briefing not take place until the week of 30 August, but HPSCI may want it sooner. John F. Pereira FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 August 1993 CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE IN FULL 2000 JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS I. Overview: CIA declassification program for JFK records - Sequestered files and Oswald 201 file - Total JFK records: Hardcopy documents: 162,000 pages Microfilm: 73 reels, 150,000 pages II. Resources devoted to JFK Number of people: 15 HRG (9 staffers, 6 retirees) 25 indexers (overtime, weekends) 10 DO for coordination III. Documents Released: Oswald 35,000 pages ✓ Sequestered files 90,000 pages ✓ Total 125,000 pages ✓ Indexing and identification forms for each document Show example of iden form Withheld temporarily: HSCA-originated: 20,000 pages Third Agency 7,000 pages Denied-in-full - Continuing review of the DIF documents by HRG - Likelihood CIA will release a number (many ?) of DIF - Review Board's determination on DIF items SAN - review for panel IV. Identification forms provided to NARA for each DIF Document V. Types of information protected in DIF items - Grounds for postponement of information under JFK Law VI. Who made judgments on withholding documents - 15 reviewers - Followed procedures - Senior Reviewers provided guidance - Directorates coordinated - Third agency coordination VII. Issues for Review Board FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE IN FULL 2000 JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS HPSCI BRIEFING OUTLINE Introduction: Discuss how CIA fulfilled requirements of the JFK Act. Discuss the withheld documents General Remarks 1. Every JFK record will be seen by the Review Board. 2. We have followed the JFK Assassination Records Act in determining which records will be postponed. (Section 6) - Our presumption was that a record would be released. 3. We made every effort to meet the 22 August deadline established by the JFK Act. The Director was committed to this. 4. This called for a major effort—additional people, lot of overtime and weekend shifts. 5. We are continuing to review the postponed documents, and expect to release a high percentage of them. 23 January 1996 CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS RELEASE IN FULL Memo for Record Subject: - Status of JFK Records Review 2000 References: Letter from Marwell to Pereira, dtd 15 Dec 96, (same subject); Letter from Pereira to Marwell, dtd 19 Jan 96, (response to above letter); Phone Conversation with Marwell, 22 Jan 96, (same subject). 1. Marwell requested a figure for the number of records in the sequestered files that contained postponements. I explained that our review figures were based on pages and that there was no record count for the microfilm part of the collection. However, based on the HRG index unaudited record count (see below) of the Oswald 201 file and the JFK hardcopy boxes, I was able to give him an estimate of 28,000 records. 2. Unaudited HRG Index statistics: \| Total Records \| Records w/Postponements \| \|---------------\|-------------------------\| \| Oswald 4,349 \| 1,871 \| \| JFK (63 boxes)\| 28,532 \| \| 32,881 (154,724 pages) \| 14,003 \| The page count for the hardcopy part of the collection is within 10,000 pages of the Microfilm (163,500). Given that the microfilm contains many duplicates and similar records as the hardcopy, the percentage of sanitized documents should be close to the same. I estimate the total number of records with postponements to be approximately 28,000. As you requested, I called Susan Oullette, HPSCI Staff today to respond to her questions about JFK Assassination records. She said that the Committee was interested in the process used for declassifying the records, the status of our review, and what criteria we use for declassification. Following are among the main topics we covered during a discussion of about 10 minutes on the STU-III: - A description of the JFK records held by CIA - Process of declassification (review by retired senior officers, coordination with DO, OGC, others) - Criteria for redaction - Coordination with FBI, other agencies on third agency documents. - Presidentially-appointed JFK Assassination Records Review Board - Differences with the Board on release of certain information e.g., names of former employees, identification of stations - Current appeal to the White House of decision by Board to release certain information we redacted. - Efforts of the Board to identify additional records, including in other countries Susan said that she may have enough information for now, but she would let me know if more would be needed. I invited her to visit us if she wanted more details or to look at the records. CC: Brian S. Latell, J. Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO CONFIDENTIAL EVENT: QUICK COM PLACE: 7BOO HQS FOR: HPSCI SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS RESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940 --- > (PARTICIPANTS) < --- ASSOC NAME ROLE STAFF OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI) CIA PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI) BRFR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In response to a request from HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette, John Pereira, Chief of the Center for the Study of Intelligence's Historical Review Group, called her to discuss staff questions. Attached is his memo of that telecon. QUOTE: I called Susan Ouellette, HPSCI Staff today to respond to her questions about JFK Assassination records. She said that the Committee was interested in the process used for declassifying the records, the status of our review, and what criteria we use for declassification. Following are among the main topics we covered during a discussion of about 10 minutes on the STU-III: - A description of the JFK records held by CIA - Process of declassification (review by retired senior officers, coordination with DO, OGC, others) - Criteria for redaction - Coordination with FBI, other agencies on third agency documents. - Présidentially-appointed JFK Assassination Records Review Board - Differences with the Board on release of certain information e.g., names of former employees, identification of stations - Current appeal to the White House of decision by Board to we redacted. release certain information Efforts of the Board to identify additional records, including in other countries Susan said that she may have enough information for now, but she would let me know if more would be needed. I invited her to visit us if she wanted more details or to look at the records. END QUOTE SUPPORTING TEXT: no further text in this document (U) [Richard E. Schroeder] DCI/OCA/CLG 28 March 1996 Distribution: DCI/CSI DO/ORMS DDI OGC OCA RES chrono CL BY 620119 CL REASON 1.5C DECL ON X1 DRV FM HUM 4-82 CONFIDENTIAL NOTE FOR: John Pereira FROM: Richard E. Schroeder DATE: 03/28/96 01:19:41 PM SUBJECT: HPSCI Request for staff brief on JFK assassination HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette liked John Pereira's 27 Mar 96 telecon on the JFK assassination issue (see attached note) so much that she'd like to schedule a staff brief for sometime in the next two weeks. She'd like the brief to concentrate on two issues mentioned by John in the telecon: - Differences with the Board on release of certain info (names of former employees, identification of stations), - Current appeal to the White House of decession of Board to release certain info we redacted. Defer to John and DO addees to work out who'll brief (see separate note from DO/ORMS/Laurie Goodwin re Bill McNair.) Ouellette suggests c. 1000 either Apr 2, 3, or 4, or Apr 9, 10, 11 since HPSCI recess schedule is pretty open. John, pls advise your timing preference. Thanks. C9605672.DOC CC: Brian Latell Barry Harrelson Fred Wickham @ DO William McNair @ DO Virginia B. OKUM @ DO Montgomery Rogers Charles Boykin Joyce Woodburn Jacqueline Mitchell MEMORANDUM FOR: Attendees at the meeting with HPSI Members on Wed: - Mike Sheehy - Christine Healey - Steve Nelson - Doug Bowman - Bill Lieser Date 4/96 TO: John Pereira Laurie Goodwin @ DO FROM: Richard E. Schroeder-C. DATE: 04/03/96 12:57:18 PM SUBJECT: Re: HPSCI Request for staff brief on JFK assassination HPSCI staffer Susan Ouellette liked John Pereira's 27 Mar 96 telecon on the JFK assassination issue (see attached note) so much that she'd like to schedule a staff brief for sometime in the next two weeks. She'd like the brief to concentrate on two issues mentioned by John in the telecon: --Differences with the Board on release of certain info (names of former employees, identification of stations), and --Current appeal to the White House of decision of Board to release certain info we redacted. Defer to John and DO addres to work out who'll brief (see separate note from DO/ORMS Laurie Goodwin re Bill McNair.) Ouellette suggests c. 1000 either Apr 2, 3, or 4, or Apr 9, 10, 11 since HPSCI recess schedule is pretty open. John, pls advise your timing preference. Thanks. C9605672.DOC I've now confirmed our briefing for HPSCI at 1030 Weds 10 April. Pls let me know who will attend for CSI and the DO. Thanks. OCA van will depart from OHB Main Entrance at 1000. RES 1255/3Apr96. CC: Brian Latell, Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO, William McNair @ DO, Virginia B. OKUM @ DO, Montgomery Rogers, Charles Boykin, Joyce Woodburn, Jacqueline Mitchell NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira J. Barry Harrelson FROM: Linda C. Cipriani DATE: 04/09/96 01:51:24 PM SUBJECT: HPSCI talking points Thought you may be interested in seeing in advance an outline of what I plan to say at the HPSCI briefing. Of course, I will be ready to alter this according to the circumstances of the meeting! Talking Points I. Statutory Authorities of the JFK Board 1. The JFK Act states that all government records relating to the JFK assassination should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure and that all records will eventually be disclosed. Although the Act allows for the postponement of release of certain information, all records will be disclosed in full by 2017 unless the President certifies that protection is still necessary. 2. Under the JFK Act, the JFK Board determines what is an "assassination record" and whether an assassination record qualifies for postponement. The Board has the power to direct a government agency to make available to it, not only assassination records, but additional information which it believes is necessary to fulfill its duties under the Act. It has the power to request the Attorney General to subpoena private persons, records and other information relevant to its responsibilities under the Act. II. Appeal Procedures set out in JFK Act 1. Once Board has determined whether a record shall be released or postponed, it must send a "Notification Letter" to the head of the agency (DCI) 2. Only recourse for an agency that disagrees with Board determination is to appeal to the President. 3. The President has 30 days from the date of the Notification Letter to reply to appeal a. White House asks that agencies submit any appeals within 7 days of receiving Notification Letter 4. CIA has never before presented an appeal to the President; FBI presented an appeal last year but the White House told the parties to work out their difficulties. III. February 8th Appeal 1. In November and December of 1995, the JFK Board notified DCI of the release of documents that would: - implicate high-ranking Mexican officials in a joint tel-tap operation against foreign embassies - Mexican liaison (December 7) - reveal station in Helsinki (December 27) - identify sensitive unilateral source in the Nicaraguan service (November 28) 2. On February 8, DCI submitted an appeal to the President on these issues. a. Admittedly, CIA did have problems getting appeal out on time. The JFK staff was very understanding of our time problems and arranged to give us more time. They too have recognized that the time periods set out in the Act are too short to bring an appeal. b. The reason for CIA's delay was simply because the decision to appeal a Board determination to the President of the US is very difficult one to make, both on a procedural and a substantive level. As CIA never did an appeal before, it did not have an efficient system worked out. c. Today, the procedure is as follows: Once HRG is notified of Board decisions, they immediately pass this on to OGC and the DO. The appropriate components within DO are asked whether the release would cause current damage to the national security or intelligence operations or sources. If so, they are tasked to provide a written assessment of that damage. d. An appeal package is then prepared by OGC and the DO. This package must then be approved by GC, DDO, EXDIR, DDCI and DCI. e. Although CIA's turn around time is improving, it can take several weeks to task the appropriate people, have them gather the information needed to prepare an appeal and then get this up to the DCI. 3. Despite our time problems, the JFK Staff was cooperative in the process of bringing this appeal to the President: a. Before submitting appeal to the President, I faxed copy of appeal to JFK Board's General Counsel with the idea that if it presented new and convincing evidence, he would present it to the Board during its session. b. Shortly after submitting the appeal to the President, I spoke with White House Counsel and Counsel to JFK Board. We agreed to put the appeal on hold until the Board could review CIA's submission to the White House and possibly reconsider its determinations in light of additional information presented in the appeal. c. I talked with JFK Board's Counsel and Executive Director regularly about the best way to handle the appeal. I arranged with them to have the General Counsel of CIA to come to the Board's February meeting and present new information regarding the issues on appeal. d. On February 29, the General Counsel of CIA and I met with the JFK Board and their staff. We discussed issues on appeal as well as 3 other stations recently released (Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen). e. Based on the information presented by CIA at this meeting, the Board reconsidered and agreed to protect all of the issues on appeal as well as 3 other stations. IV. Future appeal procedures 1. Both JFK Board and CIA agree that we should never have to appeal something to the President and we should try to work out difficult issues on our own. 2. In the last 2 months, when CIA believed that a release would damage the national security, the Board has invited us to their meetings to present additional evidence on the issue. In some cases, they have reconsidered their decision and protected the information. 3. The Board also recently released [Tokyo] station - we are arranging to meet with them at the end of this month to present stronger arguments for protecting this station. 4. The Board is now considering the release of names of CIA employees who retired under cover. It is very important for CIA's mission that the names of its employees, especially those who remain covert, be protected even after retirement. In the spirit of cooperation and in the hopes of getting the Board to understand this, CIA helped arrange a meeting between the JFK Board's General Counsel and a retired CIA covert employee. currently living in Europe. CIA hopes that after hearing from the employee about his objections to having his name released and the harm that may come to him, the Board will agree to protect his name, and others like him, from release. CC: SECRET HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996 1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered - Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working files - Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries 2. Pages released (227,000) - Percentage of pages redacted; 70% 3. Process of declassification - Former senior officers in HRG review - Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG) 4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, 1992 - Records related to the assassination or investigation into the assassination - Cuban or U.S. activities - Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of records -- "Clear and convincing evidence" must be presented to the Board E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring protection - Source or method currently utilized - Foreign government relationship currently requiring protection 5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there is "clear and convincing evidence" to support a postponement - Board then has to justify on the record each redaction with which it agrees - Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in Federal Register within 14 days - Options available: substitute language e.g., "Northern European station" - Also, summary of a record - Board has access to every document in full 6. Issues raised by Board's decisions: - Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of information that is 30 years old with damage to current intelligence operations - Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki Jan 1961 - Sept 1964 - Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover - Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US - Liaison, joint operations in Mexico - Briefing of the Board by Dave Edger, Jeff Smith, Central Cover, DO desk officers, others - Problem of accumulative effect of releases—eroding cover, ability to conduct operations 7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree with Board's determination - President has sole authority to require postponement of a record or information - President required to advise the Board within 30 days of the Board's determination - This is published in the Federal Register 8. Current appeal (now resolved) - Issues: identification of Agency asset - Potential appeal: Tokyo station 9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g., history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff records Notes: - Board does not accept "principle" as justification for postponement—requires evidence - Even if agreement to protect (even in Mex) disagreements over specific / sub language at times - Precedent set by JFK -> re FCIA etc. WTC/Memorandum for the Record EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING PLACE: H-405 CAPITOL FOR: HPSCI SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS --- (PARTICIPANTS) --- \| ASSOC \| NAME \| ROLE \| \|-------\|-----------------------\|------\| \| STAFF \| BARTON, CHRISTOPHER \| \| \| STAFF \| DUPART, LOUIS H. \| \| \| STAFF \| EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D.\| \| \| STAFF \| HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE \| \| \| STAFF \| LOWENTHAL, MARK M. \| \| \| STAFF \| OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY\| \| \| STAFF \| SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM \| \| \| CIA \| CIPRIANI, LINDA \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| HARRELSON, BARRY \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| PEREIRA, JOHN \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| SCHROEDER, RICHARD \| SPRT \| \| CIA \| WICKHAM, FRED \| BRFR \| --- (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) --- Following a telephone conversation with HPSCI staff in which HRG/CSI noted a number of JFK assassination declassification issues (see OCA C/96-05672 of 27 Mar 96), CSI, DO, and OGC briefed staff on the status of the JFK declassification effort, the 1992 law which established the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and the scope of the Board's authority, and the details of some current declassification issues we have been addressing with the Board. We noted the close working relationship between the Agency and the Board, and said that the Board staff is trying to understand the Agency's equities and perspectives. Some staff expressed concern about the Board's broad powers and authorities under the 1992 law, particularly regarding declassification of intelligence material bearing on identities, sources, and methods. (S) --- (ADDITIONAL INFORMATION) --- 1. C/CSI/Historical Review Group Pereira opened by briefly describing the nature of the CIA JFK material. The open-ended "Oswald 201" also includes material gathered after the assassination, and the "sequestered file" is that material that was assembled for the JFK assassination investigations. The material was originally sanitized and released to the National Archives in 1993. We are now reviewing the 227,000 pages and attempting to justify the material we withheld. Some seventy percent of the released material contains redactions, although later in the briefing we noted that as our experience has grown the redaction standards have evolved and now most material (up to eighty percent) is being released whole. Some 25 senior annuitants, working closely with a DO team led by Wickham, have been performing the initial review. Pereira pointed out that we are not only reviewing the assassination records, but those records bearing on the House Assassinations Committee's investigation of the assassination. Pereira identified the five academic historians who make up the Board, and said they are supported by 30 full-time Board staffers headed by former Berlin Documentation Center chief David Marwell. WTC/Memorandum for the Record Pereira said that the 1992 Act specifies that the Board must have "clear and convincing evidence" if we want to postpone release, and said that the Board requires "current justification" if we want to protect agent identities, sources and methods, or liaison identities. Under the law, the Board has the authority to release all information, and must justify in the Federal Register within 14 days any redactions. The Board sees the full text of all documents. Pereira said that we negotiate with the Board the use of summaries or generic descriptions (such as substituting "a northern European station" for Helsinki) and that the Board is making an "honest effort" to see the connection between 30 year old information and current damage to Agency equities. Dupart asked rhetorically whether the Board understood the concept of ongoing liaison, with Wickham saying that the Board clearly had a different perspective from the DO, and that the ADDO, General Counsel, Cover Staff and others have briefed the Board in detail to address this "problem." Harrelson pointed out that our joint teltaps had recorded Oswald himself, although we assured the clearly unhappy Dupart that we are trying to protect the fact that liaison cooperated in the teltaps. We also noted our effort to protect the identities of covert Agency employees, although we are working particularly hard in cases where the Agency employees now reside overseas. Pereira said we are concerned about the cumulative erosive effect on our cover and our ability to conduct operations. He noted that the Board tends to focus on individual specific cases without always focusing on the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. (S) 2. Cipriani described the appeals process specified in the 1992 JFK Act. She also lent Sheehy a copy of the act, which he studied carefully during the briefing. Under the 1992 act, documents related to JFK carry the "presumption of release," with the Board defining which records fall under the act. We have to justify any redactions or postponements, and Board decisions can only be appealed to the President himself (which, as Cipriani dryly noted, tends to inhibit appeals.) The act also specifies very short deadlines, with only 30 days for the President to make his decision. (This means we have only about seven days to get our appeals out of Hqs and to the White House—a practical impossibility.) Our only appeal to date involved three issues: (i) a cable implicating senior Mexican officials in our joint teltaps, (ii) the identification of the very sensitive Helsinki Station, and (iii) the identity of a Nicaraguan source. In fact our appeal took several months, with the Board being very accommodating about the delay, and we finally were able to give the Board enough justification and explanation that they changed their position and spared the White House the decision. Healey noted that the Agency declassification team includes a DO team (as noted above,) and asked why we hadn't been able to head off the problem. Cipriani responded that new information arises for the Board to consider in making its determination, and Wickham elaborated by noting that the DO is reluctant to reveal sensitive current information to protect old material. He characterized this as a problem of "DO culture." At the same time, he cited the specific example of the Mexicans declining to meet the DCI on his recent Latin American trip as illustrative of Mexican sensitivity to the liaison issue. We later noted that the only other appeal thus far involves the FBI, and the White House has told the Bureau to resolve the matter with the Board. (S) 3. Pereira noted to the staffers that we're dealing with very short deadlines involving enormous volumes of material, and illustrated by showing the staff a bulky recent Board declassification notification which we must review to confirm we have no problem with the material involved. In response to a Sheehy question, Harrelson reminded staff that the original redaction and submission to the Board took place in 1992-3, and as noted above, our redaction standards and judgements have evolved since then. Further, we have to double-check each release to confirm we concur, and in some cases compare substitute language. Sheehy asked why we would object to such a thing as the acknowledgment of Tokyo Station, and seemed impressed and persuaded when Wickham patiently explained that both the Japanese and Ambassador Mondale have strongly recommended against confirming the existence of the Station. The Japanese are very sensitive to any public acknowledgment of our liaison relationship. Wickham noted that the Board is trying to document Oswald's travels, and wants to identify stations reporting such travel. Pereira said that we recognize the need to report the facts, but want to protect details WTC/Memorandum for the Record that do not add to the story but harm our equities. In response to a Healey question, Pereira said we are making progress in giving the Board staff the context and framework necessary to appreciate and support our concerns. He said the staff tries very hard to give the Board necessary background, and Wickham seconded Pereira's assessment that we have a very good working relationship with the staff. Under the provisions of the Act, the Board will be working until October 1997, dealing with CIA, FBI, DepState, as well as private individuals and even foreign governments. They are interviewing people, and as Pereira noted, "getting theories." (S) 4. Staff, even those who asked pointed questions like Healey and Sheehy, seemed satisfied. Majority Staffer Eberwein, perhaps reflecting concerns voiced by Deputy Majority Director Dupart about protecting Agency sources and methods, however, expressed concern later about possibly amending the '92 act to moderate the act's bias toward release. Indeed, she contacted OCA lawyer Cindy Ellis and asked her to draft language amending the act. It had not been my impression during the briefing that staff had been especially concerned about the act to the point of intending to modify it, and its also unclear whether Eberwein was acting on behalf of senior majority staff or the membership in asking OCA to suggest modifications to the act. (S) Richard E. Schroeder (C) CIA Liaison Group Office of Congressional Affairs DCI/OCA/CLG/RESchroeder/dms/39940 (15 Apr 96) Distribution: Original - OCA Records 1 - D/OCA 1 - DCI/CSI 1 - DO/IMS 1 - DO/ORMS/CAG 1 - DCI/OGC 1 - RESchroeder Chrono --- (FOLLOW-UP ACTION ITEMS) --- There were no Action Items on file for this event. SECRET EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING DATE: 04/10/96 TIME: 1030 PLACE: H-405 CAPITOL STATUS: X - KEY: C/96-05677 FOR: HPSCI SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS RESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940 --- > (PARTICIPANTS) < --- \| ASSOC \| NAME \| ROLE \| \|-------\|-----------------------------\|------\| \| STAFF \| BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| HBALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI) \| \| \| CIA \| CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC) \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI) \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI) \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA) \| SPRT \| \| CIA \| WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS) \| BRFR \| SECRET EVENT: STAFF BRIEFING PLACE: H-405 CAPITOL FOR: HPSCI SUBJ: JFK ASSASSINATION DOCUMENTS RESPONSIBLE OFFICER: RICHARD SCHROEDER - SECURE: 3-9940 --- (PARTICIPANTS) --- \| ASSOC \| NAME \| ROLE \| \|-------\|------\|------\| \| STAFF \| BARTON, CHRISTOPHER (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| DUPART, LOUIS H. (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| EBERWEIN, CATHERINE D. (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| HEALEY, LOUISE CHRISTINE (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| LOWENTHAL, MARK M. (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| OUELLETTE, SUSAN MARY (HPSCI) \| \| \| STAFF \| SHEEHY, MICHAEL WILLIAM (HPSCI) \| \| \| CIA \| CIPRIANI, LINDA (DCI/OGC) \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| HARRELSON, BARRY (DCI/CSI) \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| PEREIRA, JOHN (DCI/CSI) \| BRFR \| \| CIA \| SCHROEDER, RICHARD (DCI/OCA) \| SPRT \| \| CIA \| WICKHAM, FRED (DO/IMS) \| BRFR \| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: Following a telephone conversation with HPSCI staff in which HRG/CSI noted a number of JFK assassination declassification issues (see OCA C/96-05672 of 27 Mar 96,) CSI, DO, and OGC briefed staff on the status of the JFK declassification effort, the 1992 law which established the JFK Assassination Records Review Board and the scope of the Board's authority, and the details of some current declassification issues we have been addressing with the Board. We noted the close working relationship between the Agency and the Board, and said that the Board staff is trying to understand the Agency's equities and perspectives. Some staff expressed concern about the Board's broad powers and authorities under the 1992 law, particularly regarding declassification of intelligence material bearing on identities, sources, and methods. (S) SUPPORTING TEXT: 1. C/CSI/Historical Review Group Pereira opened by briefly describing the nature of the CIA JFK material. The open-ended "Oswald 201" also includes material gathered later, and the "sequestered file" is that material that was assembled for the JFK assassination investigations. All is being processed for declassification, with some 227,000 pages already released. Some seventy percent of the released material contains redactions, although later in the briefing we noted that as our experience has grown the redaction standards have evolved and now most material (up to eighty percent) is being released whole. Some 25 senior annuitants, working closely with a DO team led by Wickham, have been performing the initial review. Pereira pointed out that we are not only reviewing the assassination records, but those records bearing on our own investigation of the assassination. Pereira identified the five academic historians who make up the Board, and said they are supported by thirty full-time Board staffers headed by former Berlin Documentation Center chief David Marwell. Pereira said that the 1992 Act specifies that the Board must have "clear and convincing evidence" if we want to postpone release, and said that the Board requires "current justification" if we want to protect agent identities, sources and methods, or liaison identities. Under the law, the Board has the authority to release all information, and must justify in the Federal Register within fourteen days any redactions. The Board sees the full text of all documents. Pereira said that we negotiate with the Board the use of summaries or generic descriptions (such as substituting "a northern European station" for Helsinki) and that the Board is making an "honest effort" to see the connection between thirty year old information and current damage to Agency equities. Dupart asked rhetorically whether the Board understood the concept of ongoing liaison, with Wickham saying that the Board clearly had a different perspective from the DO, and that the ADDO, General Counsel, Cover Staff and others have briefed the Board in detail to address this "problem." Harrelson pointed out that our joint teltaps had recorded Oswald himself, although we assured the clearly unhappy Dupart that we are trying to protect the fact that liaison cooperated in the teltaps. We also noted our effort to protect the identities of covert Agency employees, although we are working particularly hard in cases where the Agency employees now reside overseas. Pereira said we are concerned about the cumulative erosive effect on our cover and our ability to conduct operations. He noted that the Boards tends to focus on individual specific cases without recognizing the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. (S) 2. Cipriani described the appeals process specified in the 1992 JFK Act. She also lent Sheehy a copy of the act, which he studied carefully during the briefing. Under the 1992 act, documents related to JFK carry the "presumption of release," with the Board defining which records fall under the act. We have to justify any redactions or postponements, and Board decisions can only be appealed to the President himself (which, as Cipriani dryly noted, tends to inhibit appeals.) The act also specifics very short deadlines, with only 30 days for the President to make his decision. (This means we have only about seven days to get our appeals out of Hq's and to the White House--a practical impossibility.) Our only appeal to date involved three issues: (i) a cable implicating senior Mexican officials in our joint teltaps, (ii) the identification of the very sensitive Helsinki Station, and (iii) the identity of a Nicaraguan source. In fact our appeal took several months, with the Board being very accommodating about the delay, and we finally were able to give the Board enough justification and explanation that they changed their position and spared the White House the decision. Healey noted that the Agency declassification team includes a DO team (as noted above,) and asked why we hadn't been able to head off the problem. Cipriani responded that new information arises for the Board to consider in making its determination, and Wickham elaborated by noting that the DO is reluctant to reveal sensitive current information to protect old material. He characterized this as a problem of "DO culture." At the same time, he cited the specific example of the Mexicans declining to meet the DCI on his recent Latin American trip as illustrative of Mexican sensitivity to the liaison issue. We later noted that the only other appeal thus far involves the FBI, and the White House has told the Bureau to resolve the matter with the Board. (S) 3. Pereira noted to the staffers that we're dealing with very short deadlines involving enormous volumes of material, and illustrated by showing the staff a bulky recent Board declassification notification which we must review to confirm we have no problem with the material involved. In response to a Sheehy question, Harrelson reminded staff that the original redaction and submission to the Board took place in 1992-3, and as noted above, our redaction standards and judgements have evolved since then. Further, we have to double-check each release to confirm we concur, and in some cases compare substitute language. Sheehy asked why we would object to such a thing as the acknowledgement of Tokyo station, and seemed impressed and persuaded when Wickham patiently explained that both the Japanese and Ambassador Mondale have strongly recommended against confirming the existence of the station. The Japanese are very sensitive to any public acknowledgement of our liaison relationship. Wickham noted that the Board is trying to document Oswald's travels, and wants to identify stations reporting such travel. Pereira said that we recognize the need to report the facts, but want to protect details that do not add to the story but harm our equities. In response to a Healey question, Pereira said we are making progress in giving the Board staff the context and framework necessary to appreciate and support our concerns. He said the staff tries very hard to give the Board necessary background, and Wickham seconded Pereira's assessment that we have a very good working relationship with the staff. Under the provisions of the act, the Board will be working until October 1997, dealing with CIA, FBI, DepState, as well as private individuals and even foreign governments. They are interviewing people, and as Pereira noted, "getting theories." (S) 4. Staff, even those who asked pointed questions like Healey and Sheehy, seemed satisfied. Majority staffer Eberwein, perhaps reflecting concerns voiced by deputy majority director Dupart about protecting Agency sources and methods, however, expressed concern later about possibly amending the '92 act to moderate the act's bias toward release. Indeed, she contacted OCA lawyer [Cindy Ellis] and asked her to draft language amending the act. It had not been my impression during the briefing that staff had been especially concerned about the act to the point of intending to modify it, and its also unclear whether Eberwein was acting on behalf of senior majority staff or the membership in asking OCA to suggest modifications to the act. (S) Richard E. Schroeder DCI/OCA/CLG 15 April 1996 Distribution: DCI/CSI DO/ORMS DO/IMS OCA OGC RES chrono CL BY 620119 CL REASON 1.5C DECL ON X1 DRV FM HUM 4-82 SECRET TO: Richard E. Schroeder FROM: Linda C. Cipriani DATE: 04/15/96 05:30:04 PM SUBJECT: Re: DRAFT-OCA MFR on 10 Apr 96 HPSCI JFK Docs Brief Looks OK to me - I was especially pleased to read that the staff was concerned about the presumption for release in the Act and asked Cindy Ellis to draft language modifying the act. If Cindy needs any help, I would be very happy to give her some suggestions!! I would greatly appreciate being kept informed as this progresses. Thanks, Linda CC: John Pereira, J. Barry Harrelson, Fred Wickham @ DO, Linda Cipriani TO: Richard E. Schroeder FROM: John F. Pereira DATE: 04/16/96 02:40:06 PM SUBJECT: Re: DRAFT-OCA MFR on 10 Apr 96 HPSCI JFK Docs Brief The MFR looks basically fine. Two minor suggestions: Par 1. - change "our own investigation" to the House Assassinations Committee's investigation Par 1, last sent. - change last part of sent to read without always focusing on the broader cumulative impact of their discrete decisions. CC: J. Barry Harrelson	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10337-10002.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 27, "total-input-tokens": 31416, "total-output-tokens": 10623, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 861, 1 ], [ 861, 1807, 2 ], [ 1807, 2201, 3 ], [ 2201, 2981, 4 ], [ 2981, 4339, 5 ], [ 4339, 5602, 6 ], [ 5602, 7032, 7 ], [ 7032, 7543, 8 ], [ 7543, 8667, 9 ], [ 8667, 8823, 10 ], [ 8823, 10153, 11 ], [ 10153, 11862, 12 ], [ 11862, 13911, 13 ], [ 13911, 16139, 14 ], [ 16139, 16380, 15 ], [ 16380, 17621, 16 ], [ 17621, 19175, 17 ], [ 19175, 21991, 18 ], [ 21991, 26872, 19 ], [ 26872, 28628, 20 ], [ 28628, 29526, 21 ], [ 29526, 31414, 22 ], [ 31414, 34370, 23 ], [ 34370, 37426, 24 ], [ 37426, 38688, 25 ], [ 38688, 39243, 26 ], [ 39243, 39691, 27 ] ] }
0e8914ffbd20d25e6082d34b2943b6e2571a1854	Memo for the Record Subject: JFK Records Review - Lessons Learned The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong. I. The JFK Act Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program. Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today. Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example: a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication. For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection. b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100). Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story. Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99. II. The Process There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects: * We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive. * We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project. * Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information. * On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project. * Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion. * Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project. * In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above). * Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing. * If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index. III The Requests (being drafted) Attachment I. [incomplete draft attached] Description of the JFK Collection Attachment II. [being drafted] [statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANS, DIFs, NBR, etc.)] Memo for the Record Subject: JFK Records Review Project and Lessons Learned The CIA's JFK Collection is made up primarily of records pulled together for the Warren Commission, House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA) and the Assassinations Records Review Board (ARRB). It contains a significant amount of duplication and non-JFK related material. The current index is flawed and contains gaps. Release standards were liberal; basically only source identities and information, names of agents, employees under cover, Agency locations and foreign liaison activities were redacted. There is no evidence in the Collection to indicate that the Warren Commission conclusions were wrong. I. Background (1992-1995) The setting up of the Historical Review Program by DCI Gates in early 1992 coincided with growing interest in Congress to require federal agencies to declassify records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. DCI Gates decided to start declassification process before Congress passed legislation: * testified before Congress on 12 May 1992 about CIA's new openness policy and announced the declassification of the first folder of Oswald's 201 (also known as the pre-assassination file). * six boxes of the Oswald's 201 were reviewed and transferred to NARA by Oct. 1992. The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) was signed 26 October 1992: * it called for Presidential-appointed Assassination Records Review Board composed of non-government individuals; * established "a presumption of immediate disclosure" for records relating to the assassination. For first two years of its existence, the Historical Review Program focused primarily on the review of JFK assassination records: there were two major releases of Agency records (August 1993 and August 1994) of approximately 227,000 pages; joint HRG/DO teams reviewed additional assassination related collections at National Archives (Warren Commission), the SSCI (Church Committee and the Ford Presidential Library (Rockefeller Commission) plus numerous referrals from other federal agencies (FBI, State, Army, etc.). Due to delays in the appointment of its members and the time required to hire and clear a staff, the ARRB did not actually begin reviewing documents until May 1995. It became clear in immediately that the ARRB would require the release of far more information than the Agency had released in the 1992-94 review. In mid-1995 HRG began a re-review of the previously released sanitized documents: * approximately 80% of the 227,000 pages release in 1993-94 contained deletions * resources were taken from other projects and added to JFK project to meet Board's monthly deadlines. II. The JFK Act and the ARRB Mandated review and declassification projects can be two-edged swords. The JFK Act forced the Agency to review records that should have been opened years ago. The legal requirement to presume release, backed up by an independent review, resulted in the opening of documents that clearly would not have been released under other programs. However, the Act and the Review Board created by the Act imposed unrealistic deadlines, inflexible standards and procedures which created a major drain on all Agency review resources and had an over-all negative effect on the Agency's release program. Unrealistic Deadlines: The release dates set by the Act did not take into account the start-up time and costs (searches, inventorying and indexing) of a project of this magnitude, nor the time it would then take for a page-by-page review and sanitization of classified documents. For example, initial indexing of the collection was done on a crash basis using overtime employees and resulted in a flawed database. The revising, re-indexing and updating of that database took several thousand man-hours and continues today. Mandated Procedures: NARA's and ARRB's interpretation of the law created a time-consuming, labor-intensive review process that meant an inordinate amount of time was spent by both the Agency and Board staff on issues which were marginal to the story and to processing decisions by the Board. For example: a. Under the JFK Act every piece of paper in the collection was considered a "unique" assassination record. The result is a staggering amount of chaff and duplication. For example, one cable was files and processed 58 times in the collection. b. The ARRB required that all sanitized documents be reviewed by the Board and that each postponement (deletion) be acted on individually. Even after the Board changed procedures and accepted staff recommendations instead of reviewing each document, the detailed tracking, recording and coding of every deletion within each document required processing resources well beyond what would be considered reasonable for such a project. A most sanitized documents contained multiple deletions (one contained more than 1600 deletions and many over 100). Inflexible Standards: The level of evidence required by the Board to postpone what was generally considered protectable information was extremely high and usually required documentation of "current harm". Defenses based on general principles such as official cover or sources and methods were not acceptable. This required the Agency to dedicate significant resources to prepare evidence to support recommended postponements. Again, much time was spent on issues that were marginal to the JFK story. For example, several major evidence packages involving several offices and presentations by senior agency officers and officials were needed to secure Board agreement to protect Agency physical locations and names of employees and other persons not related to the JFK story. Three times during the six years of the project, including most of this past year, the JFK review effectively shut down all other aspects of the Historical Review Program and had to borrow additional resources from other offices and review projects to meet deadlines. The JFK review will continue to require a significant portion of HRP's resources through FY99. III. The Process and Lessons Learned There are a number of basic lessons from the JFK review that are applicable to other historical/systematic review projects: * We need reviewers with broad Agency experience, which can be either managerial or substantive. * We need to establish early on what information is already in the public domain and address the issue of "official release" in the context of each project. * Develop a strategy/policy with the IROs concerning the release of information. Be smart about it; do not accept stonewalling by them on relevant information that can be released. At the same time, avoid confrontations with them on marginal or non-relevant information. * On-site Directorate reviewers are the most effective way to handle the internal coordination requirements of a large project. Without the DO's JFK team on site it would have been impossible to complete the JFK project. * Develop guidelines and processes for coordinating Third Agency documents; include other agencies in discussions; do not drop documents into the black hole of other agencies' FOIA offices without this advance discussion. * Maintain written, up-to-date, project-specific declassification guidelines. This is no small task. A "declassification guide" must be flexible; no guide can anticipate all the issues which will arise in a review. After six years, we were still revising the JFK guidelines in the last month of the project. * In establishing deadlines, allow sufficient time to do a thorough, professional job as required by the project activities (see Unrealistic Deadlines above). * Ensure we have adequate support people for routine processing tasks; declassification involves both tough substantive analysis--and a lot of routine processing. * If possible, inventory/index all materials before the review and processing begins. Experienced indexers are a must. Identification of duplicate documents should be a key part of any inventory or index. IV ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records (see attached draft) Attachment I. Description of the JFK Collection Attachment II. [being drafted-will be available 17 Dec a.m.] [statistical summary of collection including size and status of documents (RIFs, SANS, DIFs, NBR, etc.)] DRAFT: Section 7, ARRB Requests for Additional Information and Records 1. Unlike most declassification projects, the Agency's involvement in the JFK Project was governed by the dictates of a Federal statute, the JFK Act, and the powers it vested in the Board it established -- the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB). In particular, under Section 7, the Act armed the ARRB with the authority to dig for records and information, specifically: ...(1) The Review Board shall have the authority to act in a manner prescribed under this Act, including authority to -- * * * (C)(ii) direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board, and if necessary investigate the facts surrounding, additional information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities; * * * (F) hold hearings, administer oaths, and subpoena witnesses and documents. This substantial authority provided the ARRB and its staff with almost unlimited access to Agency records and personnel. It also was the basis for a number of specific requests from the Board to the Agency for additional information, document searches and explanatory papers. HRP designated this ARRB activity, "Special Requests." During its existence the ARRB sent to the Agency fifty-three special requests, CIA 1-16 and CIA-IR 1-37. 2. Categories of Requests: Although each request had unique characteristics, all began as a request by the Board or an ARRB staff member on behalf of the board for information. The requests fell generally into five broad categories as follows: a. Requests for access to basic information which would help the board understand the CIA, its organizational structure and how it operated around the time of the assassination which included: Requests for organizational charts, briefings, mission statements, etc.; review of over ___ histories of CIA offices and projects; a review of the so-called "Breckinridge files;" and, a search for an IG index of Oswald reports. b. Requests about methodologies which included: How cable traffic was handled at HQ during the relevant time period; the existence and use of the inter-agency source registry; and, the assignment and use of alias's pseudonyms, crypts, etc. c. Requests for subject specific matters which included: The Mexico City Station annual reports; the existence of DRE monthly reports; Oswald's pre assassination files; and, a search for any documents or information detailing the Agency's involvement in transporting and processing the Zapruder film. d. Requests for project specific information and files, which included: Requests for information and files on AMWORLD, QKENCHANT, an index to the HTLINGUAL materials, and the Mexico City electronic surveillance tapes. e. Requests for individual specific information and files, which included both CIA and CIA associated individuals and non-CIA individuals: Information on individuals with JMWORLD; detailed information on Sylvia Duran; a determination of the identify of a particular "George Bush;" and, the files on William Pawley. 3. How a Request was Worked Following receipt of a request and HRP tasking the responsible Agency component(s) to conduct a search, the materials found were first reviewed by HRP staff members before access was provided to the ARRB staff. ARRB staff then reviewed the documents and materials and identified those which it believed were relevant to their inquiry and these materials were placed in the normal queue to be reviewed and processed for release. However, the mere identification of materials did not equate to automatic release. Rather, if particularly sensitive information was involved, negotiations took place and, on occasion, a written statement about the materials was provided for release vice the actual document(s). 4/3. The Agency's written responses to each request - either a letter or memoranda - included, of course, the fact the materials designated were to be processed for release according to then current guidelines. The ARRB staff then wrote its own version of the request, search, and response. Both of these are a part of the public record on this project. 5/4. Lessons learned: A number of things surfaced as HRP worked to complete these requests which required considerable explanation, negotiation, and resolution. a. First among these was the fact there existed an outside Board which asked for information and carefully monitored the responses (a very powerful external Board with subpoena authority), without doubt caused documents and information to be found and made available that would not have been provided to an internal declassification project. b. Second, for any large project such as JFK to be successful, there is an absolute requirement that each directorate and independent office identify two responsible persons -- a senior management official who can ensure that deadlines (particularly deadlines established by an external authority) are met; and, a senior focal point officer who has the substantive knowledge and background to both locate all relevant material and make decisions on its sensitivity. c. Third, the individuals identified and appointed in sub-paragraph "b" next above must be fully versed in the guidelines which pertain to each specific project. They cannot rely on FOIA or other guidelines as to the depth of their searches or the conditions governing release/redaction/denial of materials. ATTACHMENT #1 CIA'S JFK ASSASSINATION RECORD COLLECTION Oswald Files Pre-assassination "201" file—approximately 40 documents that existed at the time of the assassination. Released in 1992 with minimal deletions. DO 201 File (Approximately 26,000 pages): Agency's primary file for documents dealing with the assassination or mentioning Oswald; the file is still active. Contains pre-assassination documents; materials collected after the assassination and during the Warren Commission investigation; Mexico City files, Garrison investigation materials plus other documents related to the assassination or Oswald received over the years. A microfilm copy of file, as it existed in 1978, was sequestered by the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA). The DO's original (record copy) 201 was transferred to HRG in early 1992; a declassified version was released in August 1993; it was re-released with fewer deletions in 1996 under the authority of the ARRB. Additional documents, filed into the 201 after the its transfer to HRG, were released in September 1998. Office of Security File (2041 pages): Contained key Oswald documents, FBI investigative reports, newspaper clippings. This file, primarily duplicative of the 201, was reviewed by the HSCA, but a copy was not sequestered with the rest of the Agency's "JFK" collection. The file surfaced as a result of an ARRB request in 1997. A declassified version of the file was released in 1998. DCD "A" File (41 pages): A microfilm copy of this Oswald file was in the sequestered collection. The ARRB requested that the original file by reviewed for release. Marina Oswald's 201 file. A copy of this file from the sequestered microfilm collection was reviewed and released in 1994. The ARRB requested that the original file be reviewed for release by September 1999. The ARRB directed that the classified originals of all documents from the Oswald files be transferred to NARA for secure storage. These documents were transferred to NARA in October 1998. The Sequestered Collection At the end of its investigation, the HSCA directed that all materials (files, documents, memos, notes, tapes, etc.) collected or prepared in response to its investigation be sequestered. This included files made available for review, but not reviewed by the HSCA staff. JFK boxes 1-63 (hardcopy): These boxes are the core of the Agency's JFK collection. They are the working files/materials of the HSCA staff and reflects the wide range of issues pursued by the Committee. In addition to Agency documents, they include approximately 30,000 pages of notes, letters and memos created by the HSCA or its staff. The boxes are a combination of files on subjects and persons of interest to HSCA including documents prepared by the Agency as a result of the investigation, eight boxes of security files and Mexico City cable chrono files. The boxes contain a significant amount of duplication (most of the Oswald 201 documents appear multiple times in this part of the collection). A declassified version was released in August 1993, then re-released under ARRB in 1997. JFK Microfilm (72 reels): These reels are copies of Agency files that were made available to HSCA staff. Although the HSCA interest usually focused on a small portion of a file, the Committee sequestered the complete file. The microfilm includes approximately 25 reels of 201 files, 6 reels of Office of Personnel files, 14 reels of Anti/Castro - Cuban exile material, extensive files on Nosenko and operational and production files from Mexico City. The microfilm also contains copies of all the Oswald files except for the security file. DCI Morning Meeting Minutes This file contain 442 excerpts from the minutes of the DCI's Morning Meetings that refer to JFK assassination and related issues and investigations. The initial search for the minutes was in response to an FOIA. The material was turned over to HRG in 1993 for review and inclusion into the Collection. Russ Holmes' Working Files (19 boxes) Russ Holmes was a DO officer initially assigned to work on JFK assassination records in the mid-70s. He was one of the Agency's liaison officers with the HSCA during its investigation and subsequently became custodian of HSCA sequestered collection. He continued in this role until 1992. As the focal point for JFK related requests, Russ Holmes created a JFK reference file know as the "Ancillary Collection" (13 boxes). The contents are primarily duplicative (approximately 80%) of material found in Oswald's 201 and in the sequestered collection, but organized by subjects and requests. The collection contains some non-related material reflecting Holmes' involvement in other FOIA, etc. requests. There were an additional six boxes of unorganized reference material and files from his office transferred to HRG when he retired. These 19 boxes became know as the "Russ Holmes Working Files" and were declared assassination records as a collection by the ARRB. Non-duplicative records from this collection were released in September 1998. The duplicative material is currently being reviewed and will be transferred to NARA in early January 1999. LA Division JFK Task Force Files The survey undertaken in response to Executive Order ###### located seven boxes of DO Latin American Division continuing JFK Task Force files and related Cuban material. The ARRB staff reviewed the boxes; the non-duplicative JFK Task Force documents and selected documents from the Cuban material were designated as assassination records. 1637 pages from these boxes were transferred to NARA in October 1998. New assassination Records -- “M” [Miscellaneous] Series The ARRB submitted 53 numbered “Requests for Additional Information and Records” (CIA-# and CIA-IR-# series) plus many informal requests on individuals and subjects in their search for additional assassination records. Theses requests generated several 100 additional assassination records including 185 audio tapes from the Mexico City telephone taps. Additional material related to the JFK Act including DO cables to the field and working files of the HRP project officer were declared assassination records in the final actions of the Board. Over 4500 pages and 17 tapes have been reviewed and prepared for transfer to NARA. The remaining records and tapes are scheduled for completion by September 1999. JFK Assassination Records Collection Act - Five year Effort; Estimated 100 person years expended - Extraordinary Authorities/ Access/ “non Precedent Setting Releases” - Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action. - Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection. - Prepared a Declaration of Compliance with the Act, with a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Board’s requests. - Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review. - “The Review Board considered the CIA’s compliance with the JFK Act….to be one of [the Board’s] highest priorities.” It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency’s Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency’s activities in response to the Board. During FY 1998, compliance with the legal requirements of the JFK Act absorbed the preponderant portion of HRP resources. HRP completed necessary coordination with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board on behalf of the Agency, an ongoing process since FY 1994. HRP provided a central Agency focus for a process which: Coordinated with Board Staff on relevancy and classification on roughly 250,000 pages (many duplicates) Processed over 14,000 CIA documents upon which the Board took direct action. Transferred to the National Archives over 100,000 redacted pages for the JFK Collection. Prepared CIA’s Declaration of Compliance with the Act, a detailed accounting of CIA actions in response to the Boards requests. Negotiated a detailed Memorandum of Agreement among CIA, the JFK Board and the National Archives regarding the disposition and processing of all documents resulting from the five year review. The Board’s report of 30 September 1998 states that “The Review Board considered the CIA’s compliance with the JFK Act….to be one of [the Board’s] highest priorities.” It is particularly significant that the board fully accepted the Agency’s Declaration of Compliance and reported favorably on the Agency’s activities in response to the Board. JFK Act -- Process - Scope/Deadlines/Decisions defined by law and outside Board. - Focal Point (HRP) Serves Primarily as: (1) Moderator between Board and Components, (2) Bookkeeper, (3) Consistency Keeper. - Everything reviewed by Focal Point (HRP) and the appropriate component (Often many times). - Components often take strong initial position but recede in face of strong arguments. - Senior Agency Managers unaware of intricacies of the Process unless problems come up. - Exceptions: Issues Taken to Board by senior management: Cover, Employee Names, Facilities Stations. Without making a value judgment on the merits of the JFK Act, it is possible to characterize the process which the Act dictated for CIA. The scope/deadlines and decisions were defined in the law and by the Assassination Records Review Board, an outside body. Over the course of the history of this effort (5 years), CIA, as did other agencies, developed (and redeveloped) processes and responses to the Board. For the most part the detailed work by the Staff was at a level which did not involve senior managers unless a major problem arose. When problems did arise, Senior Agency officials were asked to make presentations to the Board and, in all cases, consensus was achieved. No issues from CIA had to be appealed to the President, the formal procedure in the Act for resolving differences between Agencies and the Board. JFK Lessons Learned - Statutory Mandates are Not Efficient - Requirements to declassify all drives out focus on important - Standards for Declassification are Invariably Different - Projects of equal merit without a statute are orphaned - Structure and Planning - Good Communications with Oversight Body - Expertise in Subject matter and Information Management - Strategy, Concepts and Policy known and Understood: - Guidelines (flexible), - Deadlines (reasonable), - Responsibilities - Understanding of Final Product Desired: - Media, Databases, indexes, etc. - Support of Senior Management - Our experience is that statutory mandates such as the JFK Act are very inefficient. The specific requirements of the act, including Board administrative decisions, required us to: - Address all possibly related documents, no matter how insignificant. - Engage in lengthy negotiation processes over an almost endless number of documents. - Establish databases for management of the documents and workflow - Treat documents in ways different from all other release programs. - Postpone plans for systematic declassification on other programs for which we had no legal mandate. - Our expectation is that there will be more of such mandates, including the recently enacted Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. Similar proposals are under consideration for human rights violations in central america. What we have learned from our JFK experience is that: - We need to remain in very close coordination with the Oversight body to assure that we are not going down the wrong street and will have to repeat efforts. - We have found that annuitants “who know the territory” can be extremely valuable as a resource for finding and understanding the sensitivity of material. - We know that we have to organize within the Agency and to gain agreement early on with regard to strategies for managing the effort, including agreement on what the final product is to be and how we are to get there. - We also need to keep senior management attention on what we are doing so that they are not surprised at the end, which not only causes delays in an orderly process but can lead to significant misunderstandings between senior participants. - We are trying to apply these lessons learned to our planning for the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM FROM: Charles A. Briggs JFK Declassification Project, OIM SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience 1. My assumption in preparing the attached is that I was asked because: a) for seven-plus years I've been involved in the project; and b) my past Agency assignments, including being the first DO Information Review Officer, gave me the opportunity to see declassification from many vantage points: from a legalistic directorate-oriented, either-or standpoint (taking full advantage of allowed exemptions), to a "corporate" Agency-wide strategy to foster credibility while protecting secrets that should remain secret. My comments and conclusions reflect that experience and do not necessarily reflect the views of HRP management. 2. Historically, the Deputy Directors have not paid much attention to information management - unless there's a problem. Then the approach has been: what went wrong; who's to blame; how can we ensure that this doesn't happen again; what lessons have we learned? What this JFK experience reiterates is the need for a proactive, not just reactive, flexible strategy, with corporate Agency direction through the Deputies to their Information Review Officers. And the IROs, who, in essence, determine credibility and resource impact, should be supergrades, with experience in at least two directorates. Because information release has become a major management issue, the Executive Director is the obvious officer to ensure consistent and informed implementation of release policy. SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE 3. Considerable skepticism in the public, the media, and, unfortunately, the Congress results from the in-house conclusion that denial is justifiable in the absence of "official acknowledgment" of Executive Branch information, even though such information is already in the public domain, from senior Agency officials' publications, Congressional investigations, books by former Cabinet-level NSC members, even Presidents. This inflexible legal strategy may win the battle and lose the war. Lawsuits are a lot more expensive than negotiation. 4. The Agency Task Force that in 1992 considered some of the aspects of DCI Gates' "openness" philosophy did not have the benefit of the JFK experience. I suggest that a senior-level panel be established to consider an objective look at the need for continued classification of generic versus specific sources and methods information, particularly that already in the public domain and when dealing with matters of high public or historic interest. HR 70-14, referring as it does in paragraph e.(4) to "Guidelines for Declassification" in Executive Order 12356, does not promote the tactical approach which is suggested in the Comments section on page eight of the attached. [Signature] Charles A. Briggs SUBJECT: THE JFK DECLASSIFICATION EXPERIENCE DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99) s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. JFK Declass Exp.doc Distribution: Original - Addressee, w/atts 1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts 1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson) 1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts 1 - SCD Subj, w/atts MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Review Group, OIM FROM: Charles A. Briggs JFK Declassification Project, OIM SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience 1. (AIUO) BACKGROUND: The impact of the JFK declassification law on Agency resources and information release decisions was dramatic and to the DO, traumatic. The resource trauma stemmed from the unanticipated number of years required to complete the project. In a memorandum for the DCI dated 11 June 1993, the then-Director of the Center for the Study of Intelligence outlined a plan for implementing the "openness philosophy" espoused by both DCIs Gates and Woolsey through a series of "Cold War Declassification" projects. He noted that priority, by virtue of a Congressionally-mandated deadline of 22 August 1993, had been given to declassification of the JFK collection; however, he said, "with the end of the JFK activity in sight," resources could be applied to the other projects. Six years later (actually seven since the project got underway), we are almost finished. 2. (AIUO) The substantive, versus administrative, trauma stemmed from the fact that the JFK Act superseded all other existing laws, including FOIA, the Privacy Act, the DCI's authorities, as well as Executive Orders and Regulations. The Act presumed release. It did allow for appeal but only to the President from the DCI. It allowed "postponements" but only if clear and convincing evidence was presented for each requested postponement and that release would demonstrably impair the national security. The net effect was the release of names, crypts, pseudos, methods, station locations (within specified dates), file identifier numbers, and tradecraft generally, which are protectable under the other laws - and which the Agency had --- 1 See OGC-92-5325, 14 Dec 92 and OGC-94-52916, 19 Sep 94 (Attachment B) SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience learned to live with (See Appendix A for the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) "Standards For Review" and "Key Distinctions Between Those Under FOIA, Executive Order 12356 and the JFK Act," with examples). 3. (U) Finally, a Presidentially-appointed assassination review board (the ARRB) had the final say both on postponement and on relevance, subject only to a successful DCI appeal to the President. Although a few appeals were considered, particularly in the early period, none was made. 4. (U) The JFK Act called for each agency to review and transfer its relevant material to NARA by 22 August 1993. Thus, a significant set of materials was transferred from CIA to NARA in 1993, reflecting CIA's then-current judgment on the redactions permitted. Subsequent Board reviews and ARRB staff inquiries resulted in the addition of material to that original set of documents, as well as adjustments to the original set, to reflect Board actions - generally to release more information. Although many documents have been adjusted or added to the collection, requiring substantive HRG and DO reviews as well as administrative actions, the net number of pages in CIA's JFK Collection at NARA is about 260,000. SIZE AND NATURE OF THE COLLECTION 5. (U) The material requiring line-by-line review included 17 boxes called the Oswald 201 File; 64 boxes called the "Segregated Collection" File, containing those documents made available to the House Subcommittee on Assassinations (HSCA) during its 1978 investigation; 23 boxes of HSCA referrals - staff notes in longhand and type, draft sections of the HSCA final report, correspondence on HSCA letterhead, trip reports - anything referred to us by the National Archives (NARA) for review of possible Agency equities; 19 boxes called "The Holmes Collection" - a reference collection used by the then-DO focal point for FOIA and other JFK queries, Russell Holmes; Presidential libraries material, Church Committee and Rockefeller Commission testimonies, National Security Council papers, PFIAB Minutes and other Community papers made available through the ARRB staff; and 13 boxes called "Miscellaneous," including follow-on questions from the ARRB, a previously overlooked Latin American Division working file, DCI calendars, some DI/OCI SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience "Dailies." Box 64 of the "Segregated Collection" consisted of 72 reels of microfilm of complete files from which the material reviewed by the HSCA staffers was drawn: CIA staff personnel and security files; a duplicate Oswald 201 file; 26 reels of 201 files on Cubans, Russians, and Americans linked with Oswald, the JFK assassination, and the several investigations; DO project history files, and so on. 6. (AIUO) Included were printed text, almost illegible Thermofax, photographs, computer listings, typed 3X5 cards, buckslips, routing sheets, handwritten scraps - every imaginable form of documentation, with a tremendous amount of duplication, in one instance, 54 copies of a Mexico City cable. Every one of these pieces of paper had to be handled according to NARA instructions, as a unique document for inclusion in the NARA collection for public access and with an Identification Aid for research assistance and retrieval. Among other things, the collection reflected little attention to procedures propounded by NARA itself for Records Management, including destruction of duplicate copies. 7. (AIUO) The pressure to meet an initial Congressionally-mandated release date of 22 August, 1993 with the NARA-required Research Identification Forms, resulted in a crash effort at indexing done, mainly, by individuals on loan from the directorates on an overtime basis and generally unfamiliar with the collection and the subject matter. Thus, a major factor in inconsistent redacting of multiple copies of the same document in different boxes was a function of the quality of the indexing and the effort of the reviewers to cope with constantly changing guidelines. Inadvertent release was inevitable. THE REVIEW PROCESS 8. (AIUO) The majority of the reviewers were independent contractors with many years of experience, in some cases senior management experience in at least two directorates. Two HRG reviewers had been Information Review Officers themselves as supergrades, one in the DO, the other in the DA. After the HRG review with suggestions for release in full or with redactions, the documents went to a DO review team. The DO agreement or disagreement was reflected on each document, and the package was returned for a senior-level HRP review prior to forwarding to the ARRB. SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience 9. (AIUO) As complicated and frustrating as the process was, it wouldn’t have worked at all without the on-site presence of the DO team with their link to DO/IMS and the area divisions in Headquarters. Not surprisingly, the DO Headquarters tended to use the familiar FOIA standards, under which much more information could be withheld than was defendable under the JFK law. A major part of the JFK story was Oswald’s trip to Mexico City; it took several months for the DO to agree to allow acknowledgment of the existence of a station in Mexico City and many more months to release the name, pseudo, and tenure of the chief of station - information, except for the pseudo, long since in the public domain. 10. (AIUO) Another long time debate concerned acknowledgment of teletap and photo surveillance by the Mexico City Station on the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates - both discussed in open literature but disguised as unidentified sensitive source materials in the Warren Commission report, along with a cropped photo and transcripts of telephone conversations that came to the station from somewhere. One issue, for a long time, was acknowledging that the teletaps were station activities. The ARRB insisted on nearly total release of Mexico City Station traffic, history, personnel, and project approvals because Oswald’s trip to Mexico City remained one of the most controversial conspiracy theory aspects of the JFK story. Proof of Oswald’s presence there, of his contact with the Soviet and Cuban embassies and consulates, and the reasons therefore, of the station’s unfamiliarity with him prior to the assassination became evident through release of the detailed information on the teletap and photo operations. 11. (AIUO) After the ARRB staff received the Agency reviewed material, discussion of the validity of the deletions (the “postponements”) occurred. In the early stages there was a tendency for the Agency Information Review Officers in the directorates to deny rather than release, to test using FOIA standards until challenged, then back off. In a couple of instances, assertions were made that the information that the ARRB said should be released was so sensitive that an appeal to the President would be made - but it wasn’t. The net result of the deny-until-pushed approach was an absence of credibility, leading the ARRB to include the following statement in its Final Report to the President on 30 September 1998: SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience "A small number of CIA staff officers, almost exclusively in the Directorate of Operations, unnecessarily impeded the process and damaged the Agency's interests by resisting compromise with all-or-nothing positions." 12. (AIUO) As time passed and both Agency and ARRB staffers became better educated in attempting the balance between the public interest and the legitimate need for secrecy, credibility improved, the ARRB members delegated the negotiation process to the staff. Previously, every postponed word, phrase, or paragraph had to be approved by the Board. Toward the end, only remaining disagreements were passed by the staff to the Board. THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE 13. (AIUO) The ARRB, under the law, determined relevance of file material - the Agency could not do so although it could and did, eventually quite successfully, negotiate. Because of the impact of the Oliver Stone movie "JFK," reflecting a 70-80% public view that the Warren Commission conclusion that Oswald acted on his own was wrong, the ARRB pursued all the major conspiracy theories. Thus, Agency files on the USSR's handling of American defectors, entry and departure controls on foreigners, alien employment and marriage with Soviet citizens, and, particularly, KGB interest in Oswald, and Nosenko's claim to have reviewed Oswald's KGB file in Moscow were declared relevant - as was the whole Nosenko bona fides issue. Agency contact with the Mafia to arrange for Castro's assassination, not known to the Warren Commission, were obviously relevant and, by extension, assassination as an Agency activity was considered relevant - hence, all such testimony before the Church Committee had to be reviewed. Of particular interest was the plot against Lumumba because of the involvement of the former Chief of the Technical Services Division, which division was also involved in the Castro assassination planning. 14. (U) The major conspiracy theory of interest to the Board concerned Cubans: either alleged Castro involvement because of his awareness of plotting against himself or Cuban exiles, furious with JFK for the Bay of Pigs failure. Thus, all files on Agency support to the many Cuban SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience exile groups and CIA involvement in Project MONGOOSE were declared relevant. Hundreds of JM WAVE cables, Mexico City Station documents, and Cuban names, and many with their crypts, were released. 15. (U) Those records that the Board concluded "truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination" were designated "not believed relevant" (NBR). Cooperative negotiation resulted in about 50,000 pages being declared NBR. INADVERTENT RELEASES/FOREIGN LIAISON CONCERNS 16. (AIUO) As noted above, inadvertent releases were inevitable. The contributing factors included: guidelines that changed almost continuously as negotiations with the ARRB reduced the claims of current sensitivity; inaccurate and incomplete records on the cover status of retirees; an initial tendency, consistent with FOIA practices, to deny crypts but to release true names- the crypt implying an Agency relationship- if the text did not imply same. (Later: duplicate copies plus mosaic pattern analysis made linkage of some crypts and true name quite easy.); and a surge of inexperienced reviewers loaned during the closing days to meet the agreed NARA deadline for the remaining files. 17. (S) The inadvertent releases of former employees names resulted in a few individual complaints but no known foreign government or liaison service complaints. Four foreign governments opposed release of their information when queried, but no inadvertent releases were involved. (See Appendix C.) The worst slip appears to have been the name of a former NOC, living abroad, who, upon being informed, demanded and received compensation for the violation of his confidential relationship with CIA and the FBI. The other outraged former employee, also living abroad, threatened to contact the President if it became known in his adopted country that he had been CIA. His true name, on a great many documents, is the only redaction; he was of considerable interest to the Board as a key player in the HSCA investigation because he was the Mexico Branch chief and was initially appointed by the DDO to be the focal point for JFK assassination information and briefings. The HSCA allowed him to testify in alias, and the ARRB allowed the substitution of his alias wherever his true name appeared; however, the Board ruled that his true name should be SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience released in May 2001 or on his death if before that date. Given the volume of the documents in which his name appeared, there were inadvertent releases of his true name. IMPACT OF THE JFK RELEASES ON FUTURE DECLASSIFICATION PROGRAMS 18. (AIUO) Whether the JFK Act is, or should be considered, precedent-establishing has been argued since its passage. It addresses a unique, highly emotional event, of obvious interest to the public; and it should serve as a catalyst for future declassification policy discussion. But it should not be considered to have set a legal precedent. What should result is what the ARRB directed in the case of exact duplicate documents: that they all be handled consistently, with the same, or no, redactions. Other documents concerning the same or a similar event, not exact duplicates but relevant to the issue, and not subject to the tight legal demands of the JFK legislation, could be reviewed in accordance with the exemptions allowed under the FOIA or the Executive Order. However, the basic factor in deciding on release or denial should not be the avoidance of embarrassment through inconsistent or inadvertent release. It should be the current need for protection of sources and methods. 19. (U) The JFK experience did demonstrate that a traditional generic sources and methods denial is not always necessary, defendable, or smart. Instead of being negatively reactive, it may well be tactically smarter to be proactive to better ensure protection of important secrets. More on that below. 20. (AIUO) LESSONS LEARNED: - Don’t cut costs on indexing. Use experienced indexers. Aim for indexing all materials before review and processing begins. A key focus should be identification of duplicate documents. - Use retirees with broad Agency experience under staff supervision. Because the most common release problems usually involve DO material, seriously consider an on site-DO team. SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience - Develop and keep updating written guidelines, including those for coordinating third-agency documents. - Establish early what is already in the public domain. Take a fresh look at the "official release" philosophy, particularly as concerns former DCIs, Cabinet Officers, Presidents, and Congressional investigations. - Develop better information on the cover status of retired employees. - Avoid confrontation on marginal or non-relevant information. Avoid stonewalling on relevant information. - Because the Information Review Officers are the key implementers of information release policy, ensure that the guidance given them by their Deputy Directors has Agency corporate equity. 21. (AIUO) COMMENTS: Information Management, Information Warfare, Information Handling, Information Declassification: at least three of these terms have elicited groans from senior Agency management and a preference to have someone else, some staffer, deal with the subject, keeping the boss out of trouble and minimally informed. But inflexible insistence on continued classification of dated information, particularly that known to the public, ignorance of what has already been declassified and released, and counterproductive stonewalling - these factors have caused trouble and will cause more trouble as the "Information Age" matures. 22. (C) In 1976, then DDI Ed Proctor wrote to the DCI, citing "the need to rationalize the classification process." A 1977 memorandum for the Agency's Executive Committee by two of the current HRG contract reviewers urged the development of an O/DDCI level (the Executive Director position having been abolished) policy review of flap potential in information release and a computer-supported index to released documents. At various times in the 1970s, consideration was given to establishing a fifth Directorate of Information Handling. After a good bit of internal agonizing, DCI Gates in April 1992 signed off on HR 70-14 to make "significant historical information available without SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience damage to national security." Subsequently, a central management focal point was established in the Office of Information Management and a system that addresses part of the indexing goal and, with its mandatory declassification "metrics" (millions of pages of released documents), modulates some of the outside criticism alleging that CIA is reneging on "openness." 23. (AIUO) What is missing is a Year 2000 look at secrecy. When the FOIA law was passed and the Agency was traumatized by receipt of 150 public requests a day for information, we were able to make case law in the courts and protect sensitive sources and methods by non-arbitrary and non-capricious use of allowed exemptions. It is obvious today that a more forward-thinking strategy than the "no comment" of the 1950s and the "answer the question only as asked" of the 1970s is needed - the JFK experience demonstrated both the counterproductive result of an all-or-nothing defense and that credibility and compromise can be gained without current sensitivity loss. And the fact that Chairman Porter Goss has joined with Senator Moynihan in proposing the existence of an outside group on the model of the JFK Assassination Review Board as arbiter in the government declassification arena is a very clear signal. 24. (AIUO) In my view (and as was the case, briefly, in the past), this extremely complicated, frustrating, and ubiquitous topic requires the personal attention of the Executive Director with "corporate" Agency focused guidance to the Deputies for their personal attention and policy guidance to the IROs. And because the IROs, as the implementors of their Deputies' policies, determine the credibility and resource impact levels, they should be supergrades and experienced in at least two directorates. 25. (AIUO) The eventual development of a credible association with the JFK ARRB was a function of: (1) the patience and diplomacy of the HRP/JFK Project Officer, Barry Harrelson and (2) the presence, on site, of the DO team, without whom this exercise could not have been completed. Ironically, as is so often the case when an individual or group is between a rock and a hard place, as the DO team was between the DO desk officers, the DO/IRO, and the HRP reviewers, there were allegations of their having SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience been co-opted. Both the DO team and HRG were seen, at times, as "the enemy." That kind of in-house idiocy needed instant quashing. 26. (AIUO) CONCLUSIONS: The JFK Project cost far too much, took far too long, produced no information to change the conclusion that Oswald acted alone. But it did make available to the public previously withheld operational material to negate what DCI Gates had called the most heinous of the conspiracy theories: that CIA was involved in the assassination of the President of the United States. The resource impact was a function of: the unique requirements of the law; the crash nature of the initial release; the National Archives decision that every duplicate must be reviewed and indexed as a unique document; less than satisfactory indexing, contributing to inadvertent releases and time wasted in checking for consistency in the handling of duplicates; problems in determining the cover status of retired employees; and stonewalling. 27. (AIUO) Although there was inconsistency and inadvertent release and some resultant retiree anger, we know of no significant national security breach. Previously withheld information from the Church Committee hearings and from the Presidential libraries declared relevant by the ARRB will be titillating and may stimulate FOIA requests, but the variance from FOIA rules was not a legal justification for withholding under the JFK law. 28. (U) If this experience leads to a serious objective look at the theory and practice of secrecy in this changed world, perhaps the cost will have been worth it. Attachments: A. Excerpt from Final Report of the ARRB (Standards) B. OGC Memorandum C. Foreign Government Information SUBJECT: The JFK Declassification Experience DA/OIM/IRG/SCD/CABriggs:bkh/31835 (29 Oct 99) s:/oim/fo/jim/hrp/jfk/C.B. Memo The JFK Declass Exp.doc Distribution: Original - Addressee, w/atts 1 - C/IRG/SCD, w/atts 1 - IRG/SCD/HRO, w/atts (Harrelson) 1 - SCD Chrono, w/atts 1 - SCD Subj, w/atts closure-oriented than President Reagan’s order. The current Executive Order applies to all Executive branch records and, unlike the JFK Act, requires agencies to engage in a systematic declassification of all records more than 25 years old. The Executive Order gives agencies five years—until April 2000—to declassify all classified information that is (1) more than 25 years old, and (2) is of permanent historical value unless the “agency head” determines that release of the information would cause one of the nine enumerated harms. The Executive Order provides for continuing protection for sources and methods where disclosure would damage the national security. It also protects, inter alia, information that involves diplomatic relations, U.S. cryptologic systems, war plans that are still in effect, and protection of the President.8 The JFK Act guidelines that governed the disclosure of records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy were detailed in section 6 of the JFK Act.9 The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone the release of assassination records only where the agencies provided clear and convincing evidence that one of five enumerated harms would occur if the Review Board released the record and that the harm outweighed the public interest in disclosure. The statute allowed protection of intelligence agents and intelligence sources and methods if the agency could show that the agent, source, or method currently required protection. The statute further allowed the Board to protect the identity of living persons who provided confidential information to the government if the agency could show that disclosure of the person’s identity would pose a substantial risk of harm to the person. The JFK Act allowed the Review Board to postpone release of information if release would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or if release would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality between a government agent and a cooperating individual or foreign government. Finally, the JFK Act allowed the Review Board to protect current information concerning protection of government officials. 2. Key Distinctions Between Standards of Release Under the FOIA, the Executive Order, and the JFK Act In considering whether the JFK Act was necessary to guarantee public access to assassination records, Congress evaluated the effectiveness of both the FOIA and the then-current Executive Order 12356. Both the House and the Senate concluded that the FOIA and the Executive Order, as administered by the executive branch, had failed to guarantee adequate public disclosure of assassination records. At the time that the JFK Act became law, the largest collections of records concerning the assassination were under the control of the FBI, the CIA, and the Congressional Committees who investigated the assassination. The FOIA provides special protections for each of these entities, and thus could not serve as the mechanism for maximum disclosure of assassination records. First, the FOIA exempts CIA operational files from disclosure.10 Second, the FOIA provides broad-based protection for law enforcement files and therefore allows the FBI to protect a substantial amount of its information from disclosure.11 Third, the FOIA does not apply to unpublished Congressional records.12 Congress found that the FOIA did not require adequate disclosure in those records that it did cover. Thus, Congress believed that the FOIA was not a satisfactory mechanism for guaranteeing disclosure of assassination records.13 President Clinton did not sign Executive Order 12958 until April 17, 1995—over two years after Congress passed the JFK Act. Clearly, the terms of the Executive Order applied to most assassination records since they were of permanent historical value and were over 25 years old. Even if President Clinton’s Executive Order had been in effect prior to 1992, it could not have achieved the maximum disclosure accomplished by the JFK Act. The problem with the Executive Order is that it allowed “agency heads” to make the decision to exempt records from automatic declassification provided that the “agency head” expected that disclosure of the records would result in one of the nine enumerated categories of harm. As many sections of this Report explain, the Review Board found that "agency heads" tended to be quite reluctant to release their agencies' secrets. The Executive Order, while well-intentioned, failed to provide for any independent review of "agency heads'" decisions on declassification. Thus, although the Executive Order's standards for declassification appeared to be disclosure-oriented, the Executive Order failed to hold agency heads accountable for their decisionmaking. The JFK Act did require agencies to account for their decisions. To ensure such accountability, Congress included four essential provisions in the JFK Act: first, the JFK Act presumed that assassination records may be released; second, the JFK Act stated that an agency could rebut the presumption of disclosure only by proving, with clear and convincing evidence, that disclosure would result in harm and that the expected harm would outweigh any public benefit in the disclosure; third, the JFK Act created an independent agency—the Review Board—whose mandate was to ensure that agencies respected the presumption of disclosure and honestly presented clear and convincing evidence of the need to protect information; and fourth, the JFK Act required agencies to provide the Review Board with access to government records, even when those records would not become part of the JFK Collection. Without these accountability provisions, the JFK Act would not have accomplished its objective of maximum release of assassination records to the public. So, while the FOIA and the Executive Order each expressed the goal of obtaining maximum disclosure, the JFK Act ensured that the goal would be met. The two accountability provisions that relate directly to the Section 6 grounds for postponement—the presumption of release and the standard of proof—are discussed in detail below. The third provision discussed below is the Review Board's obligation to balance the weight of the evidence in favor of postponement against the public interest in release. a. JFK Act presumes disclosure of assassination records. The most pertinent language of the JFK Act was the standard for release of information. According to the statute, "all Government records concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy should carry a presumption of immediate disclosure." The statute further declared that "only in the rarest cases is there any legitimate need for continued protection of such records."15 b. JFK Act requires agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence. If agencies wished to withhold information in a document, the JFK Act required the agency to submit clear and convincing evidence that the information fell within one of the narrow postponement criteria.16 Congress selected the clear and convincing evidence standard because "less exacting standards, such as substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence, were not consistent with the legislation's stated goal" of prompt and full release.17 The legislative history of the JFK Act emphasized the statutory requirement that agencies provide clear and convincing evidence. There is no justification for perpetual secrecy for any class of records. Nor can the withholding of any individual record be justified on the basis of general confidentiality concerns applicable to an entire class. Every record must be judged on its own merits, and every record will ultimately be made available for public disclosure.18 When agencies did present to the Review Board evidence of harm that would result from disclosure, it had to consist of more than speculation. The [Review] Board cannot postpone release because it might cause some conceivable or speculative harm to national security. Rather in a democracy the demonstrable harm from disclosure must be weighed against the benefits of release of the information to the public.19 The Review Board's application of the clear and convincing evidence standard is covered in more detail in Section B of this chapter. Section B includes a discussion of the “Rule of Reason” that the Review Board ultimately adopted with regard to receiving evidence from the agencies. c. JFK Act requires the Review Board to balance evidence for postponement against public interest in release. Assuming that agencies did provide clear and convincing evidence that information should be protected from disclosure, the terms of section 6 required that information not be postponed unless the threat of harm outweighs the public interest in disclosure. As used in the JFK Act, “public interest” means “the compelling interest in the prompt public disclosure of assassination records for historical and governmental purposes and for the purpose of fully informing the American people about the history surrounding the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.” The Review Board interpreted the balancing requirement to mean that agencies had to provide the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence of the threat of harm that would result from disclosure. However, to the extent that the JFK Act left room for discretion in evaluating the historical significance, or public interest, of particular assassination records, it was the Review Board—not the agency that originated the document—that was to exercise this discretion. The burden was on the agencies to make the case for postponement, not to judge the level of public interest in a particular document. The JFK Act established the Review Board as a panel of independent citizens with expertise as historians and archivists precisely in order to secure public confidence in such determinations. d. Segregability and substitute language. When the Review Board determined that the risk of harm did outweigh the public interest in disclosure, it then had to take two additional steps: (1) ensure that the agency redacted the least amount of information possible to avoid the stated harm, or “segregate” the postponed information, and (2) provide substitute language to take the place of the redaction. 3. Federal Agency Record Groups and the Standards Applied to Them. The JFK Act defines “assassination records” to include records related to the assassination of President Kennedy that were “created or made available for use by, obtained by, or otherwise came into the possession of” the following groups: the Warren Commission, the four congressional committees that investigated the assassination, any office of the federal government, and any state or local law enforcement office that assisted in a federal investigation of the assassination. When it passed the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Collection to include the record groups that it identified in section 3(2), but it also intended for the Review Board to consider carefully the scope of the term “assassination record” and to issue an interpretive regulation defining this crucial term. The Act requires government agencies to identify, organize, and process those assassination records that are defined as assassination records in section 3(2). Chapter 6 of this report explains how the Review Board interpreted its responsibility to define and seek out “additional records and information.” Set forth below is a description of some of the core government holdings on the assassination which were released under the standards of the Review Board. a. The FBI’s “core and related” files. The FBI’s “core and related” files consist of those records that the FBI gathered in response to FOIA requests that it received in the 1970s for records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. The “core” files include the FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby, as well as the FBI’s Warren Commission files and the JFK assassination investigation file. The “related” files include FBI files on Lee Harvey Oswald’s wife Marina and mother Marguerite, Oswald’s friend George DeMohrenschildt, and the Oswalds’ Dallas friends Ruth and Michael Paine. The FBI began its processing of the core and related files in 1993. The Review Board applied strict standards to its review of postponements in the core and related files. b. CIA’s Lee Harvey Oswald “201” file. CIA opens a 201 file on an individual when it has an “operational interest” in that person. The CIA opened its 201 file on Lee Harvey Oswald in December 1960 when it received a request from the Department of State on defectors. After President Kennedy’s assassination, the Oswald 201 file served as a depository for records CIA gathered and created during CIA’s wide-ranging investigation of the assassination. Thus, the file provides the most complete record of the CIA’s inquiry in the months and years immediately following the assassination. c. The FBI’s “House Select Committee on Assassinations” (HSCA) Subject Files. During the HSCA’s tenure, the Committee made a number of requests to the FBI for records that the Committee believed might be relevant to their investigation of the Kennedy assassination. In response to the HSCA’s requests, the FBI made available to the HSCA staff approximately 200,000 pages of FBI files. The FBI began its processing of the “HSCA Subject” files in 1993. The Review Board applied its “Segregated Collection” guidelines (explained below) to the HSCA subject files. d. The CIA’s “Segregated Collection” files. HSCA investigators gained access to CIA files. Upon completion of the HSCA’s work, the CIA kept separate the files that it had made available to the HSCA and retained them as a segregated collection. This collection is divided into two parts: paper records and microfilm. CIA made 63 boxes of paper records available to the HSCA staff. The paper records consist, in many cases, of particular records that CIA culled from various files. The 64th box of the CIA’s segregated collection contains 72 reels of microfilm and represents the entire set of files from which records were made available to the HSCA. Thus, in many cases, the microfilmed files contain material well beyond the scope of the HSCA investigation and may, for example, cover an agent’s entire career when only a small portion of it intersected with the assassination story. e. FBI records on the congressional committees that investigated the assassination. The JFK Act defined “assassination record” to include records relating to the Kennedy assassination that were used by the congressional committees who investigated events surrounding the assassination. Before President Clinton appointed the Review Board, the FBI collected and began to process its administrative files relating to its involvement with each of these committees. In large part, the records contained in the Bureau’s administrative files related to topics other than the Kennedy assassination. To the extent that the Review Board found records in these files that concerned topics other than the Kennedy assassination, it designated the records not believed relevant (or “NBR” as that acronym is defined infra) and removed them from further consideration. f. Requests for Additional Information. Congress included in the JFK Act a provision that allowed the Review Board to obtain additional information and records beyond those that were reviewed by previous investigations. Chapter 6 of this report explains the requests that the Review Board made and the assassination records designated as a result of those requests. B. DECLASSIFICATION STANDARDS The Review Board’s primary purpose, as outlined in section 7(b) of the JFK Act, was to determine whether an agency’s request for postponement of disclosure of an assassination record met the criteria for postponement set forth in section 6. Section 6 consisted of an introductory clause, which established the “clear and convincing evidence” standard, and five subsections that set forth the criteria under which the Review Board could agree to postpone public disclosure of assassination-related information. 1. Standard of Proof: Clear and Convincing Evidence Text of Section 6 Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if [agencies provide] clear and convincing evidence that [the harm from disclosure outweighs the public interest in release.] a. Review Board guidelines. For each recommended postponement, the JFK Act requires an agency to submit “clear and convincing evidence” that one of the specified grounds for postponement exists. The Review Board required agencies to submit specific facts in support of each postponement, according to the Review Board’s guidelines for each postponement type. b. Commentary. Although the agencies argued that the clear and convincing evidence standard could be satisfied by a general explanation of those agencies’ positions in support of postponements, the Review Board determined that the clear and convincing evidence requirement was a document-specific one. Thus, the Board required agencies to present evidence that was tailored to individual postponements within individual documents. The JFK Act clearly required agencies to provide clear and convincing evidence in support of their postponements, but it did not establish a mechanism for when and how such evidence should be presented. The legislative history provides a clue as to Congress’ intent: “[T]o the extent possible, consultation with the government offices creates an understanding on each side as to the basis and reasons for their respective recommendations and determinations.” The Review Board did consult with government offices to determine fair, efficient, and reasonable procedures for presenting evidence. The Review Board began its review of assassination records by considering pre-assassination records on Lee Harvey Oswald. In an attempt to arrive at consistent decisions, the Board asked the staff to present the records on an issue-by-issue basis. For example, with FBI records, the Review Board first scheduled a group of FBI records for review and notified the FBI of the meeting date at which it intended to vote on the records. The Review Board invited the FBI to present its evidence. Second, the FBI requested that it be allowed to brief the members of the Review Board. At the briefing, the FBI presented its position to the Board—both in an oral presentation and in a “position paper.” The FBI’s “position papers” summarized the FBI’s general policy preferences for continued classification of certain categories of information. Third, the Review Board staff researched existing law on each of the FBI’s “positions” and determined that the arguments that the FBI put forth in support of its JFK Act postponements were essentially the same arguments that the FBI offers to courts for FOIA cases. Of course, in legislating the declassification standards of the JFK Act, Congress intended for the JFK Act standards—and not the FOIA standards—to apply. Aware of congressional intent, the Review Board rejected the FBI’s general policy preferences on the basis that the arguments did not constitute the clear and convincing evidence necessary to support a request for a postponement under section 6. The FBI did appeal the Review Board’s decisions to the President, but the Review Board’s document-specific interpretation of the clear and convincing evidence standard ultimately prevailed when the vote was withdrawn. i. “Rule of Reason.” Of course, some assassination records are of greater interest than others. With regard to records that had a close nexus to the assassination, the Review Board strictly applied the law. For example, the Review Board voted to release in full nearly all of the information in the FBI’s pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald file and the bulk of the information in the HSCA’s report on CIA activities in Mexico City—the “Lopez” report—because of the high public interest in that material. With regard to the FBI files, the FBI believed that its arguments were compelling enough to merit appeals to the President on nearly all of the Review Board’s decisions on the pre-assassination Lee Harvey Oswald records. The FBI, the Review Board, the White House Counsel’s Office, and ultimately the Department of State spent a substantial amount of time resolving the issues that arose in the appeal process, and for those important records that were at issue, the Review Board considered its time well-spent. The Review Board similarly dealt with other key records and spent as much time as was necessary to deliberate and decide upon those records. The postponement-by-postponement review at each early Review Board meeting proved to be a slow and careful process. The postponement-by-postponement review proved to be a necessary educational process for the Board members. The Board members were a group of five citizens who were selected not for their familiarity with the subject of the assassination, but for their professional competence in history and law. Thus, through reviewing individual documents at its early meetings, the Board essentially educated itself about the assassination. While the Review Board did need time to educate itself and to develop its policies, the Board’s pace eventually increased. In an effort to streamline its work, the Review Board consulted with federal agencies such as the CIA and FBI to work out an approach for review of records that would allow the Review Board to make informed decisions, but not require agencies to spend hundreds of hours locating evidence for and providing briefings on each postponement within an assassination record. The first step to developing a reasonable approach was for the Review Board to formulate general rules for sustaining and denying postponements. The Review Board’s “guidance” to its staff and the agencies became a body of rules—a Review Board “common law.” Once the Review Board notified an agency of its approach on a particular type of postponement, the agency learned to present only those facts that the Review Board would need to make a decision. For example, with regard to FBI informants, the Review Board notified the FBI of what it considered to be the relevant factors in its decisionmaking. In other words, it defined for the Bureau what it considered to be “clear and convincing” evidence. Then, the Review Board worked with the FBI to create a one-page form titled an “Informant Postponement Evidence Form” that the FBI could use to provide evidence on an informant. (See illustration.) The form allowed the FBI to simply fill in the answers to a series of questions about the informant in question, which in turn allowed the Review Board to focus on those facts that it deemed to be dispositive in a particular document. This approach had the added benefit of providing consistency to the Review Board’s decisionmaking. A large number of records that the JFK Act defined as “assassination records” proved to be of very low public interest. The JFK Act required the Review Board to process all records that were “made available” to the Warren Commission and the Congressional Committees that investigated the assassination, whether or not the records were used by the Commission or the committees. Many of these records, while interesting from a historian’s perspective, are not closely related to the assassination. For those documents that were of little or no public interest, the Review Board modified its standards in the two ways described below. A. “NBR” Guidelines: Records that Review Board judged were “not believed relevant” to the assassination. For those records that truly had no apparent relevance to the assassination, the Review Board designated the records “not believed relevant” (NBR). The “NBR” Guidelines allowed the Review Board to remove irrelevant records from further consideration. Records that the Review Board designated “NBR” were virtually the only groups of records that the Review Board agreed to postpone in full. Thus, the Review Board was always extremely reluctant to designate records “NBR” and rarely did so. B. Segregated Collection Guidelines. For those records that were not immediately relevant, but shed at least some light on issues that the congressional committees that investigated the assassination explored as potentially relevant to the assassination, the Review Board created the “Segregated Collection Guidelines.” The segregated collections records, although marginally relevant, were not appropriate for “NBR” designation, as the “NBR” Guidelines would have resulted in withholding records in full. Instead, the Board passed the “Segregated Collection” Guidelines, which ensured that the Review Board staff would review every page of the marginally relevant records, but would not require agencies to present the same amount of evidence in support of postponements. The regulations that the Review Board adopted on November 13, 1996, define “Segregated Collections” to include the following: (1) FBI records that were requested by the HSCA in conjunction with its investigation into the assassination of President Kennedy, the Church Committee in conjunction with its inquiry into issues relating to the Kennedy assassination, and the Pike Committee and Rockefeller Commission that investigated issues related to the assassination; (2) CIA records including the CIA’s segregated collection of 63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records (box 64) and several boxes of CIA staff “working files.” The Review Board adopted revised guidelines on April 23, 1997 in an attempt to streamline the review process of postponements in the segregated collections, and ensure a page-by-page review of all documents in the segregated collections. The guidelines state, “...even with the assumption that our operations may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete review of postponements in the Segregated Collections under the current method of review.” Where the Review Board’s standards differed between core files and segregated collection files, the guidelines set forth below note the distinction. Thus, throughout its tenure, the Review Board sought to be vigorous in applying the law, but, in order to complete its work, found it necessary to employ a “rule of reason.” 2. Intelligence Agents Text of Section 6(1)(A) ...clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal— (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection... The CIA, however, was reluctant to produce name-specific evidence and, on occasion, CIA failed to furnish evidence when it promised to do so. CIA’s initial refusal to supply evidence on individual names was met, not with the wholesale release of names by the Board, but with a firm insistence that the Agency meet the requirements of the Act. The Review Board released the names of a few individuals who were of central importance to the assassination story early in the process, but gave the Agency a number of additional opportunities to provide specific evidence on other names. For example, in December 1995, the Review Board designated one day of their meeting “name day,” and invited CIA to provide evidence for names the Review Board had encountered in CIA records during the previous six to seven months. On that day, CIA again requested the Review Board to sustain the postponement of all CIA names. The Review Board did not want to jeopardize the personal safety of individuals and gave CIA more time to provide evidence. The Board set other “name days” in May 1996 and May 1997. As deadlines for submission of evidence approached, CIA agreed to release some names, but in most cases, continued to offer less than satisfactory evidence on those they wished to protect. Gradually, the CIA did begin to provide supporting evidence of the postponement of individual names. By May 1996, the Review Board had decided what evidence would meet the clear and convincing evidence standard. If the CIA provided evidence that the individual retired under cover or abroad, or evidence that the individual objected to the release of his or her name when contacted (CIA agreed to attempt to contact former employees), the Review Board would protect the CIA officer’s name. Moreover, where the CIA specifically identified an ongoing operation in which the individual was involved or CIA could demonstrate that the person was still active with CIA, the Review Board would protect the name. Because the JFK Act required the Review Board to balance the potential harm from disclosure against the public interest in release, there were cases in which the Review Board determined that, even though the CIA had provided the required evidence, the Review Board believed that the individual was of sufficiently high public interest that it would require the CIA to provide additional evidence before it would consider protecting the name. In these cases, the Review Board asked CIA to provide information on the employee’s current status, his or her location, and the nature of the work he or she did for the CIA. The Review Board determined that names were of high public interest when the CIA officer at issue had a substantive connection to the assassination story or where the CIA officer’s name appeared in CIA’s Oswald 201 file. By July 1997, the Review Board had determined that where CIA officer names did not fit within one of the “high public interest” categories, it would require CIA to provide significantly less evidence in support of its requests for postponement. Given the large number of CIA officer names in the CIA records, the Review Board determined that it had to adopt the practical high public interest/low public interest approach, particularly since it had limited time and resources available to complete its own review of CIA records. The Review Board would have preferred to review each name at the same high level of scrutiny that it used to review names of high public interest. Nevertheless, the Board’s approach compelled the CIA to release many more names than it would have desired. b. “John Scelso” (pseudonym). i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the true name of the individual known by the pseudonym of John Scelso until May 1, 2001 or three months after the decease of the individual, whichever comes first. ii. Commentary. The CIA employee who was head of CIA’s division “Western Hemisphere 3” during the period immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy testified before the HSCA and the Church Committee under the “throw-away” alias John Scelso. His true name appears on hundreds of documents in the JFK collection, many of which were the product of the Agency’s extensive post-assassination investigation that spanned the globe. In reviewing this particular name, the Review Board’s desire to satisfy the public’s interest in release clashed with the CIA's strong evidence in support of postponement. Initially, the Board was inclined to release Scelso's true name, but the Agency argued convincingly against release. CIA provided evidence on the current status of the individual, shared correspondence sent by him, and even arranged an interview between him and a Review Board staff member. As an interim step, the Review Board inserted his prior alias "Scelso" as substitute language. (See illustration.) Then, at its May 1996 meeting, Board members determined to release "Scelso's" true name in five years or upon his death. ii. Commentary. Whenever the Review Board voted to protect the identity of an individual throughout federal agency assassination records, it had to be realistic enough to realize that some information about individuals is so specific that release of the information would reveal the individual's identity. Examples of specific identifying information include home addresses, birth dates, job titles, names of family members, and other less obvious, but equally revealing pieces of information. d. Names of National Security Agency employees. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board protected the names of all National Security Agency employees that it encountered. The Review Board would have considered releasing names of National Security Agency employees if it determined that a particular name was extremely relevant to the assassination. ii. Commentary. Due to the nature of NSA information, few NSA employee names appeared in NSA's assassination records. Even though the Review Board did not often encounter NSA employee names, it did have to vote on those names that it did confront. NSA's policy of not releasing the names of its employees conflicted with section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act that presumed release of such information unless NSA could prove that individual NSA employee names required protection. NSA argued that the release of any names, other than those of publicly acknowledged senior officials, jeopardized the potential security of U.S. cryptographic systems and those individuals. As it did with the names of other intelligence agents and officers, the Review Board considered the names of NSA officers on a document-by-document basis. Given the nature of NSA information, the Review Board members agreed that none of the few names which appear in the documents, and for which NSA requested protection, was of high enough public interest or central to an understanding of the assassination story. Thus, it protected the names. c. Information that identifies CIA officers. i. Review Board guidelines. For specific information that, if released, would reveal the identity of an individual CIA officer that the Board had voted to protect, the Review Board protected the information. 3. Intelligence Sources and Methods, and Other Matters Relating to the National Security of the United States Text of Section 6(1)(B) and (C) ... clear and convincing evidence that the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination record is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal— (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or (C) any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States; a. CIA sources. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board handled CIA sources, assets, informants, and specific identifying information under standards similar to the Board’s decisions for CIA officers. Where the Review Board believed names held a high level of public interest, either because the name was central to the story or because assassination researchers expressed interest in the name, the Review Board subjected them to close scrutiny. The Board generally protected the identity of foreign nationals unless they were of high public interest and then the Review Board required CIA to provide specific evidence in support of its claimed postponements. The Review Board protected domestic sources, assets and informants where CIA demonstrated that release would jeopardize ongoing operations or harm individuals. If CIA did not provide evidence of one of the two above-referenced harms, the Review Board released the name at issue. In addition, where the public already knew the names of individuals who were connected to the CIA, especially if the government had previously released the information, the Review Board released the information. ii. Commentary. The Review Board addressed the issue of whether to postpone or release source names at the same time that it considered CIA employee names, and encountered the same problems as it had in the review of CIA employee names. As with CIA employee names, CIA was reluctant to provide name-specific evidence to the Review Board, opting instead to offer general principles supporting CIA’s request that the Review Board redact all names. The Review Board ultimately decided to protect the names of sources, assets, and informants in cases where the identity of the source is of reduced public interest because CIA sources live in countries other than the U.S. and were more likely to face harm if the Board disclosed their relationship with CIA. In those records where the source’s identity was of possible public interest in relation to the assassination story or was important to understanding information related to the assassination, the Review Board required the CIA to provide additional evidence to support the protection of the source’s identity. When the Review Board postponed release of source names, it did so for ten years except in cases where a foreign government might accuse the source of committing treason for assisting the CIA. In those cases, the Review Board protected the source’s name and identifying information until 2017. b. CIA pseudonyms. i. Review Board guidelines. With only a few exceptions, the Review Board released the pseudonyms of individuals. In some instances, the Review Board used pseudonyms as substitute language for the individual’s true name. ii. Commentary. Very early in the review process, the Review Board determined that, since pseudonyms were a sort of “throw away” identity for individuals who were under cover, the Review Board could release the pseudonym without harming the individual. The CIA did not object to the Review Board’s policy to release pseudonyms. The CIA did identify several pseudonyms that it believed to be particularly sensitive, and demonstrated to the Review Board with clear and convincing evidence that release of those pseudonyms would do irreparable harm. c. CIA crypts. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released some CIA “crypts”—code words for operations and individuals. The Review Board also generally released CIA “digraphs”—the first two letters of a crypt that link a particular crypt to a particular location. CIA often created crypts to refer to other U.S. government agencies; for example, the FBI was “ODENVY.” The Review Board made a blanket decision to release all U.S. government crypts. The Review Board nearly always released CIA crypts where those crypts denoted operations or individuals relating to Mexico City or Cuba. (The digraph for Mexico City was “LI,” and for Cuba, it was “AM.”) For all other crypts, the Review Board protected the digraph and released the remainder of the crypt. The Review Board established a few exceptions, and where exceptions applied, the Board required CIA to provide crypt-specific evidence of the need to protect. ii. Commentary. The Review Board had to determine whether it believed that release of CIA crypts would harm CIA operations and individuals. Section 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement of CIA crypts. The Review Board required the CIA to provide crypt-specific clear and convincing evidence that CIA currently used, or expected to use the crypt and that CIA had not previously released the crypt. Thus, in order to convince the Review Board to sustain postponements, the Board required CIA to research each crypt to determine whether CIA still used the individual or the operation and provide that evidence to the Review Board. As it did with CIA agent names, CIA initially requested the Review Board to sustain postponements of all CIA crypts—even “ODENVY”—the CIA’s old crypt for the FBI that CIA had already released in other CIA records. CIA argued that its use of crypts was an operational method that should remain secret, even though CIA had replaced most of the crypts at issue years earlier. CIA believed that if the Review Board released the crypts, researchers would be able to piece together the records and determine the identity of operations and individuals. CIA further argued that the burden of locating evidence on each crypt was too heavy. The Review Board, conversely, believed that CIA conceived crypts as a code to hide the identity of an operation or an individual, and so the Review Board could release the crypts and not compromise the operation or the individual. As with CIA agent names, the Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to locate evidence on each crypt. Finally, the Review Board released a group of CIA crypts from Mexico City with the “LI” digraph. CIA eventually agreed to release its crypts and digraphs in assassination records, and the Review Board eventually agreed to protect certain sensitive crypts. The Review Board recognized that it could not conduct a crypt-by-crypt review for every CIA record that it encountered. CIA records contain hundreds of thousands of crypts. Given the need to finish its work, the Review Board decided that, for all crypts except the “LI,” “AM,” and “OD” series crypts, it would agree to postpone the location-specific digraph and release the actual crypts. Thus, the Review Board released most crypts in the collection and the most relevant digraphs. The Review Board did make three exceptions to its general rule: it protected the digraph in non-core files when (a) the crypt appeared next to a true name that had been released, (b) when the crypt appeared next to specific identifying information, and (c) when CIA provided clear and convincing evidence that the Review Board should protect the digraph. d. CIA sluglines. i. Review Board guidelines. “Sluglines” are CIA routing indicators, consisting of two or more crypts, that appear above the text in CIA cables. (See illustration.) The Review Board released CIA sluglines according to the same criteria it applied to crypts and digraphs. ii. Commentary. The Review Board released CIA sluglines because the Agency never offered the Review Board any evidence to explain why the Board should not release them. An example of a CIA slugline is “RYBAT GPFLOR.” “RYBAT” is a CIA crypt that meant “secret,” and GPFLOR was the crypt that CIA gave Lee Harvey Oswald during its post-assassination investigation. CIA initially asked the Review Board to postpone the CIA slugline even where CIA had released the individual crypts that made up the slugline elsewhere. For example, in the case of “RYBAT GPFLOR,” the CIA agreed to release the crypt “RYBAT” in two places elsewhere in the document at issue, and the CIA agreed to release the crypt GPFLOR when it appeared in the text. CIA told the Review Board that it could not, however, release the slugline “RYBAT GPFLOR.” CIA offered no substantive arguments to support its request for postponement of the slugline. Given the statute’s demand that CIA provide clear and convincing evidence in support of its requests for postponement, the Review Board voted to release CIA sluglines. f. CIA surveillance methods. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board generally released CIA surveillance methods, the details of their implementation, and the product produced by them where the Review Board believed the methods were relevant to the assassination. The Review Board sustained postponements of CIA surveillance methods where CIA provided convincing evidence that the method still merited protection. Where the Review Board sustained the CIA’s requests for postponement of surveillance methods, it substituted the language “surveillance method,” “operational details,” or “sensitive operation.” ii. Commentary. As with all its sources and methods, CIA initially requested the Review Board to postpone all of its surveillance methods since, CIA argued, CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. The Review Board, on the other hand, believed that it was not a secret that CIA currently conducts surveillance operations. Moreover, the Review Board did not believe that its votes to release CIA surveillance methods in Mexico City in 1963 would jeopardize current CIA surveillance operations. Finally, the Review Board recognized that certain CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 were already well-known to the public because the U.S. government had disclosed details about those operations. CIA surveillance, particularly telephone taps and photo operations, was a major element in the story of Oswald’s 1963 trip to Mexico City. (See illustration.) The Board, therefore, concluded that the public interest in disclosure far outweighed any risk to national security and directed release of the information. However, in records that CIA proved did contain information about current operations, the Review Board voted to postpone the information. f. CIA installations. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board used date “windows” within which it released the locations of CIA installations where the location was relevant to the assassination. Specifically, the Review Board released the location of CIA installations relating to Mexico City during the time period 1960-1969. Likewise, the Review Board generally released the location of all CIA installations that were relevant to the assassination during the time period between the date of the assassination—November 22, 1963—and the date that the Warren Commission issued its report in September 1964. Finally, the Review Board generally released the location of all CIA installations that appeared in Oswald’s 201 file during the time period January 1, 1961 through October 1, 1964. The Review Board did grant CIA a few exceptions to its general rule, and except for the specific time windows described above, the Review Board protected all information that identified CIA installation locations. The Review Board created substitute language for its postponement of CIA installations to enable researchers to track a particular CIA installation through the JFK collection without revealing the city or country in which it is located. To accomplish this, the Review Board divided the world into five regions: Western Hemisphere, Western Europe, Northern Europe, East Asia/Pacific, and Africa/Near East/South Asia. Then the Board added a number to refer to each different location in the region. Thus, “CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1” serves as a place holder for a particular installation in all CIA assassination records. ii. Commentary. Initially, the Review Board released CIA installation locations in CIA documents relevant to Oswald’s visit to Mexico City. CIA did not raise significant objections to the Review Board’s release of its installations in these records. When the Review Board began to vote to release the location of additional CIA installation locations, the CIA did object, but did not offer evidence of the harm to national security that it believed would result from disclosure of the information. The CIA threatened to appeal to the President to overturn the Review Board’s votes, but the Review Board’s position was that the JFK Act required release of information where CIA did not provide convincing evidence to support their postponements. The Review Board allowed the CIA ample time to gather and present its evidence to support its requests for postponements as both the CIA and the Review Board hoped to avoid a CIA appeal to the President. Ultimately, the CIA determined that it would trust Review Board members with the information that the Review Board required to postpone the release of the location of a small number of CIA installations. In an effort to balance high public interest in the location of CIA installations and the need to protect certain installations, the Review Board decided to establish date “windows” within which it would release CIA installation locations. The CIA never appealed a Review Board vote to the President. g. CIA prefixes (cable, dispatch, field report). i. Review Board guidelines. CIA cable, dispatch, and field report “prefixes” are identifiers that CIA uses on its communications to indicate the installation that generates a particular message. Where the Review Board had voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board also voted to release CIA cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes that the installation generated. Likewise, the Review Board protected cable, dispatch, and field report prefixes where it voted to protect the location of the CIA installation. The Review Board replaced the prefixes that it protected with substitute language similar to that used for CIA installations. An example of substitute language for CIA prefixes is: “Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere 1.” ii. Commentary. Once the Review Board voted to release the location of a particular CIA installation, the Review Board and CIA did not disagree that the Board should release cable, dispatch and field report prefixes. h. CIA job titles. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board voted to release CIA employees’ job titles except when the Board’s disclosure of the title might reveal the identity of an individual or CIA installation requiring protection. ii. Commentary. Although the Review Board did not believe that it should vote to protect CIA job titles, standing alone, it sometimes voted to protect titles if they revealed other information that the Review Board had voted to protect. i. CIA file numbers. i. Review Board guidelines. CIA organizes many of its files by country and assigns “country identifiers” within particular file numbers. The Review Board released nearly all CIA file numbers that referred to Mexico City. The Review Board protected the “country identifiers” in CIA file numbers for all other countries with the exception of country identifiers “15” and “19.” The Review Board generally released all CIA “201” or “personality” file numbers where the files related to the assassination. ii. Commentary. The CIA rarely objected to the Review Board’s release of its file numbers. j. CIA domestic facilities. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board released references to domestic CIA facilities where the CIA has previously officially disclosed the existence of the facility. The Review Board did not release information that would reveal the location of domestic CIA facilities where the CIA provided evidence that the facility was still in use. ii. Commentary. The Review Board rarely encountered the issue of whether to release the location of CIA domestic facilities in assassination records, as CIA officially acknowledges most of its domestic facilities. When the Review Board did vote to postpone the location of CIA domestic facilities, it required the CIA to provide extensive evidence as to why the CIA had to keep the location of those facilities secret. k. CIA official cover. i. Review Board guidelines. CIA "official cover" is a means by which a CIA officer can operate overseas in the guise of an employee of another government agency. In congressional documents, the Review Board released general information about official cover but protected specific details. With regard to executive branch documents, the CIA convinced the Review Board that, while Congress might reveal information about official cover, the executive branch does not generally reveal information about official cover because to do so would damage the national security. Thus, the Review Board sustained CIA's postponements regarding official cover in executive branch documents unless the U.S. government had previously officially disclosed the information at issue. The Review Board inserted the phrase "official cover" as substitute language when it postponed such information. ii. Commentary. The Review Board initially considered the issue of official cover to be an "open secret" that was well-known to the public. Thus, they were loathe to withhold such obvious information. The CIA, however, supported its strong objections in briefings and negotiations with the Board, and eventually convinced the Review Board that the harm in releasing information about official cover outweighed any additional information that assassination researchers might gain from knowing details about official cover. l. Alias documentation. i. Review Board guidelines. CIA employees and agents use aliases and the CIA creates documentation to support its employees' and agents' aliases. The Review Board released information that revealed that CIA employees and agents used aliases. The Board protected specific details about how CIA documents particular aliases. ii. Commentary. The CIA argued that it currently uses alias documentation and that aliases are vital to CIA's performance of its intelligence operations. The CIA also argued that the Review Board's release of specific information about alias documentation would not be useful to assassination researchers. The Review Board members accepted CIA's arguments, primarily because they agreed that the public interest in the specific details about alias documentation was low. The Review Board determined that it did not want the CIA to spend a large amount of time gathering evidence in support of postponements that were of low public interest and, thus, it did not require the CIA to provide evidence in support of every postponement relating to alias documentation. m. Foreign intelligence cooperation. i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board postponed references to foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA. ii. Commentary. The Review Board vigorously debated the issue of foreign intelligence cooperation with the CIA and demanded extensive evidence and multiple briefings from the CIA on the subject. Though in some instances Board members judged that the information might add to the historical understanding of the assassination, the Review Board, with some dissent, determined that the evidence to postpone the information outweighed this potential value. n. Human sources in FBI foreign counterintelligence (assets). i. Review Board guidelines. The Review Board evaluated the need to postpone the identity of human sources in foreign counterintelligence operations on a case-by-case basis. Where the human source was a foreign national, the Review Board generally agreed to protect the individual's identity unless the individual's connection with the FBI was already known to the foreign government at issue. Where the human source was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board sometimes released the identity of the individual if the public interest in the name of the asset was high. Where the human source was a United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens, the Review Board tended to evaluate the release of the source's name more like other domestic informants. ii. Commentary. In its position paper, the FBI defined "intelligence source" as "any individual who has provided or is currently providing information pertaining to national security matters, the disclosure of which could reasonably be expected to result in damage to the FBI’s intelligence and counterintelligence-gathering capabilities.” The FBI offered the following arguments in support of its request to keep intelligence sources’ identities secret: (1) Review Board disclosure of intelligence sources would harm the FBI’s ability to develop and maintain new and existing sources, because sources would reasonably believe that the government would reveal their identities, and (2) disclosure of intelligence sources may subject the sources, their friends, and their families to physical harm, ridicule, or ostracism. The Review Board’s interpretation of the “clear and convincing” evidence standard required it to reject the FBI’s general policy arguments, and instead required the FBI to present asset-specific evidence that explained the particular harm that the FBI expected the asset to face if the Review Board voted to disclose his or her identity. As a general rule, the Review Board usually protected the identities of foreign nationals who could be prosecuted in their home countries for espionage. Likewise, where the asset was a United States citizen interacting with foreign government officials, the Review Board considered whether the individual was in a position of trust with the foreign government and whether he or she might be in danger if the Review Board disclosed his or her relationship with the FBI. Unlike the above-referenced scenarios, the source who was a United States citizen interacting with other United States citizens was generally evaluated according to the Board’s domestic informant standards. a. FBI foreign counterintelligence activities. i. Review Board guidelines. As a general rule, the Review Board believed that most aspects of the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries during the cold war period were well-known, were of high public interest, and were not eligible for postponement pursuant to § 6(1)(B)-(C) of the JFK Act. ii. Commentary and overview of foreign counterintelligence appeals. The FBI’s assassi- nation records contain information that reveal many of the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities during the cold war period. Beginning in late 1995, the Review Board considered how it could release as much information as possible in the records without jeopardizing operations that still require protection. In spring 1996, the Review Board considered and voted on a group of FBI records relating to the FBI’s foreign counterintelligence activities. In response to the Review Board’s requests for evidence on the foreign counterintelligence records, the FBI had provided its “position paper” on foreign counterintelligence activities. In its paper, the FBI defined “intelligence activities” as “intelligence gathering action or techniques utilized by the FBI against a targeted individual or organization that has been determined to be of national security interest.” The FBI’s primary argument in support of its request for continued secrecy of intelligence activities was that disclosure of specific information describing intelligence activities would reveal to hostile entities the FBI’s targets and priorities, thereby allowing hostile entities to develop countermeasures. Sections 6(1)(B) and (C) of the JFK Act provided the standard for postponement. In addition, the JFK Act’s legislative history instructed the Review Board to consider a variety of factors related to the need to postpone disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, including the age of the record, whether the use of a particular source or method is already well-known by the public, whether the source or method is inherently secret, or whether the information collected was secret.” The Review Board considered the FBI’s evidence and weighed it against public interest in the records. After careful consideration, the Review Board decided to release some foreign counterintelligence information. The Board’s primary reason for releasing such records was its belief that the FBI’s evidence did not enumerate specific harms that would result from disclosure. A. The FBI’s May 1996 Appeals to the President. On May 10 and 28, 1996, the FBI appealed to the President to overturn the Board’s vote on 17 records relating to the FBI’s surveillance of officials and establishments of four Communist countries—the Soviet Union, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, and Poland—during the 1960s. The FBI’s overarching arguments were that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods that would compromise the national security of the United States, and that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance—the four Communist countries—would harm the foreign relations of the United States. The FBI sought to postpone five types of source and method capabilities: tracing of funds, physical surveillance (lookout logs), mail cover, electronic surveillance, and typewriter and fingerprint identification. The Review Board’s response briefs to the President dealt with each source or method in turn. Specific details regarding the appeal of each issue are discussed below. In response to the FBI’s overarching argument that disclosure of the information would reveal sensitive sources and methods and compromise the national security, the Review Board responded that if the national security would be harmed by release of this information, the harm would have already occurred, since the FBI had already released both the identities of the target countries and the sources and methods that the FBI used in its operations. In response to the FBI’s arguments that disclosure of the targets of the surveillance would harm the foreign relations of the United States, the Review Board responded in three parts. First, the information that the FBI sought to protect is widely available in the public domain, from both official government sources and secondary sources, so if foreign relations are harmed by disclosure of the information, then the harm has already occurred. Second, the FBI simply did not prove its argument that it may have violated international law or “diplomatic standards” by employing the sources or methods at issue since the FBI did not cite the laws or treaties to which it referred and the Review Board could not locate any laws or treaties that were in effect at the time that the records were created. Third, despite the FBI’s assertion to the contrary, the Review Board had evidence that other governments do acknowledge that, in past years, they conducted foreign counterintelligence operations against other countries. The Review Board believed that the FBI had not provided evidence of a “significant, demonstrable harm” to current foreign relations or intelligence work. Thus, the Board asked the President to deny the FBI’s requests for postponement. The White House did not expressly rule on the appeals. Instead, after several meetings involving representatives from the Review Board, the FBI, and the White House, the White House directed the FBI to provide the Review Board with specific evidence in support of its postponements. The White House requested the Review Board to reconsider the Bureau’s specific evidence. The FBI, in turn, withdrew the first two of its pending appeals, including some records in which the Review Board voted to release information obtained from a technical source. B. Post-appeal decisionmaking. After further negotiations, the Review Board and the FBI agreed to release most information regarding its foreign counterintelligence activities against Communist Bloc countries as “consent releases.” In those few cases where the Bureau believed that foreign counterintelligence activity against Communist Bloc countries still required protection, the Bureau submitted for the Board’s determination postponement-specific evidence. To the extent that the information in the FBI’s proposed redaction did not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination, the Review Board allowed the FBI to postpone direct discussions of foreign counterintelligence activities against non-Communist Bloc countries. With regard to the FBI’s “segregated collections,” the Review Board stated in its segregated collection guidelines, It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal stan- MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group VIA: W. George Jameson Associate General Counsel Litigation Division, OGC FROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Litigation Division, OGC SUBJECT: Declassification Guidelines Established by the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 1. The enactment of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 ("the Act") has created declassification guidelines that are to some extent different from the Historical Review Program guidelines established by the Director of Central Intelligence. In the continuing review of material related to the assassination of President Kennedy, the guidelines established by the Act must be used. 2. The Act's most fundamental changes are the burden it creates on agencies to justify continued classification of information, and a requirement that agencies balance the national security concerns against the public interest. Under the Act, information must be declassified unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security. 