dest_id
int64 456
12.5M
| source_id
int64 457
12.5M
| dest_date
stringlengths 4
10
| dest_court
stringclasses 392
values | dest_name
stringlengths 3
1.01k
| dest_cite
stringlengths 23
1.03k
| source_date
stringlengths 4
10
| source_court
stringclasses 358
values | source_name
stringlengths 3
233
| source_cite
stringlengths 24
254
| passage_id
stringlengths 5
12
| quote
stringlengths 13
10.1k
| destination_context
stringlengths 5
14.3k
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_3
|
for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made.
|
Each invoice would list the date upon which the supplier would electronically draft Petro’s bank account for the cost of that fuel shipment and a later date upon which Petro’s account would be drafted for the separate cost of the applicable Virginia fuel tax and Virginia petroleum storage tank fund fee.
In theory, Lambert Oil was to pay Petro for the cost of the fuel and applicable tax and fee relating to each purchase prior to the date of the first electronic draft on Petro’s account so that Petro would be financially unaffected by these transactions. However, Lambert Oil was only successful in paying Petro prior to the first draft on two occasions, and on the other occasions payment lagged behind the first draft on Petro’s account between four and thirteen days. Lambert Oil always paid Petro for the tax and fee associated with each purchase before the second draft on Petro’s account to pay for such tax and fee.
Certain payments from Lambert Oil to Petro pursuant to this arrangement were made within ninety days preceding the bankruptcy filing. Accordingly, the Trustee initiated the present adversary proceeding to recover these payments on the ground that they constitute avoidable preferential transfers under § 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. The parties left for the decision of the bankruptcy court the question of whether the portion of each of the transfers from Lambert Oil to Petro that went to the Virginia tax and fee, totaling $17,113.11 of the $61,945.11, satisfied the requirement of § 547(b)(2) that the transfer be “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_1
|
for or on account of an antecedent debt
|
”
The bankruptcy court found that the payments covering the tax and fee were not “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_1
|
for or on account of an antecedent debt
|
Relevant to the case at hand are the “contemporaneous exchange for new value” and “ordinary course of business” exceptions, contained in § 547(c)(1) and (c)(2), which are intended to insulate from a trustee’s attack those prepetition payments that do not bear the hallmark of payments made under a creditor’s duress or the debtor’s intent to favor. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(l)-(2). The defendant has the burden of proving the applicability of these defenses.
If the trustee satisfies his initial burden of establishing five requirements of avoida-bility and the defendant fails to prove an exception applies, § 550 authorizes the trustee to recover the property transferred or its value under certain circumstances. Specifically, § 550 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section... 547... of this title..., the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from—
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under section (a)(2) of this section from—
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
11 U.S.C.A. § 550(a)-(b).
In his appeal, the Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court was in error when it decided that the portion of Lambert Oil’s transfers that was in payment of the Virginia tax and fee was not “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_1
|
for or on account of an antecedent debt
|
In his appeal, the Trustee argues that the bankruptcy court was in error when it decided that the portion of Lambert Oil’s transfers that was in payment of the Virginia tax and fee was not “for or on account of an antecedent debt” and thus not a preferential transfer under § 547. I agree. In order to satisfy the antecedent debt element, the Trustee must show that Lambert Oil owed a debt to Petro for the tax and fee and that the debt was incurred before the transfer paying it was made. See Smith v. Arthur Andersen L.L.P., 175 F.Supp.2d 1180, 1202 (D.Ariz.2001).
The bankruptcy judge believed that in order to determine whether the portions of the payments made by Lambert Oil to Petro attributable to the tax and fee were “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_2
|
had not rendered services to the debtor at the time the payments were made.
|
Grogan v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co. (In re Advance Glove Mfg. Co.), 761 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting Sandoz v. Fred Wilson Drilling Co. (In re Emerald Oil Co.), 695 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.1983)). I find that Lambert Oil became obligated to pay Petro for the fuel acquired and the associated tax and fee whenever it initiated a purchase of fuel on Petro’s credit account with its supplier. Thus, because each time Lambert Oil paid Petro it was after the fuel had been acquired, the payments were in satisfaction of an antecedent debt. In Rosenberg, the bankruptcy court held that the debtor’s insurance broker would not have had a claim against the debtor because the broker “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_8
|
rendered services to the debt- or
|
In the present case, Petro had “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_3
|
on or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before the transfer was made
|
In the present case, Petro had “rendered services to the debt- or” by allowing Lambert Oil to purchase fuel on its credit account with the supplier prior to Lambert Oil’s payment to Petro.
Having concluded that the portions of the transfers covering the Virginia tax and fee were “
|
3,705,395 | 11,769,184 |
2006-08-03
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.)
|
Callahan v. Petro Stopping Center # 72 (In re Lambert Oil Co.), 347 B.R. 173 (2006)
|
1999-01-13
|
United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.)
|
Rosenberg v. Rollins, Burdick, Hunter Co. (In re Presidential Airways, Inc.), 228 B.R. 594 (1999)
|
11769184_0
|
to the extent that such transfer was (A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new value given to the debt- or; and (B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange.
|
Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided under section... 547... of this title..., the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from — ■
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
(b) The trustee may not recover under section [subsection] (a)(2) of this section from—
(1) a transferee that takes for value, including satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt, in good faith, and without knowledge of the voidability of the transfer avoided; or
(2) any immediate or mediate good faith transferee of such transferee.
11 U.S.C.A. § 550(a)-(b).
Because Petro was the initial transferee of the funds, rather than an immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee, it is not entitled to the protection of § 550(b). An initial transferee is an entity that receives a transfer and that first exercises dominion and control over the property transferred. See Bowers v. Atlanta Motor Speedway, Inc. (In re Southeast Hotel Props. Ltd. P’ship), 99 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir.1996). As the Trustee points out in his brief, Petro’s bank account statements show that each payment made by Lambert Oil to Petro, covering the fuel amounts and the tax and fee, was deposited into the business account of Petro over which Petro had dominion and control. Therefore, § 550(b)(2) is inapplicable to the facts in hand and the Trustee can recover these amounts absent any defenses Petro may have under § 547(c). Section 547(c)(1) provides that the Trustee may not avoid a transfer that is otherwise avoidable as a preferential transfer “
|
11,663,317 | 11,783,522 |
1999-06-25
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Schell v. Witek
|
Schell v. Witek, 181 F.3d 1094 (1999)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
(1) he has alleged facts that, if proved, would entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.
|
See Graham, 91 F.3d at 221 (“As the constitutional right to choice of counsel does not apply, however, Graham must show not only that the district court improperly disposed of his motions for substitute counsel, but also that the error was prejudicial to his case....”); United States v. Morrison, 946 F.2d 484, 499-500 (7th Cir.1991) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in failing to make an inquiry into the reasons for the motion for substitute counsel but going on to determine whether the error was harmless); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927, 933 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that reversal is not required when a trial court fails to make an inquiry unless the defendant can point to some harm that has resulted from a failure to make the required inquiry). We agree with these circuits and hold that a trial court’s failure to make an inquiry into a defendant’s request for substitute counsel is reviewed under the harmless error standard.
However, in this case we are not in a position to be able to apply the harmless error standard. As previously explained, the state court’s failure to make an adequate inquiry prevents us from being able tó determine whether the dispute between Schell and his attorney prevented Schell’s attorney from providing constitutionally adequate representation. We therefore reverse the denial of the petition and remand this case to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent of the conflict between Schell and his attorney, whether that conflict prevented Schell’s attorney from providing competent representation and if so whether Schell’s trial was prejudiced by ineffective representation. We note, however, that it has been over six years since Schell’s state court trial. We therefore instruct that in the event that the district court finds that because of the passage of time a hearing on this issue would be meaningless, the district court should grant the petition and award Schell a new trial.
