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*693OPINION. Lansdon: The Revenue Act of 1921 provides in section 234 (a) (5) that the class of deductions contended for by the petitioner in this appeal, shall be allowed in cases where the bad debts are ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year. It is conceded that these debts were charged off by petitioner in 1924; also that they were worthless at the time. The respondent contends, however, that they were worthless and uncollectible in prior years, and, that in the situation which obtained in 1923, we must, as a matter of law, regard the petitioner as having ascertained their true condition not later than that year. Conceding that forcible collection of the notes was barred by the statute of limitations at the time she presented them to the executor for payment, the petitioner now makes a special plea of fact, which, she claims, entitles her to the deductions in the taxable year. She asserts, that in good faith and in virtue of the memorandum given *694to her by the son prior to his death, which she believed was a sufficient acknowledgment under the California laws to revive the statute and extend their enforceable life, she considered the notes good until their repudiation. The record convinces us as to the good faith of the petitioner. Her claim is based upon actual worthlessness for which the law intended she could apply in reduction of her taxes. As against her contention that the proper year for such deduction was 1924, when she first learned that nothing would be paid on her notes, the respondent asks us to indulge in an irrebuttable legal presumption that the notes, in fact, lost all value at the death of their maker in October, 1923, because no one thereafter could waive the statute of limitations which barred their forcible collection. He argues, also, that since all persons are presumed to know the law, the petitioner was chargeable with knowledge of worthlessness at the time and that it must be presumed that she ascertained her loss in that year and not in 1924. We think the respondent’s position in respect to both points stated is unsound in law. In the first place, although the statute of limitations had run on these notes and their maker’s executor was without power to waive that bar, such fact did not per se destroy their value, since they were still bona fide debts in favor of the petitioner. Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271; 17 Pac. 225; De Cazara v. Orina, 88 Cal. 437; 22 Pac. 74; Spect v. Spect, 88 Cal. 437; 26 Pac. 203. Outlawed notes, in suits by an administrator against their holder, have been successfully pleaded in matters of defense (see Puckhaber v. Henry, 152 Cal. 419; 93 Pac. 114), and we are unable to say in this case what the value of these notes may have been in the hands of the petitioner. A statute of limitations takes away no right of property (Cooley on Const. Law, p. 340) and, being merely a statute of repose, determines no issues of merit between debtor and creditor. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 623. The debtor has no vested right in such a defense. A legislature may repeal or extend the statute and revive the right of action at any time. A suit may be successfully maintained on them in another jurisdiction, if brought within the period there allowed, and service is obtainable on the debtor. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620; McEldowney v. Wyett, 44 W. Va. 711; 45 L. R. A. 609; Hulbert v. Clark, 129 N. Y. 295; 14 L. R. A. 59. If, however, we could agree with the contentions of the respondent on his first proposition as to the date when these notes became un-collectible, we are not persuaded that the petitioner is legally bound to take notice of such date. The provisions of law which allow the deduction here, claimed require the petitioner to show that she charged the amount off her books in the year of ascertainment of its worthlessness, from which we think it follows that she must have *695actual and not constructive knowledge of the facts in order to take advantage of its provision. Where property rights alone are affected by actual knowledge of a basic fact, there is no rule of law which conclusively presumes such knowledge. Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191. The maxim that everyone is presumed to know the law has no application here. Its provisions are limited to the necessities which gave rise to its adoption in order to prevent offenders against criminal laws from pleading ignorance as a defense, and, in cases of fraud, to escape responsibility for their acts. Topolewski v. Plankington Packing Co., 126 U. S. 654. In this case the court, anent the doctrine discussed, among other things, said: There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so * * *. If everybody knew the law there would be no need of courts of appeal whose existence show that judges may be ignorant of the law. It is obvious that the statute here applicable intended that the taxpayer, and not the law, should determine when bad debts were to be considered worthless in his hands, requiring only that good faith be shown. The provision here discussed has been many times construed by the courts and this Board, and it has been always held that it is the date of ascertainment of worthlessness by the taxpayer, and not of the worthlessness as later facts might develop, which governs. Jones v. Commissioner, 38 Fed. (2d) 550; Stephenson v. Commissioner, 43 Fed. (2d) 348; Murchison National Bank, 1 B. T. A. 617; Samuel Bird, 4 B. T. A. 259; Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 8 B. T. A. 566; Mitten v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A. 731; R. B. Lawler, Executor, 17 B. T. A. 1083; Ida C. Calloway, Executrix, 18 B. T. A. 1059; American Warehouse Co., 19 B. T. A. 8. In United States v. Frost, 25 Fed. Cas. 1221, No. 15,172, this identical provision, then a part of the income-tax law of 1864, came before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for construction; the question being whether or not the judgment of the taxpayer, in respect to a similar claim, should prevail as against facts indicating worthlessness at a different date. Respecting the language used in that law, which was identical with the recitals here considered in section 214, supra, the court, among other things, said: The language is “ to ascertain to be worthless.” By whom or how? The law is silent on this important point, and, therefore, there must be a discretion given,to the person making his