3. The Act's guidelines for declassification are found in its Section 6 and are as follows: Sec 6. GROUND FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS. Disclosure of assassination records or particular information in assassination records to the public may be postponed subject to the limitations of this Act if there is clear and convincing evidence that-- (1) the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations, or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by the public disclosure of the assassination is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal-- (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection; (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or (C) Any other matter currently relating to the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States, the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States; (2) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal the name or identity of a living person who provided confidential information to the United States and would pose a substantial risk to that person; (3) the public disclosure of the assassination record could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweighs the public interest; (4) the public disclosure of the assassination record would compromise the existence of an understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual or a foreign government, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest; or (5) the public disclosure of the assassination record would reveal a security or protective procedure currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the Secret service or another Government agency responsible for protecting Government officials, and public disclosure would be so harmful that it outweighs the public interest. 4. The Act therefore superseded the guidelines established for the Historical Review Program to the extent the Historical Review Group (HRG) is processing information related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The specific changes are as follows. a. The most basic change is that you must apply a balancing test before maintaining the classification of any information. You must balance continued classification against the public interest in the information. Therefore, the greater light disclosure of the information would shed on the assassination of the President, or on the government's investigation into that assassination, the more serious must be the need to continue to withhold the information for classification to be maintained. b. HR 70-14.e(2) states the reviewers of information advocating continued classification of information will bear the burden identifying any damage that disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to the national security. The Act defines that burden as one of "clear and convincing evidence." Further, the Act changes "reasonably could be expected to cause" to "demonstrably." Therefore, unless a showing is made by clear and convincing evidence that release of the information would demonstrably impair the national security, the information must be declassified. c. HR 70-14.e(4) addresses the standards for maintaining the classification of foreign government information, the identity of a foreign source, and intelligence sources and methods. It notes that Executive Order 12,356 presumes that this information is classified. Under the Act, with respect to these categories of classified information found with records related to the assassination of President Kennedy, you must still find demonstrable damage by clear and convincing evidence regardless of the presumption in the Executive Order. Further, with respect to intelligence sources and methods, the Act requires that they-- (1) be either currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the U.S. Government; and (2) that they not have been officially disclosed; and (3) that their disclosure would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities. All of these factors must be met by a showing of clear and convincing evidence. d. HR 70-14.e(4) also discusses CIA personnel and organizational information. The Act only permits the continued withholding of the identity of an "intelligence agent" if, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the person's identity requires protection. Further, the Act does not permit the withholding of organizational information unless, by clear and convincing evidence, it can be shown the disclosure of the organizational data would demonstrably impair the national security. e. HR 70-14.e(7) states that the HRG will determine whether information warrants continued protection pursuant to statutory or other requirements. The Act supersedes all other statutory authority for withholding information except for a provision of the Internal Revenue Code dealing with tax return information. This means the Act takes precedence over 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3) and § 403g, as well as the Privacy Act, when determining whether to release records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Act also makes no provision for protecting information on the basis of executive privilege, such as deliberative process and attorney-client communications. 5. Certain categories of information may fall into more than one of the grounds set forth in Section 6 of the Act. We recommend that you review all of the grounds when determining whether to release or withhold specific information. For example, a human intelligence source may fall into grounds (1)(A) ("intelligence agent"), (1)(B) ("intelligence source"), (2) ("living person who provided confidential information to the United States"), and/or (4) ("understanding of confidentiality currently requiring protection between a Government agent and a cooperating individual"). At this point, we do not know how the Assassination Records Review Board will interpret each of these grounds. Therefore, if you determine the standards of the Act are met to permit withholding of certain information, you should assert as many grounds as may arguably apply as authority for that withholding. 6. Although the Act severely limits what information may be withheld from disclosure, it may be possible to protect information not expressly covered by the Act. However, such information may be withheld only with the personal authorization of the President. When the President signed the Act, he issued a statement that included the following: My authority to protect [executive branch deliberations, law enforcement information of the executive branch, and national security information] comes from the Constitution and cannot be limited by statute. Although only the most extraordinary circumstances would require postponement of the disclosure of documents for reasons other than those recognized in the bill, I cannot abdicate my constitutional responsibility to take such action when necessary. 7. The Act provides individuals the ability under the Administrative Procedures Act to challenge in court final decisions of the Assassination Records Board. We can expect, then, court challenges to the Board's decisions to uphold any of our determinations that certain information meets the criteria for postponement of release. Additionally, as you know, there are FOIA litigations for this same material. Plaintiff's counsel has indicated in court pleadings and orally that he wants the court to review our redactions not under FOIA standards, but under the standards of the Act. Thus, you should apply the Act's standards knowing your judgments may be questioned by the Board, subsequent court challenges to the Board's action, and the FOIA cases. 8. If you have any questions concerning the application of the Act to your review of the assassination records, please call me on secure extension 76105. Robert J. Eatinger, Jr. DCI/OGC/RJE:ig 76105/ 15 Dec 1992 OGC-92-53256 Distribution: 1 - Addressee 1 - DO/IRO 1 - DI/IRO 1 - DS&T/IRO 1 - DA/IRO 1 - DCI/IRO 1 - PCS/PGG 1 - ERR 1 - DPH 1 - Lit file 1 - EC 1 - WGJ 1 - RJE Soft file 1 - OGC Chrono 1 - RJE Signer MEMORANDUM FOR: David P. Holmes Deputy General Counsel FROM: Robert J. Eatinger, Jr. Assistant General Counsel Litigation Division, OGC SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records 1. Per your request, I have attached a copy of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (ARCA), Pub. L. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443-3458, reprinted at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note. For your convenience, I have highlighted the pertinent provisions that will aid in responding to an inquiry regarding the statute's effect on the DCI's statutory authority to protect intelligence sources and methods. 2. The clear language and intent of the law is to supersede statutes that prohibit disclosure of information, except for some irrelevant subject areas, such as tax records. The statute provides that "it shall take precedence over any other law (except section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code), judicial decision construing such law, or common law doctrine that would otherwise prohibit" the disclosure of information subject to the Act. ARCA § 11(a). This language, taken with the provisions discussed below which limit the intelligence sources and methods that may be protected and set a strict procedural scheme by which information is to be reviewed under the ARCA, effectively supersedes the DCI's National Security Act authority with respect to intelligence sources and methods information subject to the ARCA. 3. Section 6 of the ARCA provides the grounds for which the release of information may be "postponed." The statute contemplates that all information will eventually be released. Indeed, it specifies that all information will be made available to the public no later than 25 years after the passage of the ARCA (which occurred in October 1992) unless the president certifies that continued postponement is necessary. ARCA § 4(g)(2)(D). With respect to intelligence-related information, ARCA allows postponement if: "(1) the threat to ... intelligence operations ... is of such gravity that it outweighs the public interest, and such public disclosure would reveal-- SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records (A) an intelligence agent whose identity currently requires protection; (B) an intelligence source or method which is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by the United States Government and which has not been officially disclosed, the disclosure of which would interfere with the conduct of intelligence activities; or (C) any other matter currently relating to ... intelligence operations ... the disclosure of which would demonstrably impair the national security of the United States." ARCA § 6(1) (Emphasis added.) 4. The originating agency is to make the first review to identify information that meets the standards for postponement. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(D)(i). For CIA, this effort is being undertaken by the Historical Review Group, in consultation with the Directorate of Operations and other appropriate Agency components. Information the originating agencies identify for postponement must be transmitted to the Review Board. ARCA § 4(c)(2)(E). The Review Board "shall consider and render decisions on a determination by a Government office to seek to postpone the disclosure of assassination records." ARCA § 7(i)(1). Specifically, the "Review Board shall consider and render decisions on ... whether an assassination record or particular information in a record qualifies for postponement of disclosure under the Act." ARCA § 7(i)(2)(B). 5. If the Review Board determines to order the disclosure of information that the originating agency felt met the criteria for postponement, it "shall notify the head of the originating body of its determination and publish a copy of the determination in the Federal Register within 14 days after the determination is made." ARCA § 9(c)(4)(A). If the information contained in an assassination record is "obtained or developed solely within the executive branch, the President shall have the sole and nondelegable authority to require the disclosure or postponement of ... the information under the standards set forth in Section 6." ARCA § 9(d)(1) (emphasis added). The President's decision must be certified to the Review Board within 30 days of the Review Boards determination. Id. Records postponed by the President must be re-reviewed every 5 years. ARCA § 9(d)(2). SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority With Respect to JFK Assassination Records 6. I would be happy to discuss this further if you so desire. You might also want to contact John Pereira (x30373) since he has met with some or all of the Review Board members. Attachment SUBJECT: DCI Sources and Methods Authority w/Respect to JFK Assassination Records OGC-94-52916 DCI/OGC/RJEatinger:76135 (19 Sept 94) Original - Addressee w/attach) (hand delivered) 1 - OGC Registry (w/attach) 1 - Lit File 1 - RBB (OGC/ILD) 1 - C/HRG (J.Pereira-404 Ames) 1 - RJE - Soft File (w/attach) 1 - RJE - Signer 1 - PDP 1 - KK -fyi 1 - PAS-fyi Foreign Government Information Contained in JFK Collection CIA’s JFK Collection includes Foreign Government Information (FGI) in a number of forms: First, some CIA documents in the collection contained FGI but, by general agreement with the Assassination Records Review Board, the source could be protected by redaction even when CIA and the Board agreed that substantive information could be released. Second, documents were provided by foreign governments in the aftermath of the assassination in response to requests from the US Government for information about the assassination or individuals whose names may have been associated with it. Such documents subsequently became a part of CIA’s “sequestered collection” and thus were automatically designated by the JFK Board as “Assassination Records,” subject to declassification review. A number of such documents were released in full in the early years of the project (1992-1994), with the concurrence of the DO/IRO, but OIM has no documentation regarding coordination with liaison. Third, in a number of documented cases, the DO consulted with liaison services regarding documents that were clearly identifiable as from a liaison service, and handling of both the substance and the sources was discussed with the liaison services and their views obtained. In all such documented cases, the BOARD agreed to protect the foreign government source and, as appropriate, to postpone the release of redacted portions or entire documents until the year 2017, reflecting the language of the JFK Act. The information below reflects those instances of coordination with liaison services that are reflected in OIM records: 1. (S) A 1968 letter from Charles C. F. Spry, on Australian Security Intelligence Organisation letterhead, to DCI Richard Helms objected to the proposed release of a Warren Commission document in which reference is made to the ‘Australian security service.’ [The Warren Commission document (CD #97) was a memorandum to Mr. J. Lee Rankin from DDP Helms dated 22 May 1964 reporting an anonymous caller -- who described himself as a Polish chauffeur for the Soviet Embassy in Canberra -- to the US Embassy there. That memo was sanitized to delete the ‘Australian security service.’] The Board did not accept the Agency’s initial action to “deny in full” Sir Spry’s letter and the Board’s acceptance of substitute text provided only additional time to pursue the possibility of full release. Consultations between and among EA/PAMSI, OGC, and others and queries to the Australian desk, and, in turn, the Station and the Australian Government brought an acceptable compromise. ASIO authorized the release of a redacted and retyped version of Sir Spry’s letter that did not reveal Sir Spry as the writer and that did not reveal an ASIO/CIA relationship, and ASIO further stated “this . . . should not be seen as setting any precedent in releasing ASIO documents.” The Board postponed release of the original until 2017. 2. (S) Helms’ response to Sir Spry and two related CIA documents were released in sanitized form that protected the liaison relationship. The release of the redacted portions are postponed until 2017. 3. (S) Cables exchanged between Headquarters and Canberra over the issue in Item 1 were declared assassination records, but release of the cables was postponed until 2017. British 1. (S) The BOARD wanted to release the 1963 British Security Service’s (BSS) interview of the spouse of a West-East defector (Sloboda). The BSS advised the Station that release would be a violation of privacy rights in the UK. The BOARD agreed that the document was “not intrinsic to assassination story” and that the document could be postponed until 2017. 2. (S) Another British document in the collection provided information that as of 1982 “KOSTIKOV . . . was posted in Beirut in 1978 . . . and may still be there.” (The author EPSTEIN in Legend claims KOSTIKOV was Lee Harvey Oswald’s KGB case officer in Mexico City.) The British desk accepted the release of the one pertinent paragraph (one of five paragraphs in the document), and the Board agreed to postpone until 2017 the release of all other text and source originating information. 3. (S) The BOARD learned of the existence of a British document that the CIA possessed from the BOARD’s examination of FBI files. One member of the BOARD reviewed the entire document and declared one portion of the document as relevant to the JFK assassination. The four-page section of the document regarding KGB Active Measures was released in full and further noted that it was from a foreign government that specifically requested not to be identified. Canadian (S) A report received through Canadian liaison channels on West-East defectors (Martin and Mitchell) is in the collection. As consultations with the Canadian desk were underway, the BOARD determined the document as not believed relevant and postponed its release until 2017. Dutch (S) The BOARD wanted to release two attachments (teltap transcripts) to a dispatch from the Dutch Station. The matter was coordinated with the Dutch desk, the Dutch Station, and the Director General of the Dutch National Security Service. As a result, translation substitutions provide the information from intercepted conversations on the topics of “Mr. Lee (sic)” and Richard Gibson, but redactions obscure the source of the transcripts, according to guidelines in a letter from the service. Release of the redacted portions is postponed until 2017.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10337-10014.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 63, "total-input-tokens": 73341, "total-output-tokens": 30908, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2286, 1 ], [ 2286, 4619, 2 ], [ 4619, 6254, 3 ], [ 6254, 8004, 4 ], [ 8004, 10295, 5 ], [ 10295, 12618, 6 ], [ 12618, 14627, 7 ], [ 14627, 16048, 8 ], [ 16048, 17765, 9 ], [ 17765, 19649, 10 ], [ 19649, 20137, 11 ], [ 20137, 22707, 12 ], [ 22707, 25605, 13 ], [ 25605, 26540, 14 ], [ 26540, 28762, 15 ], [ 28762, 30169, 16 ], [ 30169, 32539, 17 ], [ 32539, 34106, 18 ], [ 34106, 35402, 19 ], [ 35402, 35695, 20 ], [ 35695, 37547, 21 ], [ 37547, 39884, 22 ], [ 39884, 42225, 23 ], [ 42225, 44722, 24 ], [ 44722, 46942, 25 ], [ 46942, 49297, 26 ], [ 49297, 51268, 27 ], [ 51268, 53334, 28 ], [ 53334, 55671, 29 ], [ 55671, 57413, 30 ], [ 57413, 57707, 31 ], [ 57707, 57707, 32 ], [ 57707, 62054, 33 ], [ 62054, 66014, 34 ], [ 66014, 70142, 35 ], [ 70142, 74104, 36 ], [ 74104, 78188, 37 ], [ 78188, 82715, 38 ], [ 82715, 84718, 39 ], [ 84718, 89123, 40 ], [ 89123, 92077, 41 ], [ 92077, 95864, 42 ], [ 95864, 100142, 43 ], [ 100142, 103366, 44 ], [ 103366, 105165, 45 ], [ 105165, 109066, 46 ], [ 109066, 113185, 47 ], [ 113185, 117342, 48 ], [ 117342, 121684, 49 ], [ 121684, 121684, 50 ], [ 121684, 123413, 51 ], [ 123413, 125725, 52 ], [ 125725, 128136, 53 ], [ 128136, 130949, 54 ], [ 130949, 131200, 55 ], [ 131200, 131441, 56 ], [ 131441, 133578, 57 ], [ 133578, 135907, 58 ], [ 135907, 136183, 59 ], [ 136183, 136537, 60 ], [ 136537, 136537, 61 ], [ 136537, 139899, 62 ], [ 139899, 142058, 63 ] ] }
ecb30ec62e33db787ca11e4eff91c603c5bc6775	\| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICIAL'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) \| \|---------------------------------------------------\|------\|---------------------\|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\| \| 1. DCI / FIO \| \| \| Becky, For your review, FBI memorandum dated 12/23/63 (Brennan to Sullivan) containing CIA information. We are proposing "Release-in-Full" for this document. \| \| 2. \| \| \| Barry, No objection to full release of this document. \| \| 3. \| \| \| \| \| 4. Barry Harrelson, Reviewer CS1/HRG 402 Ames \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| \| Memorandum TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan FROM: Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) Reference is made to memorandum dated 12/19/63, from Mr. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan. Pursuant to instructions, Agent Papich met with John McConne, Director, CIA, on 12/23/63, to confront the CIA Director with false statements attributed to him by Mr. DeLoach's sources. The Liaison Agent is reporting this meeting in some detail so that you may have full appreciation of all aspects. Agent Papich advised McConne that he had a piece of business which needed ironing out before the end of the year. The Agent explained that since the assassination of President Kennedy, there have been various types of stories circulated concerning the case and the evidence collected; that some of these stories could immediately be discounted; and that there was certain information received by the Bureau which very directly affected relations between the Bureau and CIA. The Agent stated that certain information had reached such proportion to be most alarming and that the Agent had requested permission from Mr. Hoover to discuss the matter with the CIA Director. McConne was then told that he was charged with being the source of information conveyed to a high Government official and to Drew Pearson in that he, McConne, had stated that CIA had uncovered a plot in Mexico City indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald had received $6,500 to assassinate President Kennedy. The Agent elaborated by stating that if this were true, McConne had endeavored to leave the impression with certain people that CIA had developed information not known to the Bureau and, in essence, made the Bureau look ridiculous. The Agent advised that if McConne had made such statements, we could only assume that he was employing vicious and underhanded tactics since he and officials of his agency fully knew that the story concerning the $6,500 had been proved to be absolutely false. McConne's attention was directed to the Alvarado interrogation, Alvarado's admission that he had fabricated the information and the subsequent... To Mr. Brennan to Mr. Sullivan Re: RELATIONS WITH CIA SECRET Corroboration of the polygraph. McConne was very visibly incensed and left the impression that he might at any moment ask the Agent to leave. After pausing a few moments, he made the following statements: 1. He stated that he has never talked to Drew Pearson in his life; that he has never sent any kind of message to Pearson directly or indirectly and that he does not have any intention of communicating with Pearson. He briefly referred to the fact that he has been the target of attacks by Pearson, one of these occurring within the last two weeks. 2. With regard to the "$6,500 story," McConne advised that as soon as the original report was received from his people in Mexico City, he contacted President Johnson and informed him of the development. He explained to the President that this was a matter which required intensive interrogation of Alvarado and that CIA had coordinated very closely with the FBI. He told the President that Alvarado would be kept in a safe house by CIA until the FBI was satisfied that all necessary investigative action had taken place. 3. McConne advised that he has not been critical of the Bureau; that if he had any criticism he would confer directly with the Bureau and not get involved in malicious gossip. He commented that in connection with the Oswald case, he has encountered people who have been critical of the Bureau and the Secret Service and he, McConne, has gone to the defense of both agencies. McConne was left in an angry mood but he did retain his composure throughout. Before the Agent left, McConne inquired about the status of FBI - CIA relations in general and the Agent replied that they were satisfactory. He also asked about the Director's health to which the Agent answered that the Director was in excellent health. As indicated above, no statement was made which in any way might jeopardize the security of Mr. DeLoach's sources. ACTION: For information. [Signature] MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Grant P. Harmon Unit Chief, JFK Taskforce Federal Bureau of Investigation FROM: Barry Harrelson, Senior Reviewer Historical Review Group Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency SUBJECT: Authenticity of Document 1. This is in response to your request to this office to review the attached document and advise if it is a valid Agency document or something made up using an Agency reports format and information either entirely made up or from other sources. The 3 August 1962 document purports to tie Dorothy Kilgallen, Marilyn Monroe and former Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, together with knowledge of an number of matters, including the plot to kill Castro. 2. Those Agency officers who have reviewed the document consider it to be fraudulent. While the format resembles a "reports" form used in the 1960's, the substantive information and presentation is foreign to normal presentation or collection efforts. Also, the control stamps and other administrative items are not typical of CIA reports written during the 1960's. 3. If you have any further questions in this regard, please call me directly at (703) 351-2909. Barry Harrelson BH:gb 3 August 1962 Rothberg discussed the apparent break up with Kilgallen and the break up with the Kennedys. Rothberg told Kilgallen that she was attending Hollywood parties hosted by the "inner circle" of Hollywood's elite and was becoming the talk of the town against Rothberg indicated in so many words, that she had secrets to tell. No doubt arising from her trials with the President and the Attorney General. One such "secret" mentions the visit by the President at a secret air base for the purpose of inspecting things from outer space. Kilgallen replied that she knew what might be the source of visit. In the mid-fifties Kilgallen learned of secret effort by US and UK governments to identify the "wings" of crashed spacecraft and dead bodies from a British government official. Kilgallen believed the story may have come from the "New York" in the late forties. Kilgallen said "if the story is true, it would cause terrible embarrassment" to Jack and his plans to have NASA put men on the moon. 2. Subject repeatedly called the Attorney General and complained about the way she was being ignored by the President and his brother. 3. Subject threatened to hold a press conference and would tell all. 4. Subject made reference to "bases" in Cuba and knew of the President's plan to kill Castro. 5. Subject made reference to her "diary of secrets" and what the newspapers would do with such disclosures. MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Ellie Neiman DO JFK Review Team FROM: Barry Harrelson Senior Reviewer, CSI/HRG SUBJECT: FBI Request For CIA's Opinion On Proposed FBI Release Of Agent Specific Data 1. The FBI has asked for an Agency response on the following matter. 2. HRG counterparts at the FBI are engaged in serious discussions with representatives of the Review Board concerning withholding the identities of FBI confidential informants. In the course of those negotiations, FBI officers advise they are increasingly concerned about being able to withhold the crypts and, possible even the true names, of three former Soviet agents. Given that view, they believe it would assist their overall efforts and negotiating position if they could release additional information on one or more of the three Soviet agents. 3. The three former Soviet agents are: a. "TOPHAT" also encrypted as BOURBON;" true name is provided on separate attachment. b. "SHAMROCK" true name on attachment. c. "FEDORA" also encrypted or known as "IRONCLAD" "SCOTCH" AND "JADE;" true name on attachment. 4. Attached are seven documents that the FBI is considering for release. Two of them are CIA documents found in the FBI JFK file. HRG has been unable to locate these documents in the CIA JFK collection. 5. Please provide DO views on the FBI proposal. Barry Harrelson Atts: A/S IDEN ATTACHMENT TO 10 MAY 1995 MEMORANDUM The following names and descriptions are keyed to paragraph 3 of the 10 May memorandum: a. Dmitriy Fedorovich POLYAKOV; reportedly died as a result of Ames disclosure. b. [Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH] whether he is dead or alive is not known. c. Aleksiy Isadorovich KULAK (Kulyak ?); reportedly died of natural causes. Passed this revised portion of 00's 7 June 85 memos to the FBI. GWS Note: Got Lee Carter's concurrence to do so beforehand. a. [SHAMROCK's] real name, Nikolay Romanovich MAKAREVICH, may not be released. His identity has remained a secret for 30 years. We do not know if MAKAREVICH is alive or dead, and believe that exposure could damage him and his family. b. Tom RYAN's name should be deleted from the front cover of the [SHAMROCK] debriefing. Mr. RYAN retired under cover, and is employed as an intelligence contractor on a sensitive project. c. The name and cover name of [NARKULYANI ("Greta") should be deleted.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10338-10005.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 8, "total-input-tokens": 9255, "total-output-tokens": 2752, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3152, 1 ], [ 3152, 5270, 2 ], [ 5270, 7276, 3 ], [ 7276, 8474, 4 ], [ 8474, 9888, 5 ], [ 9888, 11265, 6 ], [ 11265, 11632, 7 ], [ 11632, 12253, 8 ] ] }
54ec4b0b1cdcf05d3549bc20b039c4c3ea0c5ad1	CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America Since July 1963 1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America are continuing at a steady pace, despite recent major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and Brazil. From July 1963 through December, when Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed the inevitability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however, Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to violence and have emphasized other policy priorities. Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in Latin America remains high. 2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro recaptured much of the militant tone of his speeches in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin America. He claimed that what has been done in Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many Latin American countries." The hemisphere's militants, he said, must take advantage of conditions presently favoring revolution and "open the breach." On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperialists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution," the Cubans believe that before that could be accomplished "many other revolutions like ours will appear on the continent." On 24 November, Che Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is part of our daily preoccupation." 3. What emerged from these and other Cuban pronouncements was the apparent conviction of Castro and his aides that further Communist revolutions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be initiated wherever possible and as soon as possible. It is logical to assume that despite recent official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders continue to believe that the very presence of their regime will inspire other Latin American revolutionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue to give assistance to these efforts. 4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemisphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example, OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending; despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign, constitutional government in Venezuela was successfully transferred following President Leoni's dramatic election victory last December; and the outbreaks of violence in Panama last January failed to upset constitutional processes there. The April revolt in which President Goulart of Brazil was overthrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that a breathing spell is necessary. In addition, Castro may have been cautioned to moderate his revolutionary tactics when he visited the USSR last January. This year has been designated "the year of the economy." This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed commercial and industrial goods from West also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its public expressions of support for revolution. Moreover, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy on revolution now may pay dividends after the US elections in November. He probably assumes that conditions for a US-Cuban modus vivendi--on his terms--will be more favorable then. 5. Nevertheless, evidence presented in the accompanying country-by-country index shows that Cuba has continued since the first of the year to promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (before the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In an interview published in an Italian newspaper in March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national liberation" in Latin America must take a turn to violence. He emphasized that violence would be "necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries, for "there is no other way." In an April interview in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very, very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin America by employing peaceful means." 6. A number of reliable clandestine sources have provided information on the many facets of Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America. The most serious form of subversion from Havana is its training of other Latin Americans in the practical arts of guerrilla warfare. As many as 1,500 received such training in 1962. It is estimated that several hundred Latin Americans who traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such training. It has been learned that "scholarship students" who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" receive guerrilla warfare training. This instruction encompasses the use and management of communications equipment; the techniques of military intelligence, including methods of establishing intelligence networks to obtain information from peasants; training in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small arms, which are readily available in most Latin American countries; training in explosives, and training in guerrilla tactics, including instruction on how to operate independently in the countryside for extended periods of time. A separate training school reportedly trains Communist youth from other Latin American countries. The school's one-year course is divided between the study of Communist theory and practical training in political agitation and subversive activities. Reports from returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are developing extensive files on most Latin American countries on subjects pertinent to the planning and development of further subversive activity. Detailed questionnaires submitted to all incoming trainees requested comments on possible air drop zones, weather conditions, locations of military bases, competence of local authorities, border and frontier controls, and a long list of similar questions, obviously designed to build up a body of basic knowledge. 7. Latin Americans returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba often take a round-about route to conceal the fact that they have been in Cuba. They then go through Europe to some other Latin American country, from which they enter their own. Cuba gives these travelers documents which show no indication that they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments and are given special training in clandestine communications, which permits them to maintain a contact with Cuba after they have returned home. 8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive guerrilla warfare and other types of training in Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are known to have been conducting such training in Costa Rica, Panama, British Guiana, Peru, and elsewhere. Thus, the Castro-oriented revolutionary effort in Latin America has a potential for steady growth even if there should be a lessening in the actual training program in Cuba. 9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central and South American-based extremist groups. Only in the case of the arms cache discovered in Venezuela on 1 November, however, has there been incontrovertible proof of Cuban complicity in such efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-established patterns of arms smuggling between nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo planes which are well-suited to gun-running or air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have always stressed the importance of Latin American revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from local sources. Moreover, some financing from Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms. 10. Another important aspect of Havana's efforts in Latin America is centered on supporting and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide labor organization which could serve as a platform for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its constituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's support for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now is attempting to organize another hemisphere "solidarity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in July. This proposed congress—which, however, is being officially discouraged by the Canadian government—would be modeled on a similar effort staged in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963. SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM ANNEX Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion 1. Argentina Clandestine reporting for the past year confirms that the Cubans are cooperating with small extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to establish a coordinated subversive effort in Argentina. Extreme-left wing Peronists such as John Wilkes, Jorge Amado, and Hector Villalon have been in close liaison with Cuban agents in Havana, Montevideo, and elsewhere. Villalon appears to be the principal support agent of a group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peronists believed to be directed and supported by the Cuban embassy in Montevideo. Last January, Villalon traveled to the provinces of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla camps in March. Some guerrillas who were arrested in that raid are known to have had guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items found at these camps was a book written by Jorge Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be "Commandante Segundo" and is probably in charge of the small guerrilla bands discovered in northern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas possessed the same specifications as those found in the November Venezuelan arms cache. It is believed to be of Cuban origin. 2. Bolivia Cuban subversive activity in Bolivia has been centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice President Juan Lechin. Through its embassy in La Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his supporters some arms and money to aid his bitter struggle with President Paz Estenssoro for political domination of the country. Cuban Charge Roberto Lassalle said the Cuban government believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups. He said Havana was prepared to supply the required arms. gave him two boxes of arms to be distributed among the volatile Bolivian tin miners who at that time were in revolt against his government. In March 1963, the Cuban ambassador to Lechin said that the Cuban government was willing to provide financial and material support to Lechin for his campaign to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential elections. Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban agents in early April to discuss his financial needs and to determine what he was prepared to offer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance. In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which aspires to establish a terrorist organization on the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of National Liberation, was organized last year with the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force and near the residence of the US Ambassador. The Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia as a staging area from which to send trained subversives into neighboring countries. It is possible that some Cuban support for guerrillas in northern Argentina may have come across the border from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has long been a favorite transit area for terrorists returning to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Communist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led police to an arms cache which was to be used to support guerrilla operations in Peru. Bolivian authorities have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year. 3. Brazil Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda support to Communist and pro-Communist groups. Operating primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro, Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately described Brizola as having the best prospects for starting a Castro-style revolution in Brazil. The ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao from late 1963 until the April overthrow. Cuba usually relied on its sources in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City to finance his expanding press and radio activities and to "buy some arms" from his Popular Mobilization Front. The same source reported that Cuba supplied Brizola's forces with arms. In addition, a usually reliable source in the Cuban embassy in Mexico City reports that about 10 days before the beginning of Goulart's overthrow, Havana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster the Brizola forces. Four Cuban couriers reportedly took the money to Brazil. Cuba also maintained a substantial propaganda operation in Brazil, primarily through the local office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba. The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institutes had increased to the point where they covered all major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar organizations existed at the national level, such as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National Committee Against Intervention in Cuba. Cuba also broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese. Brazil under Goulart also afforded Cuba an excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)—which is planned to replace the moribund Confederation of Latin American Workers (CTAL)—was held in Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delegation to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on 9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew, who brought a letter from the President warmly supporting the conference. Brazil was also used as a transit area for some Latin American subversives returning to their countries after having received training in Cuba. In late April, the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line, was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged by their Cuban comrades—many have been trained in Cuba—but Havana is not known to have given them direct support. 4. British Guiana The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in British Guiana, in contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to bring down the existing regime. Clinton Adlum, the Cuban trade representative in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP). Cuban ships call frequently at British Guiana ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice. Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these ships also transport arms to British Guiana which allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America. The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Communist countries, as well as for Cuban funding of Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Export (GIMPEX). Havana ordered payment of $300,000 to the manager of GIMPEX in September, ostensibly for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable source. It is unclear, however, whether the money was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds in the past both to the government and to the PPP publishing house. Another source reports that the publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan for PPP salaries and expenses. Georgetown officials believe Cuban-trained terrorists are behind much of the sporadic violence which has occurred during the months-long strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is attempting to gain an official endorsement by the Guianese sugar industry. A senior official has told the US Consul General that six or eight Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support for this group's growing terrorist efforts in Georgetown. Another source reports some Guianese were receiving guerrilla training in the interior of the country in November 1963, presumably for the newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army. 5. Chile The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on support for the presidential campaign of Salvador Allende. Allende is the candidate of the Communist-dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP), and he has a chance of being elected in the September presidential elections. Allende has visited Cuba on several occasions; his campaign manager was in Havana in January. While there, he was promised financial support for Allende's campaign. A usually reliable source reports that Che Guevara recently said: "Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin American country to enter our camp." A clandestine source reported in February that a recently returned student said some 40 Chileans would soon be leaving Cuba to return to Chile. The source said these Chileans had received political training in Cuba and were returning with funds from the Cuban government for Allende's presidential campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identified 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the past three years as "subversives," but we have no evidence of any organized guerrilla training of Chilean groups in Cuba. 6. Colombia Cuba has been providing funds to subversives in Colombia since 1960. The pro-Castro, Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC), the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)—whose members are building up the newly activated National Liberation Front (FLN), and the recently organized National Liberation Movement have been the principal recipients of Cuban funds. A fairly reliable source reported that a Cuban team of two officers went to visit Colombia to evaluate the FLN and its prospects and to pass funds for further activity. Cuba has established some contact with bandit gangs infesting the Colombian countryside. Army troops who are fighting the bandits have found Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits. Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had substantial success so far in directing bandit activity for political ends. 7. Costa Rica The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP) continues to send members for subversive training in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have begun training small groups of party members, but they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-government action. Much of the pro-Castro activity in Costa Rica appears to have been directed against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained revolutionaries based in Costa Rica have on occasion crossed into Nicaragua. The police inspector at a town in the Pacific banana zone reported in early February that two unidentified Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica attempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in support of Panamanian charges against the US. The Costa Rican Society for Friendship with Peoples, a small Communist-front group designed to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other Latin American countries, is an important Havana asset in San Jose. 8. Dominican Republic The country's two militant pro-Communist organizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ) and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faithful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence of Cuban material support for this effort. The quick response from Radio Havana suggests, however, the existence of a communications link with one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country. Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican Republic also was reflected during the transit workers strike in early May. One Dominican who has received guerrilla training in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new organization is to promote urban terrorism. A terrorist captured by police in mid-March is said to have told police that this group is receiving arms and guidance from Castro. 9. Ecuador Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the Ecuadorian government's careful monitoring of anti-government activities has hampered Cuban efforts there. When the junta began to exile Communists and pro-Castro extremists last fall, several took up residence in Havana. A clandestine source in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving guerrilla warfare training before returning to Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities. Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction of the Ecuadorian Communist Party (PCE), is reportedly planning a trip to Havana in late May to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by then so that he can "prove his good faith" to the Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid. Other clandestine sources report Cuban aid has been offered to supporters of former president Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being offered to followers of former president Arosemena. 10. El Salvador There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-supported subversion in El Salvador during the past 10 months. The Castro government probably helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for guidance and training. Havana radio, heard clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda line which can be echoed in locally published Communist publications. Havana has at least one well-trained Salvadoran intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare but in clandestine communications. Like many other Cuban agents, he is not actually working in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from which he deals with Salvadoran operations across the border on direct instructions from a Cuban intelligence officer. 11. Guatemala Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for over two years. While we have no firm evidence of substantial Cuban assistance in 1963, two clandestine sources reported in September that extremist guerrillas and terrorists had been trained and supplied by Cuban agents. In addition, another source reports one of the persons killed in October by the pre-emptive explosion of a homemade bomb was acknowledged by the State Department as a Cuban-trained extremist explosives expert. Mexican Marxist journalist Victor Rico Galan, often used by Castro as an agent in Central America, saw Von Sosa in October and is said to have urged him to work more closely with the Guatemalan Communists. Strong anti-subversive measures by the Peralta Government have curtailed, but have by no means eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala. The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guerrillas are still at large in the mountainous areas of the country. They maintain reliable communications and contacts and have the capability to stage damaging raids on carefully chosen targets. At least 64 Guatemalans are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963. On the basis of clandestine reporting, it is estimated that another 50 traveled secretly and that these received training in guerrilla tactics or political indoctrination. 12. Haiti Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio. A French-language transmission is aimed at the educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed to the masses. The speaker has been identified as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broadcasts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier. Some Haitians may have received guerrilla training in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any such trainees have returned to Haiti. The long-time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so desire. 13. Honduras Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras appears to be directed toward support of similar activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala. The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an effective internal security force, and the presence of long-established routes for smuggling into neighboring countries make Honduras well suited for such a role. Two recent clandestine sources report the Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of the Honduran Communist Party to establish an effective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are said to favor the establishment of a new organization with no direct ties to orthodox Communist groups. The Cubans are said to have selected Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to investigate their readiness for armed action against Honduras' military government. 14. Mexico The Castro regime has been careful in the past to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico. The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico City as well as individual Mexican nationals and exiled Central American residents there to support subversive activities elsewhere in Central America. The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico Galan are a case in point. Havana may find it difficult, however, to avoid exploiting the endemic peasant unrest which is increasing in northern Mexico. A clandestine source reported to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City that the Communist underground organization, the Communist Revolutionary Union (UCR), which has been behind much of the peasant unrest. The US consul general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban consul there was openly preaching revolution and distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he had stepped up the tempo of his activities considerably in recent months. At least 100 Mexicans traveled to Cuba in 1963; 150 have traveled to Cuba from January through April of this year. 15. Nicaragua Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua have been channeled principally through the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revolutionary organization. Most of this group's guerrilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along with members of various other Nicaraguan revolutionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the form of financial support, training, and guidance, but details are lacking regarding its current size or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organization some of its key personnel. Since then, the FLN has been the object of harassment by both Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has shown no capability to make another move soon. 16. Panama Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11 January incidents, Havana had been increasing its pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as the threatened banana workers' strike in October 1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government campaign. Planning quickened after the early November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly other Castro agents. Some of the approximately 100 Panamanians believed to have received training in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare courses in December and again in May. Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May 1963 national elections. Havana is reliably reported to have provided some funds for campaign assistance to selected deputorial candidates of the Radical Action Party (PAR). Seventeen Panamanian extremists arrived in Panama in late March 1963, having spent varying periods of time training in Cuba. Four of these were VAN members. Another group of recently-returned trainees was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama and to launch revolutionary activities in the near future. Sixty-one Panamanians traveled to Cuba in 1963. 17. Paraguay Cuban subversive efforts directed against Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and training Paraguayan exiles based for the most part in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Paraguayan Communist Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and attention, which is given through the Cuban embassy. Some FULNA members have received guerrilla training in Cuba. A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be keeping two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani. Six Paraguayans traveled to Cuba in 1963. However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled to Havana. 18. Peru The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for armed revolution against the Belaunde government is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a militant pro-Castro organization composed of some 1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers. Between 450 and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla training abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable for initiating anti-government action, but the movement is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized. It has the potential for carrying out a subversive campaign of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro. Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of lesser importance, but such assistance has been limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN) is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba for subversive training. Principal FLN leader Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September. Castro-inspired extremists have exploited recurring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past several months and they have been behind much of the illegal peasant land incursions which have occurred there. 19. Uruguay We have no evidence of Cuban support for revolutionary activity directed at subverting the Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on subversive contacts with dissidents from neighboring countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans, and Brazilians. The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been particularly useful as a transit point for air travel to Cuba of travelers wishing to conceal their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been useful to Cuba as a distribution point for Cuban propaganda for neighboring countries. Cuban propaganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals. At least 155 Uruguayan are known to have traveled to Cuba in 1963, 222 traveled to Cuba through April of this year. 20. Venezuela The current level of Cuban activity in Venezuela is considered fairly low. International repercussions stemming from the unprecedented discovery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist campaign to disrupt the December national elections, and the presently increased capabilities of the Venezuelan military and security forces will probably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the short run. There is no reason to believe, however, that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high priority on Cuba's target list for subversion. Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly will continue, and may even increase. The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activities, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963. The decision in late April of the central committee of the Communist party to continue using violence as a political instrument probably presages a gradual increase of terrorist incidents. Riots in mid-May led by Communist-dominated students took place in Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same time, one successful student-led robbery of a post office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery of the university payroll. Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist activities. \| NATIONALITY \| January To From \| February To From \| March To From \| April To From \| May To From \| June To From \| July To From \| August To From \| September To From \| October To From \| November To From \| December To From \| 1963 To From \| \|------------------\|-----------------\|------------------\|--------------\|--------------\|-------------\|--------------\|--------------\|----------------\|------------------\|----------------\|-----------------\|-----------------\|--------------\| \| ARGENTINA \| 18 27 47 34 \| 12 21 13 14 \| 57 12 \| 4 5 6 0 \| 4 0 37 0 \| 4 9 5 3 \| 15 1 \| 222 126 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| BOLIVIA \| 1 7 4 3 \| 3 5 6 0 \| 2 5 \| 3 2 14 0 \| 5 3 21 5 \| 1 17 2 1 \| 7 0 \| 69 48 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| BRAZIL \| 11 19 22 13 \| 9 6 18 7 \| 10 5 \| 1 6 25 0 \| 0 24 121 0 \| 2 162 0 \| 0 0 \| 219 242 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| BR. GUIANA \| 0 4 0 0 \| 0 0 0 0 \| 17 1 \| 0 7 10 0 \| 0 1 0 10 \| 0 26 25 \| 5 1 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| CHILE \| 31 44 26 20 \| 13 42 20 8 \| 9 14 \| 3 8 20 1 \| 22 47 175 1 \| 9 70 9 54 \| 18 7 \| 355 316 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| COLOMBIA \| 54 39 7 12 \| 13 9 23 5 \| 7 15 \| 3 7 29 1 \| 6 14 17 1 \| 8 14 5 1 \| 10 4 \| 182 122 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| COSTA RICA \| 9 0 0 29 \| 1 0 11 1 \| 0 8 \| 0 3 12 0 \| 0 8 0 5 \| 0 1 4 1 \| 10 0 \| 47 56 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| DOM. REPUBLIC \| 0 2 0 0 \| 0 6 2 1 \| 1 2 \| 0 2 37 0 \| 1 8 19 0 \| 11 0 0 \| 3 3 \| 74 24 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| ECUADOR \| 20 0 20 5 \| 10 1 31 1 \| 24 1 \| 4 6 2 0 \| 0 2 7 0 \| 3 4 4 0 \| 1 0 \| 121 20 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| EL SALVADOR \| 7 2 0 0 \| 0 0 5 4 \| 0 0 \| 0 4 4 1 \| 1 1 0 3 \| 0 6 0 1 \| 0 0 \| 26 12 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| GUATEMALA \| 30 18 0 5 \| 15 0 2 0 \| 1 0 \| 0 6 0 3 \| 2 0 3 0 \| 1 0 1 0 \| 1 0 \| 64 23 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| HAITI \| 0 0 4 4 \| 0 18 18 \| 0 0 \| 0 0 0 0 \| 0 0 0 0 \| 0 0 0 0 \| 1 0 \| 23 22 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| HONDURAS \| 11 12 20 0 \| 0 0 11 0 \| 1 8 \| 0 11 0 0 \| 0 8 0 0 \| 0 0 7 0 \| 0 0 \| 50 39 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| JAMAICA \| 1 0 0 0 \| 0 0 1 0 \| 1 1 \| 0 1 33 1 \| 0 2 1 0 \| 0 1 0 1 \| 0 1 \| 38 6 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| MEXICO \| 100 81 22 0 \| 26 38 37 18 \| 34 54 \| 14 42 65 \| 28 34 63 \| 84 36 24 \| 71 23 27 \| 49 72 512 530 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| NICARAGUA \| 4 7 0 0 \| 0 0 2 0 \| 0 0 \| 0 5 0 0 \| 0 0 0 1 \| 1 0 0 1 \| 0 1 \| 12 9 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| PANAMA \| 4 1 20 0 \| 2 1 2 3 \| 2 0 \| 3 0 15 0 \| 6 0 6 13 \| 1 3 0 0 \| 0 3 61 24 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| PARAGUAY \| 2 3 0 4 \| 0 2 0 0 \| 0 0 \| 1 0 3 0 \| 0 0 0 0 \| 0 0 0 0 \| 0 0 \| 6 9 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| PERU \| 6 2 2 4 \| 3 1 5 8 \| 5 3 3 5 \| 4 0 2 9 \| 1 2 0 1 \| 2 1 2 33 \| 38 38 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| URUGUAY \| 19 19 16 14 \| 8 8 8 0 \| 5 12 9 \| 0 17 15 10 \| 16 56 6 3 \| 27 1 0 \| 6 13 \| 158 130 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| VENEZUELA \| 26 9 2 3 \| 9 9 8 0 \| 4 4 8 0 \| 22 0 3 0 \| 37 0 11 10 \| 6 0 3 0 \| 139 35 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| MONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149 223 88 163 144 73 103 319 47 104 214 587 64 76 380 69 99 126 132 2430 1863 The peaks in January, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the "26 July" movement, and to the international architects' congress in October. \| NATIONALITY \| JANUARY TO \| FROM \| PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA \| \|----------------\|------------\|------\|------------------------\| \| ARGENTINA \| 9 \| 3 \| 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba. \| \| BOLIVIA \| 3 \| 1 \| 1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, I will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school. \| \| BRAZIL \| 0 \| 0 \| 29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown. \| \| BR. GUIANA \| 1 \| 0 \| Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution. \| \| CHILE \| 14 \| 15 \| An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations. \| \| COLOMBIA \| 4 \| 0 \| 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration. \| \| COSTA RICA \| 11 \| 13 \| 1 attended Architects Congress \| \| DOM. REP. \| 0 \| 1 \| 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. \| \| ECUADOR \| 8 \| 0 \| \| \| EL SALVADOR \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| GUATEMALA \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| HAITI \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| HONDURAS \| 0 \| 1 \| \| \| JAMAICA \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| MEXICO \| 87 \| 45 \| \| \| NICARAGUA \| 0 \| 1 \| \| \| PANAMA \| 1 \| 1 \| \| \| PARAGUAY \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| PERU \| 5 \| 3 \| \| \| SURINAM \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| TRINIDAD \| 0 \| 0 \| \| \| URUGUAY \| 0 \| 7 \| \| \| VENEZUELA \| 5 \| 0 \| \| \| TOTALS \| 148 \| 91 \| \| \| NATIONALITY \| JANUARY TO \| FROM \| PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA \| \|----------------\|------------\|------\|------------------------\| \| ARGENTINA \| 9 \| 3 \| 1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba. \| \| BOLIVIA \| 3 \| 1 \| 1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Communist Youth Congress in Habana, I will attend a course at the Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school. \| \| BRAZIL \| 0 \| 0 \| 29 December 1963 - not previously reported - unknown. \| \| BR. GUIANA \| 1 \| 0 \| Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban Revolution. \| \| CHILE \| 14 \| 15 \| An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to Cuba for the 1 January celebrations. \| \| COLOMBIA \| 4 \| 0 \| 3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to Habana for 2 January celebration. \| \| COSTA RICA \| 11 \| 13 \| 1 attended Architects Congress \| \| DOM. REP. \| 0 \| 1 \| 5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico. \| \| ECUADOR \| 8 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| EL SALVADOR \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| GUATEMALA \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| HAITI \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| HONDURAS \| 0 \| 1 \| 0 \| \| JAMAICA \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| MEXICO \| 87 \| 45 \| 0 \| \| NICARAGUA \| 0 \| 1 \| 0 \| \| PANAMA \| 1 \| 1 \| 0 \| \| PARAGUAY \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| PERU \| 5 \| 3 \| 0 \| \| SURINAM \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| TRINIDAD \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| URUGUAY \| 0 \| 7 \| 0 \| \| VENEZUELA \| 5 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| TOTALS \| 148 \| 91 \| 0 \| \| NATIONALITY \| MARCH-APRIL TO \| FROM \| PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA \| \|----------------\|---------------\|------\|------------------------\| \| ARGENTINA \| 11 \| 10 \| 1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party leader in Buenos Aires Province. 1 - UNESCO delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban Construction Ministry. \| \| BOLIVIA \| 8 \| 2 \| 3- Attending May Day Celebration. \| \| BRAZIL \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| BR. GUIANA \| 2 \| 2 \| 0 \| \| CHILE \| 14 \| 37 \| 4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. 16-Returning are members of delegation from School of Economy of University of Chile. \| \| COLOMBIA \| 7 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| COSTA RICA \| 3 \| 3 \| 1- En route to East Germany. 2- In attempt to obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara. \| \| DOM. REP. \| 1 \| 7 \| 4- Returning from 26th July Celebration. \| \| ECUADOR \| 5 \| 2 \| 0 \| \| EL SALVADOR \| 3 \| 8 \| 2- Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning from military training in Cuba. \| \| GUATEMALA \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| HAITI \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| HONDURAS \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| JAMAICA \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| MEXICO \| 32 \| 24 \| 3- Attending May Day Celebrations. \| \| NICARAGUA \| 2 \| 1 \| 0 \| \| PANAMA \| 2 \| 14 \| 3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action \| \| PARAGUAY \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| PERU \| 9 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| SURINAM \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| TRINIDAD \| 0 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| URUGUAY \| 14 \| 11 \| 0 \| \| VENEZUELA \| 17 \| 0 \| 0 \| \| TOTALS \| 130 \| 121 \| 0 \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10338-10018.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 24, "total-input-tokens": 27765, "total-output-tokens": 11893, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1530, 1 ], [ 1530, 3815, 2 ], [ 3815, 6243, 3 ], [ 6243, 8386, 4 ], [ 8386, 9260, 5 ], [ 9260, 10803, 6 ], [ 10803, 12756, 7 ], [ 12756, 14462, 8 ], [ 14462, 16330, 9 ], [ 16330, 18282, 10 ], [ 18282, 19877, 11 ], [ 19877, 21713, 12 ], [ 21713, 23540, 13 ], [ 23540, 25067, 14 ], [ 25067, 26539, 15 ], [ 26539, 28516, 16 ], [ 28516, 30321, 17 ], [ 30321, 32186, 18 ], [ 32186, 34029, 19 ], [ 34029, 34470, 20 ], [ 34470, 40206, 21 ], [ 40206, 42108, 22 ], [ 42108, 44042, 23 ], [ 44042, 46240, 24 ] ] }
d1fe8917a4e391b7d79d3d06ca8f24c2bfc20c6d	SECRET 1517052 JAN 76 STAFF CITE LONDON 68796 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLKMBALL NELSON FROM MEYER REF: ROGER CHANNEL 09548 1. REFERENCE FROM DEPARTMENT INFORMS EMBASSY THAT SENATOR HART OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE WILL BE ATTENDING CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY 30 JANUARY TO 1 FEBRUARY. HE HAS REQUESTED THAT EMBASSY ARRANGE WITH DEREK TONKIN FOR BRIEFINGS ON SERIES OF SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO HIM AND SELECT COMMITTEE. THEY ARE THE DIVISION OF LABOR BETWEEN A. SECURITY AND THE SECRET SERVICE AND B. INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. HE GOES ON TO REQUEST BRIEFINGS ON THE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR COVERT OPERATIONS AND POLITICAL CONTROL OF POLITICAL OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. IN ADDITION HE WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND COORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS. SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW IT WORKS. 2. TONKIN HAS BEEN CONTACTED BY EMBASSY OFFICER AND TONKIN HAS SECRET Not renewed. ADvised that Brits will do their best to provide information. Senator Hart wants but that some of the information could not be made available. He is proposing a joint meeting with Sir Leonard Hooper and Richard Sykes for general discussions on the intelligence community and with Mr. Robert Armstrong at the Home Office on the workings of the Official Secrets Act. There will be changes in the schedule and Embassy will be advised by Mr. Tonkin at a later date. 3. There is no indication in the Department traffic that CIA has been informed but we presume that officials of the agency have or will be contacted by Senator Hart of his staff on the matter. 4. No file. E2, IMPDET. SECRET TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT TAPPER PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO 1. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE CODEL ON THE EVENING OF THE 12TH GEORGE CARY CONTACTED COS AND ARRANGED FOR STATION BRIEFING AT 0630/13TH (THE CONTRY TEAM BRIEFING WAS SCHEDULED FOR 0930). CARY MENTIONED THAT THE INTEL BRIEFS HAD BEEN GIVEN "TAIL END" TREATMENT AT PREVIOUS STOPS, AND CONGRESSMAN ADDABBO HAD INDICATED THAT HE WANTED TO BE SURE AND REMEDY THAT ON THE CANBERRA STOPOVER. 2. CONGRESSMEN ADDABBO, ROBINSON AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED BY STAFFERS SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY ARRIVED AT THE EMBASSY AT 0630, WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEM DETAILED BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY HEADQUARTERS. DISCUSSION COVERED THE MAKE-UP OF THE STATION AND BASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN AUSTRALIA, THE OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME USED BY HOS IN MANAGEMENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIAISON, STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES, OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS TO SECRET. PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE: SPECIFIC DETAILS OF HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OPS TASKING- SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT WITH TARGETS AND USE OF LIAISON - STATION BUDGET, ETC., ACTUAL EXAMPLES WERE USED WHENEVER POSSIBLE TO MAKE THE POINT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE PDWHIZ CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUAL, PRIMARY TARGET. IT WAS A LIVELY SESSION, WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS' THE "LIVE WIRES" OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE PRIMARILY RELATED TO INCIDENTAL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT HE FELT IT RATHER EASY TO IDENTIFY THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS OF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY HAPPEN TO BE INTERFACED ADMINISTRATIVELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY. CO'S RESPONSE WAS THAT SUCH IS OFTEN TRUE, BUT THAT STATIONS AND HQS MANAGEMENT ARE FOCUSING ON THAT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND THAT THE WELCH INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS IN THAT REGARD. 3. ALL BUT A FEW MINUTES OF THE ENTIRE HOUR WAS SPENT IN DISCUSSING STATION OPS. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED THAT THE GROUP WAS "WITTING" AND A FEW QUESTIONS AND ISSUES WERE ADDRESSED ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT. SNODGRASS WAS THE FOCAL POINT OF THAT EXCHANGE, AND IT IS REPORTED IN SEPARATE CABLE (CANBERRA 21027). AT SNODGRASS' REQUEST STATION HAD ARRANGED A SPECIAL MEETING WITH A SELECT GROUP OF GOV OFFICIALS. THE DETAILS OF THAT MEETING AND AN ADDITIONAL ONE EARLIER IN THE AFTERNOON OF THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE ARE ALSO DETAILED IN CANBERRA 21029. ON BECAUSE OF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THESE MEETINGS, SUGGEST CEA AND C/EA/PMI REVIEW REFERENCED CABLE. THE CABLE WAS GIVEN RESTRICTED HANDLING BY STATION BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY OF ITS CONTENT. 4. THE MEETING LASTED THE FULL HOUR AND THE CONGRESSMEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL-SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAD BEEN CONVERED. COS STRESSED THAT WE WERE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE ON THE SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE DAY WAS COMPLETED, BUT THEY INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS NO FURTHER STATION CONTACT WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VISIT. THE STAFFERS DEPARTED ON THEIR "VISIT" IN THE EMBASSY CONVAIR ON SCHEDULE, AND WILL RETURN DIRECT TO SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH, ARRIVING AT ABOUT 2300. E2. IMPDET. -- SECRET SECRET 122040Z JAN 75 STAFF CITE CANBERRA 21007 TO: JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLMHGUNGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDABBO REFS: A. JAKARTA 35606 (1W787635) B. JAKARTA 35661 (1W790579) CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED REPORTING ON CODELS. WAS HELPFUL WITH THE RANDALL GROUP, AND AM SURE WILL BE VALUABLE WITH ADDABBO GROUP AS WELL. REGARDS. E2 IMPDET, SECRET 1209392 JAN 76 STAFF CITE JAKARTA 35674 TO: DIRECTOR, RYJAT PLMHCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO REF: JAKARTA 35661 (790599) 1. AT RECEPTION AT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF 11 JANUARY, REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT STATION BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE FRANK ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS. 2. MR. SNODGRASS ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE SURPRISED AND PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS TO THEIR QUESTIONS. HE ADDED THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY AGENCY OFFICERS THAT THEY HAD BEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR TEN YEARS OR MORE AND HAD NOT YET RECRUITED ONE. HE ALLUDED TO THIS AS THE BUREAUCRAT'S DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY PAID FOR SEEKING THE HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT EVER FINDING IT. COS POINTED OUT TO MR. SNODGRASS THAT SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK OF ONE STATION WHICH MIGHT NOT RESULT IN RECRUITMENT WOULD BE THE VERY BASIS ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION IS ABLE TO MAKE A SUCCESSFUL SECRET RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF A SINGLE SOVIET COULD AND DOES RESULT IN A MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A MORE REALISTIC ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO MEET IT. MR. SNODGRASS ADMITTED THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS OPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN LESS CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT WITH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER FEEL FOR OUR ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS. 3. MR. CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS TALKS WITH MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD GONE DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT THEY WERE BEING GIVEN AN ACCURATE AND INTERESTING INSIGHT. 4. THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH TO THE DELEGATION DESPITE THE INITIAL IMPRESSION THAT THEY WERE GENERALLY LETHARGIC ABOUT IT. 5. NEW SUBJECT: DOES HEADQUARTERS HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR HANDLING OF COLEL DIGGS? E2, IMPDET. SECRET 1122202 JAN 76 STAFF CITE CANBERRA 21000. TO: IMMEDIATE WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REF: WELLINGTON 15837 (12787572) 1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DESIRES REFERENCED MEETING AT 0800 AND WILL EXPECT CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON HIS ARRIVAL. 2. HE IS VERY EASY TO TALK TO AND AM SURE YOU WILL ENJOY THE MEETING. HE MET HERE WITH HEADS OF LIAISON SERVICES, ABOUT 45 MINUTES WITH EACH. HIS PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS ARE WHAT THEY THINK OF THE CURRENT INVESTIGATIONS, WHAT IMPACT HAVE THEY HAD ON FOREIGN INTEL RELATIONS, ETC. 3. HE HAS A MINOR HEARING PROBLEM, SO SHOULD ARRANGE TO HAVE HIM SEATED AS CLOSE AS POSSIBLE TO BRIGADIER GILBERT. 4. BEST REGARDS. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 1123052 JAN 75 STAFF CITE CANBERRA 21001 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLMHCONGA RTBUSHEL (DUCKETT) SUBJECT: MILFORD VISIT 1. COS SPENT ABOUT EIGHT HOURS WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ON 10 JANUARY, AND BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED HIS OBJECTIVES HERE. HE MET WITH SQUASH DIRECTOR GENERAL, D/J10 AND SOTERN/44, EACH FOR ABOUT 45 MINUTES AND ALL MEETINGS WENT WELL. ALSO WORKED THE MEETING IN WITH THE NASA REP AND THAT ALSO APPEARED TO GO WELL, AS DID THE MEETING ON THE SPECIAL S AND T SUBJECT. 2. INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON, DEALING WITH TERRORISM QUESTION. ENTIRE DELEGATION WAS VERY FRIENDLY AND A PLEASURE TO DEAL WITH. JACK MAURY'S PRESENCE WAS AN ASSET. 3. DETAILED SUMMARY OF DAY'S ACTIVITY BEING FORWARDED THIS DATE. E2 IMPDET. SECRET SECRET 1109372 JAN 76 STAFF CITE JAKARTA 35661. TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY. NIAC CANBERRA RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL ADDABBO 1. COS BRIEFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 11 JAN IN COS OFFICE. ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD CONCERNING TARGETS, OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET, ALLOCATION OF COSTS TO COMMUNIST TARGETS VS INTERNAL TARGETS, RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT, STABILITY AND INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET INFORMATION, MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK PERFORMED BY OFFICIALLY COVERED OFFICERS, MALAYSIAN INSURGENCY, INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES, DIA ROLE IN INDONESIA, AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING. 2. QUESTIONS WERE NOT PERSUED WITH MUCH VIGOR AND GROUP SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFICULT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS SNODGRASS, A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE IN MORE DETAIL BUT WAS RESTRAINED BY TIME LIMITATIONS (THE SECRET CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH). 3. THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL. NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH POLITICAL PERCEPTION OF REPS WILSON/DICKENSON. MR. CARY WAS QUITE HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THEIR OUTLOOK. 4. OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY PROBABLY DO NOT CONSIDER THIS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THEIR TRIP. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 090033Z JAN 76 STAFF CITE CANBERRA 20992 TO: WELLINGTON INFO DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLMHCUNGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REF: WELLINGTON 15837 787572) 1. COS WILL TAKE MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE. 2. REGARDS, E2, IMPDET. OUTGOING MESSAGE TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: JAKARTA 35600 IN 787573 1. STATION APPEARS TO HAVE HANDLED VISIT OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IN FINE FASHION. REF WILL BE HELPFUL IN FOLLOW-UP DISCUSSIONS HERE. 2. PARAGRAPH NINE, REFERENCE GIVES US SOME PROBLEMS. OBVIOUSLY, EVEN FACT THAT HE WAS BRIEFED BY CIA STATION CHIEF IN JAKARTA SENSITIVE SINCE THAT FACT WILL CAUSE US EMBARRASSMENT WITH INDONESIAN LIAISON AND WITH INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT PLUS CALLING UNWANTED ATTENTION TO STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES IN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IN INDONESIA WILL, IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE US DAMAGE IN INDONESIA. ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THAT WE HAVE PLEDGED TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL PROTECT OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THEM. MEETING WITH YOGA, IF PUBLISHED, WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH. 3. THEREFORE REQUEST STATION FORWARD "NON-CLASSIFIED" VERSION OF BRIEFING AND YOGA MEETING BY CABLE. HEADQUARTERS DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 058913 WILL HANDLE HERE WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SO THAT STATION OPERATIONS INCLUDING LIAISON EQUITIES ARE PROTECTED. 4. FOR CANBERRA, WELLINGTON: IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAKES REQUEST FOR UNCLASSIFIED VERSIONS OF MEETING AND BRIEFINGS WITH/ BY STATION AND LIAISON STATION SHOULD AGREE FORWARD TO HEADQUARTERS AND WE WILL HANDLE IN SIMILAR FASHION AS JAKARTA MATERIAL. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 0803522 JAN 76 STAFF CITE JAKARTA 35606 TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA ROUTINE WELLINGTON. RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: JAKARTA 035600 (N 787573) 1. CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON BRIEFED AT COS RESIDENCE NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUATION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND ROLE OF INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION, TARGETS, PERSONNEL OR BUDGET OF STATION. THEY WERE OPENLY CRITICAL OF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED EARLIER IN THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD SAID, COS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF THE TOTAL INDONESIAN "NATIONAL RESILIENCE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS A DEFENSE AGAINST COMMUNIST ENCROACHMENT. THE CONGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES. SECRET RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS, 2. THE TWO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA. THEY APPEARED HIGHLY INTERESTED WHEN COS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT APPEARED TO BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY. NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN A SHORT BRIEFING ON IT. BOTH MADE MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO-SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION CONDEMNING U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GUAM. ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IS REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO WONPAT, WHO IS THE REPRESENTATIVE FROM GUAM. THEY SAID MR. WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE OF DIPLOMACY NOT TO BRING UP THIS MATTER DURING THE VISIT, BUT THAT HE HAD CONFESSIONED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF IN THIS MATTER. COS REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT REGRETTED THAT MR. WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON THIS ISSUE SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TO LET OUR INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT HAPPY AT THIS GRATUITOUS REBUFF. IT WAS ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF PRESIDENT SUHARTO, WHO HAD REACTED BY INSTRUCTING THE INDONESIAN U.N. DELEGATION TO SEEK INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA. BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH ISSUE AGAIN, WE ALSO NOTED THAT PRESIDENT SUHARTO HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN. DELEGATION VOTE ON THIS ISSUE AND HAD MADE HIS DISPLEASURE KNOWN TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE. 3. DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF PRESIDENT MANÇOS AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEMANDING THE REMOVAL OF U.S. MILITARY BASES FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND DID NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAI AND PHILIPPINE LEADERSHIP. AS YOGA PUT IT, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY. BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAÏVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S. AND NATURALLY AFFECTED CONGRESS. CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO FIGHT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT. HE ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO. HE ASKED FOR COS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHETHER TO KEEP QUIET ON THIS OR LET HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN. COS SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION THAT IT WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD FOR CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT. COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS THAT IT DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY PUBLICLY SINCE THE PUBLIC STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE ONES WERE NOT. 4. THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS, GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE U.S. IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY ARE, HOWEVER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST SUBVERSION, AND THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED, "LOOK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED) DID TO US!" THEY EXPRESSED VERY LITTLE OF THEIR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH BOTH SEEMED TO ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL OF MR. HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE, THEY WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE CONDOR OF MR. COLBY. 5. Generally it appeared they were satisfied with their conversation with COS, although generally disappointed with the results of their visit up to that time, since they said they had not found out much from the Indonesians that they didn't know before. Strongly endorse Headquarters advice to treat with these gentlemen separately from Congressman Milford, whose interests seem quite different from theirs'. E2, IMPDET. Advised of contact with Congressmen Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on 7 January. SECRET 070944Z JAN 76 STAFF CITE JAKARTA 35600 TO: DIRECTOR INFO CANBERRA, WELLINGTON. RYBAT PLMMCONGA REF: A. DIRECTOR 788143 B. DIRECTOR 788139 C. DIRECTOR 788390 D. DIRECTOR 785722 1. MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SHORTLY AFTER HIS ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED TO BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY. ALSO CONTACTED CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND DICKINSON AND LATER MR. TED LUNGER, AND WILL BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY. 2. MILFORD BRIEFING COMPRISED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLINED REF/D. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WERE VERY CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES. 3. MILFORD WAS SERIOUS, ATTENTIVE AND INTERESTED LISTENER. HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND AND CONTROL, FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SECURITY AND MORALE OF STATION PERSONNEL. HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS OF STATION PERSONNEL, OVERALL BUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. HE WAS VERY INTERESTED. IN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT. HIS ATTITUDE WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELIEVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE. HE SAID ALSO THAT THE CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LOOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW OF THE AGENCY IF THEY TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY BY THE DDO. HE ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CO'S OUTLINED A FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE HIM. OFF THE RECORD, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SAID HE HAD IN MIND PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED. THIS COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROM THE NORM AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. ALSO, UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT BE ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT ON A STRICT BIGOTED BASIS AND MCWD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE MAJORITY OF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE. HE ADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE PRESENT CONGRESS. HE POOH-POOHED THE IDEA OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SEEING THAT IT WOULD HAVE NO LEGISLATION AUTHORITY AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER DOG BITING AT OUR HEELS. 5. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED FOR COS' VIEWS ON THIS LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH COS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON OR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO AVOID RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRESS, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST HAVE SOME SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELEMENT WE WOULD BE OUT OF BUSINESS. COS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BASIS THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT SECRET TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION. 6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT THE EFFECT OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATION ACTIVITIES. COS POINTED OUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. 7. FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, COS ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, TOGETHER WITH CHARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIRE DELEGATION, TO A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENERAL YOGA IF HE FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD ANY CRITICISM OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN INDONESIAN AFFAIRS. GENERAL YOGA REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED TO DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT. IN CERTAIN CASES IT IS POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATION IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH AS THE SOVIETS. THIS IS A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO A SPECIFIC GOAL. YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE BRITISH, THE AUSTRALIANS, THE JAPANESE, WEST GERMANS, AND ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS. HE SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH RIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. 8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED MARY WHO WAS WELL TAKEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT. SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI-TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT IS WELL TO SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM. 9. MILFORD ASKED FOR A NON-CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION BRIEFING AND OF MEETING WITH ZOGA TO BE SENT TO AGENCY AND PASSED ON TO HIM. THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED IT HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD GO INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD. I WILL PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST. 10. OVERALL BELIEVE THIS WAS A PLUS. MILFORD EXPRESSED COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEFING AND AGAIN REPEATED THAT IF OTHERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES THEY TOO WOULD BE IMPRESSED. 11. WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING WHEN IT IS COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 0721002 JAN 76 STAFF CITE CANBERRA 20980 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMMCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REF: DIRECTOR 787555 1. APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY ARRANGED. CONG. MILFORD WILL MEET WITH SOUTHERN REP (PROBABLY SOUTHERN/44, D/JIO AND SQUASH/D-G). 2. COS AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY SET FOR 0830-1000. ANTICIPATE APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES MEETING WITH EACH LIAISON OFFICER, SO SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN AMPLE TIME FOR MILFORD TO REJOIN GROUP FOR AFTERNOON ACTIVITIES. CAN EXTEND DURATION OF MEETINGS IF HE DESIRES. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 0702402 JAN 76 STAFF CITE WELLINGTON 15837 TO: CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REFS: A. DIRECTOR 787959 B. DIRECTOR 787555 PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT COS WELLINGTON CAN ARRANGE 15 JANUARY 0800 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH NZ SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H. E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON OPERATION DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND BRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN CONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT. TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR FLIGHT TO MT. COOK WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY AFTER MEETING WITH GILBERT. PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S PREFERENCE SO COS CAN CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT. E2IMPDET SECRET OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET STAFF CONF: CEA 3 INFO: FILE DCI REVIEW STAFF 000, CSIF SAY DO 000/00 0/0 TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON-Y RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y REF: DIRECTOR 787555 [] CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES DESIRE MEETINGS WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS. REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH LIAISON. E2, IMPDET-H TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE. OLC CEA/PMI DATE: 2 JAN 76 ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON UNIT: DCEA EXT: 9373 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY CEA BILL J. HOUSTON DCEA RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED SECRET OUTGOING MESSAGE TO: JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO, Y RYBAT PLMHCONGAY REFS: A. DIRECTOR 785722 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) [] B. DIRECTOR 787555 (NOT NEEDED TOKYO) [*] Y 1. BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, HE EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDRESSES AS FOLLOWS: Y JAKARTA - MORNING 7 JANUARY CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY WELLINGTON - EVENING 14 JANUARY Y 2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING, MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE), HAS BEEN MOST INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS CONCERNED ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI, ONLY MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE DRAWS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED HAS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS. HE RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION SECRET COORDINATING OFFICERS REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED AUTHENTICATING OFFICER E 2 IMPDET CL BY: AS POSSIBLE TO ASSIST HIM WRITE MINORITY REPORT. ACCORDINGLY, HE WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR IMPORTANCE THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC DISCLOSURES. RECOGNIZE SHORT NOTICE, BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE LIAISON CONTACTS. 3. FOR JAKARTA: PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND WILSON/DICKINSON CONTACTS SEPARATELY AND AVOID OBVIOUS SITUATION OF SINGLING MILFORD OUT FOR SPECIAL TREATMENT. 4. FOR CANBERRA: MILFORD DOES EXPECT MEET AND DISCUSS HIS ACTIVITY WITH MR. BONHAM IN CANBERRA. HE WILL DEVOTE DAY OF 10 JANUARY TO STATION AND NASA. REQUEST STATION COORDINATE WITH NASA REP WHO PLANS TAKE MILFORD VISIT FACILITY AT TIPENBIL. IF SO, SUGGEST STATION ARRANGE HAVE MRS. MILFORD TOUR NEARBY ZOO. IF ANY CONFLICT SCHEDULING WITH NASA, MILFORD SAYS HE WANTS AGENCY TO TAKE PRIORITY. 5. FOR WELLINGTON: MILFORD UNDERSTANDS HIS STAY WELLINGTON SHORT AND WILLING DEVOTE EVENING TO STATION. 6. FOR TOKYO: TOKYO IS REST STOP AND MILFORD EXPECTS NO CONTACT. 7. REQUEST ACTION ADDRESSES COORDINATE STATION PLANS WITH EMBASSY SCHEDULING FOR GROUP TO GIVE MILFORD OPPORTUNITY MEET SENIOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IF CONFLICT CAN BE AVOIDED. MILFORD HAS STRESSED, HOWEVER, AGENCY BUSINESS HAS PRIORITY. HAS PROVIDED MILFORD NAMES COS'S IN JAKARTA, CANBERRA, AND WELLINGTON. REQUEST STATION'S CONTACT MILFORD AS SOON AFTER ARRIVAL AS POSSIBLE SO MILFORD CAN PLAN NON-AGENCY PART OF SCHEDULE. SUGGEST STATION OFFICER ASSIST MRS. MILFORD SINCE SHE MAY NOT WISH TO TAG ALONG WITH LARGER GROUP WITHOUT HER HUSBAND. E2 IMPDET. GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP. *CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REVISED SCHEDULE. DEP. DIR/DDS&T - C. DUCKETT {DRAFT} OLC - R. CHIN {DRAFT} DATE: 3 JANUARY 76 ORIG: R. CHIN UNIT: OLC EXT: 9010 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA BILL J. HOUSTON, DCEA CLASSIFICATION SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 058088 SECRET TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLM CONGA CONGRESSMAN REFS: A4 DIRECTOR 787555 B4 DIRECTOR 785722 1. CHARGE MIKE RIVES HAS BEEN ADVISED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST FOR STATION BRIEFING PER REF A. WILL ARRANGE BRIEFING AFTER CONGRESSMAN'S ARRIVAL. 2. ON 2 JANUARY MAFAWN/1 TELEPHONED STATION TO SAY THAT CABLE HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY BAKIN FROM HACLUSE/1. WE PROPOSED MEETINGS WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT AND CALL ON PRESIDENT SUMARTO. HE ALSO PROPOSED THAT GENERAL MURDANI BRIEF THE GROUP ON GENERAL SECURITY SITUATION. BAKIN HAS SENT CABLE TO MURDANI TO RETURN TO JAKARTA EARLY NEXT WEEK TO PARTICIPATE IN BRIEFINGS. BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFF MEMBERS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD AT BAKIN HQS ON 7 JANUARY. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL PARTICIPATE IN THIS BRIEFING. STATION ARRANGED BAKIN BRIEFINGS BASED ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHARGE. SECRET OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET STAFF CONF: 9693 INFO: FILE DCC (REVIEW STAFF) CSIAF 000 81000 D00100 D00100 TO: PRIORITY JAKARTA, CANBERRA, WELLINGTON, Y RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD Y REF: DIRECTOR 785722 \|\| Y 1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REVISED SCHEDULE: ETD JAKARTA 1200 8 JAN FOR BALI Y ETD BALI 0800 9 JAN FOR CANBERRA Y ETA CANBERRA 1740 9 JAN Y ETA WELLINGTON 1515 14 JAN Y ETD WELLINGTON 1000 15 JAN FOR MT. COOK Y ETD MT. COOK 1400 15 JAN FOR CHRIST CHURCH Y ETA CHRIST CHURCH 1500 15 JAN Y ETD CHRIST CHURCH 09 16 NOTE: THIS SEPARATE TRIP TO THAT OF SNODGRASS, PRESTON, CARY MENTIONED DIRECTOR 778574 \|\| Y 2. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAD PREVIOUSLY REQUESTED MEETING WITH COS, JAKARTA 10 JANUARY, COS, CANBERRA 13 JANUARY AND WITH COS, WELLINGTON, 15 JANUARY. REVISED SCHEDULE WILL ALTER HIS DESIRES THIS CASE. MEETING WITH HIM ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL FORWARD NEW DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 054893 SCHEDULE FOR MEETINGS WITH COS' AT THAT TIME. 3. FOLLOWING ARE RESULTS CEA AND OLC {MR. ROBERT CHIN} BRIEFING OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD 19 DECEMBER 1975: A. NINETEEN DECEMBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD COULD BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW TERMS ON WHAT THE CIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND INDONESIA WERE DOING IN TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS. B. AUSTRALIA: THERE WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRA, MELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. THIS REPRESENTATION CONSISTED OF ABOUT SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC MISSION OF PURSUING SOVIET, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE IN AUSTRALIA. IT WAS STRESSED THAT THESE DENIED AREA TARGETS WERE PURSUED BOTH UNILATERALLY AND IN JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICE. THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, 66 CHINESE, 8 HUNGARIANS, 22 CZECHS, 3 BULGARIANS, 59 YUGOSLAVS, 9 RUMANIANS AND 17 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED THROUGHOUT BRIEFING THAT PRIMARY OBJECTIVE IN BOTH UNILATERAL AND JOINT OPERATIONS WAS THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN TARGETS AS IN-PLACE AGENTS WHO WOULD WORK FOR US NOT ONLY IN AUSTRALIA BUT UPON THEIR RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRY OF ORIGIN. ALSO STRESSED CIA'S INTEREST IN OBTAINING NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE FROM RECRUITED PENETRATIONS OF THE SOVIET, CHINESE OR EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN AUSTRALIA. HE WAS INFORMED OF OUR DESIRE TO RUN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS OR ARRANGE THE DEFECTION OF KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCES. OUR INTEREST IN BUILDING UP PERSONNEL INDICES ON THOSE INDIVIDUALS FROM TARGET COUNTRIES WHO WERE IN AUSTRALIA BUT WHO WERE NOT RECRUITABLE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT OF THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT ALSO WAS DISCUSSED. IT WAS UNDERSCORED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO NOT RECRUITABLE TODAY MIGHT BE RECRUITABLE IN FUTURE IF WE CAN LEARN TO UNDERSTAND WHAT MOTIVATES THE TARGET AND WHAT MAKES THEM TICK AS HUMAN BEINGS. THE BRIEFING OF REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD ON AUSTRALIA ALSO TOUCHED LIGHTLY ON THE BROAD ASPECTS OF CIA'S LIAISON WITH ASIO, ASIS AND JIOY. C. NEW ZEALAND: HE WAS ADVISED THAT CIA HAD THREE PEOPLE IN WELLINGTON WHO WERE FOCUSED ON RUNNING JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE NEW ZEALAND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AGAINST THE SOVIET, PRC. AND EAST EUROPEAN PRESENCE IN NEW ZEALAND. HE WAS GIVEN RUNDOWN ON NUMBERS OF SOVIETS, CHINESE AND EAST EUROPEAN WHO WERE CURRENTLY IN NEW ZEALAND. THE SCOPE OF OUR OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS WAS ALSO DISCUSSED IN TERMS SIMILAR TO WHAT WAS OUTLINED IN PARA 3B ON AUSTRALIA. D. INDONESIA: CIA MAINTAINED A PRESENCE IN JAKARTA, MEDAN AND SURABAYA. CIA HAD APPROXIMATELY 28 PEOPLE IN INDONESIA. THESE FIGURES WERE COMPARED AGAINST THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE PRESENCE IN INDONESIA. A DISCUSSION OF THE PRC TARGET AS SEEN FROM PERSPECTIVE OF INDONESIA FOCUSED ON LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING OF INTERCEPTED MAIL FROM CHINA TO INDONESIA. THERE WAS ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN AND VIETNAMESE TARGETS IN INDONESIA. THE BRIEFING ALSO FOCUSED ON INDONESIA AS AN INTELLIGENCE TARGET IN TERMS OF HOST COUNTRY ACTIVITIES, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS TRAFFIC INTO AND OUT OF INDONESIA. A BRIEF COMMENT WAS ALSO MADE ON TOPIC OF CIA LIAISON WITH BAKIN, THE INDONESIAN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. THE TOTALITY OF STATION'S EFFORTS IN INDONESIA WAS DESCRIBED IN BROAD MANAGEMENT TERMS AND SOME EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED FROM CIA ACTIVITIES IN INDONESIA. CEA ALSO FOCUSED BRIEFLY ON OUR ABILITY TO USE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO PURSUE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN INDONESIA. E. COMMENT: REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD TOOK NOTE OF ABOVE BRIEFINGS, ASKED LIMITED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ON THE TYPES OF INTELLIGENCE THAT WAS PRODUCED BY THE VARIOUS STATIONS AND INDICATED THAT BRIEFINGS HAD COVERED ALL OF THE ISSUES THAT HE HAD WANTED TO DISCUSS. F. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD EXPRESSED GREAT DEAL OF INTEREST IN THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS AND ASKED THAT IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, HE WOULD LIKE TO MEET WITH MEMBERS OF AUSTRALIAN LIAISON SERVICES. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD MADE POINT THAT SUCH MEETINGS WOULD BE USEFUL TO HIM IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE COMMITTEE DUTIES BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON LIAISON SERVICES' REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD WAS ADVISED THAT ATTEMPTS WOULD BE MADE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS. PARTICULARLY IN AUSTRALIA, WITH ONE OR TWO SENIOR LIAISON PERSONALITIES. 4. REGARDING REFERENCE PARA THREE F, SINCE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD SPECIFICALLY WISHES DEAL WITH LIAISON SERVICES ATTITUDES IN HIS MINORITY REPORT, HAVE NO OBJECTION GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF OUR DEALINGS WITH LIAISON SERVICES. STATIONS CAN ALSO ARRANGE MEETING WITH SENIOR LIAISON OFFICIALS ON DISCREET BASIS IF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD REQUESTS. E2, IMPDET-H GAVE DETAILS ON CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S TRIP. OUTGOING MESSAGE TO: PRIORITY CANBERRA, JAKARTA, WELLINGTON RYBAT PLNHCONGA Y REFS: A. CANBERRA 20866 [IN 774560] [RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON] B. DIRECTOR 784159 [*] [RELAYING JAKARTA, WELLINGTON] 1. THIRTEEN MEMBERS OF HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, ACCOMPANIED BY WIVES, WILL BE MAKING TRIP TO JAKARTA, CANBERRA, SYDNEY, AND WELLINGTON. GROUP WILL USE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR TRIP. THEREFORE, NO NEED FOR STATION TO MAKE HOTEL OR RELATED TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS. TWO REPRESENTATIVES, PRICE AND WILSON, ARE MEMBERS OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE WHO ARE GOING AT THIS TIME. NONE OF ABOVE HAVE ASKED TO MEET WITH STATIONS. IF LATER REQUESTED, CHIEF COUNSEL OR COMMITTEE STAFF MAY CONTACT YOU IN HEADQUARTERS TO MEET WITH GROUP. CONTACT CAN BE MADE THROUGH STAFF ASSISTANT SLATINSHEK WHO IS TRAVELLING WITH GROUP. INTEREST DEVELOPS. 2. HOWEVER, CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD [DEMOCRAT, TEXAS] WHO IS A MEMBER OF THE PIKE COMMITTEE [HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE] WILL ACCOMPANY THIS GROUP AND DOES DESIRE BRIEFINGS. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WIFE WILL TRAVEL WITH HIM. CONGRESSMAN DATE: 24 DEC 75 ORIG: B.J. HOUSTON UNIT: EX: RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION SECRET REPRODUCTION, BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 058913 MILFORD'S INTEREST AS STATED BY HIM WILL BE IN SEEING HOW THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS WORKS FROM THE GROUND UP. HE WANTS TO ACQUIRE BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE ON THIS PROCESS SO THAT WHEN THE FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT IS MADE HE CAN USE HIS INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT IT IS A BALANCED ONE. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES NOT LIKE FORMAL BRIEFINGS AND DOES NOT WANT CHARTS. 3. SINCE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS VERY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW THE AGENCY FUNCTIONS, IT IS LIKELY THAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WILL FOCUS ON THIS ASPECT OF STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT. A. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES: STATIONS PROBABLY CAN DEAL WITH THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO UNDERSTAND THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS FROM THE GROUND UP BY BRIEFING HIM ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVES FUNCTIONS. STATION CAN OUTLINE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., HOW STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HEADQUARTERS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVES IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION. DOWN TO AG'S OF SPECIFIC INTEREST. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING OF FAN'S, ETC. B. AGENT ACQUISITION: STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES ARE CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. C. AGENT AUTHENTICATION: DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHORIZED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION: SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. D. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION: ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: SHOULD MAKE POINT THAT COLLECTION ON INTERNAL TARGET IS BY PRODUCT ACQUIRED THROUGH ELICITATION FROM LIAISON, FOREIGNERS AND AMERICANS. (FYI: OBJECTIVE K HAS BEEN DROPPED FROM CANBERRA OD AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE ADDRESSED IN THIS BRIEFING.) THRUST OF PROGRAM IS RECRUITMENT OF SOVS AND CHINESE, USING LIAISON AS EXTENSION OF CIA, FOR COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. POINT OUT DO NOT RECRUIT AUSTRALIANS OR NEW ZEALANDERS WITHOUT SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED. E. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM: STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRO PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEED BACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. F. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR STATIONS. 4. WHERE APPLICABLE {SUCH AS JAKARTA} BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO DEAL SPECIFICALLY WITH STATION COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCIDS FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS. 5. FOR CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON: IT PROBABLY WOULD ALSO BE USEFUL TO PROVIDE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD WITH ANALYSIS OF THE RECENT ELECTION DEVELOPMENTS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND. HE WOULD ALSO BE INTERESTED IN STATION'S ESTIMATE OF HOW NEW GOVERNMENTS WILL CONDUCT FOREIGN POLICIES, VIS-A-VIS UNITED STATES. 6. FOR JAKARTA: IN ADDITION TO STABILITY OF SUHARTO REGIME THE CONGRESSMAN MIGHT APPRECIATE A REVIEW OF THE PORTUGUESE TIMOR SITUATION AND HOW THAT WILL INFLUENCE THE STABILITY OF THE REGION. 7. THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS, CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574. 8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE. 9. SEPARATE CABLE FOLLOWS TO CANBERRA ON SENSITIVE ASPECTS OF VISIT. THE FOLLOWING ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS: DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED COORDINATING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION: SECRET CL BY: 058913 OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR CONF: INFO: FILE DATE-TIME GROUP DIRECTOR MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER INDEX DISSEM BY: NO INDEX RETURN TO PER IP FILES # JAKARTA 6 JAN, ETD 9 JAN Y CANBERRA 9 JAN, ETD 11 JAN Y SYDNEY 11 JAN, ETD 14 JAN Y WELLINGTON 14 JAN, ETD 16 JAN E2, IMPDET A INQUIRY CONCERNING CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION. ** HAS CONTACT WITH D. MILFORD ON TRIP TO AUSTRALIA. DATE: 24 DEC 75 ORIG: B. J. HOUSTON UNIT: ACEA EXT: 9373 DAVID BLEE, A/DDO BILL J. HOUSTON, ACEA CLASSIFICATION SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 050913 SECRET 280348Z NOV 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25948 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: SEOUL 25761 (73 6898) 1. FOLLOWING LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD G. STILWELL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, AND FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST TO BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT. GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH, COMMANDER, I CORPS, CAMP RED CLOUD, FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER. GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH WAS REWORKED INTO THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS. THE LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO COS BY GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. 2. QUOTE "DEAR MR. MILFORD: SECRET GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED AT THE INTEREST YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA. I AM ONLY SORRY THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER DETAIL. THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND MY VIEWS. AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF INTELLIGENCE - AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT, SHOULD HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE. ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE US INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA IS Viable. THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, I.E., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA), DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN CONCERT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED AND EFFICIENT FLOW OF INTELLIGENCE. WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED WITH THE DEDICATION AND PROFESSIONALISM OF THE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO THOSE NATIONAL AGENCIES; AND WE HAVE EQUALLY HIGH RESPECT FOR OUR SECRET OWN PEOPLE. THIS TEAM IS RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE. LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL ASPECTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT. THE PRIMARY NEED IS FOR RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE. BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY TO THE ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN THE RANGE FANS OF HIS EMLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS, WE MUST CONSTANTLY BE ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD TIP US OFF TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, BECAUSE OF HIS READINESS AND THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING OF SUPPLIES, WE DO NOT HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE THAT WE WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS, IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT WE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THIS, US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES OF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING. NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE US INVALUABLE INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY. YET WE STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE ACTUAL LOCATIONS AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE THE EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPLY A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON THE ENEMY'S CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS. UNFORTUNATELY, INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE CLOSED NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF INFORMATION. THE PREPONDERANCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR HUMAN SOURCE CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND THAT AGENCY IS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A NEED FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED, LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ON STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS NATURE IS THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMZ. THIS IS A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE TECHNIQUES WOULD BE A MEANS OF SECRET DISCOVERING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED AGAINST US. IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH ALTITUDE PLATFORM TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND MASS TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTED SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA COLLECTED. OUR PROPOSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS, WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL. WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES. NONETHELESS, GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE, AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION AND HELP TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED. SECRET SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE E2, IMPDET." SECRET 1003222 NOV 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25761 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: SEOUL 25730 (N 732787) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATE 264362 (ROGER CHANNEL) 10 NOVEMBER 1975: QUOTE SUBJECT: LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. REF: SEOUL 8531. 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARD TO MILFORD AS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED PARA 5 REFER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE; OWING TO SENSITIVITY OF REFERENCE TO "CLANDESTINE OPERATION" IN LETTER LIKELY TO BECOME PART OF PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTE, * NO RECORD IN CABLE SEC. SECRET 3103142 OCT 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25687 TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: SEOUL 25649 (724591)* 1. REGRET DELAY IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. DCOS BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NEDZI (SEOUL 25657). 2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AEZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES. 3. COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN TO READ A STERILIZED COPY OF SEOUL 25388 LESS THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL TO TRY TO DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE 1-83 94 23 78B REVIEW SECRET STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NOT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE. THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HIS DESIRE TO NOW FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS. COMMENDED MR. SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON THIS AREA. 4. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL. HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE. E2, IMPDET. CS COMMENT:COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (D-Texas) on 25 October 1975. SECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 1 OF 4 TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: A. SEOUL 25646 (723/38) B. DIRECTOR 759641 FOLLOWING IS A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D-TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975. BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFORE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING ROOM. 1. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON. IN ADDITION TO HIS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE REPORT WILL STATE THAT: A. DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION. B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS SECRET IN FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE, C. NEW LEGISLATION AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED. 2. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN HIS OPINION THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBJECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS DID NOT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS TO PERSONALLY OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF". HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE. HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP OF THIS PROPOSAL, HE AGREED, BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE. HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES. HE IS SECRET ACTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FOR EMPLOYMENT AS HIS STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD COME UP WITH THE RIGHT MAN. 3. CUS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR COLBY WOULD BE THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE WAS NOW OBLIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES. CUS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED. HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND IS GOOD COPY, HOWEVER, OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE ASSIGNMENT. 4. THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES IT IS TO FORM A COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE MANNER. THE CONGRESSMAN IS PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT THE HOUSE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE TO BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY THE HOUSE MEMBERS. 5. THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WHETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE SHOULD BE EXTENDED. IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "BAD" LEGISLATION. IF CONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPIRED MANIPULATION OF THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL HEADLINES. HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW WHICH WAS WORSE. 6. THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT, WHICH HE SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE A dissenting minority report focusing in a positive manner on the contemporary situation rather than the historical issues that the committee has focused in a non-objective manner, however, since December is for practical purposes not a working month, this gives him only thirty days to put together a report. Since he is a member of three House committees and chairman of one sub-committee with not even one staff assistant on the select committee he is finding it almost impossible to develop a minority report. He turned aside the suggestion that favorable witnesses be called as impractical. He said, for example, that if he asked General Walters or prestigious and knowledgeable personalities with intelligence backgrounds to appear, they would not be permitted to make an objective and balanced presentation. The committee's line of questioning would be confined to their knowledge of the "dead cats" of ten to fifteen years ago. He also foresaw no possibility of modifying the majority views or the majority report, he was clearly concerned that Sam Adams' ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL PERMITTED. HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE COULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT. IF NOT, HE INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE THIS POINT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT. 7. THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING A MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE SECRET 280300Z OCT 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 OF 4 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMHCONGA HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL, AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE "ALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE". HE STATED THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT TO IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER REMEDIAL ACTIONS, COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN A THOROUGH IN-COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER TO ASSURE HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN-COUNTRY PROGRAMS. THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL SECRET WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF FOCUS AND THE CONGRESSMAN'S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING CONSTRUCTIVE, BUT HIS INABILITY TO FIND A "HANDLE".) 8. THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED BUT THESE RESTRICTIONS DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER, SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE HSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLENGED (ACCORDING TO THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY). 9. COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN WOULD BE RECEPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION, GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY TO CHART THE COURSE. IN SO DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-À-VIS THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD. COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE COLLECTION PROGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES COS IN DUE COURSE SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION. TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY J-2, CAPTAIN ALBERT M. HUNT, THE DEPUTY J-2 COLONEL ARTHUR W. LONG AND THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR. DELMAR C. LANG INTO THE DISCUSSION. THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANNELS WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROLE WAS ENDORSED BY THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE. COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE, SECRET REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIM OR PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCID'S UPON HIS RETURN TO WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLOW UP UPON HIS RETURN. 10. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE OF REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE DECISION COULD BE TAKEN. COL. LONG, THE DEPUTY J-2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS, POINTING OUT THE SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE EMPLOYED. HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND TO DELAY THE MORE RAPID TRANSMISSION OF INTELLIGENCE; TO STIFLE DISSENTING VIEWS; AND TO CREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED SUPER-AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO CONTROL AND REVIEW. THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY SECRET STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL REPORTING, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN MORE PERSUASIVE ON HIS "WILD-EYED" LIBERAL PEERS. 11. COS REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE DCI TO FURTHER REFINE THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, MRS. EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN AMERICA. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS, THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS SECRET A MAJOR ADDITIONAL STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY. COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-AGENCY RESOURCES ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS OF THE RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC. 12. COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON AS WELL AS THE FIELD. LOCAL COORDINATION WAS EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S REPORTING WAS STRESSED. COS STATED THAT HE WAS UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER HAD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE REPORT FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS. LOCALLY, COS SECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 OF 4 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMHCONGA NOTED THAT WE DO NOT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE AMBASSADOR'S OR THE CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD PLACE THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERIALLY ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT. IT WAS NOTED THAT SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY ITS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.G., THE OFFICE OF THE CINCUNC IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBJECT MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS OF THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY. COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEminate SUCH SECRET INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT, CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL LEVEL SYSTEM. 13. THE COS'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY J-2, COLONEL LONG, WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY, STRONGLY ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER DCID 5/1. 14. THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM. COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES. TO IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED. 15. ALTHOUGH COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROPOSED U-2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES. LANG ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION. THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA. COS ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD. COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIBILITY AND FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER SECRET EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS, INDEED THE UNIQUE NATURE OF NSA RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMewhat ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO ORGANIZATIONS. IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT SPAN OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION, BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESired DUPLICATIVE TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY EXPLOITATION IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT RESPONSIBILITY. MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILy ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED. 16. DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESSMAN'S INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY. THE AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN SECRET MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE RESIDENCE AT 1100 HOURS ON THE 26TH. THE CONGRESSMAN LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED TO FORWARD A LETTER ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHICH WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT. 17. IN A STATION-ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATE THE NATURE OF HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO A MINORITY REPORT, HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSA. HOLLINGSWORTH TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION, WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY SCHLESINGER WHO HAD POSED THE SAME QUESTION, THE GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL, PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM. HE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING THE ARMY DID NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE AND DID NOT DEVELOP INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS. HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT. HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUALIFIED COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST CIA AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA. HOLLINGSWORTH ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING, NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY-ORIENTED SOCIETY. SECRET 2803002 OCT 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION OF 4 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT PLMMCONGA AND THAT HE HAD FOUND OUR MILITARY/POLITICAL REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL. THE GENERAL DECLINED TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION, BUT HE VOLUNTEERED TO PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION PROBLEM"; CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION TO HIS REPORT, 18. IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS, THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE DDCI BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USIB STUDY ON KOREA SECRET REQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE HIS REPORT ON THE USIB AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FROM THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH STILL UNCERTAIN AS TO METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS TO DEVELOP A POSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR. HE BELIEVED THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE. 19. THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE DAVID C. TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE SUPPORT OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE. HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS ACCEPTANCE. HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE SECRET COMMITTEE STAFF, 20. ADDITION DISCUSSION IS SCHEDULED WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD FOR 28 OCTOBER. WILL ADVISE. E2, IMPDET. OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET TO: PANAMA CITY RYBAT PLMHCONGA REF: PANAMA CITY 34339 IN 723135 1. HQS AWARE OF AND HANDLING REF CASE. NO NEED FORWARD WALKER LETTER AND OTHER THAN POUCHING COPIES OF MEMOS, NO FURTHER STATION ACTION NECESSARY AT THIS TIME. PLS ADVISE BY CABLE IF ANY FURTHER INFO THIS MATTER COMES TO STATION ATTENTION. 2. FILE: DEFER. E2 IMPDET. LA COMMENT: REQUEST HQS GUIDANCE ON 1972 CASE OF MAIL INTERCEPTS INADVERTENTLY SENT TO PANAMA. SA/DDO - NORM SHEPANEK (TELECOORD) DATE: 28 OCT 75 ORIG: BARBARA GRAHAM: EMEP UNIT: C/LA/CAM/PA EXT: 1805 CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 054524 OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOB, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA, SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN, Y RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y REF: DIRECTOR 759843 Y 1. EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ALL CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST BEAR THE SENSITIVITY INDICATOR RYBAT AND THE CRYPTONYM PLMHCONGA. Y 2. FOR UNUSUALLY SENSITIVE CASES, CHIEFS OF STATION MAY AT THEIR DISCRETION USE THE DIVISIONS (PLMPTACT) PRIVACY CHANNEL. Y 3. ALL INFORMATION RELATING TO IDENTITY MUST REPEAT MUST BE SENT TO HQS VIA CABLE REPEAT CABLE. E2. IMPDET. A CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT} EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD} DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975 ORIG: CEA/ESOC UNIT: S.M. LABAR EXT: 1704 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA RELEASING OFFICER SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 005088 OUTGOING MESSAGE CONF: C/EA 3 INFO: FILE DCI/REVIEW STAFF, CS/RF TO: PRIORITY EASS, CHIANG MAI, KOBE, MEDAN, MELBOURNE, SURABAYA, SYDNEY, TAKHLI, UDORN, Y RYBAT ADMIN PLMHCONGA Y REF: DIRECTOR 759842 Y 1. IDENTITY IS: CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE AGENCY. 2. NO FILE. E2, IMPDET. CEA/OEM: R.E. RUSSELL {IN DRAFT} EA/DDO: MR. PECHOUS {TELECOORD} DATE: 24 OCTOBER 1975 ORIG: CEA/ESEC UNIT: S.M. LABAR EXT: 1709 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, CEA COORDINATING OFFICER REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 005088 OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF DATE-TIME GROUP 241922Z DIRECTOR MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER 759641 CONC: INFO: FILE IMMEDIATE SEOUL Y RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y REF: A. SEOUL 25645 [IN 722803] B. SEOUL 25646 [IN 723138] Y 1. IN VIEW OF CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S INTENTION AS EXPRESSED IN REF A TO SPEND ONE IF NOT SEVERAL DAYS IN DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES, BELIEVE SEOUL STATION SHOULD APPROACH THIS TASK WITH FOLLOWING DATA IN MIND: Y A. BACKGROUND. HOUSE COMMITTEE IN ITS ENTIRETY IS KEENLY INTERESTED IN COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF HOW CIA FUNCTIONS. IT MOST LIKELY CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S WILL BE FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON COMMAND AND CONTROL ASPECTS OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. Y B. MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT CONGRESSMAN MILFORD CALLS "START OF THE INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PROCESS IN THE FIELD" CAN BE DEALT WITH IF STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE DATE: 24 OCT 75 ORIG: TGSHACKLEY: DCM UNIT: C/EA EXT: 1428 RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 061971 OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE PROCESS I.E., STATION RECEIVES OD FROM HQS AND COMMENTS ON IT. ONCE AGREEMENT REACHED ON OD DIALOGUE FOLLOWS ON AG'S WHICH RELATE TO SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES. THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, IN KOREAN CONTEXT, TO FOCUS ON KEY OBJECTIVE IN GENERAL AND THEN NARROW DISCUSSION DOWN TO AG-4 OR AG-7. THIS PHASE OF BRIEFING SHOULD INCLUDE COMMENTARY ON FUNDING BY FAN'S, ETC. Y C. AGENT ACQUISITION. WITH FOCUS OF BRIEFING BEING ON AG-4 OR AG-7, STATION COULD THEN OUTLINE HOW TARGET ARE STUDIES OF KEY INTELLIGENCE REPOSITORIES IS CONDUCTED, POTENTIAL TARGETS FOR RECRUITMENT IDENTIFIED AND HOW SPOTTING, ASSESSMENT AND RECRUITMENT PROCESS UNFOLDS. IN DISCUSSION OF RECRUITMENT PHASE OF OPERATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE EXAMINATION OF NAME TRACE AND POA PROCESS. Y D. AGENT AUTHENTICATION. DIALOGUE WITH CONGRESSMAN SHOULD ALSO OUTLINE HOW AGENT AUTHENTICATED ONCE RECRUITED. STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON CONTINUING ASPECTS OF AUTHENTICATION, SECURITY OF MEETINGS, ETC. Y E. POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION. ACQUISITION OF INTELLIGENCE FROM IN-PLACE AGENT, TURNING IT INTO INTEL DISSEMINATION, REQUIREMENTS SYSTEM, AND REPORTS EVALUATION CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE REVIEWED. Y F. OPERATIONAL REPORTING SYSTEM. STARTING WITH RECRUITMENT OF AGENT, STATION SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED BY AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I.E., PRO PART I AND 2, CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS, PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS, PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND FIELD PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER, STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED ON FEEDBACK FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. Y G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT IDENTIFY ANY ACTIVE SOURCES BY TRUE NAME TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. IN VIEW OF THIS WISH POINT OUT HQS HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW ON CASE HISTORY SCENARIO TO UNDERSCORE ALL POINTS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE HISTORY ONLY IDENTITY OF AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE PROTECTION. THIS APPROACH HAS WORKED EFFECTIVELY FOR HQS AND ASSUME IT WILL BE USEFUL TECHNIQUE FOR SEOUL. 2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS. ALSO THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF BRIEFING CONCENTRATE ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S. THIS MIGHT WELL SHOW COMPLEXITY OF ISSUES INVOLVED IN MEASURING INTEL SUCCESS OR FAILURES. 3. HQS HAS HAD LIMITED EXPOSURE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THUS UNABLE TO SHED ANY LIGHT ON QUESTION POSED IN REF B PARA 2. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR THIS BRIEFING MUST BE FULL CANDOR WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY PROTECTING SOURCES AND METHODS. 4. PLEASE USE ABOVE INDICATORS ON FUTURE TRAFFIC DEALING WITH BRIEFINGS OR TRAVELS OF CONGRESSIONAL MEMBERS WHO INVOLVED IN INVESTIGATION OF INTEL COMMUNITY. E-2, IMPDET. AC/EA/JK DC/EA C/EA/COPS A/DDO DATE: 24 OCT 75 ORIG: TGSHACKLEY: DCM UNIT: C/EA EXT: 1428 THEODORE G. SHACKLEY, C/EA AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CL BY: 061991 SECRET 240620Z OCT 75 STAFF CITE SEOUL 25645 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, NIACT DIRECTOR RYBAT CODEL REF: A. DIRECTOR 758492 B. DIRECTOR 758427 1. CODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23 OCTOBER AT ROKG INVITATION. DUE HOSPITALIZATION OF COS, DCOS CONTACTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE BRIEFING IF DESIRED. IN BRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 OCTOBER IN WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE HAD BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A DETAILED STUDY OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE FIELD, HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION SCHEDULE AS OF 0900 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS. WHILE PARAMETERS OF HIS INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED IN INITIAL CONVERSATION, HE ANTICIPATES DEVOTING ONE OR NOT SECRET SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES. 2. REP. LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER DURING THEIR FIVE DAY STAY. 3. COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER. WHETHER HE IS OR NOT, COS PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP. MILFORD EITHER AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED BE CONFINED FOR ONE WEEK RECUPERATION. THIS OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, AND IF AGREEABLE TO HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS. 4. WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 0800 LOCAL 25 OCTOBER AS REP. MILFORD'S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS. E2 IMPDET OUTGOING MESSAGE TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-Y ADMIN Y 1. ALL SIGNIFICANT CABLE TRAFFIC RELATING TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF CIA SHOULD CARRY IDEN SLUG-Y. 2. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY ADDRESSEES MAY USE PLARGYLE RATHER THAN IDEN SLUG. IN SUCH INSTANCES, NE DIVISION WILL ASSURE THAT APPROPRIATE HHS COMPONENTS ARE APPRISED OF PERTINENT PORTIONS OF THOSE MESSAGES. E2 IMPDET-A DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975 ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD UNIT: NE/COPS EXT: R-1562 SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET STAFF CONF: NE-3 INFO: FILE TO: TEHRAN, BEIRUT, AMMAN, CAIRO, ISLAMABAD, NEW DELHI, JIDDA-Y ADMIN Y. REF: DIRECTOR 758926 IDEN: PLMHCONGA, E2 IMPDET.A DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975 ORIG: SAMUEL H. RICKARD UNIT: NE/COPS EXT: R-1562 CLASSIFICATION SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 056382 SECRET MESSAGE TO: ROME Y RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y FOR ACOS AND OZGA Y 1. HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE PLANS HOLD HEARINGS ON DESTROY PROJECT 29 OCTOBER. REQUEST MR. OZGA PLAN REVIEW PLDEFINE MATERIAL WITH CHIEF EUROPE ON 27 OCTOBER AND ARRANGE BE HEADQUARTERS NOT LATER THAN AFTERNOON 28 OCTOBER. Y 2. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2, IMPDET. DATE: 21 OCTOBER 1975 ORIG: PHILIP F. FENDIG UNIT: DC/EUR EXT: 1233 SA/300 (1ST DRAFT) DC/EUR (1ST DRAFT) REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: TO: LONDON, BONN-Y RYBAT PLMHCONGA Y MANY THANKS FOR YOUR REPORTING ON VISIT MR. DAVID AARON. PLEASE USE ABOVE SLUG FOR FUTURE SIGNIFICANT TRAFFIC RELATED TO THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS. IN CASES OF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY, YOU MAY USE PLKMBALL SLUG FOR SUCH TRAFFIC AT YOUR DISCRETION. E2 IMPDET-A. \| TO: \| ACTION \| INFO \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|-----\|--------\|------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| DGO \| \| \| \| \| 2 \| ADDO \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| C/PLANS\| \| \| \| \| 4 \| C/OPS \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| C/SS \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| C/CCS \| \| \| \| \| 7 \| C/CT \| \| \| \| \| 8 \| C/AF \| \| \| \| \| 9 \| C/DDO \| \| \| \| \| 10 \| C/DIVD \| \| \| \| \| 11 \| C/EA \| \| \| \| \| 12 \| C/EUR \| \| \| \| \| 13 \| C/FR \| \| \| \| \| 14 \| C/NE \| \| \| \| \| 15 \| C/SE \| \| \| \| \| 16 \| C/LA \| \| \| \| Remarks:* Senator Church? Signature: ADDO Date: 17 OCT 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs SUBJECT: The Director's Greeting Card List 1. It is requested that you provide recommendations as to whom the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 10 November 1975. 2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has met here or abroad. 