III. A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if “
|
1,733,457 | 11,783,522 |
1999-08-31
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Smith v. Stewart
|
Smith v. Stewart, 189 F.3d 1004 (1999)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy,
|
We have done the same with respect to failures of counsel in the sentencing phase of a capital case in Arizona, because under Arizona’s statute the judge must impose the death penalty in the absence of mitigating evidence. See Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1413 (9th Cir.1998) (finding prejudice established where Correll’s attorney failed to present any evidence of mental illness sufficient to satisfy Arizona law). Here, Rempe’s failure to do anything but offer evidence that the sentencing judge clearly rejected the first time around was a virtual admission his client should be put to death.
The horrific nature of the crimes involved here does not cause us to find an absence of prejudice. In Hendricks, we rejected the argument that heinous crimes make mitigating evidence irrelevant, noting that the factfinder in California has broad latitude to weigh the worth of the defendant’s life. 70 F.3d at 1044. Moreover, despite the dissent’s suggestion that a sufficiently brutal crime obviates the need for mitigating evidence, we have found prejudice where the presentation of mitigating evidence was wholly inadequate in cases involving crimes as horrific as those committed here. See Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1315, 1323-25 (9th Cir.1994). Testimony by a doctor that Smith lost contact with reality during his violent outbursts, which were themselves a result of psychological tension built up be tween the two sides of his split personality, could have led a judge to feel that he was not deserving of the ultimate punishment. Thus, we cannot say with any confidence that information about the split nature of Smith’s personality would not have led a sentencing judge to conclude that Smith was not deserving of the death penalty. Mindful of the fact that “
|
643,522 | 11,783,522 |
1999-12-07
|
United States District Court for the Northern District of California
|
Shumate v. Newland
|
Shumate v. Newland, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1076 (1999)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
... after a full and fair hearing, reliably [find] the relevant facts.
|
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296-7, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992).
Construed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence presented at petitioner’s trial supports a rational finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Each of petitioner’s convictions was supported by specific victim testimony. Petitioner presented his argument that the complained of conduct couldn’t have occurred under the alleged conditions, and the jury resolved that apparent contradiction against petitioner. Petitioner lost that argument and will not be allowed to re-hash the weight of the evidence here. As for petitioner’s mental state, the large number of acts charged plus the Bromberg testimony adequately support a finding that the touching was not a series of innocent mistakes. The Court Must Deny Petitioner’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing
Prior to passage of AEDPA, a petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing only where (1) the petitioner alleged facts that, if proved true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, and (2) the state finder of fact did not, "
|
11,548,615 | 11,783,522 |
1999-07-21
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Wallace v. Stewart
|
Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112 (1999)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[lit is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
In sum, had these experts known the details of Wallace’s family background, the substance and tone of the sentencing hearings would have been significantly different. Which brings us to the heart of the issue here: Does an attorney have a professional responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of mental health experts who are examining his client, facts that the experts do not request? The answer, at least at the sentencing phase of a capital case, is yes. In Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.1999), we stated that “
|
11,201,670 | 11,783,522 |
2000-07-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Schell v. Witek
|
Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017 (2000)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
(1) he has alleged facts' that, if proved, would entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.
|
In this respect, it appears inevitable that the basis for this claim will be explored in the hear ing we have already ordered. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that Schell could show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel unrelated to a serious conflict between Schell and his attorney. We note also that Schell attempted to discover the facts, develop the record, and explore this issue in state court in his appropriate request to the state appellate court for a remand for an evidentiary hearing, but his attempt was rebuffed. Presumably, the Respondent opposed Schell’s request. Moreover, had his trial attorney not allegedly given him defective advice on what must have happened to his Marsden motion, he would have discovered the missing facts before his trial.
To reiterate, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if “
|
11,084,081 | 11,783,522 |
2001-08-02
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Payton v. Woodford
|
Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 905 (2001)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
It is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
Regardless, the trial court correctly instructed the jury at the penalty phase on its duties in arriving at an appropriate punishment, see Boyde, 494 U.S. at 377, 110 S.Ct. 1190, and we presume that the jury followed the instructions. See Weeks, 528 U.S. at 234, 120 S.Ct. 727.
B
Payton argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the background of jailhouse informant, Daniel Escalera, who testified during the penalty phase, to determine his credibility or history as a government agent. Payton first contends that had Merwin read the transcript of Escalera’s statements to investigators, he would have known that he was a government agent. The tape does not show this, although arguably it should have spurred further inquiry. Post-conviction, Payton uncovered evidence of Escal- era’s numerous arrests, work for the Drug Enforcement Agency, and testimony as an informant. Still, nothing shows that Es-calera was planted as a government agent to elicit incriminating information from Payton, thereby violating his Massiah rights. As with Garcia, Payton acknowledged at argument that there was no reasonable likelihood that Escalera would not have been allowed to testify even if his post-conviction discoveries had been known at the time.
Second, he asserts that a reasonable investigation would have discovered substantial evidence that could have further impeached Escalera at trial. However, Escalera’s prior convictions came out on both direct-examination and cross-examination, as did his recent guilty plea to a felony robbery charge in exchange for a potential prison sentence of one to seven years; Escalera also admitted that he hoped for leniency for testifying against Payton. Thus, the jury was aware that Escalera had a motive for giving testimony. In that context, further information about his background as a confidential informant in unrelated drug cases, and leniency received in return for testimony in those cases, would unlikely have swayed the jury. “
|
9,513,907 | 11,783,522 |
2002-03-18
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Karis v. Calderon
|
Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’
|
In determining whether Karis received the reasonably effective assistance to which he was entitled, we must determine whether counsel’s representation “ ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
9,513,907 | 11,783,522 |
2002-03-18
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Karis v. Calderon
|
Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). Karis has not made such a showing based on his allegations of instructional error. Many instructions were given regarding the evaluation of witness testimony and evidence generally. The instructions that Karis challenges could also have worked to his benefit to alleviate potential prejudice from consideration of his previous conviction and parole status, as could the flight instruction which clarified that flight alone is insufficient to establish guilt. These instructions did not direct the jury to ignore Karis’ explanation for his flight.
The challenged instructions did not render Karis’ guilt trial fundamentally unfair and, thus, did not violate due process. Furthermore, even assuming Karis could meet that standard, which he did not, Kar-is’ claims of instructional error fail to establish a constitutional violation that had a substantial and injurious influence on the jury’s verdict. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 638, 113 S.Ct. 1710.
F. Cumulative Error
Although no single alleged error may warrant habeas corpus relief, the cumulative effect of errors may deprive a petitioner of the due process right to a fair trial. See Ceja v. Stewart, 97 F.3d 1246, 1254 (9th Cir.1996). That is not the case here. Karis has not shown the cumulative effect of the alleged errors deprived him of due process. See id.
II. Penalty Phase Claims
A. Under Strickland, Karis must show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, that is whether his performance “
|
1,950,011 | 11,783,522 |
2001-09-28
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Ainsworth v. Woodford
|
Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868 (2001)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
Id.