return, and if that discretion is used fairly and honestly there would seem to be no just ground for complaint. There has been no change of opinion expressed by the courts in respect to the construction put upon this provision of the tax laws since the early decision just cited; and in American Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 31 Fed. (2d) 47, the court, in recognition of the falli*696bility of human judgment, held that, to entitle the taxpayer to take such a'deduction, the ascertainment need not be absolute and that a claim may be duly ascertained to be worthless though later it may prove to be in fact collectible. It follows, from this holding, that in a reverse situation, where an over optimistic taxpayer erred in judgment, the same good faith when exercised in ascertainment of worthlessness must be the only criterion by which we can determine his rights. In support of this view, the court in Jones v. Commissioner, supra, said: In the light of subsequent events, it is quite easy now to determine that the debt was worthless before 1921; but the real question with which we are concerned is, not when did the debt become worthless, but when did decedent ascertain it to be worthless. Also, in Murchison National Bank, supra, and in Samuel Bird, supra, the deductions were allowed by this Board for years subsequent to those in which the admitted facts show the debts were actually worthless. Our decisions in these two cases would seem to apply here, in view of the respondent’s contention that when, in the eyes of the law, forcible collection of an obligation is considered at an end, the taxpayer is bound to take notice of such fact and claim his deduction in that year. The claims in the cases cited were based in each case on investments made in bonds of the Imperial Bussian Government, which was overthrown in March, 1917. In January, 1918, the Soviet Government, by official decree, repudiated all of such bonds, which entirely destroyed their value as of and from that date. The petitioners deferred claiming their deduction until later years, trusting for a fortunate turn in events to restore the lost values. Of course all of these bonds were as “uncollectible” after February, 1918, as were the petitioner’s notes after October, 1923, but their holders considered them as having value notwithstanding. In the Murchison National Bank case the taxpayer ascertained worthlessness and charged off the amount thereof on part of its bonds in 1920. This Board allowed the deduction so claimed, and in its opinion said: The Soviet Government on February 8, 1918, repudiated the bonds which taxpayer held, and from that date to the present time has not revoked, rescinded or modified its decree of repudiation. The bonds matured on June 18, 1919, but were not paid; they still remain unpaid. We know of no method or tribunal by which or before which taxpayer can enforce payment of the obligation. In short, we cannot see that at the present time the ’bonds have any value whatever, unless it be a mere speculative value, or that they had any more value in 1920 than at the present time. We are of the opinion that the bonds were worthless in 1920, and, in view of the circumstances under which they were charged off, the taxpayer should be permitted to take the full amount paid for the bonds as a deduction in determining its net income for that year. *697Whatever may have been the basis of the petitioner’s belief in the value of her notes after the death of her son, her failure to claim a deduction in 1923, which she might easily have done, indicates to us her good faith in their worth up to the time she now claims she actually ascertained that they were, in fact, worthless. Her belief in the sufficiency of the written memorandum, delivered to her in May preceding her son’s death, to extend the collectible life of the notes was, under the circumstances, adequate to justify her presenting them to the executor for payment, or for bringing suit upon them in event payment was refused. Cf. Appeal of Kate I. Nixon, 2 B. T. A. 524. The year of ascertainment of the loss here involved was 1924. Reviewed by the Board.
Decision will be entered for the petitioner.
Morris, Sternhagen, Arundell, and Van Fossan dissent. | 01-17-2020 | [
"*693OPINION. Lansdon: The Revenue Act of 1921 provides in section 234 (a) (5) that the class of deductions contended for by the petitioner in this appeal, shall be allowed in cases where the bad debts are ascertained to be worthless and charged off within the taxable year. It is conceded that these debts were charged off by petitioner in 1924; also that they were worthless at the time. The respondent contends, however, that they were worthless and uncollectible in prior years, and, that in the situation which obtained in 1923, we must, as a matter of law, regard the petitioner as having ascertained their true condition not later than that year. Conceding that forcible collection of the notes was barred by the statute of limitations at the time she presented them to the executor for payment, the petitioner now makes a special plea of fact, which, she claims, entitles her to the deductions in the taxable year. She asserts, that in good faith and in virtue of the memorandum given *694to her by the son prior to his death, which she believed was a sufficient acknowledgment under the California laws to revive the statute and extend their enforceable life, she considered the notes good until their repudiation.",
"The record convinces us as to the good faith of the petitioner. Her claim is based upon actual worthlessness for which the law intended she could apply in reduction of her taxes. As against her contention that the proper year for such deduction was 1924, when she first learned that nothing would be paid on her notes, the respondent asks us to indulge in an irrebuttable legal presumption that the notes, in fact, lost all value at the death of their maker in October, 1923, because no one thereafter could waive the statute of limitations which barred their forcible collection.",
"He argues, also, that since all persons are presumed to know the law, the petitioner was chargeable with knowledge of worthlessness at the time and that it must be presumed that she ascertained her loss in that year and not in 1924. We think the respondent’s position in respect to both points stated is unsound in law. In the first place, although the statute of limitations had run on these notes and their maker’s executor was without power to waive that bar, such fact did not per se destroy their value, since they were still bona fide debts in favor of the petitioner. Booth v. Hoskins, 75 Cal. 271; 17 Pac. 225; De Cazara v. Orina, 88 Cal.",