3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate Division or Staff for pouching or mailing. Peter V. Raudenbush SA/ADDO Distribution: C/AF C/SE C/EA C/CCS C/EUR C/CI C/DCD C/OPS C/DIVD C/PS C/FR C/SS C/LA/ SA/DDO C/NE SPG/DDO MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs SUBJECT: DDCI's Greeting Card List Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, all significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of business 10 November 1975. Peter V. Raudenbush SA/ADDO Distribution: C/AF C/SE C/EA C/CCS C/EUR C/CI C/DCD C/OPS C/DIVD C/PS C/FR C/SS C/LA SA/DDO C/NE SPG/DDO E2 IMPDET CL BY 037796 CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY \| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) \| \|---------------------------------------------------\|------\|---------------------\|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\| \| 1. \| \| \| FYI \| \| 2. \| \| \| File in "Administrative Trip File in July 1972." \| \| 3. \| \| \| \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| \| SECRET 1616502 OCT 75 STAFF CITE LONDON 66194 TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLKMBALL REF A. DIRECTOR 752556 B. DIRECTOR 754586 1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES. 2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING: A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY SECRET IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY. B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION. C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED ON SECRET. COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. WE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE U.K. 3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: A. THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED. B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIALE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH REPRESENTATIVES SERVING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM. C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH SECRET COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US. 4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET \| TO \| ACTION \| INFO \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|----\|--------\|------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| \| \| \| \| \| 2 \| \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| \| \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| \| \| \| \| 7 \| \| \| \| \| \| 8 \| \| \| \| \| \| 9 \| \| \| \| \| \| 10 \| \| \| \| \| \| 11 \| \| \| \| \| \| 12 \| \| \| \| \| \| 13 \| \| \| \| \| \| 14 \| \| \| \| \| \| 15 \| \| \| \| \| \| 16 \| \| \| \| \| \| 17 \| \| \| \| \| SIGNED BY: [Signature] DATE: 17 Oct 75 DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS ROUTING SHEET \| TO: \| ACTION \| INFO \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|-----\|--------\|------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| DDO \| \| \| \| \| 2 \| ADDO \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| C/PLANS\| \| \| \| \| 4 \| C/OPS \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| C/SS \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| C/CCS \| \| \| \| \| 7 \| C/C1 \| \| \| \| \| 8 \| C/AF \| \| \| \| \| 9 \| C/DCD \| \| \| \| \| 10 \| C/DIVD \| \| \| \| \| 11 \| C/EA \| \| \| \| \| 12 \| C/EUR \| \| \| \| \| 13 \| C/FR \| \| \| \| \| 14 \| C/NE \| \| \| \| \| 15 \| C/SE \| \| \| \| \| 16 \| C/LA \| \| \| \| SUSPENSE DATE REMARKS: File in my travel file. SIGNATURE 64/DDO DATE 17 Oct 75 SECRET 1617262 OCT 75 STAFF CITE BONN 43387 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR. RYBAT REF: DIRECTOR 752556 1. MR. DAVID AARON OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE BRIEFED BY STIGGINS, HIBBERT AND DEUTINGER FOR TWO HOURS MORNING 15 OCTOBER. AARON HAD LUNCH WITH HIBBERT AND NEWLY ARRIVED ARMY ATTACHE COLONEL OLIVER RAY. HE MET FOR OVER HOUR WITH AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND AFTERNOON 15 OCTOBER BEFORE DEPARTING FOR LONDON. 2. LARGE PART OF MORNING BRIEFING DEVOTED TO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS IN GERMANY. AARON ASKED FOR DEFINITION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT COS SUPERVISED MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WHICH EXPLAINED TO HIM IN SOME DETAIL. AARON ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION PROCESS AND HOW THIS IMPLEMENTED. HE WANTED KNOW IF THE COORDINATION PROCESS EXTENDED TO A REVIEW OF REQUIREMENTS AND OF THE VALUE OF MILITARY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AS REFLECTED IN ITS PRODUCT AND TOLD THAT OUR COORDINATION OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES GENERALLY CONFINED TO INSURING THAT MILITARY TRADECRAFT MET OUR STANDARDS AND THAT POLITICAL RISKS ACCEPTABLE IN PRACTICE. WE DID NOT REVIEW PRODUCTION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE MENTIONED THAT MILITARY COLLECTION IN RECENT YEARS WAS ON RELATIVELY MODEST SCALE AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO FLAPS IN RECENT YEARS. 3. MR. AARON SAID THAT THE SENATORS ON HIS COMMITTEE HAD BEEN SURPRISED TO FIND THAT MILITARY WAS ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN COLLECTION ACTIVITY SINCE THIS NOT COVERED IN ANY LEGISLATION, BUT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SUCH ACTIVITY AUTHORIZED IN NONSKIDS. STIGGINS MADE POINT THAT MILITARY IN GERMANY STRUCTURED ALONG COMBAT INTELLIGENCE LINES AND IN EFFECT ENGAGED IN MILITARY COLLECTION OF TACTICAL NATURE AS TRAINING EXERCISE APPROPRIATE TO THEIR POTENTIAL WARTIME MISSION. MR. AARON SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED MILITARY ORS AND PERSONNEL COULD BE ASSIGNED TO CIA OPERATIONAL. CONTROL IN FIELD. WE OPINED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN WHICH COORDINATION HAS TRENDED OVER THE YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS PROBABLY FEEL HIS CONTROL UNDERMINED THEREBY. 4. TURNING TO BKHERALD OPS, MR. AARON SAID HE RECALLED FROM WASHINGTON BRIEFING THAT GERMAN STATION HAD SIZEABLE ALLOTMENT FOR OFFICER ENGAGED IN POLITICAL COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL BASIS. WE EXPLAINED THAT MONIES IN THIS PROJECT ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY FOR SALARY-AND-EXTENSIVE TRAVEL OF OFFICER (HERZFANZ, NOT MENTIONED BY NAME) AND NOT USED FOR AGENT PAYMENT OR OTHER PURPOSES. THIS SEEMED TO SATISFY AARON. 5. HE ASKED NUMBER QUESTIONS ABOUT "FANCY" POLITICAL SOURCES, ALONG LINE THAT THESE COULD PERHAPS BE HANDLED AS NORMAL DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS AND ASKED WHETHER THESE CONTACTS DID NOT REPRESENT HIGH RISK IF EXPOSED. STIGGINS EXPLAINED AT SOME LENGTH THAT THESE SOURCES VERY FEW-IN-NUMBER, AND WERE PRODUCT OF SEVERAL FACTORS, INCLUDING MANY YEARS CONTACT WITH SPECIFIC CIA OFFICERS, MAKING POINT THAT AGENTS' CONFIDENCE IN CIA BASED ON MANY YEARS ASSOCIATION. WE ESTIMATED FLAP POTENTIAL SLIGHT THESE LONG-STANDING CONTACTS, WHICH COULD BE EXPLAINED AS OLD FRIENDSHIPS. FOR REASON THAT THEY WERE, IN FACT SUCH, THESE RELATIONSHIPS COULD NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICERS. WE MENTIONED THAT SOME OF THE LOWER-LEVEL DEVELOPMENTAL OPERATIONS ACTUALLY REPRESENTED HIGHER RISK AND CITED GENERAL OUTLINE OF "HILTON AFFAIR" (WITHOUT NAMES) AS EXAMPLE HOW DEVELOPMENTAL CASE COULD BE TROUBLESOME. EMPHASIZED THERE HAD BEEN FEW OF THESE OVER YEARS. 6. AARON ASKED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT FEDREP REACTION IN EVENT OUR INCOMPATIBLE SOURCES EXPOSED. WE RESPONDED THAT IN GENERAL GERMANS WERE NOT INTERESTED IN EMBARRASSING US AND THAT THIS KEY ELEMENT, PLUS FACTOR THAT WE HANDLED ALL INCOMPATIBLE ACTIVITY VERY CAREFULLY, LED US TO CONCLUSION THAT WE WERE NOT RUNNING RISK MAJOR EMBARRASSMENT BY CONDUCTING LIMITED NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS. POINTED OUT THAT A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THESE OPERATIONS ESSENTIAL TO PROVIDE COVERAGE THOSE AREAS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND SOME ECONOMIC FIELDS WHERE GERMANS NOT COMPLETELY CANDID WITH US EMBASSY RE THEIR ACTIVITIES. 7. Mr. Aaron asked about extent we kept ambassador informed on our activities in West German field. We replied that ambassador saw virtually all reporting and therefore knew where sources located but that as rule we did not clear with him on individual contacts, making reference to "sources and methods" provision of our regulation and statutory provisions. Pointed out that each case treated separately but that ambassador and embassy consulates have not had interest in developmental contact with younger political figures outside Bonn area. On other hand he clearly quite concerned with foreign ministry with result that we generally assumed hands-off attitude on FOMIN. 8. Mr. Aaron inquired re station case officer strength and given figures cited in position report dated October 74 (forwarded HOS by TM dated 29 Sept 74.) We explained that breakdown somewhat arbitrary and said that for number officers (those engaged in liaison, support, analysis, for instance) it not always easy to categorize their efforts. 9. He probed in some detail on our NOC strength and we answered candidly. Mr. Aaron seemed surprised at small numbers NOC officers in station and said had heard opinion from some CIA officers that NOC preferable to official cover. We said felt this dependent on location and circumstances and that here in Germany army cover readily available, generally quite satisfactory and cost considerably less than NOC cover. Aaron asked several questions re reasons we would put officer in Germany under NOC. We explained NOC primarily used for personnel we planned keep assigned Germany several years and where NOC probably more secure and for instances where it provided better access. When he pushed for further examples we mentioned had recently considered putting officer under student cover in Heidelberg where official Chinese students significant target represented but that this plan dropped for administrative reasons. We made no mention use journalist cover and did not identify any cover firms by name. 10. Aaron asked Stiggins which of what Aarons envisaged as three principal duties took most time. Aaron outlined COS duties as management of station, embassy responsibilities and coordination of military intelligence activities. Stiggins said management of STATION CLEARLY REQUIRED MOST TIME AND FURTHER THAT WITHIN STATION, THE EFFORT AGAINST THE HARD TARGETS CONSUMED THE MAJOR PART OF HIS TIME AND EFFORT. 11. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED ON OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH AARON PRIOR TO HIS SESSION WITH HIM. EC IMPIET. SECRET SECRET 161856Z OCT 75 STAFF CITE BONN 43389 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR. RYBAT REF BONN 43387 (1W716059) 1. AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND ONE-HALF SESSION WITH MR. AARON ON 15 OCT. DISCUSSION COVERED THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL SOURCES" IN BONN; (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS; AND (C) DEGREE TO WHICH AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES. 2. ON POINT #1, AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONG-STANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA. THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE. THAT IS, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS COULD NOT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE TO GRADUALLY WITHER AWAY. BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT. SECRET THE COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VALUE SINCE THE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY CONTACTS. 3. REGARDING PARA 1.B., AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED TO AARON THAT IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER INVOLVED IN LARGE-SCALE COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS. COS EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE STATION, AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF HERZFANZ WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE. 4. WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE IDENTITIES OF ANY OF THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATION ACCEPTABLE HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER- SONALLY FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT COS would advise him of anything he ought to know. Looking back on the record of the past twenty-five years, the ambassador said he concludes that in fact the ambassadors in Bonn had been kept appropriately advised and the absence of flaps would substantiate the judgment exercised by the respective station chiefs over the years. 5. Mr. Aaron discussed at some length with the ambassador the feasibility of charging the ambassador with greater direct responsibility for supervision of the clandestine effort. Ambassador stated that if it were assigned to him as a mission he would manifestly have to discharge it and would as he saw it probably need a staff of at least two competent officers to carry out the practical staff work on his behalf. Mr. Aaron then raised the question of the British system about which the ambassador made the pertinent observation that it was a question for the government to decide. If it was decided to subordinate clandestine intelligence operations in the field directly to the ambassador, then appropriate arrangement could and would be made. The ambassador was left with the impression by Mr. Aaron that at least a number of the members of the Senate Select Committee are GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE BRITISH SYSTEM AS A MEANS OF INVESTING AMBASSADORS WITH DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. E2: IMPDET. SECRET 1613022 OCT 75 STAFF SITE BONN 43369 TO: DIRECTOR RYBAT PLKMBALL 1. MR. AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 OCTOBER. SAID HE WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE OF SENATOR MONSDALE AND WAS HEAD OF SELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE. MR. AARON SAID HE FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY SCHEDULED. 2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT. HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WHAT HAPPENS TO FBI WHO WERE "GOING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED." SAID FBI HAD GONE 50 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF WRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION. 3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY SECRET COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON TALKS WITH MR. AARON, LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE OVER POSITIVE COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 66TH MIG. MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR COMMENTS TO US, AS WE REPORTING SEPARATELY. E2 IMPDET. SECRET 1616502 OCT 75 STAFF CITE LONDON 66194 TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLKMBALL REF A. DIRECTOR 752556 B. DIRECTOR 754586 1. AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM FOR AN HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT. IN RESPONSE TO HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED, WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL, THE INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL FIGURES. 2. IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING, AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING: A. HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. COS REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY... IF THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR SENSITIVITY HE WOULD PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR. COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK CONSIDERABLY. B. HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR. AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION TO LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH SITUATION. C. HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A PROGRAM. COS REPLIED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE. D. HE ASKED IF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE U.K. AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD. COS REPLIED THAT ACTION OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED. COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS. COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN, THAT THIS MIGHT WORK. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORE, OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT MANY OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. E. IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTH THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN THE U.K. 3. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED BY THE LEAKS AND CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON. THE PAD BEEN REASSURED BY US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PREPARED TO GIVE US, AARON SAID HE WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED. B. COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVYABLE DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT, THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH REPRESENTATIVES SERVING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY. AARON SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS PROBLEM. C. COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS. COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCH SECRET COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US. 4. IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT OUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS. AARON REPLIED THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER. HE SPECULATED THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEBRUARY. THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED. E2 IMPDET TO: CIA Task Force FROM: The Review Staff, Walter Elder SUBJECT: SSC/HSC Request RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905 The attached letter requests an orientation briefing for David Aaron who is travelling again, this time to Switzerland, West Germany, and the United Kingdom. Comments: 1st Meeting - Briefing on 8 Oct 1975 by Walter Elder 2nd Briefing - 10 Oct 1975 by Elder \| Action \| Info \| \|--------\|------\| \| SC/DCI \| X \| \| A/DDA \| X \| \| A/DDI \| X \| \| A/DDO \| X \| \| A/DDST \| X \| \| OGC \| X \| \| OLC \| X \| \| IG \| X \| \| B.Evans\| X \| \| SA/DDO \| \| Mr. Seymour Bolten Assistant to the Director Room 6D0120 Central Intelligence Agency Langley, Virginia Dear Mr. Bolten: This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month. Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17. The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities. Sincerely, [Signature] William G. Miller copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department Mr. William G. Hyland Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 Dear Mr. Hyland: This letter is to request an orientation briefing for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a member of the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to make this month. Although the plans are not yet precise, it is expected that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal Republic of Germany October 13-15; and in London October 16 and 17. The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military commanders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the Department of State in the control of intelligence activities. Sincerely, William G. Miller copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA \| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) \| \|---------------------------------------------------\|------\|-------------------\|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\| \| 1. Mr. Rogers \| 10/6 \| WE \| Attached is worth reading. Report on a trip of Daniel Asher and Bell Michael (both 55) to Latin America. Note para 18. BRL 24723. \| \| 2. John Wallace \| \| \| \| \| 3. \| \| \| \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| \| SECRET 241945Z SEP 75 STAFF CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 SECTION 1 OF 2 TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR. NACT BUENOS AIRES REBAT PLVWCADET 1. COS HAD TWO-HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE MORNING 24 SEPTEMBER. GENERAL IMPRESSION IS THAT BOTH WERE BUSINESS-LIKE; QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION IS FUNCTIONING IN URUGUAY. HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL. MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR SHOULD BE FAR MORE KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL". 2. COS DID NOT SHOW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THEM. 3. THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE AMBASSADORS INJUNCTIONS WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OPERATIONS. COS SAID AMBASSADOR DOES NOT WANT COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE IN URUGUAY WITHOUT HIS PRIOR APPROVAL NOR DOES HE WANT US TO MOUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS. AARON ASKED IF WE HAD ON-GOING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS. COS SAID WE DID HAVE SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED MATTER, ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULLY AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH COS RESPONDED THAT HE PRESUMED SO. COS ADDED HE HAD NOT SPECIFICALLY COVERED THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE COS ARRIVAL HERE LESS THAN ONE MONTH AGO. 4. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS WOULD WE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF ANY SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADOR'S WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE INFORM THE POLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF OUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS TRYING TO DEVELOP? COS answered we would first instruct the agent how to handle his overt contact but, depending upon relations, might also discuss the matter frankly with political officer. What about defense attache? Answer: the same. 5. This led to discussion of inter-agency source register. Having just finished with defense attache, ambassador Truehart said Defatt indicated he had many sources registered and therefore we were proscribed from recruiting them. COS pointed out source register is for covert agents only and since Defatt here is proscribed from running covert agents, none of his sources are in inter-agency source register. COS added that many defense attaches misconstrue their registering of their agents in Pentagon series as synonymous with registration in the inter-agency source register. 6. Truehart asked if we exerted "real control" over DEA's operations as required by DCID. COS said that on the contrary we exerted no control over DEA nor are we under instructions to try to do so. We do coordinate closely, register their sources, provide traces and assistance, encourage liaison to cooperate fully with them, etc. In addition, when a DEA operation is SECRET BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR AS TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY. 7. TRUEHART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON THE SOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS. HE WAS ADVISED LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT LIAISON IS PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST SOVIET TARGET, THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING TO APPROACH THIS MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO BUG RESIDENCEE OF A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBABLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE NO FLAP POTENTIAL. AARON WANTED TO PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY ENOUGH TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT. 8. AARON AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD NON-COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS OF INFLUENCE. THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON THEIR REQUEST, THEY WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER: TWO OR SECRET THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE BEEN DOING THIS KIND OF THING FOR YEARS.) WE STRESSED THAT THIS PARAGRAPH IN TWO PLACES CONTAINED THE PHRASE "SUBJECT TO POLICY APPROVAL" WHICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND WASHINGTON, WHILE THEY UNDERSTOOD THIS POINT THEY WANTED TO KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE DEFENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF A SENIOR URUGUAYAN GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT OF INFLUENCE. ANSWER: NO, DO WE HAVE ANY RECRUITED AGENTS OF INFLUENCE IN URUGUAY, ANSWER: NO, ARE WE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES. THEN AARON ASKED IF IT WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY COULD THREATEN PRIORITY U.S. INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER: TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME; WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD IT BE NECESSARY IN THE NEAR FUTURE. PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN THE STABILITY OF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE U.S. COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY. WE ANSWERED THAT URUGUAY IS SECRET CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANTI-COMMUNIST IN INTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FRIEND OF THE U.S. AARON ASKED IF SIMILAR PROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF OTHER STATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA, I.E. TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT KNOW, CONTINUING DISCUSSIONS ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART POSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF A PRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS SECRET 241945Z SEPT 75 STAFF CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2 TO: IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR. NIACT BUENOS AIRES RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR. ANSWER: NO. TRUEHART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY CONFESSES TO MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER: YES. TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. WE PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE AMBASSADOR TO BE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL. 9. SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN POWER (ABOUT TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET; HOPE PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER SECRET OBJECTIVES). HOW IS OVER-ALL BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE WITH HEADQUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET DIVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS CALLED WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES). WAS THERE ANY FLEXIBILITY DURING THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER: SOME WITHIN PROJECT ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL. DO WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF BRIEFING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY UNDERSTAND BETTER? ANSWER: NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE. AARON IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. 10. IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD WE RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? ANSWER: YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY HQS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID WE ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN THE MANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX. WE SAID WE WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS OD BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE. OF OTHER THINGS TO DO. 11. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ON NOCS WE ADVISED WE HAVE NONE IN URUGUAY, E2, IMPDET. SECRET 2314092 SEP 75 STAFF CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES. RYBAT PLVWCADET 1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES. 2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD SATURDAY AND MONDAY. 3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G. LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS. BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET SECRET THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O, THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE. AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT. 4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED). 5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS SECRET DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY. 6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL CO5 SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YEARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.) 7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE SECRET THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM, INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN SECRET 231409Z SEPT 75 STAFF CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES. BYBAT PLVWCADET BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION. 8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL SECTION--WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY). 9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE SECRET COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR- IAL DUTIES. 10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL. 11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIQS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE. 12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.) 13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT, ETC. 14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS, THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES. 15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER SECRET TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.) 16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH AT THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED. 17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS. IS SECRET A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT. 18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 2915472 SEP 75 STAFF CITE BUENOS AIRES 34519 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO. RYBAT PLVWCADET REF BUENOS AIRES 34511 (\ 698265) * 1. VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A HALF EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS RESIDENCE AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY TO AIRPORT. AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS TO AMB, COS WITHDREW AND WAITED IN ANOTHER ROOM. (UPON DEPARTING COS HEARD AMB ASK VISITORS FOR THEIR CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGGESTED TO VISITORS THAT COS BE PRESENT DURING DISCUSSION BUT THEY PREFERRED TO TALK WITH HIM PRIVATELY. COS WAS CALLED IN, HOWEVER, TO PARTICIPATE IN LAST FEW MINUTES OF DISCUSSION. IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED AMB WHETHER HE THOUGHT HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY. AARON THEN ASKED AMB WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO. AMB REPLIED HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COS IN THIS REGARD. AARON THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO SHOW AMB ALL STATION REPORTING. ANSWER: OPERATIONAL REPORTING IDENTIFYING AGENTS OR CLANDESTINE METHODS OF OPERATION COULD NOT BE SHOWN TO AMB WITHOUT SECRET HQs approval. Other info could be shown at discretion of COS. Subj of Rogers letter re showing intel reports to Amb prior to dissemination was then raised by Amb. Amb said he took position this was policy matter which had to be solved in Washington and had so informed Rogers. (COS saw draft of letter to Rogers to this effect.) At conclusion of meeting Amb handed COS a news item (Havana Meridiano 80 in Spanish 1-15 Jul 75 pp 5-6, article by Carlos Maria Gutierrez entitled American Ambassador Hill seen as CIA agent in Argentina) and asked that article be shown to visitors in Car. Amb Trueheart read article and commented something to effect that article did not seem to him to be anything to be very concerned about. Mr. Aaron did not read it. Pouching copy. (Amb subsequently told COS article had been given to him in Washington by Deputy Assistant Ryan.) 2. On way to airport after meeting with Amb, Trueheart mentioned Amb's request to see their credentials. Since they had none, they showed their passports. (Amb later told COS he had asked to see credentials since he wanted to see for himself exactly what the limits of their authority were.) COS inferred that visitors were taken aback by Amb's request but meeting with Amb. WAS NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS. (AMB LATER CONFIRMED THIS IMPRESSION.) 3. AMB TELEPHONED COS MORNING 28 SEP AND GAVE HIGHLIGHTS OF DISCUSSION WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GIVEN IN HIS OFFICE EARLY MORNING 29 SEP. AMB CHARACTERIZED VISITORS AS INTELLIGENT AND BUSINESSLIKE. AMB HAD IMPRESSION THEY SATISFIED WITH VISIT TO BUENOS AIRES AND WITH COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM EVERYONE. HE SPECULATED THAT THEIR REPORT WOULD BE WRITTEN IN MANNER WHICH SERVES INTERESTS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE SATISFIED WITH BKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA WHERE HE HAD A QUARREL WITH BKHERALD IS THAT OF COMMUNICATIONS: AMB BELIEVES STATE DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITS OWN COMMUNICATIONS; HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO BKHERALD HAVING ITS OWN COMMO. ALSO, REGARDING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF BKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS THAT BECAUSE OF TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW ABOUT BKHERALD ACTIVITIES IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW. VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT. AMB SAID HE HAD HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF WHO NOW DECEASED, WIN SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED THAT BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS HAD TOLD HIM SIXTY PERCENT OF MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS WERE DIRECTED AGAINST SECRET. CUBANS. ONLY LATER DID AMB FIND OUT BY CHANCE ABOUT SPORLON EFFORT DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA. AMB SAID MR. HELMS AWARE OF HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS GENERAL WALTERS. EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMB TOLD COS THAT AMB CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE. 4. CURIOUSLY, AARON ASKED DCOS' SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING 26 SEP. ALTHOUGH IT TURNED OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE DID NOT ATTEMPT ELICIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, AARON DID MAKE FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST: (A) HE SAID HE HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTI-BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN MUTED SOMEWHAT BY FAVORABLE IMPRESSIONS HE HAD OBTAINED OF VARIOUS BKHERALD OFFICERS IN THE FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN. (B) HE SAID HE THOUGHT BUENOS AIRES' EMBASSY POLITICAL SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD. (C) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HE, WAS SENIOR OFFICER. HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE, HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT WISH ALERT FUTURE STATIONS HE WILL VISIT OF PECKING ORDER. 5. VISITORS DEPARTED BUENOS AIRES 27 SEP AT 2130 HOURS ON SCHEDULE. 6. AMB SAID HE HAD A GOOD TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH MR. RICHARD SAMPSON IN WASHINGTON, MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REPORTED DIRECTOR 744995. 7. NO FILE. E2 IMPDET. CS Comment: Aaron and Trueheart's 26 September conversations with COS and DCOS. SECRET 2522342 SEP 75 STAFF CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION 1 OF 2 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO. RYBAT PLVWCADET REF DIRECTOR 745626 1. COS AND DCOS HELD TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR, EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING THE TWO VISITORS MET PRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED PRIVATELY WITH SMITH. (AARON BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.) COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP. 2. AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE. (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE, AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-BKHERALD. (E.G., ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.) SECRET 3. IN DISCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY PLACES" WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG. WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS, POINTED OUT ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID SOME SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FOR INTERNAL HANDLING, ALSO POINTED OUT CI VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS OFFICERS. NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION VALUE OF BKHEARALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD JUSTIFY BKHEARALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION. WE ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME REQUIRED ON WORLD-WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW GOOD SOURCES WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP. TRUEHEART ASKED FOR EXAMPLES, AND WE REFERRED THEM TO HQS FOR DETAILS. TRUEHEART SAID IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHEARALD NOW IN A "SOVIET PHASE", WHEREAS IN EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER PHASES. WE SAID SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGET, AND OUR APPROACH TO THEM HAS BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS. 4. KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE CONTROL OVER, OR AT LEAST HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS. SPECIFICALLY, DEGREE TO WHICH WE WOULD COORDINATE RECRUITMENT PROPOSAL OF GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH. ANSWER: AMB WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL SENSITIVITY OR HIGH RISK INVOLVED, WHICH HAS NOT BEEN THE CASE HERE THUS FAR. ASKED WHO DETERMINES IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED. ANSWER: COS. ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWER: HE HAD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUNCTION EXISTED, WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT OR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT. ANSWER: WE WOULD ADHERE TO IT. ASKED WHETHER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION AND ITS MISSION. ANSWER: WE BELIEVE SO, BUT DEFER TO AMB (WHO WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE-HEART.) 5. BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (I.E., PRIMARILY BY HQS OR THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS TO DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS. ANSWER: WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM HQS ON CONTINUING BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BUT NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW ON INTERNAL TARGET. WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORTING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS. VISITORS PROBED DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS. WE ALSO POINTED TO OUR PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS PRIOR TO DISSEMINATION TO POL SECTION AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS. REGARDING VOLUME OF REPORTS, WE SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH. REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF HQS DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED OFFICERS DO ALSO. 6. IN RESPONSE THEIR QUERIES, WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL. SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION OFFICERS DECLARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH BRITISH INTEL REP, ANSWER: YES; BUT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONSHIP. THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM, AND WE SAID RELATIONSHIP... SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND CONTACT IS PASSED FROM ONE PERSON TO ANOTHER. ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE REP IN BUENOS AIRES. ANSWER: WE NOT AWARE OF ANY. NO MENTION MADE OF ANY OTHER LIAISON CONTACTS AND SUBJECT OF LOCAL POLICE NOT RAISED. 7. SUBJECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED. 8. ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS. ANSWER: NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM. WE STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONJINGENCY NATURE OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING NEW AGENTS. ANSWER: WE CONSTANTLY STRIVE TO UPGRADE CALIBER OF OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT SAME TIME WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES. WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME TO ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES IN POLITICAL SCENE. 9. FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING. WE EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFFING ADEQUATE THAT STATION CUT BY OVER 30 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS OR SO, INCLUDING CASE OFFICERS. WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. OD OBJECTIVES AND PRIORITIES WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD INSEL NOT PROVIDED. SECRET 252234Z SEP 74 STAFF CITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, RYBAT PLWMCADET 10. CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM. WE DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS (MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS. AARON SAID THAT CHARGE D'AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM ANOTHER AREA WHO HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA. (AMB AWARE OF COVERAGE BY PJTENNIS-3 FROM TIME OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR.) WE EXPLAINED HOW SOURCE SUCH AS THIS CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO. WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON SECURITY OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD PROVIDE TO LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT. ANSWER: NO, FOR SEVERAL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT. 11. EVENING 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART. BECAUSE BUENOS AIRES STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING SECRET UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. THESE WILL BE COVERED IN NEXT CABLE. 12. WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS. E2 IMPDET SECRET 2919252 SEPT 75 STAFF CITE BRASILIA 24777 TO: BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR. RYBAT PLVNCADET REF: BUENOS AIRES 34519 (w6 995 94) REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF BKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE." FYI: AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON, DCM, WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART'S VISIT TO BRASILIA. IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA, CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED TO BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE OFFICERS. WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 231409Z SEP 75 STAFF CITE BRASILIA 24723 SECTION 1 OF 2 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES. RYBAT PLVWCADET 1. HAD TWO HOUR SESSION WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART AFTERNOON 22 SEPT. TRUEHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S ACTIVITIES. 2. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS. FOL IS HIGHLIGHT OF FIVE AND ONE-HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD SATURDAY AND MONDAY. 3. AARON MOST INTERESTED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS OPERATIONS--E.G., LINE OF COMMAND FROM HQS AND STATION'S RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES. HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELNOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL ACTIVITIES CENTERED AROUND THE OD, OUR PROJECTS, FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET SECRET THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCIATED IN THE OD. PERIODIC REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HQS TO APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO OUR OD PRIORITIES, AND THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED AGAINST THESE PRIORITIES. A "REPORT CARD" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE. AARON WAS INTERESTED IN HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE SUCCESS (RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C/O. THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN THE HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE. HOWEVER, IF THE C/O WORKING ON THE HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD, WAS AGGRESSIVE, BUT WAS NOT SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK OF SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARGET INDIVIDUAL EVER HELD UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WAS TOLD THAT IN OUR EXPERIENCE THIS WAS NOT SO, SO LONG AS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT EARMARK A GOOD C/O WERE PRESENT. 4. THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR BOTH AARON AND TUREHEART. THEY WERE NOT INQUISITIVE ABOUT NAMES OR COVER COMPANIES, BUT DID WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS (SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHETHER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN CONTACTING NOCS (NO, DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER SCRUPULOUS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED). 5. AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A C/O SPENT HIS DAY, THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID WE ENSURE THAT C/O'S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS SECRET DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF LIAISON AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LIAISON--TELETAPS, SURVEILLANCE, ETC.,--AGAINST HARD TARGETS). DISCUSSIONS ON COVERT ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME. DESPITE HQS BRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP. MUCH STRESS WAS PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR POLITICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET INTO THAT ACTIVITY. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN POL ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO PLUMBING AS SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FOR SUCH ACTION, THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED TO START FROM POINT ZERO UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE. IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL AS AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CHILEAN VARIETY. 6. AARON HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT. WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG COS HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND APPROXIMATELY HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL CO$T SPENT IN TRAINING (COULDN'T HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN TRAINING BUT SAID THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY, THAT OVER THE YEARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING A VARIETY OF SUBJECTS INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE PHOTOGRAPHY, COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE OF MID-CAREER COURSE, PLUS SENIOR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFICERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETC.) (AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE AND ASKED FOR PARTICULARS.) 7. ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND TUREHAERT WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER COB HAD AUTHORITY TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO STATION (YES, ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR TO THE LOCAL SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER COB MATTERS WERE FIRST SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC. PRIOR TO ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY DID SEE SECRET THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT TO THEM. INTEL ON MAJOR ITEMS-SUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES VIS-A-VIS THE U.S.-WAS SHOWN TO THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO SUBMISSION. STATION MADE IT A PRACTICE TO CHECK INTEL OUT WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL BY THE STATION. THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS REQUIRED TO LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN SENSITIVE INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED. THIS HAD NOT HAPPENED IN THE COS'S SHORT TENURE IN SECRET 2314092 SEPT 75 STAFF CITE BRASILIA 24723 FINAL SECTION OF TWO TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES. RYBAT PLWVCADET BRASILIA, BUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, CERTAIN REPORTS CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LIMITED TO THE AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL ZONE, OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY. SECURITY WAS THE CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION. 8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL SECTION—WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK TO THE AGENT ON THE PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED ACCORDINGLY). 9. AS TO KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE SECRET COLLECTION OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER OF COURSE BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART OF HIS AMBASSADOR- IAL DUTIES. 10. THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL. 11. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE KIOS AND THE CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY. THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS TO THE FIELD THAN SAY, STATE. 12. VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN RIO EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS IS AN AVID CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS.) 13. ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON AGREED ACTIVITIES. THEY WERE BOTH SURPRISED TO FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IN BY U.S. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES OF AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT, ETC. 14. AARON EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY. HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS, THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST 50 PERCENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST OF THE WORK DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES. 15. AARON KNEW OF THE OLD OPC AND OSO SEPARATIONS OF THE PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND OSO OFFICERS HAD A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER SECRET TRAINING. A GOOD OPC TYPE COULD DO EQUALLY GOOD WORK IN THE OSO FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.) 16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION. AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP, PROBING, AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING AT THINGS. IT'S DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER THE TWO ARE FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW OF GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (AD) THE MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOW THEY WORKED. 17. AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FOR BY THE EMBASSY WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE SEEMED TO ENJOY AND APPRECIATE THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON IS INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS. IS SECRET A WINE LOVER AND WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST OF THE LOCAL PRODUCT. 18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT, AARON WAS ASKED BY THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY OF THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET. SECRET 20 August 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division SUBJECT: Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing the Intention of SSC Staffers to Visit Latin America 1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the SSC Staff Director (Review Staff 75-2399) describing travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC Staffers. This is for your information. You will be alerted when this becomes firm and an itinerary is established. 2. Also attached is an agreed upon memo giving guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers before they go and a notification of the stations involved as to what the guidelines are. John H. Waller SA/DDO Attachment As stated above Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att 2 - SA/DDO E2 IMPDET CL BY 055636 SECRET SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable. 1. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions. that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government. In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador. II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT. All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms—operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government. IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC. V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES. Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities. VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance. VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment. Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized. Mr. Seymour Bolten Assistant to the Director Room 6D0120 Central Intelligence Agency Langley, Virginia Dear Mr. Bolten: This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been asked to make next month. Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September. It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and Montevideo. If time permits, they might also visit another consular post in Brazil and/or Buenos Aires. The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss State-CIA relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed. Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit. Sincerely yours, William G. Miller copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department TO: PRIORITY LONDON REF: STATE 137637, 30 JUNE 1975 1. SENATOR TOWER, MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA, IS TRAVELING IN EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND CINCUSNAVEUR ON 7 JULY. 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN U.K. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING. IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE, YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND BRITISH SERVICE CONTACTS. 3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, IN THE EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HAS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALY, AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET. TO: IMMEDIATE BONN, MUNICH. Y DIRECT BONN MUNICH LIAISON Y REF: MUNICH 30362 [IN 621567] Y 1. AS YOU AWARE, IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE (ASC) SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOWER IS TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. Y 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE ACTIVITY IN THE FRG. SHOULD HE DO SO, THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. BUT, IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING, THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE WITH THE BND, OMITTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS. THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HIMSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. 3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE, EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: HQS IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL HQS BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL TERMS, I.E., OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES OF OPERATIONS, PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY (CONSULATE) AND LOCAL MILITARY SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS. HQS IS ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. DATE: 1 JULY 1975 ORIG: GALLEN PEABY/HP UNIT: E/G/CIL EXT: 1562 SECRET CLASSIFICATION SECRET MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF CONF: INFO: FILE DIRECTOR DISSEM BY: INDEX NO INDEX RETURN TO PER IP FILES 713701 E2 IMPDET-H CLASSIFICATION SECRET PRODUCTION OR REPRODUCTION OF THIS MATERIAL BY ANY MEANS WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IS PROHIBITED. \| FROM: C/SS/CAG 3D0004 \| EXTENSION R9125 \| DATE 28 July 1975 \| \|----------------------\|-----------------\|------------------\| \| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| \| 1. Mr. John Waller SA/DDO 2B1415 \| 29 JUL 1975 \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) \| \| 2. \| \| \| \| 3. Mr. Seymour Bolten Review Staff 6 D 0120 \| \| \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten Review Staff VIA: Mr. John Waller Special Assistant to the DDO SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments 1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee. 2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary. 3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division. 4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency. 5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee. Donald J. Purcell Chief, Covert Action Group Services Staff Attachments, a/s MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten Review Staff VIA: Mr. John Waller Special Assistant to the DDO SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at Right-Wing Governments 1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing governments, which is responsive to a question from the Senate Select Committee. 2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the other disclosures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those operations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if absolutely necessary. 3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use (with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was provided to you directly by LA Division. 4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances of any use of this material outside of the Agency. 5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision of this material to the Select Committee. /s/ Donald J. Purcell Donald J. Purcell Chief, Covert Action Group Services Staff Attachments, a/s Covert Action Operations Concerning Right-Wing Regimes CATEGORY I 1. ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia. The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970, on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972. 2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly democratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and tenant farmers. 3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military action against Belize. 4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Group discussed ways and means of influencing the Duvalier dictatorship. In 1967, a modest project was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to Haiti from Radio Habana." 5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections. 6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement and its European counterparts. 1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special Group, the DCI approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The activity was terminated in 1962. 2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project was initiated in 1962 to encourage the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization. State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total of $311,705 was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968. 3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group approved a covert action project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group of National Assembly members. 4. KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a newsletter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government. 5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in the area. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power. 6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to 1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972. 7. NICARAGUA: During the period 1962 to 1966, CIA participated in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for military actions against his neighbors. 8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved a program to train 15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth, political and labor elements. MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller Special Assistant to DDO SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Against Right-Wing Governments REFERENCE: SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975, Same Subject We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the following comments on those paragraphs which concern European Division. 13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat bizarre and does not represent a productive operation, we pose no objection to its being presented to the Senate Select Committee. 14. SPAIN. We have no objection to the presentation of these programs to the Senate Select Committee for review although we share concern expressed by SS/CAG that a leak of this information would be detri- mental to the base negotiations. Signed/William W. Wells William W. Wells Chief, European Division DDO/DC/E/NW:MFBuell:tj (22 July 75) Distribution: Orig. & 1 - Addressee 1 - SS/CAG 1 - C/EUR 1 - DC/E/NW 1 - E/G 1 - E/IB H2 IMPDET CL BY 061414 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff SUBJECT: Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Regimes 1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975. 2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project has not been eliminated from your list but that the Director will request that discussion of it be limited to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing procedural errors in the presentation and review of this project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure to two former assets who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian regime. 3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently, the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August 1967 and Mr. Walt Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council, asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before. He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303 Committee should examine all political action projects. Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973. 4. In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders who are former assets under this project, and accusations in the Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement. An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor or to the two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of death for them. 5. In the case of South Africa, CIA support to a leading South African political figure to encourage the creation of a new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member of the South African parliament. Exposure of the operation could lead to his identification which would be extremely damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our government's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this operation to the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Select Committee only. 6. The European philanthropic organization which was used to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organization in South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), located in Germany. The South African labor officials and organizations which received funds from FES were not aware that the actual origin of the funds was the United States Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used to support a number of other covert action operations in Africa and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA if he has not already been informed. Clifton R. Strathern Deputy Chief, Africa Division Attachments: As Stated Above MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Waller Special Assistant to the DDO SUBJECT: Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments REFERENCE: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated 18 July 1975 Subject: "Summary of Covert Action Operations Against Right Wing Governments" 1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our concern centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to Reference as "were mounted against" "right wing governments". None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) -- were or should be so described as being mounted against the government then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government had was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking participation in the governmental process. 2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of this contact was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency today maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Department of State. 3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations were to be raised with the Senate Select Committee. Robert D. Brown, Jr. Acting Chief, East Asia Division cc: DC/Operations Staff C/SS/CAG SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: -- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government. In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives. SECRET 3011282 JUN 75 STAFF CITE LONDON 628897 TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT REF DIRECTOR 712872 1. IN MEETING WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSION OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPROACH AND FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULTY OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1960'S BY STANDARDS OF 1975. 2. AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT HE HAD MADE SOME EFFORT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT SUCCESS. IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE. IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 30 JUNE, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 38 JUNE. SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN TRIP, U.K., EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO INFORM MONDALE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME. THIS IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HQS. E2 IMPDET. SECRET 2712172 JUN 75 STAFF CITE BONN 41001 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT FROM GRAVER REF DIRECTOR 708791 1. IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY CAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER WITH SOME INDICATION OF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISIT. IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLACE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF BERLIN, I AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN. 2. WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE "SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HQS AWARE, THE BND IS LOCATED IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7 ABOUT 'SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY' WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST RESURGENCE OF LONG-STANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A SECRET PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS. THERE IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS IN FRANKFURT, AND I PLAN TO BRIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT ACTIVITIES AS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION. IF THE SENATOR PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LOCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN ADDITION TO BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF. 3. ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES, REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES, AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES, BUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD, IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAJOR AREAS OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. 4. WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA OF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN AS SOON AS THIS CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED. E2 IMPDET. SECRET 2711122 JUN 75 STAFF CITE LONDON 62823 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, RYBAT REF A. DIRECTOR 708791 B. STATE 146723 DTD 21 JUNE C. STATE 150884 DTD 26 JUNE 1. WE NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP. 2. REFS B & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING LONDON 28 JUNE DEPARTING 29TH, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY EXCEPT MRS. MONDALE. REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION. DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 1 JULY? 3. PLS ADVISE. E2 IMPDET NO RECORD IN CASLE SECRETARIAT. OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET STAFF CONFIDENTIAL INFO: FILE C1/AN, D2/AC, BLC, C/SS3, C/PS, EG2, C/C1/OP3 TO: LONDON-Y RYBAT Y REFS: A. LONDON 62701 [IN 616087] B. LONDON 62615 [IN 613590] Y AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CDE. IN ANSWER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS, WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR- ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE, BUT KNOW OF NO SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT ARISE, WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY. RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING SOURCE NAMES, YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E2, IMPDET-H DATE: 25 JUNE 1975 ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS UNIT: C/EUR EXT: 1012 WILLIAM W. WELLS, C/EUR CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E2 IMPDET CL BY: SECRET 2414512 JUN 75 STAFF CITE LONDON 62701 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT REF A, DIRECTOR 708791 B, LONDON 62615 (013590) 1. RE PARA 5 REF A, RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC, INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS, SYKES AND SIR LEONARD HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTROL IS EXERCISED OVER BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT WORKS. 2. SYKES MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR REPS. 3. WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY TO GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF B. E2 IMPDET SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT: Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk to QJWIN While Traveling in Europe This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator is traveling in Europe. The agent is QJWIN. He was first approached in 1958 through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service. At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in various European countries. Later he became the major asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made a brief visit to the Congo, but took no actions. On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others. QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read. So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have not contacted him since. We have heard that David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill Miller. It is difficult to imagine how a U.S. senator could talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and of the host government who might wonder about the propriety of investigations being conducted on their territory and involving one of their citizens. In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest to the Department of State, and the senator might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding. Walter Elder CB: 007789 E2 IMPDET Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His Proposed Contact With QJWYN 1. Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the risk of his exposure to his local government and the press. Because of his former activities and relationships he might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible prosecution for espionage at home from his local government and harassment from the media. 2. Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have further cause to believe that the American intelligence service is incapable of protecting its informants from disclosure. Contacting an agent under the insecure conditions involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship. 3. Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with the CIA. 4. It is possible that the local government involved might lodge a formal protest to the US mission protesting the unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty without requesting formal permission. 6/24/75 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence This is for your information concerning Senator Gary Hart's request to talk to a former agent of ours while traveling in Europe. You should know that we have been told that the Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff of a potential problem area in connection with such a proposed meeting. The agent in question is, of course, a subject of interest to the local intelligence service and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence service would agree that a United States senator, especially a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately conduct such investigations within its territory without clearance to do so. In any event, an approach of this nature would be of interest and indeed of concern to the Department of State and the senator might be well advised to consult with them before proceeding. For your information, the agent referred to is QJWIN and we have not been in touch with him since about 1961. /s/ Walter Elder [Signature] [Redacted] CB: 007789 E2 IMPDET MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI More facts, per your request, on the PTWIN matter. Talking points for your use with Sen. Gary Hart are included. H. Knecht 6-24-75 (DATE) SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable. I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. Their mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Several foreign governments or entities thereof now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence agreements-exchanges maintain strong neutral or anti-U.S. foreign policies; continuation of such agreements-exchanges is therefore dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. In many cases termination of such agreements would result in the loss of unique strategic intelligence and alternate collection methods are either not available or are prohibitively expensive. To help maintain the discreet nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government. In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador. II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT. All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms—operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government. IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC. V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES. Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities. VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance. Senate Select Committee principals and staff should understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence installations or foreign intelligence installations supported by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government involved. VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment. Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized. SECRET 2017452 JUN 75 STAFF CITE LONDON 62615 TO: DIRECTOR, RYBAT REF A. DIRECTOR 707518 B. DIRECTOR 708791 1. THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR MONDALE'S PROPOSED VISIT, AND AMBASSADOR AND MINISTER HAVE BOTH BEEN ALERTED. 2. IN RESPONSE TO PARA 6 REF A, COS PLANS TO BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE NATURE OF OUR INTERFACE WITH IT WITH PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE GROUND RULES GOVERNING OUR RELATIONSHIP. COS WILL ALSO COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO HAVE ANSWERS TO A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO US: A. WHAT CLEARANCES DO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS TWO STAFF ASSISTANTS HAVE? B. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE SENATOR BEEN INFORMED ABOUT AGEE CASE, AND IN WHAT DETAIL SHOULD THIS CASE BE COVERED WITH HIM AND HIS TWO ASSISTANTS? C. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD SPECIFIC CA PROJECTS BE DESCRIBED. ASSUME THERE IS NOT OBJECTIONS TO POINTING OUT THE DAMAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO TOMAHKBIT, AS A WAY OF DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN THE COURSE OF THE SENATE INVESTIGATION. D. IF THE STATION IS TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE BEING SO INFORMED. E2 IMPDET. OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET STAFF CONF: c/Corro INFO: FILE c/plan, 000, 000/000, c/pleeg, p/olec, olies c/colop3 TO: LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS INFO OSLO, HELSINKI RYBATY REF: DIRECTOR 707518 {NOT NEEDED OSLO, HELSINKI} 1. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES.} 2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {1 DAY} AND BONN {2 DAYS}. NO DECISION YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED DIRECTLY FROM VIENNA. 3. MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS' PRIORITIES AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN, BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING SPECIFICS. 4. MR. AARON STATES THERE WILL BE NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICER AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: AIRCRAFT Y 5. FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGEMENT. SENATOR MONDALE HAS ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE (AND PROBABLY MI-6) ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOW THE BRITISH COMMAND AND CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR Y 6. FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT CONTACT WITH THE GERMANY EMBASSY AND THE BND Y 7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR. AARON SAID THAT IN VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY. IN BONN THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY. IN PARIS THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM Y 8. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT YET BEEN INFORMED. E2, IMPDET Y DATE: 17 JUNE 1975 ORIG: WILLIAM U. WELLS E.H. KNOCHE UNIT: C/EUR EXT: 1012 WILLIAM U. WELLS, C/EUR CLASSIFICATION SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION DATE AND PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100 Room 2E-45 SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed Trip to Europe 1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary, while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines: a. 30 June - 1 July: London b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the Paris stop, one day. In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit Oslo and Helsinki. The purpose of this part of the trip, however, has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need Station contact. 2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions, etc. Their basic interests are related to "command and control". It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations). He recognized London was a liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer. Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world" operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the interrelations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service. 3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control". Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know, than to involve the Agency's go-between. 4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German Embassy. 5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason, we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned that he would want to bring this to the attention of others. 6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was connected with Select Committee investigations. 7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He also suggested that they might get in touch with military intelligence services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference to "Naval Intelligence". 8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still tentative and subject to change. 9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal. Mr. Waller replied negatively. 10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader would be a member of the Senator's party. Distribution: 1 - Mr. Knoche 1 - Mr. Wells 1 - Miss Page 1 - Mr. Leader SECRET 1668532 JUN 75 STAFF CITE VIENNA 26077 TO: DIRECTOR. RYBAT REF: DIRECTOR 797518 1. ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE ON STATION'S POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HQS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF. 2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF AIDE, MR. WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF SAME NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS LATE SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENANT COMMANDER. 3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET. SECRET MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR STAFF CONF: c/br 6 INFO: FILE DCT, D/DCT, DAO, CS/RF, OLC, CI/PLAN, DDO/DO, CI/LOPS, CI/OPS, CI/SLN/DO, CI/PS/ECR. TO: PRIORITY LONDON, VIENNA, BONN, PARIS-Y RYBAT Y SUBJECT: THE VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE AT THE END OF THE MONTH. Y 1. THE SENATORIAL PARTY WISHES TO VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS TO EXAMINE AGENCY COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE FIELD. SENATOR MONDALE WILL WISH TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT HOW STATIONS OPERATE AND THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY THE SENATOR WILL ALSO WISH TO EXAMINE OUR COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. Y 2. SENATOR MONDALE WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL AIDE, MR. DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMMAND AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. WILLIAM BADER, A SECOND STAFF MEMBER, MAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. Y 3. HEADQUARTERS WILL REQUEST TO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE OTHER REASONS THAN THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR HIS TRAVEL IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS. WE DO NOT KNOW, HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE. Y DATE: ORIG: UNIT: EXT: RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED SECRET E 2 IMPDET CL BY: 012866 4. YOU SHOULD ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR OF THE SENATOR'S INTENTIONS TO VISIT HIS MISSION AND THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT. PLEASE ASK THE AMBASSADOR TO RESTRICT HIS CORRESPONDENCE TO WASHINGTON ABOUT THIS TRIP TO EITHER CIA CHANNELS OR THE ROGER CHANNEL. LATER RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING, DEPENDING ON HOW SENATOR MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. Y 5. THE CODEL'S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART 30 JUNE VIA COMMERCIAL AIRCRAFT; ARRIVING LONDON 1 JULY; 2 JULY - VIENNA; 3-4 JULY - BONN; 5-6 JULY - PARIS; 7-8 JULY - LONDON; 9 JULY - RETURN TO THE U.S. Y 6. REQUEST EACH COS ADVISE HEADQUARTERS OF HIS PLANS FOR BRIEFING THE SENATOR. Y 7. FOR BONN, SUGGEST YOU CONSIDER A VISIT TO WESTPORT. Y 8. HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE AND HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDET 9. MORE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE ON OPERATIONAL DISCUSSIONS TO FOLLOW. E.H. KNOCHE LC Rothman SA/DDO WILLIAM W. WELLS DDO AUTHORIZING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED SECRET CL BY: WILLIAM W. WELLS DDO AUTHORIZING OFFICER CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED SECRET CL BY: SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: -- Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government. In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives. SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government. In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives. SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and talk to U.S. embassy and intelligence personnel. It is essential that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security problems. The following specific guidelines are applicable. I. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ABROAD FOR SOME PURPOSE OTHER THAN THE INVESTIGATION OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. Most of these installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for example, are under some form of cover, or are maintaining a low profile. Certainly all have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum protection. The mere visit of SSC representatives could be noted as evidence of U.S. intelligence presence within the country. Even in those countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from close liaison with the host government, care is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions that could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than SSC business should be given to explain any visits by SSC members and staff to help maintain the discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate contact should be made with the local press, nor should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government. In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the SSC member not publicly declaring himself to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador. II. THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE VISIT. All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. III. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will only discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. Members and staff of the SSC should refrain from asking to see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally, and cannot be divulged without the consent of the host government. IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage would be done to agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be revealed to Members or staff of the SSC. V. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES. Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with U.S. intelligence activities, the information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause the host service to reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence activities. VI. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS. In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional representatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered essential, a special request must be negotiated with the host country in advance. VII. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND STAFF, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE. This briefing will be conducted by the DCI and other representatives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.), as appropriate. The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment. Members and staff of the SSC should bear in mind at all times that they and their activities are matters of great interest to opposition intelligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly travel inconspicuously and will be easily recognized. SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad There have been already and there will continue to be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious security problems from arising. The following specific guidelines are considered important: Members of the SSC and members of its staff should not publicly appear to be abroad for purposes of investigating CIA installations. CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under some form of cover, have and need varying degrees of protection from exposure. At one extreme are Stations behind the iron curtain or in other particularly sensitive areas which need maximum protection. At the other extreme are Stations which enjoy close liaison with the host government and are thus less sensitive. In the first case, Stations existing under strict cover conditions in sensitive environments, the very presence of SSC members could be highly provocative by flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But even in countries in which we enjoy a good liaison with the host country's security service, there remains a need to be discreet. Many countries whose services want to be cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or parliamentary exposure of the relationship. Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all cases be distasteful to a host government. In sum, except in the case of very sensitive areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and with senior officers within the covering Embassy provided the SSC member does not publicly declare himself to be on SSC business and maintains his Station contacts on a discreet basis. Members of the SSC and their staff should not question Station personnel on specific operational detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational details are conveyed to the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guidelines are best understood, where the most complete and authentic records are kept (many Stations finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations, have periodically destroyed their files). There is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should not discuss operations in general terms -- operational priorities, the kinds of operations, the operational environment, relationships with the Embassy, the service attaches, etc. Members of the SSC and their staff should not interview agent personnel. Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage could be done to agent morale and motivation if they were to think their role had been revealed to members of Congress. Members of the SSC and their staff should not in most cases be in contact with members of host country's intelligence or security services. Many services will find contact with the SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard that their relationships with CIA, the information they pass us and the sort of cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter. No matter what assurances are given them, they would find it difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with the SSC or its staff, and the very fact that such matters were under investigation could well cause them to reassess the desirability of a relationship with CIA or other U.S. intelligence agencies. Exceptions can perhaps be made in special cases. Members of the SSC and their staff should not visit foreign technical intelligence installations. Again there may be exceptions to this which can be arranged, but in most countries in which we operate joint technical collection sites, the host service would be opposed to access by Congressional representatives.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10400-10311.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 231, "total-input-tokens": 265032, "total-output-tokens": 72814, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1000, 1 ], [ 1000, 1681, 2 ], [ 1681, 2672, 3 ], [ 2672, 3810, 4 ], [ 3810, 4915, 5 ], [ 4915, 5277, 6 ], [ 5277, 6336, 7 ], [ 6336, 7284, 8 ], [ 7284, 7982, 9 ], [ 7982, 8799, 10 ], [ 8799, 9834, 11 ], [ 9834, 10281, 12 ], [ 10281, 10542, 13 ], [ 10542, 11721, 14 ], [ 11721, 12095, 15 ], [ 12095, 13213, 16 ], [ 13213, 14466, 17 ], [ 14466, 15682, 18 ], [ 15682, 16939, 19 ], [ 16939, 17531, 20 ], [ 17531, 18482, 21 ], [ 18482, 19629, 22 ], [ 19629, 20881, 23 ], [ 20881, 22090, 24 ], [ 22090, 23271, 25 ], [ 23271, 23375, 26 ], [ 23375, 23929, 27 ], [ 23929, 24745, 28 ], [ 24745, 25412, 29 ], [ 25412, 26581, 30 ], [ 26581, 27581, 31 ], [ 27581, 28511, 32 ], [ 28511, 29410, 33 ], [ 29410, 30485, 34 ], [ 30485, 31524, 35 ], [ 31524, 32681, 36 ], [ 32681, 33761, 37 ], [ 33761, 34834, 38 ], [ 34834, 35304, 39 ], [ 35304, 36684, 40 ], [ 36684, 37763, 41 ], [ 37763, 38606, 42 ], [ 38606, 38951, 43 ], [ 38951, 40016, 44 ], [ 40016, 41201, 45 ], [ 41201, 41817, 46 ], [ 41817, 42774, 47 ], [ 42774, 43990, 48 ], [ 43990, 45225, 49 ], [ 45225, 46430, 50 ], [ 46430, 47662, 51 ], [ 47662, 47701, 52 ], [ 47701, 48216, 53 ], [ 48216, 49152, 54 ], [ 49152, 49870, 55 ], [ 49870, 50665, 56 ], [ 50665, 51678, 57 ], [ 51678, 52669, 58 ], [ 52669, 53610, 59 ], [ 53610, 54674, 60 ], [ 54674, 55055, 61 ], [ 55055, 55952, 62 ], [ 55952, 56939, 63 ], [ 56939, 57976, 64 ], [ 57976, 58919, 65 ], [ 58919, 59927, 66 ], [ 59927, 60837, 67 ], [ 60837, 61754, 68 ], [ 61754, 62691, 69 ], [ 62691, 63708, 70 ], [ 63708, 64748, 71 ], [ 64748, 65779, 72 ], [ 65779, 66756, 73 ], [ 66756, 67578, 74 ], [ 67578, 68598, 75 ], [ 68598, 68720, 76 ], [ 68720, 69387, 77 ], [ 69387, 70195, 78 ], [ 70195, 70750, 79 ], [ 70750, 71999, 80 ], [ 71999, 72973, 81 ], [ 72973, 73950, 82 ], [ 73950, 75026, 83 ], [ 75026, 75898, 84 ], [ 75898, 76712, 85 ], [ 76712, 77291, 86 ], [ 77291, 77656, 87 ], [ 77656, 78351, 88 ], [ 78351, 78661, 89 ], [ 78661, 79492, 90 ], [ 79492, 80451, 91 ], [ 80451, 80989, 92 ], [ 80989, 84090, 93 ], [ 84090, 84997, 94 ], [ 84997, 86066, 95 ], [ 86066, 87151, 96 ], [ 87151, 88245, 97 ], [ 88245, 88830, 98 ], [ 88830, 89650, 99 ], [ 89650, 90563, 100 ], [ 90563, 92355, 101 ], [ 92355, 94497, 102 ], [ 94497, 96782, 103 ], [ 96782, 97037, 104 ], [ 97037, 98029, 105 ], [ 98029, 99138, 106 ], [ 99138, 100348, 107 ], [ 100348, 100511, 108 ], [ 100511, 101537, 109 ], [ 101537, 101782, 110 ], [ 101782, 102684, 111 ], [ 102684, 103743, 112 ], [ 103743, 104825, 113 ], [ 104825, 105920, 114 ], [ 105920, 106505, 115 ], [ 106505, 107097, 116 ], [ 107097, 108091, 117 ], [ 108091, 109070, 118 ], [ 109070, 112236, 119 ], [ 112236, 113241, 120 ], [ 113241, 114422, 121 ], [ 114422, 115599, 122 ], [ 115599, 116833, 123 ], [ 116833, 118050, 124 ], [ 118050, 118525, 125 ], [ 118525, 119584, 126 ], [ 119584, 120770, 127 ], [ 120770, 120878, 128 ], [ 120878, 121897, 129 ], [ 121897, 123058, 130 ], [ 123058, 124182, 131 ], [ 124182, 125218, 132 ], [ 125218, 126338, 133 ], [ 126338, 126899, 134 ], [ 126899, 127886, 135 ], [ 127886, 128911, 136 ], [ 128911, 129971, 137 ], [ 129971, 131023, 138 ], [ 131023, 131422, 139 ], [ 131422, 132577, 140 ], [ 132577, 133817, 141 ], [ 133817, 135129, 142 ], [ 135129, 136221, 143 ], [ 136221, 136546, 144 ], [ 136546, 137654, 145 ], [ 137654, 138955, 146 ], [ 138955, 140159, 147 ], [ 140159, 141425, 148 ], [ 141425, 142622, 149 ], [ 142622, 142734, 150 ], [ 142734, 143904, 151 ], [ 143904, 144123, 152 ], [ 144123, 144822, 153 ], [ 144822, 145841, 154 ], [ 145841, 147003, 155 ], [ 147003, 148127, 156 ], [ 148127, 149164, 157 ], [ 149164, 150284, 158 ], [ 150284, 150845, 159 ], [ 150845, 151831, 160 ], [ 151831, 152856, 161 ], [ 152856, 153916, 162 ], [ 153916, 154970, 163 ], [ 154970, 155369, 164 ], [ 155369, 156163, 165 ], [ 156163, 157385, 166 ], [ 157385, 158732, 167 ], [ 158732, 159983, 168 ], [ 159983, 161135, 169 ], [ 161135, 162001, 170 ], [ 162001, 163083, 171 ], [ 163083, 164106, 172 ], [ 164106, 164997, 173 ], [ 164997, 166060, 174 ], [ 166060, 167595, 175 ], [ 167595, 168164, 176 ], [ 168164, 169859, 177 ], [ 169859, 170181, 178 ], [ 170181, 171876, 179 ], [ 171876, 172220, 180 ], [ 172220, 174272, 181 ], [ 174272, 176820, 182 ], [ 176820, 177366, 183 ], [ 177366, 178358, 184 ], [ 178358, 180045, 185 ], [ 180045, 182130, 186 ], [ 182130, 183783, 187 ], [ 183783, 184226, 188 ], [ 184226, 185728, 189 ], [ 185728, 187478, 190 ], [ 187478, 188152, 191 ], [ 188152, 189101, 192 ], [ 189101, 189294, 193 ], [ 189294, 190251, 194 ], [ 190251, 191132, 195 ], [ 191132, 191739, 196 ], [ 191739, 192861, 197 ], [ 192861, 193601, 198 ], [ 193601, 195221, 199 ], [ 195221, 196485, 200 ], [ 196485, 197724, 201 ], [ 197724, 197886, 202 ], [ 197886, 199114, 203 ], [ 199114, 200594, 204 ], [ 200594, 201872, 205 ], [ 201872, 203099, 206 ], [ 203099, 204479, 207 ], [ 204479, 205384, 208 ], [ 205384, 205748, 209 ], [ 205748, 207053, 210 ], [ 207053, 208272, 211 ], [ 208272, 209653, 212 ], [ 209653, 211597, 213 ], [ 211597, 211916, 214 ], [ 211916, 212585, 215 ], [ 212585, 213892, 216 ], [ 213892, 215106, 217 ], [ 215106, 216608, 218 ], [ 216608, 218358, 219 ], [ 218358, 219032, 220 ], [ 219032, 220531, 221 ], [ 220531, 222281, 222 ], [ 222281, 222955, 223 ], [ 222955, 224188, 224 ], [ 224188, 225509, 225 ], [ 225509, 226595, 226 ], [ 226595, 227833, 227 ], [ 227833, 228782, 228 ], [ 228782, 230281, 229 ], [ 230281, 232031, 230 ], [ 232031, 232704, 231 ] ] }
08d75728ed8a82e9099fa2b5436e06a8a2e38eb6	MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James M. Potts Chief, Africa Division Mr. Richard S. Sampson Chief, Europe Division Mr. Alan D. Wolfe Chief, Near East Division Mr. Richard F. Stolz Chief, Soviet/East European Division FROM: John D. Walker 0/SA/DO/0 SUBJECT: Guidelines for Providing Information to the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Concerning Foreign Intelligence and Security Services 1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be talking with your Divisions in the near future, it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as to what may be said concerning relationships with foreign liaison services. In the broad sense, liaison services constitute both a source and a method. 2. We are prepared to discuss the following: a. The identification and responsibilities of the liaison services in a particular area to the extent that we can draw on sources other than information derived through the established liaison relationship, i.e. overt information or information from penetrations which will not endanger the source. b. In further describing the liaison services, we can provide information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget and methods of operations of services provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves. c. Agency manhours and funds devoted to liaison with the foreign services. d. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign services. d. We are prepared to provide general comments on the degree of operational cooperation with the Station. If technical support, for example, provides a useful input, we can state that the liaison service provides technical support, using a qualifying adjective to define, such as excellent, limited, etc. 3. We have no objection to the provision of foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services. Source descriptions should be those used in the disseminated report. 4. We will not make available details on liaison arrangements, information on sources and methods of such services which have been obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources or other information which would reveal Agency sources and methods or violate the trust on which the official liaison relationship is based. 5. The S&I Staff approves close liaison relationships and believes that these relationships are cost effective. John D. Walker O/SA/DO/O:JDWalker:kaw (1542) Distribution Original - C/AF 1 - C/EUR 1 - C/NE 1 - C/SE 2 - SA/DO/O Guidelines for Providing Information to Congressional Oversight Committees on Foreign Intelligence and Security Services These guidelines take into account the fact that foreign intelligence and security services, when acting in connection with the Agency's official liaison with them, constitute both a source and a method and thus require the statutory protection accorded any other intelligence source or method. The guidelines also recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of the Congress have expressed an interest in such services and in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines is to provide a formula for dealing with these two sometimes conflicting objectives. The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific request, appropriately classified and sanitized information to oversight committees on the following aspects of foreign intelligence and security services: a. The identification of the governments with whose services CIA has liaison arrangements; b. Agency man hours and funds devoted to liaison with foreign services; c. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further details on such arrangements, including the scope of funds and equipment provided to such foreign services; d. Information on the objectives, key personnel, strength, budget and methods of operation of such services, provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or penetrations and not from the details of liaison arrangements with the services themselves; e. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with such services. The Agency will not make available to the oversight committees the details of liaison arrangements with foreign services, information on sources and methods of such services obtained through liaison or jointly controlled sources, or other information which would reveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust on which these official liaison relationships is necessarily based. In the event of substantial allegations of improper activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant facts which bear on such allegations. Where this would involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director will be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the committee to seek a satisfactory resolution of such problems. MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD Mr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with Chairman Otis Pike at 9:30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike: 1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached) 2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment on Foreign Intelligence). (Filed in 6D0120) 3. Three Groudrules papers: (Attached) --Agreements To Be Sought By the DCI With Chairmen of the Select Committees --Secrecy Agreement --Guides for Protection of Classified Information And Documents Furnished The Select Committee 4. 11 March 1975 Letter from Colby to Senator Church. (Attached) Rosemarie R. Hesterberg Checklist for DCI Discussion with HSC 1. Your intent to be cooperative and forthcoming. 2. Your responsibility to protect S&M. Will need HSC understanding of particularly sensitive matters: --names of agents and sources. --names of cooperating American organizations and contacts to whom we have pledged confidentiality. --material from foreign liaison. --sensitive intelligence methods and techniques of collection. 3. Will need to work out security groundrules. --Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements, compartmented clearances, etc. 4. Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness to suspend them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees. 5. Will confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and interviews. 24 July 1975 AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES 1. It would be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees, as has been customary in other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, that: (a) Departments and agencies shall have the right to request that testimony be given only in executive session, that in some instances testimony be "off-the-record" and that certain testimony be heard only by members and in some cases only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman. (b) Witnesses be afforded an opportunity to review and comment on and/or correct the record of their testimony prior to any publication of it. (c) When questioned about intelligence matters that come under the purview of another organization, witnesses should be permitted to state that a response to the question is not properly within their authority and to respectfully suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify on such matters. 2. It would also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies furnishing documents to the committees be authorized to excise from those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as well as those of other individuals whose safety or individual privacy may be jeopardized by disclosure. Also excised should be names of sources, operations, specific details of technical devices and systems maintained in compartmented channels and names of organizations cooperating on a highly confidential basis. 3. In view of their susceptibility to foreign countermeasures, it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details of the technology of the technical collection programs. It would also be desirable if the Select Committees adopted the use of Compartmented Control Systems to protect documents on these programs and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-know. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area. 4. Further, it would be desirable if the DCI attempt to secure an agreement with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that they will entertain and consider security principles and guidelines which will be provided. SECURITY AGREEMENT I, ____________________________, in accepting employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified information from unauthorized disclosure. I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth below as a condition precedent of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter referred to as the Select Committee. It is my understanding that in the course of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee I will be given access to information from departments and agencies of the Government which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 11652 of March 8, 1972, as amended. All classified information so acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the property of the United States of America and I further agree to surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee, any classified material which has come into my possession as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee. I hereby agree that the burden is on me to determine if information is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative. I hereby agree that any information learned during my employment or assignment with the Select Committee which is related to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be submitted to the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative prior to discussing with or showing to any publisher, editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said material contains any classified information as defined in Executive Order 11652. I agree that the Chairman of the Select Committee, President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has the authority to make the final determination as to whether information is classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted. I have been informed of the provisions of 18 U.S.C. 793, 794, 798 and 952; and 50 U.S.C. 783 (b); and 42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive Order 11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified information, and understand their meaning. Further, I agree to abide by such rules and procedures as the Select Committee shall institute for the protection of classified material. I understand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agreement could subject me to legal and/or administrative action. I further agree that all the conditions and obligations imposed on me with respect to the protection of classified information by this agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated. I take the obligations set forth above freely and without any mental reservations or purpose of evasion. __________________________ Signature __________________________ Date WITNESS: __________________________ Signature __________________________ Date GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES 1. Personnel Security Clearances (a) Background Investigation It would be desirable for the Select Committees to stipulate that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material, testimony or information received or generated by the committees without prior receipt of a security clearance based on a full field investigation. (b) Secrecy Agreement It would be desirable for the Select Committees to require a signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to the committees' staffs. The agreement should include provisions: 1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations is a condition precedent of employment or assignment; 2) Recognizing US Government property rights to classified information; 3) Requiring prior written consent before divulgence of classified information; 4) For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules and obligations contained in the agreement could subject the signer to administrative and/or legal action under appropriate statutes; 5) That there is no time limit on the terms of the agreement. 2. Physical and Document Security The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure that the secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be preserved. These rules should be made known to the individuals and agencies who will be called upon to present testimony or materials. Among these should be rules on physical security and document security. (a) Physical Security It would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following rules related to physical security: 1) All classified material will be stored in safes for safekeeping in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with the regulations of this registry for classified material. 2) Twenty-four-hour guard protection, supplemented by anti-intrusion alarms, should be required on the storage area. 3) Areas selected for use in closed session should be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons. 4) The committees should arrange for the conduct of audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of unauthorized use of transmitters and/or recording devices. It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter was located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 February 1973. 5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees, the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff officer who will secure any misplaced classified material or waste. 6) Areas should be designated in which classified material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure against access by unauthorized personnel. Material should not be removed from these areas for the sake of convenience except when necessary for the work of the committees and should not be transported overnight to the office or residence of personnel of the committees. (b) Document Security 1) Committees should select and identify a single location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknowledgement of receipt of classified materials provided to the committees. 2) A system of document control should be established to permit control of classified documents to provide for accountability. 3) Duplication of documents should be controlled so as to require a record of the document reproduced, the number of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be subject to the same controls as the original. 4) Appropriate arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste. 5) Transcripts. The committees should give consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate security in the transcription of testimony by committee transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In some, if not all cases, this might include escort of materials to the place of transcription, the securing of carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance with committee rules. 6) Early agreement should be reached on the disposition of classified materials such as storage under seal in the National Archives. The question of access should be determined by the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House. 3. Compartmented Information There is some extremely sensitive information in the intelligence community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict "need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate or handle the material produced by extremely sensitive foreign-intelligence collection programs. The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulnerability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily institute if details of the means of collection became known. Thus, even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access to compartmented information unless they are required to have such knowledge in the performance of their duties. This information is handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those staff personnel with an absolute "need to know" about such systems, and that documents related to such systems be handled in a compartmented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area. 4. Security Officer It would be desirable if the committees appointed a security officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the departments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security support required by the committee. 16 JUN 1975 Honorable Elmer B. Staats Comptroller General of the United States General Accounting Office 441 G Street Washington, D. C. 20548 Dear Mr. Staats: My attention has been directed to a letter from Mr. Keller, General Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, which was placed in the Congressional Record by Senator Proxmire on February 11, 1975. The letter deals with the intelligence community and reviews the General Accounting Office's right to audit and obtain information from the Central Intelligence Agency. Inasmuch as Mr. Keller has treated a subject basic to this Agency's capability to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve a useful purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of confidential funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the years. Mr. Keller notes in his letter that there are "a fairly substantial number of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a certification by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear in the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its direction to the Director of Central Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures would apply, for example, to a secret agent operating abroad in a hostile climate whose identity must be protected not only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but also because his freedom—and on occasion his life—weighs in the balance. Other intelligence activities do not have such obvious security requirements, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the mere fact of the relationships, but also its sources and methods and sensitive information. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign liaison service, but in some cases a lessening or even cessation of its cooperation. Even overt activities have their own security problems. Thus, many U. S. citizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence units only on condition that their cooperation in this respect be absolutely protected. This need for the special protection of intelligence sources and methods has been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of the Budget, addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily recommend for Government agencies, generally, the purposes sought to be obtained in the establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency are believed to be of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures proposed therein." He went on to say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters is apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided in section 102(a)(3) of Public Law 253, that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Under these conditions, he stated, "I do not feel called upon to object to the proposals advanced..." It has been and it remains the policy of CIA to rely upon vouched funds wherever possible. (Vouched funds are those which can be accounted for and audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies and with standard Government regulations and procedures.) Currently more than half of the Agency's appropriations are disbursed as vouched funds. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for "objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature." From the beginning of CIA records for all vouched fund expenditures were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and collection vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures were made legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made. Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence sources and methods. Subsequent to the enactment of the CIA legislation, GAO adopted a "comprehensive audit approach," and raised with the CIA Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10 (now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of the Agency." Mr. Allen Dulles, the Director of Central Intelligence, agreed that GAO should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for which by law the Director's certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher. The results of the trial period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1961 were made known to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 1961 from the Comptroller General in which he said the GAO planned to discontinue the audit of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively review and evaluate activities of the Support Component because the confidential and overt activities of this component are integrated to such an extent that we cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt activities of the Intelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion, will not be productive of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the extent to which needed overt information is available for collection or determine the need for the intelligence information selected for collation and use in the production of intelligence reports." In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach" and the Director's statutory responsibility and authority to protect intelligence sources and methods. Both the Director and Chairman Vinson, of the House Committee on Armed Services, requested that the Comptroller General continue to audit Agency affairs on a limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, the Comptroller General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary for our GAO audit staff to have nearly complete access to CIA activities," and that even to perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA." Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General on July 18, 1962, stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency are necessary; I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities and should be maintained." The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued audit was not a worthwhile effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities in the Central Intelligence Agency. In summary, I believe that several points are deserving of emphasis in assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to this Agency: (a) CIA cooperated fully in all respects in extending administrative support and in granting security clearances and access to information related to vouched fund activities. (b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee in the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature and status of the activity. (c) This Agency encouraged GAO to conduct and to continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational and statutory requirements imposed upon this Agency. (d) The decision to discontinue the audit activities was made solely by GAO and was approved by the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Sincerely, W. E. Colby Director Distribution: Orig - Addressee 1 - DCI 1 - DDCI 1 - ER 1 - OGC 1 - DDA 1 - Compt 1 - OF 1 - OS 1 - OLC Subject (GAO) w/basic 1 - OLC Proxmire file 1 - OLC Chrono OLC: WPY: cg (13 Jun 75) The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives Washington, D. C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: In our conversation on Friday you asked for the statutory basis for the compartmentation principle. I wish first to respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner in which your staff can receive access to the sensitive material protected by special compartmentation systems. The current basis for the U.S. Government security classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated on 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign intelligence has been treated as one category of classified national security information. There are numerous statutory recognitions of the importance of national security information, e.g., the Freedom of Information Act. Consequently, much foreign intelligence is classified CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET or TOP SECRET according to specifications set forth in the Order. Not all foreign intelligence, however, is classified national security information under the provisions of the Executive Order (e.g., an American source providing foreign information or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with the compromise of a foreign intelligence source or method differ substantially from the risks attendant with much classified defense information. Section 102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, provides: "That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." In recognition of this responsibility, National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972) instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, "...develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." Since the National Security Act did not provide for an authority corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area, the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination and security of intelligence material." The Director of Central Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence Board, has promulgated a number of directives, regulations and security manuals, related to the protection of foreign intelligence and foreign intelligence sources and methods, and applicable to the overall U.S. intelligence community. The fundamental security principle involved in the protection of foreign intelligence and of its sources and methods is a strict application of "need to know" -- a principle referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the number of individuals made privy to a secret, the less likely that it will be disclosed. The security principle of "compartmentation" involving special access and information dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those individuals whose "need to know" has been specifically approved by some higher authority, who have been specially indoctrinated, and who undertake special commitments to protect it are provided access to a particularly sensitive category of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Compartmentation assists in the application of the "need-to-know" principle by ensuring that individuals are provided access to only that information clearly essential to the performance of their duties. Compartmentation was undoubtedly a major contributing factor involved in the nation's secret development of the atomic bomb during World War II, and the principle is still implicit in security procedures related to ERDA's "RESTRICTED DATA" as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the field of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation was practiced throughout the development and operation of the U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign intelligence categories of activities using formalized compartmentation procedures today involves the matter of foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e., communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code Section 798 recognizes the special character of this material by providing specifically for prosecution for the unauthorized disclosure of information concerning any communications activities of the United States without the necessity to show intent to harm the United States. The reason for the application of strict compartmentation procedures to communications intelligence and other foreign intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which of its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift remedial action, and the source can be forever lost. On Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath used by the executive branch with respect to three compartmented access control systems were made available to you along with the revised forms developed for and executed by certain members of the staff of the Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence Activities. I would hope that the enclosed agreement modified for the House Select Committee, combining all three compartments into one document, would meet your particular concerns. For your information, in addition to the Senate Select Committee's use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees have obtained compartmented access for their staffs, which was granted after the normal briefings and signing of the secrecy oath: - Armed Services Committee - Appropriations Committee - Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee May I reiterate the points I made on Friday: a. No material is being withheld from members of the Committee. b. We are prepared to and did brief the staff of the Committee on noncompartmented matters, based upon your certification of their security clearance and the fact that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement with you, a copy of which you provided. c. The compartmentation procedures of the Intelligence Community have been established pursuant to statute and National Security Council Intelligence Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain access to this compartmented material would be to accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties in access to such compartmented material throughout the Intelligence Community. It is clear that the obligations assumed here would run between the staff member and the Committee and in no way would provide any control or influence over them by me or any element of the Intelligence Community. d. It would undoubtedly be feasible to develop another procedure to ensure special protection of the sensitive matters currently included in the compartmented systems, but this would involve review and discussions with various interested parties which would undoubtedly take some time and delay your investigations. I hope you will agree that this is the simplest and easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can proceed with the substance of your investigations. Sincerely, W. E. Colby Distribution: 1-DCI 1-DDCI 1-IG 1-OLC 1-E.H.Knocke 1-SC/DCI White House Distribution: 1-Rod Hills 1-Phil Buchen 1-Jay French I have been informed that pursuant to law (Sections 792, 793, 794, 795, 797 and 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I am not to discuss with or disclose to any person any information relating directly or indirectly to the below identified compartmented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized to discuss or receive such information or material of the particular category involved. I am aware that the responsibility of ascertaining that such an authorization for another person is valid and current, rests with me. I acknowledge that it is my responsibility to inform myself of the contents of the above mentioned sections of Title 18, U.S. Code, as they pertain to performance of my duties. I am aware further that if a change in my status renders it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented intelligence, my name will be removed from the list of persons authorized to receive such material. News media reports concerning any of these compartmented materials does not relieve me of my obligation under the oath signed below. I acknowledge that I have been briefed on the following compartmented systems or programs: __________________________ __________________________ __________________________ OATH OF SECRECY I do solemnly swear that I will not discuss with or disclose to any person, regardless of his official position or status, any information relating directly or indirectly to Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom, or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I have ascertained that such person has been authorized to discuss CONFIDENTIAL E-2 IMPDET CL BY ________ and handle this material, and that his authorization has not been revoked, except in the performance of my official duties on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence and in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules of such Committee. Social Security Number Signature Witness Date Mr. A. Searle Field Staff Director Select Committee on Intelligence Room 232 Cannon House Office Building Washington D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Field: Around the end of July, Mr. Roeder, obviously impressed by your admonitions about the need for security, asked if I could work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified documents. Our Office of Security put this together, and while I think Mr. Roeder had in mind something more applicable to an individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to you for whatever use you care to make of it. Incidentally, we have not yet carried out the physical survey of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been in touch with Ms. Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recommendations for your consideration when that is done. Sincerely, Jerrold B. Brown Assistant to the Director Attachment: a/s cc: D/OS CONFIDENTIAL 14 AUG 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. Brown VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials REFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B. Brown, subject: Request for Security Aids In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material. Robert W. Gambino Director of Security Atts. Distribution: Orig & 2 - Adse 1 - ADD/A CONFIDENTIAL GENERAL SUGGESTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL 1. Designate a Committee member as the Security Officer responsible for the overall control handling and protection of the classified material. 2. Establish and maintain a register of all Committee personnel who are authorized to review classified material and insure that no unauthorized personnel will have access to the material. 3. Establish a central document control system whereby all classified documents are properly logged upon receipt and annotated as to disposition. 4. Designate a Document Control Clerk who will be specifically responsible for the logging and control of all classified material. Appropriate records should be established to reflect that all classified material is properly logged in and out, by date and time, to authorized members of the Committee. 5. In the event material is designated as being of a codeword or compartmented nature, special physical security features as enunciated by the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United States Intelligence Board and later adopted as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics regarding these requirements will be provided in the course of the pending survey.) 6. All guards assigned to the physical security control over the Committee's storage area should be U. S. citizens and possess appropriate security clearances. 7. If feasible, a reading room should be established within the designated storage area. for the Committee's classified material, and all research and review activities of the material should be restricted to this area. 8. In those instances where the Committee meets in Executive session, every effort should be made to insure that the site being used has been subjected to a technical security inspection to negate the possibility of unauthorized transmitting or recording devices. This area of concern could pose serious security deficiencies in the event the same area would be used initially in public session and then closed for the Executive session without such an inspection being made. 9. Adequate safeguards should be utilized in the transmission of classified material under the cognizance of the Committee from one area to another. 10. Reproduction of any portion of the Committee's classified material should be prohibited without the express approval of the Staff Director. In this instance, notes, extracts, summaries, etc., made from classified material must also be provided the same degree of protection as that provided to the source material. 11. Access controls to the storage and retention area should be established to insure that only authorized personnel are allowed entrance. 12. Storage of all classified material should be within the designated area as opposed to any areas or outside offices. 13. Security protection should be provided to all Committee transcripts during the transcription process as well as during the periods while they are in transit. 14. A security check procedure should be established to inspect the areas where the Committee meets at the termination of each session to insure that no classified material or notes, etc., are inadvertently left unsecured. (Attached are examples of Security Check Sheets.) 15. Arrangements should be made to insure that there are adequate facilities for the destruction of classified waste material. In this instance, such waste material should be provided protection until its final destruction. 16. Only approved classified material destruction methods should be utilized. (Details regarding this can be obtained in the course of the pending survey.) 17. All Committee personnel granted access to classified material by the Staff Director should be briefed on their obligations and responsibilities regarding the unauthorized disclosure of such material. 18. Specific physical security recommendations applicable to the proposed storage area for the Committee's classified material, consistent with sound security principles, must be deferred until the completion of the survey. This would also include recommendations relative to the type of storage containers which the Committee proposes to use. 19. Pending the completion of a security survey at the new storage site, it is suggested that the protective measures currently in effect at the temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon Building, not be changed. SECURITY CHECK SHEET TO: Office of Security THRU: Component Security Officer TO LOCK ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION TO CHECK SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON "HERRING-HALL-MARVIN" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT (on new type, raise latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD. VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT" POSITION CERTIFICATION I CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM. MONTH(S) \| DATE \| OPENED BY \| CLOSED BY \| CHECKED BY \| GUARD CHECK \| \|------\|-----------\|-----------\|------------\|-------------\| \| \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| \| \| TIME \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| \| \| INITIALS \| TIME \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| FROM: TO LOCK ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION TO CHECK SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON "HERRING-HALL-MARVIN" SAFES TURN DRAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT (on new type, raise latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD. VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO "NIGHT" POSITION CERTIFICATION I CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT I HAVE OPENED OR PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM. MONTH(S) \| DATE \| OPENED BY \| CLOSED BY \| CHECKED BY \| GUARD CHECK \| \|------\|-----------\|-----------\|------------\|-------------\| \| \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| \| \| TIME \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| \| \| INITIALS \| TIME \| INITIALS \| INITIALS \| FORM 1-63 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS Area Security Check Sheet \| Items to be Checked \| Checker \| \|----------------------------------------------------------\|---------\| \| Desks (Including Drawers) \| \| \| Tables (Including Drawers) \| \| \| Chairs \| \| \| Floor \| \| \| Window Ledges \| \| \| Typewriters \| \| \| Stenotype Machines \| \| \| Reproduction Equipment \| \| \| Trash Receptacles \| \| \| Charts, Exhibits, Chalkboards \| \| \| Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc. (Check to insure that imprints of classified notes not present) \| \| \| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) \| \|---------------------------------------------------\|------\|--------------------\|--------------------------------------------------\| \| Edward Ryan DD/A Coordinator 4E-27, Hqs. \| 14 AUG 1975 \| ER \| \| \| ADD/A 7D-26, Hqs. \| \| \| \| \| The Review Staff 6D-0120 \| \| \| \| \| Attn: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| CONFIDENTIAL 14 AUG 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff ATTENTION: Mr. Jerrold B. Brown VIA: Acting Deputy Director for Administration SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence - Protection of Classified Materials REFERENCE: Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold B. Brown, subject: Request for Security Aids In accordance with the request in the referenced memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified material, the attached suggestions are provided for your assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive physical security survey of the area which will be used to store the Committee's classified material, specific recommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we plan to have Mr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate representatives of the Committee for the specific purpose of conducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the results of this survey and its recommendations, the attached general physical security measures are recommended in an effort to provide the requisite protection for the Committee's classified material. Robert W. Gambino Director of Security Atts. Distribution: Orig & 2 - Adse 1 - ADD/A CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Jack E. Thomas Major General, USAF (Ret.) Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS Attachment This Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment SECRET UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD SECURITY COMMITTEE SECOM-D-105 2 September 1975 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Intelligence On 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of Security/CIA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented information. Attached is a memorandum outlining the security arrangements. Donald E. Moore Chairman Attachment This Document May Be Downgraded to Unclassified When Removed From Attachment 2 September 1975 House Select Committee on Intelligence 1. The House Select Committee staff is now located in its permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms. Jacqueline Hess is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696. 2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the guard, who calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees. Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the space. 3. All classified material is kept in a secure area at the rear of the space with one entrance to the secure room. This room is to be locked at all times when specified employees are not on duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances change this arrangement will continue. 4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At present, Ms. Hess is the only person who possesses the combination to these safes. 5. Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area, consisting of several tables, in the secure area. A staff employee desiring access to a classified document must make a request for it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes taken from classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the documents must respect the original classification and receive corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection as the original. 6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building. Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed on these doors. 7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security and this will be continually stressed. Also they have tried to instill strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more than 35. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy The Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The new Subcommittee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly. Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever-increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of nuclear energy and we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required foreign intelligence. Members of the Subcommittee are as follows: Melvin Price (D., Ill.), Chairman Charles H. Wilson (D., Calif.) Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.) Dan Daniel (D., Va.) G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.) Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.) Bob Carr (D., Mich.) Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.) Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.) Bob Wilson (R., Calif.) William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.) Marjorie S. Holt (R., Md.) Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.) Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows: John Ford, Staff Director William H. Hogan, Counsel Adam J. Klein, Professional Mr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired. Mr. Hogan is Counsel of the Subcommittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency matters. Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters. PROBLEMS A. House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Military Application of Nuclear Energy Former Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to him for support in any problems developing with other committees and other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident that he is not the dominant personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems. A few weeks ago former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill. This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we contact someone in the White House on a problem. We may be faced with needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leadership. B. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control The extent of Chairman Lester L. Wolff's oversight of the Agency in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problem. As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions. The only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the Select Committee as to what the Agency's role should be. COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS House of Representatives (95th Congress, 1st Session) GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman DEMOCRATS JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania TOM STEED, Oklahoma GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, Illinois JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia NEAL SMITH, Iowa ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York JOHN J. McFALL, California EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado DAVID E. OBEY, Wisconsin EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California LOUIS STOKES, Ohio GUNN MCKAY, Utah TOM BEVILL, Alabama BILL CHAPPELL, Florida BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas EDWARD I. KOCH, New York YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania BOB TRAXLER, Michigan ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts MAX BAUCUS, Montana CHARLES WILSON, Texas LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington REPUBLICANS ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois SILVIO O. CIRINCIONE, Massachusetts JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota JACK EDWARDS, Alabama ROBERT C. McEWEEN, New York JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida JACK F. KEMP, New York WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado RALPH S. REGULA, Ohio CLAIRE W. BURGENDER, California GEORGE M. O'BRIEN, Illinois VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska KEITH F. MAINLAND Clerk and Staff Director Subcommittees AGRICULTURE & RELATED AGENCIES Whitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes, Natcher Andrews, Robinson, Myers DEFENSE Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell, Burlison Edwards, Robinson, Kemp DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Natcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin Burgener, Kemp FOREIGN OPERATIONS Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stokes Young, Conte, Smith HUD—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES Boland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokes, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison, Alexander Coughlin, McDaide, Young INTERIOR Yates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten McDaide, Regula, Armstrong LABOR—HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE Flood, Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stolten, Early Michel, Conte, O'Brien LEGISLATIVE Shipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler Armstrong, Coughlin, Cederberg MILITARY CONSTRUCTION McKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell McEwen, Regula PUBLIC WORKS Bevill, Boland, Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell Myers, Burgener, Smith STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE & JUDICIARY Slack, Smith, Flynt, Alexander, Burke, Early Cederberg, Andrews, Miller TRANSPORTATION McFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans Conte, Edwards, O'Brien TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE—GENERAL GOVERNMENT Steed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt Miller, McEwen NOTE: Mr. Mahon, as Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Cederberg, as Ranking Minority Member, are ex officio members of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members. January 26, 1977. House Appropriations Committee team: Room 2 D 0117. Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) 8801 (gray) Leonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS Badge: blue House Committee Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM Charles B. (Chuck) HAYNES Badge: green no-escort Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM Eugene B. WILHELM Badge: blue House Committee Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM George C. BAIRD (Carter) Badge: blue House Committee Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM Leon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ Badge: blue House Committee John LAYTON Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys & Investigations Staff (not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to time): Cornelius R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief Badge: green no-escort Marion S. RAMEY, Deputy Chief Badge: blue House Committee OX 7-9371 James Brian HYLAND Badge: blue House Committee MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations Committee Survey Group 1. An initial session was held on 30 July 1976 of about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, to discuss the purpose of their survey of the Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents. The following attended: Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of Surveys and Investigations Staff Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputy Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the team inspecting the Directorate of Operations Mr. Charles (Chuck) Havnes, team member Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former Agency employee) Mr. George C. Baird, team member Attending for the Agency were: Mr. Theodore Shackley, who chaired the meeting Mr. Robert Gambino Mr. Lyle Miller Mr. Thomas B. Abernathy Mr. Richard Point Mr. Philip F. Fendig 2. The meeting followed reasonably well the attached agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of the meeting. The following paragraphs summarize the important points covered. 3. Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget had suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson, characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an investigation, stated that his instructions were from the Chairman of the Committee: they called for a detailed review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety. Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests, noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over: a. He expects to do a complete review, from the managerial and substantive standpoint, of the Directorate. His initial interests indicated an auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets are compiled, examination of accounting procedures for regular and special funds, cost systems and the like. b. He went on, however, to the management aspects which they would also pursue to determine the results of the Directorate's operations - the value of intelligence produced versus the costs involved in procuring it, and areas of possible overlap in collection with the military and with NSA. c. Specific areas which would be explored, given, as examples, included contingency reserves, the "special retirement fund" (presumably referring to MHHMUTUAL), the procedures for reimbursing the State Department for cover and support, proprietaries (how created, their justification, value and effectiveness), safe-houses and "CA cadres." Mr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our managers and senior operations officers who would be involved in current operations as well as overlapping inquiries from other groups concurrently overseeing the Directorate. Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies which the Directorate might have which would aid the team in its work. 4. Duration: The team's first objective will be to render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977, in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget. The team wishes to start work immediately and will consist of either six or seven members who will occupy space in Headquarters building and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought out, however, that the team would also interview users of our intelligence and other collectors. There was ambiguity in the projection of the total length of the survey; I interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year 1977. 5. Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement by which the Committee limits access by even the members of the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress. Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges, certification of clearances, and provided for the team's consideration a copy of the "non-disclosure agreement" which we would like members to sign. There was considerable discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of the building but which must be turned in and picked up at the entrance each day. This arrangement was reluctantly accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience and physical access to the building. 6. Access: Of more concern was the Agency position that the SA/D0/O would serve as a control point for the team's further access to individuals and documents in the Directorate. The requirement was explained in terms of the need to record, against later requirements such as in fact now in progress stemming from another investigation, the names, subject matter and general content of matters discussed by Agency officers with team members. The requirement to "monitor" was explained as an effort to keep this type of record, rather than to impose a third party from the office of SA/D0/O on all interviews; the latter was clearly considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion. It was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with system outlined in the attached agenda, and that we would reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be unwieldy. We anticipated, however, that once the team splits into smaller groups as is planned, and pursues particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve a workable system which meets the objectives of both parties. 7. Other: There appears to be no difficulty in protecting identities of sources, providing documents in sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and at the appropriate security level and introducing some officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these points were noted and none was objected to. Space and other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DO/O offices. Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which relatively free access to personnel and files had been afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses and that therefore he believed that such access could have very beneficial results for the Agency. It was agreed to begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several team members will, however, set up shop on 2 August to review such general briefing papers as Mr. Fendig can make available to them at that time. (Signed) Philip F. Fendig Philip F. Fendig SA/DO/O:PFFendig:j1 (7368/1398) Distribution: (all w/att) Orig & 1 - DDO 1 - ADDO 1 - OLC (Mr. Miller) 1 - D/SEC (Mr. Gambino) 1 - COMPT (Mr. Point) 1 - SSA/DDO 1 - SA/DDCI (Mr. Bolten) 4 - SA/DO/O AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF 30 JULY 1976 A. Request statement from Committee representatives of scope, duration and proposed procedure to be followed by Committee investigators. B. Discussion of arrangements for investigation: 1. Facilities: DDO will provide office space, telephones and secure storage facilities for investigators. Parking spaces and cafeteria privileges will also be provided. 2. Security: a. Badges allowing unescorted access to Headquarters building will be issued, to be picked up and left with receptionist. Agreement to be signed when badge issued, per current procedures governing all Congressional staffs. b. Clearances through necessary level to be obtained prior to commencement of briefings or interviews, level to be determined on basis of first meeting. 3. Access: a. Orientation briefings on Directorate and its subdivisions to be offered. b. Access to personnel and documents within Agency to be controlled by office of SA/DO/0, which will maintain record of all interviews and of documents provided. c. Documents to be provided upon specific request for study within building. They will be sanitized to protect sources and methods using guidelines previously established for HSC and SSC. d. Documents to be examined by the investigation team within Headquarters building. If copies of documents are desired, investigators will request them from SA/DO/O who will see that they are provided promptly in appropriate classified and sanitized form. If required by the Committee (outside Headquarters building), same procedure will be followed but will be subject to review by SA/DO/O. e. Formal questions are to be put in writing in order to provide proper and full context so that most complete and pertinent answers can be provided. f. SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews. g. Discussion of note-taking and reports: (1) Maintenance of proper security and classification (2) Notes to retain same level of security classification as documents or interviews on which they based. SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF 1. GENERAL Members of the staff of the House Appropriations Committee began an extensive examination of the Directorate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976. They expect that it will take approximately 17 months to complete this study. They state their activities are necessary to better understand the appropriations process. They emphasize that their objective is not to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activities. The staff members' activities will be coordinated through SA/DO/O. The following paragraphs attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to exercise orderly control over the staff's activities. These procedures may be subject to modification as future experience may dictate. 2. LOCATION Members of this Congressional staff have been issued blue badges bearing the words "House Committee" which permit unescorted access to all non-specially controlled areas of the building, including the main cafeteria. The staff will be provided suitable private office space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the SA/DO/O, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initially have a greater interest in interviews than they do in documents. Since they will have adequate office space, interviews should be conducted within their premises. 3. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS a. The staff is expected to make any requests for documentation to the SA/DO/O. Individual officers who receive requests from staff members for documents should ask that the request be put to the SA/DO/O. All documents provided to the SA/DO/O for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/O will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain a copy of the document concerned. b. All documents will be properly sanitized to protect sources and methods. The staff has indicated that it does not anticipate any need for such detail and accepts the principle of sanitization. Any questions concerning the degree of sanitization should be referred to the SA/DO/O. Ground rules for sanitization are similar to those applied during the activities of the Select Committees. General guidelines will be provided separately. c. On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/O the recipient should indicate the date received, and that it had been made available to the staff. The document should be retained by the recipient in the form in which it was provided to the staff for possible further reference; the record copy of the document should also reflect the fact that a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any further copies of documents requested by the staff will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/O. 4. INTERVIEWS a. A representative from the office of the SA/DO/O will not necessarily be present during interviews. All interviews should be requested by the staff through the SA/DO/O. The SA/DO/O will maintain a record of the date of interview; the name of the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A form will be provided to the interviewee to record the essential facts. He should retain one copy for possible future reference and one copy should be forwarded to the SA/DO/0. b. It is recognized that the badge access and the length of the stay in the building by the staff members may lead to unscheduled contacts. If such contacts are connected with the official duties of the staff, then appropriate comments should be forwarded to SA/DO/0 on the form cited above. Officers should be careful not to allow conversations to drift to areas of interest not covered by official interviews. If this does take place, however, we shall rely on the officer concerned to inform the SA/DO/0 of these developments. 5. SECURITY The blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that staff members should be treated as visitors in the presence of persons not connected with their official duties. Persons introduced under alias should be careful that the alias is protected if a chance meeting takes place in the presence of other colleagues. In this connection, persons interviewed should be careful not to expose associates who have not been interviewed. William W. Wells Deputy Director for Operations cy: A/DDC1 (Mr. Bolton) 18 Aug 76 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs FROM : Philip F. Fendig SA/DO/0 SUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with House Appropriations Committee Staff REFERENCE : DON 5-218, 4 August 1976 1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee. The subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e (personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the memorandum mentioned above. 2. General guidelines are contained in reference notice. The following may be helpful, however, in preparing your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forthcoming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any information which would lead to the identification of a specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or group with which the Agency has a relationship of confidence, or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared operations should not be disclosed. 3. In the briefing contemplated on management policies and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of providing further information later. The staff has already had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and personnel strengths broken down by component, and a listing by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have been given a briefing on the current organization of the Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further questions on material already provided to the Committee, please check with this office. 4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover status; please advise this office if any persons intend to use an alias during these briefing sessions. 5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of these briefings. Philip F. Fendig att August 18, 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Philip F. Fendig SA/DO/O FROM L. M. Walters, Staff Member House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and Leon F. Schwartz. 1. Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre Provide in this briefing data relating to the organization, utilization and cost data for this activity for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77 and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and equipment levels for the aforementioned periods. 2. Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected by such a change. If additional expenditures in either dollars or manpower positions are involved, justification should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of 100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations Bill. 3. The Special Projects Group Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel from the Near East Division and providing it with special status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed. 4. Coordination Within the Intelligence Community Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the various task groups established (both within CIA and community- wide) which have been specifically established to deal with the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these groups' actions should be covered. 5. Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff and Division, (a separate briefing by each) including but not limited to: a. Overview of role of staff or division b. Decision-making processes and how coordinated in DO, CIA and intelligence community c. Organizational structure d. Program development, and execution from initiation to budgeting to implementation, including development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk officers and division or staff directors. e. Personnel policies and practices including recruitment, training promotion, position classification, establishment of station complements and rotational policies. f. Management and accounting controls to assure compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are properly used, expended and receipted for. While the order of arranging the presentations is not critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Baird or myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary material used in the presentations could be provided to the attendees during each briefing session. OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP \| TO \| NAME AND ADDRESS \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|----\|------------------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| MR FENO16 \| \| \| \| 2 \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| \| \| \| ACTION \| DIRECT REPLY \| PREPARE REPLY \| \|--------\|--------------\|---------------\| \| APPROVAL \| DISPATCH \| RECOMMENDATION \| \| COMMENT \| FILE \| RETURN \| \| CONCURRENCE \| INFORMATION \| SIGNATURE \| Remarks: Copies: To Shepard, Sovern For your info I have attached pages 6 and 77 DD/076-3259 7 26 May 1976, covering the A100's position with the SNODGRASS on MBO. Also attached is a page from the DC1's statement to the Committee on the same subject (no date) FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. \| DATE ---\|--- WALKER \| 10 Sept 76 UNCLASSIFIED \| CONFIDENTIAL \| SECRET ---\|---\|--- FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley, he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he perceived them in the time frame February to May 1976. With that as a backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective documents. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO manpower allocation procedures. Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information to the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show how men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley reiterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective documents by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whole question of sources and methods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an examination of the Management by Objective documents. It was hoped that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only conclude that Mr. Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort of a formula or equation which will enable him to test our manpower allocation system. We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as what targets are in a country, what are the great power interests in a particular country, what is the operational environment in the country i.e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass, but he is looking for something else which has less variables in it when, in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropriations Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations within the DDO might give Mr. Snodgrass the insight into manpower allocations that he is currently seeking.) 9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate product. For this the Agency gets high marks. On the other hand, the Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents, leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden for seeking a solution to a problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put another way, there appears to be no prospect for establishing the type of dialogue with Mr. Snodgrass which satisfies the interests of both parties. We are inevitably doomed to being in an adversary relationship with him, although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that MBO Mr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think appropriate? Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that, and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert action operations and with the entire management system used by the Operations Directorate. There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern revolves around the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management system is effective is that participation is strictly limited to those immediately concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership. There will be a tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of problems and to exaggerate accomplishments. Inevitably, the net effect will be to reduce the usefulness of the system. Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging performance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss recruitment in terms of numbers, the specific access of agents to information, recruitment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this sensitive material on sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily of disconnected bits and pieces or of unenlightening generalizations. And I have a third problem with this request. The reports themselves are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal management. It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the Agency who has that intimate knowledge should be present if and when you want to consider the reports.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10400-10316.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 61, "total-input-tokens": 69431, "total-output-tokens": 21238, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1183, 1 ], [ 1183, 2639, 2 ], [ 2639, 3858, 3 ], [ 3858, 5112, 4 ], [ 5112, 6061, 5 ], [ 6061, 6956, 6 ], [ 6956, 8802, 7 ], [ 8802, 9435, 8 ], [ 9435, 11242, 9 ], [ 11242, 13034, 10 ], [ 13034, 14202, 11 ], [ 14202, 15633, 12 ], [ 15633, 17207, 13 ], [ 17207, 19139, 14 ], [ 19139, 21646, 15 ], [ 21646, 24787, 16 ], [ 24787, 27897, 17 ], [ 27897, 28762, 18 ], [ 28762, 30643, 19 ], [ 30643, 33197, 20 ], [ 33197, 35282, 21 ], [ 35282, 36026, 22 ], [ 36026, 36152, 23 ], [ 36152, 37799, 24 ], [ 37799, 38113, 25 ], [ 38113, 39067, 26 ], [ 39067, 40546, 27 ], [ 40546, 40546, 28 ], [ 40546, 41999, 29 ], [ 41999, 43675, 30 ], [ 43675, 44926, 31 ], [ 44926, 44926, 32 ], [ 44926, 46796, 33 ], [ 46796, 47781, 34 ], [ 47781, 48700, 35 ], [ 48700, 50175, 36 ], [ 50175, 50595, 37 ], [ 50595, 51406, 38 ], [ 51406, 53485, 39 ], [ 53485, 54350, 40 ], [ 54350, 55917, 41 ], [ 55917, 57858, 42 ], [ 57858, 61037, 43 ], [ 61037, 61831, 44 ], [ 61831, 63248, 45 ], [ 63248, 65165, 46 ], [ 65165, 67626, 47 ], [ 67626, 69330, 48 ], [ 69330, 70605, 49 ], [ 70605, 71392, 50 ], [ 71392, 72911, 51 ], [ 72911, 74624, 52 ], [ 74624, 75805, 53 ], [ 75805, 77757, 54 ], [ 77757, 78906, 55 ], [ 78906, 80501, 56 ], [ 80501, 82074, 57 ], [ 82074, 83095, 58 ], [ 83095, 85666, 59 ], [ 85666, 88081, 60 ], [ 88081, 90275, 61 ] ] }