Even viewing counsel’s perfor- ■ manee with the deferential scrutiny required by the Supreme Court, we find that counsel's representation fell below an ob jective standard of reasonableness. As we have noted, “
|
1,241,079 | 11,783,522 |
2005-10-17
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Summerlin v. Schriro
|
Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’
|
” Thus, as we have noted, “ ‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
1,280,382 | 11,783,522 |
2005-11-02
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Daniels v. Woodford
|
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (noting that defendant “is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair”); see also Brown, 424 F.2d at 1170.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish a claim for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, Daniels must establish that (1) his counsel’s actions were outside the range of professional conduct, and (2) that, but for counsel’s error, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. In considering whether Daniels received the reasonably effective assistance to which he was entitled, we must determine whether counsel’s representation “
|
1,280,382 | 11,783,522 |
2005-11-02
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Daniels v. Woodford
|
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_12
|
ineffective where he neither conducted a reasonable investigation nor made a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.
|
We have found counsel “
|
1,280,382 | 11,783,522 |
2005-11-02
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Daniels v. Woodford
|
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
People v. Rios, 23 Cal.4th 450, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066, 1074 (2000). A defendant who killed with a subjective but unreasonable belief that he is going to be killed or seriously harmed is not guilty of first degree murder. Id.
Daniels may have believed that officers Doty and Trust were coming to kill or seriously harm him. This is objectively unreasonable, but there are several indications that it may be what Daniels actually thought. First, diagnoses of Daniels’s mental condition support this conclusion. Oliver stated that Daniels exhibited a de gree of paranoid ideation. Dudley later assessed that Daniels had a delusional disorder, and that Daniels remained delusional for “some time” surrounding the murders and the trial. Second, Daniels had previously been shot by the police nine times, arrested erroneously, betrayed by his own attorney, and subjected to insufficient and harmful medical treatment in jail that resulted in urine poisoning. Presenting evidence that Daniels was paranoid delusional and feared for his life or safety when the officers came to arrest him could have created a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to whether Daniels premeditated or deliberated these killings.
Because he did not overcome the communication failure, Jordon failed to learn Daniels’s version of the shooting and failed to advise Daniels regarding his possible testimony. Exacerbating this, Jordon also failed to adequately investigate Daniels’s mental health and background. Because of counsel’s deficient performance, Daniels was denied the opportunity to rebut the State’s theory that he acted with premeditation and malice in shooting officers Doty and Trust, opening the possibility of a verdict on less than first degree murder. Penalty Phase
In the penalty phase of a capital trial, “
|
1,280,382 | 11,783,522 |
2005-11-02
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Daniels v. Woodford
|
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_1
|
[t]he determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts. The statutory factors give the jury broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability.
|
This is necessary because “[t]he determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts.
|
1,550,524 | 11,783,522 |
2005-09-21
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Sims v. Brown
|
Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
(1) the petitioner’s allegations would, if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.
|
Even if Mauro planned to write a book about “Seat Number 3,” there is no suggestion that she had a financial interest in any particular outcome. This is quite unlike the suggestion by a third-party in Remmer that the juror could make a deal, or the bribery of a juror by a co-defendant in United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 894-95 (9th Cir.1999). As appears from Nordell’s declaration, Mauro intended to wait until after Sims’s trial to discuss her experiences. And there is no indication that Mauro’s communication had any actual impact on her or anyone else. The connection between the allegations contained in the Nordell declaration and any pecuniary interest on Mauro’s part is simply too tenuous to raise a serious concern about undermining impartiality. In these circumstances, the unauthorized communication raised no risk of influencing the' Sims verdict. See United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir.1981) (finding no prejudice from juror’s receiving obscene phone calls from an unknown person regarding the juror’s treatment of another juror, as the calls did not refer to the merits of the case, were not threatening, and were not identified with either party).
Sims contends that he should at least have been accorded discovery or an evidentiary hearing on the basis of allegations in his petition, but we see no abuse of discretion. See Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 633 (9th Cir.1997) (per curiam) (noting that abuse of discretion is the standard of review). Discovery is indicated where specific allegations give the court reason to believe that a petitioner may be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. An evidentiary hearing is required under pre-AEDPA law if “
|
1,550,524 | 11,783,522 |
2005-09-21
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Sims v. Brown
|
Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
Boren-stein was also concerned that if he exploited Sims’s relationship with Padgett, the prosecution would call her as a witness and if so, that she would testify as she did at her trial that Sims forced her to go to California and how Sims cut rope and laid out which portions he would use to tie up Harrigan’s hands and feet, laid out a washcloth and socks that he planned to use to gag the victim, and considered drowning the victim or cutting his throat. Thus, the court found that Borenstein’s decision not to present evidence regarding Padgett’s effect on Sims was a reasonable strategic decision. Finally, the court found that Borenstein also made a reasonable tactical decision not to pursue future dangerousness because it would open the door for the prosecution to present evidence of a crime that Sims committed in the Army, another structured setting.
Suffice it to say, the district court’s findings are fully supported. At the end of the day, Sims’s argument turns on a latter-day battle of experts; however, the question is whether counsel did all that he was constitutionally required to do at the time. As carefully explained by the district court, it is clear that Borenstein did. Indeed, Sims submitted no evidence during the evidentiary hearing from experts in the legal community that Borenstein’s performance fell short of prevailing legal norms. In order to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show (1) that his counsel’s representation “
|
1,550,524 | 11,783,522 |
2005-09-21
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Sims v. Brown
|
Sims v. Brown, 425 F.3d 560 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_9
|
an obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult. Once that determination has been made, counsel must present those experts with information relevant to the conclusion of the expert.
|
Counsel has “an obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult.
|
2,924,452 | 11,783,522 |
2007-09-19
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Brown v. Ornoski
|
Brown v. Ornoski, 503 F.3d 1006 (2007)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
It is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
We therefore agree with the district court that Myers’s decision to have Dr. Summerour testify “might be considered sound trial strategy,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052, as a reasonable attorney could conclude that the positive out-weighed the negative:
As the Court has previously ruled, counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to present Dr. Summerour’s opinions to the jury despite the baggage involved. Summerour’s testimony was a major part of the presentation in mitigation, portraying Petitioner as an inhibited, sad figure with a fear of women rather than as a vicious predator. The choice to depict him as an ill man, at the mercy of his complexes, was a reasonable strategic choice to try to earn him sympathy and mercy.
As such, we cannot say that it was objectively unreasonable for the California Supreme Court to conclude Brown had not satisfied the requirements of Strickland. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Claim 20(A).
C. Claims 20(B) & (C)
Brown’s other ineffective assistance claims are so intertwined that they are best discussed together. Brown contends that Myers was ineffective in the penalty phase because he failed to conduct an adequate background investigation and because, if this additional information had been presented to a competently trained neuropsychologist (as opposed to a psychiatrist), such an expert could have presented a more compelling case to the jury. Adequacy of Investigation
“
|
4,271,104 | 11,783,522 |
2015-12-02
|
United States District Court for the Southern District of California
|
Roybal v. Davis
|
Roybal v. Davis, 148 F. Supp. 3d 958 (2015)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_2
|
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
|
The “
|
4,230,660 | 11,783,522 |
2015-06-09
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Bemore v. Chappell
|
Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151 (2015)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
540 U.S. 1, 9-10, 124 S.Ct. 1, 157 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003), (quoting Jacob A. Stein, Closing Argument § 204, at 10 (1992)).
Any single omission in MeKechnie’s investigation and preparation may not, on its own, have rendered his performance “
|
4,230,660 | 11,783,522 |
2015-06-09
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Bemore v. Chappell
|
Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151 (2015)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’
|
Consequently, “ ‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
4,230,660 | 11,783,522 |
2015-06-09
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Bemore v. Chappell
|
Bemore v. Chappell, 788 F.3d 1151 (2015)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_16
|
those experts who did examine [him] with the information necessary to make an accurate evaluation.
|
Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 11, 130 S.Ct. 13. And a good character defense was unlikely to be persuasive to a jury that had just decided that Bemore had carried out a grizzly murder, including torturing the victim, and had lied on the stand to boot.