"437; 22 Pac. 74; Spect v. Spect, 88 Cal. 437; 26 Pac. 203. Outlawed notes, in suits by an administrator against their holder, have been successfully pleaded in matters of defense (see Puckhaber v. Henry, 152 Cal. 419; 93 Pac. 114), and we are unable to say in this case what the value of these notes may have been in the hands of the petitioner. A statute of limitations takes away no right of property (Cooley on Const. Law, p. 340) and, being merely a statute of repose, determines no issues of merit between debtor and creditor. Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 623.",
"The debtor has no vested right in such a defense. A legislature may repeal or extend the statute and revive the right of action at any time. A suit may be successfully maintained on them in another jurisdiction, if brought within the period there allowed, and service is obtainable on the debtor. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620; McEldowney v. Wyett, 44 W. Va. 711; 45 L. R. A. 609; Hulbert v. Clark, 129 N. Y. 295; 14 L. R. A. 59. If, however, we could agree with the contentions of the respondent on his first proposition as to the date when these notes became un-collectible, we are not persuaded that the petitioner is legally bound to take notice of such date.",
"The provisions of law which allow the deduction here, claimed require the petitioner to show that she charged the amount off her books in the year of ascertainment of its worthlessness, from which we think it follows that she must have *695actual and not constructive knowledge of the facts in order to take advantage of its provision. Where property rights alone are affected by actual knowledge of a basic fact, there is no rule of law which conclusively presumes such knowledge. Black v. Ward, 27 Mich. 191. The maxim that everyone is presumed to know the law has no application here. Its provisions are limited to the necessities which gave rise to its adoption in order to prevent offenders against criminal laws from pleading ignorance as a defense, and, in cases of fraud, to escape responsibility for their acts.",
"Topolewski v. Plankington Packing Co., 126 U. S. 654. In this case the court, anent the doctrine discussed, among other things, said: There is no presumption in this country that every person knows the law; it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were so * * *. If everybody knew the law there would be no need of courts of appeal whose existence show that judges may be ignorant of the law. It is obvious that the statute here applicable intended that the taxpayer, and not the law, should determine when bad debts were to be considered worthless in his hands, requiring only that good faith be shown. The provision here discussed has been many times construed by the courts and this Board, and it has been always held that it is the date of ascertainment of worthlessness by the taxpayer, and not of the worthlessness as later facts might develop, which governs. Jones v. Commissioner, 38 Fed. (2d) 550; Stephenson v. Commissioner, 43 Fed. (2d) 348; Murchison National Bank, 1 B. T. A. 617; Samuel Bird, 4 B. T. A.",
"259; Higginbotham-Bailey-Logan Co., 8 B. T. A. 566; Mitten v. Commissioner, 11 B. T. A. 731; R. B. Lawler, Executor, 17 B. T. A. 1083; Ida C. Calloway, Executrix, 18 B. T. A. 1059; American Warehouse Co., 19 B. T. A. 8. In United States v. Frost, 25 Fed. Cas. 1221, No. 15,172, this identical provision, then a part of the income-tax law of 1864, came before the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for construction; the question being whether or not the judgment of the taxpayer, in respect to a similar claim, should prevail as against facts indicating worthlessness at a different date. Respecting the language used in that law, which was identical with the recitals here considered in section 214, supra, the court, among other things, said: The language is “ to ascertain to be worthless.” By whom or how?",
"The law is silent on this important point, and, therefore, there must be a discretion given,to the person making his return, and if that discretion is used fairly and honestly there would seem to be no just ground for complaint. There has been no change of opinion expressed by the courts in respect to the construction put upon this provision of the tax laws since the early decision just cited; and in American Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 31 Fed. (2d) 47, the court, in recognition of the falli*696bility of human judgment, held that, to entitle the taxpayer to take such a'deduction, the ascertainment need not be absolute and that a claim may be duly ascertained to be worthless though later it may prove to be in fact collectible. It follows, from this holding, that in a reverse situation, where an over optimistic taxpayer erred in judgment, the same good faith when exercised in ascertainment of worthlessness must be the only criterion by which we can determine his rights. In support of this view, the court in Jones v. Commissioner, supra, said: In the light of subsequent events, it is quite easy now to determine that the debt was worthless before 1921; but the real question with which we are concerned is, not when did the debt become worthless, but when did decedent ascertain it to be worthless.",
"Also, in Murchison National Bank, supra, and in Samuel Bird, supra, the deductions were allowed by this Board for years subsequent to those in which the admitted facts show the debts were actually worthless. Our decisions in these two cases would seem to apply here, in view of the respondent’s contention that when, in the eyes of the law, forcible collection of an obligation is considered at an end, the taxpayer is bound to take notice of such fact and claim his deduction in that year. The claims in the cases cited were based in each case on investments made in bonds of the Imperial Bussian Government, which was overthrown in March, 1917. In January, 1918, the Soviet Government, by official decree, repudiated all of such bonds, which entirely destroyed their value as of and from that date. The petitioners deferred claiming their deduction until later years, trusting for a fortunate turn in events to restore the lost values. Of course all of these bonds were as “uncollectible” after February, 1918, as were the petitioner’s notes after October, 1923, but their holders considered them as having value notwithstanding. In the Murchison National Bank case the taxpayer ascertained worthlessness and charged off the amount thereof on part of its bonds in 1920. This Board allowed the deduction so claimed, and in its opinion said: The Soviet Government on February 8, 1918, repudiated the bonds which taxpayer held, and from that date to the present time has not revoked, rescinded or modified its decree of repudiation.",