25f818620c18e4a484c0a2dc7a0e9313da00068a	3. DEFINITIONS Within the context of this instruction, the definitions listed below will apply. Special note must be taken of the fact that the key term "operational use" employed throughout this instruction has been defined in the most succinct manner consistent with clarity. It has not been feasible, however, to cover in a definition the entire scope of possible variations in operational circumstances which may be encountered in DDO activities. The definition of "operational use" is intended to provide guidance for the majority of cases, and must be employed with responsible operational judgment. Issues involving a determination of "operational use" which cannot be resolved with reasonable assurance by the responsible operating components will be referred to the Deputy Director for Operations for decision. a. Operational Use Operational use is interpreted to mean the recruitment, utilization, or training of any individual or group for DDO purposes on either a witting or unwitting basis by or on the behalf of an element of the Operations Directorate. Utilization is made of an individual or group whenever that individual or group, responding to the direction or solicitation of a DDO element, provides information, performs services, provides cover, or supplies financial, material, or other support necessary for the accomplishment of DDO operational objectives either directly or indirectly, to or for an element of the Operations Directorate. b. DDO Element Any person or group who or which is responsible to, owned or controlled either directly or indirectly by the Operations Directorate. Included under this definition are employees or members of Agency proprietary mechanisms. c. Operational Contact Any association having as its purpose the initiation or furtherance of DDO operations. 4. RESTRICTIONS ON OPERATIONAL USE a. Restrictions on the operational use of individuals or groups are of four types and cover twenty five separate categories as outlined below and as described in greater detail in paragraphs 5 through 8 of this instruction: (1) Operational Use is Prohibited (see paragraph 5): (a) Members and trainers of ACTION; (b) Fulbright grantees; (c) Officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom; (d) Officials, employees, or grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations; (e) Employees of U.S. private detective investigation agencies. (2) Operational Use Requires Special Extra-Agency Concurrence (see paragraph 6): AND APPROVAL OF DDO. (a) Employees of other U.S. Government agencies; (b) DDO agents or assets in the United States; (c) Agents and human sources of foreign intelligence registered by other U.S. agencies; (d) Citizens (or persons documented as citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its overseas dependent territories), and New Zealand; (e) Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands; (f) Merchant seamen on ships of certain countries. (3) Operational Use Requires Special Approval by the DDO (see paragraph 7): (a) Publishers, producers, journalists or employees of public information media; (b) CARE employees; (c) Individuals engaged in public relations activities; (d) Officials, representatives, or employees of Communist countries in the United States; (e) Foreign delegates or employees of the United Nations assigned in the U.S. and U.S. citizen delegates or employees wherever assigned; (f) Staff members or officials of Red Cross societies; (g) Officials of the Vatican State; (h) U.S. Government-funded professors, lecturers, students or grantees; (i) Members of educational or private voluntary organizations; (j) Officials or employees of the African-American Institute; (k) Volunteers to America. (4) Operational Use Requires Approval by Chief of Area Division (see paragraph 8): (a) Citizens or alien residents of the U.S. in denied areas; (b) Non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of United Nations or organizations not assigned in the U.S.; (c) Members of the academic community. b. Operational use of an individual who comes under more than one type of restriction will be controlled by the highest type of restriction applicable in his particular case. 5. OPERATIONAL USE PROHIBITED a. Members and Trainees of ACTION (1) It is Agency policy that members and trainees of ACTION will not be used in any capacity, with or without remuneration, by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction. (The term "members of ACTION" will be understood to mean anyone employed by or associated with ACTION except trainees.) (2) It is Agency policy that former members of ACTION may be employed or used by the Agency or by organizations under its jurisdiction only in accordance with the following: (a) Except as stated in (b) below, a former member of ACTION may be employed or used operationally by any element of the Agency only if a period of five full years has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. (b) An Agency-controlled organization may hire a former member of ACTION, but only for duties related to the overt purposes of such organization, if a period of at least twenty-four months has elapsed since his separation from ACTION. (c) The employment or use of a former member of ACTION under the provisions of subparagraph (a) or (b) above must have the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. (3) Former trainees whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas are subject to the rules governing employment or use of former members of ACTION (subparagraph (2) above). Former trainees who did not serve at any time as members of ACTION and whose ACTION service did not include duty or training overseas may be employed or used operationally by DDO elements provided the specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations is obtained. (4) A former member or trainee of ACTION whose employment or use is permitted by subparagraph (2) or (3) above may not be assigned to or used in a country for which he had been trained or to which he had been assigned while with ACTION. (5) Information may be received by the Domestic Collection Division from private corporations and other organizations employing former ACTION personnel, notwithstanding the fact that the information may originate with former ACTION personnel. However, any direct briefing or debriefing of or contact with former members or trainees of ACTION is subject to the following: (a) The specific prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations must be obtained. (b) If the individual is a former member of ACTION, or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas, five years must have elapsed since his separation from ACTION. If contact with a former ACTION member or a former trainee whose ACTION service included duty or training overseas should be unavoidable during the required five year waiting period, the Deputy Director for Operations may request an exception from the Director of Central Intelligence. Among the possible reasons for such unavoidable contact would be the designation of a former member or trainee as the liaison officer to the Domestic Collection Division. b. Fulbright Grantees DDO policy prohibits the operational use of individuals who are receiving U.S. Government support under certain provisions (see below) of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, as amended, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act. Falling under this prohibition are teachers, research scholars, lecturers, and students (including student artists and student musicians) who have been selected to receive scholarships grants by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, appointed by the President of the United States. Operational use of such individuals is prohibited only during the period when they are participating in the educational and cultural exchange program. This prohibition specifically does not apply to the several other categories of grantees supported by other provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act such as artists, athletes, leaders, specialists or participants in international trade, fair and exposition, who do not come under the aegis of the President's Board of Foreign Scholarships (see 71, below). c. Officials or Employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom DDO policy prohibits the operational use of the officials or employees of the International Association for Cultural Freedom. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities must be limited to their cover assignments. d. Officials, Employees, or Grantees of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations DDO policy prohibits the operational use of grantees of the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation or the Carnegie Foundation, or of other persons actively participating in programs which are wholly sponsored and controlled by any of these foundations. Additionally, there will be no operational use made of the officials or employees of these organizations. In general, however, there is no restriction on nonoperational contacts or consultations with such individuals. e. Employees of U.S. Private Detective Investigative Agencies DDO policy prohibits the operational use either in the United States or overseas of the employees of any U.S.-owned or -controlled private detective investigative agency. This policy does not apply to operational use of employees of organizations which are engaged strictly in commercial or credit investigations. 6. EXTRA-AGENCY CONCURRENCE REQUIRED a. Employees of Other U.S. Government Agencies Approval for the operational use of staff or contract (including foreign) employees of other U.S. Government agencies will be granted only in cases where the employee's parent agency in Washington has been notified of and has approved of the intended operational use in accordance with the provisions of DOI 10-5. b. DDO Agents or Assets in the United States In accordance with the agreement existing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this Agency, the restrictions listed below apply to the operational activity of the Operations Directorate conducted in the United States. Coordination with the FBI of appropriate information on DDO operational activities in the United States is the responsibility of the Chief, Liaison Group, Operations Staff. (1) All investigations by this Agency of foreign officials in the United States require the prior concurrence of the FBI. In this context, the term "investigation" means systematic and direct inquiries or procedures (such as physical or technical surveillances or neighborhood inquiries) aimed at developing information concerning an individual's activities or background; "investigation" does not include the acceptance or the development of information through social contacts or contacts normally made by Agency officials in discharging their cover functions. (2) Any approach in the United States by a DDO element for recruitment of any foreign official or of any visitor from a Communist country requires the prior concurrence of the FBI. (3) Any planned meeting in the United States for assessment and social development between a DDO element and a foreign official of known or presumed interest to the FBI or between a DDO element and an official or visitor from a Communist country requires that prior notification be provided to the FBI. (4) Whenever domestic DDO operations involve matters pertaining to the national security of the United States, appropriate identification of persons engaged in the operations in the United States will be provided to the FBI. In accordance with this policy, the following categories of DDO assets will be identified to the FBI: DDO personnel, agents of the Operations Directorate who are either U.S. citizens or alien-residents, and foreign agents of the Operations Directorate recruited abroad who come to the United States for operational purposes. c. Agents and Human Sources of Foreign Intelligence (Registered by Other U.S. Agencies) The Interagency Source Register (ISR) has been established at headquarters to provide for United States Intelligence Board (USIB) agencies a centralized record of agents and human sources of foreign intelligence. A principal purpose of the ISR is to register primacy of interest and prevent multiple recruitment or unintentional duplicate operational use of such agents and human sources. It is USIB policy that no individual registered in the ISR by one USIB agency will be used for operational purposes by any other USIB agency without the specific prior approval of the agency having primacy of interest. If a DDO element desires to arrange the transfer or joint operational use of a registered individual, the ISR will contact the agency having primacy of interest to determine whether there is a willingness to discuss this matter. d. Citizens (or Persons Documented as Citizens) of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (including its Overseas Dependent Territories) and New Zealand (1) The operational use of citizens of the above-named countries (including the overseas dependencies of the United Kingdom) is restricted by agreements with the intelligence or security authorities of such countries, which require the prior approval of the appropriate liaison authority. Such approval will be obtained at the earliest feasible stage of development through the European Division (in the case of citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom), or through the East Asia Division (in the case of Australian or New Zealand citizens). (2) The above restriction also governs the use of false documentation representing DDO staff or agent personnel as citizens of the above-named countries. Approval for the use of such documentation will be sought through the same channels as stated in subparagraph (1) above. (3) Authority to make operational use of the persons or documentation described in the above subparagraphs without obtaining the prior approval of the liaison authority concerned may be granted only by the Deputy Director for Operations or by the Director. e. Citizens of Norway, West Germany and The Netherlands The operational use of any citizen of Norway, West Germany or The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, contingent on prior approval of the national intelligence service concerned. These countries are particularly sensitive in cases involving the operational use of their citizens who are merchant seamen and who are serving on ships carrying their flags. Each case involving the proposed operational use of a citizen of one of these countries will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division in the light of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division will decide whether approval is required from the national intelligence service concerned. When required, approvals for the operational use of such individuals will be obtained from the appropriate national intelligence services by the European Division. f. Merchant Seamen on Ships of Certain Countries The operational use of merchant seamen, regardless of their citizenship, who are serving on ships carrying the flags of Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (or its overseas dependencies), New Zealand, Norway, West Germany, and The Netherlands is, under certain conditions, subject to provisions of the agreements existing between this Agency and the national intelligence service concerned. Each case involving the proposed operational use of such a merchant seaman will be reviewed by the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division, as appropriate, in the light of the pertinent interservice agreements. After weighing all of the equities, the Chief of the European Division or the Chief of the East Asia Division will determine the course of action to be taken with regard to the national intelligence service concerned. 7. APPROVAL BY THE DDO REQUIRED Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations for the operational use of any individual who falls into one of the categories described in this paragraph will be requested by memorandum. The individual's covert approval status will be described in the memorandum to the Deputy Director for Operations, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. (In connection with this paragraph, contacts by the Domestic Collection Division with individuals or firms do not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations provided they constitute merely briefing or debriefing for the purpose of obtaining information acquired by an individual or representative of a firm in the course of his normal activities. If, however, in any case the contact is on behalf of another element of the Operations Directorate or another agency; or if an individual or firm will be requested to perform an operational task or to deviate from his or its normal pattern of activity; or if the activity, even though consistent with the individual's or firm's normal pattern of activity, will take place because requested or funded by the Domestic Collection Division; that case will be subject to the requirement for approval by the Deputy Director for Operations.) a. Publishers, Producers, Journalists, or Employees of Public Information Media (see DOI 240-6) (1) Operational use of publishers or producers of public information media requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations whenever there is danger that such activity might serve in any way to influence U.S. public opinion. Such activities include but are not limited to the publishing of books, newspapers, or magazines, the making of films, the production of TV or radio programs or the issuance in the United States of any public opinion influencing information media. The operational use abroad of publishers or producers of public information media for non-U.S. audiences does not require approval by the Deputy Director for Operations even though such activities may have some unintended and unsolicited fallout in the United States. (2) Approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is also required prior to the operational use of journalists, newspaper, TV, radio, or news service correspondents or stringers, and employees of news media including TV and radio stations, whenever the individual is a U.S. citizen or when the news medium involved is under U.S. ownership or control. b. CARE Employees It is DDO policy to avoid operational use of employees of the CARE organization including indigenous employees. Exceptional individual cases involving priority operational objectives will be considered on their merits. Prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations will be required in all cases. c. Individuals Engaged in Public Relations Activities (see DOI 50-18) Individuals engaged in public relations activities which in any way have or seek to have an influence on public opinions in the United States are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. In view of the peculiar aspects of public relations activity, including the special requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, approval by the Deputy Director for Operations is required prior to the operational use in a public relations capacity of any individual who is engaged in public relations activities and who is located in or operating into the United States. d. Officials, Representatives, or Employees of Communist Countries in the United States (see DOI 60-11) Prior approval of the Director or the Deputy Director for Operations is required for operational contact in the United States with or operational use of officials, representatives, or employees of the USSR, its satellite countries, Communist China, or any other country under Communist control. If, while in the United States, such individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI will also be required in accordance with paragraph 6.b., above. e. Delegates or Employees of the United Nations It is DDO policy that the operational use of delegates or employees of the United Nations, including those of its various main organs and of its related intergovernmental agencies, is of such sensitivity as to require special consideration by the Deputy Director for Operations. In especially worthwhile cases wherein operational use of a particular UN individual is deemed essential for the accomplishment of the DDO mission, approval may be obtained. In each case involving a non-U.S. citizen assigned in the U.S. or a U.S. citizen wherever assigned, the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations will be required. (See paragraph 8.b. regarding use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees not assigned in the U.S.) If, while in the United States, the UN individual is to be investigated, approached for recruitment, or contacted for operational purposes, the prior concurrence of the FBI may also be required as outlined in paragraph 6.b., above. f. Staff Members or Officials of Red Cross Societies The operational use of staff members or officials of the International Red Cross or its affiliated national Red Cross, Red Crescent, or other equivalent societies requires special consideration and prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. DDO elements should make every effort to avoid the operational use of staff members or officials of Red Cross societies. However, when especially high priority objectives are at stake and alternative agent assets are not available, approval for the use of such individuals may be granted by the Deputy Director for Operations. g. Officials of the Vatican State Operational contact with officials of the Vatican State will be made only with the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Operational use of Vatican officials will be contingent on prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. h. U.S. Government Funded Professors, Lecturers, Students or Grantees U.S. or foreign professors, lecturers or students and other persons participating in U.S. Government-sponsored academic, cultural, athletic or other exchange programs (except certain Fulbright grantees—see paragraph 5.b., above) are considered to be in a separate sensitive category. Operational use of such individuals while they are actively participating in an exchange program funded by the U.S. Government requires special consideration and approval by the Deputy Director for Operations prior to such use. In certain especially worthwhile cases wherein the operational use of a particular U.S. Government supported exchange is considered essential to the accomplishment of the DDO mission, the Deputy Director for Operations may grant approval. Memoranda requesting such approval will be forwarded through the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. In such cases the Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek the concurrence of the U.S. Government sponsor. 1. Members of Educational or Private Voluntary Organizations (1) It is U.S. Government policy that no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. This policy applies to all foreign as well as domestic activities of such organizations. In compliance with the above proscription, DDO policy requires the most careful scrutiny of all cases involving operational contact with U.S. educational or private voluntary organizations including trade and professional organizations. The operational use of any employee, staff member or official of such an organization requires prior approval by the Deputy Director for Operations. The Deputy Director for Operations will determine whether or not to seek extra-Agency approval for the conduct of such operations. (2) Operational use including covert funding abroad of foreign-based international voluntary organizations and the personnel thereof is permitted even if the organization is also funded by U.S. private voluntary organizations. j. Officials or Employees of the African-American Institute Operational use of the officials or employees of the African-American Institute requires prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Contacts with such individuals which DDO officers are obliged to make in their cover capacities will not involve operational matters until the approval of the Deputy Director for Operations has been secured. k. Volunteers to America Operational use of or operational contact with members of Volunteers to America while they are on assignment in the United States will not be made without the prior approval of the Deputy Director for Operations. Volunteers to America are participants in programs established by various foreign countries in collaboration with the Department of State as a counterpart to the U.S. Peace Corps. Such volunteers are sent to the U.S. for a period of service in schools and community development programs. The name of the organization may vary by country. 8. OPERATIONAL USE REQUIRES APPROVAL BY CHIEF OF AREA DIVISION Operational use of any individual in the categories listed in this paragraph is considered of such sensitivity as to require special consideration and approval by the appropriate Area Division Chief. This authority may not be delegated. The request for approval will be by memorandum in which the individual's covert approval status will be described, together with a concise explanation of the intended operational use. a. Citizens or Alien Residents of the U.S. Used in Denied Areas (see DOI 50-19). The operational use in denied areas of U.S. citizens, or of aliens who have been admitted for permanent residence or have resided for a prolonged period in the U.S., requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place. b. Non-U.S. Citizen Delegates or Employees of the United Nations not Assigned in the U.S. The operational use of non-U.S. citizen delegates or employees of the United Nations who are not assigned in the U.S. requires the prior approval of the Chief of the Area Division under whose jurisdiction the intended use is to take place. c. Members of the Academic Community (1) Within the context of this instruction a member of the academic community is defined as: any student, faculty member, administrative officer or staff official of a college, university or similar institution of higher learning including their associated research centers. Persons associated with institutions such as police or military training centers (except the four college-level military service academies) or undergoing specialized technical training with business or commercial firms are not considered to be members of the academic community. (2) Operational use of members of the academic community, especially those cases wherein an individual is to be made witting of Agency interest, will be on a highly selective basis. Each case will be examined to ascertain its essentiality to the DDO mission in terms of the price of possible disclosure, and to ensure that proper security procedures can be observed. When it has been determined that the operational use of a member of the academic community as defined above is operationally feasible and without suitable alternative, prior approval in the following cases will be obtained as indicated below: (a) Any U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S. or foreign college, university or similar institution of higher learning; (b) Any non-U.S. citizen who is a member of the academic community and who is associated in any way with any U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated college, university or similar institution of higher learning which is located either in the United States or abroad. If the individual is located in the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief, Foreign Resources Division. The memorandum will include a statement that the individual is, or is not, a DCD asset or contact, and in the event he is will include the concurrence of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division. If the individual is located outside the United States, approval will be requested by memorandum to the Chief of the Area Division who has jurisdiction over the area concerned. Operational use of foreign members of the academic community who are not associated in any way with U.S.-owned or U.S.-affiliated institutions of higher learning is also considered sensitive. The operational use of such individuals also requires the approval of the Chief of the Area Division. In any case involving a well known person or having special security implications, the Division Chief to whom the request is referred under the above provisions will consult with the DDO and obtain the latter's approval. (3) The provisions of paragraph (2) do not apply to Domestic Collection Division contacts with members of the academic community, but such contacts are subject to the following requirements: (a) If a member of the academic community would be asked to perform an operational task or to alter his normal pattern of activity in order to serve Agency purposes, prior approval of the Chief, Domestic Collection Division is required. Additionally, if such an individual will be in a foreign area, the concurrence of the Chief of the Area Division concerned will be obtained. (b) Prior concurrence will be obtained from the appropriate Area Division Chief if an individual is to be utilized in a politically sensitive area where his presence or activities could potentially embarrass the interests of the U.S. Government. (c) The requirements of paragraph (a) apply if a citizen or alien resident of the United States would be used in a denied area. (4) At the end of each calendar year, Chiefs of Divisions will submit a report to the Deputy Director for Operations (via Chief, Foreign Resources Division) on the number of individuals recruited from the SECRET DOI 50-10 DDO INSTRUCTION NO. 50-10 OPERATIONS-GENERAL 4 September 1973 academic community during that year. This audit will permit the DDO to keep abreast of major quantitative changes in the number of potentially sensitive operational cases in each Division. (5) It should be noted that the provisions of this paragraph do not apply to DDO employees who wish to study or teach privately. Approval for such activity will be obtained in accordance with the provisions of HR 10-7. 9. INDIVIDUAL CHANGES OF STATUS OR CATEGORY When an individual undergoes a change of status which places him in one of the restricted categories described above, or transfers him from one category to another, his operational use or continued operational use is contingent upon approval or reapproval as prescribed for his new status. 10. INTERPRETATION OR MODIFICATION OF RESTRICTIONS Certain of the policy restrictions described in this instruction are subject to interpretation, extension or modification by the Deputy Director for Operations depending on the conditions and the atmosphere for DDO operations at any particular time. Especially when dealing on the edges of policy rulings and within the guidelines set forth herein, particular heed should be paid to the price of disclosure, including careful consideration of the sensitivities of the individuals involved. When there is any doubt concerning the application of these restrictions, guidance should be obtained from the Deputy Director for Operations. William E. Nelson Deputy Director for Operations 14 SECRET	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10406-10136.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 13, "total-input-tokens": 12066, "total-output-tokens": 6575, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2196, 1 ], [ 2196, 4245, 2 ], [ 4245, 6581, 3 ], [ 6581, 9200, 4 ], [ 9200, 11682, 5 ], [ 11682, 14185, 6 ], [ 14185, 16934, 7 ], [ 16934, 19558, 8 ], [ 19558, 22347, 9 ], [ 22347, 25082, 10 ], [ 25082, 27538, 11 ], [ 27538, 30288, 12 ], [ 30288, 31862, 13 ] ] }
209853e2f2b997f8a4cc7587e64652888b36ab21	ANNEX B THE 201 SYSTEM Recission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966 1. INTRODUCTION The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated. 2. THE 201 SYSTEM The principal features of the 201 system are: a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual. b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 331) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects. c. The Master 201 Records: a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings. d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated. SECRET DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B 15 November 1974 Information About Subject 1. Sequence Number and Name 2. Sex and Date of Birth 3. Citizenship 4. Place of Birth 5. Occupation 6. Occupation Code 7. Text Document Reference Data Group 8. 201 Number 9. Name Type Indicator 10. OI Codes 11. Record Date (year only) 12. Reference ISC Control Information 13. Date of latest update of the record 14. STAR Index Record Number SECRET e. OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components: (1) general OI codes (Attachment 4) (2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations. A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer. A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment. The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service. f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist. 3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER a. General The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories: (1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only. (2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening. (3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel. (4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I. (5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20). (6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS). b. Requesting a 201 File Opening Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record. 4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures. Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to: a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples. c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II. d. Operational and other security approvals. e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals. f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym. g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations. h. Copy of contract and termination papers. i. Secrecy agreement. j. Agent Duty Status Report. k. Training and evaluation. l. SCSWIRL report. m. Newspaper clippings. n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting. 5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers. a. Purging Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following: (1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document. (2) Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening. (3) All abstract slips. (4) All document restriction notices (Form 1684). (5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report. (6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments. (7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer. (8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document. (9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)). b. Maintenance Procedures (1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201 SECRET DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B 15 November 1974 dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document. (2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RM5 for classification into that 201. (3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201. (4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISG/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it. (5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name. (6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN). (7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201. (8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file. (9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201. (10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10). Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers. (11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below. \| UNCLASSIFIED \| INTERNAL USE ONLY \| CONFIDENTIAL \| SECRET \| \|---------------\|-------------------\|--------------\|--------\| \| ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET \| TRANSMITTED OF INACTIVE 201 Dossiers \| \| \| \| NAME \| NUMBER \| DATE \| REMARKS \| \| 1/201/Files \| GC-32 \| \| (For guidance see CEB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) \| \| 2. \| \| \| Volume(s) # of volume(s) \| \| 3. \| \| \| of 201. \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2001 to Dossier) \| \| 7. \| \| \| Non-Restricted Dossier \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| For Split Charge Dossiers: \| \| 11. \| \| \| All documents prior to (date) \| \| 12. \| \| \| Converted to 12/Files. All documents after (date) \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| \| 28.4 SECRET 6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2577) to the new action desk officer. The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component. 7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files. (1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened. (2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.) (3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021). b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-restricted cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial. c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files. 8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk. IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted. Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail. 9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer. 10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 13) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 000 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special. 3. Standard Listings Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field, based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are: 1. Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number; 2. Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number; 3. Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number; 4. Numerical, leading to a surname; 5. Numerical, leading to a cryptonym. \| NAME \| TYPE \| TOWN \| STATE \| CITY \| ZIP \| DCL. \| CFT. \| JRN. \| GT-1 \| GT-2 \| NET. \| URL. \| TEL. \| \|------\|------\|------\|-------\|------\|-----\|------\|------\|------\|------\|------\|------\|------\|------\| \| CHIN, SONG \| 1 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| \| CHIN, SONG \| 2 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| \| CHIN, SONG \| 3 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| \| CHIN, SONG \| 4 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| \| CHIN, SONG \| 5 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| 11111 \| SECRET DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B 15 November 1974 26.8 SECRET All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard. b. Non-Standard Listings Based on one or more of the following selection criteria: 1. Country of location 2. OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation) 3. Citizenship 4. Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years) 5. Occupation. These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAFT covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords: (a) Surname (b) Given name (c) Date of birth (d) Country of birth (e) Citizenship (f) OI code (g) Location Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice. c. Scheduled Listings Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually. d. Special Listings Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements. e. Request for Listings All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer. SECRET DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B Attachment 2 15 November 1974 AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people. 1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above. b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches. c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (GID). (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.) 2. British Commonwealth a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services. b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given. d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS). 3. Other Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI). 4. Israel a. All Israeli diplomats. G/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with G/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest. b. Military attaches. c. Assistant military attaches. d. Identified intelligence officers. 20.15 SECRET 5. North Vietnam All diplomats and NPLSV (PRG) officials stationed abroad. 6. USSR a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office. b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna. c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned. d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning. ANNEX B PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS 1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number. 2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest. 3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control. of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself. 4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series: IDN-123457 These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers. 5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows: Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345 Headquarters File No. 201- 6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service. 7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10406-10139.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 19, "total-input-tokens": 17722, "total-output-tokens": 7578, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1768, 1 ], [ 1768, 2209, 2 ], [ 2209, 4542, 3 ], [ 4542, 6757, 4 ], [ 6757, 8193, 5 ], [ 8193, 10279, 6 ], [ 10279, 12735, 7 ], [ 12735, 13780, 8 ], [ 13780, 14714, 9 ], [ 14714, 15791, 10 ], [ 15791, 18081, 11 ], [ 18081, 19274, 12 ], [ 19274, 21273, 13 ], [ 21273, 22045, 14 ], [ 22045, 23413, 15 ], [ 23413, 23940, 16 ], [ 23940, 25667, 17 ], [ 25667, 27154, 18 ], [ 27154, 27391, 19 ] ] }
a197b61441d2de78e9b6a7aa9b6dabcb1b25e0bb	MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans) SUBJECT: Related Mission Directive for Mexico 1. Attached is the revised Related Mission Directive for Mexico. 2. Your approval is requested. [Signature] J. C. King Chief, WH Division CONCUR: [Signature] Chief, DDP/PS [Signature] Chief, FX [Signature] Chief, CA [Signature] Chief, CI 24 January 1961 Distribution: Orig & 2 - WHD 1 - PG 1 - CA 1 - CI 1 - SR 1 - FL/Plans 1 - FL/INT 1 - RI APPROVED: [Signature] A/Deputy Director (Plans) 3 JUN 1961 Date Approved RELATED MISSION DIRECTIVE FOR MEXICO I. GENERAL PROVISIONS A. National Policy. The long-range national policy objectives of the U.S. Government toward Mexico are to reduce to an ineffectual level the influence of international Communism, to encourage democratic government, and to keep the Mexican government friendly and favorably inclined toward U.S. policies. Further guidance is given in the current OCB Regional Operations Plan for Latin America. B. Operational Emphasis. The Station's primary emphasis will continue to be placed on clandestine collection operations and covert action operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc, Cuban, and Communist elements in Mexico. C. Changes in the RMD. This basic policy instruction for activities in Mexico has been revised in light of the Station's last Annual Assessment of Progress Report and to reflect more accurately operational conditions, capabilities and direction. In view of the importance and threat presented by Communist Cuba to U.S. interests in Latin America, coverage of Cuban revolutionary activities in Mexico has been made a specific requirement under Priority A. Priority B objectives and tasks include refinements of desired efforts and also provide for covert action operations against Cuban targets in Mexico. The former task for production of motion pictures and their distribution has been deleted, as it is no longer a valid requirement; two former tasks pertaining to the possible use of foreign diplomats have been combined; a task to develop young potential political leaders (ZAPATERO) has been added. Two previous Priority C objectives have been eliminated, as there is no established Mexican intelligence service, and the Station regularly reports on activities of the security services. Coverage of Chinese Communists has been raised to Priority B coincident with the elimination of the former Priority C section. D. Contingency Reporting. In addition to the specific objectives set forth in Section II, the Station will from time to time be called on to attempt to satisfy Intelligence Guides and Intelligence Directives, but it is expected that these requirements be satisfied utilizing existing assets. Of particular interest on a continuing basis is information on: (a) any indications that Mexico may be used as a base for clandestine activity directed against the U. S. (CI Book Messages 88 and 115); (b) activities of non-bloc intelligence services, especially those that are potentially harmful to U. S. interests; (c) the plotting of revolutionary groups according to their current importance in attempts to overthrow the regimes of their respective Latin American countries; (d) the current alignment and activities of political forces with the potential for assuming control of the Mexican Government; (e) U. S. Communists residing in Mexico; and (f) the Spanish Communist group. It will be noted that certain previous contingency reporting requirements have been amended as follows: The former levy for reporting on the stability of the Mexican Government has been changed to a more realistic and meaningful statement as reflected by (d) above. This modification is appropriate, as political changes in Mexico are most likely to occur within the framework of constitutionality. The previous charge for reporting on secret shipments of strategic materials from Mexico to bloc countries is no longer specifically required and has been deleted. II. OBJECTIVES PRIORITY A 1. Obtain information on Sino-Soviet bloc plans and activities in Mexico, including those of bloc intelligence services. a. Continue and, where possible, increase physical and technical surveillance of bloc installations and residences. b. Through controlled agent assets, identify and monitor the activities of bloc personnel; if conditions warrant, attempt recruitment or defection of bloc personnel. c. Continue CI operations against bloc intelligence personnel. 2. Seek to reduce and, if possible, eliminate Communist and leftist control or influence in key governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, mass media outlets, and other elements that influence public or official opinion and policies. a. Develop political action penetration agents in key functional groups, such as students, teachers and organized labor, in order to disrupt and reduce their capacity for carrying out action harmful to U. S. objectives and interests. b. Expose and discredit illegal or subversive Sino-Soviet bloc activities and representatives in Mexico, as well as the activities and personnel of international and local Communist front organizations. c. Identify, discredit, and if possible eliminate Communists and pro-Communists from strategic positions in government, educational institutions, state-controlled industrial and agricultural enterprises, labor unions, and student organizations. d. Provide support and give guidance to individuals and organizations that can be induced to produce and disseminate anti-Communist, pro-Free World propaganda via radio, television, newspapers, or other media, and carry out political action operations against Communist or other anti-U. S. elements. e. Identify, develop, and utilize important non-Communist political, business or civic leaders to carry out propaganda, economic or political actions against Communist influence and induce them to support views coinciding with U. S. Government policy interests. f. Continue to support and guide anti-Communist youth and student organizations, publications or agents, and when necessary, develop additional assets in key schools in Mexico City and selected provinces. g. Develop and support covert press assets on the staffs of influential newspapers. h. Develop access to individuals and organizations in the labor field and support non-Communist leaders and groups in key unions. 3. Obtain information on the organizational structure, key personnel, financing, covert plans and activities of the Communist Party of Mexico (PCM), Communist front organizations and groups, especially the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS), and non-Communist and/or anti-U.S. groups that may be susceptible to exploitation by International Communism. a. Exploit and extend existing penetrations in the PCM and the PPS. b. Maintain penetrations of the PCM and seek to penetrate the anti-ENCINA wing of the PCM. c. Develop and, if conditions warrant, recruit a key source in the Workers' University capable of monitoring cultural contacts between the University and bloc diplomatic installations. d. Continue to monitor the activities of selected Communist-influenced labor unions and front groups through the penetration in the PPS; if conditions warrant, make selected recruitments in the unions or groups. 4. Continue to obtain information on Cuban Revolutionary activities in Mexico and support U.S. Government efforts against the CASTRO regime. a. Continue to conduct penetration operations of Cuban Embassy and induce defections of Cuban diplomats. b. Recruit agents in Mexico for operational use in Cuba. c. Secure support of high Mexican Government officials for the conduct of operations against Cuba. d. Continue to provide operational support for activities directed against the CASTRO regime in Cuba. e. Utilize propaganda, media, political action assets, and other covert means to combat the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideologies in Mexico. PRIORITY B 1. Combat ultra-nationalistic and anti-U.S. activities in Mexico and propagandize the dangers of Communism. a. Utilize existing media and political action assets to combat anti-U.S. propaganda or activities. b. Utilize existing media and political action assets to prevent or negate collaboration between ultra-nationalists and Communists. c. Utilize media and political action assets to prevent or negate the socio-economic and cultural penetration plans or activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc. d. Spot and develop for future covert collaboration young local figures who show potential for political leadership and who may be influenced to become generally favorable to U.S. interests. 2. Obtain information on the secret intentions and activities of the Mexican Government in foreign affairs, particularly toward the U.S., the Sino-Soviet bloc, and Cuba. a. Continue to develop and influence high level contacts in the Mexican Government, particularly the Office of the President and the Foreign Ministry. 3. Collect information on the Sino-Soviet bloc. a. Continue penetration of airline and steamship offices and official government agencies to obtain advance information on travellers. b. Recruit or obtain the willing collaboration of selected travellers to bloc countries, especially those who will remain in bloc countries for an extended period and who may be on scientific missions. c. Recruit third nationals and Latin American diplomats to be assigned or transferred to bloc countries. d. Obtain communications intelligence on bloc diplomatic traffic. 4. Obtain information on the Chinese Communists in Mexico. a. Spot, assess and recruit or develop sources in the Chinese community. b. Exploit the Gobernacion files on Chinese living in Mexico and effect penetration of the SHACF.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10027.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 7, "total-input-tokens": 8038, "total-output-tokens": 2232, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 516, 1 ], [ 516, 2585, 2 ], [ 2585, 4393, 3 ], [ 4393, 6171, 4 ], [ 6171, 7762, 5 ], [ 7762, 9386, 6 ], [ 9386, 9790, 7 ] ] }
5c30017a1f98c0f73c8e2cedbcf7463d94d4a19d	Mr. Patrick Carpentier Office of the Legislative Counsel Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D. C. 20505 Dear Mr. Carpentier: In connection with the investigation of the House Select Committee on Assassinations into the death of President John F. Kennedy, I am writing to request that by March 1, 1978, the Central Intelligence Agency provide a statement explaining in detail the reasons for which a 201 file may be opened. This statement should address the following possible criteria, individually or in any combination, as well as any other possible criteria not specifically listed: 1. Possible and actual sources of intelligence information; 2. Possible and actual intelligence agents, assets, or contract employees; 3. Travelers, particularly travelers to communist or unfriendly countries; 4. Individuals who defect or have attempted to defect to communist or unfriendly countries; 5. U. S. servicemen or former U. S. servicemen who pose counterintelligence dangers by revealing, offering to reveal, or threatening to reveal military or intelligence secrets to communist or unfriendly countries; 6. Individuals whose suspected counterintelligence activities precipitate changes in United States military or intelligence codes, methods, sources or procedures; 7. Individuals who have been contacted by communist or unfriendly intelligence organizations or instrumentalities thereof; 8. Individuals who have received money or other items of value from communist or unfriendly governments or instrumentalities thereof; and 9. Possible and actual foreign intelligence agents or employees. Please address this statement to the time period 1958-1964 in particular, and indicate whether there were any changes in such criteria during these years. Finally, would you please specify in your response under which criteria, or combination of criteria, if any, the opening of a 201 file was considered to be mandatory during this period. Sincerely, G. Robert Blakey Chief Counsel and Director GRB:mgj MEMORANDUM FOR: O/SA/DO/O Attention: Mr. Shepanek FROM: William F. Donnelly Chief, Information Services Staff SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request for Information on 201 Criteria (S) REFERENCE: OLC 78-0070/19, 23 February 1978 1. (S) With reference to the conversation of 27 February between Mr. Shepanek and Mr. Cleffi of ISS, attached are copies of DOHB 70-1-1, 15 November 1974, and an earlier version, CSHB 43-1-1 dated 15 February 1960. A close study of the list of questions submitted by the HSCA Staff has led us to conclude that the most complete and effective way to respond would be by inviting the Staff to review our regulation governing the criteria for opening, maintaining, controlling and closing 201 files by the Operations Directorate. A careful reading of the regulation provides an answer to every question posed by the Staff. 2. (S) The earlier version of the regulation is included to reflect the situation as it existed in the period of their primary concern (1958-1964). The later version provides an expansion, clarification and refinement of the earlier versions. William F. Donnelly ANNEX B THE 201 SYSTEM Rescission: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1966 1. INTRODUCTION The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated. 2. THE 201 SYSTEM The principal features of the 201 system are: a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual. b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects. c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings. d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated. Information About Subject 1. Sequence Number and Name 2. Sex and Date of Birth 3. Citizenship 4. Place of Birth 5. Occupation 6. Occupation Code 7. Text Document Reference Data Group 8. 201 Number 9. Name Type Indicator 10. OI Codes 11. Record Date (year only) 12. Reference ISG Control Information 13. Date of latest update of the record 14. STAR Index Record Number e. OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components: (1) general OI codes (Attachment 4) (2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations. A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer. A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment. The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service. f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist. 3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER a. General The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and ISG. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons about whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISG for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories: (1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a POA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only. (2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening. (3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel. (4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I. (5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20). (6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS). b. Requesting a 201 File Opening Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record. 4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures. Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to: a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples. c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II. d. Operational and other security approvals. e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals. f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym. g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations. h. Copy of contract and termination papers. i. Secrecy agreement. j. Agent Duty Status Report. k. Training and evaluation. l. SCSWIRL report. m. Newspaper clippings. n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting. 5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers. a. Purging Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following: (1) Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document. (2) Name trace form (Form 382) unless it has been the basis for the opening. (3) All abstract slips. (4) All document restriction notices (Form 1884). (5) The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report. (6) Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 810) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments. (7) Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer. (8) Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 887) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document. (9) Deferred documents (see 5b(2)). b. Maintenance Procedures (1) All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201 dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document. (2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201. (3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201. (4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it. (5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name. (6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN). (7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201. (8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file. (9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201. (10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DOI 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DOI 70-10). Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers. (11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below. \| UNCLASSIFIED \| INTERNAL USE ONLY \| CONFIDENTIAL \| SECRET \| \|---------------\|-------------------\|--------------\|--------\| ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET \| BRANCH \| TRANSMITTAL OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS \| \|--------\|-------------------------------------\| \| FROM \| \| \| TO \| \| \| DATE \| \| 1. 201/Files OC-52 Volume(s) # of volume(s) 201- Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 2011 to Dossier) Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to (date) forwarded to 201/Files. All documents after (date) retained at desk. 26.4 6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer. ![NOTICE OF TRANSFER OF DOCUMENT OR FILE ACCOUNTABILITY](image) The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component. 7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files. (1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened. 26.5 (2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.) (3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021): b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial. c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files. 8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk. IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted. Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail. 9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer. 10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the non-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special. a. Standard Listings Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest Desk blocks on the 201: Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are: 1. Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number; 2. Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number; 3. Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number; 4. Numerical, leading to a surname; 5. Numerical, leading to a cryptonym. \| NAME \| TYPE \| BIRTHPLACE \| OCC. CITY \| 201 \| G1-1 \| G1-2 \| AC1 \| LOC. \| INT. \| \|------\|------\|-------------\|-----------\|-----\|------\|------\|-----\|------\|------\| \| CHIN. SHOU 1 \| 77151341540020 \| CHIN. SHANGHAI \| CHIN. HN \| CHIN. HN \| \| CHIN. SHOU 2 \| 77151341540021 \| CHIN. SHANGHAI \| CHIN. HN \| CHIN. HN \| \| CHIN. SHOU 3 \| 77151341540022 \| CHIN. SHANGHAI \| CHIN. HN \| CHIN. HN \| \| CHIN. SHOU 4 \| 77151341540023 \| CHIN. SHANGHAI \| CHIN. HN \| CHIN. HN \| SECRET DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B 15 November 1974 All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard. b. Non-Standard Listings Based on one or more of the following selection criteria: 1. Country of location 2. OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation) 3. Citizenship 4. Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years) 5. Occupation. These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAF covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords: (a) Surname (b) Given name (c) Date of birth (d) Country of birth (e) Citizenship (f) OI code (g) Location Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice. c. Scheduled Listings Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually. d. Special Listings Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements. e. Request for Listings All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer. SECRET DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B Attachment 2 15 November 1974 AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people. 1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above. b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches. c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (CID). (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.) 2. British Commonwealth a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services. b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). c. Canadian Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given. d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP-SS). 3. Cuba Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI). 4. Israel a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/ISR should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest. b. Military attaches. c. Assistant military attaches. d. Identified intelligence officers. 26,15 SECRET 5. North Vietnam All diplomats and NIFSV (PRC) officials stationed abroad. 6. USSR a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office. b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna. c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned. d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning. ANNEX B PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS 1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number. 2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest. 3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control. of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself. 4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series: IDN-123457 These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers. 5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows: Dispatch Symbol and No. XYZA-12345 Headquarters File No. 201- 6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service. 7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10078.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 22, "total-input-tokens": 25257, "total-output-tokens": 7951, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1284, 1 ], [ 1284, 2020, 2 ], [ 2020, 3157, 3 ], [ 3157, 4925, 4 ], [ 4925, 5298, 5 ], [ 5298, 7632, 6 ], [ 7632, 9847, 7 ], [ 9847, 11283, 8 ], [ 11283, 13369, 9 ], [ 13369, 15766, 10 ], [ 15766, 16724, 11 ], [ 16724, 17732, 12 ], [ 17732, 18805, 13 ], [ 18805, 21095, 14 ], [ 21095, 21955, 15 ], [ 21955, 23953, 16 ], [ 23953, 24725, 17 ], [ 24725, 26091, 18 ], [ 26091, 26618, 19 ], [ 26618, 28345, 20 ], [ 28345, 29833, 21 ], [ 29833, 30070, 22 ] ] }
584e5f60ca3d2f114c076c913a9b15632887b9e7	ANNEX B THE 201 SYSTEM Reclassification: Annex B of Chapter III, CSHB 70-1-1, 27 October 1968 1. INTRODUCTION The 201 system provides a method for identifying a person of specific interest to the Operations Directorate and for controlling and filing all pertinent information about that person. The system also provides a means for identifying subjects of 201 files from various categories of information about them and for producing lists of 201 personalities according to those categories. Only a relatively small number of personalities indexed are of sufficient interest to justify opening a 201 dossier. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest, or subjects on whom a volume of correspondence has accumulated. 2. THE 201 SYSTEM The principal features of the 201 system are: a. The 201 Number: a unique number, i.e., 201-1234567, assigned to each individual in the system to serve as identifying file number for reporting on that individual. b. The 201 Dossier: the official file containing the 201 opening form (Form 831) and all biographic reporting on and references to the individual, i.e., personal history, current status, and prospects. c. The Master 201 Record: a machine record generated by the opening of a 201 file. This record produces the master 201 reference for the Main Index and stores the pertinent information which may later be retrieved for special listings. d. Main Index Master 201 Reference: this reference, printed in reply to an Index Search Request, is printed as illustrated below. When data are absent within the record, succeeding data items or lines will be moved up and the reference consolidated. DOHB 70-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B 15 November 1974 Information About Subject 1. Sequence Number and Name 2. Sex and Date of Birth 3. Citizenship 4. Place of Birth 5. Occupation 6. Occupation Code 7. Text Document Reference Data Group 8. 201 Number 9. Name Type Indicator 10. Of Codes 11. Record Date (year only) 12. Reference ISG Control Information 13. Date of latest update of the record 14. STAR Index Record Number c. OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components: (1) general OI codes (Attachment 4) (2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations. A component may request an OI code be established by submitting a memorandum to the DDO/RMO through the component Records Management Officer. A 201 personality may be assigned two OI codes. An OI code may be assigned when the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) is initiated (see paragraph 3b below) by filling in Box 13 or a code may be assigned or added at a later date by a Form 831 amendment. The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country a listing may be compiled of all members of that service. f. 201 Machine Lists: produced from the mechanized 201 Index, based on names or other identifying information of personalities on whom 201 dossiers exist. 3. OPENING A 201 DOSSIER a. General The opening of a 201 dossier is the prerogative of an operational component, in coordination with the Information Services Group. An opening creates a master 201 record. Changes to the master record and the occasional closing of a 201 dossier are controlled jointly by the desks and JSC. 201 dossiers may be opened on persons who meet the carding criteria described in Chapter II of this handbook, when there is a reasonable expectation that additional information will be acquired and filed in such a dossier. Generally dossiers are opened on persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom counterintelligence information is being reported, and persons of operational interest to the Operations Directorate, specifically those persons for whom provisional operational approvals and operational approvals are requested (see exception below). 201 files are not to be opened on staff employees, staff agents and most categories of contract employees. Files on persons who are only of local interest to a field station or Headquarters desk and on whom no DDO records correspondence exists are not a part of the DDO records system and are to be maintained by that unit. Some desks levy requirements on ISC for automatic 201 openings on certain categories of persons whose names appear in incoming dispatches. These are listed in Attachment 2. 201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories: (1) Subjects of provisional operational approval and operational approval requests. However, a file need not be opened when a FOA is requested for persons being trained for a foreign liaison service and who are of operational interest for training purposes only. (2) Persons for whom the field requests a 201 opening. (3) MHFIXTURE personalities: bonafide diplomats of other than denied area countries, in close association with staff personnel. (4) Subjects of a Personal Record Questionnaire Part I. (5) Persons on whom a Main-Index search reveals information in five or more documents (see DOI 70-20). (6) Subjects of Interagency Source Register memoranda from LSN/ISR (opened only by IP/RMS). b. Requesting a 201 File Opening Headquarters desks may open a 201 file by filling out and submitting a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) to the Records Maintenance Section (IP/RMS). Form 831 is also used to create or amend the master 201 record and 201 machine listings and to register the assignment of a cryptonym to a 201 personality. Attachment 3 consists of sample 201 Personality File Action Requests for opening and amending 201's. A field station may request the opening of a 201 file by writing 201- in the Headquarters file or cross-reference box on the dispatch form and/or after the subject's name in the body of the dispatch. A telepouch request for a 201 opening is made by indicating 201- in the file number line. A cable request is made by placing 201- after the term "File" on the last line of the transmission. IP/AN will open 201 files as requested by dispatch or telepouch but it is the responsibility of the desk to respond to cable requests. Field stations are notified of 201 openings through receipt of the field master 201 record. 4. CONTENTS OF THE DOSSIER Information about a 201 personality should be filed or cross-referenced into his dossier. When additional information is discovered on a 201 subject through a name trace or other process, i.e., review of predecessor documents, it must be consolidated into his personality dossier. See DOI 70-20 for consolidation procedures. Material which is filed in the dossier includes but is not limited to: a. 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). b. Biographic information including photographs, fingerprints, and handwriting samples. c. Personal Record Questionnaire Parts I and II. d. Operational and other security approvals. e. Name check replies, requests, clearances, and approvals. f. Acknowledgement of pseudonym. g. 201 personality assessments and evaluations. h. Copy of contract and termination papers. i. Secrecy agreement. j. Agent Duty Status Report. k. Training and evaluation. l. SGSWIRL report. m. Newspaper clippings. n. Any information which helps provide a better understanding of the subject and our interest in him; this may include operational reporting. 5. MAINTENANCE OF 201 DOSSIERS The 201 personality dossier contains, in document date order, papers which have been made a part of the Central Records System as well as those which have not. Record documents may range from newspaper or magazine articles on the subject to finance and other administrative papers. a. Purging Purging a 201 dossier is the responsibility of the desk officer. It requires discrimination in recognizing operationally useful material, rather than the simple distinction between official and unofficial papers; it will therefore take place under the supervision of a Records Officer. Purging should be done periodically. A 201 dossier being forwarded to Central Files for retention should be purged. A 201 dossier should be purged of the following: 1. Duplicate material, i.e., exact copy(s) of a document. 2. Name trace form (Form 362) unless it has been the basis for the opening. 3. All abstract slips. 4. All document restriction notices (Form 1884). 5. The disseminated version of positive intelligence information if a copy of the raw report is contained in the 201 file; the dissemination number then must be transferred to the first page of the raw report. 6. Routing slips, routing and record sheets (Form 610) and dispatch cover sheets unless there are remarks such as coordinations or comments. 7. Record copy documents which only repeat substantive information contained in other documents in the file; authorization for destruction is by the Records Officer. 8. Top Secret documents are not to be retained in a 201 dossier forwarded to Central Files; the document must be downgraded for retention in the 201 dossier. To downgrade a Top Secret document, an authorized officer in the originating office or the Records Officer having jurisdiction over the contents of the material must possess Top Secret classification authority. If the document cannot be downgraded the file should be retained at the desk or the copy of the TS document should be removed, retained in a desk TS file or forwarded to the Top Secret Control Officer, and a cross-reference sheet (Form 867) placed in the 201 file giving the location of the TS document. 9. Deferred documents (see Sb(2)). b. Maintenance Procedures 1. All material in a 201 dossier will be filed in document date order. In the case of document attachments which have been classified into a 201 dossier and separated from the basic document by the assignment of a slash number, the attachment will be filed by the date of the basic document. (2) Deferred documents will not be filed in a 201 dossier. If they are to be retained in the dossier they should be sent to IP/RMS for classification into that 201. (3) Field index cards (held by some desks) and area desk cards may be retained in the 201 as part of a consolidation procedure. These cards should be mounted on a full-size sheet of paper for filing in the 201. (4) A 201 dossier previously opened on a person who becomes a staff employee and which contains Record Copy documents will be restricted to the ISC/DIP unless the desk retains the restriction. The dossier should be closed if there are no Record Copy documents in it. (5) A 201 opened in pseudonym should be consolidated into the true name 201 if one exists or converted to the true name. (6) Field and duplicate (shadow) 201 files no longer of active interest should be incorporated into the official 201 after the duplicate material has been purged by the desk officer and the remaining information classified to that 201 by the Analysis Section (IP/AN). (7) Any document with a predecessor organization cover sheet or an OFC (Office of Policy Coordination) cover sheet from the Archives and Disposition Section (IP/ARD) must be returned to IP/ARD for processing to the 201. (8) Desk memoranda (with or without a document source number) containing substantive or derogatory information on the subject of the 201 should be sent to IP/AN to be classified officially into the 201 file. (9) An attachment which should be separated from its basic document for inclusion in a 201 personality dossier will be forwarded with the basic document to IP/AN for processing into the 201. (10) To retain the P&L, RYBAT, or KAPOK sensitivity of a document remaining in a 201 dossier being retired to Central Files, place that document in an envelope sealed with black tape (see DO1 70-17). Any RYBAT, P&L, or KAPOK document sent to Central Files not in a black-taped envelope will automatically be handled as desensitized. A black-taped envelope may contain only one document and must be filed in chronological order within the file. If there are numerous documents of this type the desk officer may black-tape the entire dossier rather than individual documents (see DO1 70-10). Black-taped dossiers or dossiers with black-taped documents will be handled as restricted dossiers. (11) An inactive 201 dossier or an inactive volume of a large 201 dossier on permanent charge should be returned to Central Files under a Routing and Record Sheet with the notation shown below. \| UNCLASSIFIED \| INTERNAL USE ONLY \| CONFIDENTIAL \| SECRET \| \|---------------\|-------------------\|--------------\|--------\| ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET \| SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF INACTIVE 201 DOSSIERS \| \|------------------------------------------\| \| DOCUMENT NUMBER \| DATE \| SOURCE \| DESTINATION \| \|-----------------\|------\|--------\|--------------\| \| 1. 201/Files 00-10 \| \| \| \| \| 2. \| \| \| \| \| 3. \| \| \| \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| (For guidance see OMB 70-1-1, Chapter III, Annex B.) Volume(s) # of volume(s) of 201: - Restricted Dossier (Attach Form 201L to Dossier) - Non-Restricted Dossier For Split Charge Dossiers: All documents prior to (date) Forwarded to 201/Files. All documents after (date) retained at desk. 6. 201 DOSSIER CHARGES A 201 dossier may be kept on permanent charge at the desk during any period of active interest. If the dossier is transferred to another desk, the desk officer who is transferring the dossier must notify Central Files of the transfer. Central Files will then send the Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability (Form 2977) to the new action desk officer. ![Notice of Transfer of Document or File Accountability](image) The new action desk officer must then fill out a 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 813) to change the action desk designation to insure that the 201 personality will be included in the Headquarters and field machine listings for his component. 7. RESTRICTED DOSSIERS a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier may be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction in Central Files. (1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened. SECRET (3) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier.) (3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021). b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requester or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requester of a denial. c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files. 8. REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON 201 PERSONALITIES The Automated Index Section (IP/AIS) will provide the identity of the subject of a 201 number unless the 201 file is restricted, in which case the requester will be referred to the restricting desk. IP/AIS will also provide the 201 number assigned to a name, unless the 201 file is restricted, or state that there is no 201 number assigned. Requesters should supply identifying information whenever available for each name submitted. Requests pertaining to five or fewer names or numbers may be made by telephone by calling the IP/AIS red line extension; IP/AIS will provide the information by return call to the requester's extension as listed in the Badge Table. Requests for more than five names or numbers must be listed and sent by tube or courier to IP/AIS; IP/AIS will reply by return mail. 9. 201 DOSSIER CANCELLATION A 201 file may be authorized for cancellation by a Records Officer, after appropriate coordination. The file should be forwarded to IP/RMS which will destroy the folder and the cards leading to it and will remove the name and number from machine lists. Any Record Copy document contained in the folder will be reclassified to another appropriate file or sent to the Destruction Unit (IP/DU) as directed by the desk Records Officer. 10. 201 MACHINE LISTINGS Machine listings provide field stations and Headquarters desks with names and 201 numbers in the requester's particular geographic or functional area of interest. If a component wishes to exclude a sensitive 201 personality from its alphabetic, numeric, and cryptonym listings, this may be done when opening the 201 or later by a 201 amendment. On the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) leave the country of location (Box 15) and Interest desk (Box 16) blank, use the post-country code 900 in the action box (Box 14), and indicate permanent charge to the responsible desk. The only listing which will include the 201 number is the IP/201 record for the Vital Records program. 201 listings are categorized as standard or nonstandard and as scheduled or special. a. Standard Listings Issued semi-annually to Headquarters and the field; based on a component's interest as indicated in the "Action Desk," "Country of Location," and "Interest Desk" blocks on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831). The standard listings available are: 1. Alphabetical by surname, leading to a 201 number; 2. Alphabetical by given name, leading to a 201 number; 3. Alphabetical by cryptonym, leading to a 201 number; 4. Numerical, leading to a surname; 5. Numerical, leading to a cryptonym. \| NAME \| TYPE \| DISTANCE \| DEC. \| CITY \| ZIP \| GPO \| GPO \| SEC. \| ORG. \| INTERNAL USE ONLY \| \|------\|------\|----------\|------\|------\|-----\|-----\|-----\|------\|------\|-------------------\| \| CHIN. \| 1000 \| 10000000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| 1000 \| \| CHIN. \| 2000 \| 20000000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| 2000 \| \| CHIN. \| 3000 \| 30000000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| 3000 \| \| CHIN. \| 4000 \| 40000000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| 4000 \| \| CHIN. \| 5000 \| 50000000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| 5000 \| SECRET/ORGANIZATION INTERNAL USE ONLY SECRET 263 SECRET All standard listings are cumulative; previous editions must be destroyed upon receipt of current editions. These listings are by their very nature extremely sensitive compilations of information and must be given every possible safeguard. b. Non-Standard Listings Based on one or more of the following selection criteria: 1. Country of location 2. OI codes (organization and/or intelligence affiliation) 3. Citizenship 4. Year of birth (plus or minus a given number of years) 5. Occupation. These selection criteria may be used singly or in combinations. For example, a user could obtain a list of all 201 personalities who have been assigned the OI code of XX or codes of XX, XY, or XZ. A 201 personality list could also be produced of all persons who were born in Germany between the years 1915 and 1920, with the occupation computer specialist, who are now citizens of the United States, located in Mexico, and who had been assigned the OI code AA. Note however that the listing would contain only those personalities with an OI code AA. Those personalities with an OI code other than AA and those with no OI code would be excluded. The requester could however ask that persons who have not been assigned an OI code also be included. Note also that when retrieving lists based on occupation, the listing will be only as specific as the occupation code (Attachment 1). The occupation code for a courier covers only a documented courier. Some occupation codes cover more than one occupation. For example, the occupation code CRAFT covers those who practice some trade or manual occupation, i.e., carpenters, bricklayers, painters, mechanics and electricians. If a list is requested for electricians, all others in this category will be included in the printout. These non-standard listings may be sorted (arranged) according to any, but not more than three, of the following keywords: (a) Surname (b) Given name (c) Date of birth (d) Country of birth (e) Citizenship (f) OI code (g) Location 26.9 Sorts can be made within sorts. For example, 201 personalities may be sorted alphabetically by surname within OI codes for given countries of location. Because two OI codes may be listed for each personality, those names with two OI codes would be listed twice. c. Scheduled Listings Standard and non-standard listings printed semiannually. d. Special Listings Unscheduled, usually non-standard, listings produced on a one time basis in response to special operational requirements. e. Request for Listings All requests for standard or non-standard alphabetical and numerical 201 listings for Headquarters and the field, for changes in periodic listings, and for information on the 201 machine list system should be made to the component Records Management Officer. SECRET DOHB 78-1-1 CHAPTER III, ANNEX B Attachment 2 15 November 1974 AUTOMATIC 201 DOSSIER OPENINGS Note: 201 files will be opened automatically by IP/AN on the following categories of people. 1. Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE) a. Diplomats with rank of third secretary or above. b. Military attaches and assistant military attaches. c. Intelligence officers of the General Intelligence Department (CID). (Prior to opening of an ARE 201 file, check with NE/E for correct spelling of name and additional biographic data.) 2. British Commonwealth a. All positively identified members of MI-5 and MI-6, the British Intelligence Services. b. All positively identified members of the Irish Military Intelligence Service (IMIS). c. Canadian-Communist Party officials on national or provincial levels and officials of the Canadian-Communist Party front organizations. Do not open unless there is at least a date of birth given. d. All members of the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP/SSS). 3. Cuba Intelligence service employees (DSE, DGI). 4. Israel a. All Israeli diplomats. C/NE/IS should be indicated as the originating office with CI/SP always indicated as the secondary office of interest. b. Military attaches. c. Assistant military attaches. d. Identified intelligence officers. 26.15 SECRET 5. North Vietnam All diplomats and NLF SV (PRG) officials stationed abroad. 6. USSR a. All Soviets assigned PCS to an official representational installation, i.e., embassy, consulate, commercial representation, national airline (Aeroflot) office, news media office. b. All Soviets assigned PCS to the United Nations in New York, Paris, Geneva, and Vienna. c. Audio technicians, after coordination with SE desk concerned. d. Students who will be studying abroad for a full academic year at institutions of higher learning. ANNEX B PERSONALITIES - 201 AND IDN NUMBERS 1. A relatively small proportion of the total number of personalities indexed by the CS are of active operational interest at any given point in time. These are normally subjects of extensive reporting and CI investigation, prospective agents and sources, and members of groups and organizations of continuing target interest. Each of these personalities is assigned either a 201 number or an IDN number. 2. The 201 number serves a dual purpose. It brings the files on these personalities into the CS records system. A single number, e.g., 201-123456, is assigned to each person, and a dossier controlled by this number is established which contains, or has cross referenced to it, all of the reporting on the individual's personal history, current status and prospects. Once the 201 number is assigned, it is used in future reporting on the individual both as a file number and in place of other identifying data. Up-to-date machine listings are published periodically to help field stations and headquarters desks keep book on those 201 personalities falling in their particular geographic or functional area of interest. 3. It has become apparent that the 201 machine listings should include the identities of persons of operational interest because of their connection with a target group or organization even though there may not be sufficient information or specific interest to warrant opening a file. For example: A considerable number of stations are concerned with the activities of Cuban exiles. Coverage of their movements, factions and objectives can be assisted by furnishing all participating stations up-to-date listings containing information under the control. of the Cuban desk on the dramatis personae. In addition to 201 personalities, such lists should contain the names and identifying data of persons who should be kept track of, although they may only be of tangential interest or on whom there may be little or no data other than that given in the listing itself. 4. To accommodate this type of requirement in the 201 system, identifiable personalities concerning whom enough information is not yet available to require the opening of a file may be assigned numbers of the following type but in the same series: IDN-123457 These are relabeled "201" if a file is opened. IDN numbers are carried with 201 numbers in appropriate general or special listings, where they are identified by the letter "I" in the "Type of Name" column. IDN numbers are not CS file numbers. 5. All 201 code numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters, either upon receipt of Form 831, or of a field dispatch. If a dispatch is written about a personality not yet in the system, a 201 number for it may be requested simply by writing under headquarters file number in the dispatch form as follows: \| Dispatch Symbol and No. \| Headquarters File No. \| \|-------------------------\|-----------------------\| \| XYZA-12345 \| 201- \| 6. IDN numbers are assigned by RID at headquarters upon the request of stations or desks which are developing special identification programs within the 201 system. The field receives current notification of new 201 openings and IDN numbers through the Field Index Card Service. 7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10316.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 19, "total-input-tokens": 18129, "total-output-tokens": 7416, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1774, 1 ], [ 1774, 2195, 2 ], [ 2195, 4609, 3 ], [ 4609, 6824, 4 ], [ 6824, 8260, 5 ], [ 8260, 10328, 6 ], [ 10328, 12725, 7 ], [ 12725, 14175, 8 ], [ 14175, 15185, 9 ], [ 15185, 16258, 10 ], [ 16258, 18549, 11 ], [ 18549, 19560, 12 ], [ 19560, 21565, 13 ], [ 21565, 22337, 14 ], [ 22337, 23703, 15 ], [ 23703, 24231, 16 ], [ 24231, 25958, 17 ], [ 25958, 27517, 18 ], [ 27517, 27754, 19 ] ] }
3c0a806fef32d1efe2028b336154dc41e7635e6c	SECRET MESSAGE DIRECTOR C/WH 4 DCI, D/DCI, DSP, C/CI, C/CI/SI, VR SECRET 020422Z DIR INFO CNBR CITE HELB 2517 (ROLLOFFIER ACTING) 23 SEP 71 REF DIR 25690- 1. SQUARE PRELIMINARY CHECKS ON RECORDED CONVERSATIONS REVEAL FOLL: A NO TRACE 1952 DARK BLUE BUICK BELONGING SOVIET OR BLOC INSTALLATION CNBR OR SYDNEY. B NO LICENSE PLATE IDENTICAL TO ONE MENTIONED BUT FOLL L.S.W. VARIANTS CHECKED: CCC 012, 1960 VAUXHALL, TWO-TONED BLUE, ZAHARI SATRAPINSKY, 149 WENTWORTH AVE, WENTWORTHVILLE; CCC 122, 949 STANDARD, FAUN, WILLIAM JOHN SIMS, BINALONG; CCC 122, 1960 OLSEN, BIEGE, KEITH BETHKE, 26 NEWITT AVE, WAHROONGA. NO SQUARE EROG ON ABOVE. C NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO ON AUSSIE MENTIONED CNBR 0591. (WCE838) D FRASERS MENTIONED SAME REF ARE ALP MPS. E MOON FIRST SECT POSSIBLY IDU R. WILLY SASTRANEGARA HAS JUSTACHE; RUSSIA! CAPABILITY NOT KNOWN TO SQUARE; NOT NOTICEABLY USE TO SOVS CNBR. D: 2502 - 5 - 41 CLASSIFICATION REVIEW CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1976 E IMPDET CL BY 072248 SECRET INTRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED Copy No. 3. SQUARE HAS ARRANGED WITH PM LIAISON OFFICER TED YOUNG TO BE ANY FURTHER CALLS MADE. EMBASSY IN CLOSE CONTACT SQUARE. 4. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS. CRET /S COMMENT: Hqs requested information on the Polish driver connected with a Russian diplomatic establishment in Australia.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10408-10329.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 1844, "total-output-tokens": 611, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1061, 1 ], [ 1061, 1348, 2 ] ] }
1d1d7bde28c1c8b8a643a924aeed9948cc82c87f	Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: 198-10009-10098 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: Document Information ORIGINATOR: ARMY FROM: JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR. TO: MULTIPLE TITLE: ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION DATE: 11/26/1963 PAGES: 19 SUBJECTS: ICCCCA - SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION CUBAN SUBVERSION RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/15/1998 OPENING CRITERIA: COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo from Califano to Wheeler, Sloan, Alger, Wendt, Carpenter, Quilter re: attached paper concerning status of implementation of actions designed to counter Cuban subversion. MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS) MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs) MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U) Reference: DA Memo 464, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963 Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbng Cuban Subversion in Latin America. It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum. Sgd Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr. General Counsel Enclosure As Stated cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD) Lt Col Haig Mr. Califano ASG EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE on CUBAN SUBVERSION ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURRING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA SECRET I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba Department of State a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa. b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry. c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and from Latin America. d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities. e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes. f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Berber, has been attempting to establish during the past several months. g. g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo. Central Intelligence Agency a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station: (1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation; (2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October; (3) (3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights. b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non-existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo. c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and inoculations Innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress. II. Control of Movement of Propaganda Measures to control... III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms Department of State Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border. Department of Defense Three OH-13 helicopters from USOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3923 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area. IV. SECRET IV. Control of Transfer of Funds Department of State a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade. V. V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities Department of Defense a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school. b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries. c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the United States. d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo. e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes. f. On May 25, 1953, three M-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved. Central Intelligence Agency a. Guantanamo City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service. b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru. VI. VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion Department of Defense Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion. Central Intelligence Agency CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence agencies. The following actions are of special significance: a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation. c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MLR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN. The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (FNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill. The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospect for effective action when needed. d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DICEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DICEPOL. DICEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued. VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions No special actions to report. VIII. Other Special Actions United States Information Agency a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees. B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following: A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analysis on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries that were interspersed with interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize. c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to all its Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963. Central Intelligence Agency a. CIA in Brazil assisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athlete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basketball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre, Brazil in early September 1963. b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963. Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date. c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of stronger stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguayan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector will be brought to light.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/198-10009-10098.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 20, "total-input-tokens": 22860, "total-output-tokens": 4634, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 835, 1 ], [ 835, 1931, 2 ], [ 1931, 2070, 3 ], [ 2070, 3186, 4 ], [ 3186, 4234, 5 ], [ 4234, 5189, 6 ], [ 5189, 6290, 7 ], [ 6290, 6505, 8 ], [ 6505, 7342, 9 ], [ 7342, 8248, 10 ], [ 8248, 9255, 11 ], [ 9255, 10239, 12 ], [ 10239, 11314, 13 ], [ 11314, 12433, 14 ], [ 12433, 13498, 15 ], [ 13498, 14681, 16 ], [ 14681, 15952, 17 ], [ 15952, 16997, 18 ], [ 16997, 18098, 19 ], [ 18098, 18386, 20 ] ] }
d529be9522c1d302d38fe63fe821056353a0f239	Agency Information AGENCY: ARMY RECORD NUMBER: 198-10009-10099 RECORD SERIES: CALIFANO PAPERS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: Document Information ORIGINATOR: MULTIPLE FROM: TO: TITLE: DATE: 02/00/1963 PAGES: 153 SUBJECTS: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA - 1962 CUBAN SUBVERSION SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: Secret RESTRICTIONS: 1B CURRENT STATUS: Redact DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/15/1998 OPENING CRITERIA: COMMENTS: Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in Cuba, etc. JFK Review Department of the Army EO 13526 ☐ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt Authority ☐ Refer To Review Date 07/15/2015 By K. E. Stiner \| NO. \| SUBJECT \| DATE \| \|-----\|-------------------------------------------------------------------------\|---------------\| \| 1. \| Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC \| Undated \| \| 2. \| Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis \| 7 Jan 63 \| \| 3. \| SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte \| 11 Feb 63 \| \| 4. \| SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte \| 12 Feb 63 \| \| 5. \| SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte \| 13 Feb 63 \| \| 6. \| SecNav testimony before HASC \| 18 Feb 63 \| \| 7. \| Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState with attached statement by Mr. Martin before the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject of communist subversion of the hemisphere \| 19 Feb 63 \| \| 8. \| SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A.M.) \| 19 Feb 63 \| \| 9. \| SecNav testimony before HASC \| 19 Feb 63 \| \| 10. \| Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell D. Taylor, ChJCS \| 20 Feb 63 \| \| 11. \| Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC \| 20 Feb 63 \| \| 12. \| SecDef testimony before SASC \| 21 Feb 63 \| \| 13. \| Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC \| 21 Feb 63 \| \| 14. \| SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba) \| 22 Feb 63 \| \| 15. \| Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA) \| 26 Feb 63 (Transmittal Slip) \| \| 16. \| Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations - U.S. Senate \| 13 March 63 \| \| NO. \| SUBJECT \| DATE \| \|-----\|-------------------------------------------------------------------------\|------------\| \| 17. \| Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert \| 8 Mar 63 \| \| \| Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments \| \| \| 18. \| Study on Cuba as a Base for --------prepared by Bob Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def \| Undated \| \| 19. \| Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano w/draft of President's message atchd \| 29 Mar 63 \| \| \| Sub \| \| \| 20. \| Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm of Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8) \| Undtd \| \| TO: \| Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance \| \|-------------\|-----------------------------\| \| ROOM NO. \| 3B985 \| \| BUILDING \| Pentagon \| \| REMARKS: \| \| \| FROM: \| CIA - William A. Tidwell \| \|-------------\|-----------------------------\| \| ROOM NO. \| \| \| BUILDING \| \| \| EXTENSION \| Code143 6614 \| FORM NO.: 241 1 FEB 55 REPLACES FORM 36-6 WHICH MAY BE USED. STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA I. Introduction The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America. Even before the October missile crisis—and with increasing rancor since then—Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require. In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel—either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance." So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage—and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes. We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cuban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba. Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question." This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed. The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The PALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each. II. The Cuban Plan For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Communists which have been repeated to us, have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force. The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists. The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propaganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Havana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed. The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 questions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and includes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-guerrilla organization in Colombia. All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"—that is, from the security forces in his homeland. III. Training We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present. The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare. We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist parties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao. We derive some of our figures from travel control points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information mentioned above. Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft—and probably ships as well—for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries. Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it increased in 1962 over 1961. The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army." A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibilities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air supply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection. Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cubans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are invariably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature contributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban instructors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November. IV. Weapons In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home. One of our agents who was in the original group of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Argentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any determined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by our agents in these same groups. We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smuggled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms. This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment. In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most serious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries. V. Funding Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item of $44,000 was publicized in the press. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda. In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands. VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressiveness with which the broadcasts incite revolt. The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda outlet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere. Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first international broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week: - Haitian Creole to Haiti - 7 hr - Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min - English to Europe - 9 hr 20 min - English to the Western Hemisphere - 17 hr 30 min - French to Europe - 9 hr 20 min - French to Canada - 3 hr 20 min - French to Mediterranean - 3 hr 30 min - Portuguese to Brazil - 7 hr - Spanish to Europe - 16 hr 55 min - Spanish to the Americas - 108 hr 30 min In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of unique political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direction finder bearings and other technical clues indicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba. Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American countries so they can beam programs to their homelands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are exemplified by the programs transmitted to the Dominican Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Constituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo. There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States. The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays. VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy—call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"—is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion. Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force. Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia—a showpiece of the Alliance. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963. One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries—Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru—have no official ties whatever with any bloc country. Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations. against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time. ANNEX A - ARGENTINA A participant has given us a detailed account of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July to December 1962. Instruction included such subjects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, construction of defenses, guerrilla strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and open order drill. The trainees practiced with Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns, Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a 57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean, and returned to Argentina by way of Prague. Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that they had raided a warehouse which had served as headquarters for terrorists working with both the Peronists and Communists. According to the police, the gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives. A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay, provides false documentation for Argentines and Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla training. Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a police patrol stopped to investigate, they found he was carrying a number of rifles in his car. In the last week of January, another of the original batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues Lima, was arrested by national security police at an airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammunition for some of the camps which apparently are still operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced he would tell his whole story. So far, according to the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had bought another farm to continue the Peasant League guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the farm, and work it. ANNEX B - BRAZIL Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement in subversion directed against Brazil. These are the so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authorities when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial delegation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro on 27 November. The documents, a letter and attachments from "Gerardo" to "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cuban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization. The report, which relays complaints of some of the guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cuban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved. Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police official checking on possible clandestine landing fields in the interior, ran across evidence of the training camps and arranged to have some of them raided even before the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-Petronio correspondence. The Varig document provided the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources matched their details perfectly, and it has become impossible for the Communists and the Peasant League to obtain serious consideration for any claim that the documents might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their authenticity. The Peasant League operation, which was staffed by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans apparently have done their best to avoid all contact with the guerrilla organization since the exposé, Brazilian police continue to turn up further ramifications of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir ANNEX C - CHILE On 28 October 1962, at the height of the missile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean police who searched the apartment found four members of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6 cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38 fuses, and one small bomb already assembled. One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these, Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares, have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence officers. The Chilean police told the press that the group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and residence, US firms, and local public utilities. This incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack US property and installations wherever possible in Latin America. ANNEX D - ECUADOR Well-placed and reliable agents have reported that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training. More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean paratroopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano, and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders involved with the guerrilla operation in order to restore full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds. Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him undergoing guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party. Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name. ANNEX E - PERU The ruling military junta in Peru started in February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists, including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indictment, the government charges that the extremists have attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-spaced pages. The security forces have given us no evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is ample evidence of Cuban involvement. The trials center on the activities of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organization for extremist militants founded by De La Puente Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the revolution in Peru with economic and technical help from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment conforms with reports our agents received at the time from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched by the junta early in January. We believe he is in Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian associates with Fidel Castro in Havana. Although the government did not move against the Communists and other extremist groups with any great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a result, they found complete guerrilla kits including Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates, and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this incident were released, but have been picked up again in the January roundup and are to be included in the mass trials. An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla warfare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up business firms to cover espionage and agent operations, and information on location of and access to police and military installations. Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian police, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that persuaded the junta to move against the extremists. The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peruvian authorities to have received his guerrilla training in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops because the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bolivian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Communist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery. As one example of the activities of the coordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guerrillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills. ANNEX F - VENEZUELA Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing. Castro, Che Guevara, Blas Roca and other high-ranking Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963, told various visiting Latin American Communists that Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt regime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods. It would appear from the meager evidence available in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic campaign which is being waged in the country. The wave of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela has physically exhausted the handful of competent men in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban involvement. Support from Havana can be inferred, however, if only from the expert character of the sabotage carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was discovered that the Communists have begun to use shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines. Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explosives. The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is directly charged with the mission for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with advanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges, pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts have been well planned and professionally executed. There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana to attack all American installations in Venezuela as a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba. Last November a Venezuelan military court tried 139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences. Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba. One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several trips there. He was also the recipient of large quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda. Venezuelan police early in January raided a house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Communist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba, and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reaching Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested attempting to enter the house. The armed forces have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be located on the grounds of the Central University in Caracas, communicating with another station which they believe to be in Cuba. Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revolutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When the man himself was arrested, police found a radio transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car. We have received reports from a reliable source that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramilitary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last September for assistance. Castro reportedly had promised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. However, Castro is reported to have given Martinez $50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez' men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000 to finance sabotage operations against North American business installations in Venezuela. Mrs. Martinez was visiting in Cuba at the time that she received these funds. INVESTIGATION OF THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM INTERIM REPORT BY PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE Of The COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE Under The Authority Of S. Res. 75 (88th Cong., 1st Sess.) On THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman John Stennis, Mississippi Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia Stuart Symington, Missouri Henry M. Jackson, Washington Sam J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Clair Engle, California Howard W. Cannon, Nevada Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia Stephen M. Young, Ohio Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman Stuart Symington, Missouri Henry M. Jackson, Washington Strom Thurmond, South Carolina Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts Margaret Chase Smith, Maine J. Glenn Beall, Maryland Barry Goldwater, Arizona Clifford P. Case, New Jersey James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL U. S. Senate, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, May 1963. Honorable Richard B. Russell, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services U. S. Senate My Dear Mr. Chairman: There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup. In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee. The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future. It is necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security purposes and will have the report printed and released to the public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security matters have been deleted. Respectfully, JOHN STENNIS, Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. # INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP \| Section \| Page \| \|------------------------------------------------------------------------\|------\| \| I. Introductory Statement \| 1 \| \| II. Summary of Major Findings \| 3 \| \| III. Situation Prior to Mid-July, 1962 \| 7 \| \| (A) Cuban Forces \| 7 \| \| (B) Intelligence Activities and Operations \| 8 \| \| IV. Situation From Mid-July to October 22, 1962 \| 10 \| \| (A) Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment \| 10 \| \| (B) Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment \| 11 \| \| (1) SA-2 Sites \| 11 \| \| (2) Cruise Missiles \| 11 \| \| (3) MIG-21 Fighters \| 12 \| \| (4) IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers \| 12 \| \| (5) Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles \| 12 \| \| (C) Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Combat Units \| 13 \| \| (D) Alleged Photographic Gap \| 15 \| \| (E) Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC \| 16 \| \| (F) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally \| 17 \| \| V. Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of Removal of IL-28 Bombers\| 21 \| \| (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally \| 21 \| \| (B) Identification of Organized Soviet Combat Units \| 21 \| \| (C) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers \| 21 \| \| VI. Current Military Situation in Cuba \| 22 \| \| (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally \| 22 \| \| (B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba \| 23 \| \| (1) Types and Numbers of Weapons \| 23 \| \| (2) Strength and Capabilities of Forces \| 26 \| \| (3) Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba \| 26 \| \| (4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel \| 30 \| \| (C) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet Presence in Cuba \| 31 \| \| (D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion \| 32 \| \| VII. Concluding Statement \| 34 \| I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly withdrawn. However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agitational and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries. The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discussion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included in a subsequent report. Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed. Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive hearings from Mr. John A. McConne, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air Force. The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council. In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone. Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however, include some information from other sources. Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in Cuba. II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS 1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society. 2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission. 3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated. 4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were: (a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were necessarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous Cuban defense forces. (b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island. (c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14th that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles. 5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to October 14th. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded. 6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction between the agencies. 7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter. 8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time. 9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equipment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. 10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving, according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000 to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as "technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn. 11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall, we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure. 12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover. 13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence. 14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas. III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962 A. Cuban Forces It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500 Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba. By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40 propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types. The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type. Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training. It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July, 1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted. B. Intelligence Activities and Operations The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources. For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelligence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early 1962, two flights were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the number of flights was increased. Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters but not over the Island of Cuba itself. In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were many which contained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation of such activities. In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month. The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered. The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future. IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962 A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger, increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August. While our intelligence people were aware from this and other information that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community. During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confirmation of them. At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed. Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim, physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet personnel in the island were estimated at 5,000. B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment 1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, established positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of about 25 miles. 2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba. 3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the presence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962. 4. IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelligence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10. 5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile, which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identified, still appears large to the untrained observer. However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion—apparently reached near the end of September, 1962—that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex. Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evidence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned to introduce. Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconnaissance missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become operational by December 15. The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles. C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwithstanding the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophisticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the presence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba. The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people to be about 5,000 men. In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand. The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962. The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantially complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained, powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States commanders until several days subsequent to October 25. In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascertained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our forces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated. Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles. D. Alleged Photographic Gap There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5 to October 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here. The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites. On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central portion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference to the eastern end of the island. A flight was planned for September 10th but this was not flown. On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions, it was not wholly successful. Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighted as requiring early attention. Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba. E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the function of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba. These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographic coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October 14. Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom the flights should be flown. The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight which was flown on October 14th was programmed to over-fly this area. In view of the possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conducted by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reasonable and proper. It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MREM site. This, without explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no significance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence. F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been outlined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA. After the mission which verified the existence of MREM's in Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the missile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiated until October 23, the day following the President's message. During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using refugees, exiles, and other human sources. In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Subcommittee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, however, our intelligence did quite well. The MREMs were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were identified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost completely closed society. The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed. CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the Organization of American States and world acceptance of the correctness of our position. Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one. It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deployment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources. The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover, there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered. In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence. There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources. Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events unfold is evident. The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligence judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned. The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed. It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation. V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected targets. During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through November 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties. B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th provided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distributed to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces. C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers. A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet observation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equipment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accompanied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic. The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships. As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic missiles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible that despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived. VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance. The reason for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights remains a matter for speculation. The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveillance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and surface ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic reconnaissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that radar range permits. A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated rumors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines. Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly extend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate their operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficient depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxation facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods considerably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and information from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facilitate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempts to evade detection. B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba 1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was testified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, machine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers. They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated. The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plentiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned by Soviets is apparently not known. There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about 30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and thus failed to reach Cuba. The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are apparently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expedition. The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motorized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200 57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost 100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple launchers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in. To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles. The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles, which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST JOHN. According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approximately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios necessary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system, SA-2 and fighter. 2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard. The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to suppress an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organization which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long duration. The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol activities. The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters, about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of antiaircraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters. The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been turned over to the Cubans. The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics. The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real air cover or air defense capability. The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intelligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000 are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments. About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated 7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contingent in Cuba. At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some 4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accuracy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present considerably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that no one--outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles--knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure. In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combination of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in the United States and the Atlantic Ocean. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence. It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery. Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a centrally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report. 3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn. It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14. There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con- cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc. The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res- pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump- tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi- ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious. The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already been discussed. 4. Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to 5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have been withdrawn. C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence in Cuba presents to the Americas is as follows: 1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America. 2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduction of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity. 3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR. 4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities based on Cuba. 5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originating from Cuba. 6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and electronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean. 7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes launched against the United States from the Soviet Unión. 8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports with very little effort. 9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further reorientation of the U.S. air defenses. 10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage techniques. 11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation's image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep. A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents. D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the people in Cuba, will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger element creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of freedom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces. VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay. The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolutionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained. Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and moral control of subjugated peoples. This aim and goal has already been achieved in Cuba. It will be achieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere. The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date. MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection to it, subject to the following changes: 1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records. 2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy. 3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail. 4. Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS. Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 28 March 1963 U17,171/P-2 SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 TO: General Counsel Department of Defense Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted: 1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records. 2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy. 3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail. 4. Page 37, Lines 13 - 15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR. 5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS. JOSEPH F. CARROLL Lieutenant General, USAF Director 28 March 1963 U17,171/P-2 SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962 TO: General Counsel Department of Defense Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted: 1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records. 2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy. 3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November" and observed before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail. 4. Page 37, Lines 13 - 15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR. 5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS. JOSEPH F. CARROLL Lieutenant General, USAF Director MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE March 27, 1963 Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962. The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963. Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army Attachment As Stated cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky Mr. McGiffert General Carroll (DIA) TO: CCA - Mr. Hurwitch FROM: RPA - William G. Bowdler DATE: March 27, 1963 SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report To Congress on US Participation in UN During 1962. UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on US participation in the UN. Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly as possible as the report is now overdue? March 27, 1963 MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962. The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963. Signed Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army Attachment As Stated cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky Mr. McGiffert General Carroll (DIA) Soviet Buildup On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the nation and to the world the "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup" by the Soviet Union of offensive missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the President the previous Tuesday morning (October 16) and, during the week that followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course of action decided upon, friendly governments notified and consulted, the members and machinery of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) brought into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and put on the alert. The President revealed that a serious threat against the peace and security of the Americas was being secretly mounted by the Soviet Union on the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable of travelling twice as far and thus posing a nuclear threat to most of the major cities of the Western Hemisphere. This urgent transformation of Cuba into a strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an explicit threat to the peace and security of the Americas in defiance of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of this nation and hemisphere," and the Charter of the United Nations. This Soviet action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both /publicly and publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor the world community, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception and offensive threat represented by the clandestine deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. To meet this threat the United States was taking immediately the following steps: 1) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba was being initiated and, should offensive military preparations continue, "further action will be justified;" 2) the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union; 3) Guantanamo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Organization of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Nations, the United States was requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations." U.S. Objective This was a difficult and dangerous effort on which the United States had set out, the President concluded, "but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing." On the military side, steps were taken to strengthen defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to apply the quarantine. The Department of Defense had ordered all tours of duty of Navy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the /Guantanamo naval Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put 5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a training exercise. Following the resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Council of the Organization of American States (described below) the President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of 10 A.M. on October 24. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction of 25 Soviet merchant vessels known to be headed for Cuba. At 8 A.M. on October 25 the first interception of a Soviet ship, the oil tanker Bucharest, took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying vessel occurred during the Cuba affair. From the beginning it was clear that in the political and diplomatic realm U.S. policy had two immediate tasks. The first and most proximate task of U.S. diplomacy was to show that the Soviets had in fact used guile and deception to emplace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence was conclusive. The second was to halt further shipments and bring about rapidly and effectively the removal of the offensive weapons, under U.N. supervision, before the quarantine could be lifted. The United States was prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formulae but not to abandon this goal. From the start, both the Organization of American States and the United Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were used to underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet Union that elimination of the offensive weapons was a purpose to which the hemisphere was solidly committed. From the start, too, it was clear that the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forum in which the evidence of Soviet guilt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide audience, world opinion mobilized, and the world verdict pronounced. It was, also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communications. The United Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could easily meet. The Secretary-General himself supplied an important link between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their employment, the United Nations proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection and verification of dismantling and removal of the offensive weapons and for safeguards against their reintroduction. The United Nations was also prepared to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simultaneously with the President's speech, therefore, the United States took diplomatic steps to set in motion the political machinery of the O.A.S. and the U.N. O.A.S. Action In Washington the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) sent a note to the Acting Chairman requesting the immediate convocation of the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). This article provides for immediate consultation on measures to be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent when "the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American States should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America." /The O.A.S. The O.A.S. Council met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative described the nature of the threat to this hemisphere and the countermeasures which the United States considered it essential for the inter-American system to take. He stated that "the Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American Governments to carry out hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the hemisphere against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ of Consultation, without delay "call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and ... recommend ... that the member states of the Organization of American States take the necessary measures to ensure that Cuba does not continue to receive additional offensive weapons ... and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere." The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: "The threat is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which challenges our inter-American commitments ... be dealt with in the forum in which that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member /to refrain to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforce upon him its decisions. Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach, we must ensure that our hemisphere is effectively quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military power in our midst." Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the hemisphere the Council voted 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to constitute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (C.O.A.S./O.C.). Then, at the suggestion of the U.S. Representative, the Organ of Consultation adjourned for several hours to permit a number of delegations to consult their governments and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the United States to deal with the threat confronting the hemisphere. The Organ of Consultation reconvened that same afternoon. Debate centered on the draft resolution. As each representative spoke, it became evident that the American republics were solidly united in their determination to resist this most dangerous threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere. A few delegations were not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional considerations, but when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote, the support was unanimous. In one of the historic decisions of the inter-American system the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability," and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, /which they which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the Resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment." Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time on October 24. The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense "shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American states." The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed." Any vessel that refused to comply with directions might be taken into custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or /regulations regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communicate with the vessel or craft, or in self-defense. In the days immediately following, twelve other American republics offered assistance in support of the quarantine operation: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval units, posing the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on November 5, the C.O.A.S./O.C. recommended that the contributing member states take among themselves the technical measures necessary to establish an efficient and coordinated action. Pursuant to this recommendation, the governments of Argentina, the Dominican Republic and the United States on November 9 notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force into which they were integrating their respective naval units and placing officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the Combined Quarantine Force. Security Council Consideration Simultaneously with the call for a meeting of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council — that month the Soviet Representative — to call an urgent meeting of the Council "to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America." "The United States," he wrote, "now has incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves." The establishment of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole world." It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he concluded, "to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being put into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world." Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution which called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to Cuba of a U.N. observer corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution. The resolution called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of military shipments to Cuba when the above terms were complied with and recommended that the United States and the U.S.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat." The Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 24, and 25. By the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of October 23, the Soviet Union and Cuba had introduced two parallel letters to the President of the Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Council in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S. countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real threat to peace in the Caribbean. Under Rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, the Cuban Representative was invited to participate in the discussion of the matter before the Security Council. /Ambassador Ambassador Stevenson's opening speech put the issue in the perspective of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionism. He traced the "vast plan of piecemeal aggression" and "the basic drive to abolish the world of the Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and which had not been altered by the present Soviet Government. Contrasting the history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the principles of the Charter with the United States record of loyal support for the Organization and "the world of the Charter," Ambassador Stevenson regretted that some members "seemed to believe that the cold war is a private war between two great super powers." "It is not a private struggle," he insisted, "it is a world civil war -- a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world -- a contest between the world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity." "The Castro regime," he pointed out, "has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere" and "has given the Soviet Union a staging area in this hemisphere" by inviting "an extra-continental, anti-democratic and expansionist power into the bosom of the American family" and by making itself "an accomplice in the communist enterprise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued, had secretly transformed Cuba into a formidable missile and strategic airbase, armed with the deadliest, most far-reaching modern nuclear weapons, in an attempt to put all the Americas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the "Soviet diplomacy of blackmail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded. "If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations to world peace." He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded itself into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its power, and he voiced the hope that the Soviets would call an end "to this new phase of aggression." He urged the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson then informed the Security Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Council of the O.A.S. had adopted a resolution by 19 affirmative votes (as noted above) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive weapons, recommending that member states of the O.A.S. take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Council will "dispatch U.N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment." Ambassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Security Council which defined the themes for the debate during the rest of the week: (1) The Soviet action in sending thousands of military technicians to its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat to this hemisphere and to the whole world. (2) The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in consonance with the U.N. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the Organization of American States. (3) The Security Council should remove the threat by calling, as the resolution proposed, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and all offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and report in compliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the quarantine upon U.N. certification of such compliance; and urgently recommending that the United States and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security and the peace of the world and report therein to the Security Council. Following Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet Representatives made their initial statements. The Cuban Representative, Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the naval "blockade" as an "act of war" and declared that the Cuban people had answered the "armed attack" with general mobilization. He asked the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of all troops, ships and planes deployed on the approaches to Cuban shores, and for the cessation of all "interventionist" measures. The Cuban Representative also contended that the United States had no right to ask for dismantling and disarmament and that "logically, U.N. observers should be sent to the U.S. bases from which invaders and pirates emerge to punish and harass a small state." He insisted that Cuba "will not accept any kind of observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction." The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions" in Cuba. He described the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extremely dangerous act of aggression" and as "undisguised piracy." During this first encounter, while avoiding direct reference to the presence of Soviet missiles or bombers in Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusations that the Soviet Union had "set up offensive armaments in Cuba" were false, and officially confirmed the statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, "that the Soviet Government has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armaments." He also recalled the statement of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs /Andrei Gromyko Andrei Gromyko in the General Assembly just a month previously (September 21, 1962) that "any sober-minded man knows that Cuba is not ... building up her forces to such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States ... or else a threat to any state of the Western Hemisphere." Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published by the Soviet Government that day which addressed a "serious warning to the United States Government, to advise it that, in carrying out the measures announced by President Kennedy, it is taking on itself a heavy responsibility for the fate of the world;" declared that the Soviet Government will do "everything in its power to frustrate the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialistic circles;" and appealed to all governments and peoples to raise their voices in protest against the "aggressive acts" of the United States and strongly to condemn such acts. He introduced a draft resolution condemning the "actions of the Government of the United States designed to violate the Charter of the United Nations and to intensify the threat of war." The Soviet resolution insisted that the United States "repeal its decision on the control of ships of other states going towards the shores of Cuba," and called upon the United States, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. "to establish contacts and enter into negotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby removing the threat of war." At the request of the Representative of Ghana the meeting was adjourned to the following morning so that representatives might consult with other delegations outside the Council. The Next Morning: October 24 The next morning, the Security Council heard the Representative of Venezuela, Mr. Sosa-Rodriguez, associate the Latin American nations with the action taken by the United States pursuant to the O.A.S. resolution. He noted that "it has been proved that the Soviet Union has set up in Cuba rocket bases that might deliver nuclear missiles to about 1,000 miles distance, and that, apparently, it is at present setting up others for rockets with a range of up to 2,200 miles." This had created an atmosphere of insecurity and concern in the countries of the American hemisphere which felt themselves directly threatened by such weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Venezuelan Representative emphasized, were no longer defensive but offensive, and "they are of a magnitude that might be sufficient to wipe out any of the American republics and drag the world into the holocaust of nuclear war." He described the apprehension felt throughout the continent at Cuban subversive activities, including the introduction of agents, propaganda, and weapons to equip guerrilla forces in American republics. Ambassador Sosa-Rodriguez recalled the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States and declared that he was speaking for the entire continent in asking the Security Council to take measures to stop nuclear weapons from arriving in Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of nuclear rockets in Cuba dismantled. Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by no stretch even of the Soviet imagination could a nuclear missile with a range of 2,200 miles in Cuba be called defensive, and recalled assurances on this point by Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Dorticos of Cuba at the General Assembly the previous month. "While the Soviet Government were acting their lie," he stated, "the orders were being given, plans laid and preparations being made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possibly believe in the honesty of the Soviet Government's intentions in these circumstances?" The United Kingdom, he concluded, considered that the United States acted properly by coming to the Security Council at the first possible moment. Now the Security Council must take immediate and urgent steps to restore confidence /in the Western in the Western Hemisphere by having these offensive missiles dismantled and withdrawn. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the Council. The Representative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position. The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, underlined world concern with the growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He appreciated Cuban concern with its national security, "but it is a far cry from that to a military buildup of the kind which the Cuban Government now appears to have embarked upon with the massive assistance of the Soviet Union." He could not understand "why the Soviet Union should have chosen this moment to establish new missile and bomber bases on the island of Cuba?" The Foreign Minister believed he perceived some common ground in the U.S. statement to the Security Council of October 22 which declared U.S. willingness "to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to remove the existing threat to security of the Western Hemisphere," and in the Soviet draft resolution which proposed that the United States, U.S.S.R. and Cuba establish contacts and enter into negotiations. The Security Council reconvened that evening, some forty-eight hours after President Kennedy's historic speech. The naval quarantine had gone into effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Members knew that if a Soviet ship attempted to run the quarantine the result would be serious. They also knew that the President had indicated that the quarantine was an "immediate step" which would be followed by "further action" if the Soviet missiles were not removed. At this meeting the Council heard statements by those members who had not yet spoken: France, China, Chile, United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In addition to expressions of support for the U.S. resolution by France and China, the highlights of the meeting were the statement of Chile, the United Arab /Republic-Ghana Republic-Chana "restraint resolution," and the first formal intervention of the Secretary-General. Ambassador Seydoux, the Representative of France, noted that "the appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soil...cannot be considered as other than a serious initiative aimed at creating a new war front in a region which up to now has been free from such threats." He stated that the U.S. had demonstrated clearly that it is seeking a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that the solution proposed by the U.S. was desirable in the interest of the countries concerned and "in order to banish once and for all the dangers with which world peace is threatened by the recent developments in Cuba." Ambassador Lin, for the Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to see Cuba transformed, as a result of Sino-Soviet intervention, into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas. He declared that the measures initiated by the United States designed to call an immediate halt to the shipment of military material to Cuba were justified and supported the U.S. draft resolution as a reasonable and peaceful solution. Speaking for Chile, Ambassador Schweitzer endorsed the security measures of the regional system and expressed support for the U.S. draft resolution. He welcomed the authorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the Secretary-General to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. "Unfortunately," he said, "the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this idea. At such a decisive moment as this, we believe Cuba should trust the methods of the United Nations for putting out the flames of conflict and for ensuring peace. One such method could be to ensure the United Nations presence in a zone of conflict .... We make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept such a procedure." / The United Arab The United Arab Republic Representative, Mr. Mahmoud Rizk, declared that his country "cannot condone the unilateral decision of the United States of America to exercise the quarantine" which he characterized as contrary to international law and likely to increase world tension. He recalled that Dr. Dorticos had told the General Assembly that the weapons Cuba had acquired were "defensive in nature" and called for "normalization" of relations between Cuba and the United States. At the same time he reaffirmed U.A.R. policies against the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged all parties to refrain from tension-aggravating action and called for negotiations. The Ghanaian Representative, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, took a similar position, stating that he had no "incontrovertible proof...as to the offensive character of military developments in Cuba" and therefore could not condone the quarantine. He also called for negotiations to resolve the crisis on the basis of "mutual respect for sovereign rights." The U.A.R.-Ghana joint draft resolution requested the Secretary-General "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean;" and called on the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance to the Secretary-General, and "to refrain meanwhile from any action which may directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation." The formula proposed was thus limited to a general appeal for mediation by the Secretary-General, but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup nor for U.N. involvement in inspection and verification. U Thant Proposal of October 24 At the close of the meeting, the Secretary-General revealed that he had just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which proposed "the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba." That believed that such voluntary suspension for a period of two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties to "meet and discuss." He offered to "make myself available to all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform." In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the Secretary-General took the occasion of the Security Council meeting to address an urgent appeal to the President and Premier of Cuba, declaring that "it would also contribute greatly to the same end if the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba would be suspended during the period of negotiations." He then appealed to "the parties concerned" to enter into negotiations immediately, "even this night," irrespective of other procedures, with the first subject to be discussed being the "modalities" to achieve his suggestions. Significant in U Thant's intervention were his offer to make himself available to U.S. and Soviet negotiators "for whatever services" he might perform and the concrete suggestion for "suspension" of Soviet arms shipments and of the construction and development of major military installations in exchange for the suspension of the quarantine. The next day, President Kennedy's reply reminded the Secretary-General that the threat, "was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." The President noted that the Secretary-General had "made certain suggestions and...invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured" and indicated that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly..." these arrangements with you." Premier Khrushchev's reply welcomed U Thant's initiative and characterized the situation "as highly dangerous and calling for the immediate intervention by the United Nations." When the Security Council reconvened Thursday afternoon for what proved to be the last formal meeting on the Cuban crisis, Ambassador Stevenson welcomed both the course adopted by the Soviet Union the previous day to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine and the report that Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the theme in his opening remark by inviting the Council to address itself to "the realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power in Cuba." Ambassador Stevenson cautioned the Council not to forget that "we are here today...for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts." Already the Communists had attempted to distort the record by arguing that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess," the U.S. Representative continued, "that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary." He noted that some representatives in the Council say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 to 2,000 miles. If further doubt remained on this score the United States would gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges. One by one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the arguments that Ambassador Zorin had presented at the first Security Council meeting. As for the "thirty-five bases in foreign countries" which the Soviet Representative had mentioned, the fact was that there were such missiles with the forces of only three of our allies -- the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey -- and that these were established by the decision of Heads of Government in December 1957 "which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe." Why was it necessary for the Western Hemisphere nations to act with such speed? The "speed and stealth" of the Soviet offensive buildup in Cuba demonstrated the premeditated attempt by the Soviet Union "to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli." If the United States had not acted promptly and had delayed its counteraction, "the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed." He stressed that the United States had acted promptly to put into process "the political machinery which we pray will achieve a solution to this grave crisis." The one action in the last few days which had strengthened the peace was the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. The United States was now in the Security Council, Ambassador Stevenson noted, because it wished the machinery of the United Nations "to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace and to ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine." When Zorin again attempted to delude the Council about the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup, a dramatic encounter occurred between /Stevenson and Stevenson and Zorin, which exposed the truth beyond doubt. STEVENSON: Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba. Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said -- with a trespass on credulity that excels your best -- that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals -- and that is the only change that has taken place. But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger -- not the United States.... Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today -- again, if I heard you correctly -- you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist -- and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no? ZORIN: I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply. /STEVENSON: STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "yes" or "no". You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly. ZORIN: Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have your answer in due course. Inasmuch as Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aircraft and of Soviet missile bases, complete with launching sites and supporting equipment, "in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible weapons." When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he had identified in order to authenticate the evidence. The proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana, to postpone further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to consult with the Secretary-General on his suggestions of the previous day. The Security Council thus adjourned but remained "seized" of the problem while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the formal chamber of the Security Council to the informal chambers of the Secretary-General. /Weekend Negotiations: Weekend Negotiations: The Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy making certain proposals on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 27, another letter from Khrushchev, which was broadcast before delivery, also expressed willingness to withdraw the weapons but proposed to link the question of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba to the unrelated issue of strategic weapons in Turkey. The USSR would "agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means; we agree to carry this out and make a pledge in the United Nations. Your representative will make a declaration to the effect that the United States of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its similar means from Turkey...After that persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check on the spot the fulfillment of the pledge made by either side." Of course, he added, "the authorization of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey would be necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents." In addition, Khrushchev proposed that the United States and the USSR give pledges against invasion of Cuba and Turkey respectively and solemn promises to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the frontiers of these countries. This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected by the United States. A statement issued by the White House that day noted that several inconsistent and conflicting proposals had been made by the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast. The proposal The proposal involved the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere and it was the Western Hemisphere nations alone that were the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of the United States, the statement read, was that "as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification." As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and its allies had long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts could continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat was ended. President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the same day (October 27) replied to Khrushchev's letter of October 26. "As I read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are as follows: "1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate U. N. observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. "2. We, on our part, would agree -- upon establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurance against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise." Assuming work ceased on offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered inoperable, under effective UN arrangements, the President was prepared to have representatives in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 26. On Sunday, October 28 -- Chairman Khrushchev broadcast the text of his reply. In addition to earlier instructions to discontinue further work on weapons construction sites, he said, the Soviet Government "has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated: "I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear. "It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means. "Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict." /Chairman Chairman Khrushchev sent a copy of this message to U Thant "to enable you to familiarise yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive and which will help you to discharge your noble functions." At the same time, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Cuba, the Soviet Government was sending First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his "noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation." President Kennedy replied at once to the broadcast message of October 28 even before the official text reached him, and welcomed it as "an important contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read: "The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area." "I agree with you," the President concluded, "that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament...I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a /nuclear test ban. nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere." A. U.S. statement issued the same day welcomed the Khrushchev response and stated: "We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean area." Weekend Negotiations in New York Meanwhile steps continued in New York to reach agreement on practical means of avoiding conflict at sea and on arrangements to carry out the Secretary-General's suggestion for stopping work on the offensive bases and screening further shipments as conditions of suspending the quarantine. The initial aim of the Secretary-General was to avoid an incident at sea. What concerned him most, he had written on October 25 to Chairman Khrushchev, was that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels "would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement." He therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order "to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement." The next day (October 26), the Secretary-General addressed a parallel letter to President Kennedy, informing him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchev and requesting that "instructions may be issued the United States' vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an outward incident." He expressed the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures could be called off as soon as possible. Premier Khrushchev accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend." President Kennedy welcomed U Thant's efforts for a satisfactory solution and stated that if the Soviet Government accepts and abides by his request that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay out of the interception area during the period of preliminary discussions, "you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your request that our vessels in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident!" At the same time the President underlined that this was a matter of great urgency in view of the fact that certain Soviet ships were still proceeding toward Cuba and the interception area. Screening Shipments As the White House statement on October 27 made clear, the urgent preliminary to the consideration of any proposals for a solution was that work on the Cuban bases stop, the offensive weapons be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of weapons to Cuba must cease—all under effective international verification. After that means must be found to get the missiles and other offensive weapons removed and their removal verified and to institute adequate safeguards against their reintroduction. / The immediate The immediate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the initial phase, was to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure that no further offensive weapons were being introduced. The UN asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to serve as its agent in inspecting incoming vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapons were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for about one month and would be entrusted to some thirty inspectors which the ICRC would undertake to recruit. Mr. Paul Ruegger, former president of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in November to discuss with the UN whether and under what circumstances the ICRC could undertake this task. In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the ICRC pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned." The statement issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the ICRC would be based on previous consent being given by the three states concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in future discussions. Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed scheme. Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any event, realized that the system envisaged would no longer be required and that the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely on other means, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments of offensive weapons. Havana Talks The main obstacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a settlement was the attitude of the Cuban government. On October 26 U Thant wrote Prime Minister wrote Prime Minister Castro renewing his appeal that he (Castro) direct that "the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba, and especially installations designed to launch medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended during the period of negotiations which are now underway." Dr. Castro's reply came the next day and proved to be a hedged acceptance. He rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what action we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our defense." Cuba was prepared to accept "the compromises that you request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that at the same time, while negotiations are in progress, the United States Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba, including naval blockade of the country." Read literally, Dr. Castro was saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending the quarantine. At the same time, his letter contained another note: "...Should you consider it useful to the cause of peace, our government would be glad to receive you in our country as Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis." U Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept the suggestion he had made provided the United States Government "desists from threats...against Cuba including the naval blockade" while negotiations were in progress. He accepted the invitation to visit Cuba early in the coming week -- and to "bring a few aides with me to leave some of them behind to continue our common effort towards a peaceful solution of the problem." To facilitate his task the United States had agreed to suspend its naval quarantine and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's visit to Havana. Havana. At this point, the United Nations was working on the assumption that the visit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of U.N. observation and inspection and "reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean." The issue was further clouded by Castro's "statement of conditions" issued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of which President Kennedy speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elimination also of the naval blockade," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of the following measures:" 1. End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial and economic pressure" exercised by the United States against Cuba; 2. End of "all subversive activities" and the organization or support of invasions; 3. End of "pirate attacks" from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico; 4. End of "violations of air and naval space" by the United States; 5. United States withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its "return to Cuba." This statement of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated its intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the Havana talks. U Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier General Rikhye and a small military staff, flew to Havana on October 30 and held talks with Cuban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N. supervision of removal of the offensive weapons and to discuss the other modalities for carrying out the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 27-28. Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should participate in settlement of the Cuban crisis and the talks were characterized as "fruitful," the Cuban authorities balked at all proposals for U.N. inspection of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction. Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28 statement. These demands were obviously beyond the scope of the Secretary-General's purpose in negotiating with the Cubans, and no agreement was reached. The Secretary-General and his party returned to New York the next day, where, it was understood, talks between the Secretary-General and Cuban representatives would continue. Premier Castro, however, did state that he would not interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles. The missiles are "not ours," he said in a radio speech on November 1 in which he reported on his talks with U Thant, but he rejected any form of international inspection on the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. He specifically turned down a proposal that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carry out the inspection task. He also rejected other forms of U.N. inspection. On Friday, November 2, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan arrived in New York on his way to Havana and issued a statement supporting Premier Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regime. Surveillance and Dismantling Continued When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula, President Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to Cuba and authorized resumption of close aerial surveillance of the island to determine whether dismantling of Soviet missile bases was proceeding as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of November 2, the /President reported President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the "Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The President said the information was based on aerial photographs and added that the United States intended to follow closely the completion of this work through various means, including aerial surveillance, until "an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected." He also said that while the quarantine remained in effect, he was hopeful that adequate procedures could be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross could be "an appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspection. New York Negotiations: Verification and IL-28s Meanwhile, talks proceeded in New York between Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. John J. McCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working out the details of the scheme for ICRC inspection of incoming shipments (described above), the negotiators spent the next three weeks in considering two main issues. Until November 12 the central concern of the negotiators was to make sure that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satisfactory system for verification that dismantling and removal had in fact taken place. Associated with this was the problem of longer-term safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. From November 12 to November 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problem of removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba. On verification, it was clear that what the President had termed "an equally satisfactory international means of verification" required an adequate UN system of inspection to make sure that the offensive weapons had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent reintroduction of such weapons. Various schemes were considered and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place. Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the UN or under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators continued to make it clear to the Soviet negotiators that US aerial surveillance would continue so long as there was no adequate UN system of inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent to UN inspection or verification of shipments from his ports, the negotiators turned to devising a system for US inspection at sea of outgoing ships carrying the dismantled missiles. The US naval vessels would come "alongside" departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a way as to enable the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid progress was made in dismantling and loading the missiles and by November the US had counted 42 departing missiles by this procedure. Failing UN verification and safeguards, the US continued its own system of surveillance under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons were not reintroduced. On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators took up again the question of the removal of IL-28s and made it clear that the United States could not consider lifting the quarantine until the bombers were withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and were pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge. The US position was that the bombers were defined as offensive weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they... were included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27-28. The United States made it clear that it could not consider lifting the quarantine until the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s within a short time. Partial Settlement: November 20 On November 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wished to remove the bombers he would not object. That day an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the IL-28s would be withdrawn. U Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenson and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. Soviet agreement to remove the bombers paved the way for the lifting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just four weeks to accomplish. At his press conference that evening, President Kennedy announced that he had that day been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers in Cuba would be withdrawn in thirty days, and that these planes could be observed and counted as they departed. "Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago," the President announced, "I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine." The President then recalled the agreement he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev October 27-28, including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had complied with all his pledges, "we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurance against invasion of Cuba." Evidence to date indicated that all known offensive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and sea inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn. But, he warned, "important parts" of the agreement "remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to /verify whether all verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba." The United States, therefore, had no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The United States, he said, will continue its efforts to achieve "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification of Cuba." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate safeguards as "an inspection which would provide us with assurances that there are not in the island weapons capable of offensive action against United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced." Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future. "As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, "We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere." The United States, he stressed, would not abandon the political, economic, and other efforts to halt subversion from Cuba nor its purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free. "But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island." Inter-American Quarantine Force Terminates Operations Following the lifting of the quarantine, the three governments whose naval units had participated in the inter-American combined quarantine force — i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United States — notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. on November 30 that the operations of the quarantine force had been terminated. During this period, it had not been necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and other types of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and solidarity. As the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in New York progressed, the United States kept the C.O.A.S./O.C. fully informed of developments. The C.O.A.S./O.C. in the meantime withheld taking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks were completed. Continued Negotiations The Soviet Government carried out its promise to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, and, by December 6, the United States was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left. No progress, however, was made during the rest of the month in achieving the "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba" that the President had mentioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding. Deputy Premier Mikoyan's three-hour conversations with the President on November 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did not advance the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations in New York. By mid-December several important loose ends still remained. No adequate, U.N.-supervised arrangements for verification of removal of offensive weapons and safeguards against their reintroduction had been achieved. The U.S. assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained from aggressive acts against the Western Hemisphere. Soviet Troops The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Cuba was also a matter of deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at his press conference of November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet combat units and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in due course. The U.S. position was that removal of the offensive weapons systems made the presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary. Efforts to secure their removal continued into 1963. Security Council Consideration Concluded The formula for terminating Security Council consideration of the Cuban crisis was finally agreed between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. It represented a standstill rather than a final settlement. The two governments agreed to send a joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to the Security Council for information of its members. The text of the letter read: "On behalf of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area. "While it has not been possible for our governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time. "The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war." The same day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Carlos M. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he requested be transmitted to United Nations members, expressing a dissenting view on the conclusion of the affair. Cuba, the letter declared, "does not consider as effective any agreement other than one which would include consideration of five points or measures, which as minimum guarantees to peace in the Caribbean, our Prime Minister Fidel Castro stresses in his declaration of 28 October, 1962...." As the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Cuban item, the situation remained as follows: 1. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its offensive missiles, its bombers, and some of its military personnel. The United States and participating American Republics had lifted the quarantine. 2. The Cubans had refused to accept on site inspection and post-removal verification or to agree on a system of continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons under United Nations auspices. 3. In the absence of adequate inspection and safeguards, the United States continued other methods of surveillance of military activities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric security. 4. The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the Western Hemisphere. Efforts continued with the USSR to obtain their removal as agreed. 5. The United States continued to be seriously concerned about Cuban subversive efforts directed against other American Republics. 6. The United States position with regard to assurance against invasion remained that stated by the President on November 20, as outlined above. 7. With the conclusion of the New York talks and the joint US-USSR letter terminating Security Council consideration of the matter, responsibility of further action remained with the OAS Organ of Consultation in its hemispheric context. Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilateral, Regionals, and UN Diplomacy The Cuban affair demonstrated the utility and possibilities for interaction of the various diplomatic and military instruments available to the United States in a crisis. Orchestration of bilateral diplomacy, regional arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the crisis throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique demonstration of coordination between a regional system and the world organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the O.A.S. and the United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments directly involved. The O.A.S. system successfully met the test of /Workability by workability by demonstrating conclusively the solidarity and determination of the American Republics when their security is endangered. The rapid, decisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty strengthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in negotiating with the Soviets. The United Nations played a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity and for enlisting diplomatic support of the United States position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for negotiation; and, as an institution willing and able, on short notice, to provide inspection and verification services. (1) The United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to representatives of 109 nations and through communications media directly to world public opinion. Ambassador Stevenson's speeches of October 23 and 25 in the Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to delegations both inside and outside the chamber, presented incontrovertible evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing the world of the facts. In addition, the United Nations provided a forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue. (2) The Secretary-General provided an effective point of contact, notably in the tense days at the outset of the crisis and valuable suggestions for avoiding direct confrontation. The Secretary-General's intervention on the second day of Security Council debate, in which he called for suspension of arms shipments and of construction and development of military installations in exchange for suspension of the quarantine led to the formula under which Soviet ships stayed away from the interception area and on that condition the United States agreed to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation. Khrushchev gave unprecedented agreement to the idea of U.N. inspection and verification of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was ready and capable of organizing a corps of observers and a system of inspection in rapid order. Both the United Nations and the Organisation of American States proved their utility and vigor -- and emerged stronger from the ordeal. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH SUBJECT: Cuba As a follow-up to my memorandum to you on February 15, 1963, I am attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in testimony given by the Department of Defense to congressional committees. They continue from the latest date of each committee excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed Services Committee transcripts. Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references inasmuch as all transcripts are not available. Thus the House Armed Services Committee has been covered up to February 21, the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to February 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet begun its hearings. As transcripts become available, I will send the requested items to you. SIGNED David E. McGiffert Assistant to the Secretary (Legislative Affairs) 11 Attachments 4 HASC Transcript excerpts 3 DoD SC, HAAppns Transcripts excerpts 4 SASC Transcript excerpts cc:(S/Attachments included) - Mr. McNaughton, GC Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst. Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA) Mr. Lennartson, PA Mr. Califano, OSA STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS U. S. SENATE 13 March 1963 Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new addition to our Defense arsenal. My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air- plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend- able both in training missions and in actual combat. The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with: - The least expensive, time-consuming research and development effort before production. - The least reliance upon unknown process and materials. - The earliest delivery to our fighting forces. - The highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft. - The greatest use of proven design techniques and methods. - The most understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft. When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961--1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be continued in order to meet the military requirements. Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded: "(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system. "(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy. "(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. "(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. "(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability." The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal, and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing proposal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considerations entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part of the record. When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed me to: 1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings. 2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost. Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of nuclear surprise attack. At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly increased. Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy period of development, their tremendous combat power and their enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves. In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have commonly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when the program started, and in some instances more. Some of the reasons for such overruns have been: 1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet performance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements. 2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied many times during the program. 3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract is awarded. 4. We have too often employed inadequate and unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting insufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production of similar weapons. 5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce cost. Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organizations as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources. At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our current source selection procedures can be improved. One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements. The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic support, maintenance, training programs, and operations. The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already obsolete and practically worthless. When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105. At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became convinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter. The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible. While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways, was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach, considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept myself fully advised of the development of the TFX as it progressed over the succeeding 14 months. Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy fleet air defense mission. From the outset, the emphasis was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum." This is a recurring theme throughout the procurement actions which followed. Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms two months thereafter. A Source Selection Board was organized with members appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division. To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft carriers. The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force who made their recommendations to me. Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recommended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change. A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommendation was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsibility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group. The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evaluation Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby more apt to be saved than lost in the long run." It considered that competition should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design. Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that: a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up to stated Service requirements. b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of the low probability of its development in the time required, since not even a prototype existed at the time. c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints. I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost estimates. The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correcting identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time. The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overshadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorsements transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified concurrency of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally selected." The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft, resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined. Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasizing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent in a joint program. At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recommended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the third evaluation were held had not been satisfied. Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy requirements, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully understood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy and the Air Force. Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use of common equipments and structures. To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962, explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any contract would be awarded. These were: "1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the winning design. "2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the inherent savings of a joint program. "3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon system, which costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military strength by the weapon system." These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used in judging and weighing the two proposals -- Boeing and General Dynamics. They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its comments and conclusions. The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2. At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force: "(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system. "(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy. "(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period. "(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war. "(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability." The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors. When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one. In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having "a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuverability at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability, conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing performance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort." In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable from the users' viewpoint. In the "Production, Management and Cost" area, General Dynamics was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented the better program. It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased. In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all. It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. You will recall that those two conditions were: (1) minimum divergence from a common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs. It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational capability. These are conditions more properly the concern of those charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest. When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The Report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions. On the other hand, the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were the same. In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of identical parts in the General Dynamics design -- a particularly crucial point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds. In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact. It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic purpose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase costs at every stage beginning with development itself. As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter, and fatigue analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs; and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions." Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become complicated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the logistics area. These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates, common technical manuals, and the like. If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum divergence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality. lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point were clear and consistent. Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk, who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, discussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging development and production programs, it became clear to me that the General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable. There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in my mind. The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing touch down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on supersonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commercial jet transports and cargo-type aircraft in which the engines are mounted on outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made. This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early operational date for the TFX. In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evaluation Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust reverser design and development. Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically proven and offer a more straightforward approach to meeting the stated military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility to undertake this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits. The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant installation with top-mounted inlets. The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the airflow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately, and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system. In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through" installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems. The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach. The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat-resistant applications and where high stress levels in thick plates are not involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details, especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but additional costs would be incurred. In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal. These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped General Electric engine for its initial submission. Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in supersonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact, complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution. But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the Boeing proposal. I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic cost estimates in the Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate the complexities of developing the TFX. This is understandable because Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable to TFX estimating. I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- demonstrably credible understanding of costs -- Boeing's proposal was deficient. The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but not nearly so much so as Boeing's. The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are subject to substantial errors. Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by the application of statistical factors. The question has been raised as to why costs are important when both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There are several reasons. In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two proposals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred. Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract. It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to be far in excess of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development. In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expenditure is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well as the contractor. Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this production program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research and development contracts, the price of the production program, which for all practical purposes would be committed to the development contractor, would probably be affected. When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense. This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must be operational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled. The more straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters, and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and producer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer to our needs. I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of obtaining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within the dollars programmed. Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently, coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded: First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided to move ahead with the development of the TFX aircraft. Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award. Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts again before we arrived at a final decision. Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics. There remains one more important aspect of this case which I believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment is what is at issue. In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board, using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion, this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness. There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation, but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology. That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is, I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations on the task to be achieved. I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed. In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final responsibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my decision were: - Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs met stated military requirements and would provide significant improvements in combat capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force. - The General Dynamics proposal resulted in minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate mission of the Navy and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings and increased dependability inherent in a joint program. - The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more realistic understanding of costs. As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the decision was mine.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/198-10009-10099.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 154, "total-input-tokens": 176170, "total-output-tokens": 54485, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 879, 1 ], [ 879, 2940, 2 ], [ 2940, 3999, 3 ], [ 3999, 3999, 4 ], [ 3999, 4523, 5 ], [ 4523, 4636, 6 ], [ 4636, 6654, 7 ], [ 6654, 8843, 8 ], [ 8843, 10915, 9 ], [ 10915, 13029, 10 ], [ 13029, 14990, 11 ], [ 14990, 17126, 12 ], [ 17126, 19216, 13 ], [ 19216, 21355, 14 ], [ 21355, 23231, 15 ], [ 23231, 25337, 16 ], [ 25337, 26866, 17 ], [ 26866, 28992, 18 ], [ 28992, 30992, 19 ], [ 30992, 33294, 20 ], [ 33294, 33954, 21 ], [ 33954, 35241, 22 ], [ 35241, 36178, 23 ], [ 36178, 38412, 24 ], [ 38412, 39362, 25 ], [ 39362, 41088, 26 ], [ 41088, 43272, 27 ], [ 43272, 45613, 28 ], [ 45613, 47646, 29 ], [ 47646, 49623, 30 ], [ 49623, 49623, 31 ], [ 49623, 49871, 32 ], [ 49871, 50618, 33 ], [ 50618, 52156, 34 ], [ 52156, 54906, 35 ], [ 54906, 56748, 36 ], [ 56748, 58474, 37 ], [ 58474, 60059, 38 ], [ 60059, 61805, 39 ], [ 61805, 63634, 40 ], [ 63634, 65711, 41 ], [ 65711, 67445, 42 ], [ 67445, 69242, 43 ], [ 69242, 70870, 44 ], [ 70870, 72613, 45 ], [ 72613, 74472, 46 ], [ 74472, 76317, 47 ], [ 76317, 78060, 48 ], [ 78060, 80019, 49 ], [ 80019, 81715, 50 ], [ 81715, 83390, 51 ], [ 83390, 85139, 52 ], [ 85139, 87096, 53 ], [ 87096, 88836, 54 ], [ 88836, 90636, 55 ], [ 90636, 92423, 56 ], [ 92423, 94215, 57 ], [ 94215, 96035, 58 ], [ 96035, 97928, 59 ], [ 97928, 99755, 60 ], [ 99755, 101372, 61 ], [ 101372, 103139, 62 ], [ 103139, 105007, 63 ], [ 105007, 106772, 64 ], [ 106772, 108575, 65 ], [ 108575, 110266, 66 ], [ 110266, 111795, 67 ], [ 111795, 112783, 68 ], [ 112783, 114624, 69 ], [ 114624, 115639, 70 ], [ 115639, 116937, 71 ], [ 116937, 117220, 72 ], [ 117220, 118704, 73 ], [ 118704, 120185, 74 ], [ 120185, 120798, 75 ], [ 120798, 121567, 76 ], [ 121567, 122212, 77 ], [ 122212, 123911, 78 ], [ 123911, 125701, 79 ], [ 125701, 127567, 80 ], [ 127567, 129419, 81 ], [ 129419, 131270, 82 ], [ 131270, 133124, 83 ], [ 133124, 134959, 84 ], [ 134959, 136850, 85 ], [ 136850, 138730, 86 ], [ 138730, 140718, 87 ], [ 140718, 142555, 88 ], [ 142555, 144557, 89 ], [ 144557, 146436, 90 ], [ 146436, 148489, 91 ], [ 148489, 150397, 92 ], [ 150397, 152295, 93 ], [ 152295, 154126, 94 ], [ 154126, 156104, 95 ], [ 156104, 157957, 96 ], [ 157957, 159882, 97 ], [ 159882, 161734, 98 ], [ 161734, 163305, 99 ], [ 163305, 165084, 100 ], [ 165084, 166791, 101 ], [ 166791, 168556, 102 ], [ 168556, 170276, 103 ], [ 170276, 171990, 104 ], [ 171990, 173693, 105 ], [ 173693, 175406, 106 ], [ 175406, 177290, 107 ], [ 177290, 178810, 108 ], [ 178810, 180615, 109 ], [ 180615, 182491, 110 ], [ 182491, 184301, 111 ], [ 184301, 186135, 112 ], [ 186135, 187801, 113 ], [ 187801, 189292, 114 ], [ 189292, 191041, 115 ], [ 191041, 192901, 116 ], [ 192901, 194437, 117 ], [ 194437, 196267, 118 ], [ 196267, 196862, 119 ], [ 196862, 198056, 120 ], [ 198056, 198056, 121 ], [ 198056, 199409, 122 ], [ 199409, 200696, 123 ], [ 200696, 202161, 124 ], [ 202161, 203521, 125 ], [ 203521, 204642, 126 ], [ 204642, 206236, 127 ], [ 206236, 207510, 128 ], [ 207510, 208631, 129 ], [ 208631, 209786, 130 ], [ 209786, 211257, 131 ], [ 211257, 212495, 132 ], [ 212495, 213914, 133 ], [ 213914, 215282, 134 ], [ 215282, 216745, 135 ], [ 216745, 218217, 136 ], [ 218217, 219526, 137 ], [ 219526, 221088, 138 ], [ 221088, 222802, 139 ], [ 222802, 224456, 140 ], [ 224456, 225970, 141 ], [ 225970, 227499, 142 ], [ 227499, 228943, 143 ], [ 228943, 230501, 144 ], [ 230501, 232248, 145 ], [ 232248, 233803, 146 ], [ 233803, 235156, 147 ], [ 235156, 236491, 148 ], [ 236491, 237679, 149 ], [ 237679, 238883, 150 ], [ 238883, 240131, 151 ], [ 240131, 241735, 152 ], [ 241735, 243139, 153 ], [ 243139, 243359, 154 ] ] }
71a1dc2c2e491475410347017a6f7fbc7891ad99	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10187 RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : OSD FROM : TO : TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON MONGOOSE 6 SEP 62 DATE : 09/06/62 PAGES : 5 SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State. NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF DATE: MAR 2016 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected. g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban countermeasures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail. i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless they could be completely covered up. 5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary. 6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered. 7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated. 8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further. 9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree. 10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other continuance beyond those envisaged in the WOODY program. f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected. g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight. i. General Carter urged that, in connection with General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban countermeasures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail. i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy. 4. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32. General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or but that we must avoid external activities such as. 5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclination to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary. 6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered. 7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated. 8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further. 9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree. 10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the WONGOOSE program.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/202-10001-10187.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 1535, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 665, 1 ], [ 665, 2081, 2 ], [ 2081, 3585, 3 ], [ 3585, 4934, 4 ], [ 4934, 6255, 5 ] ] }
d61e189292bd7927f3e9993f06e814b955b7e37c	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10203 RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 204 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : OSD FROM : TO : TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT DATE : 01/24/62 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State. NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF DATE: MAR 2016 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review A. TASKS Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper. 1. Task 1, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary. 2. Task 2, p. 5. The Cpa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date. 3. Task 3, p. 5. The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information... obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined. 4. Task 4, p. 5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. An intensive program aimed at the acquisition of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4. a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March. b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February. c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February. 5. Task 5, p. 5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials. Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access abroad is under way. 6. Task 6, p. 5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on cover and deception operations by that date. 7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions. 8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date. 9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO officials have been conducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February. 10. Task 21, p. 7. Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance, so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to be directed against crops, particularly rice. 11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedoes and mines toward this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions. The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions (2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking (4) upon the completion of specialized training. All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent re-institution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR. 12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks. 13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph. 14. Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12. 15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel. 16. Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met. 5. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K. Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review. 17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February. 18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon. 19. Section F, p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 20. Section H, p. 1. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated. 21. Section K, p. 4. Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will also be utilized.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/202-10001-10203.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 9, "total-input-tokens": 10583, "total-output-tokens": 2562, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 616, 1 ], [ 616, 1690, 2 ], [ 1690, 2899, 3 ], [ 2899, 4081, 4 ], [ 4081, 5370, 5 ], [ 5370, 6749, 6 ], [ 6749, 7966, 7 ], [ 7966, 9216, 8 ], [ 9216, 9480, 9 ] ] }
4a150818ea959567948e77584c3353db8195786c	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10219 RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 220 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : OSD FROM : TO : TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE PROGRESS DATE : 05/31/62 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE CLASSIFICATION : MEMORANDUM RESTRICTIONS : 1B CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State. [NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION REQUIRED CONCURRENCE OF] DATE: MAR 2016 [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED 31 May 1962 SENSITIVE MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Subject: Operation Mongoose Progress Intelligence build-up by CIA includes efforts to recruit a Cuban diplomat in place and an official in an airline office in Havana. The CIA team placed in Pinar del Rio Province last March was successfully re-supplied by maritime means on 24 May. The Navy and CIA have worked out a cooperative effort to strengthen the U.S. security and intelligence program at Guantanamo. The CAC continues to provide word from inside Cuba covering local security moves and popular unrest (unrest reportedly increasing). A substantial reduction in oil refining and manufacture of tires and tubes is reported from CAC sources. Economic pressure upon the Communist regime may be increased by a Department of Commerce move denying bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessels under Sino-Soviet bloc charter carrying cargo to Cuba. State Department reports having solicited views of our Ambassador to Japan regarding possible approaches to the Japanese asking them to cease sugar purchases from Cuba. Propaganda efforts of USIA and CIA continue to apply pressure upon the Cuban regime by focusing upon abuses of power and failure of key programs such as medical and food. The USIA use of refugees in interviews especially underlined this theme. I am looking into a USIA proposal that we counter Communist Cuba moves to impress Latin America by participation in the athletic North Central American and Caribbean Games set for August 11-21 in Kingston, Jamaica: a "free Cuba" team might be effective, with good publicity support. Incident at Guantanamo occurred 26 May when a light Cuban aircraft landed there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot, at pistol point, to land them at our Naval Base. With State's concurrence, Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the Base. Fracturing the Regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable (including the Minister of National Economy, Leon Boti). Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May, seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA: 1. Task 7. "Voice of Free Cuba," is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging with Navy for use of a submarine. CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime. 2. Task 19. CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castro's attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for "the revolution" he has now betrayed. 3. Task 17. CIA believes it can recruit some 25-man teams for possible use in beating up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The "noise level" hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if timed with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans. Task 23. Counterfeit Currency to increase Cuban economic problems is considered feasible within 30-60 days upon a limited basis and in considerable scale within six months. CIA asks the Group approval before proceeding with this action. Other Tasks. I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, Time magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis. The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our project's goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists. "Eyes Only" copies to: 1. General Taylor 2. Mr. Johnson 3. Mr. Gilpatric 4. Mr. McCona 5. Mr. Kennedy 6. General Kennitzer 7. Chief of Operations	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/202-10001-10219.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4646, "total-output-tokens": 1430, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 595, 1 ], [ 595, 2241, 2 ], [ 2241, 4299, 3 ], [ 4299, 5549, 4 ] ] }
77f08a64dc42cfb8f614ce7339bf8866af8c54ef	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : JCS RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10124 RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : OSD FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE TO : MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS TITLE : CUBAN AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATE : 06/26/65 PAGES : 27 SUBJECTS : ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/98 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. ICCCA report on Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government. EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526 SEC 3.3(b) 5/8 DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016 JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 3/24/38 OKAY TO RELEASE AS DELETED W/CIA CONCURRENCE [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba 1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [Holloway]; from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned. 2. The following topics were discussed: a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed: (1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting. (2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting. (3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions. (4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [Brazil] which suggest postponement of the meeting. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department of State SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U) Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63 In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist. "A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba "4. Harassment of Guantanamo "(a) Cutting off of the water supply" COMMENT: A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed. "(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute" purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders. "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas. "E. Actions Against Targets in the US" "1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings" COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity. "2. Jamming of US radio stations" COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications. The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba. It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT 1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. "A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba "4. Harassment of Guantanamo "(a) Cutting off of the water supply" COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy. "(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute" COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit containing necessary skills, the requisite labor force, and the possible stationing of a repair ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel with appropriate skills. Critical personnel would be transported by air, to arrive within 48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT. "(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lacrimating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. "(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death" COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. Enclosure circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, through increased defense conditions, placing personnel in positions protected from fire, and return of fire if appropriate and required as determined by the Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance. A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another. "(e) Sabotaging of base facilities" COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base. "B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping" "1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage" COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. "C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles" "1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry. "2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory. Enclosure "3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters "4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force, however ships or aircraft ordered to the area of the attack may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized only in those instances where it has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders. "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U.S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U.S. governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the Enclosure Interchange of information between the U.S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas. "E. Actions Against Targets in the US" "1. Sabotage or terrorist bombings" COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity. "2. Jamming of US radio stations" COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications. 2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba. 3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America. MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba 1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [redacted] from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned. 2. The following topics were discussed: a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed: (1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting. (2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting. (3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions. (4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [redacted] which suggest postponement of the meeting. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Department of State SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U) Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63 In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist. "A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba "4. Harassment of Guantanamo "(a) Cutting off of the water supply" COMMENT: In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed. "(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute" COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of "(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action "(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death" COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him. "(e) Sabotaging of base facilities" COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base. "B. Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping" "1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage" COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to "C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles 1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry. 2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory. 3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters. 4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters." COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider," even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean" "E. Actions Against Targets in the US" "1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings" COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity. "2. Jamming of US radio stations" COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications. The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba. It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT 1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. "A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba "4. Harassment of Guantanamo "(a) Cutting off of the water supply" COMMENT Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy. "(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute" COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of "(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action "(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death" COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. Enclosure circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him. "(e) Sabotaging of base facilities" COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base. "B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping" "1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage" COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures. "C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles" "1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry. "2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory." "3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters "4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. "5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean COMMENT "E. Actions Against Targets in the US 1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings" COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity. 2. Jamming of US radio stations" COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications. 2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba. 3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declarations that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or "the harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/202-10002-10124.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 18, "total-input-tokens": 18594, "total-output-tokens": 6252, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1047, 1 ], [ 1047, 2742, 2 ], [ 2742, 4023, 3 ], [ 4023, 5818, 4 ], [ 5818, 7551, 5 ], [ 7551, 9359, 6 ], [ 9359, 11439, 7 ], [ 11439, 13395, 8 ], [ 13395, 15091, 9 ], [ 15091, 16101, 10 ], [ 16101, 17151, 11 ], [ 17151, 18201, 12 ], [ 18201, 19402, 13 ], [ 19402, 20413, 14 ], [ 20413, 21370, 15 ], [ 21370, 22297, 16 ], [ 22297, 24079, 17 ], [ 24079, 25966, 18 ] ] }
527033d2071e250213ab6c969389b766b699a0d0	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|--------------------------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRIEN, RONALD \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| 26,800.00 \| 2,233.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| 27,100.00 \| 2,258.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| 16,000.00 \| 888.89 \| 11-01-78 11-20-78 \| TERMINATED 11-20-78 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM N \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 11-01-78 \| \| 354-42-1661 \| DEPAOLIO, PAUL A \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| 8,000.00 \| 666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DONNEY, JANE LIND \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| 36,400.00 \| 1,011.11 \| 11-01-78 11-10-78 \| TERMINATED 11-10-78 \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 527-96-7881 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 207-46-6088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 062-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 033-40-0589 \| GOLDEN, PAUL T \| XEROX/MESSENGER \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 4,200.00 \| 350.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 11-01-78 \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 251-68-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 29,300.00 \| 2,441.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 219-59-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR \| 41,200.00 \| 0.00 \| LWOP SINCE--07-16-78 \| \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,800.00 \| 2,233.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 19,000.00 \| 1,583.33 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 087-49-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATTHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 31,700.00 \| 2,641.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,300.00 \| 2,191.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 23,000.00 \| 1,916.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 16,700.00 \| 1,391.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORTIARY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 22,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 19,700.00 \| 1,641.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SEC'TY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 16,700.00 \| 1,391.67 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 \| 11-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 526-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4690 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 13,700.00 \| 1,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 027-38-2968 \| WATRISS, HELEN WHITNEY \| ASSISTANT EDITOR \| 27,000.00 \| 2,100.00 \| 11-03-78 11-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 11-03-78 \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,300.00 \| 2,191.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 049-34-0893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 171-30-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10079.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 6892, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3121, 1 ], [ 3121, 6348, 2 ], [ 6348, 9243, 3 ], [ 9243, 11399, 4 ] ] }
2c84f7a0fa18454438681f52a9c755823d4faf6c	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRIEN, RONALD \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 26,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,800.00 \| 2,233.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,100.00 \| 2,258.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 888.89 \| 11-01-78 11-20-78 \| TERMINATED 11-20-78 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 11-01-78 \| \| 354-42-1661 \| DEPAOLO, PAUL A \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 8,000.00 \| 666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 1,011.11 \| 11-01-78 11-10-78 \| TERMINATED 11-10-78 \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|---------------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|--------------------------\| \| 527-96-7681 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A. JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 033-40-0589 \| GOLDEN, PAUL T \| XEROX/MESSENGER \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 4,200.00 \| 350.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 11-01-78 \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 29,300.00 \| 2,441.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR--KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET DFCR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 0.00 \| \| LWOP SINCE--07-16-78 \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, EUNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 26,800.00 \| 2,233.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L. III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 19,000.00 \| 1,583.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHews, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 31,700.00 \| 2,641.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,300.00 \| 2,191.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 23,000.00 \| 1,916.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 16,700.00 \| 1,391.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 19,700.00 \| 1,641.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 211-30-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, A JANE \| RESEARCHER \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 16,700.00 \| 1,391.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-78 \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 22,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 13,700.00 \| 1,141.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 027-38-2968 \| WATRISS, HELEN WHITNEY \| ASSISTANT EDITOR \| 27,000.00 \| 2,100.00 \| 11-03-78 11-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 11-03-78 \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,300.00 \| 2,191.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-78 11-30-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10080.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 7087, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3499, 1 ], [ 3499, 7292, 2 ], [ 7292, 10241, 3 ], [ 10241, 12349, 4 ] ] }
b43cbdc267fb4a442481760e05ad728471656edf	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRIEN, RONALD \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,800.00 \| 2,233.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLO, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 579-50-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 263-09-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| COLLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 354-42-1661 \| DEPAOLO, PAUL A \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 462-80-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 8,000.00 \| 666.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DONLEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR--KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 527-98-7081 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 136-28-6024 \| FORZI, GASTON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZIANI, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 033-40-0589 \| GOLDEN, PAUL T \| XEROX/MESSENGER \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,600.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 129-38-7623 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,600.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E RICK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 0.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| LWOP SINCE--07-16-78 \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARCO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,800.00 \| 2,233.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 16,600.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 26,300.00 \| 2,191.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 047-34-7188 \| MCDONALD, JAMES E \| SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL \| 33,000.00 \| 2,111.11 \| 10-01-78 10-02-78 \| TERMINATED 10-02-78 \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARCH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 23,000.00 \| 1,916.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORTARY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 237-00-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, CALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM. SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 570-68-0305 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 520-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 13,700.00 \| 1,141.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 26,300.00 \| 2,191.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 049-34-6893 \| WOOD, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 102-40-5872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 16,800.00 \| 1,400.00 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--10-01-78 \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 10-01-78 10-31-78 \| \| DATE 11/03/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/78 TO 10/31/78 OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00 \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY \| EMPLOYEES \| THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES \| SALARY PROJECTION USED \| \|-----------\|---------------------------------\|------------------------\| \| CLERICAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| PROFESSIONAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| SUB TOTAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| INVESTIGATIVE \| 86 85 \| 163,277.80 \| 163,066.69 \| \| GRAND TOTAL \| 86 85 \| 163,277.80 \| 163,066.69 \| I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON. [Signature] Chairman, House Administration Comm.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10081.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 7251, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2951, 1 ], [ 2951, 5945, 2 ], [ 5945, 8937, 3 ], [ 8937, 10511, 4 ], [ 10511, 11863, 5 ] ] }
c375080999b0b372f5d902ae84a4a87e6d1da13b	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRINE, RONALD \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 327-48-4790 \| BERLOH, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5707 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G RODERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,550.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 556-70-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| TERMINATED 08-31-78 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 438-06-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROM L A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 351-42-1661 \| DEPAOLO, PAUL A \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 8,000.00 \| 666.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--09-01-78 \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 527-96-7881 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 207-46-6088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 033-40-0569 \| GOLDEN, PAUL T \| XEROX/MESSENGER \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 056-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 22,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRINES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 875.00 \| 09-01-78 09-15-78 TERMINATED 09-15-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 251-68-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 0.00 \| LWOP SINCE--07-16-78 \| \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 579-56-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 047-34-7188 \| MCDONALD, JAMES E \| SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL \| 38,000.00 \| 3,166.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| Terminated 10-2-78 \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWN C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 506-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, GABARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|------------------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST. \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 542-60-3245 \| WEBB, DEAN B \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 550.00 \| 09-01-78 09-11-78 TERMINATED 09-11-78 \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 20,900.00 \| 0.00 \| \| TERMINATED 08-31-78 \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6687 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 09-01-78 09-30-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10082.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 7018, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3350, 1 ], [ 3350, 6265, 2 ], [ 6265, 9197, 3 ], [ 9197, 11613, 4 ] ] }
1756fff8bfcc2f3e375a1b919185971e6e3960a4	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRIEN, RONALD \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLO, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SUELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 579-50-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 430-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASSISTANT DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 354-42-1661 \| DEPAOLO, PAUL A \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNER, ILENE GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 4,000.00 \| 333.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DUNN, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| Remarks: - Term 8/31/78 - Appointment 08-01-78 - P/R Change 08-01-78 - Terminated 07-31-78 \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|-------------\|-----------\|------------------\| \| 100-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| 33,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 527-96-7881 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 062-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FORZI, GAETON J \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 033-40-0589 \| GOLDEN, PAUL T \| 11,500.00 \| 766.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 08-07-78 \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 148-52-9861 \| GREEN, CHARLOTTE A \| 6,240.00 \| 0.00 \| \| \| TERMINATED 07-31-78 \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| Term 9-15-78 \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| 27,600.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAYMAN, ALAN B \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 220-40-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| 27,000.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MICK \| 41,200.00 \| 0.00 \| \| \| LWOP SINCE 07-16-78 \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 223-36-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 08-01-78 \| 08-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KEITH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 07-31-78 \| TERMINATED 07-31-78 \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATTHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 047-34-7188 \| MCDONALD, JAMES E \| SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL \| 38,000.00 \| 3,166.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| Term 10-2-78 \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCKARGH, KEITH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAVID C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORTARY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,550.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 430-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| TERMINATED 07-31-78 \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| AOM SECY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 542-60-3245 \| WEBB, DEAN B \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 102-40-6072 \| WELBURN, MENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 169-20-6880 \| WELLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 20,900.00 \| 1,741.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 171-30-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 08-01-78 08-31-78 \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10083.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 7336, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3383, 1 ], [ 3383, 6469, 2 ], [ 6469, 9719, 3 ], [ 9719, 12000, 4 ] ] }
029eda55dc8701f793a1d00aac23a9802558ed22	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRIEN, RONALD \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 300-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLO, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 P/R CHANGE--07-01-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 579-50-3427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 098-26-3192 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| \| 414-93-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 583.33 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| \| 063-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 436-83-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST YO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 220-35-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| \| 229-26-8374 \| DAVY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,066.67 \| 07-01-78 07-16-78 TERMINATED 07-16-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1332 \| DINKEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00* \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| Terminated 7/9/78 \| \| 576-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 527-96-7881 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00* \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER-Staff Counsel \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALEZ, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| \| 149-52-9661 \| GREEN, CHARLOTTE A \| SUMMER INTERN \| 6,240.00 \| 520.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 1,038.89 \| 07-01-78 07-11-78 TERMINATED 07-11-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK** \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 1,716.67 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 \| LWOP SINCE 07-16-78 \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 437-92-532C \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 060-30-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| TERMINATED 06-30-78 \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAXON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 450.00 \| 07-01-78 07-09-78 \| TERMINATED 07-09-78 \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHews, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 047-34-7168 \| MCDONALD, JAMES E \| SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL \| 38,000.00 \| 3,166.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 301-40-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCFHerson, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 712.50 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L* \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--07-01-78 \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| TERMINATED 06-30-78 \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6640 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 666.67 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 583.33 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-31-78 \| \| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| RESEARCHER \| 19,300.00 \| 804.17 \| 07-01-78 \| 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, HEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 542-60-3245 \| WEBB, DEAN B \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8693 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE—07-01-78 \| \| 169-28-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 20,900.00 \| 1,741.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 171-39-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 07-01-78 07-31-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRAE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 07-01-78 07-15-78 \| TERMINATED 07-15-78 \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10084.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 8870, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3401, 1 ], [ 3401, 6189, 2 ], [ 6189, 8975, 3 ], [ 8975, 11868, 4 ], [ 11868, 13599, 5 ] ] }
561af8bff402037f526c466c9be3ffbbd18b7237	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| ADRIEN, RONALD \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 27,000.00 \| 1,950.00 \| 06-05-78 06-30-78 \| APPOINTMENT 06-05-78 \| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTEI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S. JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G. ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 579-58-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--06-01-78 \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 480-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 229-26-8374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--06-01-78 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 527-96-7861 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 148-52-9861 \| GREEN, CHARLOTTE A \| SUMMER INTERN \| 6,240.00 \| 520.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1366 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 226-10-4799 \| MUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--06-01-78 \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 05-31-78 \| TERMINATED 05-31-78 \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATTHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 047-34-7188 \| MCDONALD, JAMES E \| SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL \| 38,000.00 \| 3,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DANNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORTIARY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 791.67 \| 06-01-78 06-19-78 TERMINATED 06-19-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 542-60-3245 \| WEBB, DEAN B \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| 20,900.00 \| 1,741.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRASE, RICHARD C \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 06-01-78 06-30-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10085.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 8918, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3115, 1 ], [ 3115, 6752, 2 ], [ 6752, 10170, 3 ], [ 10170, 13102, 4 ], [ 13102, 15003, 5 ] ] }
63a691075b4808af9fc3cb0de492b619c9b4c033	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 290-60-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--05-01-78 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 099-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 066-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 229-26-8374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|--------------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|--------------------------\| \| 578-32-6132\| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284\| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 242-28-3222\| ECCLES, FRANK L \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723\| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805\| EVANS, EDWARD M \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 527-96-7881\| EWING, MICHAEL \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8088\| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909\| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734\| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924\| FONZI, GAETON J \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438\| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041\| GODFREY, JANE E \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772\| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 082-14-2877\| GONZALES, ALBERT \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 148-52-9861\| GREEN, CHARLOTTE A \| 6,240.00 \| 329.33 \| 05-12-78 05-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 05-12-78 \| \| 212-56-6718\| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353\| HACK, ALFRED S \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541\| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952\| HARDWAY, DAN L \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823\| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696\| HESS, JACQUELINE \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 219-56-7593\| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 194-30-5931\| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386\| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799\| HUTTON, E MCK \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| SDC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 577-76-1080 \| JACKSON, BEVERLY \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 600.00 \| 05-15-78 05-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 05-15-78 \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARCO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 233-92-1262 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHews, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEO DIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 047-34-7188 \| MCDONALD, JAMES E \| SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL \| 38,000.00 \| 3,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| RESEARCHER \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 542-60-3245 \| WEBB, DEAN B \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3652 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 20,900.00 \| 1,741.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--05-01-78 \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRAE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 05-01-78 05-31-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10086.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 8637, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2868, 1 ], [ 2868, 6382, 2 ], [ 6382, 9775, 3 ], [ 9775, 12685, 4 ], [ 12685, 14988, 5 ] ] }
59e048e4e5c72e217192f4f4b027c51b970c7b00	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 290-50-4529 \| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355 \| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 13,700.00 \| 1,141.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--04-01-78 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9427 \| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 229-26-8374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|-----------------------\| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 527-96-7881 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 27,800.00 \| 77.22 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| TERMINATED 04-01-78 \| \| 207-46-6088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 136-28-6924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAVE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORTIARY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| NORRIS, ELIZABETH BROWN\| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| P/R CHANGE--04-01-78 \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| 25,700.00 \| 1,856.11 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-26-78 \| TERMINATED 04-26-78 \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 579-60-0395 \| SMITH, CONSTANCE C \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 1,125.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYNN \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| RESEARCHER \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 04-01-78 \| 04-30-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|--------------------------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPPLET, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 542-60-3245 \| WEBB, DEAN B \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6680 \| WILLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRASE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 04-01-78 04-30-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10087.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 9022, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3462, 1 ], [ 3462, 7291, 2 ], [ 7291, 10909, 3 ], [ 10909, 13903, 4 ], [ 13903, 16168, 5 ] ] }
aa19ebf0337b75de12fab3a0363c57f06f0e6210	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| FROM PERIOD \| TO PERIOD \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 416-54-2948\| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227\| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 075-14-0710\| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592\| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 290-50-4529\| BERK, CHARLES M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-15-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-15-78 \| \| 327-48-4790\| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548\| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 139-24-4355\| BILLINGS, RICHARD N \| EDITORIAL CHIEF \| 30,000.00 \| 2,083.33 \| 03-06-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-06-78 \| \| 243-74-5707\| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 243-48-4536\| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139\| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 579-58-9427\| BRIGGS, YVONNE W \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 666.67 \| 03-15-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-15-78 \| \| 237-90-5178\| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 098-20-3182\| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 438-48-7116\| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| \| \| TERMINATED 02-28-78 \| \| 414-98-4025\| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 086-46-9506\| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 024-44-5163\| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756\| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234\| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 460-74-1179\| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 579-40-4377\| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 17,500.00 \| 1,458.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 220-36-0563\| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 132-14-2717\| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 229-28-8374\| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| TO \| TERMINATED \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|----\|------------\|---------\| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| 02-26-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 527-96-7081 \| EWING, MICHAEL \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 900.00 \| 03-13-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| APPOINTMENT 03-13-78 \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 36,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 32,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 194-30-5931\| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| 34,000.00 \| 2,633.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386\| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799\| HUTTON, E MCK \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 128-20-8996\| ISRAEL, MAURICE \| 24,000.00 \| 533.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-08-78 \| TERMINATED 03-08-78 \| \| 437-92-5320\| JACKSON, MARGO E \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743\| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135\| JOHNSON, GENE R \| 44,500.00 \| 3,708.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 578-58-2498\| JONES, DIANA N \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 103-18-7227\| KELLY, JAMES P \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 161-38-7640\| KILKER, ELIZABETH A \| 17,100.00 \| 807.50 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-17-78 \| TERMINATED 03-17-78 \| \| 068-38-5091\| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 074-30-3065\| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962\| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 579-58-9975\| LAWSON, BELFORD L,III \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 093-42-2090\| LEE, SHELLA JACKSON \| 25,700.00 \| 0.00 \| \| \| TERMINATED 02-28-78 \| \| 071-28-5111\| LEHNER, ROBERT J \| 45,500.00 \| 0.00 \| \| \| TERMINATED 02-28-78 \| \| 042-52-4602\| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE\| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 534-50-0480\| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972\| LOCKE, RALPH C \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2185\| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 338-48-1298\| MARS, MITCHELL A \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 237-56-8144\| MASON, M C \| 18,000.00 \| 1,100.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-22-78 \| TERMINATED 03-22-78 \| \| 013-34-3361\| MATTHEWS, ISIAH C \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 526-74-9097\| MATTHEWS, LEDDIS C \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111\| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 301-46-2531 \| MCHARGH, KENNETH S \| STAFF ATTORNEY \| 27,000.00 \| 2,550.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 22,500.00 \| 1,875.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 375.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-09-78 \| TERMINATED 03-09-78 \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 192-34-0781 \| RIFE, REBECCA A \| SECRETARY \| 13,500.00 \| 937.50 \| 03-06-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-06-78 \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 042-42-5437 \| SACCO, THOMAS W \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 200.00 \| 03-27-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-27-78 \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 15,500.00 \| 1,291.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 114-44-4360 \| SHAPIRO, HOWARD L \| RESEARCHER ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 500.00 \| 03-21-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-21-78 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|--------------------------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 245-56-4327 \| Sisson, Betty Lou \| Secretary \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| Smith, Beverly \| Clerk Typist \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 578-68-0385 \| Smith, Constance C \| Secretary \| 13,500.00 \| 675.00 \| 03-13-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-13-78 \| \| 528-64-5299 \| Smith, Johanna Lynn \| Document Clerk \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| Speiser, Mark A \| Staff Counsel \| 22,000.00 \| 2,666.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 227-76-3525 \| Strickland, Ann Lyon \| Secretary \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| Svendsen, Lance W \| Clerical Assistant \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 036-34-9187 \| Taylor, Ann Furnald \| Researcher \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 216-34-9326 \| Thomas, Joseph A \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 550-50-7581 \| Trippett, William K \| Staff Counsel \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| Wagner, Olive E \| Staff Assistant \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 260-40-7319 \| Walker, Robert J \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| Waxman, Mel \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 542-60-3245 \| Webb, Dean B \| Research Attorney \| 18,000.00 \| 550.00 \| 03-20-78 \| 03-31-78 \| APPOINTMENT 03-20-78 \| \| 049-34-8893 \| Webb, William A \| Staff Counsel \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 \| \| 102-40-6872 \| Welburn, Brenda L \| Researcher \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 247-76-3852 \| Wilander, Anne Paul \| Staff Assistant \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6880 \| Wills, Marion H \| Assistant Chief Clerk \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| Wizelman, Leslie H \| Researcher \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| Wolf, Elizabeth Ann \| Researcher \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| Wolf, James Lerer \| Dep Chief Counsel, Legal Unit \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| Wrase, Richard C \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 03-01-78 \| 03-31-78 \| \| DATE 04/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PAYROLL CERTIFICATION REPORT ID 001.00.00 ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78 OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00 SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY \| EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID/ACTIVE \| THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED \| SALARY PROJECTION USED \| \|---------------------------------\|--------------------------------------\|------------------------\| \| CLERICAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| PROFESSIONAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| SUB TOTAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| INVESTIGATIVE \| 118 114 \| 209,945.00 \| 213,316.67 \| \| GRAND TOTAL \| 118 114 \| 209,945.00 \| 213,316.67 \| I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON Allowed Chairman, House Administration Comm.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10088.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6858, "total-output-tokens": 10490, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 4240, 1 ], [ 4240, 8422, 2 ], [ 8422, 11675, 3 ], [ 11675, 14775, 4 ], [ 14775, 18405, 5 ], [ 18405, 19922, 6 ] ] }
1e3b1d3deeb6a1d917bf6fa3a847c5a97f4a0051	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| SENIOR COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| P/R CHANGE--02-01-78 \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 22,000.00 \| 1,833.33 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-29-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-29-78 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 438-48-7116 \| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 438-88-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASSIST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 229-26-8374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 \| 02-28-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 579-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 14,500.00 \| 1,208.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| P/R CHANGE--02-01-78 \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 272-42-7056 \| GAY, DONOVAN L \| CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 38,500.00 \| 0.00 \| 01-31-78 \| TERMINATED 01-31-78 \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 129-36-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 128-20-8996 \| Israel, Maurice \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| Jackson, Marjorie E \| Document Clerk \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| Johnson, Ernestine G \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| Johnson, Gene R \| Deputy Chief Counsel \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| P/R CHANGE--02-01-78 \| \| 579-58-2498 \| Jones, Diana N \| Secretary \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| Kelly, James P \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 161-38-7640 \| Kilker, Elizabeth A \| Secretary \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| Klein, Kenneth D \| Staff Counsel \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| Kreidman, Melvin \| Staff Counsel \| 34,000.00 \| 2,633.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| Larkin, Joyce Ann \| Secretary \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| Lawson, Belford L, III \| Staff Counsel \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 093-42-2090 \| Lee, Sheila Jackson \| Staff Counsel \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 071-28-5111 \| Lehner, Robert J \| Deputy Chief Counsel \| 45,500.00 \| 3,791.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| Lichtenfels, Beth Anne \| Documents Control Clerk \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| Lindley, Robin D \| Researcher \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| Locke, Ralph C \| Researcher \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 087-40-2165 \| Lopez, Edwin J \| Researcher \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| Mars, Mitchell A \| Researcher \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 237-56-8144 \| Mason, M C \| Researcher/Secretary \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| Mathews, Isiah C \| Special Counsel \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| Matthews, Leodis C \| Staff Counsel \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| Maxwell, Albert \| Staff Investigator \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 301-46-2531 \| McHugh, Kenneth S \| Staff Attorney \| 27,000.00 \| 675.00 \| 02-22-78 02-28-78 \| APPOINTMENT 02-22-78 \| \| 240-66-7674 \| McPherson, Vivian L. \| Executive Assistant \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| Miller, Dawne C \| Administrative Assistant \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| P/R CHANGE--02-01-78 \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORRIS, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 029-36-8530 \| SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| SDC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|--------------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 036-34-9187\| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| RESEARCHER \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 216-34-9326\| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 550-50-7581\| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012\| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 260-40-7319\| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521\| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8893\| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872\| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852\| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6880\| WILLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757\| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221\| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6687\| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784\| WRASE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 02-01-78 02-28-78 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10089.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 9057, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3819, 1 ], [ 3819, 7476, 2 ], [ 7476, 11140, 3 ], [ 11140, 14791, 4 ], [ 14791, 17056, 5 ] ] }