Some of the defense penalty phase witnesses did mention Bemore’s drug problems and tumultuous upbringing. Even so, it is not enough just to present “extensive mitigating evidence” where particularly persuasive evidence — especially evidence in the form of expert testimony— was omitted.
Caro held, for instance, that a petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on an IAC claim because his lawyer had not engaged toxicologists or neurologists to evaluate the impact of the petitioner’s extensive chemical exposure, nor provided “
|
5,756,089 | 11,783,522 |
2009-09-18
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Hamilton v. Ayers
|
Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100 (2009)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
Accordingly, because Hamilton has not shown that his “allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief,” an evidentiary hearing on these claims was not required. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The overwhelming evidence of Hamilton’s guilt only strengthens our conclusion that he was not prejudiced by the alleged Brady and Napue violations. In light of this evidence, defense counsel’s failure to prepare effectively for the penalty phase of Hamilton’s trial is all the more egregious.
C. Penalty Phase Claims
Hamilton asserts two penalty phase claims.
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Hamilton must demonstrate that his trial counsel’s penalty phase performance “
|
5,756,089 | 11,783,522 |
2009-09-18
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Hamilton v. Ayers
|
Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100 (2009)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
[t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy,
|
Because “
|
5,756,089 | 11,783,522 |
2009-09-18
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Hamilton v. Ayers
|
Hamilton v. Ayers, 583 F.3d 1100 (2009)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase,
|
Because “[t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy,” Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir.1995) (citing Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted), “
|
4,221,603 | 11,783,522 |
2010-03-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Stanley v. Schriro
|
Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
It is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
372 U.S. at 313, 83 S.Ct. 745. Therefore, Stanley is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim if his allegations, if proved, would entitle him to federal habeas relief. See Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670. The standard we apply to determine whether the alleged facts would entitle Stanley to relief is the deferential standard of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
“
|
4,221,603 | 11,783,522 |
2010-03-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Stanley v. Schriro
|
Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_1
|
The determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts.
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir.1999), as amended. See id. (“
|
4,221,603 | 11,783,522 |
2010-03-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Stanley v. Schriro
|
Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_4
|
have the benefit of expert testimony to explain the ramifications of[this background] on Caro’s behavior
|
See Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227 (clarifying that although the jury had information regarding the defendant’s background, it did not “
|
4,221,603 | 11,783,522 |
2010-03-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Stanley v. Schriro
|
Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_8
|
A lawyer who knows of but does not inform his expert witnesses about essential pieces of information going to the heart of the ease for mitigation does not function as ‘counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment.
|
Even if expert testimony regarding Stanley’s mental state at the time of the crime would not have been admissible to challenge premeditation, as discussed above, it would have been admissible and highly relevant at sentencing. Evidence that might not rise to the level of defense of a crime may nonetheless be important mitigating evidence. See Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 993-94 & n. 12 (9th Cir.2006).
In Wallace, we held that trial counsel has an affirmative duty to provide mental health experts with all information relevant to the formulation of their conclusions. “
|
3,953,334 | 11,783,522 |
2010-03-31
|
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
|
Loza v. Mitchell
|
Loza v. Mitchell, 705 F. Supp. 2d 773 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_13
|
this Court has recognized that the failure to present evidence necessary to bridge a cultural gap may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
|
The Sixth Circuit also noted that given the absence of available mitigation evidence, counsel’s decision not to present such an expert was a sound one because of a probability that the expert would have done more harm than good. See also Fears v. Bagley, No. 1:-cv-183, 2008 WL 2782888, at *90 (S.D.Ohio Jul. 15, 2008) (finding no ineffective assistance for the failure to present expert on southern culture of violence because even assuming the expert testimony would have passed muster as reliable under Daubert, such testimony presented an alternative theory of mitigation, which does not establish ineffective assistance, and would have contradicted culpability phase trial theory). See e.g., Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1316 (9th Cir.1994); see also Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir.1999) (“
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
The declaration of petitioner’s cousin, James Michael Lord, relates limited information concerning the family’s history in paragraphs 3 and 4. Because there is no evidence that this information was communicated to trial counsel, it is relevant only to the prejudice prong of petitioner’s penalty phase ineffective assistance claim, and is therefore admissible only in the second phase of the bifurcated proceedings. Respondent does not object to the remaining paragraphs of Lord’s declaration, which concern information Lord gave law enforcement officers immediately following petitioner’s arrest for murder. These portions of the declaration are submitted in support of petitioner’s prosecutorial mis conduct claim and are relevant to that issue.
3. General Objections to the Testimony of Drs. Beaber, Schulte, and Ratner
Respondent asserts that Dr. Beaber’s declaration is irrelevant in the first phase of the bifurcated proceeding. Dr. Beaber’s testimony concerns petitioner’s guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim; as noted, the hearing on this claim was not bifurcated. Therefore, Dr. Beaber’s testimony is admissible in this phase so long as it is relevant to either the deficient performance or prejudice prong of petitioner’s guilt phase ineffective assistance claim and so long as it is otherwise admissible. See Skaggs v. Parker, 235 F.3d 261, 270 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that defense counsel’s decision to present, during the penalty phase, the testimony of an unqualified psychologist who had already provided damaging testimony at the guilt phase was deficient in that it “
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(A) (prior statements of a witness that are “inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, and [that were] given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition” are not hearsay). Accordingly, Marshall’s prior statements to Correll, Watkins, and Kell cannot be admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
As will be seen, however, the truth of Marshall’s statements is not relevant. The only question that is relevant under the Ninth Circuit’s remand order is whether any law enforcement officer coerced Marshall’s testimony or otherwise knew it to be false. The reports are admissible, therefore, to the extent they are probative of what Marshall told law enforcement officials before he testified and whether any law enforcement officer was on notice that Marshall’s testimony was false and/or coerced. The statements are admitted, therefore, for the limited purpose of showing what information Marshall gave law enforcement prior to trial. Subject to this restriction, petitioner’s objection to the reports is overruled.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During the Guilt Phase 1. During the Guilt Phase
In general, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show (1) that his trial counsel’s performance “
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_18
|
To prevail on a habeas claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must establish both (1) that counsel’s performance was so deficient that it fell below an ‘objective standard of reasonableness’ and (2) that the deficient performance rendered the results of his trial unreliable or fundamentally unfair,
|
See also Cox v. Ayers, 588 F.3d 1038, 1045—46 (9th Cir.2009) (“
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_9
|
[C]ounsel have an obligation to conduct an investigation which wdll allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult. Once that determination has been made, counsel must present those experts with information relevant to the conclusion of the expert.... A lawyer who knows of but does not inform his expert witnesses about ... essential pieces of information going to the heart of the case for mitigation does not function as ‘counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment,
|
See also Wallace, 184 F.3d at 1117 (“[C]ounsel have an obligation to conduct an investigation which wdll allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult.
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
[t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy,
|
Because “
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase,
|
Because “[t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy,” Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1044 (citing Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1152, 1161 (9th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)), “
|
4,112,623 | 11,783,522 |
2010-07-23
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Lang v. Cullen
|
Lang v. Cullen, 725 F. Supp. 2d 925 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.
|
As with the standard governing preparation of mental health experts, the standard of care governing the investigation and presentation of background evidence is higher at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase. Although the Ninth Circuit has not explicitly addressed this difference, it follows from and is directly analogous to the reasoning that gives rise to the differing standards applicable to preparation of mental health experts in the guilt and penalty phases. As noted, at the guilt phase, mental health experts are called to prove narrow and technically defined defenses; at the penalty phase, by contrast, any mental health testimony that explains or lessens the culpability of defendant's conduct is relevant. The differences are even more stark when the testimony in question is that of lay witnesses who can provide information regarding the defendant's background. At the guilt phase, such witnesses will be relevant, if at all, as background evidence supporting a narrow and technically defined mental state defense. At the penalty phase, by contrast, the "Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.” Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1044.