"The bonds matured on June 18, 1919, but were not paid; they still remain unpaid. We know of no method or tribunal by which or before which taxpayer can enforce payment of the obligation. In short, we cannot see that at the present time the ’bonds have any value whatever, unless it be a mere speculative value, or that they had any more value in 1920 than at the present time. We are of the opinion that the bonds were worthless in 1920, and, in view of the circumstances under which they were charged off, the taxpayer should be permitted to take the full amount paid for the bonds as a deduction in determining its net income for that year. *697Whatever may have been the basis of the petitioner’s belief in the value of her notes after the death of her son, her failure to claim a deduction in 1923, which she might easily have done, indicates to us her good faith in their worth up to the time she now claims she actually ascertained that they were, in fact, worthless.",
"Her belief in the sufficiency of the written memorandum, delivered to her in May preceding her son’s death, to extend the collectible life of the notes was, under the circumstances, adequate to justify her presenting them to the executor for payment, or for bringing suit upon them in event payment was refused. Cf. Appeal of Kate I. Nixon, 2 B. T. A. 524. The year of ascertainment of the loss here involved was 1924. Reviewed by the Board.",
"Decision will be entered for the petitioner. Morris, Sternhagen, Arundell, and Van Fossan dissent."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/4492463/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Amendment The amendment filed 01/07/2021 has been entered.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-4, 10, 12, and 14-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FAIVRE (US 2017/0356794) in view of MIYATA (US 2016/0348857). Regarding claim 1, FAIVRE discloses a light converting device (1, see Fig. 1, Para. 0083) comprising: a light converter (phosphor pad 12, see Figs. 2A and 2B, Para. 0010) with a light entrance surface and a light emission surface, the light converter (phosphor pad 12) arranged to convert laser light scanned over the light entrance surface to converted light (see Para. 0011), with a peak emission wavelength of the converted light However, FAIVRE does not explicitly disclose a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter. MIYATA teaches a light source device having a light converter (wavelength converting member 2 formed of phosphor particles 10, see Fig. 1, Para. 0050-0051) and includes a confinement structure (sealed housing 4, see Fig.1, Para. 0050-0052); wherein the confinement structure having the geometric shape approximately matching the geometric shape (rectangular parallelepiped in shape, see Para. 0052) of the light converter (wavelength converting member 2) and with a gap (a gas channel region 8, see Fig. 1, Para. 0052) between the confinement structure (sealed housing 4) and the light emission surface of the light converter (see Fig. 1)such that the heat obtained from the phosphor particles (10) is radiated to the outside of the sealed housing (4, see Para. 0055). Therefore in view of MIYATA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE’s confinement structure to have a geometric shape approximately matching the geometric shape of the light converter on and include a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter as taught by MIYATA thereby the
Regarding claim 2, FAIVRE further discloses the light converter (12) is characterized by a thickness d (see Fig. 2B) perpendicular to the light entrance surface, wherein the confinement structure (the ceramic ring 10 and protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B) is arranged to keep a broken piece of the light converter with the thickness d perpendicular to the light entrance surface at a position of the mechanical failure of the light converter (as shown in figure 2B the ceramic ring 10 and protective glass 14 are arranged to keep the deteriorations 16, such as cracks or breaks with the thickness d, see Fig. 2B).
Regarding claims 3 and 16-19, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure (as shown in figure 2B the ceramic ring 10 and protective glass 14) is arranged such that there is a width g of a gap between the confinement structure and the light entrance surface or of the gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface (i.e. free space below the pad 12 and around the light entrance surface, see Fig. 2A). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the width g of the gap perpendicular to the light entrance surface or the light emission surface is less than 2µm; wherein the gap is less than 3 µm; wherein the gap is less than 1 µm; wherein the gap comprises micro-gaps. MIYATA further teaches the gas channel region (8) includes the micro-passages (channel 6, see Para. 0058); wherein the channel (6) is a micro-passages can be defined by the particles with a diameter in a range of 1 µm to 1 mm (see Para. 0053) Therefore in view of MIYATA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE to form the gap to be less than 1µm for providing optimum light-emission spot size, since it has been held that where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, discovering the optimum or workable ranges involves only ordinary skill in the art. In re Aller, 105 USPQ 233.
Regarding claim 4, FAIVRE further discloses wherein the gap is arranged such that there is a mechanical contact but no optical contact between the confinement structure (10) and the light entrance surface or between the confinement structure and the light emission surface (see Fig. 2A).
Regarding claim 10, FAIVRE further discloses comprising a failure sensor (detection device and sensor, see Figs. 3, 4, and 7, Para. 0078, 0084, 0103), wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a damage of the confinement structure.
Regarding claim 12, FAIVRE further discloses a laser-based light source (1, see Fig. 1) comprising: a light converting device according to claim 1, and a laser (laser light source 2, see Fig. 1, Para. 0008) adapted to emit the laser light.