30e8a89ce8fd232fa74ab32d569dc00b5791b768	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 22,000.00 \| 1,633.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 579-46-5458 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S. JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 438-48-7116 \| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 229-26-8374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DONNEY, JANE LIND \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 14,500.00 \| 1,208.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,633.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 207-46-8098 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 272-42-7056 \| GAY, DONOVAN L. \| CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 251-68-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,633.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 128-20-6996 \| ISRAEL, MAURICE \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE P \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 577-56-7465 \| JOHNSON, LILLIAN B \| SECRETARY \| 13,000.00 \| 433.33 \| 01-01-78 01-12-78 TERMINATED 01-12-78 \| \| \| 576-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 161-38-7640 \| KILKER, ELIZABETH A \| SECRETARY \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L,III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 093-42-2090 \| LEE, SHEILA JACKSON \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 071-28-5111 \| LEHNER, ROBERT J \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 45,500.00 \| 3,791.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE\| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 237-56-8144 \| MASON, M C \| RESEARCHER/SECRETARY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATTHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DANNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| P/R CHANGE--01-01-78 \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENSON, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 01-01-78 01-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| 19,300.00 \| 1,606.33 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 102-40-6872 \| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 247-78-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 169-28-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRAE, RICHARD C \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 01-01-78 \| 01-31-78 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY \| EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID/ACTIVE \| THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES \| SALARY PROJECTION USED \| \|---------------------------------\|---------------------------------\|------------------------\| \| CLERICAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| PROFESSIONAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| SUB TOTAL \| .00 \| .00 \| \| INVESTIGATIVE \| 114 113 \| 210,341.66 \| 209,908.33 \| \| GRAND TOTAL \| 114 113 \| 210,341.66 \| 209,908.33 \| I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON. Allowed: Chairman, House Administration Comm.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10090.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6858, "total-output-tokens": 9281, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2944, 1 ], [ 2944, 6582, 2 ], [ 6582, 10220, 3 ], [ 10220, 13871, 4 ], [ 13871, 15662, 5 ], [ 15662, 17048, 6 ] ] }
7efaebff129e8300164bc63750589039d21c11e7	\| SDC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| STAFF COUNSEL \| $25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $22,000.00 \| 1,633.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| $28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| $15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| $23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| $25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| $47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| $28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| $15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 438-48-7116 \| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| $12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 086-46-0506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| $11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| $18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-29-77 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-29-77 \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| $16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| $12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| $42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| $16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 229-26-0374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| $15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DOWNEY, JANE LIND \| SECRETARY \| $15,000.00 \| 41.67 \| 12-30-77 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-30-77 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 576-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 14,500.00 \| 1,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,033.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 272-42-7056 \| GAY, DONOVAN L. \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZIN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 251-08-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 559-28-5038 \| HOLT, LAURA MAE \| SECRETARY \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| TERMINATED 11-30-77 \| 11/4/77 \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| ✓ 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 128-20-0996 \| ISRAEL, MAURICE\| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E\| DOCUMENT CLERK \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G\| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL\| ✓ 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 577-56-7465 \| JOHNSON, LILLIAN B\| SECRETARY \| ✓ 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 577-32-9574 \| JOHNSON, ALICE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| ✓ 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| TERMINATED 11-30-77 \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| ✓ 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 161-38-7640 \| KILKER, ELIZABETH A\| SECRETARY \| ✓ 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 371-32-3731 \| KUHN, DOROTHY W \| RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST \| ✓ 14,000.00 \| 777.78 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-20-77 \| TERMINATED 12-20-77 \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN\| SECRETARY \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III\| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 093-42-2090 \| LEE, SHEILA JACKSON\| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 071-28-5111 \| LEHNER, ROBERT J \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| ✓ 45,500.00 \| 3,791.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE\| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK\| ✓ 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 087-48-2185 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 237-56-8144 \| MASON, M C \| RESEARCHER/SECRETARY \| ✓ 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| ✓ 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 528-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C\| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| $17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| $21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| $14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| $21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| $15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| $18,000.00 \| 200.00 \| 12-27-77 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-27-77 \| \| 215-66-2714 \| QRR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| $18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| QRR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| $16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| $18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH \| SECRETARY \| $15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| $25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| $12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| $16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| $15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 048-58-4432 \| ROSEN, MERETE MUFF \| RESEARCHER \| $18,000.00 \| 0.00 \| \| TERMINATED 11-30-77 \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| $20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| $19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| $14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| $16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| $14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| $11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|--------------------------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 528-64-5299\| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 023-36-0715\| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 227-76-3525\| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 264-98-4680\| SVENSDEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| ✓ 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 036-34-9187\| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 216-34-9326\| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 550-50-7581\| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 101-22-5012\| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| ✓ 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 260-40-7319\| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 087-26-0521\| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 049-34-6893\| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| ✓ 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 102-40-6872\| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 41.67 \| 12-30-77 \| 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-30-77 \| \| 247-78-3852\| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 169-28-6880\| WILLS, MARION H \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| ✓ 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 171-38-3757\| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| ✓ 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 363-52-5221\| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| ✓ 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 057-40-6887\| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| ✓ 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 113-18-5784\| WRASE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| ✓ 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10091.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 9965, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3729, 1 ], [ 3729, 7499, 2 ], [ 7499, 11405, 3 ], [ 11405, 14447, 4 ], [ 14447, 17716, 5 ] ] }
917f94abc1f80f1de4787f627080c256a2750b3b	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BACETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 22,000.00 \| 1,833.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| CHIEF CLERK \| 23,600.00 \| 1,966.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 438-48-7116 \| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 024-44-5163 \| COLLINS, WENDY S \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-29-77 \| 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-29-77 \| \| 438-86-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 229-26-0374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 462-00-1032 \| DINNEEN, EILEEN GAIL \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-30-77 \| \| 454-52-5820 \| DONNEY, JANE LIND \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-20-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 14,500.00 \| 1,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,633.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 272-42-7056 \| GAY, DONOVAN L \| CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| OFFICE MANAGER \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 212-58-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 559-28-5038 \| HOLT, LAURA MAE \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| TERMINATED 11-30-77 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,633.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 41,200.00 \| 3,433.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 128-20-0996 \| ISRAEL, MAURICE\| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E\| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-58-7465 \| JOHNSON, ELIZABETH B \| SECRETARY \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 577-03-0674 \| JOHNSTON, ALICE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 12,000.00 \| 0.00 \| \| \| TERMINATED 11-30-77 \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 161-38-7640 \| KILKER, ELIZABETH A \| SECRETARY \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,400.00 \| 3,033.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 371-32-3731 \| KUHN, DOROTHY W \| RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST \| 14,000.00 \| 777.78 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-20-77 \| TERMINATED 12-20-77 \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 080-42-2090 \| LEE, SHEILA JACKSON \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 071-28-5111 \| LEHNER, ROBERT J \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 45,500.00 \| 3,791.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 042-52-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 087-48-2185 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 237-56-8144 \| MASON, M C \| RESEARCHER/SECRETARY \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHews, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATHews, LEDIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWN C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 32,100.00 \| 2,675.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 21,400.00 \| 1,783.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 129-36-3080 \| OPPENBERG, GALE LYNN \| RESEARCH ATTORNEY \| 18,000.00 \| 200.00 \| 12-27-77 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-27-77 \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 211-36-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 048-66-4432 \| ROSE, MARIE E \| RESEARCHER \| 10,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| TERMINATED 11-30-77 \| \| 227-16-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 12-01-77 12-31-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 528-64-5299\| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 023-36-0715\| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 227-76-3525\| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 264-98-4680\| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 036-34-9187\| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| RESEARCHER \| 19,300.00 \| 1,608.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 216-34-9326\| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 550-50-7581\| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 101-22-5012\| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 260-40-7319\| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 087-26-0521\| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 049-34-8893\| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \| \| 102-40-6872\| WELBURN, BRENDA L \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 15,000.00 \| 41.67 \| 12-30-77 \| 12-31-77 \| APPOINTMENT 12-30-77 \| \| 247-78-3852\| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 169-28-6880\| WILLS, MARION H \| ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 171-38-3757\| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 383-52-5221\| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| RESEARCHER \| 16,100.00 \| 1,341.67 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 057-40-6887\| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 \| \| 113-18-5784\| WRASE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 12-01-77 \| 12-31-77 \| \|	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10092.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 9854, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 4234, 1 ], [ 4234, 7260, 2 ], [ 7260, 11075, 3 ], [ 11075, 14105, 4 ], [ 14105, 17226, 5 ] ] }
29a11d4675c3065164736ddf6e48cabd1c2000b1	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|----\|---------\| \| 416-54-2948 \| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 390-44-4227 \| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 22,000.00 \| 1,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 075-14-0710 \| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 1,133.33 \| 11-14-77 \| 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-14-77 \| \| 046-36-4592 \| BEESON, PETER G \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 327-46-4790 \| BERLOW, LISA M \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-46-4548 \| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| SECRETARY \| 22,000.00 \| 1,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 243-74-5787 \| BLACKMER, S. JONATHAN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 243-48-4536 \| BLAKEY, G. ROBERT \| CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 556-78-1139 \| BRADY, SURELL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 237-90-5178 \| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 098-20-3182 \| BROWN, WILLIAM \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 438-48-7116 \| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 414-98-4025 \| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 086-46-9506 \| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| CLERICAL ASSISTANT \| 9,500.00 \| 791.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 438-66-9756 \| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 263-08-0234 \| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 462-88-1832 \| COPELAND, EILEEN \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 460-74-1179 \| CORNWELL, GARY T \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-40-4377 \| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 220-36-0563 \| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 132-14-2717 \| DALY, MARTIN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 229-26-6374 \| DAY, CLARENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 436-62-4154 \| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 578-32-6132 \| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| SECRETARY \| 14,500.00 \| 1,208.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 324-40-6284 \| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|---------------\|---------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 36,000.00 \| 3,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELEY, ELIZABETH C \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 333.33 \| 11-21-77 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-21-77 \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 36,000.00 \| 3,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 272-42-7056 \| GAY, DONOVAN L \| CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 219-40-9759 \| GIANGRASSO, DOMINICK K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| TERMINATED 10-31-77 \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 559-28-5038 \| HOLT, LAURA MAE \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 015-18-1386 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 128-20-8996 \| ISRAEL, MAURICE \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARCO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 223-38-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 577-56-7465 \| JOHNSON, LILLIAN B \| SECRETARY \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 577-32-9574 \| JOHNSTON, ALICE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 161-38-7640 \| KILKER, ELIZABETH A \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, HELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,172.22 \| 11-08-77 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-08-77 \| \| 371-32-3731 \| KUHN, DOROTHY W \| RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L, III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 093-42-2090 \| LEE, SHEILA JACKSON \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 071-28-5111 \| LEHNER, ROBERT J \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 042-92-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 237-56-8144 \| MASON, M C \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATTHEWS, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|-------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| 17,100.00 \| 1,429.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-24-3862 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| 15,000.00 \| 416.67 \| 11-21-77 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-21-77 \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 048-58-4432 \| ROSEN, MERETE MUFF \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| \|------------\|--------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| XEROX/MESSENGER \| 9,500.00 \| 791.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 247-70-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 169-28-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 057-40-6887 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,000.00 \| 3,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRASE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassination PAYROLL CERTIFICATION OFFICE CODE: 83000 ACCOUNTING PERIOD: 1/1/77 TO 11/30/77 \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER \| PAY SCHEDULE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|---------------\|------------------------\|--------------\|---------------\|-----------\|-------------\|-----------\|---------\| \| Alice E. Johnston \| 577-32-9574 \| 12,000.00 \| $466.67 \| X \| 11/1/77 - 11/14/77 \| Term. 11/14 \| \| Receptionist \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Laura Mae Holt \| 559-28-5038 \| 24,000.00 \| $266.67 \| X \| 11/1/77 - 11/4/77 \| Term. 11/4 \| \| Staff Counsel \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY \| NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES \| LEAVE W/O PAY \| AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH \| EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH \| NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF \| NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF \| \|---------------------\|--------------\|--------------------------\|-------------------------\|-----------------------------\|-----------------------------\| \| 2 \| \| \| $733.34 \| \| \| I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon. 151 Chairman, House Administration Committee	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10093.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6858, "total-output-tokens": 9316, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2855, 1 ], [ 2855, 5788, 2 ], [ 5788, 9437, 3 ], [ 9437, 12344, 4 ], [ 12344, 14496, 5 ], [ 14496, 15978, 6 ] ] }
c5924ef3671c7e89e12660f0fbede45733e88fd9	\| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 416-54-2948\| AKERS, JEREMY RAY \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE—11-01-77 \| \| 390-44-4227\| BAETZ, CONRAD E \| 22,000.00 \| 1,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 075-14-0710\| BASTERI, JOSEPH J \| 24,000.00 \| 1,133.33 \| 11-14-77 \| 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-14-77 \| \| 046-36-4592\| BEECH, PETER G \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 327-46-4790\| BERLOW, LISA M \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-46-4548\| BERNING, ELIZABETH L \| 22,000.00 \| 1,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 243-74-5787\| BLACKMER, S JONATHAN \| 25,700.00 \| 2,141.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE—11-01-77 \| \| 243-48-4536\| BLAKEY, G ROBERT \| 47,500.00 \| 3,958.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 556-78-1139\| BRADY, SURELL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 237-90-5178\| BROWN, ELIZABETH METTS \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 098-20-3182\| BROWN, WILLIAM \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 438-48-7116\| BURAS, ROBERT C, JR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 414-98-4025\| BURFORD, JUDITH R \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 086-46-9506\| CHAMPION, OLIVER J \| 9,500.00 \| 791.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 438-86-9756\| CONZELMAN, JAMES K \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 263-08-0234\| COOPER, CYNTHIA SUE \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 462-88-1832\| DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK\| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 460-74-1179\| CORNWELL, GARY T \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-40-4377\| CROSS, WILLIAM H \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 220-36-0563\| CULLINGS, JEROME A \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 132-14-2717\| DALY, MARTIN J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 229-26-8374\| DAY, CLARENCE J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 436-62-4154\| DELSA, LAWRENCE J \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 578-32-6132\| EAGLE, MARJORIE A \| 14,500.00 \| 1,208.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 324-40-6284\| EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 242-28-3222 \| ECCLES, FRANK L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 108-30-7723 \| EMANUEL, CARYL M \| \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 129-22-1805 \| EVANS, EDWARD M \| SECRETARY \| 36,000.00 \| 3,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 341-44-6951 \| FACTER, JEFFREY \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 207-46-8088 \| FEELY, ELIZABETH C \| STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT \| 12,000.00 \| 333.33 \| 11-21-77 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-21-77 \| \| 082-22-5909 \| FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR \| CHIEF INVESTIGATOR \| 36,000.00 \| 3,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 214-60-6734 \| FLANAGAN, T MARK \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 136-28-8924 \| FONZI, GAETON J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 272-42-7056 \| GAY, DONOVAN L \| CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE—11-01-77 \| \| 299-50-7438 \| GENZMAN, ROBERT W \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 219-40-9759 \| GIANGRASSO, DOMINICK K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 0.00 \| \| TERMINATED 10-31-77 \| \| 119-36-4041 \| GODFREY, JANE E \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 058-44-6772 \| GOLDSMITH, MICHAEL \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 082-14-2877 \| GONZALES, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 212-56-6718 \| GRIMES, MARY SUSAN \| RESEARCHER \| 21,000.00 \| 1,750.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-22-9353 \| HACK, ALFRED S \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 251-88-1541 \| HAMILTON, GERALD P \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 263-17-0952 \| HARDWAY, DAN L \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 129-38-7823 \| HAUSMAN, ALAN B \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 220-48-5696 \| HESS, JACQUELINE \| DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER \| 27,800.00 \| 2,316.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE—11-01-77 \| \| 219-58-7593 \| HINDLE, LOUIS H \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 559-28-5038 \| HOLT, LAURA MAE \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 194-30-5931 \| HORNBECK, JOHN W \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 015-18-1366 \| HOWARTH, THOMAS \| BUDGET OFFICER \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 226-10-4799 \| HUTTON, E MCK \| DEPUTY DIRECTOR \| 38,500.00 \| 3,208.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| SDC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM \| TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|-------------\|------\|---------\| \| 128-20-8996 \| ISRAEL, MAURICE \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 437-92-5320 \| JACKSON, MARGO E \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 223-36-6743 \| JOHNSON, ERNESTINE G \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 371-40-1135 \| JOHNSON, GENE R \| ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 577-56-7465 \| JOHNSON, LILLIAN B \| SECRETARY \| 13,000.00 \| 1,083.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 577-32-9574 \| JOHNSTON, ALICE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 578-58-2498 \| JONES, DIANA N \| SECRETARY \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 103-18-7227 \| KELLY, JAMES P \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 161-38-7640 \| KILKER, ELIZABETH A \| SECRETARY \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 068-38-5091 \| KLEIN, KENNETH D \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,833.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 074-30-3065 \| KREIDMAN, MELVIN \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 34,000.00 \| 2,172.22 \| 11-08-77 \| 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-08-77 \| \| 371-32-3731 \| KUHN, DOROTHY W \| RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 233-92-1962 \| LARKIN, JOYCE ANN \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-58-9975 \| LAWSON, BELFORD L,III \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 093-42-2090 \| LEE, SHEILA JACKSON \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 071-28-5111 \| LEHNER, ROBERT J \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 42,500.00 \| 3,541.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 042-92-4602 \| LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 534-50-0480 \| LINDLEY, ROBIN D \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 017-36-1972 \| LOCKE, RALPH C. \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 087-48-2165 \| LOPEZ, EDWIN J \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 338-48-1298 \| MARS, MITCHELL A \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 237-56-8144 \| MASON, M C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 013-34-3361 \| MATHews, ISIAH C \| SPECIAL COUNSEL \| 26,000.00 \| 2,166.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 526-74-9097 \| MATTHEWS, LEODIS C \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 109-20-5111 \| MAXWELL, ALBERT \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM \| PERIOD TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|-----------\|-------------\|-----------\|--------------------------\| \| 240-66-7674 \| MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. \| EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT \| 17,100.00 \| 1,425.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 214-42-6489 \| MILLER, DAWNE C \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 21,500.00 \| 1,791.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 132-24-7659 \| MISITA, ANNE B \| SECRETARY \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-24-3662 \| MORIARTY, JOHN J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 403-36-7980 \| MORRISON, ROBERT C \| DIRECTOR OF SECURITY \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 177-42-4376 \| MOSLEY, BARBARA L \| TYPIST/SECRETARY \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 215-66-2714 \| ORR, PATRICIA M \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,700.00 \| 1,558.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 219-64-3205 \| ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 508-22-0421 \| PALMER, ELIZABETH J \| RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 452-74-2381 \| PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH \| ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 211-38-9707 \| PURDY, DONALD A, JR \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 254-66-1801 \| REEVES, FLOYD L \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 147-40-4845 \| RESNICK, GINA I \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 438-68-2917 \| RISINGER, MARLIN, III \| DOCUMENTS CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 579-58-9953 \| ROBINSON, BARBARA J \| RESEARCHER \| 15,000.00 \| 416.67 \| 11-21-77 \| 11-30-77 \| APPOINTMENT 11-21-77 \| \| 220-20-6648 \| ROSE, HAROLD A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 048-56-4432 \| ROSEN, MERETE MUFF \| RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 \| \| 227-18-5345 \| ROSS, IDA JANE \| ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST \| 20,000.00 \| 1,666.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 029-38-8530 \| SCHLICHITMANN, JAN R \| LAW ASSISTANT \| 19,500.00 \| 1,625.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 209-46-4088 \| SCHULTZ, NANCY P \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 531-50-7701 \| SELLECK, ELIZABETH K \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 16,000.00 \| 1,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 245-56-4327 \| SISSON, BETTY LOU \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 235-94-3124 \| SMITH, BEVERLY \| CLERK TYPIST \| 11,500.00 \| 958.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 528-64-5299 \| SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| 023-36-0715 \| SPEISER, MARK A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 \| 11-30-77 \| \| \| SOC SEC NUM \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY EARNED \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|------------\|--------------------------\|----------------------------\|---------------\|------------------\|----------------\|---------\| \| 227-76-3525 \| STRICKLAND, ANN LYON \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 264-98-4680 \| SVENDSEN, LANCE W \| XEROX/MESSANGER \| 9,500.00 \| 791.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 036-34-9187 \| TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD \| SENIOR RESEARCHER \| 18,000.00 \| 1,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 216-34-9326 \| THOMAS, JOSEPH A \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 550-50-7581 \| TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 30,000.00 \| 2,500.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 101-22-5012 \| WAGNER, OLIVE E \| RECEPTIONIST \| 11,000.00 \| 916.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 260-40-7319 \| WALKER, ROBERT J \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 087-26-0521 \| WAXMAN, MEL \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 049-34-8893 \| WEBB, WILLIAM A \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 28,000.00 \| 2,333.33 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 247-70-3852 \| WILANDER, ANNE PAUL \| STAFF ASSISTANT \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 169-29-6880 \| WILLS, MARION H \| SECRETARY \| 14,000.00 \| 1,166.67 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 171-38-3757 \| WIZELMAN, LESLIE H \| RESEARCHER \| 12,000.00 \| 1,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 383-52-5221 \| WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN \| DOCUMENT CLERK \| 15,000.00 \| 1,250.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 057-40-6987 \| WOLF, JAMES LERER \| STAFF COUNSEL \| 36,000.00 \| 3,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| \| 113-18-5784 \| WRASE, RICHARD C \| STAFF INVESTIGATOR \| 24,000.00 \| 2,000.00 \| 11-01-77 11-30-77 \| \| U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassination PAYROLL CERTIFICATION OFFICE CODE: 83000 ACCOUNTING PERIOD: 11/1/77 TO 11/30/77 \| EMPLOYEE NAME \| SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER \| PAY SCHEDULE \| ANNUAL SALARY \| GROSS PAY \| PERIOD FROM TO \| REMARKS \| \|---------------\|------------------------\|--------------\|---------------\|-----------\|----------------\|---------\| \| Alice E. Johnston \| 577-32-9574 \| 12,000.00 \| $466.67 \| 11/1/77 - 11/14/77 \| Term. 11/14 \| \| Receptionist \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Laura Mae Holt \| 559-28-5038 \| 24,000.00 \| $266.67 \| 11/1/77 - 11/4/77 \| Term. 11/4 \| \| Staff Counsel \| \| \| \| \| \| OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY \| NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES \| LEAVE W/O PAY \| AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH \| EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH \| UNUSED MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF \| NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF \| \|---------------------\|---------------\|--------------------------\|-------------------------\|-----------------------------\|-----------------------------\| \| 2 \| \| \| $733.34 \| \| \| I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon. [Signature] Chairman, House Administration Comm.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10125-10094.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6858, "total-output-tokens": 9723, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3457, 1 ], [ 3457, 6976, 2 ], [ 6976, 10759, 3 ], [ 10759, 14833, 4 ], [ 14833, 17155, 5 ], [ 17155, 18611, 6 ] ] }
9784b3947893ca86449d99ba24d83705d251780e	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION * AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10425 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 503-507 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : 108TH MI GROUP TO : TITLE : EXHIBIT DATE : 02/25/70 PAGES : 5 SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C. TRINKALA, VICTOR L. SWORN STATEMENT TAPE RECORDING OF INTERVIEW CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR DISCHARGE FROM ARMY DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND EXHIBIT COVER SHEET SUBJECT: THINKALA, Victor Lee PVT - 186 42 1155 FILE NUMBER: 9321 - 6006 PREPARING UNIT: 108th MI Group (I-SIB) AGENT REPORT DATED: 25 February 1970 DESCRIPTION: SUBJECT'S Sworn Statement (DA Form 2823), dated 19 February 1970. 503 INACTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION WITNESS STATEMENT PLACE 108th MI Group, Region I, Room 1332, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY 10007 DATE 19 Feb 70 TIME 1500 Hrs FILE NUMBER 9321 6006 LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME TRINKALA, Victor Lee SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO. 186 42 1155 GRADE PVT ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 127 West 43d Street, Room 301, Manhattan, New York 10036 SWORN STATEMENT Victor Lee Trinkala WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH Q. Mr. Trinkala, before we proceed, it is my desire to acquaint you with the purpose of this interview. The United States Department of Army must be assured of the character, suitability, and unswerving loyalty to the United States of persons who are in the United States Army and its Reserve component. In this regard, you have been asked to voluntarily undergo an interview under oath concerning your background since you were discharged from active duty and placed in the inactive reserves. This interview will provide a dual opportunity to you and the Department of Army to determine your status up to the present. Do you understand what I have just said to you? A. Yes. Q. Do you have any objection to being interviewed under oath? A. No. Q. Please stand and raise your right hand. Do you affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth? A. Yes, I so affirm. Q. Do you have any objection to having this interview tape recorded for administrative purposes? A. No, none whatsoever. Q. Please state your name, address of residence, occupation, name and address of employer, and Social Security Account Number. A. My name is Victor Lee Trinkala and I reside at the Hotel Woodstock, Room 301, 127 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York. I am currently unemployed. My Social Security Account Number is 186 42 1155. Q. What addresses have you resided at since your discharge? A. I lived at the Hotel Strand, 206 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York for approximately two or three weeks after my discharge from the Army. I then moved to my current address and have resided there ever since. Q. What employment have you had since your discharge? A. None. I collect a weekly unemployment check from New York State which pays for my bills. Q. Did you come directly to New York City after your discharge? A. Yes. Q. Mr. Trinkala, have you ever had contact with any embassies, legations, consulates, or representatives of any foreign country? A. No, none that I know of. Q. Have you or any member of your family ever been contacted by a representative of a foreign intelligence service either here or abroad? A. No, none that I know of. Q. Have you or any member of your family ever been contacted by anyone with a more than casual interest in your military assignments, career, or duties? EXHIBIT INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF __ TAKEN AT __ DATED __ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BE INITIALED AS "PAGE __ OF __ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM. Statement of TRINKALA, Victor Lee, taken at 108th MI Group, Region I, 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1332, New York, New York 10007, dated 19 February 1970, continued: Q. No, no one that I can recall. A. If you were contacted by someone with a more than casual interest in your military assignments, career, or duties, what would you do? A. I would report them to the FBI, CIA, or the CID. Q. Do you, Mr. Trinkala, still consider yourself to be a Conscientious Objector? A. Yes. Q. You do consider yourself to be a Conscientious Objector? A. I consider myself to be a Conscientious Objector to a certain point. Q. Explain, if you will, Mr. Trinkala. A. I do not believe in killing someone for no reason. I just can not bring myself to kill a man because someone tells me to. Q. What are your Conscientious Objector grounds based upon? A. I have religious and moral objections to killing people. Q. When were you discharged? A. I was discharged on 3 December 1969. Q. What were the reasons given for your discharge? A. I really cannot recall the reasons for my discharge. Q. Were you told why you were discharged? A. There were several reasons involved. A friend of mine helped me to get discharged. Q. How did he help you obtain a discharge? A. I do not know how he helped, or if, in fact, he did help me to get discharged. Q. What is your friend's name? A. His name is Richard Nagel. Q. Where does Richard Nagel reside? A. I do not know where he lives. I have never met him in person and do not know him personally. He is a friend of a friend. Q. How did you become acquainted with Mr. Nagel? A. Mr. Nagel is actually the friend of Tony Muneer of whom I have known for three or four years. Q. Where does Mr. Muneer reside and what is his occupation? A. Tony Muneer resides at the Hotel Woodstock, 127 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York. He is employed there as a Desk Clerk. Q. Have you ever resided in the same residence with Mr. Muneer previous to your discharge? A. Yes, we both lived in the Hotel Strand, 206 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York. Q. What was his occupation at that time? A. He was working as a Desk Clerk and going to school at IBM. Q. What was your occupation at that time? A. I was working at the Clinton Hotel, 19 West 31st Street, Manhattan, New York. Q. So, Mr. Muneer told you he would help you get out of the Army? A. Yes, he said he would speak to a friend, Richard Nagel, and see what he could do. Q. Did he ever tell you what he did to help you get out of the Army? A. No. Q. Have you ever associated with any dissident, anti-Army, or anti-war groups? A. No. Q. Have you ever been contacted by any individual who is a representative of any dissident, anti-Army, or anti-war groups? A. I do not know. Q. Has any person ever asked you to attend meetings of such groups? Statement of TRINKALA, Victor Lee, taken at 108th MI Group, Region I, 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1332, New York, New York 10007, dated 19 February 1970, continued: Q. Have you ever attended any meetings of any dissident, anti-Army, anti-war groups? A. No, never. Q. Where were you stationed while in the Army? A. I was stationed at Fort Gordon, Georgia for approximately nine weeks during which time I received Basic Training. I then went to Fort Polk, Louisiana, for AIT training in the MOS 11B10. I stayed at Fort Polk for approximately 10 weeks. I was then sent to Oakland Army Terminal with orders for Viet Nam. I was discharged at Oakland Army Terminal on 3 December 1969. Q. Do you not remember the reasons for your discharge? A. No, I do not remember the specific reasons. Q. How much time had you spent in the Army? A. I had spent five months and 22 days. Q. Did you not think it rather odd that you should be granted a discharge after only five months and 22 days? A. Yes, I thought it was odd but I did not know what was happening. Q. Did you receive any counseling while in the Army from Army personnel? A. No, but the Personnel Officer at Oakland Army Terminal asked me who Richard Nagel was. Q. Why did he ask you the identity of Richard Nagel and what was his name and rank? A. I do not know why he asked me about Richard Nagel. He was a Warrant Officer but I do not remember his name or rank. Q. What did you tell him about Mr. Nagel? A. I told him only that he was a personal friend of mine. Q. Had you requested a discharge at any time prior to arriving at Oakland Army Terminal? A. I do not recall. Q. You had never requested a discharge? A. I was trying to get my combat status changed to non-combat status. I never initiated any formal procedures to obtain a discharge. Q. Did you ever tell any one that you were a Conscientious Objector? A. Yes, I told the adjutant at Oakland Army Terminal but he tore up my request and told me to get the hell out. Q. Have you his name and rank? A. No, I do not recall his name or rank. Q. Did Richard Nagel ever mention to you how he got out of the Army? A. No, as I mentioned before I have never seen him before or since. He called me long distance from New York City while I was at Oakland Army Terminal and that was the first and last I heard from him. Q. Has Tony Munzer heard from him or does he know of his whereabouts? A. No, Tony has not heard from him since December 1969 and does not know of Richard Nagel's whereabouts. Q. Have you ever been arrested? A. Yes. Q. How many times? A. About three or four times. Q. Have you ever been arrested since being inducted into the Army? A. No, and I listed all my arrests on the forms I had to fill out before going into the Army and at Basic Training. Q: Do you have friends who are members of dissident, anti-Army, or anti-war groups or organizations? A: No, but most of my friends do not like the Army. I do not know their reasons. Q: To what country do you owe your allegiance? A: The United States. Q: Do you support the Constitution of the United States and are you willing to defend the United States against any and all of her enemies without exception? A: I support the Constitution and am willing to fight any enemies who invade the United States but I am not willing to fight in Viet Nam because I believe the war is immoral. Q: If called upon to fight in Viet Nam would you go? A: I would try to obtain Conscientious Objector status. If that did not work I do not know what I would do. Q: Would you be willing to go on Active Duty if called upon? A: I would not be willing to be called to Active Duty and I do not know if I would go if called. Q: Why are you opposed to killing? A: I was brought up to be opposed to killing. They wanted to teach me in four months to kill somebody and you cannot teach in four months something which is opposed to what you have been taught for many years. Q: Are these attitudes due to religious beliefs? A: Yes, I am Catholic and do not believe in killing. Q: If you had to kill someone in self-defense what would you do? A: I would fight back but this is different than being placed in Viet Nam where I would probably have to kill. Q: If you were in Viet Nam and were under fire would you kill the enemy? A: Yes, I would. Any human being would fight back. Q: If a foreign power attacked the United States would you have any objection to killing the aggressor? A: No, not really. Q: Do you have anything further to add? A: No, I have nothing further to add. Victor Lee Trinkala Affidavit I, Victor Lee Trinkala, have read or have had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 4. I fully understand the contents of the entire statement made by me. I have initialed all corrections and have initialed the bottom of each page containing the statement. I have made this statement freely without hope of benefit or reward, without threat of punishment, and without coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement. Victor Lee Trinkala (Signature of Person Making Statement) Witnesses: [Signatures] Organization or Address: 507 Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20th day of February, 1970, at 127 West 43rd Street, Manhattan, NY 10036. Timothy T. McPherson, Special Agent (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath) Authority To Administer Oath AR 136 (b), UCMJ Page 6 of 6	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10007-10425.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6858, "total-output-tokens": 3728, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 677, 1 ], [ 677, 1034, 2 ], [ 1034, 4170, 3 ], [ 4170, 6965, 4 ], [ 6965, 9789, 5 ], [ 9789, 12444, 6 ] ] }
d15ffc7e3ea39376ef700bd67f0cedaddead5fa5	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10426 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGE 508 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 11/14/69 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C. TRINKALA, VICTOR L. MILITARY SERVICE HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR CANCELLATION OF ORDERS DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : PAGE 508 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 1 JUNE 1994. (MISCELLANEOUS) During my tour of duty, 0800 hours 12 November 1969 through 0800 hours 13 November 1969, as Duty Agent (DA), 108th Military Intelligence Group, Region I, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York (MIGP), the following information was received telephonically from an anonymous male caller, who stated substantially as follows: At 2105 hours the call was received and the unidentified male stated that an active duty US Army Enlistedman, Pvt Victor L. TRINKALA, US 527-47-228, DD Form 2-A, card number, D-323-185, issuing officer, LT James Kraft (Phonetic), Field Artillery, left New York City four or five days prior to 12 November 1969 enroute to Oakland Army Terminal, Oakland, California for shipment to the Republic of Vietnam. TRINKALA completed HIS Basic Combat Training at Fort Jackson, Columbia, South Carolina and HIS Advanced Individual Training at Fort Polk, Louisiana. He was in New York City on HIS authorized travel time to Oakland Terminal. While in New York City, unknowingly, HE was contacted by a "Soviet Agent" since the "Soviet Agent" contacted TRINKALA and found HIM to be a Conscientious Objector (CO), enroute to Vietnam, he, the "Soviet Agent", plans to use this as a propaganda pitch against the US, reason being that since TRINKALA is a known CO by the Army, the Army is still sending HIM to Vietnam, and will make HIM serve in a combat zone, against HIS will. The caller stated that he was a former US Army Captain, Special Agent in the Counterintelligence Corp and that his former credential-badge number was 10-837. He stated that this badge number could be verified through the records at Fort Holabird, Maryland. He called in order for this office to send a "twix" to Oakland Army Terminal and cancel TRINKALA'S orders or to detain HIM in Oakland. The caller's reason for calling and explaining the situation was to prevent the US embarrassment. The caller stated that he planned to travel to Washington, DC in the near future to inform the "proper" authorities of the incident concerning TRINKALA and the "Soviet Agent". The caller was released from East Germany approximately one year ago but would not discuss this on the telephone because of security reasons, nor would he discuss any other information concerning TRINKALA telephonically. He refused to release his identity because he was a civilian and did not want to get involved with an Army matter. AGENT'S NOTES: The caller seemed to be very knowledgeable of the Army and knew many Army terms. He was very relaxed and co-operative when he was asked questions but refused to come to this office to discuss the incident on 12 November 1969 nor at a future date. He conversed with the undersigned for approximately thirty minutes and kept putting additional coins in the public pay telephone. He had no outstanding speech characteristics.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10007-10426.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 1004, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 718, 1 ], [ 718, 3556, 2 ] ] }
e0a69051252fc2105ba1db9c3ceb2471bb73e704	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10030 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC643360W - PAGES 15-16 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : CIA TO : TITLE : CIA INFORMATION REPORT DATE : 01/04/63 PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS : PFUNTER, JORDAN J. UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 1C CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/22/97 OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA. COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH CIA HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER LTR DTD 23 SEP 97. CUBA/LATIN AMERICA UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA DECEMBER 1962 ENGLAND, LONDON (3 JANUARY 1963) 1. FIDEL CASTRO HAS LOST LITTLE PRESTIGE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT RECENT CRISIS. IN EYES OF HIS DISCIPLES, THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO EXPLOIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNSEAT HIM, AND CASTRO REMAINED IN POWER. 2. LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DIVIDED BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT FACTIONS. THIS CONTROVERSY IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES ADOPTING MORE INDEPENDENT AND FLEXIBLE POLICIES. THERE IS A GENERAL TREND AGAINST POLICIES "DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE." AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A REGULAR SOURCE, QUOTING A YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST WHO RECENTLY TOURED LATIN AMERICA." 3. BRITISH COMMENTS. A. THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BUT IT IS AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. To whom?! B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBAN EXILES IN VENEZUELA ARE "DISILLUSIONED" OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BUT THAT THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE, REVOLUTIONARY STUDENT DIRECTORATE) AND ALPHA 66 INTEND TO CONTINUE PROMOTING SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS ON CUBA. 4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB. END OF MESSAGE ACTION: ACS, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD INFO: DCSOP DA IN 4722	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10030.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 821, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 748, 1 ], [ 748, 1515, 2 ], [ 1515, 2068, 3 ] ] }
9af7971042946872c8ab5ed3780acd68fbda25e6	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10400 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 785-787 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : DCSI USCOB BERLIN TO : OPSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG TITLE : MESSAGE DATE : 12/02/67 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR POSSIBLE US ARMY DESERTERS DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : PAGES 785-787 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94. CONFIDENTIAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER MESSAGE CENTER B041N JCS738/5 VZC2CTEA358 PP RUEPJS DC RUPBK 031 3390945 ZNY CCCCC P 009452 DEC 67 RM USCINCEUR INFO DIA DIACI WASH DC P 021230 DEC 67 RM DCSI USCOB BERLIN GER TO DPSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER SGD CARPENTER SUBJECT: POSSIBLE US DESERTERS (U) 1. (C) ON 28 NOVEMBER 1967, WEST BERLIN POLICE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS, DESERTERS FROM THE AMERICAN ARMY, WERE POSSIBLY IN WEST BERLIN: PETER SIMONS BORN 5 MAY 1943 IN GERMANY ROMAN ARNOLD BORN 6 JANUARY 1945, PRESUMABLY IN GERMANY 2. (C) THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM THE DUSSELDORF POLICE, WHO REQUESTED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS BE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AND TURNED OVER TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY POLICE. DURING A VISIT IN DUSSELDORF IN LATE OCTOBER, THE TWO MENTIONED THAT THEY WANTED TO GO TO BERLIN TO AN UNIDENTIFIED STUDENT ORGANIZATION. THEY FURTHER STATED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO GO TO VIETNAM. 3. (C) THIS SAME MESSAGE WAS SENT TO THE FRANKFURT MAIN POLICE, INASMUCH AS SIMONS HAS A GIRL FRIEND THERE, AND HIS FATHER ALSO RESIDES IN THAT CITY. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FRANKFURT POLICE WERE THE SAME. 4. (C) ON 1 DECEMBER 1967, THE WEST BERLIN POLICE REPORTED THAT THE TWO MEN HAD BEEN REGISTERED IN THE FRENCH SECTOR SINCE 27 SEPTEMBER 1967 AT FALKENTHALER STEIG 140, C/O DECH, BERLIN-HERMSFORD. POLICE ARE DEFERRING ANY ACTION IN THAT MATTER. 5. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES HAVE VERIFIED THAT THE TWO MEN HAVE BEEN IN WEST BERLIN ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS IN OCTOBER AND ACTION: DIA-15 INFO: CJCS-1 DJS-3 J1-2 SDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/MPR-1 ST-1 CIA-4 CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(55) ETO/RA PAGE 1 OF 3 DA IN 465341 785 CONFIDENTIAL NOVEMBER, WITH THEIR EXACT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. THEY HAVE RETAINED ATTORNEY HORST MAHLER TO REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS. IT APPEARS THAT ARNOLD IS TRYING TO OBTAIN YUGOSLAVIAN CITIZENSHIP. THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE FREE UNIVERSITY ASTA, OR GENERAL STUDENTS COMMITTEE, THE STUDENT BODY ORGANIZATION. FI STUDENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS ACTIVE IN THE AREA OF OFFERING TO ASSIST LOCAL MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WISH TO AVOID SERVICE IN VIETNAM BY GOING TO A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. 6. (U) INFORMATION ON DD FORM 553 RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE FROM POLICE DUSSELDORF INDICATES FOLLOWING DATA: ARNOLD, ROMAN, SP4 E4 RA 16 838 183 SSN: 355-36-1583 SPECIAL PROCESSING DET, HQ USAG TROOPS FT HOOD, TEXAS DATE AND LOCATION OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE DUTY: 15 OCT 67, AF EES, CHICAGO, ILL. ABSENT AS OF: 21 SEP 67, 0515 HRS CARRIED AS DESERTER AS OF: 10 OCT 67 MOS: 36 C 20 DOB: 6 JAN 45, POB: GERMANY SIMONS, PETERK., SP4 E4 RA 19 841 799 SSN: 558-66-6254 SAME UNIT DATE AND LOCATION OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE DUTY: 28 APR 65, US ARMY RMS, LOS ANGELES, CA ABSENT AS OF: 21 SEP 67, 0515 HRS CARRIED AS DESERTER AS OF: 10 OCT 67 MOS: 31 M 20 (RADIO RELAY OPERATOR) DOB: 5 MAY 43N POB: COTTBUS, GERMANY 7. (C) ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO ASCERTAIN IF SIMONS AND ARNOLD ARE IN BERLIN AND TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON THE PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO THESE US ARMY DESERTERS. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHETHER SUBJECTS ARE US CITIZENS OR GERMAN NATIONALS. WEST BERLIN POLICE RECORDS INDICATE SIMONS IN POSSESSION OF FRG PASSPORT NR 2616712 AND THAT ARNOLD WAS UNABLE TO PRODUCE ANY IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. GP-4 B. (C) ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY RESULT WHEN SUBJECTS ARE APPREHENDED. THERE ARE NO LEGAL PROBLEMS SEEN EITHER BY THE SJA, USCOB OR BY USBER. MINISTER HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND USBER IS PROVIDING DETAILS TO U.S. EMBASSY, BONN. 2. (C) UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY USAREUR OR US EMBASSY BONN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IF SUBJECTS ARE DETERMINED TO BE IN BERLIN. A. WEST BERLIN POLICE WILL BE ASKED TO APPREHEND SUBJECTS. US MILITARY POLICE WILL ACCOMPANY THE WEST BERLIN POLICE. B. SUBJECTS WILL BE APPREHENDED AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE AND TAKEN TO BERLIN BRIGADE STOCKADE AND PLACED IN SEPARATE ROOMS. C. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN COORDINATED FOR C-47 AIRCRAFT STATIONED AT EMPELHOF TO FLY SUBJECTS TO RHEIN MAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER APPREHENSION DUE TO POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND STUDENT REACTIONS. 10. (C) DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MILITARY POLICE AT RHEIN MAIN WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PM BERLIN BRIGADE. HOWEVER, RECOMMEND USAREUR COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT FROM RHEIN MAIN. GP-4 ACTION: DIA(ARMY ACS1) DA IN 465341 REGRADER UNCLASSIFIED ON 22SEP94 BY CDR USAREUR F01/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R PAGE 3 OF 3 54525 PAGE 3	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10400.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 2132, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 672, 1 ], [ 672, 2365, 2 ], [ 2365, 3806, 3 ], [ 3806, 5153, 4 ] ] }
d1a49dbc9489fe48f06a78a5cf603023b9bd5e2a	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10408 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 795-796 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 10/05/67 PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR REPORT OF FINDINGS POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION ARNOLD, ROMAN D. S. FIELD 201 FILE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : AGENT REPORT (AR 381-130; FM 30-17) 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Possible Sensitive Desertion 2. DATE SUBMITTED 5 October 1967 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (FIELD 201 FILE) On 3 October 1967, the 201 file of Roman D. S. Arnold, Specialist Four (E-4), RA 16 838 103, Wireman's Helper, 49th Signal Platoon, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was procured from the Special Processing Detachment, United States Army Garrison Troops, Fort Hood, and from which the following information was extracted: Name: Roman Davor Sreko Arnold Rank: Specialist Four (E-4) ASH: RA 16 838 103 SSAN: 355 36 1583 DOB: 6 January 1945 POB: Lindau Bodensee, Germany Citizenship: German BFD: 14 October 1965 ETS: 13 October 1969 Marital Status: Single Religious Preference: Roman Catholic Father: Alfons Arnold; date and place of birth not indicated; presently resides in German Federal Republic, address unknown. Mother: Zdenka Niketa; born in Yugoslavia, date and exact location unknown; presently resides at Post Office Box #1644, Wilmington, North Carolina. Arnold's DA Form 20 (Enlisted Qualification Record), indicates that his mother is an Alien; Alien Registration Number, date and place of entry within United States unknown. Physical Profile: Physical Description: 111121B, 15 October 1965 Age, 22; Sex, Male; Height, 72"; Weight, 135 pounds; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or identifying marks, None indicated. Civilian Employment: Civilian Education: None indicated Arnold's DD Form 4 (Enlistment Record) indicates 12 years education terminated with High School graduation. His DA Form 20 lists Maine-Township High School, Des Plaines, Illinois, as institution attended with schooling being completed in 1965, exact date unknown. Aptitude Test Scores: IN, 86; AE, 100; EL, 111; CH, 107; IG, 107; CL, 107; GT, 87 Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15) 795 (continued) 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ASHTON K. DURST, 501st ML Dat (army Div) 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT DA FORM 341 REPLACES W-11 Possible Sensitive Deserter Military Education: Red Rel & Carr Attn, 31M20, Sig C, 12 weeks during 1966, exact dates not given. Record of Non-Judicial Punishment: None indicated Record of Courts Martial: None indicated DD Form 98: Executed 15 October 1965, without qualification. DD Form 398: Arnold's 201 file did not contain a DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History). DA Form 673: None DA Form 2545: None Security Clearance: None indicated other than residence of 48 months in Germany, ending in 1949. Civilian Foreign Travel: 19 March 1966 - 27 January 1967, USAREUR (Germany) Foreign Service: FVT, E-1(P), 15 October 1965, AR 601-210 FVT, E-2(P), 15 January 1966, Para 7-19a, AR 600-200 Promotions/Reductions: FPC, E-3(P), 23 June 1966, UC#59, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn 1966 SPA, E-4(T), 20 August 1967, Para 4, SO#42, Hqs, 196th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex 67 Chronology of Military Service: 15 October 1965, USA Bco Sta, Ft Knox, Ky 22 October 1965 - 1 January 1966, 2 Co, 3d Bn, 1st Bde, USATCI, Ft Benning, Ga 1 January 1966 - 23 March 1966, Sbu Co, XUSASESGS, Ft Gordon, Ga 23 March 1966 - 23 May 1966, Btry C, 5th Hsl Bn, 6th Arty, USAREUR 23 May 1966 - 6 March 1967, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn, USAREUR 6 March 1967 - 19 May 1967, Co C, 141st Sig Bn, 1st Armd Div, Ft Hood, Tex 19 May 1967 - present, 49th Sig Platoon, 196th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex Remarks: The absence of a DD Form 398 from Arnold's 201 file limited the quantity of information which could be obtained for each item listed above. His 201 file did not reflect any action taken to conduct a background investigation on this individual. 796	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10408.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 1741, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 654, 1 ], [ 654, 2752, 2 ], [ 2752, 4376, 3 ] ] }
4389063cffc1b8829a153610e22b27f20b67aeab	AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10409 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 797-799 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 10/05/67 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR REPORT OF FINDINGS-- POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION SIMONS, PETER K. FIELD 201 FILE DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : AGENT REPORT 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Possible Sensitive Desertion 2. DATE SUBMITTED 5 October 1967 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (FIELD 201 FILE) On 5 October 1967, the 201 File of Peter K. Simons, Specialist 4, RA 19 841 799, was examined and revealed substantially the following information: \| Name: \| Peter Karl Simons \| \|----------------\|-------------------\| \| Rank: \| Specialist 4 (E4) \| \| Service Number:\| RA 19 841 799 \| \| SSAN: \| 550-66-6254 \| \| DOB: \| 5 May 1943 \| \| POB: \| Cottbus, Germany \| \| Citizenship: \| German, Alien Registration Number, A 13 022 527; Date of entry, 8 August 1962; Port of entry, New York, New York. \| \| BFED: \| 28 April 1965 \| \| ETS: \| 27 April 1968 \| \| Marital Status:\| Single \| \| Religious Preference: \| Roman Catholic \| \| Father: \| Karl-Heinz Simons; POB: Saarland, Germany, DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Unknown. \| \| Mother: \| Agnes Fries; POB: Essen, Germany, DOB: 17 September 1920; Present Address: Cheruskerstr 49, Duesseldorf, W. Germany. \| \| Step-Father: \| Richard Westlake; POB: Unknown; DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Weston-Super-Mare, Somerset, England. \| \| Physical Profile: \| PULHES 111 121, Code B, 28 August 1965 \| \| Physical Description: \| Age, 24; Sex, Male; Height, 73"; Weight, 178#; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or marks, None. \| \| Civilian Education: \| 55-59, Martin-Buteer, Dierdorf, W. Germany, Graduated; 59-62, Dierdorf Handeisichule, Duesseldorf, Germany, Graduated. \| \| Civilian Employment: \| Apr 59-Apr 62, Deurognbh, Berliner Alee 29, Duesseldorf, Germany; Supervisor, Mr Grosskopf, Reason left (RL), immigrate to US; Apr 62-Jul 64, Air-Sea Forwarders Inc, 406 S. Main St., Los Angeles, California, Supervisor, Mr Rautenberg, RL, Better future; Jul-Sep 64, Liberty Engineering Co., Culver City, Calif., Supervisor, Mr. Kilner, RL, quit; Sep-Oct 64, Sightseeing in New York; Oct 64-Apr 65, Harper-Robinson & Co., 354 S. Spring St., Los Angeles, Supervisor, Mr Caranea, RL, Joined Army; Apr 65 to present, US Army. \| \| Aptitude Test Scores: \| IN, 111; AE, 103; EL, 103; GH, 102; MM, 115, CL, 123; GT, 106. \| Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15A) 5. TYPE NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Armd Div) 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT [Signature] DA FORM 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341 NW 88613 Docld:34531096 Page 2 Possible Sensitive Desertion Military Education: Rad Rel Carr Attend, MOS 31120, Signal Corps, 12 weeks, 1965 Record of Non-Judicial Punishment: None Record of Courts Martial: None DD Form 398: Executed, unqualified dated 1 October 1965 DD Form 98: Executed, unqualified dated 28 April 1965 Security Clearance: None; Background investigation requested by the AGO, G2, Fort Gordon, Georgia, on 4 October 1965, UP AR 614-280 for retention of Simons in Military Service Civilian Foreign Travel: 53 to 54, Great Britain, Schooling; Apr 56 to Aug 56, Great Britain, Schooling; Aug 57 to Sep 57, Italy, Vacation; Jul 61 to Sep 61, France, Vacation; Simons has also been in the following countries for sight seeing purposes from 1957 to 1965, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Mexico, Holland, Luxembourg, France, and Spain Foreign Service: 14 Nov 65 to 27 Nov 66, USAREUR Germany Promotions/Reductions: PVT E1 (P) 8 Apr 65 AR 601-210 PVT E2 (P) 28 Aug 65 Par 7-19 AR 600-200 FPC E3 (P) 4 Jan 66 Par 1 UO/4, Co B, 32d Sig Bn APO 757 SP4 E4 (T) UO/32, Co B, 32d Sig Bn, APO 09757 Chronology of Military Service: 28 Apr 65 USARECSTA (4075) FT POLK LA 10 May 65 CoE1Bn2TngSDE Ft Polk LA 17 Jul 65 StuCoS USASSECS Ft Gordon, GA 16 Nov 65 CoB 32dSigBn APO 09757 25 Nov 65 Enroute to Conus 9 Jan 67 CoC 1/1stSigBn 1st AD Ft Hood, Tex 8 Jun 67 49thSigPlatoon, 198thInfBde, Ft Hood, Tex Remarks: 1. Simons identification card reported lost to Provost Marshal, 17 August 1967, issued new identification card. 2. Special Order Number 31, Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, dated 19 August 1967, authorized ordinary leave for Simons effective 1 September 1967, for 20 days. Leave address: Oberlindau 89, Frankfurt-Air, Germany. Special Instruction: EM will report to the Army attache at the American Embassy, or to the Commander of the USA Element, as appropriate. 3. Simons enlisted under the Buddy Assignment Plan, with one Michael C. Morgan, RA 19 841 794, for further assignment to USAREUR. Possible Sensitive Desertion 4. Simons drew advance pay of $360, 16 Aug 67, to be repaid at $60 a month for six months.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10409.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 2133, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 607, 1 ], [ 607, 3179, 2 ], [ 3179, 5198, 3 ], [ 5198, 5318, 4 ] ] }
3077b322a2ee0f9a215416b0f9a801c4b433e8c1	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10452 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZP000003W - PAGE 894 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 11/28/66 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR POTENTIAL US ARMY DEFECTOR TO THE USSR REPORT OF FINDINGS LOCAL AGENCY CHECK DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : (LOCAL AGENCY) On 28 November 1966, George Bombel, Captain, 0-5707877, social security number 527-48-5002, Commanding Officer, Company T, US Army Signal Center and School (USASCS), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, checked the unit's Morning Report and the Personnel Register (DA Form 647) to determine if Virgilio Capino, Private E-1, RA 10124363, Company T, was on leave, pass, or absent from Company T for the period 19 through and including 23 October 1966. The records revealed that Capino was present for duty during this period. Bombel explained that Company T is a student company and its personnel are considered the transient type; consequently, Bombel had no personal knowledge regarding Capino.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10452.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 498, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 642, 1 ], [ 642, 1342, 2 ] ] }
c4cc64fc7a773dc149b08c8e07fabd877bbcd1ac	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10471 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 913-914 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : DURRETT, MILTON K. [ R ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 10/05/67 PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR REPORT OF FINDINGS FIELD 201 FILE CHECK ARNOLD, ROMAN DAVOR SRECKO POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : PAGES 913-914 ARE DUPLICATE COPIES OF PAGES 795-796. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED Possible Sensitive Desertion (FIELD 201 FILE) On 3 October 1967, the 201 file of Roman D. S. Arnold, Specialist Four (E-4), RA 16 836 103, Wireman's Helper, 49th Signal Platoon, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was procured from the Special Processing Detachment, United States Army Garrison Troops, Fort Hood, and from which the following information was extracted: Name: Roman Davor Srecko Arnold Rank: Specialist Four (E-4) SSN: 355 36 1583 DOB: 6 January 1945 POB: Lindeau Bodensee, Germany Citizenship: German BPD: 14 October 1965 BTS: 13 October 1969 Marital Status: Single Religious Preference: Roman Catholic Father: Alfons Arnold; date and place of birth not indicated; presently resides in German Federal Republic, address unknown. Mother: Zdenka Niketa; born in Yugoslavia, date and exact location unknown; presently resides at Post Office Box 1644, Wilmington, North Carolina. Arnold's DA Form 20 (Enlisted Qualification Record), indicates that his mother is an Alien; Alien Registration Number, date and place of entry within United States unknown. Physical Profile: Physical Description: Age, 22; Sex, Male; Height, 72"; Weight, 155 pounds; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or identifying marks, None indicated. Civilian Employment: Civilian Education: Arnold's DD Form 4 (Enlistment Record) indicates 12 years education terminated with High School graduation. His DA Form 20 lists Maine-Township High School, Des Plaines, Illinois, as institution attended with schooling being completed in 1965, exact date unknown. Aptitude Test Scores: Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-45) 913 (continued) Possible Sensitive Deserter 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (201 File continued) Military Education: Red Bel & Carr Attnd, 31120, Sig C, 12 weeks during 1966, exact dates not given. Record of Non-Judicial Punishment: None indicated Record of Courts Martial: None indicated DD Form 98: Executed 15 October 1965, without qualification. DD Form 398: Arnold's 201 file did not contain a DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History). DA Form 673: None DA Form 2545: None Security Clearance: None Civilian Foreign Travel: None indicated other than residence of 48 months in Germany, ending in 1949. Foreign Service: 19 March 1966 - 27 January 1967, USAREUR (Germany) Promotions/Reductions: FVT, E-1(P), 15 October 1965, AR 601-210 FVT, E-2(P), 15 January 1966, Para 7-19a, AR 600-200 FPC, E-3(P), 23 June 1966, WO#59, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn 1966 SP4, E-4(T), 20 August 1967, Para 4, SO#42, Rgs, 196th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex 67 Chronology of Military Service: 15 October 1965, USA Bec Sta, Ft Knox, Ky 22 October 1965 - 1 January 1966, E Co, 3d Bn, 1st Bde, USAFCT, Ft Benning, Ga 1 January 1966 - 23 March 1966, Stu Co, XUSASCS, Ft Gordon, Ga 23 March 1966 - 23 May 1966, Btry C, 5th Isl Bn, 6th Arty, USAREUR 23 May 1966 - 6 March 1967, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn, USAREUR 6 March 1967 - 19 May 1967, Co C, 141st Sig Bn, 1st Armd Div, Ft Hood, Tex 19 May 1967 - present, 49th Sig Platoon, 196th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex Remarks: The absence of a DD Form 398 from Arnold's 201 file limited the quantity of information which could be obtained for each item listed above. His 201 file did not reflect any action taken to conduct a background investigation on this individual. 914	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10471.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 1586, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 754, 1 ], [ 754, 2415, 2 ], [ 2415, 4096, 3 ] ] }
42e392cab4c38e1f7ac9d4572b100cdf68c23c00	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10472 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 915-917 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 10/05/67 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR REPORT OF FINDINGS FIELD 201 FILE CHECK POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION SIMONS, PETER KARL DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : PAGES 915-917 ARE DUPLICATE COPIES OF PAGES 797-799. Possible Sensitive Desertion On 5 October 1967, the 201 File of Peter K. Simons, Specialist 4, RA 19 841 799, was examined and revealed substantially the following information: Name: Peter Karl Simons Rank: Specialist 4 (E4) Service Number: RA 19 841 799 SSAN: 550-66-6254 DOB: 5 May 1943 POB: Cottbus, Germany Citizenship: German, Alien Registration Number, A 13 022 527; Date of entry, 8 August 1962; Port of entry, New York, New York. BPED: 28 April 1965 ETS: 27 April 1968 Marital Status: Single Religious Preference: Roman Catholic Father: Karl-Heinz Simons; POB: Saarland, Germany, DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Unknown. Mother: Agnes Fries; POB: Essen, Germany, DOB: 17 September 1920; Present Address: Cheruskerstr 49, Duesseldorf, W. Germany. Step-Father: Richard Westlake; POB: Unknown; DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Weston-Super-Mare, Somerset, England. Physical Profile: FULHES 111 121, Code B, 28 August 1965 Physical Description: Age, 24; Sex, Male; Height, 73"; Weight, 178 lbs; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or marks, None. Civilian Education: 55-59, Martin-Buteer, Dierdorf, W. Germany, Graduated; 59-62, Dierdorf Handesischule, Duesseldorf, Germany, Graduated. Civilian Employment: Apr 59-Apr 62, Deurogubh, Berliner Alee 29, Duesseldorf, Germany; Supervisor, Mr Grosskopf, Reason left (RL), immigrate to US; Apr 62-Jul 64, Air-Sea Forwarders Inc, 406 S. Main St., Los Angeles, California, Supervisor, Mr Rautenberg, RL, Better future; Jul-Sep 64, Liberty Engineering Co., Culver City, Calif., Supervisor, Mr. Kilmer, RL, quit; Sep-Oct 64, Sightseeing in New York; Oct 64-Apr 65, Harper-Robinson & Co., 354 S. Spring St., Los Angeles, Supervisor, Mr Caranea, RL, Joined Army; Apr 65 to present, US Army. Aptitude Test Scores: IN, 111; AE, 103; EL, 103; GM, 102; HM, 115, CL, 123; GT, 106. (Continued) Possible Sensitive Deserter Military Education: Rad Rel Carr Attend, MOS 31120, Signal Corps, 12 weeks, 1965 Record of Non-Judicial Punishment: None Record of Courts Martial: Executed, unqualified dated 1 October 1965 DD Form 398: Executed, unqualified dated 28 April 1965 DD Form 98: None; Background investigation requested by the AGO, G2, Fort Gordon, Georgia, on 4 October 1965, UP AR 614-280 for retention of Simons in Military Service Civilian Foreign Travel: 53 to 54, Great Britain, Schooling; Apr 56 to Aug 56, Great Britain, Schooling; Aug 57 to Sep 57, Italy, Vacation; Jul 61 to Sep 61, France, Vacation; Simons has also been in the following countries for sight seeing purposes from 1957 to 1965, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Mexico, Holland, Luxemburg, France, and Spain Foreign Service: 14 Nov 65 to 27 Nov 66, USAREUR Germany Promotions/Reductions: PVT E1 (F) 8 Apr 65 AR 601-210 PVT E2 (F) 28 Aug 65 Par 7-19 AR 600-200 PFC E3 (F) 4 Jan 66 Par 1 UO/24, Co B, 32d Sig Bn APO 757 SP4 E4 (T) UO/32, Co B, 32d Sig Bn, APO 09757 Chronology of Military Service: 28 Apr 65 USARECOSTA (4075) FT POLK LA 10 May 65 CoELBn2TngBDE Ft Folk LA 17 Jul 65 StuCoS USASSECS Ft Gordon, GA 16 Nov 65 CoB 32d Sig Bn APO 09757 25 Nov 65 Enroute to Conus 9 Jan 67 CoC 1/1st Sig Bn 1st AD Ft Hood, Tex 8 Jun 67 45th Sig Platoon, 198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex Remarks: 1. Simons identification card reported lost to Provost Marshal, 17 August 1967, issued new identification card. 2. Special Order Number 31, Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, dated 19 August 1967, authorized ordinary leave for Simons effective 1 September 1967, for 20 days. Leave address: Oberlindau 89, Frankfurt-Main, Germany. Special Instruction: E1 will report to the Army attache at the American Embassy, or to the Commander of the USA Element, as appropriate. 3. Simons enlisted under the Buddy Assignment Plan, with one Michael C. Horgan, RA 19 841 794, for further assignment to USAREUR. Protection Marking is Excluded From WILLIAM F. HOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Army Div) DA FORM 341 REPLACES WD AGO 150-64, 1 APR 52 WHICH BE CANCEL NW 88613 Docld:34531181 Page 3 4. Simons drew advance pay of $360, 16 Aug 67, to be repaid at $60 a month for six months.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10472.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 1976, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 709, 1 ], [ 709, 2535, 2 ], [ 2535, 4715, 3 ], [ 4715, 4805, 4 ] ] }
279580f1778dfa79612d9b305454689259c754e1	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10477 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 935 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : TO : TITLE : REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK DATE : 07/00/66 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR FAMILY HISTORY RESIDENCES EMPLOYMENT CIVILIAN SCHOOL DOWLING, JOHN JOSEPH DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : US NAVY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK AK 381-130 DATE OF REQUEST: 28 Jul 66 1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS/ER - NICKNAMES - CHANGED NAME DOWLING JOHN J. 2. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH 25 Oct 46 3. PLACE OF BIRTH Oakland, Calif 4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 560 68 6542 5. SERVICE NUMBER DA 16-776, 105 6. RELATIVE'S NAMES FATHER DOWLING JOHN J. Waterbury, Conn San Diego, Calif MOTHER (maiden name) DOWLING, FRANCES T. UNK San Diego, Calif SPouse (maiden name) 7. PRESENT ADDRESS 8. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 9. CITIZENSHIP 10. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter) \| FROM \| TO \| NUMBER AND STREET \| CITY \| STATE \| \|------\|----\|-------------------\|------\|-------\| \| 1952 \| 1966 \| 3016 Murray Ridge Rd \| San Diego \| Calif \| 11. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter) \| FROM \| TO \| EMPLOYER \| PLACE \| \|------\|----\|----------\|-------\| \| 2-66 \| 3-66 \| Bill Burgers Drive-in \| Linda Vista \| \| 5-66 \| 7-66 \| Car wash \| \| 12. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL \| FROM \| TO \| NAME \| PLACE \| \|------\|----\|------\|-------\| \| 9-53 \| 6-66 \| Kearny \| \| 13. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks) - [X] IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES? - [X] ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE? - [X] ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT? - [X] EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT? - [X] FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE? - [X] ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98? - [X] ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD? 14. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper) Failure to report FAD Drunk in public Disturbing peace 15. CONTROL OFFICE Ac of S, G2 Ft Ord, Calif 16. THRU: 11/5/66 FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED DA FORM 3027 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 59, WHICH IS OBSOLETE NW 88613 Docld:34531187 Page 2	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10012-10477.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 1141, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 644, 1 ], [ 644, 2725, 2 ] ] }
ec9b9b6234a1da073190a6712fadb3890f99fffe	AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10005 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 959-960 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 01/24/68 PAGES : 2 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR DEFECTOR GRIGGS, KENNETH C. [ RESTRICTED ] INTERVIEW DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : PAGES 959-960 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94. EXHIBITS I THRU IV INDEXED SEPARATELY. On 23 January 1968, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, retired dairyman, residing at 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, was interviewed at his home concerning letters received in reference to his adopted son, Kenneth C. Griggs, and stated substantially as follows: Source stated that he had received two letters concerning SUBJECT from a Philip LaChapelle Jr., 172nd North Linder, Chicago, Illinois, who claimed to have been the Security and Intelligence clerk with the 191st Ordnance Battalion, Vietnam, but was presently out of the US Army. LaChapelle, in his first letter dated 8 November 1967, indicated to Source that being SUBJECT's closest friend in Vietnam, he felt that he should write to Source giving some history and facts concerning the period prior to SUBJECT's defection. LaChapelle indicated sympathy and concern over SUBJECT's defection. LaChapelle stated that he believed the Army had suppressed information to cover up mistakes. LaChapelle told Source about SUBJECT being beaten and shunned by his companions during his assignment with the 191st Ordnance Battalion and that he was SUBJECT's only friend. LaChapelle stated that he had also written to SUBJECT, but had received no answer. Copy of letter written by LaChapelle dated 8 November 1967 is attached as EXHIBIT I. On 16 November 1967, Source answered the letter of 8 November 1967 thanking LaChapelle for the communication. Source indicated that he had very little knowledge of SUBJECT's philosophy or plans and requested further information from LaChapelle since he was apparently more knowledgeable concerning these aspects. Source asked four specific questions of LaChapelle. First asking about SUBJECT's view of the world, as known by LaChapelle. Secondly asking LaChapelle's view on why SUBJECT felt that his conscience dictated decision was a solution to any problems that he envisioned. Thirdly was SUBJECT encouraged by a third party to defect and the last question was whether SUBJECT's defection was motivated by resentment about his treatment by other Army personnel. Source indicated that LaChapelle's tone in his letter indicated a certain feeling of bitterness about the way the incident was handled by the US Army. Source requested a reply because the information would be of interest to Source. Copy of letter by Source dated 16 November 1967 is attached as EXHIBIT II. LaChapelle again wrote to Source on 20 November 1967, indicating interest in the letter written by Source on 16 November 1967. LaChapelle stated that he was bitter because the Army took no remedial action concerning the mental state of SUBJECT, and indicated to Source that SUBJECT had a medical history of emotional disturbance. LaChapelle stated that he had been the Security and Intelligence Clerk, 191st Ordnance Battalion, Vietnam, and SUBJECT's personnel records had passed over his desk after the defection. LaChapelle indicated that the records had been classified to conceal any embarrassing incidents. LaChapelle commented on the National Security in reference to the classification of SUBJECT's records. LaChapelle indicated that SUBJECT's view of the world was that he was simply bitter and thought it was going in the wrong direction. LaChapelle stated that SUBJECT favored an absolute state of control as long as HE was one of the ruling class. LaChapelle stated that SUBJECT's defection was the truest decision HE could make thus making the only solution HIS conscience dictated. LaChapelle stated that SUBJECT was not encouraged by a third party to defect except maybe the world around HIM. LaChapelle stated that only three people other than himself who were in any way friendly were Chaplain Camp, presently in Germany, Hal Nelson, and John Klink. They would not encourage a defection. SUBJECT would not let HIMSELF be influenced by others. LaChapelle went on saying that SUBJECT's defection was motivated by HIS resentment of HIS treatment by other personnel, indicating that HE had been beaten and required stitches in HIS head on one occasion and that HE was considered different by HIS section leaders. SUBJECT had mentioned defection to LaChapelle, but LaChapelle had talked HIM out of it. At that point in their relationship, the friendship between LaChapelle and SUBJECT seemed to decline. LaChapelle blames the Army and society for forcing SUBJECT to defect. LaChapelle requested any information or photographs of SUBJECT because LaChapelle intends to be a writer and wants to write about SUBJECT and HIS problems. A copy of letter dated 20 November 1967, written by LaChapelle is attached as EXHIBIT III. On 24 November 1967, Source answered the letter of 20 November 1967, stating that at first he was apprehensive and wondered how much LaChapelle was involved with SUBJECT. Source commented that he could offer very little concerning SUBJECT for LaChapelle to use in his writing. Source stated that SUBJECT's mental problems started before HIS entry into the US Army and that LaChapelle should take a more kindly view of the people who comprise society. Source gave LaChapelle a short history of SUBJECT from the time HE came to the United States in 1956 to the time HE was placed in the Children's Home, Boise. During this period, SUBJECT would not stay with any one thing for very long, such as scouts, sports, and physical activities. HE became angry very easily. SUBJECT was intelligent in school. From the time HE was placed in the Children's Home until HE entered the US Army, SUBJECT had a history of running away and was never satisfied being in the same place for very long. SUBJECT finished high school and entered the military service. Source stated his desire to again hear from LaChapelle. A copy of letter dated 24 November 1967, written by Source is attached as EXHIBIT IV. Source stated that he had not received any other correspondence concerning SUBJECT. Neither Source nor his family have heard from SUBJECT or any official of the Cuban Embassy in Japan. Source further stated that he has no information concerning SUBJECT's present whereabouts or HIS future plans. Source stated that he would advise this office in the event he received other letters or information pertaining to SUBJECT. AGENT'S NOTES: Source was very cooperative. He had original letters written by LaChapelle and carbon copies of his replies, which Source allowed this office to copy.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10013-10005.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 1758, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 673, 1 ], [ 673, 3885, 2 ], [ 3885, 7031, 3 ] ] }
73f461a3fb691d9116cb3fb5846bafb959e59a25	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10006 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 961 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : TO : TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET DATE : 01/24/68 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY PHILIP LACHAPELLE JR. DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY. EXHIBIT COVER SHEET Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C. PFC, RA 19 772 378 DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea File Number: 8008-9182 519-46-7994 Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV) Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968 Description: Copy of letter dated 8 November 1967 written by Philip LaChapelle Jr., 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois, to SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10013-10006.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 476, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 631, 1 ], [ 631, 1049, 2 ] ] }
e26cb9ba83ff6108c6d9268c68d7fbc5c39f2623	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10009 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 965 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : TO : TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET DATE : 01/24/68 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CECIL L. GRIGGS DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY. EXHIBIT COVER SHEET Subject: GHIGGS, Kenneth C. PFC, RA 19 772 378 DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea File Number: 8008-9162 519-46-7994 Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV) Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968 Description: Copy of letter dated 16 November 1967 written by SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, to Philip LaChapelle, 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10013-10009.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 478, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 625, 1 ], [ 625, 1040, 2 ] ] }
90f59a80e822f8eda7753ca04cf81360b5530e6f	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10011 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W PAGE 968 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : TO : TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET DATE : 01/24/68 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY PHILIP LACHAPELLE JR. DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY. EXHIBIT COVER SHEET Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C. PFC, RA 19 772 378 DPOE: 25 December 1946, Korea File Number: 8008-9182 519-46-7994 Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV) Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968 Description: Copy of letter dated 20 November 1967 written by Philip LaChapelle Jr., 1724 Linder, Chicago, Illinois, to SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho. EXHIBIT 71 968	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10013-10011.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 489, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 628, 1 ], [ 628, 1058, 2 ] ] }
df9a085b7b13b51c9d253f80278d9a6256df0479	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10013 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W PAGE 973 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : TO : TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET DATE : 01/24/68 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CECIL L. GRIGGS DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY. Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C. PFC, RA 19 772 376 DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea File Number: 8008-9182 519-46-7994 Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV) Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968 Description: Copy of letter dated 24 November 1967 written by SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil I. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, to Philip LaChapelle Jr., 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10013-10013.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 466, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 623, 1 ], [ 623, 1021, 2 ] ] }
98450a86cc38c3f9f14ac5e2f9ccd45f5b297af1	JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10139 RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 1179 DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : USA FROM : [ RESTRICTED ] TO : TITLE : AGENT REPORT DATE : 10/04/82 PAGES : 1 SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY GLAISTER, HENRY D. SWORN STATEMENT DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : SWORN STATEMENT INDEXED SEPARATELY. AGENT REPORT For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. \| 1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT \| 2. DATE SUBMITTED \| \|----------------------------------------\|-------------------\| \| WHITE, Joseph Timothy \| 4 October 1982 \| \| PFC, 492-60-2196 \| \| \| DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO \| \| \| 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER \| \|----------------------------------\| \| \| \| 4. REPORT OF FINDINGS \| \|-----------------------\| \| \| SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED TO SUBJECT On 3 October 1982, Henry D. Glaister, CPT, Field Artillery, 547-76-1040, United States Army, was re-contacted at his home at 812 Maplewood Drive, Columbia, Missouri 65201, for the purpose of obtaining his written permission for release of Agent Report (AR), DA Form 341, dated 22 September 1982, concerning Joseph T. WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196. CPT Glaister reviewed AR prepared from his personal interview on 16 September 1982, (EXHIBIT______) and executed a Sworn Statement, DA Form 2823, dated 3 October 1982, (EXHIBIT______) giving his written permission to release the AR, in full, to Norval (NMN) White Jr., father of Joseph Timothy WHITE. --- 5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group 6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT [Signature] --- DA 341 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NW 88613 Docld:34531350 Page 2	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/194-10013-10139.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 828, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 658, 1 ], [ 658, 2239, 2 ] ] }
5412ff2614d987567db47d6eaf3c2b52fc9177a9	RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce CLASSIFIED MESSAGE SECRET TO: ROME FROM: DIRECTOR CONF: UNCLASSIFIED INFO: DDP, C1, C10PS, C10A, F, EE4, EE4, VR MOB INT 85 SB IOS PERS AR RITS LOG CA 23 April 16 55Z DEP: 4 RUTINE TO: ROME INFO: CITE DIR 16358 KEYWAY PBRUHEN AMSHIP/1 AMSHIP/1 ARRIVING EUROPE 26 APRIL FOR THREE WEEK'S BUSINESS TRIP, INCLUDING KURARK ERRANDS PARIS, GENEVA. WILL ARRIVE ROME CIRCA 5 MAY AND CONTACT STATION VIA USUAL CHANNEL TO ASCERTAIN ANY SERVICES ROME MAY WISH. END OF MESSAGE THOMAS F. THIELE COORDINATING OFFICER BRUCE B. CHERRY AUTHORIZING OFFICER REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10239.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 297, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 661, 1 ] ] }
8323a24cca54780102097c875a28c7b64cb5a57d	RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce SECRET TO: GENEVA BERN MADRID ROME PARIS FROM: DIRECTOR CONF: DC/WH/SA 5 INFO: DOP, ADOP, C/CI, C/FI 2, C/EE 3, C/WE 3, VR 17 April 1964 RE: AMWHIP C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED AMWHIP-1 15094 BYRAT PERUEN AMWHIP REF: GNVA 6486 (IN 62186) (not sent ROME PARIS) 1. RE PARA 2 REF, AMWHIP UNABLE LEAVE NEW YORK PRIOR 24-25 APRIL. HAS MINIMUM THREE DAY PRY KUBARK BUSINESS PARIS. WILL TRY EXPEDITE BUT DOUBT AMWHIP AVAILABLE GNVA BEFORE 30 APRIL. WOULD HOPE THEREFORE ROME CAN ASK AMWHIP/2 BE AVAILABLE FOR ASSISTANCE, PRIOR A/1 ARRIVAL. 2. FOR PARIS. WILL COMMENT SUBSEQUENT TRAFFIC RE ARRIVAL AND USE AMWHIP/1 FOR PARIS BUSINESS RE CARRILLO AND ROBRENO. END OF MESSAGE WH/SA/EOB WH/SA/80/8B BRUCE B. CHEYENNE DC/WH/SA COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10240.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 405, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 882, 1 ] ] }
85615fa65c9206c2ab59b43b2b98a2a290a5f911	MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: AMMUG/1 Operation 06 Meeting with Colonel Peralta Saturday, 10 October 1964 REFERENCE: Memorandum dated 13 October 1964 06 concerning briefing of Colonel Peralta 06 1. Following the meeting described in the reference, Colonel Torres requested a separate meeting which was held on Saturday, 10 October 1964. Andy Rogers of the Guatemalan 03, 16-Z Station was present at the meeting. 2. During the meeting the matters covered on the previous day with the Chief of State were reviewed and the specific action to be taken was indicated with agreement on the following points: A. Special treatment should be given to the "Caso Astatiga" and the "Caso Hombres Blancos" which involved Don Sosa, Luis Augusto Turcios Lima, and Manuel J.C. Ortega Parra and one (1) (1) whom we will be able to identify if shown a photograph. Every effort should be made to identify the last-named person and then to recruit all four of them. Meanwhile, all information available concerning them should be collected and furnished to the Station for forwarding to headquarters. The object in each of these cases should be to achieve contacts with them for the purpose of effecting recruitments. If required, we will have a Cuban who knows the individuals and whom they believe to be a Cuban Intelligence officer go to Guatemala for the purpose of contacting them under controlled conditions which will permit us to monitor the conversation during the time that he poses as still active in Cuban intelligence. Following this, the recruitment attempt would be made in each case possibly by one of our officers if the circumstances at the time indicate that this procedure would be most likely to be a success. B. Without waiting for the outcome of effort to recruit the four individuals described above, the Guatemalan government should bend every effort to locate all those individuals (possibly as many as 200) who have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, and to arrest them. Maximum publicity should be given to the arrests once they have been questioned. Hopefully declarations will be made by some of them which will assist in effective propaganda use of their arrest and their involvement in subversion on behalf of the Castro government. They should be interviewed separately and, if possible, some with greater potential should be doubled so that they may serve to keep us informed of plans for subversion in the future. C. The Guatemalans should keep us advised at every stage of the progress made in the cases so that we may lend assistance when appropriate. 3. Colonel Porres said that he understood the importance of the case and would do his utmost to follow through in line with the action proposed above. He said that although he does not have a large organization, it is secure and is capable of collecting information and of arranging for the arrests and interrogation. 4. Colonel Porres discussed three other cases (the ALFARO case, the case of Luis Ramirez, and the case of Nestor Jordi Chambonyer). Rogers said that full details concerning the ALFARO case had been sent to Headquarters. This is the same case which according to the Chief of State involved a Mexican courier acting on behalf of the Cuban intelligence service. Colonel Porres said that this individual is still in jail in Guatemala. The Jordi and Ramirez cases are being made the subjects of separate memoranda. Harold F. Swenson Chief, W11/SA/CI	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10259.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 812, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1626, 1 ], [ 1626, 3440, 2 ] ] }
a7cb644d5ae2f84d1c802a915b33a96379107a12	MEMORANDUM SUBJECT: AMIGU-1 Operation Briefing in Guatemala of Chief of State Feralta 1. The briefing was held in a small luxurious government conference room on the afternoon of Friday, 9 October 1964, lasting about 2 1/2 hours. Chief of State, Colonel Feralta, Minister of Government, Colonel Ferraro, and Intelligence Chief, Colonel Porres attended for the Guatemalans. Paul Webb and Andy Rogers of our Station were present. 2. At the request of the Chief, Paul Webb, I prefaced the operational briefing with a brief description of how the U.S. Intelligence Community operates, in the role of CIA, of the need for compartmentation and security, and specifically of how the foregoing considerations make it imperative for the Guatemalans to adopt security precautions which will ensure that the information we provide and the joint operations we undertake are compartmented within the Guatemalan government, in fact, discussed by the Guatemalan government exclusively with our representatives in the field. 3. Following the introductory remarks outlined above, I briefed the group on the CIA structure, the CIA operational techniques, and specifically on CIA aims and operations in Guatemala. The President gave close attention throughout the briefing and examined the exhibits closely, including the CIA intelligence requirements for Guatemala and the Salvadoran "Caso Zapote" files. 4. After the foregoing exposition, I explained our aims in exploiting the information with regard to the recruitment aspect, the CIA role, and the control of CIA version. In this connection I asked for close cooperation and coordination of activities, promising that we shall do our utmost and making reference to our travel lists and watch list. 3. With reference to the SALT case, because of the developments and plans in El Salvador, I explained briefly the status of the SALT case and the possibility of his being transferred to Guatemala. This was in line with the discussions in El Salvador which included our Chief of Station, the President, and the President's intelligence advisor, Colonel [name redacted]. I asked that the Guatemalan government take no action unless requested by President [name redacted] or Colonel [name redacted] and said that, if transferred, one of our people probably would talk to [name redacted] in Guatemala. 6. The Chief of State Perla made a rather impassioned speech in which he covered the following points: a. His own long experience in the CIA, in Cuba and in Central America; b. The early warnings about Castro—which were disregarded; c. The extent to which Guatemala has lived up to its obligations in the OAS, to which it has cooperated in efforts against Castro and to which it has looked toward U.S. leadership; d. The failure of the U.S. to take aggressive action against Cuba and the need for taking a hard line, including the use of force in support of military activity by the free Cubans and the other American countries; e. His appreciation that the Soviets will not be willing to risk a nuclear war over Cuba; f. Condemnation of Mexico for her dealings with Cuba, for failure to abide by her obligations in the OAS, and for permitting the Castroites to operate out of Mexico against other American countries; x. The need for action against Mexico; h. The effectiveness of his own actions against guerrillas in Guatemala and his determination to "meet violence with violence." i. Recognition of the importance of the information covered in the brief, and of its exploitation. j. Reference to the case of the Mexican courier working for Cuban intelligence and now detained in Guatemala (the Alfonso case). k. Acceptance of security restrictions and his decision to hold the information to those present. In replying to the remarks of Colonel Peralta, I said that we appreciate the cooperation of Guatemala in the 24 OA and that we shall be most interested in the exploitation of the possibilities in the present case. I added that the matter of using force against Cuba is a policy matter on which I was not competent to comment but that the decisions made by the United States Government are based on careful study of detailed information including information on Soviet intentions and capabilities. At the conclusion of the meeting, Peralta asked for a copy of the 131 requirements (which he already had gone over closely) and took the copy with him to study further. Harold E. Swenson Chief, VII/5A/CI SECRET	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10260.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 1049, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1740, 1 ], [ 1740, 3303, 2 ], [ 3303, 4471, 3 ] ] }
76d0b0d15012a29346d0d0e7fee4c61882df448d	SECRET 1. LANFOSCH AND AMNUG 1, ONCE EACH ALONE AND ONCE TOGETHER, SAID [REDACTED] ON SEPTEMBER 3, AMNUG 1 TOOK SAME POSITION AS PARA 2, REF A. IDENTIFIED KNOWING AMNUG DESPITE CASE OFFICER RELATIONSHIP, REFUSED DISCUSS ANYTHING ABOUT CUBAN INTEL, AND DEMANDED FOR RELEASE AND EXILE TO START LIFE AGAIN. 2. OBTAINING TRUTH FROM AMNUG 1 WILL BE TIME CONSUMING. HE FULLY AWARE PROOFS AGAINST HIM BUT PROBABLY HOPES POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL FORCE SELF-ADMISSION AND PROBABLY FEARS ADMISSION OF HIS COMPLICITY WILL NOT HELP HIM. SALV GOVT MUST CONVINCE HIM HE WROTE ON BOTH COUNTS. HE OF DUBIOUS VALUE IN SO FAR AS CONTRIBUTING NEW INFO ABOUT PAST ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN INTEL OR PCES BUT OF CONSIDERABLE INTEREST AS AGENT IF HE CAN BE TARGETED AGAINST CUBAN INTEL OR PCES. IF RELEASED WOULD BE DEFINITE OBSTACLE TO FURTHER OPS AGAINST AMNUG TARGETS. IF HE SHOULD BE DOPED, HIS IMPRISONMENT WOULD COULD RECRUITMENT AND WOULD TEND TO ENHANCE HIS VALUE. PROBABLY WOULD BE MOST USEFUL OUTSIDE SALV INCLUDING MEXI AND CUBA. 3. As matters stand most important to protect KURAY EQUITY in 02 [JUAVE 2] WHO OF TREAT PACT. THIS OR COULD BE AFFECTED ADVERSELY BY SPREAD OF NEWS ABOUT ACHIEVING EFFECTS ON PEOPLE BE KURAY TO EFFECT RECRUITMENTS. BECAUSE OF VALUE OF [JUAVE 2] PREFER FOR PRESENT NOT to PROCEED AGAINST OTHERS WHO RECEIVED INTEL TRAINING. AFTER [JUAVE 2] IS PRODUCING AND AFTER PRESENT INTERVAL KURAY CAN PROCEED WITH RECRUITMENT EFFORT AGAINST OTHERS EITHER UNILATERALLY OR WITH [LIAISON] DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS. A. PROCEEDING WITH ARREST OF CHELLILPOS TRAINED IN CUDA PROBABLY WOULD BE BENEFICIAL AS LONG AS NOT ATTRIBUTED TO ACHIEVING. IN ADDITION to BENEFITS OF CA PLAY, SOME OF THOSE RETAINED MIGHT BE COUPLED AND TARGETED AGAINST CHELLILPOS GROUP ON PEP 3. 5. APPRECIATE PEP 3 TO WHICH WILL REPLY AFTER DISCUSSING FURTHER PROSPECTS AND GOVT INTENTIONS WITH [JUILL 1 ARE POSSIBLY PRESIDENT]. 01, 02 SECRET 01 [FULILL-1] AGREED WITH ABOVE. 01 HAVE WHEN LIAISON WILL BE [JUILL-1]. 02	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10261.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 759, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1014, 1 ], [ 1014, 2005, 2 ] ] }
8057abfcef578a27ff6da93a46930cd70102b4c1	SECRET 82908 SECRET IN ACCORDANCE WITH COE AND LAKOSCH YET JUHILL INFORMED ON SEPTEMBER 15, COE OFFICE TO BRIEF HIM ON HAVE 2 RECRUITMENT, IMPORTANCE AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. JUHILL WAS MUCH IMPRESSED AND AGREED TO ACTUALLY ONLY HE AND PRESIDENT WOULD KNOW RECRUITMENT AND THEY WOULD MAKE NO RECORD OF IT. DURING LAKOSCH FOR THE BUT HAVE 2 IS MOST IMPORTANT LOCAL TARGET BECAUSE HE HAS INFLUENCE OF AND ACCESS TO CONNIE PARTIES SALV AND OTHER CENTS IN COUNTRIES, IS POPULAR IN UNIVERSITY AND STUDENT LEADER. IT IS THE MILITARY COMMITTEE, TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO CONNIE PARTIES SUCH AS AT VOGOCH, PRAGUE, KENI, CARR AND ETC. IT IS KNOWN, BAD COE CONTACTS, WAS TRAINED AND RECRUITED BY LAKOSCH. COE ALONG WITH HAVE 2, 27 YEARS OLD WAS DECEIVED. SINCE 1969, HE IS POTENTIAL IN PARTY, BUT THAT ANY INFLUENCE OF HAVE 2 AND ALL HE COULD PRODUCE FOR YEARS TO DATE. LAKOSCH TOLD ONE OF HIS AGENTS WHO ALREADY HAS LEFT SALV. SECRET DETAILED CONTACT WITH HAVE 2. HAVE 2 ACCEPTED WITHOUT QUESTIONS. DECEIVE ALL HIS FACILITIES AND URGENT COOPERATION TO KUBARK. CCS AND LANGOSCH BELIEVE THERE HAS BEEN NO SECURITY PROBLEM TO DATE. 3. DO NOT PLAN HIT ANY OTHER TARGETS SALV AT THIS TIME, EXCEPT HAVE 1, AS HAVE 2 OP TOO IMPORTANT TO RISK DRAWING ATTENTION TO KUBARK PRESENCE OR RECRUITMENT EFFORTS. PLAN TO CONTINUE. HAVE 1 INTERROGATION AND RECRUITMENT EFFORT. HIS SILENCE AND COLLABORATION IMPORTANT IN THEMSELVES BUT ALSO FOR FORESEEING REASON. HANDLE EXACTLY AS KUBARK HIGHER. 4. HAVE NOT SPECIFIED AMOUNT OF RENUMERATION TO HAVE 2 EXCEPT THAT IT WILL INCLUDE PAYING COST OF FURTHER STUDIES OF BROTHER IN WHATEVER COUNTRY KUBARK CONSIDERS BEST FROM VIEWPOINT OF ADEQUATE SCHOOL OR INSTITUTE AS WELL AS FROM SECURITY STANDPOINT. AFTER GRADUATION AND WHEN BROTHER HAS SPECIALIZED IN CANCER RESEARCH ESPECIALLY (CANCER) NOW COMPLETING WORK AT IED AND EXPECTED RETURN SALV OCTOBER. HAVE TOLD HAVE 2 BROTHER MUST HAVE SCHOOL AND OTHER PROCEEDS TO ESTABLISH COMPETENCE IN APPLYING FOR MISSIONS. HAVE TOLD ASAP SUGGEST SCHOOLS, HOSPITALS OR RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS WHERE BROTHER SHOULD APPLY AND WHERE PREFERABLY KUBARK SECURELY CAN PROVIDE RAPID ATTENDANCE, TOGETHER WITH SUGGESTED MEANS PAYING. HAVE TOLD BROTHER SPEAKS ONLY SPANISH BUT HAS READING KNOWLEDGE ENGLISH AND FRENCH. HAVE TOLD HAVE 2 BROTHER MUST FULFILL MIN 2 YRS OF TRAINING BY HAVE 2 AND ATTENDANCE AT INSTITUTE. BY STARTING OF SCHOLARSHIP ARE STRICTLY ON OWN EXPENSE. SIGNED SECRET	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10262.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 863, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 922, 1 ], [ 922, 2444, 2 ] ] }
30b8829765ffa249cfe24003536b7cb1a559415a	SECRET 342232 DIRECT TEGU 5633 FYI: TEGU 5625 (66 66 66) FOLLOWING FROM LANGOSCH 1. PRESUMING CHIEF AND LANGOSCH HAD PRIVATE MEET SEPTEMBER 66. CHIEF OF STATE COL. OSWALDO LOPEZ LANGOSCH BRIEFED ON DGI OPS AND ORGANIZATION, INCLUDING INFO ON CARLOS SUSA N. ARROYO, CARLOS MORENO ESPINAL, EDUARDO BANEGAS AND ANTONIO FERNANDEZ IZAMARIL. WHO USES HONDURAN DOCS IN NAME MIGUEL RANCIAS RABIN. ALSO FURNISHED RECENT TRAVEL LISTS AND COPY OF DGI REQUIREMENTS ON 2. LOPEZ EXHIBITED KEEN INTEREST, REVIEWED ALL CASES, SAID HE KNEW SOME PERSONALLY INCLUDING SUSA. PROMISED PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE INFO ON ALL HONDURANS THROUGH PRISING CHIEF AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO FULL COOPERATION. SAID GOVT HAS ABOUT 25 SUSPECTS UNDER ARREST AND HAS HAD TO RELEASE OTHERS FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE BUT SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL OFFICE IS PROHIBITED CLASSIFIED SECRET CAPABLE OF MAKING MISTAKES OF PEOPLE LIKE [REDACTED] IF THEY ENTER COUNTRY AND WILLING MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO GOVERN. HOWEVER, [REDACTED] SPECIFIED LACK OF SECURITY AND COMPETENCE IN HIS GOVERNMENT: A. HE MUST KEEP MATERIAL FURNISHED IN PERSONAL POSSESSION OR OWN HOME BECAUSE OFFICE IS NOT SECURE. B. MOST PEOPLE IN GOVERNMENT INCLUDING THOSE IN INTEL AND POLICE ARE NOT SECURE EITHER BECAUSE SUSCEPTIBLE TO BRIEFS OR NOT ABLE TO SAFEGUARD ANY CONFIDENCES. C. NOBODY IN GOVERNMENT IS TRAINED TO COPE WITH PSI OPERATIONS. D. GENERALLY GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL ARE LESS ASTUTE THAN [REDACTED] AND OTHER COUNTRIES. 3. [REDACTED] MENTIONED FELIX GYUELA, CHIEF INVESTIGATOR, AS ONLY TRUSTED AND REASONABLY COMPETENT PERSON BUT ADDED GYUELA TOO BURDENED WITH OTHER DUTIES. THEREFORE, SEEK SUITABLE CANDIDATE WHO [REDACTED] WILL PROPOSE TO PLACING CHIEF SO SUCH PERSON COULD BE TRAINED AND DEVOTE TIME TO SUBVERSIVE AND ESPIONAGE MATTERS. SECRET CONCERNED LAW ENFORCEMENT ON [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10267.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 703, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 851, 1 ], [ 851, 1868, 2 ] ] }
c37d3468f97ef30cadf4a6b9bc8711fb804ef370	MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/SA/CI VIA : Chief, WH/PO/A SUBJECT : AMMUG/1, Operation Target Analysis and Non-surfacible Leads 1. Reference is made to your memorandum date 16 June 1964 requesting Target Analysis Summary Reports on leads to be exploited and lists of those leads which the Branch desires not to be surfaced to the Intelligence community. 2. Attached are separate lists for each appropriate Central American and Caribbean country detailing nationals of each country whose names have been mentioned or otherwise cropped up during the debriefing of AMMUG/1. WH/2 considers, at this time, that it is not feasible nor desirable to surface any of these leads to the intelligence community, pending a final determination as to the feasibility of pursuing some of these leads for operational exploitation. Those leads which are determined to be of no operational potential will be released to your office on a continuing basis for surfacing to appropriate agencies. 3. Attached also are seven completed Target Analysis Summary Reports on: a) Francisco Javier MELLA Pena b) Jaime DURAN Hernando c) Socrates Isaías PEGUERO Sehuroer d) Jean Norbert MONTERO e) Mauricio de la SELVA Venegas f) Roque DALTON Garcia g) Noel GUERRERO Santiago These individuals represent immediate targets on whom we have already undertaken action. We anticipate that certain selected other individuals from the lists cited in paragraph one above will become targets, and accordingly, are in the process of examining and investigating these. As these individuals are culled through, Target Analysis Summary Reports shall be prepared and forwarded to your office. 26 [John M. Whitten] C/WH/2 Attachments: Target Analysis Summary Reports AMMUG/1 Leads Not to be Disseminated Distribution: 0 & 1 - C/WH/SA/CI (w/atts) 1 - WH/PO/A (w/atts) 3 - WH/2 (w/atts) Dominican Republic Leads Not to be Disseminated AMC01 Operation Francisco Javier REILLA Pena Jaime DURAN Hernando Socrates Isaias PEGUERO Schurman Epidio RUIZ (this is an alias of "TIBURON" - true name still not known) David Onello ESPAILLAT Campos Francisco Eleuterio RAMOS Pegoero Francisco Elizardo RAMOS Pegoero Teresa Inocencia ESPAILLAT Hernandez Jose Bienvenido OJEDA Kovel Hector Augusto CARRAL Ortega Leopoldo Aristeo GRULLON Ruiz Jose CASA Lagrono Silvano LORA Vicente Ilander Canoni SALIG Belmonte Ana Mercedes ESPINAL de Castro Baldemiro CASTRO Garcia Marcelino GRULLON Jimenez Denito ALLEO German Norge BIELLA Fernandez Rafael Francisco TAVARES Rosario Hugo TODES Vargas Cayetano Armando ARIAS DEL PRADO Antonio Emilio Jose EVA Conde Simon BOLIVAR Arturo Rafael ESPAILLAT Rodrigues Cecilia E. HERNANDEZ de Pazas Ernesto LOPEZ Molina Maximo LOPEZ Molina El Salvador Leads Not to be Disseminated APR/01 Operation ✓ Roberto BRIQUEL Marín GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Raul Fernando ESCOBAR Melendez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X ✓ Carlos Alberto FLORES Hernandez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X ✓ Juan Ramon LOZANO Rosales ALIAS OF ROBERTO BRIQUEL MARIN ✓ Carlos MARTINEZ Ortiz DEAD - GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Ricardo Augusto MARTINEZ Vanegas GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Ivan Danilo RODRIGUEZ Leon GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X ✓ Lisandro RAMIREZ Solis GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X ✓ Pedro RODRIGUEZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Ciro Arturo RUIZ Torres GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY (IN CONTACT WITH) ✓ Victor Manuel SANCHEZ Bonilla GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Marcelo CONTRERAS Molina ALIAS OF VICTOR MANUEL SANCHEZ ✓ Arturo ALFARO Fuentes GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Raul Antonio VARGAS GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Andres Antonio VELASQUEZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Roque DALTON Garcia ✓ Manuel Antonio CALERO GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY (IN CONTACT WITH) ✓ Jose Alberto CARRILLO Calderon ALIAS OF ANTONIO CALERO (IN CONTACT) ✓ Jose Salvador Rosales GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Ricardo CASTRO Rivas ALIAS OF ANTONIO CALERO (IN CONTACT WITH CASTRO) ✓ Francisco CORRAL Cardano GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X ✓ Freddy Guerra GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Armando LOPEZ Mantiel GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY ✓ Jose Antonio GARCIA Rivera GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY X - 2 - - Pedro SANTACHUZ Castro GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY - Ruben MARTI Guardado GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY - Raul Concepcion Morales NO RECORD IN AMMUC-1 INDEX UNISAFE - Jose MANCIA Martinez GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY INDIVIDUAL NAME RICKY MARTINEZ ROAD TRAINING IN CUBA KNOWN NAME USED BY ALEJANDRO GOMEZ MONTANO - Jesus Antonio PAZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY - Rita RAMIREZ GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY - Pedro AYALA Valdez ALIAS OF JESUS ANTONIO PAZ 06 TA [Jorge Federico BAIRE] AGENT 2 AMMUC-1 KNOWS [Jorge] 1 IN CONTACT WITH SUB. - Ana Leticia BIZUZA (BARRAGAN) Quiros GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING ONLY 06 - Raul Castellanos MEXICO IN MEXICO WAS SUMMONED TO MEET 06 TA [Tomas GUERRA RIVAS] 201 247 512 201 AGENT 06 TA [Alejandro MONTANO] 06 GOMEZ MONTANO TRAINING IN AMMUC-1 06 [Rafael AGUIRRE Blanco] AGENT SUMMONED IN CASE 06 [Jose Manuel RIGUETA Canas] 201 262 254 201 SECRET Guatemala Leads Not to be Disclosed AM-03/1 Operation Antonio JOHN Marcos Julio CAMARA Sierra G/W Francisco CHUZ Figueroa G/W Victor Manuel CUELLAR Carranza G/W Bernardo DIAZ Mendez G/W only Rolando HERRERA Hernandez G/W Marco Antonio LEGUI Aguilar G/W AMUC-1 HUACUS Edgar Roberto LOBO Dubon G/W AMUC-1 HUACUS Jose Aquiles L. MORALES G/W AMUC-1 HUACUS Manuel Josue ORTIZA Paz Angel PALENCIA Sanchez G/W only Ricardo Arturo OJEDA (pseud: Alberto ANTONIO Molinar) Jacobo ARBANZ Ouzman Mario BARRIENTOS Manuel GALICH Carmen ROMERO Soa Fernando SOSA Pol Marco Antonio YON Sosa Luis Augusto TURCIOS Lima Francisco AMADO Granados Alicia HOYA de Amado Jose Manuel FORTUNY Victor Manuel GUTIERREZ Garbin Isabel FOHL Romero de Sosa Jose RODRIGUEZ Melida TURCIOS SECRET Faith Leads Not to be Disseminated Jorge Norbert MONTEGO Rene DEPESTRE (unknown) "PITIN" Honduras Leads Not to be Disseminated Maglio MORENO Espinal Mario SOUSA Navarro Leis Randolfo BARELAS Nicaragua: Leads Not to be Disseminated ANTONI Operation Noel GUERRERO Santiago Professor TORRES (probably Adelberto TORRES Espinoza) Silvio MATEO (or MALLORCA) Ernesto MARTINEZ German PALACIO Baca Efrain SANCHEZ Carlos A. TIMOCO Montiel Marvin CASTRO Felix MONTERREY Dobil Hlicio Dharinto GONZALEZ Noron Alejandro ALEGRIA Bermudez Juan Jose GARCIA Lorio Eli ALTAMIRANO Bayardo ALTAMIRANO Lopes Ivan BACA Alejandro BERMUDEZ Anibal LORIO Garcia Enrique MARSHCO Orlando QUANT Quintana Rolando QUANT Monterrey FLIES Rodolfo ROMERO Gomez Efrain SANCHEZ Sancho Panama Leads Not to be Disseminated Thelma KING Jorge TURNER (Unknown) "Luis Sonrisa Case" - 2 male guitarists SECRET Dominican Republic Target Analysis Summary Report SUBJECT: Francisco Javier MELLA Pena aka Francisco Xavier MELLA Dona aka "Pichi" I. Significance of Target a) Cuban Intelligence Service Connection MELLA has been identified as a Singleton Cuban Intelligence Service Agent in the Dominican Republic, trained as a frogman, and also in S/W and ciphers. His exact mission on behalf of the CIS is not known. b) Communist Party Affiliation Subject is a member of the Castroist revolutionary Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). The APCJ is not a Communist Party per se; however, its present, dominant leaders are Marxist-Communist in their political direction. The APCJ is presumed penetrated by actual Communists, and is known to receive moral and material support from Cuba. c) Information Which Could be Obtained 1. His exact mission on behalf of the Cuban Intelligence Service. What information is he required to furnish to the Service? The reason for this information. 2. What persons will he use to acquire this information? Will they all be unwitting? 3. What is his exact role as a frogman? (for arms caches, demolition etc.) 4. Information on his accommodation address in France. Additional information on his accommodation address in Jamaica. 5. Information on the relationship between Cuba and the APCJ and plans for the Dominican Republic. 6. Information on other Cuban IS agents known to him. 7. Doubling (see III for more details). II. Current Location Hermanos Miralles No. 5, Madrid, Spain (since February 1964, when he went there from Cuba. In Madrid, he was joined by his Dominican girl-friend, Xiomara SALAS Decillo, whom he married there. Neither has yet returned to the Dominican Republic.) His last known address in the Dominican Republic is Avenida Independencia No. 55, Santo Domingo. III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection) None known. The only information on NELLA was acquired in April 1963 when he transited Mexico en route to Cuba. At that time NELLA became quite upset when "salio a Cuba" (left for Cuba) was stamped in his passport. Accordingly, with this being the only past information on subject, we would be starting from "scratch". IV. Family and Relatives a) Wife: Xiomara SALAS Decillo, Dominican citizen (no information) Father: Luis NELLA, Dominican citizen (no information) Mother: Nenel (nee unknown) de NELLA, Dominican citizen (no information) (The Santo Domingo Station is presently conducting an investigation of his relatives) b) None known to be in the United States. V. Biographical Date of Birth: 25 February 1937 Place of Birth: Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic Citizenship: Dominican Republic Languages: Native Spanish (only language capability known to us at this time) Physical Description: 5'10" tall 120 pounds black hair (cut short - but not crew-cut) dark brown eyes swarthy complexion Photographs: Available at the JCS Other pertinent data: NELLA would be described as "pretty". He has no mustache and does not shave. VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection a) [2071/19] - Lives in same apartment building area as Subject. Has furnished some information on Subject and his girl-friend, which he obtained through normal contacts. b) [2071/19] - Operational Lead only (see separate target sheet). He is close to NELLA and also could lead us to a still unidentified CIS agent "TIRANO" who used DURAN as an unwitting courier for the delivery of microfilm to Cuba. c) [2071/19] - Although not a leader of the ARCJ, he has good access to the ARCJ's extremist "circle". He has been used with extremely good results for information on other Cuban targets of interest. VII. Evaluation: a) As was stated above, NELLA is completely new to us. However, the Station is currently conducting an investigation of NELLA in an effort to determine his vulnerability for recruitment/defection. b) With the present ruling Dominican Triumvirate, Subject could be arrested if he came to security notice, not only in his position with the CIS but also if he became involved in any subversive Communist activities. In the event he is arrested he undoubtedly would be deported. Dominican Republic Target Analysis Summary Report SUBJECT: Jaime DURAN Hernando aka Jaime DURAN Hernandez aka "Jimmy" I. Significance of Target a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service Subject is not a Cuban Intelligence Service agent, but did receive guerrilla training in Cuba. b) Communist Party Affiliation DURAN is Secretary-General of the pro-Castro Agrupacion Politica de Catorce Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Movement) in the Dominican Republic, and is a member of that faction of the APCJ favoring the training of its members to direct the future of a socialist government. c) Subject is a close friend of Francisco Javier MELA Pena, an identified Cuban Intelligence Service Agent in the Dominican Republic. Subject was also used as an "undetected" courier by a still unidentified Cuban IS agent "TIRAN" in the Dominican Republic. Subject unwittingly carried to Cuba for "TIRAN" in September 1970, a watch-book containing microfilm. d) Utility - Penetration of the 14 June plans & intentions of the Cubans vs D.R. II. Current Location Believed to be in Cuba. Has been there since September 1970. Last known Dominican Republic address: Capellan 220, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection) None known. (Also see VII - Evaluation) IV. Family and relatives a) Wife - Gloria AGUIRRE de Duran, Dominican citizen (no information) No other relatives known. b) No known relatives in the U.S.A. V. Biographic Data Date of Birth: 17 June 1933 Place of Birth: Jarabacoa, Dominican Republic Citizenship: Dominican Republic Language ability: Native Spanish (only ability known to us at this time) Physical description: (requesting from the station) Photographs: Is available at the Desk VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection [207/1] - Lives in the same residential section as DURAN. Has furnished some information on Subject, which he obtains through normal contacts. [207/1] - Has provided numerous reports on DURAN's activities within the APCJ. [207/1] - Has provided brief information on Subject's activities within the APCJ and his travel to Cuba. VII. Evaluation In that we presume that DURAN is a hard-core Communist and at present have scant information for a target assessment, immediate prospects for recruitment are virtually nil. Requirements can be levied on [207/1] since he is a controlled source; information could be elicited from [207/1] and possibly from [207/1]. As developed, leads from foregoing could be followed up on, but, as indicated above, we will be starting at the bottom of the ladder on DURAN as an operational target. Cuba - Dominican Republic Target Analysis Summary Report SUBJECT: Socrates Issias PSUEDO Schuorar alias Nelson BARCET Disla aka "Fupo" I. Significance of Target In that Subject lives in Cuba he could be extremely valuable to WH/3A and WH/2/Dominican Republic. a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service PSUEDO is the APCJ (Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio - 14th of June Political Group) representative in Cuba acting as focal point between the APCJ and the Cuban Intelligence Service (XII). b) Communist Party Affiliation APCJ representative in Cuba. Subject has been reported as a member of the pro-Castro faction of the APCJ since 1961 when he was exiled in Caracas. c) Information which Subject Could Furnish 1. Subject could furnish information on the relationship between the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ. 2. Information on the APCJ as a party, plans, members etc. 3. Information on Cuban Intelligence Service personnel known to him. 4. Possible operations of the Cuban Intelligence Service against the Dominican Republic. 5. Possible information on matters of interest to WH/3A within Cuba. 6. Doubles as a penetration of the Cuban Intelligence Service and the APCJ. 7. Information on Dominicans born trained in Cuba, not only in guerrilla training, but as agents. II. Current Location Lives in Habana, Cuba (address unknown). In Cuba he goes by the name of Nelson BART. III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection) None known. No information on his activities since 1961 is known. IV. Family and Relatives a) Wife - Gisela SANCHEZ de Pequaro, daughter of former Dominican Consul in Curacao. b) Children - one daughter (name and age unknown), and one son (name unknown) born in Habana, Cuba in December 1963. c) Father - Ismael PEQUARO Perez (deceased) d) Mother - Tullia (nee unknown) de PEQUARO (no additional information) e) Brother - Nelson Ramon PEQUARO Senorier (deceased) f) Sisters - Sobeya O. PEQUARO Senorier and Maria A. PEQUARO Senorier (no additional information) g) No relatives known to be in the United States. V. Biographic Data Date of Birth: 1 January 1929 Place of Birth: San Pedro de Macoris, Dominican Republic (NOTE: when travelling, uses Dominican passport issued 23 July 1963 in the name of Nelson BART Diaz, date and place of birth: 23 January 1939, Dominican Republic; occupation: student) Citizenship: Dominican Republic; possibly changed to Cuban. Language ability: Native Spanish; others not known. Physical Description: 5'7" tall 150 pounds brown-skinned black eyes wears eyeglasses wears mustache Photograph is available of his and also the real Nelson BART Diaz Other pertinent data: Laboratory Technician VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection We have several sources reporting on activities of the APGJ, its members etc. within the Dominican Republic. Could be used to elicit information on PEGUERO through their normal contacts. is being used at this time to report on other Cuban targets. VII. Evaluation While there is no information on hand to indicate subject is approachable, the fact that he is in Cuba, known to AK-10/1 - whom might approach him - and has been identified to us he becomes of operational interest. Obviously our objective is to continue our interest and collect what information we might, awaiting the day for his exit from Cuba. At that time more definitive action might be considered. His importance as a source of information on inside Cuba and that country's intention and capabilities on the Dominican Republic cannot be discounted and merit our continued alertness to his activities and whereabouts. Target Analysis Summary Report SUBJECT: Ruben DALTON Garcia I. Significance of Target DALTON is a recruited agent of the Cuban DGI. He has been trained in guerrilla warfare, a/w, radio transmission, and radio reception. AMMUG/1 claims that Subject is a member of the Central Committee of the PCES. AMMUG/1 characterized Subject as having excellent contacts within the DGI in Cuba. Subject is in contact with Mauricio de la Selva Yenegas, the Salvadoran intermediary, in Mexico City. In view of the above, Subject could be expected to furnish considerable information on both the PCES in El Salvador and his activities for the DGI. II. Current Location Subject was deported from El Salvador to Mexico in late January 1964. On 16 June 1964 Subject was spotted by the Salvadoran National Police in San Salvador, and is now under surveillance. Exact address will be obtained by the San Salvadoran Station. III. Vulnerabilities AMMUG/1 lists Subject as his leading candidate for recruitment by us. His reasoning on this is that Subject is not highly motivated, has a weakness for women and the easy life, and a generally weak nature. AMMUG/1 says that Subject is very intelligent, but never showed a real desire to learn during his Cuban training. Subject was given 600 dollars to purchase a radio receiver upon his return from Cuba, but he apparently spent the money on himself. IV. Family and Relatives Father (deceased) was U.S. citizen. One of Subject's three brothers fought for the U.S. in Okinawa. A sister, Margarita, is Mexican citizen who now is in Cuba as a student. V. Biographic Data DOB: 14 May 1935 DOB: San Salvador, El Salvador Nationality: Salvadoran Language Ability: Native Spanish; others not known Physical Description: Height 1.68 meters; long thin face; black eyes; two gold teeth; thinlipped; black hair parted on left side. Photo Available: Yes VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Defection Subject is known personally by AMUG-1 and by JFRIN-1, recently recruited agent of San Salvador Station. Subject is presently under surveillance by the National Police in San Salvador (Station has unilateral penetration of the police who might be used as a lead into Subject). VII. Evaluation From AMUG-1's assessment of Subject, based on personal knowledge and observation, it would appear that Subject would not be a too difficult target to hit. However, some of his personal characteristics which have made him a handling problem for the DCI would presumably make him a handling problem for us. His failure to perform for the DCI since October 1963 might mitigate against our use of him which would include, presumably, resumption of his s/w channel. Nonetheless, AMUG-1's claim that Subject is a member of the Central Committee of the PCE's (news to us) makes him an operational target for that reason alone. Haiti Target Analysis Summary Report SUBJECT: Jean Norbert MONTERO I. Significance of Target a) Connection with Cuban Intelligence Service At this time Subject is not an agent of the Cuban Intelligence Service. He is currently in Cuba seeking assistance from the DGI for the training of Haitians in guerrilla warfare activities for an eventual thrust against Haiti to oust President Francois DUVALIER. b) Communist Party Affiliation Secretary-General of the Haitian Liberation Front, a newly formed party, with the ultimate aim of merging the two communist parties of Haiti. Sensitive information available at the time indicates that this party is Moscow influenced. c) Information which Subject Could Furnish 1. Subject could provide valuable information on the Haitian Liberation Front, i.e., its members, plans, status with the USSR/Cuba etc. 2. Information on the USSR/Cuba position with respect to Haiti. 3. Information on USSR/Cuba influence and penetrations of Haitian exile circles. 4. Information on Cuban's relationship with President Francois DUVALIER. 5. Information on Haitians now in Cuba and/or the USSR. II. Current Location As of April 1961 he was living at the Hotel Calina in Habana, Cuba. His permanent residence is believed to be in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic where he has been in exile. III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection) None known. He is strongly anti-DUVALIER. In that many Haitian exile circles are somewhat down on the United States as a result of the unsuccessful September 1933 invasion of Haiti, it is possible that subject merely turned to the "left" for assistance in overthrowing DUVALIER. It is however quite possible that he would cooperate with the United States if he felt we were taking an anti-DUVALIER stand. IV. Family and Relatives None known. V. Biographic Data Date of Birth: Unknown Place of Birth: Haiti (?) Citizenship: Haitian Language ability: Native French or Creole; very little Spanish Physical description: 5' 10" tall 160 pounds Wears mustache Nero Photograph is not available Other pertinent data: None VI. Operational leads and lines to subject for recruitment or defection a) [Redacted] - Haitian exile leader in the Dominican Republic who housed the CNTAC exile group in 1961. b) [Redacted] - Haitian exile in the Dominican Republic who stayed with CNTAC in the Dominican Republic in 1961. c) [Redacted] - Asset in Haiti who is only in a position to make discreet inquiries regarding NNTAC. d) [Redacted] - Asset in Haiti who is only in a position to make discreet inquiries regarding NNTAC. VII. Evaluation a) Until information has been gleaned from the assets cited in VI above regarding CNTAC's vulnerability to recruitment little can be done. However, as was pointed out in III above, it is highly probable that subject merely turned to Cuba for assistance in overthrowing President DUVALIER of Haiti. b) Subject is not subject to arrest when he returns to the Dominican Republic, unless of course, his activities with the Cubans become known. In any event he definitely would not return to Haiti, as he would immediately be imprisoned and most probably tortured and killed. Target Analysis Summary Report SUBJECT: Noel GUERRERO Santiago (201-81510) I. Significance of Target GUERRERO is presently in Mexico and is "intermediary" between Cuban IS and the FLN in Nicaragua. His Cuban Intel pseudo is Andres Madariaga. ANHUC-1 saw him in Mexico in March 1984 regarding funds which the DGI had provided the FLN. According to ANHUC-1 GUERRERO is involved in "Rios de la Tempestad" which also involves three or four other DGI agents. ANHUC-1 also reported that GUERRERO is in trouble with the FLN which claims he spent money improperly. The FLN has no confidence in him and considers him cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. By other sources he has been described as one of the main Communists in Central America. He was in Cuba in 1959 to get Cuban aid for the revolutionary movement against Nicaragua. He was formerly a member of the Communist Party in Mexico. He was a cell leader in Corinto and advisor to the Elevador's Union. II. Current Location He is presently in Mexico. He was a political exile in Honduras in 1957. He has travelled extensively throughout Central America and may have been clandestinely in Nicaragua in July 1983. III. Vulnerabilities (for recruitment or defection) ANHUC-1: GUERRERO is in trouble with the FLN which claims he spent money improperly. The FLN has no confidence in him, and considers him cowardly and lacking in fighting spirit. Among ANHUC-1 documents is a critique of the abortive incursion in Nicaragua in July 1983 by Silvio Mayorga and Orlando Quintana which blames GUERRERO for its failure. GUERRERO's own account admits certain mistakes and tries to justify others. However, it must be borne in mind that GUERRERO is a long time Communist, anti-Somoza revolutionary. IV. Family and Relatives Wife: Ofelia Chacon Brother: Dr. Eloy GUERRERO Santiago, suspected Communist, says Noel is Communist. Eloy is anti-Somoza, has spent time in jail. Father: Jose F. GUERRERO Castillo, resident of Leon (DOI: 1953) V. Personalia DOB: 12 April 1914 POS: Leon, Nicaragua Nationality: Nicaraguan Languages: Spanish and English Religion: Protestant Education: 2 courses first year law Photo: Available in Biographic Register Physical description: 5'8", grey hair, dark brown eyes, complexion trigueñolargo (light brunette). VI. Operational Leads and Lines to Subject for Recruitment or Deception ABNOC-1 knows him personally, was in contact with him in Mexico in March 1934. VII. Evaluation In 1942 or 1947 (reported both ways) GUERRERO was expelled from the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) according to another member of the PCM (LIRMAN) who was a recruitment candidate (but dropped), and who said that GUERRERO might then be amenable to recruitment. Apparently no attempt was made to recruit him. He has been recorded throughout the years since as an active Communist revolutionary and was exiled from Nicaragua for revolutionary activities in 1959. Also in 1959 he went to Cuba and was active there in preparing for the revolutionary movement in all Latin America. He apparently was working for Cuban IS at the time of the abortive revolutionary attempt against Nicaragua in 1963, as a document provided by ABNOC-1 written by Madariaga (GUEVARA's pseudonym) attempts to point out reasons for its failure. Another document written by Silvio Mayorga and Orlando Cuart Blanes "Andres" (GUEVARA) for its failure. GUEVARA, however, must still be in the good graces of the Cuban 15, if he is an agent in the "Hijos de la Tempestad" and serves as "intermediary" to the FLN, or remnants which may be reorganizing. It seems highly unlikely that GUEVARA would be receptive to either recruitment or defection. ANWXC-1 knows him personally and met with him in Mexico in March 1964. It would appear that ANWXC-1 could furnish more information about his contact with GUEVARA which would be helpful in an assessment of GUEVARA. There is a report that GUEVARA was in Nicaragua clandestinely in 1962. He would undoubtedly be arrested should he return there and his presence discovered by the Nicaraguans. NOTE: This is not a complete target analysis and should not be used as such.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10276.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 27, "total-input-tokens": 30861, "total-output-tokens": 8200, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1235, 1 ], [ 1235, 1860, 2 ], [ 1860, 2579, 3 ], [ 2579, 2728, 4 ], [ 2728, 4229, 5 ], [ 4229, 5166, 6 ], [ 5166, 5930, 7 ], [ 5930, 6020, 8 ], [ 6020, 6123, 9 ], [ 6123, 6681, 10 ], [ 6681, 6795, 11 ], [ 6795, 8297, 12 ], [ 8297, 9855, 13 ], [ 9855, 11027, 14 ], [ 11027, 12489, 15 ], [ 12489, 13681, 16 ], [ 13681, 14987, 17 ], [ 14987, 16387, 18 ], [ 16387, 17349, 19 ], [ 17349, 18931, 20 ], [ 18931, 20213, 21 ], [ 20213, 21544, 22 ], [ 21544, 23129, 23 ], [ 23129, 23402, 24 ], [ 23402, 25111, 25 ], [ 25111, 26590, 26 ], [ 26590, 27541, 27 ] ] }
104247497924b43a519de42f06a646be17248805	AS STATED REFERENCE: UFGA-27105 It is requested that the photograph of "Comandante William" be shown to the AMBINGO's for possible identification. Subject claimed to have received two years' pilot training at San Antonio de los Banos Air Base, reportedly sometime in 1965 and 1966, and may have worked as a Cubana pilot. While he was in Cuba he used the name Ernesto Castro Moro. Please notify Bogota Station of the results. Constance M. Quilhot Distribution: Orig and 1 - COS/JMWAVE 1 - COS/Bogota 15 March 1967 Distribution: 1 - RID 1 - WH/REG/C 1 - WH/COG/CICS 1 - WH/COG/MO 1 - WH/3/C 1 - Originator 201-749651	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10325.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 240, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 621, 1 ] ] }
678b4f2fcc3e411d4a584a67e74a66db7ee70f20	SECRET 8815422 CITE SANTO DOMINGO 2554 DIRECTOR INF HJWAVE, CARACAS 16-17 8 JUL 73 441 REF: SANTO DOMINGO 2561 (NOT SENT JHJAVE) (IN 73380)* KAPOR DYOYUR PBRUMEN DESENSITIZED 1. OTHER TOPICS MENTIONED IN DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN CUBANS AND MH-1J4 REPS, AND NOT INCLUDED IN REFERENCE DUE OPERATIONAL CONTEXT, WERE: A. [DICH MELLA] CASE. CUBANS TOLD DOMINICANS TO REVIEW ALL THE "COMPANEROS" WHO WERE IN CUBA WITH [DICH] AND TO BE CAREFUL WITH AND "VIGILANT" [MELLA]. THEY ADD THAT [MELLA] MUST MOVE AND AVOID MEETING WITH THE "TIPU" ANYMORE. NEXT SENTENCE SAYS, "IMPORTANTE: AJUSTICIAMIENTO DE VICTOR". VICTOR ALSO REFERRED TO AS AGENT OF CIA AND TRAITOR. B. DOMINICANS ALSO DISCUSS "GRUPO FRANCES" WITH CUBANS. CUBANS SAY THAT THEY BELIEVE GROUP IS COLLABORATING WITH FRENCH AND YANKIES (CIA) BECAUSE OF THE CASE WITH WHICH THEY GET THINGS DONE. CUBANS ADD THAT THESE PEOPLE (GRUPO FRANCES) GOT IN TOUCH WITH MH-1J4 THROUGH LUIS GENAO AND FIDELIO DESPRADEL. C. CUBANS SAY THEY ARE INVESTIGATING CONTACT THAT GENAO (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) MADE A FEW MONTHS AGO IN NEW YORK. WITH MEMBERS VR-134 (WIDOW MINAYA). CUBANS ARE VERY WORRIED ABOUT PROBLEM OF GENAO AND WHO TO SUBSTITUTE FOR HIM IN ROMA. NO INDICATION THAT THIS GENAO IDENTIFIABLE WITH LUIS GENAO ESPAILLAT. 2. FOR DIRECTOR SUGGEST YOU MAY WISH RELAY REFERENCE TO JMVAVE. 3. FOR JMVAVE: REFERENCE WAS LISTING AND DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENTS CONFISCATED FROM DOMINICAN COMMUNIST COURIER FERNANDO DE LA ROSA BY VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS. SECRET SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL TIMES AND CONTENTS OF INFO AVAILABLE TO SHOWN FROM FERNANDO DE LA ROSA AND FROM CONFISCATED PAPERS.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10331.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 653, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1077, 1 ], [ 1077, 1629, 2 ] ] }
0dd6ed0138436da41f0348b4ddcad2cbd9cef438	RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce. MESSAGE FORM TOTAL COPIES: 20 SECRET FROM: DIRECTOR CONF: WH/COG 8 INFO: VR FILE 21 RID COPY, SECURE 4, OCS 3, C10A, C16P SECRET DATE AND TIME FILED: 8 1922 ZITE DIRECTOR 58190 TO: JMWAVE TYPIC AMUG REF: JMWAVE 4480 (IN 54041) 1. RE PARA ONE REF. (INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION) MAIN OFFICE LOCATED IN BALTIMORE. REF PROVIDES ALL INFO NECESSARY FOR WOGAME ANSWER CREDIT QUERIES. 2. RE PURCHASE OF HOME, HQS RECOMMENDS AMUG/1 DEFER DECISION UNTIL QUESTION HIS WOFACF FUTURE DEFINITELY SETTLED. FYI: LANGOSCH HAS REQUESTED AMUG/1 SERVICES (IN FRANKFURT) BUT QUESTION NOT YET DETERMINED. DISPATCH FOLLOWING. END OF MESSAGE JACOB D. ESTERLINE AC/WHD THOMAS J. FLORES C/WH/COG RELEASING OFFICER SECRET REPRODUCTION OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 7 Dec 66 201-749651	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10333.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 384, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 872, 1 ] ] }
febd88a0a0838dc4d295546470fefb27666dfcb6	SECRET 662311Z CITE JMWAVE 4462 DIRECTOR TYPIC AMMUG REFERENCE DIRECTOR 57011 6 Dec 65 54041 1. JMWAVE RECORDS SHOW FROM ARRIVAL JMWAVE LATE 64 THROUGH DECEMBER 65 AMMUG/1 U/C'D AS STATUS COVER, (INTER-UNIVERSITY COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ACTION) WHICH WAS PROVIDED BY HEADQUARTERS. JUST TITLE WAS RESEARCHER WITH SALARY $600 PER MONTH. AMMUG/1 CLAIMS NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE (BALTIMORE COMPANY) AND SEARCH JMWAVE FILES FAILS TO PRODUCE ANY INFO THAT AMMUG/1 CONNECTED WITH ANY SUCH COMPANY. REQUEST TO CLARIFY. 2. AS IN CASE NUMBEROUS OTHER PERIMEN AGENTS, JMWAVE REVISED AMMUG/1 COVER 1 JAN 66 TO MEET TAX REQUIREMENTS AND TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVE STATUS COVER. STATION NEGLECTED INFORM WOGAME RE THIS CHANGE. (SCHAEFFER) EMPLOYMENT THUS BEGAN 1 JAN 65. THERE WAS NO INTERIM EMPLOYMENT. 3. SEVERAL OTHER CREDIT CHECKS SINCE AMMUG/1 EMPLOYED BY (SCHAEFFER) HAVE WORKED SMOOTHLY. AMMUG/1 ATTEMPTING PURCHASE HOUSE LOCALLY WHICH APPEARS BE REASON FOR PRESENT SECRET 201-747651 6 Dec 1966 PAGE 2 JMWAVE 4480 SECRET CHECKS. APPRECIATE EARLY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT INQUIRIES TO EXPEDITE CLOSING PURCHASE. SECRET SECRET	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10335.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 477, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 998, 1 ], [ 998, 1121, 2 ] ] }