"[W]e conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.
|
3,120,521 | 11,783,522 |
2008-05-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Correll v. Ryan
|
Correll v. Ryan, 539 F.3d 938 (2008)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration.
|
’ ” When it comes to the penalty phase of a capital trial, “
|
4,140,573 | 11,783,522 |
2008-07-11
|
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
|
Ben-Sholom v. Ayers
|
Ben-Sholom v. Ayers, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (2008)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_4
|
the benefit of expert testimony to explain the ramifications of [Ben-Sholom’s] experiences on [his] behavior
|
Ben-Sholom points out that Mr. Alexander’s idea that any psychologist could offer evidence of empirical test results without a clinical interview was totally wrong. The error was universally refuted by all the mental health experts who testified at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Wynbrandt, Dr. Rienzi, Dr. Geshuri, and Dr. Richmond. Similarly, not giving his experts all relevant information, good and bad, totally defeated the purpose of a mental health examination. Mr. Pereira explained that Mr. Alexander’s failure to learn the true facts about Ben-Sholom’s background and his withholding information was contrary to the practice at the Tulare County Public Defender’s Office at the time of Ben-Sholom’s trial. Mr. Cher-ney also testified that to be effective, the experts needed to have an understanding of Ben-Sholom’s complete background, especially since, in his opinion, the damaging information about Ben-Sholom was mild when compared to the magnitude of the mitigating benefit. Ben-Sholom argues, for instance, that Mr. Alexander should have (but did not) provide Dr. Rienzi with his Kings View records and information which would have corroborated his reports of severe emotional torment. Maintaining that Mr. Alexander’s omissions rendered his representation constitutionally incom petent, Ben-Sholom relies on Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1079 (1998), where trial counsel who retained mental health experts but provided them with none of the necessary background information to establish a diagnosis was found to have provided constitutionally inadequate representation at a penalty phase proceeding. Although two experts actually testified at Bean’s penalty phase proceeding, neither had sufficient information upon which to base reliable opinions. Id. Because Mr. Alexander failed to verify Ben-Sholom’s background information, he did not (and could not) provide what he didn’t know to his experts. This strategy left the jury without “
|
4,140,573 | 11,783,522 |
2008-07-11
|
United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
|
Ben-Sholom v. Ayers
|
Ben-Sholom v. Ayers, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (2008)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_3
|
lay people are unable to make a reasoned judgment alone.
|
This strategy left the jury without “the benefit of expert testimony to explain the ramifications of [Ben-Sholom’s] experiences on [his] behavior” in circumstances where “
|
4,076,616 | 11,783,522 |
2007-05-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Lambright v. Schriro
|
Lambright v. Schriro, 485 F.3d 512 (2007)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his trial counsel’s performance “
|
4,076,616 | 11,783,522 |
2007-05-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Lambright v. Schriro
|
Lambright v. Schriro, 485 F.3d 512 (2007)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
‘it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’
|
Indeed, we have consistently held that “ ‘it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
3,477,464 | 11,783,522 |
2007-05-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Lambright v. Schriro
|
Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103 (2007)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that (1) his trial counsel’s performance “
|
3,477,464 | 11,783,522 |
2007-05-11
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Lambright v. Schriro
|
Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103 (2007)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
‘it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’
|
Indeed, we have consistently held that “ ‘it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
6,054,006 | 11,783,522 |
2015-03-31
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Doe v. Ayers
|
Doe v. Ayers, 782 F.3d 425 (2015)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
The imperative to cast a wide net for all relevant mitigating evidence is heightened at a capital sentencing hearing because the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.
|
Id. at 7-8,130 S.Ct. 13.
“[D]eath is different!)]” Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 587, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). “
|
6,054,006 | 11,783,522 |
2015-03-31
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Doe v. Ayers
|
Doe v. Ayers, 782 F.3d 425 (2015)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_10
|
broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, in effect, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability,
|
Thus in Hendricks, we held that it was reasonable for counsel to rely on his experts’ findings that.no diminished capacity defense was available at the guilt phase, and to terminate his perfunctory investigation of his client’s known mental impairments. Because a sentencing jury is given “
|
3,626,147 | 11,783,522 |
2008-06-13
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Belmontes v. Ayers
|
Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d 834 (2008)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that his trial counsel’s performance “
|
3,626,147 | 11,783,522 |
2008-06-13
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Belmontes v. Ayers
|
Belmontes v. Ayers, 529 F.3d 834 (2008)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
‘it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’
|
Indeed, “ ‘it is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
11,424,278 | 11,783,522 |
2002-08-26
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Hayes v. Woodford
|
Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
so deficient that it fell below an ‘objective standard of reasonableness.’
|
Amerson’s testimony was echoed by David Taylor, retired CYA counselor, who thought that Hayes would “be a profit to some institution” and a “positive” influence on other inmates because of his leadership skills. He testified that Hayes had presented “no problem whatsoever” to CYA authorities and that Hayes’s behavior on the streets was in “marked contrast” to his behavior with CYA. By way of demonstration, Taylor testified that when Hayes had responsibility for the kitchen at CYA, he had ready access to “all sorts of weapons,” but he never abused the trust placed in him. Hayes offered no other witnesses.
Hayes argues that Tauman’s representation was constitutionally deficient because he failed to investigate and to present potentially mitigating evidence regarding Hayes’s family background, drug abuse, and mental health. Under the familiar two-prong test for effective ness, established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), Hayes must show that Tauman’s representation was both deficient and prejudicial. Hayes bears the burden of demonstrating that Tauman’s performance was “so deficient that it fell below an ‘objective standard of reasonableness.
|
11,424,278 | 11,783,522 |
2002-08-26
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Hayes v. Woodford
|
Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
(1) the petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.
|
Such a hearing is required if "
|
11,089,975 | 11,783,522 |
2001-06-26
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Murtishaw v. Woodford
|
Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (2001)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’
|
The defendant is entitled only to “ ‘reasonably effective assistance,’ ” id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052), and the ultimate question is whether counsel’s representation “‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
11,089,975 | 11,783,522 |
2001-06-26
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Murtishaw v. Woodford
|
Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (2001)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’
|
In determining whether the defendant received effective assistance of counsel, we “will neither second-guess counsel’s decisions, nor apply the fabled twenty-twenty vision of hindsight,” id., but rather, will defer to counsel’s sound trial strategy. See id. The defendant bears the heavy burden of proving that counsel’s assistance was neither reasonable nor the result of sound trial strategy.
Second, even if counsel’s actions “
|
11,089,975 | 11,783,522 |
2001-06-26
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Murtishaw v. Woodford
|
Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926 (2001)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_5
|
the most important evidence of mitigation
|
Drew was superceded by statute reinstating M'Naghten. People v. Skinner, 39 Cal.3d 765, 768-69, 217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752 (1985).
7
. Dr. Siegel testified at Murtishaw's first penalty trial that Murtishaw was violent, as-saultive, and combative, and that he could become similarly violent in the future and repeat his homicidal tendencies because he had little ability to restrain himself. The California Supreme Court found this testimony to' be unreliable, and it was this testimony that caused the California Supreme Court to reverse the first death penalty sentence. See Murtishaw I, 29 Cal.3d at 768, 774, 175 Cal. Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446.
8
. Feringa’s office was in Los Angeles, over a hundred miles away from Bakersfield, where Murtishaw was in jail.