Regarding claim 14, FAIVRE further discloses A vehicle headlight comprising a laser-based light source according to claim 12 (see Para. 0003, 0013, 0069).
Regarding claim 15, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure improves the safety of the light converting device such that eye safety of the light converting device is increased (i.e. as shown in the figure the ring 10 has an opening for accommodating the pad 12 and the protective glass 14 cover over the pad 12 to carry out an equivalent functionality, see Para. 0010 and 0012).
Regarding claim 20, FAIVRE in view of MIYATA further discloses the gap creates optical decoupling between the light converter and the confinement structure (i.e. free space below the light converter on the top portion and with a gap between the confinement structures).
Claims 5-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FAIVRE (US 2017/0356794) in view of MIYATA (US 2016/0348857) and further in view of Anc et al. (US 2016/0369954). Regarding claims 5-7, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure comprises a confinement cover (e.g. protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the confinement structure includes a substrate and wherein the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover; wherein the substrate is transparent in the wavelength range comprising the laser peak emission wavelength, wherein the light entrance surface is Anc et al. teaches a light converter assembly (100, see Figs. 1 and 7) including a first substrate (102), phosphor material (104), confinement material (106) and second substrate (108, see Para. 0024) to provide high heat conductance and preferably an airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material (see Para. 0019), wherein the substrate is transparent (see Para. 0024) in the wavelength range comprising the laser peak emission wavelength, wherein the light entrance surface is arranged next to the substrate, wherein the light emission surface is different from the light entrance surface, and wherein the light emission surface is arranged next to a surface of the confinement cover, as recited in claim 6; wherein the substrate is in mechanical contact but not in optical contact to the light entrance surface, as recited in claim 7 (see Figs. 3A-3B, Para. 0030-0031). Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate as taught by Anc et al. thereby the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover (14) in order to provide airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material and improved cooling means. One would have been motivated to make this combination to
Regarding claim 8, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement cover (protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B) is in mechanical contact but not in optical contact to the light emission surface.
Regarding claim 9, FAIVRE further discloses a reflective structure (i.e. the ceramic ring 10 having a reflecting coating, see Para. 0010), wherein the reflective structure is arranged to reflect laser light received via the light entrance surface of the light converter and converted light to the light emission surface (see Para. 0082). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the substrate is coupled to a reflective structure. Anc et al. teaches the substrate (102, 108, see Figs. 3A and 3B) is coupled to a reflective structure (300/302. See Fig. 3A, see Para. 0030) wherein the reflective structure is arranged to reflect laser light received via the light entrance surface of the light converter and converted light to the light emission surface. Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate to be coupled with a reflective structure as taught by Anc et al. thereby the confinement layer (106A) does not have to be optically non-absorbing (see Para. 0030).
Claims 11 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FAIVRE (US 2017/0356794) in view of MIYATA (US 2016/0348857) and further in view of OGURA (US 2015/0085262) and Anc et al. (US 2016/0369954). Regarding claim 11, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure comprises a confinement cover (e.g. protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the confinement structure includes a substrate and wherein the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover, and wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate. OGURA teaches a luminescent light emitting device (100, see Fig. 7, Para. 0029, 0080) that includes a luminescent material plate (101) fixed to a front surface of a retaining substrate (113), a thin connecting material (112) and conductive thin wire film (105); wherein when the luminescent material plate (101) is damaged, the conductive thin wire is also damaged to be disconnected (see Para. 0082 and 0083) whereby the operation of a light source unit (60) including the excitation light sources (71) and the like or the projector (1) can be stopped (see Para. 0012-0013, 0083). Anc et al. teaches a light converter assembly (100, see Figs. 1 and 7) including a first substrate (102), phosphor material (104), confinement material (106) and second substrate (108, see Para. 0024) to provide high heat conductance and preferably an airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material (see Para. 0019). Therefore, in view of OGURA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by OGURA to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate thereby the operation of laser light source can be stopped. One would have been motivated to make this combination to provide a hermetically sealed environment for a phosphor material whereby the safety is ensured (see Para. 0010). Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate as taught by Anc et al. thereby the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover (14) in order to provide airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material and improved cooling means. One would have been motivated to make this combination to provide a hermetically sealed environment for a phosphor material and preventing overheating of the phosphor material.
Regarding claim 13, FAIVRE further discloses the light converting device comprises a failure sensor (see Fig. 3), wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a damage of the confinement structure that includes a confinement cover (14) and wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate, the laser-based light source further comprising a failure detector, wherein the failure detector is coupled with the failure sensor, wherein the failure detector is arranged to generate a control signal upon detection of the damage of the confinement structure, and wherein the laser-based light source is arranged to switch However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the confinement structure comprises a substrate wherein the light converter is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover. OGURA teaches a luminescent light emitting device (100, see Fig. 7, Para. 0029, 0080) that includes a luminescent material plate (101) fixed to a front surface of a retaining substrate (113), a thin connecting material (112) and conductive thin wire film (105); wherein when the luminescent material plate (101) is damaged, the conductive thin wire is also damaged to be disconnected (see Para. 0082 and 0083) whereby the operation of a light source unit (60) including the excitation light sources (71) and the like or the projector (1) can be stopped (see Para. 0012-0013, 0083). Anc et al. teaches a light converter assembly (100, see Figs. 1 and 7) including a first substrate (102), phosphor material (104), confinement material (106) and second substrate (108, see Para. 0024) to provide high heat conductance and preferably an airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material (see Para. 0019). Therefore, in view of OGURA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate and failure detection means as taught by OGURA to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate thereby the operation of laser light source can be stopped. One would have been motivated to make Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate as taught by Anc et al. thereby the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover (14) in order to provide airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material and improved cooling means. One would have been motivated to make this combination to provide a hermetically sealed environment for a phosphor material and preventing overheating of the phosphor material.
Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments filed 01/07/2021 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually (i.e. FAIVRE fails to teach a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter, MIYATA’s seal housing cannot provide any tight mechanical conformation for phosphor particles, Anc fails mention any aspects of the laser safty), one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed. Cir. 1986). In this case, FAIVRE teaches tight mechanical conformation. However, fails to teach a gap between the confinement structure and the MIYATA teaches gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter. Therefore, FAIVRE as modified in view of MIYATA teaches a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter. In response to applicant’s arguments that FAIVRE failed to disclose individually, or suggest in combination, “a tight mechanical confinement structure”, the applicant is respectfully advised that while the claims of issued patents are interpreted in light of the specification, prosecution history, prior art and other claims, this is not the mode of claim interpretation to be applied during examination. During examination, the claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. In re American Academy of Science Tech Center, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir. May 13, 2004). In this case, FAIVRE teaches mechanical confinement structure that surrounds the light converter therefore limit lateral shifts of the light converter.
Conclusion THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Tsion Tumebo whose telephone number is 571-270-1668. The examiner can normally be reached on 7:30 am to 4:00 pm, Monday thru Friday. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jong-Suk (James) Lee can be reached on (571)272-7044. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /TSION TUMEBO/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2875 | 2021-05-03T05:43:57 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Amendment The amendment filed 01/07/2021 has been entered. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.",
"Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claims 1-4, 10, 12, and 14-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FAIVRE (US 2017/0356794) in view of MIYATA (US 2016/0348857). Regarding claim 1, FAIVRE discloses a light converting device (1, see Fig. 1, Para. 0083) comprising: a light converter (phosphor pad 12, see Figs. 2A and 2B, Para. 0010) with a light entrance surface and a light emission surface, the light converter (phosphor pad 12) arranged to convert laser light scanned over the light entrance surface to converted light (see Para.",
"0011), with a peak emission wavelength of the converted light However, FAIVRE does not explicitly disclose a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter. MIYATA teaches a light source device having a light converter (wavelength converting member 2 formed of phosphor particles 10, see Fig. 1, Para. 0050-0051) and includes a confinement structure (sealed housing 4, see Fig.1, Para. 0050-0052); wherein the confinement structure having the geometric shape approximately matching the geometric shape (rectangular parallelepiped in shape, see Para. 0052) of the light converter (wavelength converting member 2) and with a gap (a gas channel region 8, see Fig. 1, Para. 0052) between the confinement structure (sealed housing 4) and the light emission surface of the light converter (see Fig. 1)such that the heat obtained from the phosphor particles (10) is radiated to the outside of the sealed housing (4, see Para.",
"0055). Therefore in view of MIYATA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE’s confinement structure to have a geometric shape approximately matching the geometric shape of the light converter on and include a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter as taught by MIYATA thereby the Regarding claim 2, FAIVRE further discloses the light converter (12) is characterized by a thickness d (see Fig. 2B) perpendicular to the light entrance surface, wherein the confinement structure (the ceramic ring 10 and protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B) is arranged to keep a broken piece of the light converter with the thickness d perpendicular to the light entrance surface at a position of the mechanical failure of the light converter (as shown in figure 2B the ceramic ring 10 and protective glass 14 are arranged to keep the deteriorations 16, such as cracks or breaks with the thickness d, see Fig.",
"2B). Regarding claims 3 and 16-19, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure (as shown in figure 2B the ceramic ring 10 and protective glass 14) is arranged such that there is a width g of a gap between the confinement structure and the light entrance surface or of the gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface (i.e. free space below the pad 12 and around the light entrance surface, see Fig. 2A). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the width g of the gap perpendicular to the light entrance surface or the light emission surface is less than 2µm; wherein the gap is less than 3 µm; wherein the gap is less than 1 µm; wherein the gap comprises micro-gaps. MIYATA further teaches the gas channel region (8) includes the micro-passages (channel 6, see Para. 0058); wherein the channel (6) is a micro-passages can be defined by the particles with a diameter in a range of 1 µm to 1 mm (see Para. 0053) Therefore in view of MIYATA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE to form the gap to be less than 1µm for providing optimum light-emission spot size, since it has been held that where the general conditions of a claim are disclosed in the prior art, discovering the optimum or workable ranges involves only ordinary skill in the art. In re Aller, 105 USPQ 233.",
"Regarding claim 4, FAIVRE further discloses wherein the gap is arranged such that there is a mechanical contact but no optical contact between the confinement structure (10) and the light entrance surface or between the confinement structure and the light emission surface (see Fig. 2A). Regarding claim 10, FAIVRE further discloses comprising a failure sensor (detection device and sensor, see Figs. 3, 4, and 7, Para. 0078, 0084, 0103), wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a damage of the confinement structure. Regarding claim 12, FAIVRE further discloses a laser-based light source (1, see Fig. 1) comprising: a light converting device according to claim 1, and a laser (laser light source 2, see Fig. 1, Para.",