ff29f9f40ab4a0e008c1041f3feaa068ae2e7e67	\| TO \| NAME AND ADDRESS \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|----\|------------------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| Jack J. Lynn \| 3/23 \| 95 \| \| 2 \| The Source \| \| \| \| 3 \| \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| \| \| Remarks: F 11 I'm here asked to brief the 1st branch of your staff on the current situation. Would you like to meet? Not Portugal - would that talk to FROM: Name, Address, and Phone No. Date: UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training ATTENTION: Chief, Covert Training/OS/TH SUBJECT: Covert Training for member of [CIA/OS] REFERENCE: Proposed Training Curriculum for [CIA/OS] Trainees From CC/OS/TH 1. It is requested that covert training be given to the [CIA/OS] trainees listed below for the period of 5 March - 30 April 1965. This will be the second group of [CIA/OS] trainees under this program which was initiated by the [Venezuelan Desk of Branch Three of WI Division through Mr. [Rudolph Taylor] Chief, Covert Training, in September 1964. The first group has been given an 8 weeks covert course ending on 26 February 1965. The trainees will be in Washington under the notional cover of "participating in military training courses" or possibly a "purchasing mission" for their Government. As such, they will not be formal [liaison] visitors and will not be expected to enter Headquarters Buildings, except for one day training in the K & S Building, or to meet Agency officials. 2. Project [CIA/OS] is a [Caracas Station Liaison] activity which has as its objective the establishment of a [liaison relationship with the Venezuelan Armed Forces Intelligence Service, (SIPA)] to permit CIA to improve the efficiency and capabilities of SIPA and to provide CIA access to its intelligence take, and to eventually recruit a member of SIPA, Jacob R. [Hirschwood], a Staff Agent under non-official cover in Caracas, in providing advice and guidance to SIPA and in obtaining intelligence information in return. It is believed that covert training can help improve the efficiency and Internal security of SIFA which will enable this organization to more effectively combat the extremist guerrilla and terrorist activity fomented by the Communist Party of Venezuela with aid and encouragement from Cuba. Venezuela is getting maximum attention from Castro in his effort to bring about communist take-over in Latin America. Besides the inherent value of the training itself, the granting of the training will help improve his daily operational association with SIFA and enhance his opportunity of making successful recruitment in the future. Orientation in Counter Insurgency is also being included to give SIFA officials a greater awareness of the problem and thus to lay the groundwork for future work in this field. 3. The responsible desk operations officer for this course will be Mr. [William E. Cavan] who will be known to the trainees as "Bill Cabal", the same identity he used with the first group. An Agency serviced telephone number, 638-3130 has been arranged and will be given to the trainees as a number where "Bill Cabal" can be reached in an emergency. This number is serviced 24 hours a day and Mr. Cavan is immediately notified to call the person who asked for him at that number. Mr. Cavan is located in room 32013 of Headquarters Building, extension 4521. 4. The following is pertinent biographic data on the trainees: a. [Lt. Colonel Mario [illegible] Lobato] 08 DPO: [La Guaira, Venezuela, 25 September 1923] 08 Marital Status: Married 3 April 1949. Has three small children. Formal Education: High School, Caracas (dates unknown). A graduate of the Venezuelan Military Academy in 1950. Attended the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1950 and studied English at American University. In 1961 he attended the Argentine Army School of War for approximately 12 months. Language Ability: Spanish and some English. (English listed as "fair"). Present Status: Chief of Administration Area Knowledge: Has visited the USA and Argentina Previous Intelligence Training: None indicated, but has probably had some intelligence training either in the Venezuelan Army or the Argentine course. Other: RUMSCHE considers [unreadable] as a potential 24 recruit on return to Venezuela and suggests he be given special attention. b. [Major Luis Alfonso Gómez] 06 DPO: 9 September 1938, Las Llanzas, State of Bolivar, Venezuela Marital Status: Married 1952, has 6 small children Formal Education: High School [unreadable], 1946-1950. Entered the Venezuelan military service in 1948 and has taken intermediate and advanced courses in the Venezuelan Infantry School. He has commanded rifle platoons and infantry companies and has been an instructor in the Infantry School of the Venezuelan Army. Language Ability: Only native Spanish Present Status: [unreadable] official; exact title not indicated. Previous Intelligence Training: not indicated o. [Lt. Colonel Raúl Jiménez Gómez] 06 DPO: 16 December 1933, San Felipe, State of Yaracuy, Venezuela Marital Status: Married - wife is [unreadable] de Jiménez Formal Education: Not listed, but probably a graduate of the Venezuelan Military Academy. Language Ability: Not indicated Present Status: Deputy Director of SIPA Previous Intelligence Training: Not indicated Area Knowledge: Not indicated. Other: [Jimenez] has recently been named Deputy Director of SIPA and should be given deference as the leader of the group. d. [Lt. Colonel Solis Antonio Martinez] Birth: 3 August 1926, San Luis, State of Falcon, Venezuela Marital Status: Married, three children Formal Education: High School, Caracas 1940-1944; Venezuela Military Academy 1944-1947 (graduate). Also completed specialized course in Infantry Tactics and Tank Warfare, as well as the course of study given by the Superior War College of the Venezuelan Ministry of War. He has served in a variety of capacities within the Venezuelan Army since 1947, commanding everything from platoons through battalions as well as instructor of artillery. He has seen action against the guerrillas in the State of Falcon. He served in Colombia dates unknown, as a member of the Venezuelan mission to "Operation America". Language Ability: Native Spanish, reads but does not speak or write English. His competence in understanding English is given as "fair". Area knowledge: Subject's only travel outside of Venezuela was to Colombia. Previous intelligence: Training: None indicated but probably has had some intelligence training during his military career. Other: He is Chief of Investigations of the SIFA and will probably return to this position. It is possible that he is aware of Station's 24 police liaison with Venezuelan political police (JUGOS), without knowing the details of the relationship. 6. Training Requirements: The training should be held in a safehouse, conducted in Spanish and on a full time basis. The suggested dates are from 5 March through 30 April 1965, which have been approved by Chief, Covert Training, OS/TS. The trainees will use actual military training cover during the training period, and it is not anticipated they will enter Headquarters building. They will be taken into the R & S building for a one-day indoctrination in Seals and Flaps and Audio Surveillance. Requests for this entrance will be covered in a separate paragraph. A one-day orientation course in Counter Insurgency is also discussed in a subsequent paragraph as well as an extensive two-week course in Flaps and Seals for Major (Ochoa) at a TSO Safe House. 7. Requirements for OS/TS/Covert Training: Station Caracas has submitted the following recommendations as areas which should be covered in the training of these officers: OS/TS/Covert Training may modify and/or adapt the list as necessary. a. The Organization of Clandestine Activities b. Security c. Observation and Description (Casting) d. Surveillance q. Agent Acquisition 1. Spying 2. Assessment 3. Recruitment 4. Training 5. Management 6. Termination f. Clandestine Communications g. Counter Intelligence h. Interrogation i. Reporting j. Intelligence Research and Analysis 8. It is requested that Ground Branch of SOD make the services of Colonel Valeriano available for a one-day orientation in the latest techniques used in the field of counterinsurgency. The trainees are well aware of the general problems and history of fighting guerrillas and are actively engaged in operations at the present. It is suggested that the instructions stress use of intelligence in combating guerrilla groups and means of procuring it to include the creation of intelligence nets among peasants in the afflicted areas. It is also believed that any current information on modifications in the tactics of Mao Tse-tung would also be of value as would be examples of the use of psychological warfare programs against the guerrillas and the intellectual leaders of the communist party, considered as the moving force behind the guerrilla movement in Venezuela. It is proposed that Mr. Navas, who would use the alias of "Will Cabal," take the trainees to the office of Valeriano and that Valeriano be introduced as a consultant of CIA who is very knowledgeable of counterinsurgency problems. Valeriano, as a member of the International Police Services Academy, has talked to other Latin American officials on this problem as part of his overt duties. It is believed his talks will make SIPA more aware of the threats of insurgency movements and also be the groundwork for possible future association with SIPA or the Venezuelan government in the counterinsurgency field. Through Mr. [Fill in] Chief of the Ground Branch of S(6), and Mr. Wall, of the same branch, one-half day orientation course was given to the first trainees who suggested that a full day would be sufficient due to the level of the above trainees and the experience they have in this field. 9. [Fill in] Arrangements have been made with Mr. Luria and Mr. [Fill in] of T39/Training to provide Major Luis O. C. Alfonso Gomar with a Flaps and Seals course for the period of 19-30 April at a T39 Safe House. It is believed the Flaps and Seals course will benefit CIA because it will offer HURSCHWOOD the opportunity to maintain closer contact with [Fill in] who will be responsible for this type activity in SIFA. [SIFA] proposes to make a concerted effort in the latter intercept field to keep better informed of the extreme leftist efforts to overthrow the [Venezuelan] government, and it is felt that HURSCHWOOD can keep abreast of the operation. Because of [SIFA's] responsibility, it is believed that the more efficient effort that [SIFA] can make in this field will result to the benefit of CIA. [Major Gomar] would take the first six weeks of the covert training course then devote the last two weeks to the Flaps and Seals course. 10. It is also requested that T39/Training provide a one-day course in Audio Surveillance and Flaps and Seals for the other three trainees at the H & S Building. This should be a very general briefing with the least possible emphasis on complicated, expensive equipment that might be later requested by the trainees. It is believed this general introduction will give the [SIFA's] trainees some idea as to approaches and problems involved in these fields as well as the pitfalls that should be avoided. This one-day course was given to the first three trainees who appeared impressed with the concepts exposed to them. This subject has also been discussed with Mr. Luria and a firm date has been selected for the training. The OTI instructor will accompany the trainees and act as translator. It is requested that CI/KA obtain permission for the visitors to enter the R & S building for this training which is scheduled for the 19th of April. DESMOND FITZGERALD Chief Western Hemisphere Division Concurrences: DC/CI DUF Training and Qualification Review Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee 1 - DUF/TRD 1 - CI/Staff 1 - FI/OPS 2 - TSD/TRKG 1 - SOR/Group 1 - C/AMM 1 - C/ML/Flang 2 - ML/3408	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10346.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 9, "total-input-tokens": 10287, "total-output-tokens": 3238, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 595, 1 ], [ 595, 2185, 2 ], [ 2185, 4002, 3 ], [ 4002, 5233, 4 ], [ 5233, 6488, 5 ], [ 6488, 8036, 6 ], [ 8036, 9771, 7 ], [ 9771, 11806, 8 ], [ 11806, 12206, 9 ] ] }
bf287ed9f75c8c4e0c9b07e8fb0875722db9a251	1. Cuban pp in name of Jesus PEREZ. Sent to [Pedro SANTOS, Cadiz] 06 Also [Carlos MIRANDA, Ponce] 06 Salcedo, trained in guerrilla warfare in late 1963. 2. Cuban pp in name of Carlos PEREZ. Sent to [Julian GARCIA, Rio Grande] 06 Also [Carlos MIRANDA, Ponce] 06 Salcedo, trained in guerrilla warfare in late 1963. 3. Cuban pp in name of Jesus PEREZ. Sent to [Pedro SANTOS, Cadiz] 06 Also [Luisito LOPEZ, Ponce] Salcedo, trained in guerrilla warfare in late 1963. 4. Cuban pp in name of Jesus PEREZ. Sent to [Enrique DURAN, Caguas] 06 Trained in guerrilla warfare in late 1963. 5. Cuban pp in name of Jesus PEREZ. Sent to [Pedro SANTOS, Cadiz] 06 Trained in guerrilla warfare in late 1963. 6. Report on [date illegible] 15 March. 7. DB: Case file "ZIPOTE" containing a) Data on 3 agents 1) [Name: Dated: Location] 06 2) [Name: Dated: Location] 06 3) [Name: Dated: Location] 06 b) SW Instructions 1) Legal ID, signature for agent = Canadian 2) Accommodation address, identification for contact c) Comments 1) SW + 2-way radio 2) Reconstruction of call, time 3) Land data 4) Address, points d) Contact plan for [MONTANO] 06 1) Place of meeting - primary 2) Signal - telephone into key phone 3) Recognition signals 4) Alternate meeting site 5) Signal - key phone into key phone 6) Recognition signals e) Contact plan for [DARTON] 06 f) Contact plan for [DARTON] 06 g) Contact plan for [DARTON] 06 h) Contact plan for [DARTON] 06 j) Clarinetone Common from 4th to 1st i) Flute tone ii) Violin tone k) Clarinetone Common from 4th to 1st i) 3rd clef line for 5th measure, measure 4 ii) From measure (lettered), requires notation, but reports m) Clarinetone from 4th to 1st measure a) Can offer constant to kind of music b) Clarinetone from 4th to 1st measure 8. Transcribe to POTE case file content on new envelope 9. Part of DS 1 organization 10. English data 11. One CS dissemination	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10347.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 870, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 813, 1 ], [ 813, 1623, 2 ], [ 1623, 2103, 3 ] ] }
85262c3d949e74878bcfca8782eca8551d9bed49	OPERATIONAL MATERIAL dated 8 February 1966 - 31 December 1970 FLIGHT DOCUMENTATION AND TRAVEL SECRET 312214Z DEC 70 CITE DIRTECH 2697 IMMEDIATE WH/MIA MI INFO DIRECTOR IDENTITY MR LESTER L RHODES 6716 EDSAL ROAD SPRINGFIELD, VIRGINIA 22151 GP-1 SECRET END OF MESSAGE ORIG: DONALD KATER ACOP/TSD LEASING OFFICER KONALD KATER TSD/COP CS COPY 31 Dec 70 SECRET 201-749651 SECRET 312214Z DEC 73 CITE DIRTECH 3696 IMMEDIATE WH/IA/I INFO DIRECTOR AQUATIC REF: WH/IA/I 9915 SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY. GP-1. SECRET THE SECRET 31 DEC 70 31 December 1970 WH/COG - 70-447 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/OA ATTENTION: Mr. Ruffner SUBJECT: Amendment of OA for AMMUG/1 It is requested that the Operational Approval for AMMUG/1 (201-749651) be amended to permit its operational use outside the United States. Bernice Turbeville WH/COG/OPS Distribution: Original & 1 - Addressee 1 - WH/COG/OPS 1 - WH/COG/CHRONO 1 - Originator 31 Dec 70 SECRET 311239Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2755 WH/MIA MI INFO DIRECTOR THE HAGUE LONDON TYPIC REF: MADRID 2743 (W 234495) 1. LIAISON TRAVEL LIST DATED 21 DECEMBER SHOWS ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART AND EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ LEFT FOR CASABLANCA ON THAT DATE. LIAISON LISTS NOT ALWAYS ACCURATE. 2. FILE 201-865545M GP-1 SECRET SECRET 31 Dec 70 SECRET 31113Z DEC 70 CITE THE HAGUE 5901 WH/Miami Info Director, Madrid, London TYPIC REF: WH/Miami 09263 (J 234350) 1. Depending on nature and degree WH/Miami interest Subject ref, would recommend watchlisting with Dutch liaison which might produce timely information on subject's arrival, residence while in the Netherlands and onward itinerary. Otherwise, station will at best be able to provide after the fact travel data. Please advise whether watchlisting desired. 2. Would emphasize that watchlisting will signal JKLANCE interest, although we estimate little if any liaison concern. Also that station must, in general, limit overall volume watchlisting requirements. 3. For Director. Recommend has be alert to traces subject ref in material forwarded under OSHA-37367 and related. 4. File: 281-365545. GP-1. SECRET 31 Dec 70 SECRET 311721Z DEC 70 CITE WH/MIA 9914 THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON TYPIC REF: THE HAGUE 991(1) 235592 1. AFTER WEIGHING REF CONSIDERATIONS AND OUR NEED TO NAIL DOWN SUBJECT'S LOCATION, REQUEST THE HAGUE WATCHLIST SUBJECT OF REF WITH DUTCH LIASON. 2. FILE: 231-265545, GP-1 SECRET SECRET S E C R E T 291714Z DEC 70 CITE MADRID 2743 LONDON, WH/MIA MI INFO THE HAGUE, PARIS, DIRECTOR TYPIC QUITID REF: WH/MIA MI 09893 (U 234 250) 1. RE PARA 1 REF, ON 21 DECEMBER ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART CALLED DIONISIO A R R A N Z TREMOLS, CUBAN COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN LONDON, AND TOLD HIM HE LEAVING THAT DATE FOR LONDON. LLOMPART, WHO TRAVELLING WITH EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVEZ, WAS TO BE MET BY ARRANZ AT AIRPORT. 2. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, BLANQUITA (PROBABLY BLANCA CALVET, ADMINISTRATOR CUBAN COMMERCIAL OFFICE LONDON) CALLED RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART AND SAID SHE LOOKING FORWARD TO HIS VISIT. RODRIGUEZ ASKED BLANCA NOT GIVE UP APARTMENT IN LONDON WHICH THEY SCHEDULED GIVE UP 1 JANUARY SO THAT HE MIGHT USE IT. 3. BOTH ARRANZ AND BLANQUITA ASKED RODRIGUEZ ABOUT HIS BROTHER'S EYESIGHT TO WHICH RODRIGUEZ REPLIED HE GETTING ALONG QUITE WELL. 4. FILE 221-6655547. GP-1 SECRET 29 Dec 70 SECRET 291422 DEC 70 CITE WH/MIA 09283 IN 234 350 PRIORITY LONDON, THE HAGUE, PARIS INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID TYPIC (L 233739) REF: MADRID 2727 (NOT SENT PARIS) 1. REQUEST THAT JAGUAR: A.) CONFIRM LONDON ARRIVAL OF ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. B.) IF POSSIBLE, PROVIDE PRESENT LOCATION AND/OR ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS. 2. FOR THE HAGUE: REQUEST YOU FORWARD ANY INFO THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE ON RODRIGUEZ TRAVEL YOUR AREA. 3. FOR PARIS: REF REPORTED THAT RODRIGUEZ DEPARTED MADRID FOR LONDON ON 21 DECEMBER AND INDICATED THAT HE PLANNING A 48-DAY EUROPEAN TRIP INCLUDING A POSSIBLE VISIT THE HAGUE. NO SPECIFICS AVAILABLE. REQUEST THAT YOU FORWARD ANY INFO THAT BECOMES AVAILABLE ON RODRIGUEZ TRAVEL YOUR AREA. 4. FILE: 291-865547. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 29 Dec 70 SECRET SECURITY 2815274 DEC 76 CITE MADRID 2727 PRIORITY MIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, THE HAGUE, LONDON TYPIC REFS: A. MADRID 2715 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (1231249) B. DIRECTOR 397505 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (1232407) C. MIAMI 9865 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE AND LONDON) (1232407) 1. ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART SCHEDULED DEPART MADRID FOR LONDON 21 DECEMBER 1976. OUTSIDER REVEALS HE PLANNING 42-DAY EUROPEAN TRIP AND MENTIONED POSSIBLE VISIT THE HAGUE (DATES NOT SPECIFIED). 2. FILE 261-565545. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 241437Z DEC 73 CITE WH/MIA 9365 PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR TYPIC REF MADRID: 2715 (23249) 1. PLS PROVIDE ANY INFO AVAILABLE ON PRESENT LOCATION AND/OR ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS OF ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. 2. FILE: 221-865547. GP1. SECRET 24 Dec 70 SECRET 161847Z SEP 70 CITE WH/MAY 6936 DO BASE NEW YORK INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC AMROSE DUNOPS REFERENCE: DO BASE NEW YORK 8155 (W/60/21) 1. STATION WENT THROUGH FILES OF AMHUG-1 AND AMDAUB-1 AND HAD OUTSIDE OFFICERS CONTACT THEM TO DETERMINE FEASIBILITY OF REF PROPOSAL. 2. AMHUG-1 AND STATION FEEL THAT ANY PUBLICITY GIVEN HIM AT THIS TIME WOULD ONLY BE DETRIMENTAL. HE IS HAPPILY SETTLED AND DOES NOT WANT HIS PAST BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF HIS NEIGHBORS OR PERSONS HE WORKS WITH. 3. AMDAUB-1 ON THE OTHER HAND IS SETTLED BUT CURRENTLY HAS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS DUE TO INACTIVITY CONSTRUCTION BUSINESS, FAMILY PROBLEMS, ETC., ALL OF WHICH ARE NOT CONDUCIVE FOR ANY INTERVIEW. 4. IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING WE FEEL THAT THE TIME IS NOT PROPITIOUS FOR ANY ARTICLES 201-802-332 SECRET 18 Sep 70 166076 PAGE 2 WH/NIAI 8936 SECRET TO BE PUBLISHED AT LEAST ON THESE TWO DEFECTORS. 5. FILE: 201-354406, GP-1 SECRET SECRET TELEPOUCH DISPATCH NO - UFAW-378 FILE NO - 201-749651 DATE - 22 MAY 1970 INDEX - NO FILM - NO TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAI INFO - NO FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION SUBJECT - CITIZENSHIP OF AMMUG-1 ACTION - SEE BELOW REFS - UFAW-771 DATED 3 FEB 70 UFAA-1844 DATED 6 MAR 70 1. BILL NO. HR 17740 WAS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS ON 20 MAY 1970 REQUESTING WAIVING THE TEN-YEAR PROVISION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF AMMUG-1. 2. THE BILL WILL PROBABLY NOT PASS THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS, BUT ITS INTRODUCTION WILL INITIATE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK MAKING CHANCES FOR PASSAGE OF THE BILL GOOD FOR THE NEXT SESSION. Joyce K. Jawgiel JOYCE K. JAWGIEL DISTRIBUTION 3 - COS, WH/MIAI WH/COG/OP/Geisler: kgb 22May70 Distribution: 1 - 749651 1 - WH/COG/Chrono 1 - Originator COORDINATE: SECRET TELEPOUCH UFAW-378 PAGE ONE 22 May 70 201-749651 Action Required: See Below Reference: UPAW-878 Attached is a copy of Bill No. HR 17740 which may be passed to Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera. Joyce E. JAWGIEL Distribution 3 - COS, WH/Miami w/att herewith IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES May 29, 1970 Mr. Reutzo introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. A BILL For the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, who was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on July 2, 1964, shall be held and considered not to be within the classes of persons whose naturalization is prohibited by the provisions of section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. III CS COPY 1. BILL NO. HR 17740 WAS INTRODUCED TO CONGRESS ON 20 MAY 1970 REQUESTING WAIVING THE TEN-YEAR PROVISION OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT IN THE CASE OF AMMG-1. 2. THE BILL WILL PROBABLY NOT PASS THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS, BUT ITS INTRODUCTION WILL INITIATE THE NECESSARY PAPER WORK MAKING CHANGES FOR PASSAGE OF THE BILL GOOD FOR THE NEXT SESSION. JOYCE K. JAYCIEL DISTRIBUTION 3 - COG, WH/MIAI WH/COG/OP/Geisler: kgb 22 May 70 Distribution: 1 - 749651 1 - WH/COG/Chrono 1 - Originator C/WH/COG/OP C/WH/COG \| SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT \| DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION \| \|---------------------\|-------------------------\| \| AMHUG 71/ \| 201-824335 \| \| 201-749651 \| UFAA-01982 \| \| SEX M DOB ? \| 04 MAY 70 \| \| CIT ? \| \| \| OCC ? \| \| \| IDENTIFIED COMMERCIAL COUNSELOR IN CSR \| \| R 7005080080 FILE IN 201-749651 FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. Action Required: Para 2, below References: A. UFAX-14 B. UFAX-771 C. UFAX-730 1. Forwarded herewith is the most recent contact report from Henry S. PACHANKIS concerning AMMUG-1. 2. As indicated, PACHANKIS broke the bad news contained in Reference B on AMMUG-1's citizenship. AMMUG-1 apparently took the news as well as could be expected. Nevertheless, the Station would appreciate periodic notice on the status of AMMUG-1's case so we may keep him informed on any progress. 3. In regard to Reference C, PACHANKIS probed in the area of wife problems and never really resolved the situation. PACHANKIS seemed to think, however, that the wife is still living with AMMUG-1. Melvin D. KERSCHEN Attachment: Contact Report Distribution: 3 - Chief, WHD w/att h/w Cross Reference To UFAX-1844 2 March 1970 SECRET 201-749651 Action Required: FYI References: UFIA-1774 1. On 26 February when Henry S. PACHANIS met with AMHUG-1 (201-749651) on his citizenship problem, information on the following two brothers was obtained: Hector RODRIGUEZ Llompart (201-276598) Cuban Ambassador to East Germany Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart CIT: Cuba DOB: 22 October 1932 POB: Regla, Havana, Cuba OCC: Government 2. This information was as follows: a. AMHUG-1 was asked if he had anything new to report. He brought up a most interesting case, one which could prove to be a valuable lead. b. AMHUG-1 has known the RODRIGUEZ family since his childhood in Regla (a small town across the bay from Havana). The father had been a bolita banker during the Batista era. c. AMHUG-1 was very friendly with RODRIGUEZ' two sons: Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart DPOB: c. 1934 in Regla, Havana, Cuba Hector RODRIGUEZ Llompart Distribution: 3 - Chief, WHD CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-749651 DISPATCH STAMP AND NUMBER UFIA-1845 DATE 3 March 1970 CLASSIFICATION SECRET SECRET 201-276598 d. During the middle and late 1950s, Roberto had been a salesman for the Burroughs flour company and had stayed clear of the political picture in Cuba. e. During the same period, Hector had been a student in the University of Havana, under Raul ROA, and had taken part in some revolutionary activities. He had been arrested and beaten by the Batista police for his anti-government actions and his father had sent him into exile in the US. f. When Castro came into power, the father was a potential "war criminal" for his illicit dealings. AMMUG-1, who was in the police force in the initial stages of the revolution, states that he deleted an incriminating page from the father's dossier (showing he paid off the police to run his bolita operation) and thus saved him from prosecution. g. AMMUG-1 continued to be close to the family, especially with Roberto, "whom I saw every day and run around with." Roberto never entertained the revolution. As late as 1962-63, "We used to talk quite openly and frankly. He was always against the revolution and the communists. He worked in the Ministry of Industry because his brother got him the job, but he had only one idea in his head: to get out of Cuba and come to the US. He was even plotting to get out by boat. He had a US visa for many years and had visited here many times." h. When AMMUG-1 defected, he lost contact with Roberto. But, about two weeks ago a neighbor from Regla came to Miami on the Freedom Flights. (COMMENT: This undoubtedly refers to Cuban refugee Segundo CASCUDO Gonzalez. Reference forwarded the AMOT debriefing of CASCUDO on Roberto.) When AMMUG-1 asked about Roberto, the neighbor said that he understood that Roberto, "was assigned in a foreign Embassy." The refugee could not say what country Roberto was in. i. This news prompts AMMUG-1 to comment: "This would be a most interesting person to talk to. I don't think that he has changed his original way of thinking. I believe he took the job to get out of Cuba, and because of the influence of his brother Hector. I know he will talk to me and there is no telling what this man is capable of doing if someone approached him." j. Roberto is (or was) married to: Zulema (Inu) DPOB: c. 1934 in Cuba They had two children and the wife was even more anti-Castro than Roberto. k. Hector, the other brother, was a rabid revolutionary when AMMUG-1 last saw him in c. 63-64. He had joined the Castro bandwagon at the outset due to his revolutionary activities during the Batista era and his closeness to Raul ROA. In c. 1950-61-62, Hector was closely aligned with "Che" GUEVARA and served in his entourage, even on foreign junkets. "He was very close to Che and traveled abroad a lot. He and I were good friends—he used to bring me gifts when he returned from trips—but you couldn't even insinuate any opposition to the revolution, he was so fierce for it. I hear that he is the Ambassador to Germany; I guess through his friendship with Paul ROA. I doubt if he has changed, but I can talk to him in complete confidence—perhaps not like I could Roberto—but I could know how he thinks." 3. Since Roberto appears to be an excellent recruitment target, we will have him watchlisted with a view toward having AMBUC-1 make an approach to him at the first opportunity. Although Hector appears far less vulnerable, we will consider an approach to him should he be transferred to a Free World country. 4. Please open a 201 file on Roberto. Melvin D. KERSCHEN SECRET 03/0552 MAR 70 CITE WH/MIA 6665 DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, PARIS TYPIC UNCOSMIC REF: A. PARIS 4569 (IN 01/18) B. DIRECTOR 059524 (NOT SENT PARIS) (IN 01/18) C. WH/MIA 6246 (NOT SENT PARIS) D. UFIAA-1645 (NOT SENT PARIS, MADRID) 1. WH/MIA HAS GOOD ASSESSMENT FROM AMMUG-1 (201-749651, DGI DEFECTOR IN 1964) ON ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART, SUBJECT OF REFS. AMMUG-1 HAD CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ROBERTO, WITH WHOM HE GREW UP IN REGLA, HAVANA. IN 1962 AND 63, THEY TALKED QUITE FRANKLY AND OPENLY. ROBERTO ALWAYS TALKED AGAINST THE REVOLUTION AND COMMUNISTS. HE HAD ONE PRINCIPAL IDEA--TO LEAVE CUBA AND GO TO STATES, EVEN BY BOAT. AMMUG-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE HE COULD HAVE CHANGED AND ONLY HOLDS CURRENT GOC POSITION BECAUSE OF BROTHER, HECTOR (201-276598), WHO IS AMBASSADOR IN EAST GERMANY. AMMUG-1 IS SURE ROBERTO WILL TALK WITH HIM. 2. AMMUG-1 SAID HECTOR WAS RABID REVOLUTIONARY CS COPY FILED IN 201-276598 SECRET 201-749651 PAGE 2 WH/MIA 6565 SECRET AND CLOSE TO RAUL ROA. ALSO HAD BEEN CLOSE FOLLOWER OF CHE GUEVARA. AMMUG-1 COULD ALSO TALK TO HECTOR IN COMPLETE CONFIDENCE, BUT NOT WITH SAME CONFIDENCE AS WITH ROBERTO. 3. DIRECTOR: POUCHING REF D, WHICH IS DEBRIEFING OF AMMUG-1 ON ROBERTO AND HECTOR. 4. MADRID: PLS PUT BOTH BROTHERS ON WATCHLIST. ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN PUTTING AMMUG-1 IN CONTACT WITH ROBERTO WHEN HE TRAVELS TO EUROPE AGAIN. 5. PARIS: PLS QUERY UN COSMIC-1 FOR ANY FURTHER DETAILS HE CAN RECALL ABOUT TALKS WITH ROBERTO (REF A). 6. FILE 201-276598 AND 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 201-749651 \| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment) \| \|---------------------------------------------------\|------\|--------------------\|--------------------------------------------------\| \| DDP \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| \| Legislative Counsel \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| \| ER \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| \| C/WH \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| \| C/WH/CO6 \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| \| C/WH/OPS \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| \| Diary \| 19 FEB 1970 \| \| \| MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH : Deputy Director for Plans SUBJECT : Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera 1. This memorandum contains a recommendation in paragraph three for the approval of the DDCI. 2. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera is a former Cuban national who defected to the United States in Nova Scotia, Canada on 21 April 1964. At that time he was an intelligence officer in the General Directorate of Intelligence, the Cuban external intelligence agency. He was brought to the United States under the provision of Section 7 of Public Law 110 (CIA Act of 1949). He has never been a member of the Communist Party, but due to his service in the Cuban external intelligence organization he is not eligible to petition for naturalization until ten years after the date of his defection, or 1974. 3. Mr. RODRIGUEZ desires to become a naturalized U.S. citizen at the earliest possible time and has requested assistance from this Agency. We request that a private bill be submitted to Congress waiving the ten-year provision of the Immigration and Naturalization Act in his case, enabling him to become a U.S. citizen after five years of residence. It is recommended that you authorize the Legislative Counsel to seek a private bill for RODRIGUEZ' relief. SUBJECT: Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera 4. Biographic Data and a Detailed Justification and Assessment on this case are attached. [Signature] William V. Broe Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Attachments: (A) Biographic Data (B) Detailed Justification and Assessment Concur [Signature] Legislative Counsel Concur [Signature] Deputy Director for Plans The recommendation in paragraph 3 is APPROVED: [Signature] Deputy Director of Central Intelligence SECRET SECRET BIOGRAPHIC DATA Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera 1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera was born on 6 February 1937 in the City of Havana, Cuba, the son of Carlos RODRIGUEZ Ferrer and Josefa LAHERA Marrero. RODRIGUEZ's wife, Luisa Nelia RODRIGUEZ y Timoneda, born 24 August 1934 in Regla, Havana, and her two children by a former marriage, Vicente Maximiliano HERNANDEZ Rodriguez, age 19, and Francisca Luciana HERNANDEZ Rodriguez, age 17, legally entered the United States on 11 May 1955 and reside with Subject in Miami. Her parents, Pablo RODRIGUEZ Escobar and Sara TIMONEDA Valdes now reside in the United States. 2. RODRIGUEZ attended Escuela Publica #46, first to sixth grade; Primaria Superior #19, seventh and eighth grade; Artes y Oficios (Construction Civil) one year; and Instituto de Habana for two years. 3. Subject was a member of the Cuban Rebel Army from 1957 to 1961, during which time he advanced from the rank of Private to Lieutenant. He was imprisoned at Castello Principe, Cuba, from 14 July 1957 to 11 February 1958 for participation in sabotage and propaganda activities on behalf of the 26th of July Movement. He then joined Fidel CASTRO's forces in the Sierra Maestra and remained there until the end of 1958 when he returned to Havana upon the fall of the BATISTA Government. He was a precinct lieutenant of the Cuban National Police from November 1959 to December 1961, at which time he resigned from the Army under which he had held his position in the National Police. He was out of work until April 1962 at which time he was employed by the Ministry of Foreign Trade where he remained until he became a staff member of the General Directorate of Intelligence in August 1963. He was a member of this organization until his defection in Ottawa, Canada, on 21 April 1964, when he left his plane which was enroute from Cuba to Prague. 4. Soon after RODRIGUEZ joined the General Directorate of Intelligence, he found he could no longer submit to having his thoughts and actions circumscribed by controls which deprived him of liberty and self respect nor continue to support the Cuban Government or be a part of its intelligence activities; he therefore planned to defect as soon as the opportunity arose. After deciding to leave Cuba permanently, he began a systematic collection of documents at the General Directorate of Intelligence Headquarters. He brought these documents with him to the United States as proof of Fidel CASTRO's subversive activities in Latin America. 5. Subject is 5 feet 2 inches tall, weighs approximately 130 pounds, has a medium build and erect posture. He has a long face, medium complexion, black hair and brown eyes. 1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ LaHera has cooperated with this Agency since his defection on 21 April 1964 at which time he turned over to CIA documents from the General Directorate of Intelligence he had collected during the preceding several months. In addition, he has provided voluminous, accurate and valuable information on the organization of the Cuban intelligence services, their operations, staff members and agents. These documents and information have given us the potential and opportunity to take effective measures to safeguard United States Government interests. Subject has been of great value in the past, and will continue to be in the future, in the CIA recruitment/detection program. His wide acquaintance among and knowledge concerning high level Cuban diplomats and Cuban intelligence personnel provides the Agency with the necessary background in planning operations against them and makes Subject ideal for use in carrying out the operations. His talents and contacts can be used not only in furthering the defector program, but in other types of political action and psychological warfare operations. 2. As a result of technical interrogations of RODRIGUEZ on 11 May 1964 and again on 15 July 1966, his bona fides have been established not only for intelligence exploitation purposes but also for the purpose of resettlement in the United States. There is no reason to believe that RODRIGUEZ is under the control of any hostile intelligence service. 3. The medical and psychiatric examinations have shown that RODRIGUEZ has no serious medical or psychiatric problems. 4. Mr. RODRIGUEZ has adjusted well to American life. He has been trained as a dental technician and has recently applied for employment with an airline company. It is believed that he would be a solid, responsible citizen. REFERENCE: UFAK-14 1. On 27 January, Alien Affairs Staff advised that under Section 313 of Immigration and Naturalization Act, AMMUG-1 cannot become an American citizen until after 10 years from April 1964. While normal Cuban exile must wait five years, Communist party members must wait 10 years. AMMUG-1's position as "intelligence officer" is considered a "meaningful extension" of CP membership. 2. In view of AMMUG-1's distinguished service to RVROCK, WH Division will submit a memorandum through appropriate channels requesting authorization to submit a bill to Congress to reduce AMMUG-1's waiting period from ten to five years. At this writing, we do not know how long this processing will take but will keep you advised. 3. Paragraph 2 above is our intention and we naturally cannot guarantee approval at this time. If a special bill is passed by Congress, AMMUG-1 will go through routine application for Naturalization with RVROCK guidance. James M. HAMMERSFAHR Distribution: 3 - WH/Miami TO: CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIA SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE ON CITIZENSHIP ACTION: PARA 5, BELOW REFERENCE: NONE 1. AXXY/1 HAS A STRONG INTEREST AND NEED TO BECOME A "NATIONALIZED AMERICAN CITIZEN." HE HAS MADE APPLICATION TO AVIANCA AIRLINES, WHICH IF ACCEPTED, WILL REQUIRE HIM TO TRAVEL TO COLOMBIA. HE HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT PURGEO WILL ATTEMPT ASSIST HIM IN OBTAINING HIS PAPERS. 2. AXXY/1 HAS NOT FILED AN APPLICATION FOR "NATIONALIZATION" LOCALLY BECAUSE HE IS AWARE THAT HE WILL BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT HIS ENTRY INTO THE COUNTRY, ADDRESSES IN THE STATES, EMPLOYER REFERENCES, POLITICAL BACKGROUND, AND OTHER QUESTIONS IN DELICATE OPERATIONAL AREAS. HE REALIZES THAT HE CANNOT ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS WITHOUT PURGEO'S HELP. WH/MIA HAS REACHED THIS SUBJECT, IN A GENERAL WAY, WITH LOCAL IMMIGRATION AND WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM, WE WOULD HAVE TO HANDLE ON THE WASHINGTON LEVEL. 3. A CHIEF OF AXXY/1'S HISTORY WILL E C P T TELEPHONE DATE: 13 JANUARY 1972 INDEXING: NO MICROFILM: NO FILE NO: 231-749651 DISP NO: 14 SECRET PAGE TWO SHOW THAT HE WAS BROUGHT INTO STATES BLACK FROM CANADA IN APRIL 1964. HE WAS DEBRIEFED FOR SEVERAL MONTHS BY HOS AND THEN SETTLED IN MIAMI. HE WAS NOT PUT ON A COVER PAYROLL UNTIL 1965 AND THEN TERMINATED ABOUT YEAR LATER, AT WHICH TIME HE BEGAN OVERT JOB. THIS WOULD FACE EMBARRASSING PROBLEM OF ANSWERING DETAILED IMMIGRATION QUESTIONS ON ENTRY AND EMPLOYMENT BACKGROUND, NOT TO MENTION PREVIOUS ANSTAFF EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO DEBRIEFING. 4. ANYUG/1 HAS BEEN ASSURED THAT SHOULD HE HAVE THE OCCASION TO TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE STATES IN THE NEAR FUTURE, MIAMI IS IN A POSITION TO FACILITATE THE ISSUANCE OF A PERMANENT PERMIT IN A SHORT TIME. OUR LIAISON CONTACT IN LOCAL IMMIGRATION HAS ASSURED US ON THIS POINT. 5. PLS NOTE THAT HENRY S. PACHAKIS IS IN PERIODIC CONTACT WITH ANYUG/1 AND IS CURRENTLY DEBRIEFING HIM ON THE CUBAN MATES PROVIDED BY ANDEBEVI. A DISPATCH ON THESE DEBRIEFINGS IS UNDER PREPARATION. 6. IN THE MEANTIME, WE REQUEST THAT HEADQUARTERS INITIATE ACTION WITH IMMIGRATION TOWARD GRANTING ANYUG/1 HIS NATURALIZATION PAPERS. PLS FORWARD ANY QUESTIONS THAT ANYUG/1 CAN PROVIDE TO ACCOMPLISH THIS. IF IT WOULD PROVE TO BE MORE EXPEDIENT, MIAMI HAS 10 OBJECTIONS TO SPONSORING A TRIP TO SECRET PAGE TWO WASHINGTON by AMHUG/1 to help resolve any outstanding questions or problems encountered on the above. Also, a prompt reply to any action headquarters can take on AMHUG/1's case is requested. The agent is most anxious to learn of any progress that is made toward his citizenship. NELVIN D. KERSCHEN DISTRIBUTION VIA TELFPOUCH 3 - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION S E C O N D P A G E T H R E E On 30 December 1969, AMNIP-1 reported that AMHUG-1's wife called him on the day before Christmas and informed him that her father had been hospitalized with a heart attack and that AMHUG-1 had left her. AMNIP-1 called AMHUG-1's place of employment in Miami on the day after Christmas and was informed AMHUG-1 was not working that day. AMNIP-1 left a message for AMHUG-1 to call him but as of 30 December had not heard from AMHUG-1. AMNIP-1 commented that he thought AMHUG-1's wife was a little unbalanced mentally and although her parents are now in the United States and she has no real ties left in Cuba, that she is interested in returning to Cuba. Howard A. TRECKLER Distribution: 2 - COS, WH/Miami SECRET 1. CONTACT WITH AMMUG-1 WAS REESTABLISHED 31 JANUARY BY PACHANKIS FOR WH/MIAI WHICH HAD NEVER PICKED UP CONTACT FROM JMAVE. PACHANKIS HAS MEETING WITH AMMUG-1 SCHEDULED FOR NIGHT 3 FEBRUARY TO SERVICE REF REQUEST. 2. FILE 201-287019 X REF 201-749651. SECRET SECRET 292112 MAY 68 CITE JMWAVE 2567 DIRECTOR AKULE PBRUMEN REFERENCE: DIRECTOR 02905 CORRECTED ALIEN REGISTRATION CARD DELIVERED AMMUG/1 20 MAY. PREVIOUSLY ISSUED CARD BEING POUCHED UFGA-30127, 28 MAY. SECRET BT REFERENCE: UFGS-10530, 9 May 1968 Referenced Alien Registration Card (corrected) was given AMHUG-1 on 21 May 1968. Forwarded under separate cover is the card formerly issued him. Julian T. PROCARIO Attachment: U/S/C As stated Distribution: 3 - C/WHD w/att usc 2 - WH/COG w/o att MAY 28 1968	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10355.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 39, "total-input-tokens": 45576, "total-output-tokens": 10194, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 95, 1 ], [ 95, 377, 2 ], [ 377, 541, 3 ], [ 541, 934, 4 ], [ 934, 1279, 5 ], [ 1279, 2131, 6 ], [ 2131, 2429, 7 ], [ 2429, 3321, 8 ], [ 3321, 4100, 9 ], [ 4100, 4627, 10 ], [ 4627, 4901, 11 ], [ 4901, 5702, 12 ], [ 5702, 5814, 13 ], [ 5814, 6720, 14 ], [ 6720, 6924, 15 ], [ 6924, 7546, 16 ], [ 7546, 8074, 17 ], [ 8074, 8531, 18 ], [ 8531, 9354, 19 ], [ 9354, 9354, 20 ], [ 9354, 10437, 21 ], [ 10437, 13021, 22 ], [ 13021, 13916, 23 ], [ 13916, 14857, 24 ], [ 14857, 15459, 25 ], [ 15459, 16762, 26 ], [ 16762, 18041, 27 ], [ 18041, 18502, 28 ], [ 18502, 20359, 29 ], [ 20359, 21172, 30 ], [ 21172, 22983, 31 ], [ 22983, 23987, 32 ], [ 23987, 25100, 33 ], [ 25100, 26335, 34 ], [ 26335, 26732, 35 ], [ 26732, 27437, 36 ], [ 27437, 27705, 37 ], [ 27705, 27924, 38 ], [ 27924, 28221, 39 ] ] }
df7228d0c5dab36e081b8a48693c177c9e1036bd	FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 201-749651 Vol. II INCLUSIVE DATES: 31 Dec 70 - 13 Apr 74 CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: LADD ROOM: 3026 DELETIONS, IF ANY: \| DATE RECEIVED \| DATE RETURNED \| REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) \| SIGNATURE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL \| \|---------------\|---------------\|--------------------------\|--------------------------------\| \| 2 July 78 \| \| Chuck Berk \| \| \| 27 July 78 \| \| Chuck Berk \| Charles Beck \| \| 1 Aug 78 \| \| Cornwall \| \| \| 6 Nov 78 \| \| Betsy Wolf \| \| MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FILE. OPERATIONAL MATERIAL dated 2 January 1971 - 10 April 1972 THIRD AGENCY DOCUMENTS FBI, 6 April 1978 I&NS, 19 April 1971 SECRET STAFF CONF: LA-8, INFO: FILE, VR, DDD-4, C/PCS, CI-4, DDD/00, EA-8, EPS/EG-2, IP/OMS-2, LSN/ID, DDPD-0, PCS/LSN, (34/P) 78 0552087 PAGE 001 TOTAL 130012Z APR 78 DIRECTOR 204604 SECRET STAFF 130012Z DIRECTOR 204604 TO: IMMEDIATE LA/MIA INFO PANAMA CITY. #NINTEL REAM REF: LA/MIA 28157 0527676 1. IN CONVERSATION WITH NVCANOPY THEY HAVE ADVISED THAT THEY ARE INTERESTED IN A PRELIMINARY INTERVIEW WITH SLANK-1 (S-1). AND DEPENDING ON ITS OUTCOME WILL MAKE A DETERMINATION IF THEY DESIRE S-1'S CONTINUED CONTACT WITH SALVADOR ALDEREGUA (SA). PACHANKIS SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO S-1 THAT RATIONALE ODOUSLY HAS NO OBJECTION TO HIS COOPERATION WITH NVCANOPY. PACHANKIS ALSO SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO S-1 THAT RATIONALE HAS NO INTEREST IN HIS (S-1'S) CONTINUED RELATIONSHIP WITH SA. 2. A REVIEW OF THE FILES OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH WHOM PACHANKIS CURRENTLY IN ACTIVE CONTACT INDICATES THAT NVCANOPY APPROVAL WAS SOUGHT AND GRANTED IN EACH CASE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF DEFECTORS SUCH AS SLANK-1 WHO HAD BEEN HANDLED AS A DEFECTOR ALTHOUGH ACCORDING TO THE FILE HE NEVER OFFICIALLY GRANTED THIS STATUS UNDER PL 110. HQS DOES NOT COORDINATE EACH INDIVIDUAL MEETING NOR IDENTIFY OFFICER HANDLING CASE TO NVCANOPY. 3. FILE: 201-2992431 201-749651. E2, IMPOET.> LA COMMENT: REF QUERIED HQS REGARDING FBI OR CIA INTEREST IN S-1 PLAYING ROLE OF CONFIDENTIAL TO ALDEREGUA. ORIG: LA/CO (SMITH/SPEED X1819/1325) COORD: AC/LA/CO/EA (HARRINGTON), AC/LA/PHNCR (PDRN), PCS/LSN ( ), C/LA/CARI (BURNETT), C/LA/CAR (GREIG), AUTH: DC/LA/CO (LATRASH), REL: C/LAD (HARRREN); CL BY: 012034.< END OF MESSAGE: SECRET SECRET 080750Z CIA 202417 TO: FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION. ATTENTION: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SECRET/WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION. CIR-316/01514-78 SUBJECT: TOMCAT: ESP-CUBA-PANAMA; RA-CUBA-PANAMA REFS: A. FBI TELETYPED DATED 052028Z APRIL 1978, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE. B. CIR-316/00260-75, DATED 18 FEBRUARY 1975, CAPTIONED "SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA, ALSO KNOWN AS "EL GALLEGU" INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA..." 1. WITH REGARD TO CLARIFICATION OF SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA'S ASSOCIATION WITH U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PARTICULARLY WITH CIA, REFERENCE B ADVISED THAT HE WAS OF INTEREST TO THIS AGENCY IN 1960 WHEN WE WERE INDIRECTLY INVOLVED IN ASSISTING IN HIS EXFILTRATION FROM CUBA. HOWEVER, HE TOOK ASYLUM IN THE URUGUAYAN EMBASSY IN HAVANA ON 3 JULY 1960 AND DEPARTED THE SAME DAY FOR CURACAO. AFTER HIS ARRIVAL IN MIAMI IN FEBRUARY 1961, THIS AGENCY WAS BRIEFLY IN CONTACT WITH HIM BUT OUR INTEREST WAS DROPPED PARTLY BECAUSE HIS UNCLE, ONE OF THE LEADING FOUNDERS OF THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS THEN CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO YUGOSLAVIA AND ALDEREGUIA'S TRUE LOYALTIES WERE UNKNOWN. THIS AGENCY HAS HAD NO INTEREST IN OR CONTACT WITH ALDEREGUIA SINCE THAT TIME. 2. VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAMERA DPOB 6 FEBRUARY 1937, HAVANA, CUBA WAS A FORMER DGI STAFF OFFICER WHO DEFECTED ON 21 APRIL 1964 IN HALIFAX NOVA SCOTIA. HE WAS DEBRIEFED AND HANDLED THROUGH NORMAL DEFECTOR CHANNELS AND WAS THE SOURCE OF NUMEROUS CSC'S CONCERNING THE DGI IN 1964 AND 65. HE WAS USED OPERATIONALY IN RECRUITMENT ATTEMPTS AGAINST DGI OFFICERS DURING 1964-1967. HE WAS TERMINATED IN JULY 1967, AND WAS CONSIDERED, BUT NEVER USED, FOR ANOTHER RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT IN 1971. SINCE 1971 RODRIGUEZ HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY CIA OPERATION IN MIAMI OR ELSEWHERE. JOSEPH NORRIS IS THE ALIAS OF A CIA REPRESENTATIVE WHO PERIODICALLY DEBRIEFS RODRIGUEZ ON PERSONALITIES AND METHODS OF THE DGI. THERE IS NO OTHER CIA INVOLVEMENT WITH RODRIGUEZ. 3. THIS AGENCY WILL QUERY ITS REPRESENTATIVE IN MIAMI TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELEVANT TO THIS MATTER. [Signature] SECRET 21-74-9651 4. CLASSIFIED BY: 012034. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 B(2). IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE DATE OF AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION. ORIG LA/CO/CI SPEED X1325; COORD LA/CAI BURRET; L1/PHNC/P PORN; AOC/CA/CO KEENAN AUTH C/LAD MARRON; REL AC/PCS/LSN KUNH CL BY 012034. END OF MESSAGE SECRET ADV NOTIFIED AND ISSUED LA 22142 ACTION: LA-8 (837) INFO: FILE, VR, DDD-4, C/PCS, CI-4, EPS/EG-2, IP/DPS, LSN/ID, ODPO-D, SIA, SIA/IC, (25/M) 76 0527670 PAGE 001 IN 0527670 TOR: 0722092 APR 78 LMIM 28158 SECRET 0721422 APR 78 STAFF CITE LA/Miami 28158 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY NIACT DIRECTOR NNINTEL REAM REF: LA/Miami 28157 0527676 IDEN A: WILLIAM WALTON FBI SPECIAL AGENT IDEN B: JACK COGSMELL, A WEST PALM BEACH RESIDENT WHO SA SAYS WAS A RETIRED U.S. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. E2, IMPDET. END OF MESSAGE SECRET 7 Apr 78 249657 SECRET ADV NOTIFIED AND ISSUED LA 22162 ACTION: LA-8 (B36) INFO: FILE, VR, DDO-6, C/PES, C/SIA, C/SIA/IC. CI-6, EPS/EG-2, IP/DHS, LSN/ID, DDPD-D. (25/4) 78 0527676 PAGE 001 IN 0527676 TOR: 072208Z APR 78 LM1M 28157 SECRET CITE LA/Miami 28157 TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE PANAMA CITY. NIAC DIRECTOR AN INTEL REAM REF: DIRECTOR 201936 1. DURING THE YEARS THAT PACHANKIS HAS BEEN IN CONTACT WITH SLANK-1 (S-1), FORMERLY AMMUG-1, FROM 1965 TO 1978, PACHANKIS HAS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE THAT S-1 HAS EVER BEEN IN CONTACT WITH NVACANOPY. SINCE 1969 IT HAS BEEN PACHANKIS' UNDERSTANDING THAT NVACANOPY HAS BEEN INFORMED EVERY TIME PACHANKIS HAS MADE AN OPERATIONAL CALL ON A U.S. PERSON IN THE MIAMI AREA. PACHANKIS HAS NEVER BEEN EXPOSED/INTRODUCED TO NVACANOPY IN MIAMI. PACHANKIS HAS BEEN INTRODUCED TO NVACANOPY REPS IN NEW YORK CITY WHILE ON TOY TO FR/NY (CIRCA 1974). PACHANKIS HAS ALSO MET AN NVACANOPY AGENT IN NEWARK, NEW JERSEY UNDER THE ALIAS OF JOE NORRIS. 2. PACHANKIS HAS BEEN HANDLING S-1 SINCE EARLY 1970. SEVERAL TIMES OPERATIONS ALMOST CAME OFF BUT HAS DECIDED AT THE LAST MINUTE TO PRESERVE S-1'S SECURITY. IN THE PAST FEW YEARS THERE HAS NOT BEEN MUCH CONTACT WITH S-1 EXCEPT FOR A CHRISTMAS CALL OR A ROUTINE CGG REQUIREMENT. 3. SLANK-1 CALLED PACHANKIS ON 6 APRIL AND REQUESTED MEETING TO REPORT FOLL: A. SALVADOR ALDEREGUIA (SA) HAS BEEN S-1 FRIEND SINCE 1955 IN CUBA. THEY CONSPIRED AGAINST THE BATISTA REGIME WHILE IN THE RANKS OF THE 26TH OF JULY MOVEMENT. B. S-1 HAD NOT SEEN SA IN ALMOST FOUR YEARS WHEN THEY COINCIDENTALLY MET ON A MIAMI STREET IN 1965 (LESS THAN YEAR AFTER S-1'S DEFECTION FROM DGI). FROM 1965 UNTIL FEB/MARCH 1978, THEY HAD INFREQUENT THOUGH CORDIAL ENCOUNTERS IN MIAMI. C. AFTER SA'S RECENT ARREST IN MIAMI BY NVACANOPY ON ESPIONAGE CHARGES, SA HAS BEEN A CONSTANT VISITOR TO S-1'S HOME. SA HAS OSTENSIVELY BEEN SEEKING "TEA AND SYMPATHY" FROM S-1. 20 APR 78 SECRET 20 747451 CLAIMING HE HAS BEEN FRAMED BY NV CANOPY. WHILE S-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE SA, S-1'S "CI MIND" AND CURIOSITY HAVE COMPELLED HIM TO CONTINUE CONTACT WITH SA. IN RECENT WEEKS SA HAS INTRODUCED S-1 TO IDEAS A AND B. 4. S-1 WANTS TWO POINTS MADE CLEAR TO RTACTION AND NV CANOPY. ONE, S-1 HAS NEVER BEEN INVOLVED IN SA'S APPARENT ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. TWO, S-1 VOLUNTEERS TO SERVE AS SA'S CONFIDANT IF NV CANOPY AND/OR RTACTION CONSIDER S-1 CAN DO GOOD IN SUCH A ROLE. PLEASE ADVISE. 5. STATION HAS NO FILES ON S-1 AND THEREFORE CANNOT COMMENT ON NV CANOPY KNOWLEDGE OF RTACTION'S PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH S-1. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT NV CANOPY HAS BEEN INFORMED OF PACHANKIS' ACTIVITIES IN ALIAS JOE NORRIS FOR THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AT THE HOS LEVEL. 6. FILE: 201-(SLANK=1). E2, IMPDET. Colvin - SPOB (spc. Figueroa) x 3135 called re. SCRNK 11 (001-76965) [formerly encrypted M11468/1 - - He has old (100.175) MEC which not touched since 206/76 and wants to know status of case 12 - is still being paid - in the terminal - etc. Since this year case handled by Fachetti's cut will check the file and let Colvin know - and ordered the file in Melissa Walsh name. RAS 13 Apr 77 RNK/11 Turnbull to Victoria RODRIGUEZ (whine) Informed "Colvin" on 15 April 77 that SCRNK 11 is still on active status, not receiving any salary, but will be paid if action is used in an operation. He problems line. SPOB will keep his contact on an active folder. RN 15 Apr 77 30 JUL 1976 NOTE: WE WILL NOT ASK FOR A DEVISED FACILITY FOR SLANK/1 UNTIL IT IS DETERMINED HE WILL BE USED AGAIN. LA/COG/EA SECRET MEMORANDUM OF ORAL COMMITMENT SUBJECT: Engagement of SLANK-1 (201-749651) 1. Term and Project Charge: Subject has been engaged under oral contract for use under Project SLEEPER. The effective date of the oral contract is 16 Oct 1975. 2. Security Approval: An OA for the operational use of Subject outside the U.S. was granted on 6 Jan 1971. 3. Citizenship: Subject is a United States Citizen. 4. Compensation: Subject is reimbursed for travel expenses and is given a salary replacement for any time he is required to be absent from work at the request of the Agency. The salary reimbursement will not exceed $40 a day. He may be awarded cash bonuses for services rendered. He may also be given gifts from time to time, the individual value of which will not exceed $50. 5. Taxes: Subject is obligated to pay U.S. taxes and should be issued a Devised Facility Form 1099 at the end of each tax year. 6. Quarters and/or Subsistence: a. Subject is not furnished quarters or subsistence. b. No commitments have been made regarding additional compensation to accommodate increased cost of living and quarters expenses. 7. Operational Expenses: Subject will be reimbursed for operational expenses such as entertainment of operational contacts, phone calls, cover expenses, etc., upon submission of proper accounting for such expenses. 8. Contingent Obligations: Although no commitment to this effect has been made to Subject, should the security of Subject or his family become threatened because of activities undertaken by him at the request of this Agency, this Agency would have an obligation to reimburse Subject for expenses required to reduce that threat, including expenses needed to relocate Subject and his family and, if necessary, to supplement his income while he is establishing a new residence and employment. 9. No commitments other than those stated above have been made to Subject. SIGNED: ____________________ Case Officer REVIEWED: ____________________ APPROVED: ____________________ Field Contracting Officer Attachment: Non-Staff Personnel Data Sheet Distribution: Orig & 2 - LA/Personnel w/att 1 - Vital Documents w/att 1 - LA/COG/Chrono 1 - 201-749651 1 - LA/B&F SECRET SECRET NON-STAFF PERSONNEL DATA SHEET INSTRUCTIONS: 1. SUBMIT FOR: - A. CONTRACT EMPLOYEES (TYPE A, B AND CAREER) - B. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER WRITTEN CONTRACT OR WOC (US CITIZENS OR RESIDENT ALIENS ONLY) 2. THIS FORM IS NOT APPLICABLE FOR OPERATIONAL OR FIELD AGENTS 3. COPIES OF THE FORM WILL BE RETAINED BY THE ORIGINATING COMPONENT (NUMBER OF COPIES AT ITS DISCRETION) AND BY CSIS/AGENT BRANCH (1 COPY ONLY) NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE): RODRIGUEZ Ladera, Vladimir SEX: M DATE OF BIRTH: 2 Jun 1937 MARITAL STATUS: M NO. DEPENDENTS: 3 YEAR OF BIRTH: 24 Aug 1934 NATIONALITY: U.S. LAST MEDICAL EXAM: DATE OF LATEST SECURITY/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL: Anended OA 7 Jan 1971 JOB TITLE: COMPONENT: CONTRACT CATEGORY: B EFFECTIVE DATE: 16 Oct 75 EXPIRATION DATE: Indefinite SALARY: GRADE EQUIVALENT: PROJECT OR FUND: SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS: FEDERAL DEATH AND DISABILITY: ANNUAL AND SICK LEAVE: CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT: FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE: CONTRACT LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE: MISSING PERSONS BENEFITS: OTHER (EXPLAIN): If forced to move for security reasons. CIA would help with expenses. NON-CIA EDUCATION: Escuela Publica #46 Primaria Superior #19 Artes y Oficios (Construcion Civil) 1 Year Instituto de Habana 2 years toward bachelor degree DATES \| FROM \| TO \| EMPLOYER \| LOCATION \| FUNCTION \| SALARY \| \|------\|----\|----------\|----------\|----------\|--------\| \| Aug 63 \| Apr 64 \| Ministry of Foreign Relations \| Havana, Cuba \| Intel Off Market Researcher \| $600 mo. \| \| May 65 \| Dec 66 \| Schaeffer Advertising Co \| Miami, Fla \| \| \| \| Dec 66 \| CA Dec \| 74 Marriot Corp \| Miami, Fla \| Bus Driver \| $15,000 yr. \| \| Dec 74 \| Present \| Metro Transit Authority \| Miami, Fla \| \| \| CIA TRAINING: CIA EMPLOYMENT HISTORY (BEGINNING WITH F/D): \| FROM \| TO \| FUNCTION \| LOCATION \| PROJECT \| SALARY \| \|------\|----\|----------\|----------\|---------\|--------\| \| Apr 64 \| Nov 67 \| Agent \| B \| Washington, D.C. & Miami \| AMMUG \| $600 mo. \| \| Jan 69 \| Present \| Informant \| B \| Miami, Fla \| SLEEPER \| WAE \| Cuban Intelligence Service At present, subject is not involved in any activities that require him to use a cover. If and when he travels abroad, he will use business or personal cover appropriate to the mission involved. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE: ADAPTABILITY (SUBJECT AND FAMILY) TOWARDS DUAL LIFE B. PREVIOUS COVER WAS: ☐ OFFICIAL ☑ NON-OFFICIAL (GIVE BRIEF DESCRIPTION IF NON) MOBILITY INDICATE LIMITING FACTORS BOTH PERSONAL AND OPERATIONAL No known limiting factors FUTURE UTILIZATION INDICATE PLANS OR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR USE AFTER CURRENT ASSIGNMENT Headquarters plans to use Subject to contact and approach Cubans of operational interest to LA/COG. 28 April 1976 Q-251-749651 1. For the Record: SLANK-1 (S-1) has purchased a home at: 2931 SW 19th Terrace Miami, Florida tel: (305) 443-3027. Henry S. PACHANKIS. 27 March 1976 1. At 27 March meeting, PACHANKIS discussed latest CARACAS Station requirements with SLAM-1 (S-1). 2. S-1 not seen SLAM-1 (S-1) since c. 1964, thus unable to provide updated assessment. S-1 does not know S-1's wife. 3. S-1 considers highly improbable F-1 would accept private meeting via phone. F-1 could be suspicious of S-1's motives and might round up own welcoming committee for confrontation. 4. S-1 confident a direct street meeting - one on one - would offer best opportunity to communicate Agency offer to F-1. 5. S-1's second choice would be home approach, were it known F-1 was alone or only with wife. 6. S-1 is disciplined, discreet, devoted, plucky professional. States will go anywhere, anytime to cooperate. Prepared to take up to 5 days sick leave without pay to participate approach to F-1. Could leave Miami on Saturday, returning latest Sunday following week. S-1 is Amcit and has US passport. S-1 needs c. 1 week prior notice to prepare for CARACAS, NY. 7. S-1 reviewed names of Cubans on latest Diplomatic List. Only positive was: Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo (the Ambassador) with former OSS colleague of S-1. Henry S. PACHANKIS. SECRET 3 February 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: SLANK-1 In reviewing SLANK-1's file for possible leads to targets of interest the following names were selected: 1. Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart (201-865547) 2. Ricardo ESPINO Martinez (201-818437) 3. Federico CRESPO Moreira (201-894397) (in Peru since January 1973) 4. Rafael MIRABAL Fernandez (KDACOUSTIC-1) (201-812117) (Mexico - February 1967) 5. Manuel CARDONELL Duque (201-279604) (Capt. Pol. worked with M-1) 6. Armando "Ulises" ESTRADA Fernandez (201-809440) 7. Ramon Cesar CUENCA Mintoto (201-328945) (PCS Caracas - October 75 (DGI)) 8. Roque DALTON Garcia (201-215097) (DSE - now in Havana) Individual files of subject now being reviewed. If one or several of these subjects appears recruitable, a plan will be written up explaining "plan of action." Wilfredo CLOWER E2 IMPDET CL BY 025231 SECRET 18 November 1975 SUBJECT: Change of Address and Phone of SLACK-1 (S-1) 1. S-1 has informed me via a letter to my PO Box that he has moved once again and has a new phone. Please record: 610 SW 19th Road Miami telephone (305) 858-3043. HSP 29 October 1975 SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1 (S-1) 1. S-1 was met on the evening of 28 October, at his Miami apartment, to inform him of the following: A. His old DGI chum, Ramon Cesar CUNHA Montoto, appeared to be settling down for an extended stay in Caracas. B. Consequently, our people had decided to study him in depth and decide at a later date what action, if any, could or should be taken against him. i.e. to pitch or not to pitch. C. Our office had asked me to thank him for his offer to assist in any operation and would keep him in mind in any future plans. S-1 was grateful to hear these words and reiterated his willingness/availability to help out in this or any other Operation. 2. I thought this to be the most diplomatic and effective way to treat this issue. I wanted to give him an answer yet not say we didn't think him the most likely candidate. S-1 has always been PRESENT when we needed volunteers. He longs to get back in the "business" and there is no doubt he can do the job. They don't care any "gutsier." We never know when we'll need him and it's good to know he is there. Henry S. PACHANKIS. For SLANK-1 20/7/75 16 October 1975 SUBJECT: Contact Report on S-1 (S-1) 1. S-1 was visited on the evening of 15 October, at his new address (5501 NW 7th St, apt 1062) same phone (443-5463) to discuss recent H&H requirements. 2. S-1 was excited to learn his old boss, Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montoro is in Caracas. "I just knew he had to be there because the Cuban Ambassador (Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo) was my boss in the DDI (c. 1963-64) and 'Cesar' was above us both." (In other words, in c. 1963-64, CUENCA was superior in rank to both S-1 and HERNANDEZ - the present Cuban Ambassador to Venezuela.) (CUENCA was know as Cesar to his coworkers/friends). 3. S-1 is seriously ready, willing and able to partake in any Agency Operation against CUENCA and/or HERNANDEZ. S-1 is an AMCIIF and has a valid US passport. His only consideration in obtaining the proper permission from his employers. This is a matter which the Agency MUST solicit for him. As previously reported, S-1 works for: Metro Transit Authority (bus driver) 3300 NW 32 Avenue, Miami. The persons to be contacted at MTA, to grant S-1 the necessary leave are: Mr. FNU CROSS and Mr. M. C. BUTLER 4. The ball is in our court. You cannot ask for a more dedicated/motivated/educated (re the DDI) than S-1. S-1 will be ready to travel the minute Agency obtains necessary permission from MTA. 5. Re: "HERNANDEZ" - the Yemen based Cuban military instructor - S-1 reports NEGATIVE. (SLAESTICK-1 had previously reported NEGATIVE) 6. Whatever decision H&H takes, would appreciate being informed so we can notify S-1. He is most dedicated/valuable asset and we owe him this courtesy. In past, he has been alerted and we have failed to notify him of abortions, and left him hanging in mid air. Henry S. PACHANKIS. E-1's daughter was 5 years old yesterday and I took the children to the zoo yesterday. I bought her a new E-1 continues to be all right, but I am not sure how long he will be able to continue. He is still working very hard, but his health is not as good as it used to be. For the report, I have a few things to say. E-1 has been very busy in the past few weeks. He has Henry E. [Signature] 201-749651 28 February 1975 SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLNK-1 (S-1) 1. S-1 was contacted on the evening of 27 February, at his Miami home (2761 SW 24th Terrace, tel: 443-0155) re his availability to approach his old friend, Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llompart. 2. As on all previous occasions when we have asked for S-1's collaboration, S-1's answer was AFFIRMATIVE. The only condition is that we obtain his employer's permission to be absent from his present job. He is not entitled to vacation until 6 August 1975. 3. S-1 is presently employed as a bus driver for the: Metro Transit Authority 3300 NE 32nd Avenue Miami, Tel: 633-9736. The persons who must grant the permission are, in this order of rank: H. I. CROSS B. L. WALLACE W. C. BUTLER 4. S-1 has a valid US passport. And, he can be available to travel the moment his superiors grant him the leave without pay we request. 5. I have again thanked him for his sincere/loyal cooperation. I have promised to keep him abreast of developments. Henry S. FACHAUSIS. SECRET 2616302 FEB 75 STAFF CITE LA/KIAI 23060 (ENNIS ACTING) TO: DIRECTOR, RE: AM REF: DIRECTOR 661166 1. SLANK-1 CONTACTED BY PACHANKIS 27 FEB 75. 2. AS IN THE PAST, S-1 INDICATED HE IS WILLING TO MAKE AN APPROACH TO SUBJECT PER REF. S-1 IS NOW EMPLOYED WITH THE LOCAL METRO TRANSIT AUTHORITY AND IS NOT DUE A VACATION UNTIL AFTER MID-1975; THEREFORE ANY ABSENCE FROM WORK MUST BE REQUESTED BY B. KHERALD AND APPROVED BY ANY ONE OF HIS SUPERIORS (H. I. CROSS, B. L. WALLACE, M. C. BUTLER -- IN ORDER OF DESCENDING AUTHORITY). 3. S-1 HAS VALID U.S. PASSPORT AND CAN TRAVEL WHEN NEEDED. 4. FILE: 261-0749651, E2, IMPDET. RECORD COPY SECRET 261-0749651 OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET STAFF CONF: LA 10 INFO: TEL TO: LA/MIA RE: AM Y 1. HAS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITY OF USING VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA (201-749-651) IN APPROACH TO HIS OLD FRIEND ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLONPART (201-865-547). 2. REQUEST PACHANKIS DETERMINE WHEREABOUTS OF RODRIGUEZ LAHERA AND WHETHER OR NOT HE WILLING AND AVAILABLE TO ASSIST IN APPROACH. 3. FILE: 201-749-651, 201-865-547. E2, IMPDET. DATE: 26 FEBRUARY 1975 ORIG: MARY MUSGRAVE-CB UNIT: LA/COG/OPS EXT: 9229 RECORD COPY SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET CL BY: CL/ACOG 21 December 1974 SUBJECT: Contact Report on SLANK-1. (S-1) 1. S-1 was met on the afternoon of 21 December, for a brief social call, to pay our respects and present him with a bottle of Scotch for the Christmas season. 2. S-1 was grateful not only for the gift but to see we had not forgotten him. His home life seems to have settled down after some rocky periods earlier in the year and he has a new, more secure position as bus driver for the Metro Transit Authority in Miami. As previously reported, he has also taken the Postal Service exams and would accept a letter carrier's job if it is offered to him. 3. As always, S-1 is ready to assist us in any way that he can. If Roberto RODRIGUEZ Lillopart should ever come out again, S-1 can be counted on to make an approach. All that we would have to do is to contact his employers and obtain the necessary permission. Henry S. PACHANKIS. OUTGOING MESSAGE SECRET CONFIDENTIAL TO: PRIORITY MADRID RYBAT REAM SLASH Y REF: MADRID 24401 IN 3951431 Y 1. APPRECIATE MADRID'S OFFER ATTEMPT APPROACH SLASH-1. HOWEVER, WISH STAND-DOWN FOR MOMENT ON OP. SINCE WE SEE NO CHANCE OF SUCCESS USING ONLY NAME OF SLANK-1. Y 2. SLANK-1 DISAPPEARED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO. HENRY S. PACHANKIS, WHO IN CONTACT WITH SLANK-1, PRESENTLY N.Y. WHERE INVOLVED OTHER OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, AND UNABLE RETURN MIAMI TRY TRACK DOWN SLANK-1. WE HOPE DO SO WHEN PACHANKIS RETURNS MIAMI, AND WILL THEN THINK IN TERMS OF SLASH-1'S NEXT TRIP OUT. Y 3. FILE: 201-365547. EZ IMPDET. LA COMMENT: REF OFFERED CO MADRID TO APPROACH SLASH-1 USING NAME SLANK-1 (CHILDHOOD FRIEND OF SLASH-1) AS BONA FIDES. SLANK-1 201-747651 DATE: 23 OCT 74 CONF: JOAN SILVERLEIGH UNIT: LA/COG/OPS EXT: 9229 C/LA/COG C/EUR C/2/10/S C/LA C/LA CLASSIFIED REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED CL BY: 2ACt 74 SECRET 231651E OCT 74 STAFF CITE MADRID 24401 TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR, RE: REAM SLASH REFS: A. MADRID 24341 (2 390775) B. DIRECTOR 611511 1. OUTIMID OF 21 OCTOBER REPORTS THAT SLASH-1 WILL BE IN MADRID FOR TEN OR FIFTEEN DAYS. CUBAN EMBASSY IS REQUESTING 22 DAY VISA FOR HIM. SLASH-1 IS IN MADRID NEGOTIATING WITH THREE SPANISH FIRMS FOR COMPLETE EQUIPMENT OF PLANTS FOR CUBAN MINISTRY OF MINES. NO INDICATION YET OF WHERE SLASH-1 STAYING BUT EXPECT ASCERTAIN THROUGH OUTIMID. 2. ASSUME FROM REF B THAT SLANK-1 NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR APPROACH TO SLASH-1. IF DESIRES, MADRID STATION WILL ATTEMPT APPROACH SLASH-1 USING NAME OF SLANK-1 AS BONA FIDES. 3. FILE: 221-0355547. EZ IMPET. SLANK-1 201 SECRET 23 OCT 74 B. SLALCM-1 -- He is close to Nestor RAMIREZ, a CURAPESCA Representative who is currently in Tokyo. SLALCM-1 states RAMIREZ is approachable because RAMIREZ is definitely not a Communist, and he thinks very much like him (SLALCM-1). C. SLANK-1 -- He mentioned to PACHANKIS that he had been close to Roberto RODRIGUEZ Llopart, a Cuban Mining Official who often travels to Mexico and Canada. D. Gustavo MAS -- Brother-in-law of the current Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. MAS has advised PACHANKIS that he is willing to help us only to the extent of determining the feelings of his sister and the Ambassador at any given time, but no more. He will not accept any remuneration from us and will foot his own bill to visit his sister. E. SLCOOL-1 and SLACE-1 -- In describing the former, PACHANKIS referred to him as from another generation, i.e., of the HOA class, who could possibly be used with any older Cuban officials that might still be around. He cautioned, however, that SLCOOL-1 had undergone a delicate cancer operation two years ago which might impede his usefulness. As concern SLACE-1, PACHANKIS suggested that we were probably better off forgetting him. He described SLACE-1 as very problematical and then went on to add such adjectives as avaricious, sly, secretive, and a person inclined not to follow-through on any task given him. 6. PACHANKIS believes that much can be done with the above defectors against the targets mentioned and, himself, is anxious to get involved in another recruitment operation as soon as possible. Frank C. Esquivel WH/COG/FI SECRET 2918282 MAY 74 STAFF CITE WM/MIAM: 21838 TO: PRIORITY OTTAWA INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR. RE: AM ABOVE REF: OTTAWA 23384 (IN 264930) 1. REGRET TO ADVISE THAT SLANK-1 WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR GDS TRAVEL UNTIL 9 JUNE 1974. HIS EMPLOYER INDICATED WILLINGNESS FREE SLANK-1 FOR TRAVEL FOR USG UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES; HOWEVER, TWO OF SLANK-1 FELLOW WORKERS CURRENTLY ON JURY DUTY AND EMPLOYER REGRETFULLY UNABLE LIBERATE SLANK-1 FROM WORK COMMITMENT UNTIL 9 JUNE. 2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-749652, 201-749653, 201-749654 E2: IMPER B201-865547 SECRET 201-749651 29 MAY 74 SECRET 1719532 APR 74 STAFF CITE WH/MIAI 21548 (BEARDSLEY ACTING) TO: PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO MADRID, AKULE REAM REF: DIRECTOR 538829 1. "PACHANKIS IN TOUCH WITH SLANK-1 WHO WILLING TO TRAVEL," SLANK-1'S NEW EMPLOYER WOULD HAVE TO BE CONTACTED BY STATION SECURITY OFFICER TO OBTAIN PERMISSION FOR LWOP. OBTAINING INFO ON NEW EMPLOYER TO START CLEARANCE PROCEDURE. 2. FILE: 201-2865447. E-2, IMPDET. Reference: UFAA-4701, 11 January 1973 Forwarded under separate cover is a copy of a personality assessment report prepared by Lawrence B. SELJACK (P) concerning AMUG-1. Linda N. QUASHNOCK Attachment: Assessment report U/S/C Distribution: 3 - COS, WH/Miami w/att U/S/C SECRET TELEPOUCH DISPATCH NO - UFAS-2195 FILE NO - 201-749651 DATE - 29 AUGUST 1972 INDEX - NO FILM - NO TO - CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAI INFO - NONE FROM - CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION SUBJECT - AKULE/TYPIC/AMMUG-1 ACTION - SEE BELOW REFS - UFAT-3304, 21 AUGUST 1972 1. AMMUG-1 WILL BE ADVISED REGARDING INTERVIEW BUT THE PROCESSING MAY TAKE 3-6 MONTHS DEPENDING ON WORK- LOAD MIAMI INS. 2. EZ, IMPDET. WANDA F. BREMSON DISTRIBUTION - 3 - COG, WH/MIAI /BY TAPE/ Distribution: Originated by: Vivian Barry, 1 - WH/COG/CHRONO WH/COG/OS X4163 1 - WH/COG/OS Released by: C/WH/COG 1 - Originator 1 - 201-749651 SECRET MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of Security/Alien Affairs Staff SUBJECT: Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lahera It is requested that Subject be processed for naturalization. I-485 forms, completed and signed by Subject, are attached. Vivian Barry 28/COG/72 SECRET TO EH/Miami Typic Anmug Ref: Director 301165 1. Copy Anmug-1 Citizenship Bill, (Private Law 92-22, 30 June 72) TM No. 533651 in 28 Aug 72 pouch. 2. File: 201-749651. E2, Impdet. End of Message [Signature] Theodore G. Shackley C/WHD [Signature] Lamont Stockfield C/WH/COG [Stamp] S.E.C. R.I.T. [Stamp] 17 Aug 72, NA. IMPORTANT. TYPE AMUG REF: IMPORTANT 1972 [EN 14334] 1. AMUG-1 SHOULD COMPLETE THE PAPERS AND STATION FORWARD COMPLETED PAPERS TO HRS. ATTN: OTIS C. VIGILANT. THIS UNIT WILL PREPARE PAPERS AND FORWARD PAPERS TO ALLOC APPEARANCE STAFF FOR THE RRS PROCESSING. 2. EXPECT RECEIVE COPY OF AMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL WITHIN NEXT FEW DAYS. WILL POUCH TO STATION HIGH RECEIVED. 3. FILE BILL-POUCH. EX IMPORT UN-RECEIVED. CS COPY 201-749451 15 August 72 SECRET 191555Z AUG 12 STAFF CITE WH/MIA 15478 DIRECTOR. AKULE TYPIC AMMUG REFS: A. DIRECTOR 291693 B. UFAT 3381 1. MR. JAMES TILLMAN OF LOCAL INS CONTACTED STATION AND INFORMED US THAT AMMUG-1 HAD CONTACTED HIM FOR ASSISTANCE IN INITIATING NATURALIZATION PROCEEDINGS (WE HAD PREVIOUSLY ALTERED TILLMAN OF POSSIBLE AMMUG-1 CONTACT FOR SUCH ASSISTANCE). 2. TILLMAN STATED HE NOT AUTHORIZED ASSIST AS PRIVATE CITIZENSHIP BILL HANDLED BY HIS CENTRAL OFFICE WHICH MUST ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS TO LOCAL OFFICE FOR ACTION. TILLMAN INFORMED US THAT HE GAVE AMMUG-1 VARIOUS FORMS TO COMPLETE AND RETURN TO STATION. COMPLETED FORMS SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO BKTRUST HQS ATTENTION ALIEN AFFAIRS STAFF WHICH SHOULD REVISE AND THEN FORWARD ON TO INS CENTRAL HQS. INS HQS WILL THEN ADVISE LOCAL OFFICE WHAT ACTION TO TAKE, AFTER WHICH AMMUG-1 WILL BE GRANTED CITIZENSHIP. 3. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST WHETHER ABOVE PROCEDURE CORRECT CS COPY SECRET 14Aug 12 201-7491651 PAGE 2 WH/MIAI 15470 SECRET AND WHAT ELSE MUST BE DONE SO WE CAN ADVISE AMMUG-1 WHAT TO DO WHEN HE, AND HE WILL VERY SHORTLY, CONTACTS US. 4. ALSO REQUEST DATE WHEN WE CAN EXPECT RECEIVE COPY OF AMMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. 5. FILE: 201-749651. E2 IMPDET WN-SISM. SECRET SECRET TELEPOUCH DISPATCH NO: UFAT 3301 DATE: 20 JULY 1972 FILE: 291-749651 TO: CHIEF, WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION FROM: CHIEF OF STATION, WH/MIAI SUBJECT: TYPIC/AMMUG - AMMUG/1 REENTRY PERMIT REF: DIRECTOR 289899 FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER IS AMMUG/1'S REENTRY PERMIT FOR DELIVERY TO IANS. STANLEY F. SPECHLER ATTACHMENT: USC (VIA POUCH 246P(7)6 1972) DISTRIBUTION: VIA TELEPOUCH 3 C/VHD; W/ATT USC EX-2 APDIR, WH-SISM. SECRET SECRET T/N/P USC ATTACHMENT TO UFAX-3301 (TELEPOUCH) TO: C/WID FROM: COS, MIAMI SECRET SECRET WI/Miami 15074 (IN 6/3499) 1. President signed AECUG-1 Citizenship Bill (P.L. 92-92) 30 June. A-1 may now initiate naturalization proceedings. 2. File: 201-749651. EX-2, APDIR, WN-SISM. END OF MESSAGE Chris file (Initials) 1. WOBONE HAS REQUESTED ANMUG-1 REENTRY PERMIT FOR DELIVERY 2. FILE: 201-749651. EX. 2. APPR., WH/MIAMI END OF MESSAGE John Dorey, CS/AS, called. He wants NATO's country point returned to him for delivery to JCS. All AFRICOM was supposed to do this, but apparently did not. P.S. I'm in Vladivostok today, request would be made to Mari. Please handle this for me. 201-749-151 Cable dear to Will, Miami 19 July 72 [Signature] SECRET 30 Jan 72 STAFF CITE WH/MIA 15075 DIRECTOR ANALYTIC ANNEX REF: WH/MIA 15074 (2649499) IDENT: VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAHERA GP-1 SECRET 30 Jan 72 SECRET 201-74-9651 SECRET 3014362 JUN 72 STAFF CITE WH/MIAI 15074 DIRECTOR. AKULE TYPIC AMMUG REF: DIRECTOR 283581 1. AMMUG-1 PLANS NO LEGAL NAME CHANGE... WILL FILE NATURALIZATION PETITION AS IDEN. 2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET Iden in CMM 15075 30 Jun 72 SECRET 201 74 7657 SECRET WH/MIA TYPIC AMUG 1. SENATE PASSED AMUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE EXPECTED WITHIN 6 TO 10 DAYS. FLS ADVISE IF A-1 PLANS LEGAL NAME CHANGE AT TIME HE FILES PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION. 2. FILE: 201-749651. END OF MESSAGE COC/COMMENT: The Office of Legislative Counsel wants to know if A-1, a DSI officer who defected to the U.S. in 1964, plans to change his name when he files petition for naturalization in near future. OLC Mr. Carpentier (Telecord) [Signature] THEODORE G. SHACKLEY C/AND SECRET [Signature] LAURENCE M. STEINFIELD C/AND/COG RELEASING OFFICER SECRET [Signature] SECRET 27 Jun 1972 SECRET CABLE SECRETARIAT DISSEMINATION PERSONAL UNIT NOTIFIED SECRET ADVANCE COPY: [ ] ISSUED [ ] SIGNED REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED WHY: FILE VR JPN, SECUR ACTION UNIT ACTION NO. SECRET 27 JUN 1972 STAFF CITE WH/MIA 15359 DIRECTOR. AKULE TYPIC AMMUG REF: DIRECTOR 250368 1. REQUEST STATUS AMMUG/1 CITIZENSHIP BILL WHICH PER REF BEING CONSIDERED BY SENATE. 2. FILE: 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 27 Jun 1972 A letter, with attached memorandum, dated October 6, 1971, to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with reference to the case, reads as follows: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE Washington, D.C., October 6, 1971. A-13721684. Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your request for a report relative to the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHerna, there is attached a memorandum of information concerning the beneficiary. The bill is apparently intended to permit the beneficiary to become naturalized as a citizen of the United States notwithstanding his ineligibility to citizenship by reason of his membership or affiliation with an organization as prescribed in section 313 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since April 29, 1961. Sincerely, RAYMOND F. FARRELL Commissioner. MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FROM IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FILES RE H.R. 2076 The beneficiary, Vladimir Rodriguez LaHerna, a native and citizen of Cuba, was born on February 6, 1927. His parents and two brothers are natives, citizens and residents of Cuba. He married Marion Cueva-Calle, a native and citizen of Cuba, on August 13, 1950, in Havana, Cuba. This marriage was terminated by divorce in October 1959. There was no issue of this union. On December 17, 1961, the beneficiary married Luisa Rodriguez-Torres, a native and citizen of Cuba, in Havana, Cuba. She was born on August 24, 1934, in Havana, Cuba, and is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. One child, Luisa, was born of this marriage on May 25, 1969, in Miami, Fla., and is a citizen of the United States. Mrs. Rodriguez' marriage to Vicente del Rosario Hernandez-Garcia on September 3, 1959, in Havana, Cuba, was terminated by divorce October 11, 1963. Two children were born of this marriage in Havana, Cuba, Vincente Maximiliano, on August 21, 1959, and Francisca Luciana, on January 7, 1952. The boy died in Miami, Fla., in 1968 and the girl became a naturalized citizen of the United States on September 2, 1971. Mrs. Rodriguez and her two daughters reside with the beneficiary in Miami, Fla. The beneficiary obtained the equivalent of 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of vocational school in his native country. Since December 1966, he has been employed as a supervisor of food handlers for a local aircraft catering service at a weekly salary of $140. Prior to his present employment, he was a market research salesman for a local advertising company. His wife, employed as a machine operator for a local dress manufacturer at a weekly salary of $82. Their combined assets consisting of two automobiles, real and personal property and possessions, total $35,500. The real property bears a mortgage of $17,500. The beneficiary arrived in the United States from Canada on April 29, 1961, at Thousand Islands Bridge, N.Y., and was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period under the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 7, 1966, his status was changed to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and the date of his admission recorded as of April 29, 1961. On his alien registration form the beneficiary listed employment with the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Cuban Government from August 16, 1963, until April 21, 1961, just prior to his defection. He also showed military service in the Cuban Rebel Army from February 4, 1958, until December 20, 1961. The beneficiary desires to become a citizen of the United States because of his long period of residence and to enhance his opportunity for advancement in his vocation. Private bill H.R. 17740, 91st Congress, introduced in the beneficiary's behalf was not enacted. The committee, after consideration of all the facts in the case, is of the opinion that the bill (H.R. 2076) should be enacted. VLADIMIR RODRIGUEZ LAFFERA JUNE 19, 1972—Ordered to be printed Mr. EASTLAND, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H.R. 2076] The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez Laffera, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon without amendment and recommends that the bill do pass. PURPOSE OF THE BILL The purpose of the bill is to enable Vladimir Rodriguez Laffera to file a petition for naturalization, notwithstanding the fact that he was formerly a member of a proscribed organization. STATEMENT OF FACTS The beneficiary of the bill is a 35-year-old native and citizen of Cuba, whose status was adjusted to that of a lawful resident alien on November 7, 1966, retroactive to April 29, 1964, the date on which he was paroled into the United States from Canada. He resides in Miami, Fla., with his wife, a lawful resident alien, and two daughters. The beneficiary was employed in Cuba with the General Directorate of Intelligence, and served in the Cuban Rebel Army. Without enactment of the bill, the beneficiary would be unable to petition for naturalization until 1974. A letter, with attached memorandum, dated October 6, 1971, to the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representa- tives from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with reference to the case, reads as follows: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Washington, D.C., October 6, 1971. A-13721684: Hon. Emanuel Celler, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your request for a report relative to the bill (H.R. 2076) for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez La- Hera, there is attached a memorandum of information concerning the beneficiary. The bill is apparently intended to permit the beneficiary to become naturalized as a citizen of the United States notwithstanding his in- eligibility to citizenship by reason of his membership or affiliation with an organization as prescribed in section 315 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. He has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since April 25, 1964. Sincerely, RAYMOND F. FERRILL, Commissioner. MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FROM IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE FILES RE H.R. 2076 The beneficiary, Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, a native and citizen of Cuba, was born on February 6, 1937. His parents and two brothers are natives, citizens and residents of Cuba. He married Marcon Caba-Caba, a native and citizen of Cuba, on August 13, 1959, in Havana, Cuba. This marriage was terminated by divorce in October 1959. There was no issue of this union. On December 17, 1962, the beneficiary married Luisa Rodriguez-Timoneda, a native and citizen of Cuba, in Havana, Cuba. She was born on August 24, 1934, in Havana, Cuba, and is a lawful permanent resident of the United States. One child, Luisa, was born of this marriage on May 25, 1970, in Miami, Fla., and is a citizen of the United States. Mrs. Rodriguez' marriage to Vicente del Rosario Hernandez-Garcia on September 3, 1948, in Havana, Cuba, was terminated by divorce October 11, 1963. Two children were born of this marriage in Havana, Cuba, Vicente Maximiliano, on August 21, 1950, and Francisca Luciana, on January 7, 1952. The boy died in Miami, Fla., in 1968 and the girl became a naturalized citizen of the United States on September 2, 1971. Mrs. Rodriguez and her two daughters reside with the beneficiary in Miami, Fla. The beneficiary obtained the equivalent of 8 years of elementary education and 2 years of vocational school in his native country. Since December 1966, he has been employed as a supervisor of food handlers for a local aircraft catering service at a weekly salary of $140. Prior to his present employment, he was a market research salesman for a local advertising company. His wife is employed as a machine operator for a local dress manufacturer at a weekly salary of $85. Their combined assets consisting of two automobiles, real and personal property and possessions, total $32,500. The real property bears a mortgage of $17,500. The beneficiary arrived in the United States from Canada on April 29, 1964, at Thousand Islands Bridge, N.Y., and was paroled into the United States for an indefinite period under the parole provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 7, 1965, his status was changed to that of a lawful permanent resident of the United States and the date of his admission recorded as of April 29, 1964. On his alien registration form the beneficiary listed employment with the General Directorate of Intelligence of the Cuban Government from August 16, 1963, until April 21, 1964, just prior to his defection. He also showed military service in the Cuban Rebel Army from February 4, 1939, until December 20, 1961. The beneficiary desires to become a citizen of the United States because of his long period of residence and to enhance his opportunity for advancement in his vocation. Private bill H.R. 17470, 91st Congress, introduced in the beneficiary's behalf was not enacted. The committee, after consideration of all the facts in the case, is of the opinion that the bill (H.R. 2076) should be enacted. 1. Vladimir RODRIGUEZ Lafuente has cooperated with this Agency since his defection on 21 April 1964 at which time he turned over to CIA documents from the General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) he had collected during the preceding several months. In addition, he has provided voluminous, accurate and valuable information on the organization of the Cuban intelligence services, their operations, staff members and agents. These documents and information have given us the potential and opportunity to take effective measures to safeguard United States Government interests. Subject has been of great value in the past, and will continue to be in the future, in the CIA recruitment/defection program. His wide acquaintance among and knowledge concerning high level Cuban diplomats and Cuban intelligence personnel provides the Agency with the necessary background in planning operations against them and makes Subject ideal for use in carrying out the operations. His talents and contacts have been used not only in furthering the defector program, but in other types of political action, psychological warfare and recruitment operations. 2. As a result of technical interrogations of RODRIGUEZ on 11 May 1964 and again on 15 July 1966, and objective operational testing since, his bona fides have been established not only for intelligence exploitation purposes but also for the purpose of resettlement in the United States. There is no reason to believe that RODRIGUEZ is under the control of any hostile intelligence service. 3. The psychiatric and periodic medical examinations have shown that RODRIGUEZ has no serious medical or psychiatric problems. 4. Mr. RODRIGUEZ has adjusted well to American life. He has been trained as a dental technician and for the past two years has been working for the Marriott Corporation, specifically as manager of the airlines' catering division in Miami. He is pleased with this new occupation. There is every reason to expect that he would be a responsible and loyal citizen. \| SECURITY REGULATION(S) VIOLATED \| SUBSTANCE OF VIOLATION \| \|--------------------------------\|------------------------\| \| ER 16-315 1 July 53, Para 2 b (1) (ii) \| Use of crypt + True identity in some UFAN 4016 Pouch. Specifically, this is the use of "Cuban defectors" in dispatch and sending the dispatch in pouch which has other dispatches of same format and basic subject, but using the crypt for Cuba. \| Reference: OFPW 46605, 2 March 1972 1. The photographs of Petra Concepcion Barragan Garcia (201-88132), Carlos Esteban Ramos Frias (201-88131), Maria Victoria Caignet Urena (201-826455), Pedro Lara Zanora (201-883367) and wife and Marco Campanioni Tanayo (201-886144) and his wife were reviewed with MUSTART defector SWING-1 on 6 April 1972 with negative results. 2. The photographs will be reviewed with other Cuban defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and we will advise you of any positive results. Eustace D. KLOOCK Distribution: 3. COS, Paris -UP 2. Chief, WHD 2. Chief, EURD DOC. MICRO. SER. APR 13 1972 MICROFILMED Reference: OCOA-16803, 14 March 1972 1. The photographs of Felix M. Milian Pantoja (Subject) and his wife, Luisa M. Gonzalez Sabio, were reviewed with AMHUG-1 on 6 April 1972. While Gonzalez was familiar to AMHUG-1 he could not provide any information on her. He did not, however, recognize Subject. 2. We will review the photographs of Subject and his wife with the other defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and advise you of any positive results. 3. Station is most appreciative of the high quality photographs that we have recently been receiving from SHACT via SHABOVE. Eustace D. KLOOCK Distribution: 3 - COS, Ottawa 3 - Chief, WHD 2 - Chief, EUR Reference: OFFA 97498, 23 February 1972 Copies of the original photographs of Rolando Moncés de la Hoya and his wife, Sara Manresa Condelez, which were forwarded to us by Headquarters, were reviewed with AMSTAFF defector AMMUG-1 on 6 April 1972 with negative results. The photographs will be reviewed with other Cuban defectors who are the responsibility of WH/Miami and we will advise you of any positive results. Eustace D. KLOOCK Distribution: 3 - CGS, Paris 5 - CGS, WHD 2 - Chief, EURD SECRET TO WH/Miami AMHUG 1. HOUSE PASSED AMHUG-1 CITIZENSHIP BILL. BILL NOW IN SENATE. MAY TAKE ANOTHER MONTH BEFORE DECISION REACHED. 2. FILE: 201-74951. GP-L. END OF MESSAGE 3. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mr. Garner J. Cline, Counsel, Subcommittee No. 1, House Judiciary Committee, who told me that there would be no problem with the Democratic objector relating to H.R. 2076, a bill for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera. Mr. Donald Benn, Associate Counsel of the Judiciary Committee, has not touched base as yet with the Republican objector but will do so before the private calendar is called on 7 March. Mr. Cline told me also that the Davis bill, H.R. 5178, was formally tabled by the full Committee in its meeting of 22 February. The tabling was without discussion on the basis of an adverse recommendation by the Subcommittee. See Memo for Record dated 11 February 1972 on A. Trevor Callahan. 3. (Confidential - JGO) Met with Mr. Drury Blair, Senate Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee staff, who told me that due to the primaries in the Chairman's home state he did not believe that any further meetings of the Subcommittee will be held until mid June. H.R. 2076, a bill for the relief of Vladimir Rodriguez LaHera, is on the agenda for the next Subcommittee meeting. Miss Chris Hopkins, WH Division, has been advised. Salena De Rodriguez Pat Carpenter Legislative Counsel X 9.207 Bill for ward of 10 yrs. underpend/has passed H.R. House 7/15 in the Senate. SECRET WH/Miami INFO: MADRID 233810 TYPIC AMETROPIA REF: WH/Miami 13854 (IN 538389) 1. AGREE WITH REF CRITERIA FOR FURTHER PURSUIT AMETROPIA/1 CASE. 2. FILE: 201-865547 AND 201-749651. END OF MESSAGE WH/COG/COMMENT: Miami suggests we not position AMETROPIA/1 for possible contact with AMETROPIA/1 until he is PCS or TDY long enough to permit an orderly approach. JAMES E. FLANNERY AC/WHD RELEASING OFFICER SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ORIGINAL OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 17 Feb 72 SECRET 1521202 FEB 72 CITE WH/MIA 13854 MADRID INFO DIRECTOR AKULE TYPIC AMETROPIA REF MADRID 15657 (IN 53615) 1. APPRECIATE REF INFO ON ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART. BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT YOUR PRIORITY TARGETS RIGHTFULLY TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THIS RATHER ELUSIVE ONE AND SUGGEST THAT WE STAND DOWN ON ANY EFFORT TO POSITION AMMUG-1 FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT. THIS, UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT RODRIGUEZ IS PCS OR IN A TDY STATUS LONG ENOUGH TO PERMIT AN ORDERLY APPROACH. 2. FYI: AMGAME-1 WHO KNOWS RODRIGUEZ, ASSESSES HIM AS BEING A WORTHWHILE TARGET AND POSSIBLY RECRUITABLE. 3. FILE: 201-665547, 201-816552, 201-749651. GPl. SECRET SECRET Chief of Station, Mexico City Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Chief of Station, WA/Hawaii TYPIC/Fernando Otero Espino (201-634360) Reference: KUSA 41469, 10 December 1971 1. While AMARILLO-1 immediately recognized the photograph of Subject which was forwarded in Reference, AMARILLO-1, AMARILLO-1 and AMARILLO-1 did not. We will review the photograph with AMARILLO-1 and advise any positive results. 2. Forwarded herewith is a debriefing report from AMARILLO-1 on Subject. If after reviewing this report, Mexico City has any additional requirements for AMARILLO-1, we will be glad to service them. Esteban D. KLOCH Attachment: Report, herewith Distribution: 2 - CIC, Mexico City w/att, herewith 2 - Chief, FBI without att CS COPY FILED 201-82X820 201-631273, 201-602332, UFAD-3771 201-749681, 201-316388 SECRET Typed: 21 January 1973 201-634360 21 Jan 73 SECRET 172143Z JAN 72 CIIE WH/MIAI 13595 OTTAWA INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC SMABOVE REF A OCUA 16526 B UFIA 3597 1. PRIOR TO FEBRUARY CONFERENCE WE INTEND TO REVIEW ALL PHOTOGRAPHS OF PBRUMENS STATIONED CANADA WITH THOSE AMSTAFF/AMQUAKE DEFECTORS WHO ARE RESPONSIBILITY OF WH/MIAI. PLEASE FORWARD ANY AVAILABLE COPIES OF I.D. PHOTOS FOR INDIVIDUALS LISTED REF B. 2. FYI: VALUE OF SUCH A REVIEW IS UNDERLINED BY AMMUG-1'S RECENT RECOGNITION OF JORGE DE LA VEGA VIGNON (201-815356) VIA SUCH A PHOTO. UNFORTUNATELY, AMMUG-1 WAS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY VEGA AS BEING INTEL. 3. FILE: 201-815356, 201-749651, 19-2-16. GPI. SECRET CS COPY FILED 19-2-6 SECRET 17 Jan 72 SECRET Chief of Station, Mexico City Chief, Western Hemisphere Division Chief of Station, WH/Disal PREPARED/Fernando Otero Espino (301-824860) Reference: WHAA 41406 AHRAUD-1 did not recognize the photograph of Fernando Otero Espino which was forwarded by Reference. The photograph will be shown to AHRAUD-1, AHRAUD-2, AHRAUD-1, AHRAUD-1 and AHRAUD-1 at the first opportunity. Sustace D. KLOOCK Distribution: 3 - CGJ, Mexico City 3 - Chief, WHD CS CPAA 824860 201-749651 WHAA-3735 DUPPLICATE COPY FOR CROSS REFERENCE 201-749651 Typed: 10 January 1973 201-824860 201-624869 Reference: A. HDA-41566, 13 December 1971 B. HDA-40515, 7 June 1971 1. AMR-1 failed to identify the picture of Enrique Gomez Carlinz which was forwarded in Reference A. We will of course, review the photograph with the other AMSTAFF/AMR-1 defectors who are the responsibility of the MI/Siam Station and advise you of the results. 2. According to paragraph 3 of Reference B, Subject is to be found at the extreme right of the photograph. While it is entirely possible that we are mistaken, the individual at the extreme right of the photograph bears little resemblance to the AMR-1 photograph of Subject which was forwarded to us via Reference B. 3. We would appreciate if you would review the photographs which were forwarded via References A and B and reconfirm that they are indeed of Subject. We are forwarding as attachments to this dispatch, copies of the photographs which we received to facilitate this task. Lustace D. ROOCE Attachments: Photographs, b/w Distribution: 3-COS/Mexico City, w/atts b/w (V) 3-COS/MIH w/atts b/w [Signature] [Date] 201-777321 [Reference] [Date] 201-777321 REFERENCES: A. HICA-11222, 19 November 1971 B. HICA-11444, 16 December 1971 C. HICA-11488, 15 December 1971 1. The delay in responding to Reference A's request that a picture of Subject be reviewed with the appropriate assets was due to the fact that prior to the receipt of the Reference B photographs, we lacked a good picture of Subject. We felt that the picture of Subject, #143 in Volume II of the Cuban Mugbooks, was something less than satisfactory for the purposes of positive identification. 2. Immediately upon the receipt of the Reference B photographs, the undersigned reviewed with AME-1 the one of Nelson Quesada Rivera with negative results. AME-1, however, did recognize the name of Quesada and identified him as being AMSTAFF. Needless to say, we will show AME-1 the photograph of Subject at the earliest opportunity to determine how well he knows him and if warranted, will debrief him in detail on Subject. 3. The Reference B photograph of Subject will be reviewed with the other AMSTAFF/AMQUEL assets residing in the JICODRA area and we will promptly inform you of the results. Eustace D. KLOOCK Distribution: 3-COS/Mexico City -c/r 3-C/WHD REFERENCE TO 201-719361 201-816552 CLASSIFICATION U/FAA-2732 TYPED: 7 January 1972 201-836379 SECRET 291500Z NOV 21 CITE (MADRID 15141) 23 Nov 1947 9487 DIRECTOR INFO WH/MIA TYPIC AMETROPIA/AMUG REF/ MADRID 15135 (W 478415) 1. AFTER GUTIMID CONVERSATIONS INDICATED AMETROPIA-1 DUE ARRIVE EACH DAY 23-25 NOVEMBER, SUBJECT FINALLY APPEARED 26 NOVEMBER. QUSEQUIN AT AIRPORT DID NOT NOTE ARRIVAL AND STATION COGNIZANT ONLY THROUGH GUTIMID MONITORING AFTERNOON 27 NOVEMBER. AFTER NEGATIVE QUSEQUIN-37 CHECK OF HOTELS NORMALLY FREQUENTED BY CUBANS, PHONE CALL TO HOTEL CONDE DUQUE (WHERE CUBANA AIRCREWS STAY) RECEIVED ANSWER THAT TARGET HAD CHECKED IN 26 AND LEFT 27 NOVEMBER. (AILISTS LATER SHOW TARGET WENT TO HAVANA ON 28 NOVEMBER AND LIAISON AFTER-ACTION CHECK CONDE DUQUE REVEALS OTHER CUBAN DIP WITH SAME PATRONYM HAD REGISTERED AND DEPARTED ON DATES SPECIFIED). 2. AMMUG-1 LEAVING FOR NEW YORK BY IBERIA 951 ON 29 NOVEMBER AND ETA MIAMI 1900 HOURS ON EASTERN 227. ADVANCED $100 (T/A MIAMI) TO COVER PURCHASE NEW TICKET SINCE FULL VALUE RETURN TRIP GOOD ONLY FOR PERIOD LONGER THAN 17 DAYS. 3. TARGET'S EVASIVENESS MAY REFLECT TIGHTENED MEASURES PAGE 2 MADRID 15141 SECRET FOR AM WHEN DEFECTION. HE DID NOT STAY AT USUAL HOTEL. USE QUIN TRAVEL CONTROL PROCEDURES OBVIOUSLY DEFICIENT. AMMUG-1 GAVE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE AND APPEARS MORE EAGER THAN EVERY TO ATTEMPT PITCH. 4. FILE: 201-855547; 201-749651. GP-1. SECRET SECRET 2617132 NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15135 PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAI 25 Nov 71 78415 TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG REF: DIRECTOR 205025 1. AMMUG-1 MET WITHOUT HITCH MORNING 25 NOVEMBER. STILL NO SIGNS OF AMETROPIA-1. QUITIMID TRAFFIC 25 NOVEMBER SHOWED CONVERSATION BETWEEN JOSE MARTINEZ OF COMPANIA EUROPA DE MANUTENCION CONTINUA AND CACHON IN COMMERCIAL OFFICE WHERE LATTER ADVISES THAT A/1 DEFINITELY DUE THAT DAY (BUT NO OTHER CALLS INDICATING HE ACTUALLY ARRIVED). LIAISON WILLING TO COOPERATE ONLY SO FAR AS PROVIDE TWICE-DAILY CHECK HOTEL AROSA ROSIER AND ALERI FROM AIRPORT IF A/1 SPOTTED ARRIVING, BOTH CHANNELLED THROUGH QUSEQUIN/37, BUT NOT WILLING TO APPROACH MARTINEZ (WHO DOES NOT APPEAR TO KNOW MORE THAN WHAT IS TOLD BY COMMERCIAL OFFICE ANYWAY). CUFLUTE-1 HAD ONLY FALSE ALARM TO REPORT BUT NO OTHER INDICATIONS. 2. STATION KEEPING CLOSE TOUCH WITH AMMUG-1 AND TRYING TO DETERMINE A-1 PRESENCE SOONEST. CS COPY: SECRET 201 749651 2617132 \| PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED \| CLASSIFIED MESSAGE \| TOTAL COPIES \| ROUTING AND/OR INITIALS BY \| \|----------------------\|--------------------\|--------------\|-----------------------------\| \| \| SECRET \| \| \| \| \| (When Filled In) \| \| \| \| \| GROUP 1 \| \| \| \| \| DECLARED FOR INTELLIGENCE USE \| \| \| \| \| DECLASSIFIED \| \| \| \| \| REPRODUCTION OF THIS COPY PROHIBITED \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 1 \| 5 \| \| \| \| 2 \| 6 \| \| \| \| 3 \| 7 \| \| \| \| 4 \| 8 \| PAGE 2 MADRID 15135 SECRET 3. FILE: 201-749651; 201-865547. GPI SECRET SECRET 231908Z NOV 71 CITE WH/MIA 13192 IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR 23Nov IN 476216 TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG REF: MADRID 15114(W 476162) 1. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AMMUG-1 FOLLOWS: HT: 64", WT: 140, HAIR: BLACK, AGE 34, FACE: THIN AND SLIGHTLY MARKED. 2. FILE: 201-865547, 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 191502Z NOV 71 SITE MADRID 19090 IMMEDIATE WHMIAMI INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR TYPIC AMETROPIA QUIIMU REF: A. WHMIAMI 15096 (W470042) B. MADRID 15095 (W470042) 1. ACCORDING TO QUIIMU CONVERSATION BETWEEN TWO CUBAN OFFICIALS, AMETROPIA-1 LEFT LONDON FOR MONTREAL EARLY MORNING 19 NOVEMBER, WILL RETURN TO LONDON 21 NOVEMBER AND PLANS TO ARRIVE MADRID 23 NOVEMBER. ONWARD TRAVEL PLANS STILL INDEFINITE BUT MADE INQUIRIES ABOUT 26 NOVEMBER CUBANA FLIGHT TO HAVANA. (NO HOTEL RESERVATIONS YET MADE BUT WILL ADVISE ASAP WHEN INFORMATION AVAILABLE.) 2. REFER TO ABOVE JUDGEMENT WHETHER AMETROPIA-1 TRIP SHOULD BE MADE ON BASIS THIS INFORMATION. IF AFFIRMATIVE, STATION WILL ASSIST ANY WAY POSSIBLE. 3. FILE 201-865547, 201-749891, GF-1. SECRET CREDENT TO W470042 203159 SECRET 749651 19 NOV 71 SECRET 151712Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 15835 DIRECTOR INFO WH/Miami TYPIC AMEIROPIA QUITIMID REF: MADRID 15010 (11) 467099 1. PHONE CONVERSATION BETWEEN SPANISH BUSINESSMAN AND AMEIROPIA-1 IN LONDON INDICATES A-1 DEFINITELY WILL SEE SPANIARD IN MADRID BUT AFTER WEEK ENDING 20 NOVEMBER. SINCE CONVERSATION DID NOT MENTION ANY DEADLINES WE HAVE NO TIME FRAME WHICH AMMUG-1 MIGHT BEST TRAVEL TO MADRID. 2. FILE 201-749651. GP-1. SECRET 201-749651 CS COPY SECRET 201-749651 15 NOV 71 SECRET WH/Miami Typic Amhug Ref WH/Miami 13055 (in 466569)* 1. House sub committee favorably approved bill for Amhug-1 citizenship. Bill now goes to full committee and later to House for final action. 2. File 201-749651. GP-1. End of message WH/Cog comment: Ref requested outcome of bill to grant Amhug-1 U.S. citizenship. William V. Broe C/WHD Lawrence Sternfield C/WH/Cog CS Copy Coordinating Officers Releasing Officer Secret Reproduction by other than the issuing office is prohibited. 12 Nov 71 Copy No. 201-749651 SECRET 1018512 NOV 71 CITE WH/MIAI 13055 DIRECTOR TYPIC AMMUG 1. WOULD APPRECIATE OUTCOME OF HQS DISCUSSIONS RE AMMUG-1 BEING GRANTED U.S. CITIZENSHIP. IF THERE HAVE BEEN ANY POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS STATION WOULD LIKE TO PASS THEM ON TO AMMUG-1. 2. FILE: 201-749651. GPl. SECRET CS COPY SECRET 201-749651 SECRET 050842Z NOV 71 CITE MADRID 14969 PRIORITY DIRECTOR INFO PRIORITY WH/MIAI TYPIC AMETROPIA REF DIRECTOR 197498 1. AS OF COB 4 NOVEMBER NO INDICATION FROM STATION SOURCES CONCERNING AMETROPIA-1 RETURN NOR DID HOTEL AROSA (HIS USUAL RESIDENCE) CLAIM TO HAVE RESERVATION IN HIS NAME. 2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-865547. GP-1 SECRET RELAYED TO AIRTECH PER AIR 198194, B-201-865547 SECRET 5 NOV 71 201-749651 E.C.R. T 231555 NOV 11 CITE MADRID 14955 RIOIRITY: 231555 INFO 12000, DIRECTOR YPIC ANDROPRIA SFC4ET 1. APPRECIATE OFFER BUT STATION CAN HANDLE. 2. FILE: 201-865547: 201-749651, CPI SECRET File In: 201-749651 201-865547 \| TO \| ROOM NO \| DATE \| OFFICERS RECEIVED \| FORWARDED \| INITIALS \| \|----\|---------\|------\|-------------------\|-----------\|----------\| \| 1 \| C/WH/C \| 1ST \| \| \| \| \| 2 \| C/WH/C \| \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| C/WH/C \| \| \| \| \| \| 4 \| Marshall\| \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| Alright \| \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| Judy \| \| \| \| \| \| 7 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 8 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 9 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 10 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 11 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 12 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 13 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 14 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 15 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 16 \| \| \| \| \| \| \| 17 \| \| \| \| \| \| FILE TITLE* FILE NUMBER DATE MICROFILMED DOCUMENT DATE DOCUMENT NUMBER SECRET WHEN FILED IN ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET INSTRUCTIONS 1. Fill in Sect. 2 on back. Detach back flap and forward to RID. 2. Destroy front cover sheet, unless it records significant action taken or comments requiring preservation. TO ACTION BRANCH If file no. and title shown are not proper, insert proper file no. below and forward document to RID AN. FROM RID PAGE ERIAN IP/AN EXT. 4239 PROPER FILE NO TO ALL ADDRESSEES FILL IN SECTION 1 ON BACK, IF APPROPRIATE COMMENTS DOC. MICRO. SER. OCT 27 12 MICROFILMED 68765 Reference: UFAA-1245 1. AMULG-1 did not recognize the photograph of Manuel Ignacio Quevedo Santamaria (201-27266), which is contained in Volume 1 of the Cuban Attaché. 2. AMULG-1 recognized two names from the listing of Cuban officials in Spain, which was forwarded by OSA-27086 of 24 May 1971. They were: Federico Cerezo Martinez (201-81827) and Federico Cerezo Moreira. AMULG-1 commented that he had known Cerezo quite well and that he was in periodic contact with him from April 1961 to May of 1963. AMULG-1 added that Cerezo used to be the director of an import house in Cuba, but was unable to recall the name of this firm. AMULG-1 stated that he had known a Federico Cerezo Moreira from his days in the Cuban police. According to AMULG-1 Crespo worked underneath him from 1959 to January 1961 when both men were transferred to the Army. AMULG-1 commented that Crespo was given the rank of sergeant. AMULG-1 last saw Crespo around early 1962. AMULG-1 added that Crespo was a Caucasian, would be about 32 years of age and that the last time he saw him, Crespo had blondish hair, was about 5'9" tall and weighed about 170 pounds. Station files list Crespo's DOB as being 3 August 1940 which dovetails with AMULG-1's information. 3. AMULG-1 information on the subject(s) if any, will be forwarded in the immediate future. Distribution: 3. - Chief, WMD CS COPY OCT 27 1971 MICROFILMED OCC, MICRO, SER. 201-27266/201-618477 UFAA-2472 Typed: 6 October 1971 201-49651 SECRET 2713132 TL 71 CITE W/Miami 12682 PRIORITY MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC REF: MEXICO CITY 17236 (W357237) 1. DUE TO DOCUMENT PROCEDURAL COMPLICATIONS, AMMUG-1 DID NOT DEPART FOR MEXICO CITY AS PLANNED. IN LIGHT OF INFO CONTAINED REF, AMMUG-1 HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED REMAIN IN MIAMI. 2. IN ADDITION TO DESBRIEFING OF AMSLOUCH-6 AND AMSLOUCH-7, REQUEST THAT KLOOCK TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY FOR IN DEEPER FAMILIARIZATION WITH PBRUMEN PERSONALITIES, ACTIVITIES AND MODE OPERANDI IN MEXICO CITY. 3. FILE: 201-872345 AND 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET GS COPY 201-872345 SECRET 201-749651 SECRET 262019Z JUL 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 17230 WH/Miami Info Director TYPIC REF: WH/Miami 2012022 (in 383476) 1. Eustace D. Klock arrived per ref. 2. File: 201-749651; 201312117 and 201-872345. GP-1 SECRET Bosch Fernandez, Alfonso Miralles Fernandez, Rafael Ramirez Lopez, Vincente Rodriguez Llanes, Vladimir CS Copy SECRET 26 Jul 71 201-749657 201-749657 SECRET 2213242 JUL 71 CITE WH/MIA 12835 MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC A. DIRECTOR 162399 (NOT SENT MEXICO CITY) B. WH/MIA 12822 (W 383476) 1. PER PERMISSION GRANTED REF A, EUSTACE D. 2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-812117 AND 201-872345. GPl. SECRET G 201-812117 B 201-872345 SECRET 22 Jul 71 201-749651 SECRET PRIORITY WH/Miami Typic Amrose Anslouch REF: WH/Miami 12022 (IN 383676) 1. RE PARA 1 OF REF PERMISSION GRANTED. 2. FILE: 201-749651; 201-812117; 201-872345. END OF MESSAGE William V. Broe C/WID Lawrence Sternfield C/WID Coordinating Officers Releasing Officer Authenticating Officer Reproduction by other than the issuing office is prohibited. SECRET 211628Z JUL 71 CITE WH/MIA/12022 (GADDELLY ACTING) PRIORITY DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY TYPIC AMROSE AMSLOUCH REF WH/MIA/11983 (380663) 1. FOR DIRECTOR: REQUEST PERMISSION FOR EUSTACE D. KLOOCK TO TRAVEL IN HIS REGISTERED ALIAS TO MEXICO CITY ON AMMUG-1/AMSLOUCH-6 OPS. TRAVEL INFO AS FOLLOWS: DEPART MIAMI AT 1730 HOURS 25 JULY VIA PAA FLIGHT 552 WHICH SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE MEXICO CITY AT 2105 HOURS. 2. AMMUG-1 WILL UTILIZE SAME PAA FLIGHT ON 26 JULY WHICH SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE AT 1935 HOURS. 3. FOR MEXICO CITY: REQUEST THAT IF POSSIBLE, YOU MAKE RESERVATIONS ABOVE SCHEDULE FOR KLOOCK IN HIS REGISTERED ALIAS AT EITHER HOTEL BRISTOL OR MONTEJO AND RESERVATIONS FOR AMMUG-1 IN HIS TRUE NAME AT THE HOTEL MAJESTIC. KLOOCK WILL CONTACT STATION MONDAY MORNING. APPRECIATE YOUR SUPPORT. 4. FILE: 201-743651; 201-612117 AND 201-872345. GP1. SECRET CS 8X1 201-842345 201-512117 SECRET 201-949651 SECRET 162042Z JUL 71 CIIE WH/MIA (11583) MEXICO CITY INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC AMROSE REF MEXICO CITY 17155 (16377734) 1. ALL THINGS CONSIDERED, SUGGEST WE SET 26 JULY AS TARGET DATE FOR AMMUG-1'S TRAVEL TO MEXICO CITY AND THAT HE TRAVEL IN TRUE NAME VIA FAIRLY DIRECT ROUTE. NO MATTER WHAT TRANSPRISES WITH AMSLOUCH-6, KLOOCK WILL BE IN MEXICO CITY 26 JULY TO DIRECT AMMUG-1, IN CONCERT WITH MEXICO CITY. 2. FILE: 201-749651, 201-812117. GP1. SECRET SECRET 101740Z JUL 71 CITE MEXICO CITY 17120 DIRECTOR, WH/Miami Typic Amrose REFS: A. MEXICO CITY 17033 (N368344) B. DIRECTOR 155185 C. WH/Miami 11878 (N374346) D. DIRECTOR 158728 1. REF C ANSWERS TO OUR QUESTIONS SHOW AMMUG-1 TRIP HERE CANNOT BE GIMMICKED. HE'LL BE MARKED FROM FIRST MOMENT FOR WHAT HE IS. APPARENTLY, THIS IS OF NO PARTICULAR CONCERN TO WH/MAMI OR AMMUG-1 HIMSELF. THIS BEING CASE, DO NOT SEE WHAT WE HAVE TO LOSE BY GOING AHEAD. THERE NOTHING THAT SENSITIVE OTHERWISE IN PROCESS, INCLUDING KDUCK-18 CASE, WHICH SHOULD BE AFFECTED BY AN AMMUG-1 APPROACH TO KDACOUSTIC-1 IN NEAR FUTURE. 2. LET'S ELABORATE JUST A BIT FURTHER ON OUR QUERY OF PARA 2G, REF A, AND WH/Miami COMMENT OF PARA 2G, REF C. IF AMMUG-1 CAN MANEUVER TO SEE KDACOUSTIC-1 UNDER PRIVATE, RELAXED CIRCUMSTANCES (ADMITTEDLY DIFFICULT), WE CERTAINLY HOPE HE'LL GO BEYOND MERELY OFFERING HIMSELF AS CHANNEL FOR DEFECTION. (KDACOUSTIC-1 KNOWN STATION OFFICERS PERSONALLY AND HOW TO REACH THEM.) WE'D CS 8377 10 Jul 71 SECRET 201-747651 PAGE 2 MEXICO CITY 17120 SECRET LIKE AMMUG-1, AS AN OLD, KNOWLEDGEABLE COLLEAGUE, TO ENGAGE KDACOUSTIC-1 IN MEANINGFUL IDEOLOGICAL-POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, COMPARE NOTES ON MUTUAL ACQUAINTANCES, ELICIT RE PERSONAL LIFE, GIVE US A BETTER INSIGHT ON AN UNCOMMUNICATIVE TARGET AND, THUS, A BETTER ASSESSMENT. THIS WOULD BE WORTH THE TRIP, EVEN IF AMMUG-1 OTHERWISE REJECTED. 3. ASSUME AMMUG-1 READY TO GO WITHIN THIS OF NEXT MONTH. COULD AMMUG-1 VISIT BE COMBINED WITH ONE OF HOBBERLIN'S VISITS RE KDTUCK-18 (PARTICULARLY IF AMMUG-1 LOOKS LIKE HE MIGHT BE HANDLING PROBLEM)? 4. FILES: 201-749651; 201-842117. GP-1 SECRET WH/Miami, Mexico City Typic Amrose Ref: WH/Miami-11878 (P 374 3946) 1. Given station WH/Miami and Mexico City enthusiasm for Ref Op, HQS concurs in proposal to lay necessary groundwork for AMMUG-1 and KDACOUSTIC-1 meeting. Gardalphe will discuss with station on arrival. 2. File: 201-749651; 201-862117. End of message WH Comment: Ref recommended Gardalphe delayed for AMMUG-1 trip to Mexico to contact KDACOUSTIC-1. SECRET 8815032 JUL 71 CITE WH/MIA 11878 DIRECTOR, MEXICO CITY TYPIC AMROSE REFS: A. DIRECTOR 155185 B. MEXICO CITY 17033 (W 38344) 1. WHILE WE UNWILLING GO TO THE MAT TO PLACE AMMUG-1 IN CONTACT WITH KDACOUSTIC-1, THIS IS A CASE WHERE WE HAVE A GOOD ACCESS AGENT AND BELIEVE WE WOULD BE REMISS IF WE LET THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RECRUIT/DEFECT AN AMSTAFF OFFICER PASS US BY. WHILE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IS PROBABLY QUITE SLIM, WE FEEL POTENTIAL REWARD WELL WORTH THE MINIMAL EFFORT INVOLVED. 2. FOR MEXICO CITY: FOLLOWING INFO GEARED TO QUESTIONS RAISED PARA TWO REF B: A. YES. B. YES. C. NO. D. MARCH 1964 MEXICO CITY AS CO-WORKERS IN AMSTAFF SECTION E. YES CS COPY SECRET B 201-812117 8 JUN 71 201-749651 PAGE 2 WH/MIAI 11878 F. NO, BUT THEN IT IS NOT OUR OBJECTIVE THAT AMMUG-1 OFFER KDACOUSTIC-1 A JOB. G. BELIEVE WE CAN SAFELY ASSUME THAT IF AMMUG-1 DOES APPROACH KDACOUSTIC-1 THAT THE LATTER WILL ASSUME THAT AMMUG-1 HAS BEEN SENT BY LNFORT/JKLANCE. THIS BEING SO, BELIEVE AMMUG-1'S PRIMARY GOAL IS TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH KDACOUSTIC-1 AND ASSURE HIM THAT IF HE EVER DECIDED TO DEFECT FROM PBRUMEN, THAT AMMUG-1 CAN SERVE AS HIS CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION TO LNFORT. THIS OF COURSE SAME RATIONALE BEING USED IN THE AMBEATNIK-1/AMMEDIA-1 RELATIONSHIP H. AMMUG-1'S PRIMARY REASON FOR GOING TO MEXICO WILL BE TO CONTACT KDACOUSTIC-1. I. NO 3. IN VIEW OF MEXICO CITY'S BELIEF THAT KDACOUSTIC-1 WILL RETURN PCS PBRUMEN THIS SUMMER, RECOMMEND WE PRESS FORWARD AND WITH THE NECESSARY GROUNDWORK TO EFFECT MEETING BETWEEN AMMUG-1 AND KDACOUSTIC-1. 4. FILE: 201-749651 AND 201-82117. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 29 Jun 71 23 372 CITE DIRECTOR J.55185 WH/Miami INFO Mexico City TYPIC AMROSE REF: WH/Miami 11787 (IN 366332) 1. PAST EXPERIENCE WITH APPROACHES UTILIZING CUBAN DEFECTORS DOES NOT LEAD US TO BE SANGUINE REGARDING PROPOSED OP AGAINST KDACOUSTIC-1, ESPECIALLY USING "ACCIDENTAL ENCOUNTER" PLOY. WHILE RISK IN SUCH AN ATTEMPTED APPROACH IS MINIMAL, WE WOULD FAVOR DELAYING OP IN HOPES OF DEVELOPING MORE UP-TO-DATE INFO ON THE TARGET'S VULNERABILITIES AND POSSIBLE SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RECRUITMENT/DETECTION. 2. FOR MEXICO CITY: HAS KITUCK-1 OR OTHER STATION ACCESS AGENTS DEVELOPED ANY SIGNIFICANT INFO ON KDACOUSTIC-1 RECENTLY? 3. FILE: 201-312117, 201-749651. END OF MESSAGE 201-749651 WILLIAM V. RHOR C/WHD C/VH/1 LAWRENCE SHERWOOD C/VH/1 RECEIVING OFFICER SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL IS PROHIBITED. \| TO \| ROOM NO \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| \|----\|---------\|------\|-------------------\| \| 1 \| \| 13 Jul 71 \| \| \| 2 \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| 19 Jul 71 \| \| \| 7 \| \| \| \| \| 8 \| \| 19 Jul 71 \| \| \| 9 \| \| 26 Jul 71 \| \| \| 10 \| \| \| \| \| 11 \| \| \| \| \| 12 \| \| \| \| \| 13 \| \| \| \| \| 14 \| \| \| \| \| 15 \| \| \| \| \| 16 \| \| \| \| FILE TITLE FILE NUMBER (PRIMARY CODE): 201-249651 DATE MICROFILMED: 28 Nov 71 DOCUMENT DATE: 28 Nov 71 DOCUMENT NUMBER: UF63 03131 --- 3-6: Since someone is an active asset, someone should be assigned to his (person's) Hq Co. There seems to be some confusion about who is to take action in such a case. 6 to 7, 8, 9: In view of the domestic aspects of this, I think the Co should be informed. 1. During JKLANCE's most recent attempt to contact AMETROPIA-1 via AMHUG-1, it became readily apparent that the cover story AMHUG-1 utilized with his immediate superior was unsatisfactory from two points: First, it did not permit us the operational flexibility so necessary in an approach of this sort and secondly, if AMHUG-1 had not returned when he did, his job security would have been jeopardized. 2. To correct the above deficiency, WH/Miami has arranged the following with the Miami Field Office (MFO): In the future, if we again utilize AMHUG-1 to approach a PBRUMEN official, we will ask that the MFO arrange to have one of their representatives from their Headquarters component contact the appropriate senior official of AMHUG-1's company. This senior official will in turn notify AMHUG-1's immediate superior that AMHUG-1 is to be permitted to travel on matters of importance to the Department of Defense. 3. Transmitted under separate cover is a copy of a memorandum we received from the MFO concerning the above arrangements. Eustace D. KLOOCK Attachment: Memo, u/s/c via True Name Pouch Distribution: 3 - C/WHD w/att u/s/c 12 Jul 71 CROSS REFERENCE TO 201-865547 DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFAA-3131 DATE 21 JUNE 1971 CLASSIFICATION 201-749651 3 June 1971 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Station, WII/Miami FROM: MFO ATTENTION: Security Officer SUBJECT: Ralph NOSEDA 1. Reference your memorandum OS 169-71. 2. Pursuant to your request this office contacted a senior official of the Marriott Corporation in Washington, D.C., who approved the travel to Europe of a Miami based Marriott employee who is affiliated with WII. 3. The Marriott official, Mr. James McALLISTER, contacted his Miami representative, Mr. Ralph NOSEDA, and advised NOSEDA that your asset was free to travel to Spain on short notice. 4. NOSEDA was advised by McALLISTER that this was a matter of interest to the Department of Defense. NOSEDA, to the best of our knowledge, has not been approached by anyone else in Miami or Washington on this matter since the initial call from McALLISTER in March. REUBEN C. HARVELL DOC. MICRO. SER. JUL 13 1971 MICROFILMED CS COPY S/cate 1 to UFIAA-3131 201-749651 SECRET 1. DURING HIS RECENT TDY TO MEXICO CITY ON THE KOTUCK-16 OPERATION, WOODROW G. ROBERLIN DISCUSSED WITH TERENCE D. SISIOME OUR PROPOSAL TO USE AMMUG-1 TO APPROACH KDAACUSTIC-1. AMMUG-1, WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH KDAACUSTIC-1 DATES BACK TO 1954, ASSESS KDAACUSTIC-1 AS ONLY FEIGNING LOYALTY TO THE PRIHUMEN REGIME AS HE IS BASICALLY AN OPPORTUNIST. 2. WHEN PROVIDED WITH GIST OF INFO CONTAINED REF AND ASKED TO CATEGORIZE KDAACUSTIC-1, AMMUG-1 COMMENTED THAT KDAACUSTIC-1 WOULD HAVE TO BE GROUPED WITH THOSE WHO HAD COME UNDER FIRE FOR BEING SOMETHING LESS THAN RAPID REVOLUTIONARIES. WHILE AMMUG-1'S APPROACH TO KDAACUSTIC-1 WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO ASSUME THE FORM OF AN "ACCIDENTAL ENCOUNTER" WE ARE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN ANY IDEAS ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE TO REVISE A LESS CONTRIVED APPROACH TO KDAACUSTIC-1. 3. REQUEST ADDRESSEE COMMENTS ON THE ABOVE PROPOSAL FILE: 201-52117, 201-749651, GP-1 SECRET 201-52117 SECRET 26 Jan 71 Forwarded herewith is a copy of Eustace D. KLOOCK's contact report on his latest meeting with AMMUG-1. It is requested that all the individuals mentioned in this report be indexed. Eustace D. KLOOCK Attachment: Contact Report Distribution: 3-C/WHD, w/att, h/w CONTACT REPORT AGENT: AMBUC-1 PLACE: AMBUC-1's home CASE OFFICER: Gustave D. KLOOCK DATE: 1630-1700, 19 May 1971 Funds passed: None 1. At the time and place indicated above, I reviewed with AMBUC-1 Volumes II and III of the Cuban Mugbook, with the following results: Volume II Armando U. Estrada Fernandez (201-809440) Photo #39 AMBUC-1 correctly identified the pseudo of Estrada as being "ULISES". AMBUC-1 added that he had last spoken with Estrada in February of 1964. German Miguel Ramos Photo #42 AMBUC-1's only comment was that he wasn't sure if Ramos was his correct name. Roque Dalton Garcia (201-215097) Photo #118 AMBUC-1 commented that he had spoken with Dalton in September of 1964. Manuel Carbonell Dique (201-739084) Photo #159 AMBUC-1 commented that he knew Carbonell from circa 1960, when Carbonell was a captain in the police. Volume III AMBUC-1 did not recognize any of the photographs contained in Volume III of the Cuban Mugbook. 2. AMBUC-1 was also shown the photograph of Luis Martinez Menocal (201-769092) which was forwarded in UFAV-1118 of 7 May 1971. While AMBUC-1 thought the face familiar, he was unable to identify the photograph. 3. In addition to the above, AMBUC-1 was also shown the photographs of the following individuals with negative results: Jorge Luis Garcia (201-833320) and Sergio Valdes (201-754447). Gustave D. KLOOCK Forwarded herewith is a copy of Bustace D. KLOOCK's contact report on his latest meeting with AMHUG-1. It is requested that all the individuals mentioned in this report be indexed. Bustace D. KLOOCK Attachment: Contact Report Distribution: 3-C/UHD, w/att, h/w ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI only. 1. During the undersigned's most recent meeting with AMMUG-1, the agent stated that a Mr. Rex M. Griffin, an investigator of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had visited him on 13 April 1971. According to AMMUG-1, the purpose of Griffin's visit was to inquire into AMMUG-1's present welfare and to determine his relationship to Mr. Rodino. (COMMENT: Mr. Rodino is the sponsor of H.R. #2076 which will expedite AMMUG-1's application for U.S. citizenship by waiving the standard waiting period.) When asked about his relationship with Mr. Rodino, AMMUG-1 simply explained that Mr. Rodino was a friend of his from Washington. 2. Griffin explained that the reason that he wanted to talk to AMMUG-1 personally, was the fact that nearly all of the information surrounding AMMUG-1 was held in INS's office in Washington. He added that the information that was held by the Miami office was closely held and access to the files was severely restricted. During his visit, Griffin asked AMMUG-1 if he noticed any unusual interest in his comings and goings, to which AMMUG-1 replied negatively. 3. In view of above, believe it reasonable to assume that Griffin suspects that JKLANCE is somehow involved with AMMUG-1. This position is concurred in by Station Officer who maintains liaison with the Miami office of the INS. 4. AMMUG-1 characterized Mr. Griffin's visit as being very pleasant and commented that he was "muy amable". In sum, there does not appear to be any need for intervention on AMMUG-1's behalf or on that of the Station. If the need does arise, we will promptly inform Headquarters. Eustace D. Klock DISTRIBUTION: 3 - C/WHD UFAA - 2951 Typed: 19 April 1971 SECRET 201 - 749651 Forwarded herewith is a contact report prepared by Eustace D. KLOCK on his most recent meeting with AMUG-1. During this meeting, Volume I of the Cuban Hugbook was reviewed with AMUG-1. The individuals AMUG-1 was able to identify are listed in paragraph 2 of the attached contact report. It is requested that all the names be indexed. Eustace D. KLOCK Attachments: Contact Report Distribution: 3-C/MD, w/att, b/w CONTACT REPORT AGENT: AMMUG-1 PLACE: AMMUG-1's home DATE/TIME: 6 April 1971, 1530-1800 1. On 6 April 1971 I reviewed with AMMUG-1, Volume I of the Cuban mugbooks. He identified the individuals listed in para 2 below. Unless otherwise noted, the following general comments apply to all: That he knew them quite well and the last time he saw them was 1963-1964, usually in Mexico. 2. Arsenio FRANCO Villanueva (201-346425). According to AMMUG-1, FRANCO is G-2, and is one of the individuals he approached (at our behest) during the Pan American games which were held in Puerto Rico in 1966. He commented that FRANCO dismissed AMMUG-1's initial approach out of hand stating that he was a Marxist-Leninist. According to AMMUG-1, while a follow up was supposed to be made in Caguas, Puerto Rico, the staff officer who was accompanying AMMUG-1 decided against it. Jorge E. GARCIA-BANGO Dirube (201-736492). AMMUG-1 commented that GARCIA-BANGO was the other individual that he tried to approach during the Pan American games. Like FRANCO above, while a follow up was planned for Caguas, Puerto Rico, the staff officer accompanying AMMUG-1 decided against it. Vicente LOBAINA Lobaina. AMMUG-1 commented that he did not know LOBAINA very well. He added that he used to be AMMUG-1's instructor in firearms at the Police Academy. SECRET - 2 - Rolando PASTOR Rodriguez - possibly identifiable with Armando PASTOR Rodriguez (201-300074). AMMUG-1 last saw PASTOR about 1962 when he was attached to the Administrative Department of the Police Department. Ramon Cesar CUENCA Montato (201-328945). AMMUG-1 identified CUENCA as being DGI. Rafael PAEZ Perez - possibly identifiable with Rodolfo PAEZ (201-334244). Fernando RAVELO Renedo (201-765244). AMMUG-1 correctly identified "RAVELO" pseudo as being "FERMIN". Manuel VEGA Perez (201-334253). According to AMMUG-1, in 1963, VEGA was the DGI desk officer for Nicaragua. Joseph Parker MORRIS (201-345986). AMMUG-1 said that he knew SINOBAS fairly well. Carlos Sixto CHAIN Soler (201-349576) Juan Guido LICEA Figueroa (201-876266). AMMUG-1 identified LICEA as being a diplomatic courier commenting that he only knows him casually as they used to take the same plane from Cuba to Mexico. Augustin YASSELLS Gonzalez (201-345986). AMMUG-1 identified YASSELLS as a diplomatic courier commenting that he only knows him casually as they used to take the same plane from Cuba to Mexico. Mario OIZ Falgueria (201-737654). Jose Raul VIERA Linares (201-328953). AMMUG-1 said that his DGI pseudo was "Gomez", and that he was stationed in Bolivia from 1962-1963. Felipe LLAUDI Hernandez (201-742032). AMMUG-1 commented that LLAUDI's DGI pseudo was "ROBANE". Oswaldo RELOBA Penechet (201-737138). Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (201-332665). AMMUG-1 commented that he knew RODRIGUEZ quite well and when RODRIGUEZ was in Mexico he used to handle HYSAGE-1. Julian NOVAS Fernandez (201-747936). AMMUG-1 commented that ARASTAGUIA was a TSD technician and that his DGI pseudo was "RENE". Pedro FARINAS Diaz (201-728234). AMMUG-1 commented that FARINAS' DGI pseudo was "OTONIEL". Elpidio INTERIAN Comezanes (201-745393). AMMUG-1 correctly identified INTERIAN as being a DGI code clerk. CO Comment: INTERIAN is presently stationed in Santiago, Chile. Jose LAIN Martin Gonzalez (201-750250). AMMUG-1 commented that he knew LAIN quite well and that in 1963, LAIN used to be stationed in the Cuban Consulate in Merida. Jose Benigno MEDINA Plasencia (201-756652). AMMUG-1 identified MEDINA as being a TSD technician and an expert photographer. Andres Nicolas AROMA Ramos. AMMUG-1 commented that his DGI pseudo was "ERNESTO". Orestes Guillermo RUIZ Perez (201-735296). According to AMMUG-1, RUIZ was in Mexico in 1964 where he was in contact with Noel GUERRERO, a member of the Nicaraguan FSLN. Jose Miguel FERNANDEZ Roa (201-730852). Guillermo SALGADO Alvarez (201-331825). AMMUG-1 correctly identified him as a diplomatic courier. Angel TATO Ramirez (201-351544). Teudys TRUTIE-Matilla (201-733681). AMMUG-1 identified him as a TSD technician. Angel PIFERRER Santiago PEREZ Orlando PRENDEZ Gutierrez (201-330002) Luis Norberto HERNANDEZ Curbelo. AMMUG-1 commented that HERNANDEZ had been a friend since 1950. He added that HERNANDEZ, along with Sauli GONZALEZ (201-756664) were the ones who recruited him for the DGI. Rogelio MONTENEGRO Guasp (201-747803) Chafela Homero SAKER Zenni (201-335014) AMMUG-1 commented that the name listed for the picture, Manuel RODRIGUEZ Gonzalez, was incorrect. His real name is Gines Silvio CORRIZ Castroman (201-761475). (CO Comment: RODRIGUEZ is an alias used by CORRIZ.) Jose L. POSADAS Torres (201-234245) Manuel Eugenio VEGA Perez (201-334253) REFERENCE: UFAA-2768, 1 March 1971 1. Your request to show the Cuban Mugbooks, Volumes I and II, to AMCARD-1 and AMMUG-1 is approved. 2. Per Reference, paragraph 2, Headquarters will forward such photographs of Cuban officials to WH/Miami. 3. We are planning a slight change in the new Cuban Mugbook (Volume III). This Mugbook will be distributed earlier (i.e., after 100 photos have been collected rather than after 500 as was the case with Volume II) and in looseleaf binders. As new sections of the Volume III are compiled, probably in groups of 100 photos, they will be sent to the Stations concerned to be added to Volume III. Incidentally, as a result of your comment on the most recent Mugbook, we are sending an alphabetical listing for Volume II to the Stations which received this Mugbook. Thornton V. CARUANA Distribution: 3 - COS, WH/Miami SECRET 012129Z MAR 71 CITE WH/MIAI 10555 (SADELY ACTING) SECRETARY MADRID, LONDON INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC ANETROPIA REF A MADRID 3167 (276331) B MADRID 3151 (NOT SENT LONDON) C MADRID 2715 (NOT SENT LONDON) 1. APPRECIATE REPS. WH/MIAI STILL KEENLY INTERESTED IN POSITIONING ANNUC-1 FOR POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH ANETROPIA-1. 2. LONDON: REF B REPORTED THAT CUT INID REPORT OF 26 FEBRUARY INDICATES THAT ANETROPIA-1 EXPECTS TO COME TO MADRID "WITHIN FEW DAYS" AND THAT HE WAS STAYING IN LONDON AT TIME OF ELGERIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ. WH/MIAI BELIEVES THAT GONZALEZ IS POSSIBLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH ELGERIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ. STATION HAS FOLLOWING TRACES ON GONZALEZ WHICH MAY BE PASSED TO JAGUAR: A. GONZALEZ'S NAME WAS INCLUDED IN A LIST IDENTIFYING COMMUNISTS/INFORMERS WHO WERE EMPLOYEES AT THE U.S. ROYAL TIRE CO. IN HAVANA (AMFAST-13) SECRET PAGE 2 WH/MIAI 12595 SECRET REPORT OF 26 NOV 1965 AND E. DPOE: CIRCA 1915, CAGUAY. EARLY MEMBER OF THE MILITIA AND A SUPPORTER OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION. (UFCA 3725, 5 APRIL 1962) STATION HAS FOLLOWING TRACES ON A EUGENIO ZALEZ WHO IS BELIEVED TO BE IDENTIFIABLE WITH EUGENIO GONZALEZ ALVAREZ: (A) CHIEF SUBSECTION 1-2/SPECIAL STEELS/CF CUBANETALS (UFCA 5352, 15 JUNE 1964); (B) AND "LA ROSCA" HEAD OF PAYMENT, SUB-SECTION OF THE GENERAL CONTROL SECTION OF THE CONSOLIDATED PETROLEUM ENTERPRISE (ECF) OF THE MINISTRY OF INDUSTRIES (MININD) (AM-4434, 12 JAN 1967) AND (C) ASSISTANT MANAGER OF CUBANETALS, HAVANA (EP/1/117/215-67). PER REF C, GONZALEZ ARRIVED HARRED FROM CUBA ON 16 DEC 1978 IN COMPANY WITH METROPIA-1. HE UTILIZED PP EF 67128. 3. REQUEST YOU CHECK WITH JAGUAR TO TRY AND DETERMINE GONZALEZ'S LONDON RESIDENCE AND/OR METROPIA-1'S PLANS. FILE: 221-665447 AND 221-454511. OPI. SECRET 1. Request permission to show AMCARD-1 and AMRUG-1 Cuban mugbooks, Volume I and II. 2. We have noted that on a number of occasions in the past, photographs of Cuban officials which have been obtained by our various Stations abroad, are generally sent only to Headquarters. We request that when Headquarters does receive such photographs that WH/Miami be provided with a copy. It should be borne in mind that barring over-riding security considerations, it is our intention to show such photographs to AMCARD-1 and AMRUG-1 for possible identification. Justice D. KLOOCK Distribution: 3 - Chief, WHD \| X-REF. \| SYM NUMBER \| DOC. DATE \| CLASSIFICATION \| \|--------\|------------\|-----------\|----------------\| \| 201-0769651 \| 4Y14-17543 \| 26 FEB 73 \| 201-046554 \| The above document(s) is cross referenced to the 201 file cited under left margin. SECRET MADRID INFO: WH/Miami SUBJECT: AMHUG AMETROPIA REF: MADRID 2964 (IN 256284) 1. CONCUR. PLS SUPPLY TRAVEL DETAILS 48 HOURS IN ADVANCE AS REQUIRED BY LNYUMA. 2. FILE: 201-865547 AND 201-749651. END OF MESSAGE SECRET C217312 FEB 71 CITE MADRID 2971 WH/Miami Info Director ANTIGUA AMHUG REF: A. LONDON 7530 (256365) 3. WH/Miami 6234 (204373) 1. AMHUG-1 SCHEDULED LEAVE MADRID FOR NEW YORK ON 3 FEBRUARY VIA IBERIA FLT 951. ONWARD FLIGHT NEW YORK TO MIAMI 3 FEBRUARY VIA EASTERN AIRLINES FLT 25. 2. STATION PROVIDED AMHUG-1 WITH 150 U.S. DOLLARS ON 2 FEBRUARY WHICH HE WILL ACCOUNT FOR IN MIAMI. 3. FILE 201-565647; 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET MICROFILMED MAR 5 1971 DOC. MICRO. SER. 2 FEB 1971 201-749651 2 FEB 71 SECRET 6117522 FEB 71 CITE MADRID 2964 PRIORITY WH/MIA INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR, LONDON, STOCKHOLM RYBAT AHMUG AMETROPIA REF: WH/MIA 6226 (W 256017) 1. IN VIEW COMPLETE ABSENCE INDICATIONS AT STATION OF AMETROPIA-1 TRAVEL, UNLESS OTHER STATIONS CAN PROVIDE CONCRETE TARGET ETA MADRID WITHIN NEXT 24 HOURS BELIEVE AHMUG-1 SHOULD RETURN HOME 3 FEBRUARY. 2. FILE 261-865547; 231-749651. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 3191502 FEB 71 CITE WH/MIANI 6254 (SADELLY ACTING) PRIORITY MADRID INFO PRIORITY LONDON, DIRECTOR, STOCKHOLM PERUEN ANHUG ANSTROPIA REF: MADRID 2964 (N 256264) 1. CONJUR PLAN OUTLINED REF. 2. FILE: 201-365547: 201-749551. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 211413Z FEB 71 CITE W/MIAMI 228 (SADELLY ACTING) PRIORITY MADRID INFO DIRECTOR, LONDON, STOCKHOLM RYBAT AMHUG AMETROPIA 1. AMHUG-1'S WIFE SAID 31 JANUARY THAT AMHUG-1'S EMPLOYERS CALLED HER ON 27 JANUARY TO INQUIRE WHEN AMHUG-1 WOULD RETURN TO WORK. AS AMHUG-1 HAD TOLD HIS EMPLOYERS THAT HE HAD TO VISIT A SICK RELATIVE IN NEW YORK, SHE REPLIED THAT THE RELATIVE'S CONDITION WAS STILL GRAVE AND THAT SHE DID NOT KNOW JUST WHEN AMHUG-1 WOULD RETURN TO WORK. 2. FOR MADRID: WE ARE RELUCTANT TO WITHDRAW AMHUG-1 AT THIS POINT. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO JEOPARDIZE AMHUG-1'S JOB SECURITY WHICH COULD IN TURN ADVERSELY AFFECT HIS ROLE FUTURE OPS. WE BELIEVE, THEREFORE, WE SHOULD SET A CUTOFF DATE ON AMHUG-1'S PRESENT IDY IF AMETROPIA-1 REMAINS UNLOCATED. APPRECIATE YOUR THOUGHTS THIS MATTER. 3. FILE: 261-665547; 261-745551. GPl. SECRET SECRET 011760Z FEB 71 CITE LONDON 7838 MADRID INFO WH/Miami STOCKHOLM DIRECTOR RYBAT AMMUG AMETROPIA REF: WH/Miami 0228 (N 256017) 1. AS POSSIBLE INPUT TO HELB ANSWER REF, JAGUAR CONTINUE TO REPORT AS OF 1600 HOURS LOCAL, THEY HAVE NO INFO TO SHOW AMETROPIA/1 HAS LEFT U.K. 2. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749651. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 1 Feb 71 SECRET 281502Z JAN 17 CIIE LONDON 7711 PRIORITY MADRID INFO STOCKHOLM WH/MIA MIAMI DIRECTOR RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG REF MADRID 2915/12 251591 1. OVER LAST SEVERAL DAYS ON ZASIS AMMUG/1 ARRIVAL MADRID, STATION HAS PUT CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE ON JAGUAR TO PROVIDE MORE TIMELY INFO ON ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE OF WATCHLISTED CUBANS AND HAVE CITED AMETROPIA/1 AS A CASE OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO JKLANCE. 2. AS OF 1500 HOURS LOCAL, JAGUAR MAINTAINED THERE NO RECORD AMETROPIA/1 HAS LEFT U.K. JAGUAR HAS ALERTED BAIRN TRANSCRIBERS AND HAS PROMISED TO REPORT TO STATION ASAP ANY INFO ON FUTURE PLANS FOR PRESENT WHEREABOUTS AMMUG/1 AMETROPIA. 3. AS MADRID KNOWS, BEA ON STRIKE AND IT POSSIBLE AMMUG/1 ONWARD TRAVEL DELAYED. 4. FILE 201-865547. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 271528Z JAN 71 CITE STOCKHOLM 1389 PRIORITY MADRID INFO W/ MIAMI DIRECTOR LONDON RYBAT ANETROPIA ANNUUS REF: MADRID 2915 (25/5/71) 1. TELEPHONE CALL MADE TO COMMERCIAL OFFICE. SUBJECT WAS ASKED FOR IN FULL NAME BUT RESPONSE WAS "RODRIGUEZ" NO HERE. NO OTHER DETAILS WERE OBTAINABLE. 2. NOTE CUBAN COMMERCIAL CONSEILLER NAME ALDO RODRIGUEZ CAMPS. 3. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1 SECRET 27 Jan 71 SECRET SECRET 251-512 JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2915 PRIORITY LONDON, STOCKHOLM INFO KHAN/MIAHI, DIRECTOR SYNTH ANETROPIA ANHUS REF: A. KHAN/MIAHI 2114 (IN 248101) B. MADRID 2217 (IN 242980) 1. COULD APPRECIATE ATTEMPT BY ACTION ADDRES CONFRY IN ANY PRESENCE ANETROPIA-1 LONDON OR STOCKHOLM THROUGH PRESENT PHONE CALL(S) COMMERCIAL OFFICE. ANHUS-1 NOW MADRID AND STATION HAS NO INFO AVAILABLE AS OF MORNING 26 JANUARY RE WHEREABOUTS ANETROPIA-1. PLEASE ADVISE. 2. FILE 251-369547, CP-1 SECRET 26 Jan 71 SECRET SECRET 231035Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2898 WH/MIANI INFO DIRECTOR RYBAT AMETROPIA AMMUG REF: MADRID 2881 (IN 248307) 1. AMMUG-1 MADE CONTACT WITH STATION MORNING 23 JANUARY PER REF: 2. FILE: 201-865547. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 221603Z JAN 71 CITE STOCKHOLM 1375 PRIORITY WH/Miami INFO PRIORITY MADRID, ROUTINE DIRECTOR, LONDON. REF: WH/Miami 0337 (24630) 22 Jan 24630 1. RE REF REQUEST LIAISON REPORTS AS OF 22 JANUARY. 71 THEY HAVE NO RECORD OF ANYONE BY NAME OF SUBJ REF ENTERING SWEDEN. HOWEVER, NOTE IT POSSIBLE FOR PERSON TO ENTER SWEDEN WITHOUT IT BEING RECORDED BY AUTHORITIES PARTICULARLY IF HE COMES SWEDEN VIA OTHER SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRY IN WHICH CASE CONTROLS ON ENTERING SWEDEN ARE LIMITED OR NON EXISTENT. 2. FILE: 201-365547. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 22 Jan 71 SECRET 211303Z JAN 71 CITE MADRID 2885 IMMEDIATE WH/Miami INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR RYJAT TYPIC AMETROPIA AMMUG REF: WH/Miami 0137 (249149) 1. AMMUG-1 HAS RESERVATION AT HOTEL PLAZA, LOCATED PARQUE ESPANA 2. 2. FILE 281-865547, 281-749651. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 211643Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIA 0133 IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR RYBAT PERUMEN AMETROPIA AMMUG REF: WH/MIA 0137 (249/49) IDENTITY: HECTOR RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY GP-1 SECRET SECRET TO PRIORITY WH/Miami, Madrid RYBAT PBRUNEN AMETROPIA AMMUG REF: WH/Miami 0137 (IN 249149) 1. AGREE WITH REF OPS PLANNING. 2. FILE 201-865547 AND 201-749651. END OF MESSAGE WILLIAM V. BROE JOHN H. SHERWOOD EUR/IR WESLEY L. CAYBOURNE AC/WH/COG COORDINATING OFFICERS RELEASING OFFICER SECRET REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. 21 Jan 71 SECRET 211643Z JAN 71 CITE WH/MIA 0137 IMMEDIATE MADRID INFO PRIORITY DIRECTOR RYEAT PBRUKEN AMETROPIA AMHUG REF A MADRID 2551 (248307) 21 Jan 245149 B DIRECTOR 103557 1. WHILE THE OPERATIONAL CLIMATE/SITUATION WILL WEIGH HEAVILY IN YOUR FINAL DECISION AS JUST HOW AMHUG-1 WILL APPROACH AMETROPIA-1, WE FORWARD THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION: (A) AMHUG-1'S RELATIONSHIP WITH AMETROPIA-1 AS A FRIEND/CONFIDANT DATES BACK TO THEIR CHILDHOOD. WHILE AMHUG-1 ALSO KNEW AMETROPIA-1'S BROTHER, IDENTITY, HE WAS CLOSER TO AMETROPIA-1: (B) THIS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP STILL EXISTED WHEN AMHUG-1 LAST SAW AMETROPIA-1 IN 1963; (C) AMHUG-1 STILL FIRMLY BELIEVES THAT AMETROPIA-1 WILL TALK TO HIM IF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTS ITSELF; (D) AMHUG-1 DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT AMETROPIA-1 IS A LOYAL SUPPORTER OF THE AMHUG-1 REGIME; (E) ACCORDING TO AMHUG-1, THE ONLY THING AMETROPIA-1 WANTED IN LIFE WAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COME TO WOCORK; (F) THAT TO HAVE AMHUG-1 PHONE. 81 Jan 71 PAGE 2 WH/MIA 0137 SECRET ANETROPIA-1, WHERE ANETROPIA-1 WOULD HAVE THE CHANCE TO REFUSE CONTACT, IS PROBABLY THE LEAST DESIRABLE APPROACH. ANHUG-1'S ASSESSMENT OF COURSE IS BASED ON OBSERVATIONS NOW EIGHT YEARS OLD. 2. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANETROPIA-1 SHOULD BE BURDENED WITH ANH CLANDESTINE COMM AT THIS POINT. REFER TO MADRID TO SUPPLY AN ACCOMMODATION ADDRESS OR OPS PHONE NUMBER AS APPROPRIATE IF OP DEVELOPS SUCCESSFULLY. WE EXPECT THAT IF ANETROPIA-1 ACCEPTS THE PITCH, HE WILL ASK JUST WHAT HE WILL GET IN RETURN AND PROBABLY HIS CHANCES FOR RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY COMMITMENT RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK CAN OR SHOULD BE MADE AT THIS TIME. RATHER THAT HE BE TOLD THAT POSSIBILITY FOR RESETTLEMENT IN WOCORK WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THE EXTENT OF HIS COOPERATION WITH JKLANCE. IF THE QUESTION OF MONETARY RECOMPENSE IS RAISED ANHUG-1 SHOULD INDICATE SALARY WE ARE THINKING IN THE RANGE ($800 TO $500) WILL BE PUT IN AN ESCROW ACCOUNT. 3. WH/MIA WILL INFORM ANHUG-1 THAT THE GUIDANCE SECRET PAGE 3 WH/MIAI 0137 SECRET FOR THIS OPERATION WILL BE PROVIDED BY STATION MADRID. FOR MADRID: AMHUG-1 WILL DEPART MIAMI ON EASTERN FLIGHT 23, 1423 LOCAL ON 22 JANUARY FOR NEW YORK. HE WILL DEPART NEW YORK AT 1900 LOCAL ON IBERIA FLIGHT 592 SAME DAY AND WILL ARRIVE MADRID 0730, 23 JANUARY. DOES STATION MADRID HAVE GPS PREFERENCE FOR AMHUG-1 HOTEL ACCOMMODATIONS IN MADRID? 4. FORWARDING SEPARATELY REQUIREMENTS FOR USE WITH AMETROPIA-1. 5. FILE: 201-865547; 201-749531. GPl. SECRET SECRET 221522 JAN 71 CABLE TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATE WHITMAN INFO IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR ASHMORE LONDON STOCKHOLM PARIS TYPIC AETHROPIA REF: WHITMAN 714 (W. W. W.) 1. BE REP; HAVE AN 71-1 CALL AT 1000 GMT 15TH FEB AND ASK FOR "SECRET" ON WEEKDAYS BETWEEN 1000-1100 AND 1500-1600 AND WEEKENDS BETWEEN 1000-1100 HOURS. 2. FILE: 201-865547. CP-1 SECRET C.T FILE 201-865547 201-749651 SECRET No. 201-749651 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, WH/COG/OPS - B. Turbeville Operational Approval is hereby amended in the case of AMMUG/1, for the purpose specified in your request dated as follows: Subject's OA is amended herewith to authorize his operational use outside the United States as set forth in his PRQ Part II dated 13 February 1965, per your memorandum request of 31 December 1970. This Approval is based upon evaluation of information available to this Office, and is granted under authority contained in CSI and CSI-2 10-5. /SS John E. Howard CI/OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION Date: 6 January 1971 lc SECRET SECRET WH/Miami 65-71 60 20 099417 TYPIC REF: DIRECTOR-097508 1. AIDUG-1 OA GRANTED EFFECTIVE 5 JAN FOR OPS USE OUTSIDE U.S. AS SET FORTH IN PRQ DATED 1965. 2. SUBJECT REF ASSIGNED AMETROPIA-1. 3. FILE: 201-865547, 201-749651. END OF MESSAGE MICROFILMED JAN 20 1971 DOC. MICRO. SER. WILLIAM V. BROE C/WHD WESLEY L. LAYBOURNE AC/WHD/COG 6-JAN-71 201-865547 REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. SECRET 052216Z JAN 71 CIIE WH/MIAI 9956 PRIORITY LONDON, THE HAGUE INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID RYBAT TYPIC REF A LONDON 7124 (NOT SENT THE HAGUE, MADRID) (IN 237738) B THE HAGUE 8910 (IN 237605) 1. FOR LONDON: OUR INTEREST IN ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ LLOMPART IS BASICALLY OUR ASSESSMENT THAT HE IS RECRUITABLE. THIS ASSESSMENT PROVIDED US BY ONE OF RODRIGUEZ'S CLOSEST FRIENDS WHO IS PRESENTLY RESIDING UNITED STATES. BRIEFLY STATED THIS ASSESSMENT INDICATES THAT RODRIGUEZ HAS TALKED AGAINST THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND COMMUNISTS. ACCORDING TO ASSESSOR, RODRIGUEZ HAD ONLY ONE PRINCIPAL IDEA AND THAT WAS TO LEAVE CUBA AND GO TO THE STATES. 2. WE DO NOT THEREFORE, HAVE ANY DEROG INFO PER SE. HERE FOLLOWS A BIOGRAPHIC SUMMARY ON RODRIGUEZ: DPOB: 22 OCT 1932, RECLA, CUBA. IN OCTOBER 1968 RODRIGUEZ APPOINTED DIRECTOR OF MINING INDUSTRY SUPPLY UNIT, UNDER MINISTRY OF MINES, FUEL AND METALLURGY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT SUBJECT OWES HIS POSITION TO HIS BROTHER, HECTOR, WHO IS PRESENTLY CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO EAST GERMANY. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION: HT: 64 INCHES, WT: 110 LBS, HAIR: STRAIGHT BLACK. SECRET 5 Jan 71 3. FOR THE HAGUE: DPOB AAS PER PARA TWO. IN JUNE 1970, RODRIGUEZ WAS REPORTED AS HOLDING CUBAN DIPLOMATIC PPT D/67/587, ISSUED HAVANA 6 SEPT 1967. 4. FILE: 201-865547. GPI. SECRET 051722Z JAN 71 CIIE LONDON 7124 PRIORITY WH/MIA MI INFO DIRECTOR TYPIC REF WH MIAMI 09883 (L 23Y 350) 1. IN ORDER MAKE STRONGER CASE WITH JAGUAR FOR COVERAGE OF RODRIGUEZ, WOULD APPRECIATE SHORT SUMMARY DEROG INFO FOR PASSING JAGUAR SINCE LONDON HAS NO TRACES. 2. FILE 201-865545. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 0515502 JAN 71 CITE THE HAGUE 6910 WH/MIA MI INFO DIRECTOR, MADRID, LONDON TYPIC REF: WH/MIA 9914 (L235545) 1. STATION HAS REQUESTED LIAISON WATCHLISTING SUBJECT REF AND RELATED ON WHOM WE HAVE ONLY FULL NAME. TO INCREASE CHANGES EFFECTIVE LIAISON ACTION, WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIPT DPOB AND, IF AVAILABLE, PASSPORT TYPE AND NUMBER. 2. FILE: 201-965545. GP-1 SECRET SECRET 5 Jan 71 SECRET 3122142 DEC 73 CITE DIRTECH 3696 IMMEDIATE WH/MIAMI INFO DIRECTOR SEND PHOTOS TO IDENTITY, GP-1. SECRET CS COPY SECRET 2 Jan 71 201-747651	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10183-10366.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 135, "total-input-tokens": 159041, "total-output-tokens": 40081, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 781, 1 ], [ 781, 839, 2 ], [ 839, 902, 3 ], [ 902, 2509, 4 ], [ 2509, 4633, 5 ], [ 4633, 4957, 6 ], [ 4957, 5535, 7 ], [ 5535, 7478, 8 ], [ 7478, 8262, 9 ], [ 8262, 8930, 10 ], [ 8930, 9057, 11 ], [ 9057, 10407, 12 ], [ 10407, 11272, 13 ], [ 11272, 13475, 14 ], [ 13475, 14143, 15 ], [ 14143, 14310, 16 ], [ 14310, 15482, 17 ], [ 15482, 16354, 18 ], [ 16354, 16596, 19 ], [ 16596, 17762, 20 ], [ 17762, 19516, 21 ], [ 19516, 19920, 22 ], [ 19920, 20928, 23 ], [ 20928, 21587, 24 ], [ 21587, 22179, 25 ], [ 22179, 23074, 26 ], [ 23074, 24032, 27 ], [ 24032, 24752, 28 ], [ 24752, 26319, 29 ], [ 26319, 26896, 30 ], [ 26896, 27300, 31 ], [ 27300, 27572, 32 ], [ 27572, 28196, 33 ], [ 28196, 28434, 34 ], [ 28434, 28772, 35 ], [ 28772, 29220, 36 ], [ 29220, 30170, 37 ], [ 30170, 30442, 38 ], [ 30442, 30890, 39 ], [ 30890, 30982, 40 ], [ 30982, 31219, 41 ], [ 31219, 31340, 42 ], [ 31340, 31650, 43 ], [ 31650, 31825, 44 ], [ 31825, 32097, 45 ], [ 32097, 32713, 46 ], [ 32713, 33171, 47 ], [ 33171, 37305, 48 ], [ 37305, 38508, 49 ], [ 38508, 42649, 50 ], [ 42649, 44494, 51 ], [ 44494, 44672, 52 ], [ 44672, 45080, 53 ], [ 45080, 45719, 54 ], [ 45719, 46389, 55 ], [ 46389, 46883, 56 ], [ 46883, 47067, 57 ], [ 47067, 47802, 58 ], [ 47802, 48380, 59 ], [ 48380, 48877, 60 ], [ 48877, 49505, 61 ], [ 49505, 50382, 62 ], [ 50382, 51041, 63 ], [ 51041, 51625, 64 ], [ 51625, 52727, 65 ], [ 52727, 52727, 66 ], [ 52727, 53991, 67 ], [ 53991, 55049, 68 ], [ 55049, 55329, 69 ], [ 55329, 56309, 70 ], [ 56309, 57578, 71 ], [ 57578, 57887, 72 ], [ 57887, 58692, 73 ], [ 58692, 59171, 74 ], [ 59171, 59708, 75 ], [ 59708, 60023, 76 ], [ 60023, 60441, 77 ], [ 60441, 60669, 78 ], [ 60669, 62627, 79 ], [ 62627, 64105, 80 ], [ 64105, 64698, 81 ], [ 64698, 65062, 82 ], [ 65062, 65370, 83 ], [ 65370, 65732, 84 ], [ 65732, 66647, 85 ], [ 66647, 67098, 86 ], [ 67098, 68123, 87 ], [ 68123, 68743, 88 ], [ 68743, 69170, 89 ], [ 69170, 69894, 90 ], [ 69894, 70787, 91 ], [ 70787, 71639, 92 ], [ 71639, 72885, 93 ], [ 72885, 74154, 94 ], [ 74154, 75081, 95 ], [ 75081, 76017, 96 ], [ 76017, 76280, 97 ], [ 76280, 77658, 98 ], [ 77658, 77921, 99 ], [ 77921, 79665, 100 ], [ 79665, 80080, 101 ], [ 80080, 81406, 102 ], [ 81406, 82817, 103 ], [ 82817, 84230, 104 ], [ 84230, 84805, 105 ], [ 84805, 85662, 106 ], [ 85662, 86499, 107 ], [ 86499, 87399, 108 ], [ 87399, 88000, 109 ], [ 88000, 88244, 110 ], [ 88244, 88464, 111 ], [ 88464, 88984, 112 ], [ 88984, 89384, 113 ], [ 89384, 89631, 114 ], [ 89631, 90482, 115 ], [ 90482, 90826, 116 ], [ 90826, 91577, 117 ], [ 91577, 91981, 118 ], [ 91981, 92497, 119 ], [ 92497, 92715, 120 ], [ 92715, 93270, 121 ], [ 93270, 93528, 122 ], [ 93528, 93750, 123 ], [ 93750, 94134, 124 ], [ 94134, 95108, 125 ], [ 95108, 96135, 126 ], [ 96135, 96623, 127 ], [ 96623, 97008, 128 ], [ 97008, 97648, 129 ], [ 97648, 98080, 130 ], [ 98080, 99180, 131 ], [ 99180, 99354, 132 ], [ 99354, 99660, 133 ], [ 99660, 100057, 134 ], [ 100057, 100207, 135 ] ] }
d6123d1e28c1b954fc0ecd070954580590621f62	ACTION REQ: See Para 4 1. IDEN A, a wealthy and prominent New Orleans businessman, was recommended to JMwave and made available by Headquarters. He had been cleared by Headquarters for JMwave use under date of 15 December 1962 in DIR-05291. 2. IDEN A was initially contacted for JMwave by Eli A. SACHTSCHALE, who was introduced to him by the New Orleans KUJUMP office on 27 December 1962. The JMwave cover situation was discussed with IDEN A by SACHTSCHALE and IDEN A's assistance was requested. IDEN A was first enlisted as the President of YOCOUGH, a JMwave cover company. Also cleared and used as officers of YOCOUGH are IDEN D and IDEN E. Although cleared and vetted, these individuals are contacted only when their signatures on YOCOUGH documents are required, all contact normally being with IDEN A. IDEN A also permits use of his own company as a funding mechanism for YOCOUGH. He has acted as a spotter for JMwave and has recommended several other businessmen who are being used by JMwave. He has also made available several oil companies in which he owns interests for use in back-stopping cover of JMwave operational vessels. It is known that he is used by Headquarters for several JRECHO activities. IDEN A is contacted several times each month by JMwave. 3. IDEN A has met Rufus E. MANGROLL and Colip R. HOWGRIND as well as Eli A. SACHTSCHALE. He knows YOCOUGH, YOAPT and the JMwave operational vessel IDEN B. He knows that Miami attorney IDEN C participates in JMwave activities. So far as is known, he knows no other JMwave personnel or assets. 4. It is requested that a 201 number be assigned IDEN A and that it be made known to JMwave. ANDREW K. REUTEMAN ATTACHMENT: Identities u/s/c DISTRIBUTION: √ 3 - C/WH/C w/att u/s/c CLASSIFICATION SECRET DATE TYPED 12 May 65 DATE DISPATCHED MAY 19 1965 DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER UFGA-21422 HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER 201- UNDER SEPARATE COVER TO: UFQA-21422 IDENTITIES IDEN A: Alfred J. Moran DPOB: Not available Res: 8422 South Claybourne Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana Bus: 909 South Broad Street New Orleans, Louisiana IDEN B: M/V BARB IDEN C: James Costello IDEN D: Glenn E. Magnuson IDEN E: Robert T. Nieset	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10104-10172.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 709, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1890, 1 ], [ 1890, 2196, 2 ] ] }
cf169e2f02a05c9958cb2014dcf15683ba57cf0a	\| FROM: E/BC \| EXTENSION \| NO. \| \|------------\|-----------\|-----\| \| TO: AC/EURBC \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| \| 1. \| 20 Dec 67 \| \| \| 2. \| \| \| \| 3. Office of General Counsel John Greaney \| \| 06C67-2367 \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| SECRET Passed oral in 1950 to Mr. Kossack that FBI was given report in London on MI-5 Court Gervison to Russell Foundation on 2 Jan 1968. J.K.T. 20 December 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR: Office of General Counsel ATTENTION : Mr. John Greaney SUBJECT : James Garrison 1. Per our conversation in the environs of the DD/P's office on 19 December, we have just received from [London] Station a scrap of information on Subject's activities. [MI-5,] the [British] Security Service, has provided the following in a report on Americans who are in correspondence with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation: "Jim Garrison, District Attorney, Orleans, Louisiana A secret and reliable source has reported that the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation has been in touch with Jim Garrison. Our source states that the initiative in this contact appears to have come from the Foundation and the purpose of it seems to be to persuade Garrison to write an article about the late President Kennedy's assassination which presumably the Foundation could use in some way." 2. [MI-5] has also passed this information to the Legal Attache (FBI representative) in [London]. I would stress that [MI-5's] source is very sensitive and request that this office be advised in advance if any executive action is to be taken on the basis of the above information. [Signature] Philip F. Fendig AC/EURBC	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10104-10262.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 595, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 494, 1 ], [ 494, 1715, 2 ] ] }