9
. Our circuit's precedent that might suggest otherwise is distinguishable. In Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir.1998), we held that the defendant's counsel had been ineffective when he ignored the expert’s requests for information. See id. at 1079. In Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.1999), the panel found that counsel's failure to provide experts with relevant information was ineffective assistance of counsel only insofar as the penalty phase of the trial was concerned because counsel’s failure prevented the jury from hearing "
|
9,440,665 | 11,783,522 |
2002-04-24
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Visciotti v. Woodford
|
Visciotti v. Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.’
|
As we have noted, “ ‘[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
9,397,736 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-01
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Silva v. Woodford
|
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
Thus, the court held that habeas relief on ineffective assistance grounds was again not warranted.
As required under Strickland, we analyze Silva’s claims first for deficiency and then for prejudice under a de novo standard of review. Deficient Performance
For Silva to prevail, he must show that Buckwalter’s representation “
|
9,397,736 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-01
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Silva v. Woodford
|
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[I]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
While it is true that “the competence of a lawyer’s tactical and strategic decision... is entitled to an additional measure of deference if he acts in conformity with the client’s wishes,” Summerlin v. Stewart, 267 F.3d 926, 948 (9th Cir.2001), counsel’s duty to investigate mitigating evidence is neither entirely removed nor substantially alleviated by his client’s direction not to call particular witnesses to the stand. See Jeffries, 5 F.3d at 1198 (finding no deficient performance where counsel was prepared to present mitigating evidence but precluded from doing so by client’s informed and knowing decision not to include it); see also Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1117 (9th Cir.1999) (“
|
9,397,736 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-01
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Silva v. Woodford
|
Silva v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 825 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
[a] habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing as a matter of right on a claim where the facts are disputed if two conditions are met: (1) the petitioner’s allegations would, if proved, entitle him to relief; and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.
|
Put another way, although Buckwalter’s decision not to cross-examine Thomas more forcefully about Silva’s adoptive admissions or the accident may seem ill-advised in retrospect, his explanation does not appear so unreasonable when viewed at the time of the trial as to violate Strickland’s minimum standard of competence.
Most importantly, Buckwalter secured an acquittal on one of the two murder charges Silva faced: the death of Laura Craig. In light of the overwhelming evidence presented by the state of Silva’s general involvement in the crimes — including physical evidence, weaponry, and other witness testimony placing Silva at the gas station and at Shelton’s ranch — this result militates strongly in favor of finding that counsel’s overall performance was adequate during the guilt phase. In sum, we conclude that Buckwalter was not deficient in his handling of Thomas’s testimony.
VII.
Finally, Silva argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the prosecution improperly failed to disclose an important component of a deal they struck with Thomas, to the effect that he would not be psychiatrically examined until after he testified in Silva’s trial. In support of this claim, Silva offers a declaration from Thomas’s attorney stating that he believed his brain-damaged client was either incompetent to stand trial or insane, and that he had immediate plans to have Thomas psychiatrically examined before striking the deal with the prosecution. This aspect of the alleged agreement was never divulged to Buckwalter or the trial judge, nor was it revealed by Thomas in his testimony before the jury.
Under pre-AEDPA law, which applies to this claim, “
|
9,396,802 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-06
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Pizzuto v. Arave
|
Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_11
|
A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim if ‘(1) the petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.’
|
VIII
Pizzuto contends that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on-his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial and sentencing, that he was denied an impar tial judge, and that the trial judge improperly relied on undisclosed information at sentencing. The district court meticulously went through every one of Pizzuto’s claims. To help it decide whether Pizzuto was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on any of the grounds in his petition, the court ordered him to make an offer of proof regarding extra-record evidence which he would seek to present through such a hearing. Pizzuto submitted substantive affidavits from Beaver, Ross, and himself. Having considered them along with everything in the record, the court concluded that there is no reasonable probability that Judge Reinhardt, absent the alleged errors by defense counsel, would have found the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death; thus, Pizzuto failed to make a colorable claim warranting an evi-dentiary hearing. It found that Pizzuto could not establish prejudice on his trial claims either, as there is not a reasonable probability a different outcome would have resulted had the jury heard evidence that Pizzuto suffered from a seizure or other psychological disorder. It held that Pizzu-to procedurally defaulted his claim of judicial bias, and failed to show either cause or prejudice to excuse it.
Prior to AEDPA, the rule was:
“A habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim if ‘(1) the petitioner’s allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, and (2) the state court trier of fact has not, after a full and fair hearing, reliably found the relevant facts.
|
9,398,067 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-19
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Woodford
|
Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_17
|
All counsel had to do was ask the question ‘What did all that extraordinary exposure to chemicals do to his brain?’ And then, in order to find the answer, he merely had to address the question to either a neurologist or a toxicologist.
|
Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1105, 120 S.Ct. 844, 145 L.Ed.2d 713 (2000) (counsel has “a professional responsibility to investigate and bring to the attention of mental health experts who are examining his client, facts that the experts do not request!.]”); Clabourne v. Lewis, 64 F.3d 1373, 1385 (9th Cir.1995). This duty to provide the appropriate experts with pertinent information about the defendant is key to developing an effective penalty phase presentation. Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1079-80 (9th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999).
In this case, counsel was aware of Caro’s extraordinary history of exposure to pesticides and toxic chemicals, yet he neither investigated fully this history nor informed the experts who examined Caro of those facts that were known to him. As we emphasized in our earlier opinion, “All counsel had to do was ask the question ‘What did all that extraordinary exposure to chemicals do to his brain?’
|
9,398,067 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-19
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Woodford
|
Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
all relevant mitigating information [must] be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
We have held that “
|
9,398,067 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-19
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Woodford
|
Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_1
|
The determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts; The statutory factors give the jury broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability.
|
Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227. “
|
9,396,011 | 11,783,522 |
2002-02-12
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Turner v. Calderon
|
Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851 (2002)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[I]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
See also Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 873-74 (9th Cir.2001) (holding defense counsel’s penalty phase performance constitutionally deficient where counsel “failed to adequately investigate, develop, and present mitigating evidence to the jury even though the issue before the jury was whetherfthe defendant] would live or die”); Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir.1999) (“
|
9,380,554 | 11,783,522 |
2003-01-24
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Douglas v. Woodford
|
Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (2003)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigation information be unearthed for consideration.
|
Peters attested during the habeas proceedings that at the time he was making the closing argument, he was afraid Douglas was going to “leap out and grab me around the throat” for disregarding his wishes.
Douglas contends here that much more information should have been discovered and presented at the penalty phase. At the evidentiary hearing, he presented detailed testimony of a difficult childhood. Douglas was abandoned as a child and raised by foster parents, including an abusive alcoholic foster father who locked him in a closet for long periods of time. He grew up in an extremely poor Chicago neighborhood where children had to scavenge for food in garbage cans and often ate lard or ketchup sandwiches. After running away at the age of fifteen to join the Marines, Douglas was arrested and put in a Florida jail where he was beaten and gang-raped by other inmates.
Additional character evidence was also available. In the Marines, Douglas earned a number of medals and commendations and also helped rescue two drowning sailors. Another witness testified that Douglas had been very helpful to her during her pregnancy and marital difficulties.
Finally, Douglas presented additional evidence of possible brain damage. After the military, Douglas began working in furniture refinishing and was exposed to toxic solvents daily. In 1967, Douglas was involved in a serious auto accident and suffered a concussion and damage to his left temporal lobe. He also consumed a great deal of alcohol on a daily basis from 1966 to 1977.