"0008) adapted to emit the laser light. Regarding claim 14, FAIVRE further discloses A vehicle headlight comprising a laser-based light source according to claim 12 (see Para. 0003, 0013, 0069). Regarding claim 15, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure improves the safety of the light converting device such that eye safety of the light converting device is increased (i.e. as shown in the figure the ring 10 has an opening for accommodating the pad 12 and the protective glass 14 cover over the pad 12 to carry out an equivalent functionality, see Para.",
"0010 and 0012). Regarding claim 20, FAIVRE in view of MIYATA further discloses the gap creates optical decoupling between the light converter and the confinement structure (i.e. free space below the light converter on the top portion and with a gap between the confinement structures). Claims 5-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FAIVRE (US 2017/0356794) in view of MIYATA (US 2016/0348857) and further in view of Anc et al. (US 2016/0369954). Regarding claims 5-7, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure comprises a confinement cover (e.g. protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the confinement structure includes a substrate and wherein the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover; wherein the substrate is transparent in the wavelength range comprising the laser peak emission wavelength, wherein the light entrance surface is Anc et al. teaches a light converter assembly (100, see Figs. 1 and 7) including a first substrate (102), phosphor material (104), confinement material (106) and second substrate (108, see Para.",
"0024) to provide high heat conductance and preferably an airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material (see Para. 0019), wherein the substrate is transparent (see Para. 0024) in the wavelength range comprising the laser peak emission wavelength, wherein the light entrance surface is arranged next to the substrate, wherein the light emission surface is different from the light entrance surface, and wherein the light emission surface is arranged next to a surface of the confinement cover, as recited in claim 6; wherein the substrate is in mechanical contact but not in optical contact to the light entrance surface, as recited in claim 7 (see Figs. 3A-3B, Para. 0030-0031). Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate as taught by Anc et al. thereby the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover (14) in order to provide airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material and improved cooling means. One would have been motivated to make this combination to Regarding claim 8, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement cover (protective glass 14, see Fig.",
"2B) is in mechanical contact but not in optical contact to the light emission surface. Regarding claim 9, FAIVRE further discloses a reflective structure (i.e. the ceramic ring 10 having a reflecting coating, see Para. 0010), wherein the reflective structure is arranged to reflect laser light received via the light entrance surface of the light converter and converted light to the light emission surface (see Para. 0082). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the substrate is coupled to a reflective structure.",
"Anc et al. teaches the substrate (102, 108, see Figs. 3A and 3B) is coupled to a reflective structure (300/302. See Fig. 3A, see Para. 0030) wherein the reflective structure is arranged to reflect laser light received via the light entrance surface of the light converter and converted light to the light emission surface. Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate to be coupled with a reflective structure as taught by Anc et al. thereby the confinement layer (106A) does not have to be optically non-absorbing (see Para. 0030).",
"Claims 11 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over FAIVRE (US 2017/0356794) in view of MIYATA (US 2016/0348857) and further in view of OGURA (US 2015/0085262) and Anc et al. (US 2016/0369954). Regarding claim 11, FAIVRE further discloses the confinement structure comprises a confinement cover (e.g. protective glass 14, see Fig. 2B). However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the confinement structure includes a substrate and wherein the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover, and wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate.",
"OGURA teaches a luminescent light emitting device (100, see Fig. 7, Para. 0029, 0080) that includes a luminescent material plate (101) fixed to a front surface of a retaining substrate (113), a thin connecting material (112) and conductive thin wire film (105); wherein when the luminescent material plate (101) is damaged, the conductive thin wire is also damaged to be disconnected (see Para. 0082 and 0083) whereby the operation of a light source unit (60) including the excitation light sources (71) and the like or the projector (1) can be stopped (see Para. 0012-0013, 0083). Anc et al. teaches a light converter assembly (100, see Figs.",
"1 and 7) including a first substrate (102), phosphor material (104), confinement material (106) and second substrate (108, see Para. 0024) to provide high heat conductance and preferably an airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material (see Para. 0019). Therefore, in view of OGURA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by OGURA to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate thereby the operation of laser light source can be stopped. One would have been motivated to make this combination to provide a hermetically sealed environment for a phosphor material whereby the safety is ensured (see Para. 0010). Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate as taught by Anc et al.",
"thereby the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover (14) in order to provide airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material and improved cooling means. One would have been motivated to make this combination to provide a hermetically sealed environment for a phosphor material and preventing overheating of the phosphor material. Regarding claim 13, FAIVRE further discloses the light converting device comprises a failure sensor (see Fig.",
"3), wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a damage of the confinement structure that includes a confinement cover (14) and wherein the failure sensor is arranged to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate, the laser-based light source further comprising a failure detector, wherein the failure detector is coupled with the failure sensor, wherein the failure detector is arranged to generate a control signal upon detection of the damage of the confinement structure, and wherein the laser-based light source is arranged to switch However, FAIVRE is silent with respect to the confinement structure comprises a substrate wherein the light converter is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover. OGURA teaches a luminescent light emitting device (100, see Fig.",