ecef02833ab0b0a671c823ced5b7970e9ce0c17d	A. NAME: Ace Marine Survey, Inc. OFFICE ADDRESS: Room 214, 2525 S.W. 3rd Street, Miami, Florida MAILING ADDRESS: P. O. Box 1337, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida LOCATION: Office of Attorney Norman S. Pallot B. TYPE OF FACILITY: This is a Florida Corporation established by and under the control of JMwave and certified to do business in Florida. Ace Marine Survey, Inc. was formerly known as Ace Cartography Company, a corporation which had been certified to do business in Florida on 11 July 1962. This Corporation was amended on 4 November 1966 to its new name, Ace Marine Survey, Inc. The President of the Corporation is Alfred J. Moran of New Orleans, Louisiana. Mr. Moran is a very prominent businessman in the New Orleans area. He is head of Kalvar and has investments in a variety of businesses which include many oil interests. He is known to Headquarters representatives particularly in Logistics. C. OSTENSIBLE BUSINESS: Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged primarily in marine research including the study of marine life and testing of marine equipment. However, its general provisions permit it to perform almost any corporate function. D. USE: JMwave use of the Corporation is to provide cover for a maritime vessel, the M/V SONORA. The Corporation provides status cover and payrolling of the agents assigned to the M/V SONORA and the safe area or berthing site from which the vessel operates in the performance of its ostensible business. E. FUNDING: Method - This account is funded through the Bank and Hall covert account at the First National Bank of Miami by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits. Overt Attribution or Source - [Offshore Navigation Company, 3503 Fern Street, New Orleans, Louisiana] F. TAX STATUS: This is a profit-making corporation and has met Federal and State requirements as follows: 1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Returns. 2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes. 3) Florida State Unemployment Tax. 4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return. 5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return. G. AGENT IDENTIFICATION: The Corporation was providing status cover and payrolling for 10 Cubans as of 31 January 1967. H. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY: 1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: This cover company should be affected little by a flap. However, because of the berthing location within largely tourist or recreation areas, its commercial activity has been noted. 2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967: A successor to Ace Cartography Company, Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is currently used in connection with the leasing of a waterfront berthing site for the berthing of M/V SONORA, which is registered under this firm. The firm also provides cover and serves as well as the vehicle for payrolling the agent crew. Ace Marine Survey, Inc., is engaged in the field of marine research, including the study of marine life as well as the testing of marine equipment. In view of the current limited use of this cover, the likelihood of exposure is considerably reduced. However, if such an exposure did occur, it is felt that the damage to either WOFACT or the officers of Ace Marine Survey, Inc., would be of no great import. The major likely "injury" that would be sustained would be the denial of further use of the berthing site and the need for re-naming/re-registering the M/V SONORA. In order to add depth and lend further substance to the cover story, the officers of a legitimate firm, [Offshore Navigation Company, New Orleans, Louisiana, which is engaged in marine research and off-shore oil exploration activities, have agreed to backstop the activities of Ace Marine Survey, Inc. and to recognize the latter firm as a client. SECRET JM WAVE COVER FACILITY Ceres Enterprises, Inc. ADDRESS: Suite 1409 Biscayne Building, 19 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33101 ADDRESS: P. O. Box 5045, Main Post Office, Miami, Fla. 33101 FACILITY: Office of Attorneys George E. Brown and Thomas B. Duff This corporation was established in Florida and certified to do business on 10 March 1964. It was established by and is under the control of JM WAVE. The President of this corporation is Mr. Richard W. Freeman, who is the retired Chairman of the Board of Delta Airlines. He is also the principal owner of the Coca-Cola Bottling Company in New Orleans. In addition he has many other varied interests including investments in oil ventures. He is extremely prominent in the New Orleans civic and social structure. BUSINESS: This corporation was established ostensibly to maintain and operate boats for all types of marine research. This corporation provided cover for maritime vessels, the M/V BARB and the M/V JADE, and served as the status and payroll mechanism for the agents employed by this corporation. Method - This account is funded through the Bank and Hall covert account at The First National Bank of Miami by the following method: A check in the total amount of the deposits is drawn on this account. A credit ticket is obtained by our cleared contact from the cash vault. This credit ticket together with the appropriate deposit slips for the various corporations is then turned over to a teller, where it is combined with all other transactions which are processed by that particular teller on the given business day. Since the number of transactions handled by a given teller may go as high as 250 to 300 there is slight chance of the deposits being attributed to the particular credit ticket which accompanied these deposits. Overt Attribution or Source - Peterman & Peterman Associates, P. O. Box 8103, Main Post Office, Chicago, Illinois SECRET TAX STATUS: This is a corporation for profit. It has met federal and state tax requirements as follows: 1) Corporation Federal Income Tax Return 2) Federal Withholding and Unemployment Taxes 3) Florida State Unemployment Taxes 4) Florida Corporation Report and Tax Return 5) Florida Intangible Property Tax Return AGENT IDENTIFICATION: None at this time. ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY: 1. Maritime Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - The cover mechanism established by the Ceres Enterprises, Inc. was very secure during the period of its operation and remained so until the loss of one of its agents who was captured in Cuba. This made it necessary to terminate the activities of this corporation and transfer its activities to another entity. This was accomplished without any unusual events or actual public exposure. If any should occur at this late date, the damage would be minimal. 2. Cover Branch Assessment dated 6 March 1967 - This corporation is currently inactive and will become legally dormant after three years. It was placed in this status due to an operational flap which could have exposed the corporation. The last active tax return was filed at the tax year ending March 31, 1966. An additional tax return will be filed for the past tax year which will indicate no financial transactions. Its assets and activities were transferred to other JMwave entities. This corporation was established to provide cover for a Maritime Branch vessel and status and payroll cover for the agents assigned to it. The corporation is inactive and will be allowed to remain so. It was placed in this status due to a flap wherein an agent was captured in Cuba who had knowledge of this vessel and its ownership. There was no public exposure in the Miami area. However, because of the past incident the corporation should not be used in the future under its current name. While in use the corporation served very satisfactorily for the purpose for which it was established.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10104-10271.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 4, "total-input-tokens": 4572, "total-output-tokens": 1956, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 2306, 1 ], [ 2306, 4291, 2 ], [ 4291, 6219, 3 ], [ 6219, 8204, 4 ] ] }
b34c11c25bc6c08e9794198b2067f901702f140b	1 July 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security FROM: Sherwood R. Bosworth External Activities Branch SUBJECT: Manuscript by David Phillips 1. Attached herewith is a proposed letter to Mr. David A. Phillips outlining deletions which the Agency would like made from his book. The general tone of the responses from Agency components was that, if possible, this book should not be published. In the view of most, it dangerously reveals sources and methods, internal organization, missions, and functions. It also provides public confirmation of covert Agency activities and the disruption and reduced morale created by Agee and others. 2. However, on the assumption that publication could not or would not be blocked, the operating components catalogued their most serious concerns. The attached letter to Mr. Phillips includes many of these reservations. The chapter by chapter review, which appears later in this memorandum, contains those recommendations for deletion which, for various explained reasons, should not be forwarded to Mr. Phillips. 3. Before proceeding with the manuscript review, we would like to advise that Mr. John Greaney of OGC has volunteered his services to accompany you or Mr. Stembridge when our proposals are placed before Mr. Phillips. Due to time limitations, he has not had a chance to review this memorandum or the proposed letter to Mr. Phillips as of this date. 4. The following is a compilation of items of concern to Agency components which were not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. This does not include chapters one and six which have been previously reviewed and returned to Mr. Phillips. 5. Chapter two: Guatemala a. Several offices expressed concern that this book, for the first time, confirms the CIA's role with Col. Armas and the coup. However, since it would be difficult to defend a classification on this, it was not included in the letter to Mr. Phillips. The same was true of the reference to the coup in Iran (p. 43). b. Another area of concern was our relationship with the FBI in connection with his arrest and our use of false identity papers in the U. S. Of particular concern was mention of a capability to alter FBI criminal records. Again, we don't believe we can prove classification. c. The one item which could have been deleted was a footnote on page 35 which inferred that the CIA had indemnified Lloyd's of London for a sunken ship. LA Division was able only to ascertain that no payment had been made as of August 1960. Since the footnote begins "press reports claimed that . . ." without further specifying the source, we felt it best to make no comment to Mr. Phillips on this point. 6. Chapter three: Havana and Beirut a. Some concern was expressed regarding the paragraph on page 13 explaining salary off-set for deep cover officers. Although this may be truely classified, it might be best to let it remain as is, to dissuade readers that the Agency or its officers are making extra money on the side. b. Other comments related to the details of Mr. Wisner's death (p. 5); connecting Ernest Hemmingway with the Havana COS (p. 21); and confirming that an American executed by the Cubans was a CIA NOC (p. 48). The latter point, while clearly sensitive, was not raised to Mr. Phillips as LA Division posed no specific objection. 7. Chapter four: Bay of Pigs a. Some objection was raised to Mr. Phillips citing the Gulf Steamship Company as a cover for the broadcasting aspect of the Bay of Pigs operation. However, in checking this out, it was learned that the cover was the Gibraltar Steamship Company so no objection is made to the use of Gulf. b. SSU also raised questions regarding the confirmation of assassination planning against Castro (p. 12) and the use of the Alban Towers Hotel as a temporary lodging facility for Agency personnel (p. 17). Since no one else raised an objection on these points, they were not relayed to Mr. Phillips. 8. Chapter five: Mexico City a. In addition to all the comments directed to Mr. Phillips (see attached letter), the SSU objected to discussion of the purchase of scotch (p. 15), the specifics associated with the Cuban missile crisis (pp. 25-27), and the handling of "walk-ins" (pp. 33-35). LA Division also objected to the Agency's role in name tracing (p. 8). b. In view of the considerable deletions requested of Mr. Phillips, the above were not included as their sensitivity and justification for classification appears to be marginal. 9. Chapter seven: Washington, D. C. a. Several offices took exception to some items in this chapter which were not passed on to Mr. Phillips. b. The SSU objected to the mention of liquor in the Director's dining room and the footnote confirming a CIA role in the Glomar Explorer (p. 26). In view of the fact that GSA is now trying to rent or sell the ship, we don't feel we can justify a classification on these items. c. The DDO objected to the general discussion of cover starting on page 29, but we could not pin the objection down to specifics. SSU commented that Mr. Phillips reveals the location of many stations around the world (including Brazzaville on page 31), but deletions of the names would be difficult to justify legally. 12-32 d. Both the SSU and LA Division objected to Mr. Phillips mention of assassination attempts on Castro (pp. 42-44), but, again, we would have trouble defending the classification of the information presented. 10. Chapter eight: Rio de Janeiro and Caracas a. The most sensitive objections to this chapter involved the information on pages 15 to 20 of our role in Chile - Track II. These included the allegation of back-channel correspondence and the fact that the information could distort the public's view of the whole affair. Unfortunately, no one could tie it to the sources and methods or classification questions and therefore it was not included in the Phillips letter. b. Other items of concern were the discussion of cover in Brazil (pp. 2-3); the operational use of women (p. 23); the employment of blacks (p. 26), especially the revelation that two black officers in Brazil were CIA officers, jeopardizing their cover, and that Army commo went through the Agency during the Dominican crisis (p. 31). While all of these could cast us in a questionable light or make operational life more difficult, it would be difficult to justify their deletion on legal grounds. 11. Chapter nine: LA Division a. Although the requested deletions from this chapter are rather lengthy, they do no include all reservations raised by our offices. b. Several offices objected to references to the assassination of President Kennedy and the Watergate affair (pp. 5, 16, 30). These were rather innocuous and could probably not be justified on legal grounds. c. The second objection was the author's general verification of the information in the Agee book and the impact of this book on the Agency. Again, deletion would be difficult to justify, but you may wish to discuss the damage potential with Mr. Phillips directly. 12. Chapter ten: Retirement The DDO raised the question that Mr. Phillips statement on page 12 that he knew Agee has been to Cuba five times betrays knowledge he gained either from travel programs or liaison services. This would be a difficult point to argue in any confrontation with Mr. Phillips. 13. Epilogue a. The SSU questioned whether this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface the fact that two cables sent to Santiago in May 1973 established our non-involvement in the overthrow of Allende (p. 6). We could see no justification to strike this. b. The SSU further believes that revelation of friction between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger (p. 13) is also improper. Perhaps so, but difficult for us to press for deletion. c. And last, the SSU objected to comments on pp. 14-18 which are suggestive of Agency judgements and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency. (Sherwood R. Bosworth) Att Distribution: Orig - Adse 1 - OS Registry 1 - EAB 1 - Chrono OS/SSD/EAB(SRBosworth):sw (1 Jul 76)	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10102.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 2040, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1401, 1 ], [ 1401, 3143, 2 ], [ 3143, 4726, 3 ], [ 4726, 6568, 4 ], [ 6568, 8138, 5 ] ] }
b75284ac2699b8c9a693469d4e362e051d96e37d	Chapter 3 Page 13 - Refers to deep cover personnel income offset against CIA salary and to CIA officers under light cover protected by diplomatic or official passports. Page 14 - Refers to laundering of CIA salary before deposit to personal bank account. Chapter 5 Contains detailed references throughout to Winston Scott, identified as chief of station, Mexico City. Central Cover Staff points out that Mr. Scott, who was never officially acknowledged as a CIA employee, retired under State Department cover in Mexico, where he subsequently died and where his widow and children still reside. Chapter 7 Page 29 et. seq. - Discussion of cover Pages 44-49 - Identifies ("Camp Perry") as a CIA training establishment, discusses training cover and Department of Defense cover. Central Cover Staff asserts that while the CIA auspices of Camp Peary has been often alleged in the press, the Agency has never confirmed it as a fact. Chapter 8 Pages 2, 3 - Discussion of cover. Page 4 - Reference to CIA/State ground rule that ambassadors are not necessarily informed about deep cover officers. Chapter 9 Page 37 - As written, passage in first full paragraph could endanger a particular source, according to NE Division, which suggests the following modification: ...unexpected development. From surveilling the group's movements it was established that the intention was to travel to an adjoining area, where a major energy installation, we assumed, might be their target. CIA, through liaison, warned the authorities of that country and appropriate defense measures were taken. I instructed the CIA Station in [Costa Brava] to advise the president that the terrorists might be using his country as... LA Division recommends that the passage on the terrorist kidnapping in the Dominican Republic be deleted for the following reasons: 1) This incident is still fresh in the minds of most Dominicans and it is unrealistic to assume that it will not be picked up and published in the local press. Barbara Hutchison, USIA, one of the people kidnapped, is still in the Dominican Republic and, according to two recent reports, is again being considered as a target for kidnapping. The potential for terrorist acts against US citizens continues; three leaders of terrorist-oriented groups are in prison and publication of this item could propel the terrorists into action. 2) The close link between the ambassador and the station, as portrayed in the book could be prejudicial to his public image and might even provoke the terrorists to target against him. 3) The station has renewed a liaison relationship and much effort is being directed toward developing mutual confidence. Revelation of details of a joint operation by a former division chief might lead the increasingly friendly liaison contacts to wonder whether we can maintain confidence on future operations and thereby throw the new relationship into jeopardy. 4) Although the bugging of the thermos was discovered and appeared in the press, the use of the Coca Cola case was not exposed and therefore continues to be an operational possibility, at least as far as the Dominican Republic is concerned. Revelation of the technique by Agee should not be a criterion for further disclosure.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10103.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6858, "total-output-tokens": 848, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 257, 1 ], [ 257, 597, 2 ], [ 597, 931, 3 ], [ 931, 1094, 4 ], [ 1094, 1704, 5 ], [ 1704, 3248, 6 ] ] }
1173627346ad1352f057140228168970f5252eb0	MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counterintelligence Staff ATTENTION: Mr. Julian Fox FROM: Clifton R. Strathern Chief, Latin America Division SUBJECT: General Comments on Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript REFERENCE: C/LAD Memorandum dated 22 June 1976, Citing Specific Objections to Mr. David Phillips' Manuscript 1. The general tenor of the manuscript leaves much to be desired from both an operational and security viewpoint. The author in numerous instances specifically discloses sources, methods, cover arrangements and liaison relationships. Various LA Division officer who have reviewed portions of the manuscript pertinent to their areas have commented negatively on the revelations of tradecraft and identification of numerous overseas Stations and operations. 2. Other objectionable items in the manuscript concern the confirmation of Agee's effectiveness in neutralizing Agency efforts abroad by publishing lists of CIA personnel in specific Stations; revelation of Office of Communications personnel in every Embassy abroad; the Agency role in countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking and training provided other services to counteract these activities; and, the specific identity of liaison relationships, particularly, the Israeli service. 3. The overall consensus of this Division is that publication of this manuscript in its present form would be detrimental to the Agency and this Division in particular. Clifton R. Strathern SECRET E2 IMPDET CL BY 009560	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10119.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 335, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1472, 1 ] ] }
c37a3e62126173a6fd1569cfaf2b297d52db5d35	\| FROM: \| Robert R. Kierce \| Chief \| Special Security Unit, DDO \| 1015 \| \| TO: \| C/EAB/SSD \| \| DATE \| 14 June 1976 \| \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| \| \| COMMENTS \| \| 1. C/EAB/SSD 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM PRIORITY MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch, SSD SUBJECT: Manuscript by David Phillips 1. The following passages are a compilation of observations made by the SSU regarding Mr. Phillips' manuscript. The comments are by no means a total list of reservations concerning the submitted chapters but those noted from the perspective of the SSU. 2. In general the undersigned felt somewhat enlightened but rather uncomfortable in reading the submitted manuscript. This uneasy feeling appears to be based upon two impressions. Throughout the text, there is an obvious effort on the part of Mr. Phillips to "set the record straight" with regard to events, techniques and activities involving the CIA. Regrettably, as is often the case when one attempts to clarify and present the real facts, there is a possibility of further compounding a confused and ambiguous circumstance. Because of the various ramifications of the activities of the Agency, the SSU gained the feeling that more was lost rather than won in Mr. Phillips' efforts. The second disarming impression is that because an individual has proved to be an effective and successful CIA operations officer, there is no clear-cut assurance that he can achieve the same success as an author. The SSU was continually pained by Mr. Phillips' efforts to employ certain techniques often seen in spy fictions. The problem with author Phillips is that he is not writing fiction and has been identified as a former CIA employee with over 25 years in intelligence service. Although Mr. Phillips labored to introduce some humor into his manuscript, some of his anecdotes appear to be in bad taste. 3. The following comments are codified to complement those parts of the manuscript reviewed in this reading. Epilogue Page 6: Although Mr. Phillips makes a considerable effort to conceal the true identity of "Abe", there is a question as to whether the fact that two cables were sent from Headquarters to Chile in May 1973, and if this manuscript is the proper vehicle to surface such information. Page 13: Mr. Colby is quoted by the author indicating certain information revealing complications between Mr. Colby and Dr. Kissinger. In addition to breaching personal confidences, the author contradicts what he had indicated earlier to be an intent to permit Mr. Colby to speak for himself. Page 14-18: Mr. Phillips again refers to "Abe" and his evaluations of the various congressional select committees investigating the CIA. In effect these comments are suggestive of Agency judgments and evaluation regarding the conduct and success of the investigative efforts as well as other personalities critical of the Agency. Chapter 3 Page 5: Have the circumstances regarding Mr. Wisner's death ever been surfaced with such particulars as provided in this text? Page 14: The information regarding the "laundering of money" as set forth in the first paragraphs of this page serves as a confirmation of official involvement in such activities. This should be deleted. Page 21: There is a serious question raised regarding the author connecting Ernest Hemmingway and the Havana Chief of Station implying the prospect of a professional as well as personal affiliation. Page 48: If it is in fact correct, has it ever been officially acknowledged that a U.S. citizen, a businessman in Havana, implied by the author as being a CIA agent was executed? Note: This chapter is replete with a profusion of illustrations of tradecraft and operational activities too numerous to set forth. Chapter 5 Page 1: Mr. Phillips in his writing provides a historical chronology of senior assignments within the Agency with particular reference to the LA or WH Division. This is illustrated on this page in his reference to Colonel King "regaining leadership of the WH Division". Anyone interested in noting the organizational hierarchy and key personalities in the WH or LA Division during the period of Mr. Phillips' tenure with the Agency, would be aided considerably on page 2 and further as the author proceeds to identify Mr. Winston Scott as the Chief of Station Mexico. Page 3: Although it has been publicly surfaced that Mr. William F. Buckley had worked for CIA in the past, the author on this page now ties him in with Howard Hunt and Mexico City and further as an American contract agent. The best interests of the Agency are not served nor for that matter the interests of Mr. Buckley and Mr. Hunt are not served by such revelations. Page 4-6: The SSU believes it is totally unwise to have the mission and organization of the Mexico City Station outlined as explicitly as contained in these pages. Page 5-6: The above observation is further complicated by the author's remarks regarding operations levied against the Cubah Embassy in Mexico. Page 8: The SSU further challenges the information set forth on this page regarding the biographic details of Mr. Winston Scott's assignments in Cuba, (London), Eur Division and Mexico City. Page 15: The undersigned does not believe the content of the information set forth regarding the Agency's procedures associated with the purchasing of scotch liquor. He is implying things which may perhaps have been unique to that station but certainly has not been a worldwide practice. Mr. Phillips' anecdote about the prospects of the Agency printing counterfeit tax stamps and the details involved in such planning, even though perhaps presented in jest would not be viewed as such in the eyes of many individuals in the United States today. Page 16: Because Philip Agee has revealed the secret of the camera operation in his book, is it necessary for Mr. Phillips to repeat and in effect collaborate what a diselected employee of the Agency is purporting? From a friendly alumnus of the Agency, this serves as a verification of Agee's statements and provides a violation of sources and methods of this organization. Page 18-19: Pursuing the aspect of sources and methods, the SSU questions the author's anecdote regarding the identification and employment techniques of the material "why me". It would seem that in so far as any chemical or technical devices of this nature used by the Organization should not be surfaced in a book such as this. Page 25-27: The specifics associated with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 involving former Director John McConne and others are subject to strong question as to whether they should be included in this text. Again, what is provided by Mr. Phillips in this manuscript is drawn from such personal experiences realized in his Agency duties. Page 33-35: The SSU takes exception to the information presented regarding "walk-ins" based upon the same rationale as contained above. It also flirts with the concerns of sources and methods of this Agency. Page 46-48: All remarks concerning technical operations such as hidden microphones, quick plants, etc, are out of order particularly with reference to the development of a microphone in the armchair. This again violates the Agency's concern regarding sources and methods. Page 55-61: Considerable inside information is provided regarding Lee Harvey Oswald and his activities in Mexico. The SSU defers to LA Division, SE Division and OS regarding the advisability of inclusions of this material in this manuscript. Chapter 7 Page 26: Although there is a legal basis for the serving of alcoholic beverages in the DCI dining room, is it appropriate to include such "tidbits" providing the news media with grist to conjure up stories of senior CIA executives making critical decisions following an alcoholic luncheon. This implication is synonymous with the problem of beer being available to the Secret Service when they are on assignment with the President. Page 31: Throughout the manuscript the author in his narration confirms the fact that CIA has stations located around the world and in his writing proceeds to verify the location of these stations. The comments relating to where he was assigned and where others in the Agency have been or are assigned, not only relates to the South America area but on this page the author confirms the fact that there was a CIA station in (Brazzaville.) Other than in the change in name there is no effort made to dispel the prospect that the station continues. Page 42-44: Although it is a most timely subject, information regarding any U.S. Government effort to assassinate Castro is highly explosive. Mr. Phillips is reporting information which he has privy to as a direct result of his Agency experiences. These should not be contained in this book. Page 44: Although (Camp Peary) has unfortunately been identified as a CIA facility, is it necessary for the author to reinforce media articles regarding this establishment by spelling out the cover background and other "chapter and verse" items regarding this facility. I believe comments regarding firearms training, counterterrorism training should be avoided. Chapter 8 Page 7: The author's remarks concerning CIA support to the Elbrick kidnapping again is a violation of sources and methods, and should be deleted. Pages 13-21: It is understandable but regrettable that the author continues to single out sensitive issues; i.e., assassination and in this instance CIA involvement in Chile. The information contained in these pages are volatile and should not be included in such a commercial venture. Any such information is liable for quotations out of context warping or reinforcing the involvement that the Agency did have in the political activities of Chile. Page 25: For the first time the SSU was made aware of the daughter of a CIA officer who was stripped naked and held with a knife at her throat by political assassins. If this is in fact a true statement, I question the value of such an inclusion in this text particularly in light of the terrorism problems that this Agency and other elements of the U.S. Government are experiencing around the world. Page 27: The statement the author makes with regard to promotion to GS-17 is not correct. Page 31: I believe that Office of Communications should be consulted on the entire section relating to communications, communications personnel and the Office of Communications, however, the SSU raises the question concerning the inclusion of teletype decoding speeds on this particular page. Chapter 10 Note: Chapter 10 continues in the same vein as all of the other chapters. It further reinforces the earlier remarks that the more one tries to explain and clarify a point the more confusing it becomes. The remarks contained in pages 23 and 24 regarding Chile are illustrative of this. 4. In summary, the SSU joins those who feel that this book would better have been left unwritten. It is a text replete with names, details, operational information and close personal privileged information based upon the author's assignments which has been rendered into a commercial version of Mr. Phillips' affiliation with this agency for over 25 years. This manuscript reinforces the difficulty of a retired operations officer to develop a non-fiction text which is attractive to the public but does not contain information regarding intelligence personalities, organization and sources and methods. Robert R. Kierce Chief Special Security Unit, DDO	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10120.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 7, "total-input-tokens": 8001, "total-output-tokens": 2743, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 318, 1 ], [ 318, 2366, 2 ], [ 2366, 4426, 3 ], [ 4426, 6551, 4 ], [ 6551, 8899, 5 ], [ 8899, 10955, 6 ], [ 10955, 11609, 7 ] ] }
6cd7e8514d301677799494bd8abeeb24ae5cbe6a	3 June 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, External Activities Branch Office of Security FROM: John H. Stein Deputy Chief, Soviet/East European Division. SUBJECT: Manuscript by David Phillips. 1. At the risk of tilting continually at windmills, it is the undersigned's view, and that of innumerable colleagues, that Mr. Phillips' book should not be published. In the first instance, those portions we have read are superficial and give the reader the impression that the profession which Mr. Phillips practiced so well is one of derring-do, frivolity and foolishness. More seriously, the entire book is based on knowledge acquired by Mr. Phillips during his career in the Agency. Whether a given sentence is in the public domain or not, Mr. Phillips should not put his stamp of authenticity on that sentence. If publish Mr. Phillips must, and if the Agency cannot legally stop him, then so be it. Hopefully, while there is still time, someone will push for appropriate legislation to stop this foolishness. 2. While it is perhaps fruitless, we have attempted to identify some of the more damaging items in the text as drafted. These are cited below: a. Page 15: Discussion of back channel communications used to circumvent the Secretary of State seems to be ill-advised and not designed to enhance Agency relations with State. b. Page 23: There begins here a discussion of the use of women by the DDO. While I understand Mr. Phillips' desire to indicate that the DDO does in fact hire women and minorities, this section causes some anguish. At the present time, certainly in the Near East, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, the use of women provides us an operational flexibility which we would not otherwise have. It is quite evident, furthermore, that the local security services have not focused on the extent to which we do use women. We would like to keep it that way as long as we possibly can, and it is the undersigned's firm belief that statements from Mr. Phillips, obviously authentic, will rather quickly bring the women we do use under increased scrutiny of hostile intelligence services. Further, in opening the Pandora's box of the use of women and minorities in the DDO, Mr. Phillips may be opening both himself and the DDO to unjustified criticism that we are either exploiting women or not hiring enough of them; similarly the minorities. c. Page 25: I have known personally for 17 years the girl who, although stripped naked by burglars, managed to save her mother and father from harm. There are others elsewhere in the government and probably outside who are knowledgeable about the incident. The girl, now a lovely lady, is about to be dispatched under very sensitive cover abroad. Mr. Phillips would do well to delete reference to her as being an Agency employee. d. Page 26: I think it is unwise for Mr. Phillips to conjecture on the reason why there are few blacks employed in the DDO. His reasoning may be correct, but I would venture that not everyone who reads his book will believe so, and the Agency may come under unfortunate pressure because of it. The specific black cited on page 27 as having removed a flag from the hands of demonstrators is a personal friend of mine. He is under cover. By citing the incident, Mr. Phillips removes that cover, for the black retrieved the flag as an American citizen, not as a CIA officer. In sum, I would suggest the deletion of the section involving women and minorities because it opens a Pandora's box and because, as written, the cover of two highly effective officers is placed in jeopardy. e. Page 36: The anecdote on page 36 should at least be modified. The person referred to is the undersigned. I am the only Agency and (State) officer who owns a Chow dog. All my acquaintances abroad know I own the Chow dog. To avoid damaging further what cover I have left, I would appreciate Mr. Phillips simply citing "dog" or calling it a "poodle." John H. Stein	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10126.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 972, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1637, 1 ], [ 1637, 3776, 2 ], [ 3776, 3943, 3 ] ] }
b582b2f852afdfb6c32c5374174c3052c9cebf81	Manuscript by David Phillips FROM: John M. Reeves, Jr. C/EAB TO: DDO/SS/Sec 3D00 (H. Keough) DATE: 24 May 76 EXTENSION NO.: 7770 OFFICER'S INITIALS: RECEIVED FORWARDED COMMENTS: Attached are Chapters 3, 5, 7, 8, 10 and the Epilogue to David Phillips' book "The Night Watch." Previous chapter numbers are changed as follows: 5 (Bay of Pigs) is now 4; 8 (Dominican Crisis) is now 6; and 11 (Washington 1973-74) is now 9. Please review these chapters for material that: (1) is classified, (2) was learned while the author was a CIA employee, and (3) has not been placed in the public domain by the Agency. Concurrent review is being conducted by LA Div., CI Staff, CCS, DDO/SS/SOG, OGC DDO/SU, O/Commo (Chapter 10) and SE Div (Chapter 8). The author must meet a publishing deadline within the next few weeks. In order to negotiate deletions before the deadline, your review and comments should be returned no later than 11 June 1976. Only comment by C/SOG re Chapter 7, p 44 re Camp Peary being CIA installation. To our understanding, this base has never been officially acknowledged as a CIA installation. C/SOG also suggest NE Div and CAG may wish review. This package given to C/CAG and returned with no comments.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10130.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 438, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1262, 1 ] ] }
8cd5dd61ad01c51eb3a35a9f47a9e8706b7b12e0	\| TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building) \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) \| \|---------------------------------------------------\|------\|--------------------\|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------\| \| 1. Chief, EAB, Office of Security \| \| \| Attached are the comments of Acting Chief, SOG, regarding subject manuscript. All three comments fall within caveats 2) and 3) cited in your Routing and Record Sheet. \| \| 2. \| \| \| \| \| 3. \| \| \| \| \| 4. \| \| \| \| \| 5. \| \| \| \| \| 6. \| \| \| \| \| 7. \| \| \| \| \| 8. \| \| \| \| \| 9. \| \| \| \| \| 10. \| \| \| \| \| 11. \| \| \| \| \| 12. \| \| \| \| \| 13. \| \| \| \| \| 14. \| \| \| \| \| 15. \| \| \| \| Chapter XI Page 10: Though Camp Perry has received much publicity, there appears no good reason to confirm the use of this facility by the Agency. Unless we plan on officially opening Camp Perry as a CIA training facility, it should not be mentioned. (Check OTR) Page 15: The "Phoenix Program" originated before William Colby became DEPCORDS, COMUSMACV. Ambassador Komor started the program and asked that Colby replace him as DEPCORDS so that there would be some continuity in the effort to deal with criminal elements of the Viet Cong infrastructure. It is unfair to subjectively state that the "Operation Phoenix" was Colby's own albatross. Certainly Colby doesn't believe this though he is receiving considerable flack from those who would like others to believe that the whole program was one of assassination of which Colby, as head of the CIA, was in charge. Page 39: We're still putting audio devices in coke bottles -- all these techniques and methods should not be discussed since we may very well want to use them again in the future.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10133.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 615, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 3157, 1 ], [ 3157, 4205, 2 ] ] }
50e097894d02046140422e101bacd74ad5e6e7de	Subject, a retired Agency staff employee and former C/LA Div., has submitted the attached manuscript containing three (3) chapters of a book he has in preparation. Coordination for review and comment is requested to determine if the material: (1) is classified, (2) was learned while the writer was employed by the Agency, or (3) has not been placed in the public domain by the Agency. Please note author's query for information contained in paragraph 3 of his letter FYI. The author had previously submitted Chapters I and VIII which were security approved with deletions. Coordination for review is being conducted with LA Div., CI Staff, CCS, DDO/SS/SOG, and DDO/SSU. It would be appreciated if this office could have your comments before COB 16 Jan 1976. 1 to 9: CCS recommends deletion of that part of the last sentence, following the semi-colon of the first paragraph on page 10 of Chapter XI, which identifies (Camp Perry) as the site of Agency training courses. (Camp Perry) is an Agency training installation (under DOD cover), and while its CIA affiliation has been alleged numerous times in the press, no confirmation of this affiliation has been made by the Agency. Mr. Phillips' comments as a former senior Agency officer can be interpreted as constituting official acknowledgement of the CIA/CAMP PERRY relationship. HCS	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10137.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 2, "total-input-tokens": 2286, "total-output-tokens": 368, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 762, 1 ], [ 762, 1339, 2 ] ] }
c5413241f34277fd2ea5e171e97f656bf08da631	\| TO \| NAME AND ADDRESS \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|----\|------------------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| OEC \| \| \| \| 2 \| Mr. Greene \| \| \| \| 3 \| \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| \| \| ACTION - DIRECT REPLY - PREPARE REPLY APPROVAL - DISPATCH - RECOMMENDATION COMMENT - FILE - RETURN CONCURRENCE - INFORMATION - SIGNATURE Remark: John - the attached is all we can contribute. APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE: C/506 UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET Every plan: 1. STAR System Compete Time DDS Main file 2. Central Cover Staff a. HT Legal b. Watch Lists c. etc. 3. C I / S T A F F 4. DCD 5. For Recovery Div 6. OPS / [Signature] [Initials] [Date] [Chaos] 7. DEP / DC OP / AL files 8. Men Div's (CA) Robert Bayard John Mullon Maria de Magon - Seattle, WA Central Intelligence Agency, Inc. Security Consultant International, Inc. Defense Systems International, Inc. Defense Service Company Research Corporation of America Mills & Raymond Research Project No funds - 1/7. [Signature] Sup DOT, 1970 SI Cl. 1974. Mullon - leave w/o pay 19 Nov 71, 19 Nov 72 65.12 19 Nov 72 - draft [Signature] Warble - C.I./Staff 7 FBI referrals + 4 docs Call to Ath 0. Dnr 375530 (17.12.74) 6 Kts 0. All in 304528 74 11 July 74 3. Telephone to Boreale 23 Dec '69 4. Send Scions 70 ft 4. To FBI 27 Jan 74 CIRA - 0371 - 74 6/14/7 CIA Dec 73 10 Dec 73 Mullenburg, Kurt Keuch - Briefed Mark Silver 5th Circuit. Keuch Conf. Plowman Def. & Citation - Opinion of Ct. 3 - Margin:atty Δ Co. Min. has been Subpoenaed Charles Jaffee [Signature] CRIMINAL DIVISION Assistant Attorney General, Richard L. Thorburn, Rm. 2107 ........................................ 2601 Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John C. Keeney, Rm. 2107 ........................................ 2621 Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Keuch, Rm. 2113 .............................. 2333 Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Jay C. Waldman, Rm. 2113 .............................. 2636 Special Assistant, James M. Seif, Rm. 2208 ................................................................. 4676 Special Assistant, William Brady, Rm. 2209 ................................................................. 2825 Executive Assistant, James W. Musket, Rm. 2119 .......................................................... 2641 Appellate Section, Chief, George Gilinsky, Rm. 2216 ...................................................... 2657 Fraud Section, Acting Chief, Mark Richard, Rm. 764, SAFE Bldg. .................................... 2648 General Crimes Section, Acting Chief, Alfred Hantman, Rm. 504, FTRI Bldg. .................... 2624 Government Regulations and Labor Section, Acting Chief, Philip Witens, Rm. 808 SAFE Bldg. 3761 Internal Security Section, Chief, John H. Davitt, Rm. 200 FTRI Bldg. ............................... 2307 Legislation and Special Projects Section, Acting Chief, Philip White, Rm. 2714 .................. 2613 Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section, Acting Chief, Kurt Muellenberg, Rm. 408, SAFE Bldg. 3971 Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Chief, William Lynch, Rm. 2521 .................... 3516 Public Integrity Section, Acting Chief, Thomas Henderson, Rm. 868 SAFE Bldg. ................ 2676 Special Litigation Section, Acting Chief, George Calhoun, Rm. 216, FTRI Bldg. .................. 3885 LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION Assistant Attorney General, Peter R. Tafel, Rm. 2143 .................................................... 2701 Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Walter Kiechel, Jr., Rm. 2143 .................................... 2718 Legislative Assistant, Martin Green, Rm. 2607 ............................................................... 2736 Administrative Section, James F. Hickey, Rm. 2610 ....................................................... 2721 Appellate Section, Edmund B. Clark, Rm. 2339 ............................................................... 2748 Appraisal Section, Norman E. Lauer, Rm. 500, SAFE Bldg. ............................................ 5054 General Litigation Section, Floyd L. France, Rm. 2133 .................................................. 2704 Indian Claims Section, A. Donald Mileur, Rm. 604, SAFE Bldg. ...................................... 5069 Land Acquisition Section, Anthony C. Liotta, Rm. 504, SAFE Bldg. ................................. 5092 Marine Resources Section, Bruce Rashkow, Rm. 2646 ..................................................... 2750 Pollution Control Section, Alfred T. Ghiorzi, Rm. 2625 .................................................. 2707 Indian Resources Section, Myles E. Flint, Rm. 4710 ...................................................... 4241 Morton, Sifter - DoJ Robert Richardson Charles Joffre Mod on Van Cleef incident Crom Cruen - Ruth Pena Carl @ DIA/DoJ Mat also attended Aug 56 - going back to USA for 20 yrs. See By 56 Dec 48 Monica Carmen Addis 02 25 Dec 48 Duration - Sept 56 Detained at Dep of State 8/11/65 Not even at DAE Pub. - Buckley May 67 - Thurgood Sec. of State July 67 - Retention Treated worst 24 May 1968 Back to Army to complete 20 yrs Confidential 1. What Money Paid 2. What Contacts with Here 3. Only Meeting for 1/2 4. Final release of Security Apt. RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce 2:00 Put Take home out Run Now the RT USV Robert Richardson 128-6175 Chief Counsel, DEA. A 6 meeting to today. 10 am am w/ Wexbell Written meeting with him. DEA assassination team 350-41136 Death of Col Robert F. Bayard '56 Atlanta, Ga. July 75 Jack Sam Wm. Warren Bernstein: dead!! (FBI) Sup records of Council Release from Security Cle. Copy CIA letterhead Roland Burgess well Nell Bell Witness: ? The H.P. W/ Fox & device Southern Air Transport Date of Sale June 66 Conlin, Lucien Emile 1943 - Married - Son from Paris (Ponto, France) - Divorced wife - Rose Mamin - Sept 21, 41 - Divorced 3/31/42 - Brought to US, no child - Naturalized 1942 DOB: Nov 29, 1919, Paris - ASN: 01322708 - Born France 1919-1925 - Came US 9/1925 - Naturalized 8/11/42 Arrived - Kansas City 1935-36 - Type Setter - Married Aug 1940-41 - Returned US Apr 41 - Overseas, engaged w/fiancee - Attended USA - Sept 41 - Appointed OSS June 43 (48: Received training in USA States not known) Monique Veler on Apr 23, 46 - Richard Veler reported known of 10-2 (for sale) - Sold with furniture - Ad the division - Feb 48 - Dec 23, 1947 EOD w/ CIA on Mar 51 "Communist China Intel Study" 23 Sep 73 Lucien E. Comini & Richard L. Kostkof 75 days old, Senate with top secret, Richard L. Kostkof Macken, W. H. Jr. B. R. For Co. of 10 Nov 69 Michael John Morrison - 2 Infractions Porta Gena - Pro Demon Subject was the puppet Von Macken 5 Nov 69, gun ST date (Comm) Second in VN under (2nd Govt) 32 * 3 Feb 72, made contact with Bui of Nung, 2 days TK Briefing 20 Mar 72 31 Aug 61 - 13 Nov 62 FBIS (Coly) Dec 62 - Dec 63 May 63 - May 64 May 64 - Feb 67 May 67 - Feb 72 1 Tel 72 - dated 1 W BNDD to CIA 31 Oct 72 Inferno - Still, that desk must have sent the 12 ton (1440) DEA of CIA 30 more days - 2 plus 1 7K. deliver 12/1 2 504/73 ST/Comm. 5/10/73 Control of - Griffin in WH. Also (from CIA) W/DEA Replied on machine in Form 4 quantity Lot of strikes as lot Warbell Secrecy Agt. 7 July 59. OSS July 45 - Dec 45 Embled 20 Feb 43. 2d Lt. 21 Dec 44. Burma & China Soldiers Medal. printed. B6. John Wagner 15 Dec 45 POB - 4 Aug 59. Oct 59 - Decision to drop: 1. Motivation to use A for some of funds to fill his personal plans 2. His access to data of value limited change 20 3rd had. To advise - suggested to not date Feb Feb 63 [Guatemala, Nicaragua & El Salvador] Note: "Wanted: Organizers for the Liberation of Cuba" Haitian invasion of Government of Duvalier July 6, 1966 Haitian Counsel, Maximilien Arms to Rolando Masferrer Rojas Luban Senita & Batista Fort Connections in Dominican Republic May 69 Ops against Thailand Sinoes, Inc. Atlantic Co. Fred N. Brown, Inc. Export license to Thailand Jan 70 Ops against Duvalier for Cuba To FBI & others Feb 71 DoD Cl Problems Mar 71 Logistics Call from Suby re Cl Pub 27 Apr 73 State: Bahamas - effort Edwin Morgan, Att'y "Council for Free Abaco" Subject Military Assistance Corp - Abaco plan Jan 74 - DCD review Take note - Stay away TO FBI Van Cleve to FBI from on 13th July 74 Aug 74 - deal with Arms to 2 to a Control of Voting - see if "fratogue" Jan 75 - DCD Conlin - B.R. For Co. Michael Morrissey Jan 75 - DEA, Narcotics & overthrow of Grenada Muldoon, John Patrick 3 Feb '58 DOB: 25 Aug '37 Came - USA. Staff Trip: Feb '58 - Feb '59 Feb '59 - Aug '61 Aug '61 - Feb '64 Feb '64 - Oct '64 Oct '64 - Sept '66 Sept '66 - Dec '68 Dec '68 - 1 SI Cl 12 Feb '68 Ann Jnr. 1970 (FBI) (WYC Dec 1970) Retired - Policy Planning (Buddhism) May '70 Seeing all on family 17 Nov '71 Come SI - (18 USC 798) (See this) Retired Medical 19 Nov '72 Involved w/ Werbell - Friend of ABDAA.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10210.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 26, "total-input-tokens": 23998, "total-output-tokens": 4259, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 780, 1 ], [ 780, 1070, 2 ], [ 1070, 1465, 3 ], [ 1465, 1695, 4 ], [ 1695, 1718, 5 ], [ 1718, 1911, 6 ], [ 1911, 5053, 7 ], [ 5053, 5053, 8 ], [ 5053, 5195, 9 ], [ 5195, 5195, 10 ], [ 5195, 5486, 11 ], [ 5486, 5607, 12 ], [ 5607, 5607, 13 ], [ 5607, 5703, 14 ], [ 5703, 5703, 15 ], [ 5703, 5858, 16 ], [ 5858, 5913, 17 ], [ 5913, 6104, 18 ], [ 6104, 6150, 19 ], [ 6150, 6813, 20 ], [ 6813, 7378, 21 ], [ 7378, 7635, 22 ], [ 7635, 8112, 23 ], [ 8112, 8515, 24 ], [ 8515, 8910, 25 ], [ 8910, 9349, 26 ] ] }
53038021154d8c5db4a95463c82deb9e5a0aae87	\| TO \| NAME AND ADDRESS \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|----\|------------------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| OGC Attn: Walter Lloyd \| 8/9 \| 20 \| \| 2 \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| File Wendell \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| \| \| Remarks: Fold here to return to sender FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. \| DATE ---\|--- (A.F. Addona) C/1000/DIC/AR \| 6 Aug UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions Richardson - Counsel / Chief 128 - 5295 Robert? / Craig? 128 - 6175 Minor Prot - John Muldoon Wen Bell Low Cohen Sup. Kennedy State A - Paul AG. Colleen - 1944 x 25th (To DeA < Send by 4/11) Bob Krog - Perkins CIA Technical a Drug Traffick Show Colleen - used Wehrmacht We mutual Idaho WWII - OSS 1969 - CIA Central Am. - FE	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10211.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 3, "total-input-tokens": 3429, "total-output-tokens": 437, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 547, 1 ], [ 547, 701, 2 ], [ 701, 889, 3 ] ] }
7a3da0170bafd89ce3dbf38beddd92911abdd563	SPEED LETTER \| TO: \| Office of General Counsel \| \|--------------\|---------------------------\| \| ATTN: \| Walter Lloyd \| \| FROM: \| DDO/PIC \| \| \| (A. F. Addona) \| \| SUBJECT: \| Privacy Act Case 71-528--Werbell \| I understand you requested the status and date of completion of the above Privacy Act case. DDO/PIC estimates that the case will be completed by 20 August 1976. If there are further questions, would you please call either Hal Matter, DDO/PIC, or myself. (A. F. Addona) cc: Ernie Sawyerfield, OGC Hal Matter, DDO/PIC	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10212.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 1, "total-input-tokens": 1143, "total-output-tokens": 204, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 610, 1 ] ] }
3592a3fc8091a20dcab3adbaf34cac0786c265b0	\| TO \| NAME AND ADDRESS \| DATE \| INITIALS \| \|----\|------------------\|------\|----------\| \| 1 \| OGC \| Fu-2 \| \| \| \| Attn: Ernie Mayerfeld \| \| \| \| 2 \| \| \| \| \| 3 \| Walt Lloyd \| \| \| \| 4 \| \| \| \| \| 5 \| \| \| \| \| 6 \| \| \| \| Remarks: FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. \| DATE ---\|--- (A.F. Addona), C/DOO/PIC/Al \| 6 Aug UNCLASSIFIED \| CONFIDENTIAL \| SECRET FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions \| ORIGIN: \| Atlanta, Georgia \| \|-----------------\|----------------------------------\| \| DATE: \| 8 July 1975 \| \| SUBJECT: \| Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III \| \| BUREAU FILE: \| None Given \| \| FIELD FILE: \| None Given \| \| ORIGIN: \| Atlanta, Georgia \| \|-----------------\|----------------------------------\| \| DATE: \| 9 August 1974 \| \| SUBJECT: \| Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III \| \| BUREAU FILE: \| None Given \| \| FIELD FILE: \| None Given \| \| ORIGIN: \| San Diego, California \| \|-----------------\|----------------------------------\| \| DATE: \| 7 August 1974 \| \| SUBJECT: \| Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III \| \| BUREAU FILE: \| None Given \| \| FIELD FILE: \| None Given \| \| ORIGIN: \| Director, FBI \| \|-----------------\|----------------------------------\| \| DATE: \| 6 August 1974 \| \| SUBJECT: \| Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III \| \| \| Internal Security - ABACO \| \| \| Neutrality Matters - ABACO \| \| BUREAU FILE: \| 62-108665 \| \| FIELD FILE: \| None Given \| \| ORIGIN: \| Atlanta, Georgia \| \|-----------------\|----------------------------------\| \| DATE: \| 22 July 1974 \| \| SUBJECT: \| Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III \| \| BUREAU FILE: \| None Given \| \| FIELD FILE: \| None Given \| \| ORIGIN: \| New York, New York \| \|-----------------\|----------------------------------\| \| DATE: \| 19 July 1974 \| \| SUBJECT: \| Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III \| \| \| Internal Security - Abaco \| \| \| Neutrality Matter - Abaco \| \| BUREAU FILE: \| None Given \| \| FIELD FILE: \| None Given \| ORIGIN: Las Vegas, Nevada DATE: 24 July 1974 SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III BUREAU FILE: None Given FIELD FILE: None Given ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable) DATE: 25 June 1975 SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell III William Martin Bell Neutrality Matters - Grenada BUREAU FILE: None Given FIELD FILE: None Given ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable) DATE: 24 January 1975 SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston Werbell, III BUREAU FILE: None Given FIELD FILE: None Given ORIGIN: Director, FBI (Cable) DATE: 16 January 1975 SUBJECT: Aladdin N, Al-Tayyar Internal Security - Iraq BUREAU FILE: None Given FIELD FILE: None Given Nestor - Dayman Days Trial - Miami "Conspiring to import of distribute 1. Aff'd not one of people. 2. Notes - Pete Kinsey CIA/DEA Chen - Interdict White H. - DEA Chen Colson Lucien Cone from CIA - UN Conversation: 74-75 "looking for" Judge: Search 74-75 July 75 Pete Fay Nestorino info. USDC Not on FOIA Motion for discovery Formal written request HA - FE Dudley 350 - 4443 - 70x Lively Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) FBI Jerry Brown - 05 1968 4400 BK Kerr - in Miami 591-4870 DEA Note: Mother - DDD/For A Cause Wally - Deceased 8/4 1313 Military in 1943, 2nd Lt. in Signal Corps June 44 assigned to China Burma Theater. To OSS from Apr 44 to Dec 45. Returned to US & discharged on 1st Lt. Col. Colness Molden Colson Kreig Nixon 305-591-4910	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10213.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 8, "total-input-tokens": 8264, "total-output-tokens": 1510, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 610, 1 ], [ 610, 2837, 2 ], [ 2837, 3455, 3 ], [ 3455, 3455, 4 ], [ 3455, 3664, 5 ], [ 3664, 3859, 6 ], [ 3859, 4019, 7 ], [ 4019, 4225, 8 ] ] }
800b0ac905caae2acb95ace3f0a999140ad18431	\| TO \| DATE \| OFFICER'S INITIALS \| COMMENTS \| \|----\|------\|-------------------\|----------\| \| ADDO 7E26 \| \| \| \| \| DDO \| 9 MAR 1976 \| \| \| \| Associate General Counsel, OGC 7D01 \| \| \| \| FROM: Nestor D. Sanchez Acting Chief Latin America Division EXTENSION NO.: 1884 DATE: 3 MAR 1976 SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III 3 MAR 1976 MEMORANDUM FOR: Associate General Counsel, OGC VIA: Deputy Director for Operations SUBJECT: Mitchell Livingston WER BELL III REFERENCE: Your memorandum of 24 February 1976, Subject as above 1. Per reference request, we are forwarding information in our files concerning contacts that have taken place between this Agency and WER BELL. 2. The following is a summary of all DDO contact directly with WER BELL which took place in 1959: a. A 6 July 1959 Memorandum to C/WH Division signed by (Thomas J. Flores) stated that General Cabell called (Flores) to report that WER BELL had called him. WER BELL discussed with General Cabell a trip WER BELL had taken to the Dominican Republic and offered to come to Washington at his own expense to discuss the trip. No commitments were made to WER BELL by General Cabell. b. A 7 July 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that WER BELL was met in Washington, D.C., by (Flores) who discussed with WER BELL information concerning the Dominican Republic, Fidel Castro, Fulgencio Batista and General Pedraza. c. A 8 July 1959 Memorandum of Conversation signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that on 8 July 1959 (Flores) called WER BELL to set up an appointment. During the meeting, WER BELL was told that the United States would not support any revolutionary activities by General Pedraza. He was also told that the U.S. will observe its international obligations concerning Cuba and Pedraza, and that the U.S. would not overlook any violations by Pedraza or his followers of the neutrality laws. (Flores) said that the Agency had some interest in the possibility of his (WER BELL's) working for us as an intelligence gatherer under terms to be negotiated after we obtained a security clearance on him. (Flores) pointed out that the Agency was not attempting to limit his actions in connection with the Dominican Republic, nor was it assuming any responsibility for those matters he carried out in his own behalf. (Flores) dictated a Secrecy Agreement to him and had him sign it. d. A 9 July 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that Subject called him on 9 July 1959 from New York. WER BELL gave (Flores) further information on Loos, fnu, the representative of a Colonel Frei, fnu, of the Swiss army who had 1,000 men available for duty as soldiers. e. A 20 July 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that WER BELL called (Flores) from Miami on 20 July to ask about the Agency picking up the tab for his forthcoming trip to the Dominican Republic. They discussed his clearance which had not come through. f. A 3 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by Martha R. Tharpe reported that on 24 July 1959 WER BELL called for Mr. (Thomas J. Flores). Since (Flores) was on leave, Tharpe took the call. WER BELL gave Tharpe further information concerning Pedraza and Batista. Tharpe called WER BELL back that evening to tell him that if he obtained further information to report it to Mr. Justin Gleichauf, 00 Contacts Representative in Miami, until Mr. (Flores) returned to Washington. g. A 5 August 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) stated that WER BELL phoned him on 5 August 1959 to ask if there was any news on his clearance. WER BELL said he wanted to go to the Dominican Republic soon, and would like CIA to pick up his expenses. He was told there was no news. (Flores) and WER BELL discussed the Dominican Republic and Cuba. On 3 August (Flores) phoned WER BELL and told him that his clearance had not been granted and that he should not predicate his activities on the expectation of the clearance at any given time. WER BELL said that the Pedraza group was air lifting and dropping material into Cuba. h. A 9 September 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) reported that WER BELL called (Flores) on 9 September 1959 to provide information on Cuba. He was told by (Flores) that his clearance had not yet been processed. i. According to a 23 September 1959 (Flores) Memorandum for the Record signed by (T. J. Flores) WER BELL called (Flores) on 9 September 1959 to ask if his clearance had come through since he wanted the Agency to finance his trip to the Dominican Republic. He was told it had not. WER BELL told (Flores) about some people who had been discussing the counterfeiting of U. S. dollars and Cuban pesos for use in connection with Cuban revolutionary activities. He was told by (Flores) to contact the FBI. On 13 September WER BELL had phoned (Flores) at home to say that the FBI had referred him to the Secret Service on the counterfeiting aspect, and that no one seemed particularly interested in the gun running. The Secret Service asked him to go to Miami at his own expense to obtain further information on the matter and WER BELL asked (Flores) advice. (Flores) said that he could not influence him one way or the other since he was not in a position to direct his activities, but felt he might be better off to take no action. He was told that (Flores) would be in touch with him as soon as he had any further information concerning our possible use of him. j. A 13 October 1959 Memorandum for the Record signed by (Thomas J. Flores) states that WER BELL phoned him on 25 September 1959 to report on Cuba. On 2 October 1959 (Flores) talked with WER BELL by phone and terminated the relationship. 3. The following undated memorandums are also contained in WER BELL's file: a. A Memorandum for the Record signed by T. Flores reports that WER BELL called Flores on 13 August 1959 to discuss Cuban activities in Miami. This memorandum also records that WER BELL phoned Flores again on 26 August 1959 at which time activities in the Dominican Republic and Cuban activities in Miami were discussed. WER BELL also asked about the status of his clearance, and was told it had not yet come through. b. A letter signed "W" addressed to ("Tom") gave "W's" location and some information concerning Batista and Castro. (This letter is probably in the 1959 time frame.) c. A Memorandum of Conversation signed by T. Flores reports that WER BELL called Flores and gave his location. The status of WER BELL's clearance was discussed and Flores told him it had not yet come through. WER BELL gave Flores some information concerning Batista. (This memorandum probably is in the 1959 time frame.) d. An unsigned report, apparently from WER BELL, gave a summary of his contacts and activities during a trip to the Dominican Republic. (This report is probably in the 1959 time frame.) 4. A 17 December 1963 dispatch from Station Santo Domingo reported that Station (NOC Officer Joseph Luna) recently met WER BELL in Santo Domingo. No further details of the meeting were reported. 5. According to the CS file on WER BELL, three former Agency employees were contacted in 1974 by WER BELL and other representatives of a group called "Friends of Abaco (FOA), a group allegedly advocating the secession of the island of Abaco from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas. The three former employees contacted are: a. John Patrick Muldoon, retired from CIA on 20 March 1972. b. (Theodore John Roussos), retired from CIA on 31 July 1970. He was rehired on a contract in February 1971. His contract was terminated in September 1973. c. Walter Joseph Mackem, separated from CIA on 31 October 1973. 6. Mr. Muldoon contacted Agency employee (E. James McTighe) on 22 May 1974. Mr. Muldoon told Mr. McTighe that he was nominal Vice President of a Washington-based firm called "Security Consultants International." He presented Mr. McTighe with a report containing the essential data he possessed concerning WER BELL and other members of FOA whom he had met on 17 and 20 May 1974 in Washington, D.C. According to Mr. Muldoon, WER BELL had hopes of establishing gaming casinos, hotel and other tourist facilities in Abaco catering to the U.S. tourist crowd. As a consequence of some run-in with Prime Minister Pindling of the Bahamas, however, WER BELL is apparently persona non grata in the Bahamas; hence his ambitions appeared to be contingent on Abacan independence. Mr. Muldoon reported that at least on two occasions WER BELL made a concerted effort to involve persons formerly affiliated with the Agency in the activities of the FOA in support of its independence. On several occasions, WER BELL introduced Mr. Muldoon and Mr. Roussos as active Agency officials, implying that either the Agency or the United States Government supported the aims of the FOA. WER BELL also proposed to Messrs. Muldoon and Roussos in separate conversations that they conduct a study, involving a visit to Abaco, to determine the feasibility of Abaco's independence in political and economic terms. The study was to include interviews with citizens of Abaco prior to an alleged "plebiscite" on independence to take place in Abaco on 28 June 1974. In default of the collaboration of either Muldoon or Roussos, WER BELL hired Mr. Walter Joseph Mackem, a former Agency friend of both Muldoon and Roussos. According to WER BELL's file, Mackem later in 1974 contacted the Agency in an attempt to get an official policy on the activities of the FOA. Mackem was informed that the case comes under FBI jurisdiction, that this Agency has no official involvement, and that all information we had on the matter had been made available to the FBI. He was advised at that time to report his contacts and any information he had to the FBI. 7. On 24 March 1975, Mr. (Joseph P. Hayes) assigned to SE/PCH, reported that during the week of 9 March 1975, he talked with Mr. Wesley Dyckman. Mr. Dyckman is a former Agency employee employed by the Drug Enforcement Agency. According to Dyckman, former Agency employee Walter Mackem was employed in the Washington area as a private investigator. He is also involved with a paramilitary activity funded by some unnamed British source. The activity, which Dyckman referred to as "the new land project" sought to establish a tax shelter on one of the out-islands of the Caribbean by forcefully taking over the island and establishing a government there. Mackem is supposedly involved in the paramilitary training of forces who would participate in this adventure. According to Dyckman, the paramilitary training supposedly was to take place in Georgia, where WER BELL is based. 8. On 31 August 1974, Mr. Roussos met with Mr. K. Michael Absher, who at that time was AC/E/GC, and told him that WER BELL was leaving for Athens on 31 August to sell arms to the Greek Government. WER BELL wanted Roussos to be his advisor in this venture and to go to Athens. Roussos told WER BELL that he would check with CIA before giving him an answer. WER BELL asked Roussos to see if the Agency was in favor of such an arms deal or not. Mr. Absher strongly advised against getting involved in this deal. Roussos told Mr. Absher that he understood and agreed not to get involved. Roussos said that WER BELL would probably call him from Athens and he would give WER BELL a final negative reply. 9. On 22 July 1974, the FBI reported that WER BELL may be in possession of a one-line note from former CIA Director William Colby stemming from a chance meeting with the Director at an OSS alumni dinner, reading something like "Good to see you again." This note was apparently used by WER BELL to suggest that he and Mr. Colby were good friends. This information was passed on to Mr. Colby on 9 August 1974. 10. According to reporting from several Stations, WER BELL and Arthur L. Smith (a cohort of WER BELL's) were in several Central American countries during August and early September 1962. Their principal activity appeared to be contacting officials of the governments of Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador for the purpose of obtaining recognition of a de facto Cuban Government in exile called the "United Organization for the Liberation of Cuba." In discussions with Nicaraguan Government representatives, WER BELL claimed the proposed Cuban Government in exile had the support of 90 separate Cuban exile organizations and 186,000 Cuban exiles. WER BELL offered a representative of the Nicaraguan Government $100,000 to obtain that government's recognition of the Cuban Government in exile. The group claimed to have its headquarters at 1025 Connecticut Avenue, NW, in Washington, D.C. While in Guatemala, Smith claimed that the group had a man in the Department of State in Washington, D.C., whom they pay $6,000 per year "to keep them advised." 11. In December 1965 WER BELL contacted a Miami DCD asset and told him that he and six Cuban exiles in the U. S. had organized a group, including approximately 20 Cubans inside Cuba, to perform a commando operation in Cuba during early January 1966. Their primary mission was the assassination of Fidel Castro, with the secondary mission of blowing up the generators that supply electricity to Havana, Cuba. WER BELL, at the time, stated that he was trying to get a "green light" from CIA to proceed with the mission, and inferred that the mission would be called off if such approval was not obtained. 12. On 7 February 1966 the Miami office of the FBI reported that WER BELL had been in contact with various news agencies concerning an alleged plan to assassinate Fidel Castro, and reportedly also had discussed the plan with Mr. Richard Phillips, Public Affairs Officer, Department of State, Washington, D.C. WER BELL claimed to have a group of some 500 men infiltrated into Cuba and said that they were ready for action to overthrow the regime immediately following the assassination of Castro. According to the FBI, WER BELL gave the impression that he is acquainted with many high government officials, both in the U. S. and other countries, and implied that his assassination plan had been approved by CIA. 13. According to a memorandum in WER BELL's file, on 7 February 1968, one Bruce Arman Baker telephoned an employee of this Agency and said he had been in contact with WER BELL. Mr. Baker said that WER BELL was in the weapons manufacturing business and delivered them by air throughout the world. Mr. Baker said that he understood that WER BELL does this for CIA. Mr. Baker said that he understood from WER BELL that he would have to get a CIA security clearance to fly for WER BELL. Baker said that he was afraid that his past smuggling record might keep him from getting a CIA clearance. 14. WER BELL came to the attention of the Bangkok Station in early 1969 when he went to Thailand representing himself as Vice President of Sionics, Atlanta, Georgia. He described himself as a counterinsurgency expert, had a variety of weapons to display, claimed to be a retired colonel, and introduced himself at a local nightclub as Chief of CIA in Thailand. WER BELL attempted to sell arms to the Thais and also to a variety of U. S. military elements (Station Bangkok) passed the gist of his reputation to key personalities in the U. S. mission and the Thai Government stressing that he was not sponsored in any way by the U. S. Government. 15. WER BELL was also the subject of two memorandum signed by Lawrence R. Houston. Mr. Houston, answering a request from Joseph J. Liebling, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, on 23 February 1971, denied WER BELL's alleged affiliation with the CIA. On 28 October 1971, Mr. Houston wrote Mr. David H. Henretta, Jr., of the Industrial Security Clearance Review Division, to return notarized Interrogatories previously sent by Mr. Henretta. 16. We have no information on Colonel Bayard except news articles reporting his death which were forwarded by the FBI. 17. Per your request, we have sent instructions to the LA/Miami Station that there should be no contact with WER BELL. Nestor D. Sanchez Acting Chief Latin America Division	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/104-10105-10218.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 9, "total-input-tokens": 10287, "total-output-tokens": 4372, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 346, 1 ], [ 346, 1829, 2 ], [ 1829, 3770, 3 ], [ 3770, 5831, 4 ], [ 5831, 7661, 5 ], [ 7661, 10315, 6 ], [ 10315, 12872, 7 ], [ 12872, 15423, 8 ], [ 15423, 16159, 9 ] ] }
aed5b3e34a01b67e5c5abe37606cf4c8c33e5c2a	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10060-10492 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 4 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10492 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 09/27/77 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION NORRIS, ELIZABETH DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) ☐ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth M. Morris \| November 30, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 237-90-5178 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Title Change \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business) \| Specify Date (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level _______ Step _______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 11, 1978 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: ID ____________________________ Office Code ____________ Benefits ____________________________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ as of ____________ Payroll ____________________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Elizabeth H. Morris \| October 1, 1978\| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 237-90-5178 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| $16,100.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number If applicable, Level Step I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. October 10, 1978 All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ID Monthly Annuity $00 as of Payroll (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Elizabeth M. Brown \| December 1, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 237-90-5178 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Title Change \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| \| ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business) \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Staff Assistant \| $15,000 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 96th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 1, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name and title of above official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: ID ____________________________ Benefits ____________________________ Monthly Annuity $ _______ 00 as of ____________________________ Payroll ____________________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth M. Brown \| September 27, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 237 90 5178 \| Appointment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Staff Assistant \| $13,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________________ 19 77 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Title—If Member, District and State All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee. To: G. Robert Blakey From: Tom Howard Date: September 27, 1977 Re: Hiring of Staff Assistant I recommend that we hire Elizabeth Brown as the second staff assistant in the Budget Office at an annual salary of $13,000.00 starting September 27, 1977. EXPERIENCE October 1974 - Present Staff of U. S. Representative Jack Brooks, Washington, D. C. Handle all aspects of case work in the areas of military, Social Security and veterans affairs. Correspond with constituents in regards to general and specific inquiries, which often necessitates contact with various government agencies and Congressional Committees in order to obtain needed information. Correspond with constituents concerning legislative inquiries. Assist in reviewing and assigning all outgoing mail. Responsible for various facets of the procedure involved with the nomination of service academy applicants. Performed duties of receptionist and appointment secretary on a full time basis, and presently perform these duties as needed. Temporarily assumed duties and responsibilities of office manager. Sept. 1973 - Dec. 1973 Learning Foundations, Inc., Wilmington, N. C. Part-time math tutor for grades one through twelve. Feb. 1973 - June 1973 Wonder Shop, Wilmington, N. C. Part-time sales clerk. EDUCATION 1972 - 1974 University of North Carolina Wilmington, N. C. 28401 Degree: Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics 1970 - 1972 Peace College Raleigh, N. C. BIOGRAPHICAL DATA Born: March 12, 1952, Wilmington, N. C. Appearance: Height: 5'5" Weight: 114 lbs Health: Excellent Hobbies: Water sports, tennis, needle point, and reading. MEMORANDUM TO: ALL STAFF RE: Payroll Certification The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman. The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change. ☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. ☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________ Signature of Employee 9-27-77 Date	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10060-10492.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 9, "total-input-tokens": 10305, "total-output-tokens": 3849, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1182, 1 ], [ 1182, 1678, 2 ], [ 1678, 4361, 3 ], [ 4361, 6349, 4 ], [ 6349, 9162, 5 ], [ 9162, 11333, 6 ], [ 11333, 11582, 7 ], [ 11582, 12938, 8 ], [ 12938, 14147, 9 ] ] }
025a7becafd2ac67b5adff3a4b6dcae083948812	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10493 RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 3 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10493 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 12/27/77 PAGES : 5 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION OPPENBERG, GALE DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Gale Lynn Oppenberg \| December 1, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 129-36-3080 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| $19,000.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ___________ If applicable, Level _______ Step _______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date December 11, 1978 Signature of Authorizing Official LOUIS STOKES Chairman Type or print name of Authorizing Official Chairman Title—If Member, District and State All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: ID ____________________________ Benefits ____________________________ Monthly Annuity $ ___________ as of ___________ Payroll ____________________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Gale Lynn Oppenberg \| 12/31/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 129-36-3038 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. ______ of ______ Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. January 2, 1979 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) CHAIRMAN (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ________ as of ____________ ID ____________________ Benefits ____________________ Payroll ____________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Gale Lynn Oppenbarg \| December 27, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 129-36-3030 \| Appointment \| \| \| Salary Adjustment \| \| \| Title Change \| \| \| Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| \| Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business) \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Research Attorney \| $18,000 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res.655 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date December 29, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ________ 00 as of ____________ ID ____________________ Benefits ____________________ Payroll ____________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel DATE: December 22, 1977 RE: Ms. Gale Lynn Oppenberg This memorandum is to advise you that Ms. Gale Lynn Oppenberg has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the Select Committee on Assassinations. Her effective starting date will be Tuesday, December 27, 1977, and her starting salary will be $18,000.00. Your full cooperation will be greatly appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Oppenberg with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard. ICM:j1 MEMORANDUM TO: ALL STAFF RE: Payroll Certification The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman. The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change. ☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. ☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________ Signature of Employee 12/27/77 Date	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10060-10493.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 7, "total-input-tokens": 8015, "total-output-tokens": 2883, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1058, 1 ], [ 1058, 1553, 2 ], [ 1553, 3859, 3 ], [ 3859, 6178, 4 ], [ 6178, 8952, 5 ], [ 8952, 9530, 6 ], [ 9530, 10741, 7 ] ] }
1e1b10de24c98f36aa8659b20f1385d93e8dd44b	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10060-10494 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 13 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 11 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 U.S.C. 2107 Note). Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10494 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 10/21/76 PAGES : 13 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION ORR, PATRICIA DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 12/31/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-66-2714 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|-------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number. If applicable, Level. Step. I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: January 2, 1979 [Signature of Authorizing Official] [Type or print name of Authorizing Official] [Title—If Member, District and State] All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: [Signature of Authorizing Official] Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: \| ID \| Benefits \| Payroll \| \|----\|----------\|---------\| \| \| \| \| Monthly Annuity $00 as of Copy for Initiating Office or Committee (Revised: August 1, 1977) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| November 1, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-66-2714 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| $19,700.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res 256 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_______ Step________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: November 8, 1978 [Signature] LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name and title of above official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: \| ID \| Benefits \| Payroll \| \|----\|----------\|---------\| \| \| \| \| Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 11/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-66-2714 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|--------------------\| \| Senior Researcher \| $18,700 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: November 8, 1977 Louis Stokes Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Date: November 7, 1977 Re: Salary Adjustment - one year anniversary Adjust the salaries of the following individuals as indicated effective November 1, 1977 \| Employee \| Present Salary \| 7.05% Increase \| New Salary \| \|-------------\|----------------\|----------------\|------------\| \| Akers \| $24,000 \| $1,700 \| $25,700 \| \| Blackmer \| 24,000 \| 1,700 \| 25,700 \| \| Gay \| 36,000 \| 2,500 \| 38,500 \| \| Hess \| 26,000 \| 1,800 \| 27,800 \| \| McPherson \| 16,000 \| 1,100 \| 17,100 \| \| Orr, Patricia \| 17,500 \| 1,200 \| 18,700 \| To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 8/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-66-2714 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| Employing Office or Committee: Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Senior Researcher \| 17,500 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House; complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: August 2, 1977 [Signature of Authorizing Official] LOUIS STOKES CHAIRMAN All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code: __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 5/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215 66 2714 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \|-----------------------------------\|------------------------------------------------------\| \| \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $16,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________________ May 10, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 4/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215 66 2714 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $33,600 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level __________ Step __________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date __________ April 29, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes (Title or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initiated by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 2-1-77 \| \| Employee Social-Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-65-2714 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \|-----------------------------------\|------------------------------------------------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $10,000. \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date __________ 2-28-77 __________ 19 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 1/3/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215 66 2714 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $10,400 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff ☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________________ 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ _______ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| 1/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215 66 2714 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment and title change \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Select Committee on Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel and Director \| $16,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 29, 1976 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Thomas H. Downing, Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Select Committee on Assassinations (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| November 22, 1976 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-66-2714 \| □ Appointment \| \| \| □ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| □ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Select Committee on Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Researcher \| $10,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1549 of 94th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number__________ If applicable, Level__________ Step__________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: November 22, 1976 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Thomas N. Downing, Chairman Select Committee on Assassinations (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code__________ Monthly Annuity $__________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Patricia M. Orr \| October 21, 1976 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 215-66-2714 \| ☒ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Select Committee on Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Researcher \| $9,000.00 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number___________ If applicable, Level _______ Step_________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: October 26, 1976 Thomas N. Downing Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code: __________ Monthly Annuity $__________00 ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder) MEMORANDUM TO: All Staff Employees FROM: Budget Officer DATE: January 3, 1977 RE: Payroll Certification Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977). The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer. Approved Richard A. Sprague I am not related I am related by the following relationship Signature of Employee Date	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10060-10494.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 15, "total-input-tokens": 17175, "total-output-tokens": 7138, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1187, 1 ], [ 1187, 1681, 2 ], [ 1681, 3894, 3 ], [ 3894, 6216, 4 ], [ 6216, 8320, 5 ], [ 8320, 9081, 6 ], [ 9081, 10795, 7 ], [ 10795, 12853, 8 ], [ 12853, 15043, 9 ], [ 15043, 17407, 10 ], [ 17407, 19582, 11 ], [ 19582, 21668, 12 ], [ 21668, 23898, 13 ], [ 23898, 25806, 14 ], [ 25806, 26701, 15 ] ] }
b5b28766cc7af97bf579b983d87d00579bb29100	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10060-10495 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual, Number of Postponements: 7 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107) Note: Case #: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10495 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 12/16/76 PAGES : 8 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION ORR, PHOEBE DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initiated by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Phoebe Curtis Orr \| December 1, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219-64-3205 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| $17,000.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date December 11, 1978 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: \| ID \| Benefits \| Payroll \| \|----\|----------\|---------\| \| \| \| \| Monthly Annuity $ ________ as of ________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Phoebe Curtis Orr \| December 1, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219-64-3205 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \|--------------------------------------------\| \| Assassinations \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Researcher \| $16,700 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level _______ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 1, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (If or print name and title of above official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ ID ____________ Monthly Annuity $ _______ 00 as of ____________ Benefits ____________ Payroll ____________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Pheobe Curtis Orr \| 8/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219-64-3205 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \|-----------------------------------\| \| Assassinations \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Document Clerk \| 15,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff ☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: August 2, 1977 LOUIS STOKES CHAIRMAN All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code: ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Phoebe Curtis Orr \| 5/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219 64 3205 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment; complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $11,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House; complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ________________ May 10, 1977 [Signature of Authorizing Official] Louis Stokes Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Phoebe Curtis Orr \| 4/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219 64 3205 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $14,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number___________ If applicable, Level___________ Step___________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: ___________________________ 1977 ______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) ______________________________ (Title—If Member, District and State) Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ (Chairman, Committee on House Administration) Office of Finance use only: Office Code: __________ Monthly Annuity $__________ .00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Phoebe C. Orr \| 1/3/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219 64 3205 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|--------------------\| \| \| $10,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff □ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee... (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ________________ 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Henry B. Gonzalez Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Phoebe Curtis Orr \| 12/16/76 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 219 64 3276 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Select Committee on Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Document/Research \| $11,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________, 1976 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Thomas M. Downing, Chairman Select Committee on Assassinations (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees; must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: All Staff Employees FROM: Budget Officer DATE: January 3, 1977 RE: Payroll Certification Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977). The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer. Approved Richard A. Sprague I am not related I am related by the following relationship Phoebe C. Orr Signature of Employee Jan. 24, 1977	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10060-10495.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 10, "total-input-tokens": 11450, "total-output-tokens": 4795, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1183, 1 ], [ 1183, 1673, 2 ], [ 1673, 4208, 3 ], [ 4208, 6791, 4 ], [ 6791, 8718, 5 ], [ 8718, 10624, 6 ], [ 10624, 12915, 7 ], [ 12915, 15012, 8 ], [ 15012, 17014, 9 ], [ 17014, 17932, 10 ] ] }
c18ce1b255fe7cf2fde333737e702e0e4a9a2896	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10060-10498 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 1 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 *Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107) Note: Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10498 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 09/26/77 PAGES : 7 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION PARISI, LOUIS DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED December 11, 1978 Major Raymond J. Brennan Administrative Officer New Jersey Division of State Police P. O. Box 7068 West Trenton, N. J. 08625 Dear Major Brennan: This is to officially notify you that the services of Detective Sergeant Louis Parisi with the Select Committee on Assassinations will terminate at the close of business on Friday, December 22, 1978. Your letter to me of October 4, 1978 billed the Committee for Mr. Parisi's services through September 22, 1978. At your earliest convenience, kindly bill the Committee for the period September 23 through December 22, 1978. I'm sure that the New Jersey State Police will hear from Chairman Stokes concerning Mr. Parisi's valuable contribution to the Committee. In the meantime, I wish to thank you for your cooperation. Sincerely yours, Thomas Howarth Deputy Staff Director and Budget Officer PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Louis Parisi \| September 26, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 070 34 8534 \| Appointment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Investigator \| $7,236 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: September 26, 1977 Louis Stokes Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee April 18, 1978 The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr. Chairman Committee on House Administration House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: I have approved a salary increase of $1,980.00 per year effective April 1, 1978 for Louis Parisi, a staff investigator for the Select Committee. As Mr. Parisi's basic salary and benefits are paid by the New Jersey State Police, his additional salary from the House is paid in the form of a monthly expense allowance per prior agreement with your staff and the Clerk of the House. This was to avoid Mr. Parisi from earning retirement benefits from both the Federal Government and the State of New Jersey. Accordingly, Mr. Parisi's monthly expense allowance will increase from $625.00 to $790.00 effective April 1, 1978. Sincerely, LOUIS STOKES Chairman LS/thw TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Staff Director DATE: April, 11, 1978 RE: Salary Adjustments Please increase the salaries of Louis Parisi and Ida Jane Ross seven percent (7%) effective April 1, 1978. September 27, 1977 The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr. Chairman Committee on House Administration H-326 Capitol Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Mr. Chairman: The Select Committee on Assassinations has hired Mr. Louis Parisi as a staff investigator at an annual salary of $28,000. In order to protect Mr. Parisi's pension and other benefits with the New Jersey State Police, he will be carried on the State's payroll while he is assigned to the Select Committee. New Jersey will bill the Committee at an annual rate of $20,764 so that Mr. Parisi's stipend from The House of Representatives will be $7,236. Mr. Parisi will be working full time for the Select Committee and will perform only those duties assigned by the Committee. Sincerely, Louis Stokes Chairman cc: Finance Office LS/th MEMORANDUM TO: Professor Blakey FROM: Edward M. Evans Chief Investigator, MLK DATE: September 22, 1977 SUBJECT: Louis Parisi, Investigator, MLK Mr. Parisi has agreed to take a position with us as Staff Investigator assigned to the Martin Luther King, Jr. Task Force. He will start September 26, 1977 at $28,000. Annual to New Jersey State Police 20,764 EME:ek 9/3/77 Salary - Hourly 7,236 Annual Hold until we know the amount we have to reimburse the New Jersey State Police - somewhere around $20,000. The balance will be his Congressional salary. Parisi is to be a member of the staff as of 9/26/77, but his salary will not be included on our payroll. He will be reimbursed by voucher each month to cover his salary. (Per Tom Hawarth.) EB MEMORANDUM TO: ALL STAFF RE: Payroll Certification The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman. The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change. ☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. ☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________________ Signature of Employee 9-26-77 Date	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10060-10498.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 10, "total-input-tokens": 11450, "total-output-tokens": 2556, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1183, 1 ], [ 1183, 1675, 2 ], [ 1675, 2538, 3 ], [ 2538, 4385, 4 ], [ 4385, 5211, 5 ], [ 5211, 5453, 6 ], [ 5453, 6243, 7 ], [ 6243, 6801, 8 ], [ 6801, 6994, 9 ], [ 6994, 8203, 10 ] ] }
9bd9fd7c9f2e8fc7b3ca0e804817367bb0436c9d	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10060-10499 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 6 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107) Note: Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10499 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 11/01/77 PAGES : 9 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION PONDER, MARY DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box 2. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Mary Elizabeth Ponder \| 3/9/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 452-74-2381 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ____________ Step ____________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ____________ 1978 LOUIS STOKES Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ ID ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ as of ____________ Payroll ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel DATE: 7 March 1978 RE: Termination Please be advised that effective Friday, March 3, 1978, Mary E. Ponder will be terminated from the Committee payroll. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience. Termination Effective 3/9/78 ICM:j OFFICE OF THE CLERK U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD 1978 \| DATE OF APPOINTMENT \| ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY \| \|---------------------\|------------------------\| \| 1-1-77 \| 1.0 □ \| \| \| 1.5 □ \| \| \| 2.0 □ \| \| PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE \| \|-----------------------\| \| 1.0 \| \| 1.5 \| \| 2.0 \| \| MONTH \| DAY OF MONTH \| APPROVED THIS MONTH \| AVAILABLE THIS MONTH \| USED THIS MONTH \| BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH \| \|-------\|--------------\|---------------------\|---------------------\|----------------\|--------------------------\| \| Jan. \| 5 \| 11 \| 3 \| 10 \| 3 \| \| Feb. \| \| 11 \| 4 \| 10 \| 4 \| \| Mar. \| XXXX \| \| \| \| \| \| Apr. \| \| \| \| \| \| \| May \| \| \| \| \| \| \| June \| \| \| \| \| \| \| July \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Aug. \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Sept. \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Oct. \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Nov. \| \| \| \| \| \| \| Dec. \| \| \| \| \| \| Terminated 3/9/78 CERTIFIED CORRECT: Employee's Signature Date Chief's Signature Date Approved: Clerk of the House Date This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder. EXHIBIT I PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Mary Elizabeth Ponder \| December 1, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 452-74-2381 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Secretary \| $15,000 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 1, 1977 Louis Stokes Chairman (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) (If appropriate, signature of Authorizing Official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ ID __________ Benefits __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ as of __________ Payroll __________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Mary Elizabeth Ponder \| 5/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 452 74 2381 \| ☑️ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \|-----------------------------------\|------------------------------------------------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $14,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑️ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ________________ May 10, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—H Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Mary Elizabeth Ponder \| 4/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 452.74 2381 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \|-----------------------------------\|------------------------------------------------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $26,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level _______ Step _______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ____________ April 29, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes (Title—If Member, District and State) Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Mary E. C. Ponder \| 1/3/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 452 74 2361 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $10,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff ☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: ______________________ 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Mary E. C. Ponder \| 1/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 452 74 2367 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Select Committee on Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Administrative Assistant \| $14,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number___________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 15, 1976 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Thomas A. Downing, Chairman Select Committee on Assassinations (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code__________ Monthly Annuity $__________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: All Staff Employees FROM: Budget Officer DATE: January 3, 1977 RE: Payroll Certification Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977). The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer. Approved Richard A. Sprague I am not related to any Member of Congress. I am related by the following relationship ____________________________ Signature of Employee Jan. 10, 1977	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10060-10499.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 11, "total-input-tokens": 12595, "total-output-tokens": 4955, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1182, 1 ], [ 1182, 1673, 2 ], [ 1673, 3832, 3 ], [ 3832, 4202, 4 ], [ 4202, 6653, 5 ], [ 6653, 9156, 6 ], [ 9156, 11461, 7 ], [ 11461, 13554, 8 ], [ 13554, 15735, 9 ], [ 15735, 17955, 10 ], [ 17955, 18914, 11 ] ] }
17da2cbbf2ab1fa9f69809682fa02a6c707f4118	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY HSCA RECORD NUMBER 180-10068-10298 RECORD SERIES STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3 Reason for Board Action The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question, (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual Number of Postponements: 1 Postponements All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers Reason for Board Action The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest Substitute Language SSN Date of Next Review Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case# NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10298 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 05/25/78 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION ADRINE, RONALD DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #:1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initiated by the authorizing official) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives I hereby authorize the following payroll action \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Ronald Adrine \| 6/5/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 302-46-7079 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Staff Counsel \| $27,000.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below) 1. □ Standing Committee Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 956 of 95th Congress 3. □ Joint Committee (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level _______ Step _______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________________, 1978 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member: District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED ____________________________ Chairman Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only \| ID \| Benefits \| Payroll \| \|----\|----------\|---------\| \| \| \| \| Monthly Annuity $ ____________ as of ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee (Revised August 1, 1977) MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel DATE: June 2, 1978 RE: Mr. Ronald Adrine Please be advised that effective Monday, June 5, 1978, Mr. Ronald Adrine has accepted the position of Staff Counsel with the Select Committee. His effective starting salary will be $27,000.00 per annum. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience. (It has not been determined which task force Mr. Adrine will be assigned to) ICM: J Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress Date May 25, 1978 To: Assassinations Comm. (Employing Authority) ☒ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress. - father - mother - son - daughter - brother - sister - uncle - aunt - first cousin - nephew - niece - husband - wife - father-in-law - mother-in-law - son-in-law - daughter-in-law - sister-in-law - stepfather - stepmother - stepson - stepdaughter - stepbrother - stepsister - half-brother - half-sister ☐ I certify that I am the ___________________________ of the ___________________________. Honorable ___________________________. (Name of Member to whom related) Ronald B. Adrine (Employee) GPO 10-7800-3	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10298.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5715, "total-output-tokens": 1641, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1163, 1 ], [ 1163, 1658, 2 ], [ 1658, 4227, 3 ], [ 4227, 4774, 4 ], [ 4774, 5534, 5 ] ] }
6e9415e07ee517279f136680401a680ffc2d9276	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10300 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 16 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question, (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual Number of Postponements: 1 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10300 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 10/12/76 PAGES : 29 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION AMATO, CAROLYN HANSEN DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Resume included. Box #:1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED To the Clerk of the House of Representatives I hereby authorize the following payroll action \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Carole Hansen (Amato) \| 12/13 October 1976 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 257-56-9440 \| ☑ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Select Committee on Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Secretary \| $16,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below) 1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff ☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional 2 ☑ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 1540 of 94th Congress 3 ☐ Joint Committee (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below) Position Number ___________ If applicable, Level _______ Step _______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives Date ___________ October 14, 1976 Thomas N. Downing Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration APPROVED Office of Finance use only Office Code ___________ Monthly Annuity $ ___________ 00 ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (for officer, personnel folder) RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents, military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone 931-3669 Office Phone 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA Date of Birth June 12, 1941 Health Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail, Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly-radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence, took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. October 7, 1976 Honorable Dawson Mathis 236 Cannon House Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Dear Dawson: Thanks so much for your letter endorsing Carole Amato for a position on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Your interest in the formulation of the committee staff is appreciated. Dawson, as you may be aware, owing to Carole's great qualifications, she has been selected to join the staff of the committee. Again, thanks so much for your interest, and with kind regards. Sincerely, Thomas N. Downing Chairman, Select Committee on Assassinations vm Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 September 30, 1976 Honorable Thomas N. Downing, Chairman Select Committee on Assassinations 2135 Rayburn House Office Building Washington, D.C. Dear Tom: I am pleased to have the opportunity to recommend Carole Hansen Amato for a position on the Select Committee on Assassinations. I have known Carole since I came to Congress in 1971. She was a member of Congressman John Davis' staff for seven years and was highly valued by him. Since that time she has held an executive position with Congressman Carroll Hubbard and presently works as the legislative secretary to Congressman Bob Jones. During her nine years on Capitol Hill, Carole has repeatedly proven herself as a reliable and competent worker. She has shown excellent abilities as executive secretary, press assistant and in a legislative capacity. I recommend her highly. If you should need additional information about Carole, please let me know. With best regards, I am Sincerely, Dawson Mathis, M.C. DM:lr2 RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 – Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 – Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 – Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 – July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 – Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 – Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 – Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 – July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 – Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 – Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 – Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 – July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congress- man Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 – Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 – Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 – Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 – July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 - Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 - July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 – Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 – Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 – Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 – July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation. RESUME Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato 4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317 Arlington, Virginia 22206 Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801 PERSONAL DATA: Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married EDUCATION: Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C. Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine. Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia. Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall. SKILLS: Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years. EXPERIENCE: May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements. Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office. Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape (this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District. Feb. 1963 – Nov. 1967 Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment. Feb. 1962 – Feb. 1963 Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership. July 1960 – Feb. 1962 Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations. May 1959 – July 1960 Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10300.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 31, "total-input-tokens": 35477, "total-output-tokens": 16898, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1159, 1 ], [ 1159, 1679, 2 ], [ 1679, 3466, 3 ], [ 3466, 5823, 4 ], [ 5823, 8019, 5 ], [ 8019, 10370, 6 ], [ 10370, 12566, 7 ], [ 12566, 13135, 8 ], [ 13135, 14194, 9 ], [ 14194, 16554, 10 ], [ 16554, 18750, 11 ], [ 18750, 21110, 12 ], [ 21110, 23306, 13 ], [ 23306, 25666, 14 ], [ 25666, 27862, 15 ], [ 27862, 30222, 16 ], [ 30222, 32418, 17 ], [ 32418, 34778, 18 ], [ 34778, 36974, 19 ], [ 36974, 39336, 20 ], [ 39336, 41532, 21 ], [ 41532, 43892, 22 ], [ 43892, 46088, 23 ], [ 46088, 48448, 24 ], [ 48448, 50644, 25 ], [ 50644, 53004, 26 ], [ 53004, 55200, 27 ], [ 55200, 57560, 28 ], [ 57560, 59756, 29 ], [ 59756, 62116, 30 ], [ 62116, 64311, 31 ] ] }
7068640ace8560daa88caa4ae83a54f40af1afd1	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10303 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 5 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107) Note: Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10303 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 01/01/77 PAGES : 13 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION BARROW, GUILIA M. DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #:1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED June 16, 1977 Mrs. Guilia M. Barrow 509 Kentucky Avenue, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003 Dear Guilia: I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff. You have our best wishes always. Sincerely yours, Louis Stokes Chairman LS:tle May 3, 1977 Mr. Al Lewis Acting Staff Director Select Committee on Assassinations Washington, D. C. 20515 Dear Mr. Lewis: I regret to inform you that May 15th, 1977, will have to be my termination day as an employee on your committee. I have conveyed my situation and reasons behind my decision to Joan Thornell but would be glad to talk with you if you would like. I wish you the greatest of luck both for this committee and all your own personal endeavors. Sincerely, Giulia Mainieri Barrow May 6, 1977 Mrs. Giulia Mainieri Barrow Select Committee on Assassinations House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Giulia: Receipt of your letter of resignation, effective May 15, is acknowledged. I was disappointed to hear your decision, but understand your reasons. I enjoyed getting to know you and appreciate your assistance during the past several months. With all best wishes for the future, Sincerely, Alvin B. Lewis, Jr. Acting Chief Counsel and Director ABL:elb May 6, 1977 Mrs. Giulia Mainieri Barrow Select Committee on Assassinations House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Giulia: Receipt of your letter of resignation, effective May 15, is acknowledged. I was disappointed to hear your decision, but understand your reasons. I enjoyed getting to know you and appreciate your assistance during the past several months. With all best wishes for the future, Sincerely, Alvin B. Lewis, Jr. Acting Chief Counsel and Director ABL:elb PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initiated by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Giulia M. Barrow \| 5/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 145 46 6759 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $14,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number_________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date____________________ May 10, 1977 Louis Stokes Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code_________ Monthly Annuity $_________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Giulia M. Barrow \| 5/15/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 145 46 6859 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number_________________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date_________________________May 10, 1977 Louis Stokes Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:_________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code_________________________ Monthly Annuity $__________________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Giulia M. Barrow \| 4/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 145 46 6759 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|--------------------\| \| \| $26,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ________________ April 29, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Giulia M. Barrow \| 1/3/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 185 65 8759 \| □ Appointment \| \| \| □ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| □ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $10,303.00 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 77 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number_________________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date_________________________ 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code__________ Monthly Annuity $__________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Giulia M. Barrow \| 1/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 145 46 67-9 \| ☑ Appointment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Secretary \| $14,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number__________ If applicable, Level__________ Step__________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: December 15, 1976 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Thomas M. Downing, Chairman Select Committee on Assassinations All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code__________ Monthly Annuity $__________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee. Mr. Sprague: Edith, Rick, and I have interviewed Giulia (Julie) Mainieri and we all recommend her pending your final approval. Present salary $12,800.00. MEMORANDUM TO: All Staff Employees FROM: Budget Officer DATE: January 3, 1977 RE: Payroll Certification Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977). The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer. Approved Richard A. Sprague I am not related I am related by the following relationship Signature of Employee Date January 10, 1976 RESUME Giulia Pat Mainieri - Barrow - Ms. 509 Kentucky Avenue, S. E. Washington, D. C. 202-546-4912 CAPITOL HILL EXPERIENCE: January - July, 1971--Glenn M. Anderson of California Joined staff as secretary to the administrative assistant, Harry Anderson. Stayed here only six months because I did not find the work challenging and was losing my skills because I was not using them enough. Salary was approximately $6,800 to $7,400. September, 1971 - September, 1975--Office of the Legislative Counsel Was member of the secretarial pool taking a great deal of shorthand and typing from 25-30 attorneys. This job was extremely demanding but was also excellent experience. I left a bit reluctantly to go to school. December, 1975 - November, 1976--Richard F. Vander Veen of Michigan Became member of this staff on a part-time basis. My duties involved typing letters composed by entire staff except administrative assistant. Here again, as in the Counsel, I had responsibility for a great deal of typing, but less shorthand than before. I learned how to work two kinds of automatic typewriters and was responsible for using them for large- volume mailings. Left staff after this seat turned over after election. Salary approximately $6,500 for a twenty hour week. PRIOR TO HILL EXPERIENCE: March, 1970 - January, 1971--Shering Pharmaceutical Company Secretary for two product managers, John Moser and Toby Madison. Had many different responsibilities: filing, typing, shorthand, telephone calling and answering, making reservations for overseas trips and in- country trips, and creating business clients. Enjoyed this job greatly. Salary approximately $6,400. Personal Information: Date of birth--October 26, 1950--Houston, Texas Marital Status--Married, no children Health--Excellent References: Honorable Richard F. Vander Veen Tele: 202-225-3831 1232 Longworth House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Tom Quimby, Administrative Assistant for Mr. Vander Veen 1232 Longworth House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-3831 Bill Wilson Staff Director for the Office of the Legislative Counsel 136 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-6060 Giulia Pat Mainieri 509 Kentucky Avenue, S. E. Washington, D. C. 202-546-4912 CAPITOL HILL EXPERIENCE: January - July, 1971--Glenn M. Anderson of California Joined staff as secretary to the administrative assistant, Harry Anderson. Stayed here only six months because I did not find the work challenging and was losing my skills because I was not using them enough. Salary was approximately $6,800 to $7,400. September, 1971 - September, 1975--Office of the Legislative Counsel Was member of the secretarial pool taking a great deal of shorthand and typing from 25-30 attorneys. This job was extremely demanding but was also excellent experience. I left a bit reluctantly to go to school. December, 1975 - November, 1976--Richard F. Vander Veen of Michigan Became member of this staff on a part-time basis. My duties involved typing letters composed by entire staff except administrative assistant. Here again, as in the Counsel, I had responsibility for a great deal of typing, but less shorthand than before. I learned how to work two kinds of automatic typewriters and was responsible for using them for large-volume mailings. Left staff after this seat turned over after election. Salary approximately $6,500 for a twenty hour week. PRIOR TO HILL EXPERIENCE: March, 1970 - January, 1971--Shering Pharmaceutical Company Secretary for two product managers, John Moser and Toby Madison. Had many different responsibilities: filing, typing, shorthand, telephone calling and answering, making reservations for overseas trips and in-country trips, and greeting business clients. Enjoyed this job greatly. Salary approximately $6,400. Personal Information: Date of birth--October 26, 1950--Houston, Texas Marital Status--Married, no children Health--Excellent References: Honorable Richard F. Vander Veen 1232 Longworth House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-3831 Tom Quimby, Administrative Assistant for Mr. Vander Veen 1232 Longworth House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-3831 Bill Wilson Staff Director for the Office of the Legislative Counsel 136 Cannon House Office Building Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-6060	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10303.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 15, "total-input-tokens": 17099, "total-output-tokens": 5495, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1183, 1 ], [ 1183, 1682, 2 ], [ 1682, 2011, 3 ], [ 2011, 2511, 4 ], [ 2511, 3003, 5 ], [ 3003, 3495, 6 ], [ 3495, 5543, 7 ], [ 5543, 7401, 8 ], [ 7401, 9547, 9 ], [ 9547, 11663, 10 ], [ 11663, 13580, 11 ], [ 13580, 13736, 12 ], [ 13736, 14652, 13 ], [ 14652, 16851, 14 ], [ 16851, 19072, 15 ] ] }
6b282a9fe5c2f834cadee72b4b3fcc3cae01a35d	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10305 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 3 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 44 USC 2107 Note. Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10305 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 08/08/77 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION BEESON, PETER G. DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #:1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Peter C. Beeson \| December 1, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 046-36-4592 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Ass't Deputy Chief Counsel \| $36,400.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. December 11, 1978 [Signature of Authorizing Official] [Type or print name of Authorizing Official] [Title—If Member, District and State] All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ ID ____________ Benefits ____________ Payroll ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ as of ____________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Peter C. Beeson \| March 1, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 046 36 4592 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Staff Counsel \| $30,000 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number________________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: March 14, 1978 [Signature of Authorizing Official] [Type or print name of Authorizing Official] [Type or print name and title of above official] [Title—If Member, District and State] All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code________________________ ID________________________ Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of________________________ Benefits________________________ Payroll________________________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Peter G. Beeson \| 77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 046 36 4592 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Employing Office or Committee: Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Staff Counsel \| $26,900 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 565 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: August 15, 1977 Louis Stokes Chairman (Signature of Authorizing Official) (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code: __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: ALL STAFF RE: Payroll Certification The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman. The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change. [X] I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. ☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________ Signature of Employee 8-8-97 Date MEMORANDUM TO: Robert Blakey FROM: Robert Lehner DATE: July 19, 1977 RE: Applicant Peter G. Beeson Mr. Beeson is an intelligent, articulate young man who evinced great interest in working with us. He has some knowledge of the King case and possesses an open mind as to its resolution. He has tried some Narcotic Conspiracy cases for the Justice Department and has filed appellate briefs. He would be a welcomed addition to our team. His present salary is $20,000. He states as of March 15, 1978 he would expect to make $25,000 under a GS-13 rating and therefore requests $25,000 with us. He will be available to start with us in the next two weeks. I recommend we take him. [Signature] $28,000 [Signature] July 12, 1977 Professor G. Robert Blakey House Select Committee on Assassinations House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 Dear Professor Blakey: I am sending the resume which you requested, along with a suggested salary of $25,000, (in line with the level which I would automatically reach with the Justice Department in the relatively near future). The litigation experience reflected on the resume is almost complete; it omits only a second case in Puerto Rico (conspiracy) currently in pre-trial stages, an Atlanta conspiracy case I am preparing to indict, and a brief just completed for an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The job has provided me with a varied and respectable amount of litigation and appeal experience, in addition to the more routine matters (immunities, witness protections, indictment dismissals, Title III wiretap authorizations, solicitor general memos etc.) handled on a daily basis by the various sections within the Criminal Division. The job which you have described obviously presents an exciting and unique opportunity. Further, I would consider it an honor to work with you on the investigation. I expect I would be able to start work with you within a month, or sooner, should an offer be extended. I look forward to hearing from you in the near future. Sincerely, Peter Peter Beeson	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10305.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 8, "total-input-tokens": 9160, "total-output-tokens": 3190, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1180, 1 ], [ 1180, 1677, 2 ], [ 1677, 3943, 3 ], [ 3943, 6569, 4 ], [ 6569, 8550, 5 ], [ 8550, 9762, 6 ], [ 9762, 10475, 7 ], [ 10475, 11805, 8 ] ] }
1d194df981e43a6647bf613db1dd0d0815530e53	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10306 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 2 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#: NW 88326 Date: 2005 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10306 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 03/15/78 PAGES : 4 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION BERK, CHARLES M. DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #: 1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Charles Michael Bark \| 12/31/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 290-50-4529 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 256 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number__________ If applicable, Level_______ Step__________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: January 2, 1979 LOUIS STOKES CHAIRMAN All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code__________ ID__________ Monthly Annuity $__________ as of__________ Benefits__________ Payroll__________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Charles Michael Berk \| March 15, 1978\| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 290-50-4523 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Senior Researcher \| $18,000.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical—or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level _______ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date March 15, 1978 LOUIS STOKES (Signature of Authorizing Official) CHAIRMAN (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) (Type or print name and title of above official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ ID ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ as of ____________ Benefits ____________ Payroll ____________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk FROM: G. Robert Blakey DATE: 15 March 1978 RE: Mr. Charles M. Berk Please be advised that effective Tuesday, March 14, 1978, Mr. Charles M. Berk has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the Select Committee on Assassinations. His effective starting salary will be $18,000.00. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience. GRB:j Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress Date 03/14/78 To: Select Committee on Assassinations (Employing Authority) ☑ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress. father nephew sister-in-law mother niece stepfather son husband stepmother daughter wife stepson brother father-in-law stepdaughter sister mother-in-law stepbrother uncle son-in-law stepsister aunt daughter-in-law half-brother first cousin brother-in-law half-sister ☐ I certify that I am the __________________________ of the __________________________ Honorable __________________________ (Name of Member to whom related) Charles M. Berk (Employee) 3/15/70 PH 4:33 H OF R. FINANCE OFFICE	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10306.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 6, "total-input-tokens": 6870, "total-output-tokens": 2176, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1182, 1 ], [ 1182, 1680, 2 ], [ 1680, 3792, 3 ], [ 3792, 6420, 4 ], [ 6420, 6891, 5 ], [ 6891, 7643, 6 ] ] }
11f0ebbfb68b324801c58884425a7cfcfd5544f8	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10307 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 4 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10307 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 06/22/77 PAGES : 6 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION BERLOW, LISA M. DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #:1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initiated by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Lisa M. Berlow \| 12/31/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 327-46-4790 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 256 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number_________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: January 2, 1979 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) CHAIRMAN (Type or print name and title of above official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code_________________________ ID_________________________ Benefits___________________________ Payroll_____________________ Monthly Annuity $_________00 as of__________________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Lisa M. Berigay \| 7/1/78 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 327-46-4790 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| 16,100 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. ______ of ______ Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable; Level __________ Step __________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. July 7, 1988 Date ____________________________ 19 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) (If print name and title of above official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ as of __________ ID ____________________________ Benefits ____________________________ Payroll ____________________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Lisa M. Berlow \| December 1, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 327-46-4790 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Researcher \| $15,000 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date December 1, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) (If appropriate, signature of Majority Leader or Ranking Minority Leader) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: \| ID \| Benefits \| Payroll \| \|----\|----------\|---------\| \| \| \| \| Monthly Annuity $ _______ as of ________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee (Revised, August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Lisa M. Berlow \| 6/22/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 327 46 4790 \| ☑ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Researcher \| $12,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date _______________ 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: ALL STAFF RE: Payroll Certification The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman. The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepbrother sister mother-in-law stepsister uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change. ☐ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. ☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________ Signature of Employee ______________________________ Date Jan 29, 1977 MEMORANDUM TO: Louis Stokes, Chairman FROM: Tom Lambeth, Acting Director DATE: June 14, 1977 I would recommend approval of the attached request that Lisa Berlow be hired. At the moment, there are four (4) vacancies on the research staff. OK	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10307.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 8, "total-input-tokens": 9160, "total-output-tokens": 3571, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1155, 1 ], [ 1155, 1651, 2 ], [ 1651, 4326, 3 ], [ 4326, 7005, 4 ], [ 7005, 9684, 5 ], [ 9684, 11857, 6 ], [ 11857, 13108, 7 ], [ 13108, 13351, 8 ] ] }
d728868d0072d0122afe8c6b5d4dc36a451d72f0	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10308 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 10 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107) Note: Case# NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10308 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 01/01/77 PAGES : 13 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION BERNING, ELIZABETH L. DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initiated by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| 1/1/79 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579-46-4548 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| $26,900.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number_________________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date_________________________1979 (Signature of Authorizing Official) LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) CHAIRMAN (Type or print name and title of above official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code_________________________ID_________________________ Monthly Annuity $__________________ as of_________________________ Benefits_________________________Payroll_________________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| December 1, 1975 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579-46-6543 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| \| $33,100.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res.____ of ______ Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date December 11, 1978 Signature of Authorizing Official LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name and title of above official) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ Monthly Annuity $ _______ 00 as of ____________ ID ____________ Benefits ____________ Payroll ____________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| December 1, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579-45-4548 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee \| \| \|--------------------------------------------\|---\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Chief Clerk \| $23,600 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 655 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date December 1, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ ID __________________ Benefits __________________ Monthly Annuity $ ________ as of __________ Payroll __________________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| October 1, 1977 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|---------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579-46-4548 \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| ☐ Appointment \| \|---------------------------------\|-----------------\| \| Assassinations \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Chief Clerk \| $22,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date __________ October 14, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas Howarth FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director RE: Elizabeth Berning This is to advise that effective October 1, 1977, Elizabeth Berning will become Chief Clerk at an annual salary of $22,000. PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| 8/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579-46-4548 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Secretary \| $21,500 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date: August 2, 1977 LOUIS STOKES Chairman, Committee on House Administration All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code: __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| 5/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579 46 4548 \| ☑️ Salary Adjustment \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|--------------------\| \| \| $16,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑️ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________________ May 10, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) Chairman ____________________________ (Title—H Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration. Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ ________ 00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| 4/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579 46 4548 \| \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Assassinations \| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|--------------------\| \| \| $33,600 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. □ Standing Committee: Staff—□ Clerical or □ Professional. 2. □ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress. 3. □ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number___________ If applicable, Level________ Step________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date____________________ April 29, 1977 Louis Stokes (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED:__________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code________ Monthly Annuity $________00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| 2-1-77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579-46-4548 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|--------------------\| \| \| $10,000. \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority: H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date 2-28-77 __________________________ Henry B. Gonzalez (Signature of Authorizing Official) Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official) __________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________ Copy for Initiating Office or Committee To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Serning \| 1/5/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 579 46 4943 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☑ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| \| $10,789.00 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff ☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date ______________________, 1977 (Signature of Authorizing Official) Henry C. Gonzalez Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN Please consider this verification that Elizabeth L. Berning began employment, permanent full-time status, with the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations January 1, 1977. Rebecca Wheeler Martin Chief Clerk January 31, 1977 To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| Elizabeth L. Berning \| 1/1/77 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| \| ☑ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| Employing Office or Committee \| \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Select Committee on Assassinations\| \| (If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary \| \|----------------\|---------------------\| \| Secretary \| $16,000 \| (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority=H. Res. 1547 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number __________ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date _______________ December 30, 1976 ____________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official) Thomas N. Downing, Chairman Select Committee on Assassinations (Title—If Member, District and State) All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code __________ Monthly Annuity $ __________.00 Copy for Initiating Office or Committee MEMORANDUM TO: All Staff Employees FROM: Budget Officer DATE: January 3, 1977 RE: Payroll Certification Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977). The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: - father - mother - son - daughter - brother - sister - uncle - aunt - first cousin - nephew - niece - husband - wife - father-in-law - mother-in-law - son-in-law - daughter-in-law - brother-in-law - sister-in-law - stepfather - stepmother - stepbrother - stepsister - half-brother - half-sister All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer. Approved Richard A. Sprague I am not related I am related by the following relationship Signature of Employee Date 1-10-77	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10308.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 15, "total-input-tokens": 17175, "total-output-tokens": 6978, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1183, 1 ], [ 1183, 1685, 2 ], [ 1685, 4384, 3 ], [ 4384, 6898, 4 ], [ 6898, 9491, 5 ], [ 9491, 11704, 6 ], [ 11704, 11933, 7 ], [ 11933, 14125, 8 ], [ 14125, 16340, 9 ], [ 16340, 18515, 10 ], [ 18515, 20882, 11 ], [ 20882, 22948, 12 ], [ 22948, 23218, 13 ], [ 23218, 25356, 14 ], [ 25356, 26293, 15 ] ] }
567da31023ac541dd20dd9ca7d27ab5be2077970	Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification AGENCY: HSCA RECORD NUMBER: 180-10068-10309 RECORD SERIES: STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER: December 8, 1995 Status of Document: Postponed in Part Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3 Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual. Number of Postponements: 1 Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers. Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest. Substitute Language: SSN Date of Next Review: 2017 Board Review Completed: 10/24/95 Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case # NW 88326 Date: 2025 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM AGENCY INFORMATION AGENCY : HSCA RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10309 RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOCUMENT INFORMATION ORIGINATOR : HSCA FROM : TO : TITLE : DATE : 03/06/78 PAGES : 3 SUBJECTS : HSCA, ADMINISTRATION BILLINGS, RICHARD NEWCOMBE DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM CLASSIFICATION : U RESTRICTIONS : 3 CURRENT STATUS : P DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93 OPENING CRITERIA : COMMENTS : Box #1. [R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM (Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Washington, D.C. 20515 (Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.) To the Clerk of the House of Representatives: I hereby authorize the following payroll action: \| Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) \| Effective Date \| \|-----------------------------------\|---------------\| \| Richard Newcombe Billings \| March 6, 1978 \| \| Employee Social Security Number \| Type of Action \| \|-----------------------------------\|----------------\| \| 139-24-4355 \| ☐ Appointment \| \| \| ☐ Salary Adjustment \| \| \| ☐ Title Change \| \| \| ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) \| \| \| ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business, Specify Date) \| Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee: Assassinations (If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.) \| Position Title \| Gross Annual Salary* \| \|----------------\|----------------------\| \| Editorial Chief \| $30,000.00 \| * If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office. (If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress. 3. ☐ Joint Committee. (If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.) Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________ I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives. Date March 13, 1978 LOUIS STOKES Chairman All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration. APPROVED: ____________________________ Chairman, Committee on House Administration Office of Finance use only: Office Code ____________ ID ____________ Monthly Annuity $ ____________ as of ____________ Benefits ____________ Payroll ____________ (Revised: August 1, 1977) MEMORANDUM TO: ALL STAFF RE: Payroll Certification The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman. The following are the relationships to be included in the certification: father nephew brother-in-law mother niece sister-in-law son husband stepfather daughter wife stepmother brother father-in-law stepsister sister mother-in-law stepbrother uncle son-in-law half-brother aunt daughter-in-law half-sister first cousin Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change. ☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. ☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________ Signature of Employee ______________________________ Date March 6, 1978 MEMORANDUM TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel DATE: 9 March 1978 RE: Mr. Dick Billings This is to advise you that effective Monday, March 6, 1978, Mr. Dick Billings has accepted the position of Editorial Chief with the Select Committee. His effective starting salary will be $30,000.00. If you have any questions concerning this matter, please feel free to contact me. ICM:j	olmocr	2025-03-20T00:00:00	2025-03-20T00:00:00	{ "Source-File": "../pdfs/180-10068-10309.pdf", "olmocr-version": "0.1.60", "pdf-total-pages": 5, "total-input-tokens": 5725, "total-output-tokens": 1740, "total-fallback-pages": 0 }	{ "pdf_page_numbers": [ [ 0, 1182, 1 ], [ 1182, 1688, 2 ], [ 1688, 4333, 3 ], [ 4333, 5581, 4 ], [ 5581, 6039, 5 ] ] }

Subsets and Splits

No saved queries yet

Save your SQL queries to embed, download, and access them later. Queries will appear here once saved.