We first consider whether Peters’s investigation of Douglas’s social history was inadequate. Douglas was not forthcoming with useful information, but, as noted above, this does not excuse counsel’s obligation to obtain mitigating evidence from other sources. When it comes to the penalty phase of a capital trial, “
|
9,380,554 | 11,783,522 |
2003-01-24
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Douglas v. Woodford
|
Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079 (2003)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_4
|
have the benefit of expert testimony to explain the ramifications of these experiences on[defendant’s] behavior
|
See Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227 (holding that the jury did not “
|
1,037,327 | 11,783,522 |
2006-03-08
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Landrigan v. Schriro
|
Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness
|
In his state habeas petition, Landrigan made a general claim that his counsel had failed to investi gate and develop potential mitigating evidence, including his biological mother’s use of drugs and alcohol during gestation, his adoptive mother’s alcoholism and its adverse effect on Landrigan’s upbringing, and information regarding his biological father and his family history of violence. Landrigan sought the appointment of a medical expert to assist in establishing mitigating evidence regarding the effects of drug and alcohol use on a developing fetus, and also requested an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance claim. Landrigan supported his petition with various declarations by available witnesses who attested they were never contacted by Landrigan’s trial attorney, and with documentary evidence regarding criminal psy-chobiology and congenital determinants of violence. The state court denied both the appointment of an expert and Landrigan’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
Landrigan tried and failed, through no fault of his own, to develop the facts supporting his ineffective assistance claim at the state-court level. He is therefore not precluded by AEDPA from seeking an evi-dentiary hearing in federal court. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1169; Jones v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1002, 1013 (9th Cir.1997). In such circumstances, Landrigan is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he can establish a “colorable claim” for relief. See Earp, 431 F.3d at 1173.
II.
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the sentencing phase of a capital case. We analyze Landrigan’s claim that he was deprived of this right pursuant to the standards set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland: Landrigan must demonstrate that his counsel’s representation “
|
1,037,327 | 11,783,522 |
2006-03-08
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Landrigan v. Schriro
|
Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration.
|
466 U.S. at 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
A.
According to the prevailing standards at the time of Landrigan’s sentencing, counsel had an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background. As this court has also noted, when it comes to the penalty phase of a capital trial, “
|
9,058,551 | 11,783,522 |
2004-01-13
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
|
Rompilla v. Horn
|
Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233 (2004)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_8
|
A lawyer who knows of but does not inform his expert witnesses about ... essential pieces of information going to the heart of the case for mitigation does not function as ‘counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment.
|
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1123, 119 S.Ct. 907, 142 L.Ed.2d 905 (1999).
It was likewise not unreasonable for trial counsel to rely on its mental health experts to detect whether there was any basis for further pursuit of mitigating evidence relating to their client’s mental condition. Trial counsel retained no fewer than three highly qualified experts. Dr. Cooke and Dr. Sadoff looked for any evidence that could be used as mitigation but found none. A battery of tests was performed but yielded no indication of mental retardation or anything else that would have been useful for mitigation. Although all three of the experts testified that the records that PCRA counsel subsequently obtained would have caused them to do further investigation, none of the experts asked for records or suggested that any further testing be done.
In view of these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that trial counsel did not fall below the constitutionally mandated level of representation by failing to search out the records at issue and by failing to provide those records to their mental health experts. See Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir.1999) (“A lawyer who knows of but does not inform his expert witnesses about... essential pieces of information going to the heart of the case for mitigation does not function as ‘counsel’ under the Sixth Amendment.
|
9,018,384 | 11,783,522 |
2005-04-21
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Boyde v. Brown
|
Boyde v. Brown, 404 F.3d 1159 (2005)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigation information be unearthed for consideration.
|
Both Sauls and Will corroborated Ken-dricks’s report of frequent sexual abuse.
Even though Boyde’s counsel was aware of physical and sexual abuse by Boyde’s mother and stepfather, he failed to investigate that abuse. Because the defendant’s background is so important in the sentencing process, “
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
It is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
The penalty phase lacked a coherent narrative, but some themes included that petitioner abused alcohol; that his mother had suffered several mental breakdowns during his childhood; that petitioner had some emotional problems; that petitioner would probably not be dangerous in prison and that petitioner’s life should be saved due to familial love, his potential for religious salvation or both.
Dr. Girsh testified that petitioner likely suffered from borderline personality disorder and, on cross-examination, that petitioner may have suffered from antisocial personality disorder. (14 RT 3584, 3599.) Dr. Maloney testified that petitioner suffered from “emotional disturbances” from an early age, but that Dr. Maloney had no data to suggest that petitioner was psychotic, disturbed or unable to understand what he was doing at the time of the crimes. (14 RT 3473-74, 3475.) Neither Dr. Girsh nor Dr. Maloney knew the circumstances of petitioner’s in útero development or his inherited predisposition to mental illness.
The brief testimony from petitioner’s family members did not evoke much mercy. Petitioner’s adoptive mother provided largely scattered testimony about her mental illness, with no testimony about how her incapacitation affected petitioner. Petitioner’s adoptive father testified that petitioner was upset about his mother’s breakdowns but that he tried to be helpful, that petitioner was harassed a lot by the police due to his race, that petitioner was able to take care of himself starting around age seven or eight and that petitioner got angry when he did not get his way. Petitioner’s uncle testified that petitioner had too much responsibility heaped on him, that he did not have a backyard with grass growing up and that had a bad experience at Montessori preschool. Petitioner’s paternal aunt testified that she saw petitioner only two or three times a year since his adoption, but that she would commit to writing petitioner every month and visiting him every other month if he were sentenced to life without parole. A friend testified that petitioner convinced her to give up drinking and smoking because she had Diabetes.
“
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
[t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.
|
Moreover, “
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_6
|
that overwhelming evidence of guilt does not ameliorate the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.
|
Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner’s adoption and birth records would have shown that petitioner was born to a fourteen-year-old girl in a physically abusive relationship with an incarcerated eighteen-year-old. Petitioner was exposed to violence, drugs and alcohol in útero. Petitioner was delivered with forceps, which are known to cause neurological damage. (See Gur 2/8/05 Deel. at 14, ¶ 27.) Limited additional investigation into petitioner’s birth family would have shown that petitioner’s birth mother suffered from depression and that his father suffered from serious mental illness. Petitioner’s mental health experts did not know about the circumstances of petitioner’s birth family or in útero development, and the jury did not hear any such evidence. Had petitioner’s experts considered and testified about petitioner’s inherited vulnerability to mental illness, his exposure to toxins in útero and his forceps delivery, a substantially different case in mitigation would have been presented.
The Ninth Circuit has held “
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_1
|
the determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts. The statutory factors [in California] give the jury broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability.
|
In fact, “the determination of whether to impose a death sentence is not an ordinary legal determination which turns on the establishment of hard facts.
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_7
|
[c]ounsel have an obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult. Once that determination has been made, counsel must present those experts with information relevant to the conclusion of the expert.
|
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005) (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527). In this instance, however, effective representation would not have required counsel to do anything as dramatic as scour the globe in the hope that he would find something helpful.
In addition, “[c]ounsel have an obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult.
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_3
|
[t]he jury did not ... have the benefit of expert testimony to explain the ramifications of these experiences on [petitioner’s] behavior. Expert evidence is necessary on such issues when lay people are unable to make a reasoned judgment alone.
|
(14 RT 3478-79.) Counsel did not investigate or present any evidence about how being raised by a psychotic, schizophrenic mother and a paranoid father affected petitioner. Counsel presented some testimony that petitioner was raised by a mentally ill mother, but “[t]he jury did not... have the benefit of expert testimony to explain the ramifications of these experiences on [petitioner’s] behavior.
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_14
|
most likely to affect a jury’s evaluation of the punishment
|
Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.2001); see also Caro, 165 F.3d at 1226-27 (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where counsel failed to investigate and present “precisely the type” of mitigating evidence “
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_15
|
[i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase.
|
However, “
|
3,965,336 | 11,783,522 |
2011-08-16
|
United States District Court for the Central District of California
|
Hernandez v. Martel
|
Hernandez v. Martel, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (2011)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
The imperative to cast a wide net for all relevant mitigating evidence is heightened at a capital sentencing hearing because ‘the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.’
|
”); see also Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 989 (9th Cir.2006) (“The imperative to cast a wide net for all relevant mitigating evidence is heightened at a capital sentencing hearing because ‘the Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.
|
3,795,400 | 11,783,522 |
2010-08-20
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Crittenden v. Ayers
|
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
|
Nonetheless, even assuming that trial counsel’s performance “
|
3,795,400 | 11,783,522 |
2010-08-20
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Crittenden v. Ayers
|
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_7
|
conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult.
|
After being informed by Dr. Kaldor that there were “certain organic mental conditions which are associated with aggressive behavior and poor impulse control,” trial counsel explored this potential source of mitigating information. It is not disputed that the experts they retained were competent and “qualified to evaluate” Crittenden’s mental impairments. Trial counsel therefore fulfilled their obligation to “
|
3,795,400 | 11,783,522 |
2010-08-20
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Crittenden v. Ayers
|
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_9
|
present [appropriate] experts with information relevant to the conclusion of the expert.
|
Their investigative duties were not then at an end, however, because in the preparing for the penalty phase, counsel must also “
|
3,795,400 | 11,783,522 |
2010-08-20
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Crittenden v. Ayers
|
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_16
|
information necessary to make an accurate evaluation of [the defendant’s] neurological system
|
3d at 585-86 (rejecting IAC claim where counsel “retained and informed well-qualified experts upon whom [counsel] could reasonably rely”); cf. Caro, 165 F.3d at 1227 (criticizing trial counsel for failing to provide expert with the “
|
3,795,400 | 11,783,522 |
2010-08-20
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Crittenden v. Ayers
|
Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (2010)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_3
|
unable to make a reasoned judgment
|
Hoptowit’s closing argument reminded the jury of this medical testimony, emphasizing that the “frontal lobe area is — as Doctor Seals told you — the executive control area... [ijt’s the regulator and inhibitor of all other brain functions” and that Crittenden’s brain defect was “treatable[,j [c]ontrollable by medication.”
Crittenden complains that trial counsel did not say that such damage affected his “impulse” control, which Hoptowit now says was a “terrible oversight.” We decline to assign any talismanic quality to the word “impulse. Although “lay people” might well be “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
Silva, 279 F.3d at 835 (internal quotation marks omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
III. Penalty Phase Claims
Frierson raises three claims of error in the penalty phase of Frierson III, including two IAC claims. First, he alleges that Lieman was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence of chronic drug abuse, organic brain damage, and child abuse. Second, Frierson contends that Lieman was ineffective when he induced, and failed to challenge, White’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and in doing so prevented White from either confessing to the Green murder or being impeached with testimony of his earlier confession. Third, Frierson claims cumulative error.
To prevail on his IAC claims, Frierson must show that (i) Lieman’s performance was deficient, and (ii) this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. To satisfy the performance prong, Frierson must show that Lieman’s performance “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_12
|
where he neither conducted a reasonable investigation nor made a showing of strategic reasons for failing to do so.
|
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir.2005).
A. IAC Claim F(2): Failure to present mitigation evidence
Frierson alleges that Lieman rendered constitutionally defective assistance by failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase that included Frierson’s extensive drug history; early childhood head trauma, mental impairments and organic brain damage; and child abuse. We agree.
Deficient Performance
Counsel has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation so that he can make an informed decision about how best to represent his client. Thus, counsel may render ineffective assistance “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_0
|
[t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy.
|
Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1456 (9th Cir.1994). We have held that a failure to investigate and present, at the penalty phase of a capital trial, evidence of organic brain damage or other mental impairments, drug abuse, and a dysfunctional family or social environment may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate defendant’s mental impairments caused by childhood exposure to toxic chemicals); Wallace v. Stewart, 184 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that counsel was ineffective where counsel failed to investigate dysfunctional family background, drug history, and evidence of organic brain damage); Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1043 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to investigate readily available evidence of mental impairment). The imperative to cast a wide net for all relevant mitigating evidence is heightened at a capital sentencing hearing because “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_7
|
Counsel ... [has] an obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult.
|
However, Lieman did not read the transcripts of Frierson II and therefore could not have relied on Dr. Gillick’s testimony.
“Counsel... [has] an obligation to conduct an investigation which will allow a determination of what sort of experts to consult.
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_20
|
none of the experts were neurologists or toxicologists,
|
Caro, 165 F.3d at 1226. Caro had been exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals and pesticides as a child, and because “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_20
|
conduct[ ] the neurological testing needed to evaluate the effects that the pesticides and chemicals had on Caro’s brain.
|
Caro had been exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals and pesticides as a child, and because “none of the experts were neurologists or toxicologists,” none was able to “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_16
|
failed to provide [his expert] with the information necessary to make an accurate evaluation of [Frierson’s] neurological system.
|
But because Lieman never informed Dr. Gillick of the brain injuries or the Turner Report’s reference to organic brain damage, Lieman “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_10
|
broad latitude to consider amorphous human factors, in effect, to weigh the worth of one’s life against his culpability,
|
’ ” Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2462 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052). Because the evidence presented at each phase of a trial serves a markedly different purpose, we analyze the reasonableness of counsel’s efforts to prepare for trial and sentencing differently. As we explained in Wallace v. Stewart:
Hendricks alludes to why the lawyer’s burden might differ at the guilt phase from that at the penalty phase: Mental state is relevant at the guilt phase for issues such as competence to stand trial and legal insanity — technical questions where a defendant must show a specific and very substantial level of mental impairment. Most defendants don’t have problems this severe, and counsel can’t be expected to know that further investigation is necessary to develop these issues. By contrast, all potentially mitigating evidence is relevant at the sentencing phase of a death case, so a troubled childhood and mental problems may help even if they don’t rise to a specific, technically-defined level.
184 F.3d at 1117 n. 5. Thus in Hendricks, we held that it was reasonable for counsel to rely on his experts’ findings that no diminished capacity defense was available at the guilt phase, and to terminate his perfunctory investigation of his client’s known mental impairments. See 70 F.3d at 1038. Because a sentencing jury is given “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_19
|
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
|
Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 538, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (internal quotation marks omitted). We reverse the district court’s denial of habeas relief as to Frierson’s death penalty sentence on the basis of this IAC claim alone.
B. IAC Claim F(3): White’s Invocation of the Fifth Amendment
Frierson claims that Lieman was ineffective for inducing and failing to challenge Louis White’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when Lieman knew, or should have known, that in 1972 the juvenile court acquitted White of the charge of murder for the Green homicide.
Deficient Performance
It is clear that Lieman’s conduct as counsel “
|
3,724,047 | 11,783,522 |
2006-09-14
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Frierson v. Woodford
|
Frierson v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982 (2006)
|
1998-10-27
|
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
|
Caro v. Calderon
|
Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223 (1998)
|
11783522_6
|
overwhelming evidence of guilt does not ameliorate the failure to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase.
|
The district court misapprehended the different purposes for the drug evidence at each phase of trial. Evidence of a history of chronic drug abuse may not have been sufficient to demonstrate that Frierson lacked the requisite mental state for the crime, but the extent of Frierson’s drug use from an early age was an important mitigating factor that the jury did not have an opportunity to consider. We also note that "
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.