"7, Para. 0029, 0080) that includes a luminescent material plate (101) fixed to a front surface of a retaining substrate (113), a thin connecting material (112) and conductive thin wire film (105); wherein when the luminescent material plate (101) is damaged, the conductive thin wire is also damaged to be disconnected (see Para. 0082 and 0083) whereby the operation of a light source unit (60) including the excitation light sources (71) and the like or the projector (1) can be stopped (see Para.",
"0012-0013, 0083). Anc et al. teaches a light converter assembly (100, see Figs. 1 and 7) including a first substrate (102), phosphor material (104), confinement material (106) and second substrate (108, see Para. 0024) to provide high heat conductance and preferably an airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material (see Para. 0019). Therefore, in view of OGURA, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate and failure detection means as taught by OGURA to detect a relative movement of the confinement cover with respect to the substrate thereby the operation of laser light source can be stopped. One would have been motivated to make Therefore, in view of Anc et al., it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify FAIVRE by providing a substrate as taught by Anc et al. thereby the light converter (12) is confined between the substrate and the confinement cover (14) in order to provide airtight seal to prevent atmospheric contamination of the phosphor material and improved cooling means.",
"One would have been motivated to make this combination to provide a hermetically sealed environment for a phosphor material and preventing overheating of the phosphor material. Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments filed 01/07/2021 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. In response to applicant's arguments against the references individually (i.e. FAIVRE fails to teach a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter, MIYATA’s seal housing cannot provide any tight mechanical conformation for phosphor particles, Anc fails mention any aspects of the laser safty), one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 208 USPQ 871 (CCPA 1981); In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 231 USPQ 375 (Fed.",
"Cir. 1986). In this case, FAIVRE teaches tight mechanical conformation. However, fails to teach a gap between the confinement structure and the MIYATA teaches gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter. Therefore, FAIVRE as modified in view of MIYATA teaches a gap between the confinement structure and the light emission surface of the light converter. In response to applicant’s arguments that FAIVRE failed to disclose individually, or suggest in combination, “a tight mechanical confinement structure”, the applicant is respectfully advised that while the claims of issued patents are interpreted in light of the specification, prosecution history, prior art and other claims, this is not the mode of claim interpretation to be applied during examination. During examination, the claims must be interpreted as broadly as their terms reasonably allow. In re American Academy of Science Tech Center, 70 USPQ2d 1827 (Fed. Cir.",
"May 13, 2004). In this case, FAIVRE teaches mechanical confinement structure that surrounds the light converter therefore limit lateral shifts of the light converter. Conclusion THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Tsion Tumebo whose telephone number is 571-270-1668.",
"The examiner can normally be reached on 7:30 am to 4:00 pm, Monday thru Friday. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jong-Suk (James) Lee can be reached on (571)272-7044. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR.",
"Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /TSION TUMEBO/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2875"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2021-05-09.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim(s) 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Liu (CN 106548764 A; see translated portion) in view of Hayashi (US 20200393890 A1)
With regards to claim 1. Liu disclose(s): A brightness adjustment method that is applied to a mobile terminal (figs 1-9), comprising: detecting a brightness of an environment (110; figs 8-9; [lines 1-2 in page 9]) where the mobile terminal is located to acquire a brightness value (see fig 5); transmitting a determining whether there is an occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to a transmitting parameter of the adjusting display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment when there is no occlusion; and maintaining the display brightness of the mobile terminal when the occlusion is present (see step s43 for maintaining and s44 for adjusting; page 6), wherein the first preset value refers to a threshold value configured to trigger the display brightness of the mobile terminal to be adjusted ( “amount threshold” [page 6]; ). Liu does not disclose(s): transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity Hayashi teaches transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity [0059] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the method of Liu by transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity as disclosed by Hayashi in order to precisely detect a distance of an object as taught/suggested by Hayashi ([0059]).
With regards to claim 2. Liu as modified disclose(s): The method of claim 1, Liu further disclose(s): wherein the determining whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the transmitting parameter of the wave parameter of the wave further comprises: determining whether the occlusion is causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]). Hayashi further disclose(s): acquiring a feedback parameter of an object in a detection region of the radar wave according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo [0036];
With regards to claim 3. Liu as modified disclose(s): The method of claim 2, Liu further disclose(s): wherein: the feedback parameter further includes at least one of a distance parameter [lines 18-21 in page 6] determining whether the occlusion is causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]) includes at least one of; determining whether there is the occlusion of which a distance to the mobile terminal is in a preset occlusion distance range according to the distance parameter ([lines 10-16 in page 7]); or
With regards to claim 5. Liu as modified disclose(s): The method of claim 1, Liu further disclose(s): wherein adjusting the display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment further comprises: adjusting backlight brightness of a display module of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment (see s61+ s64; [lines 21-35; page 7]; see LCD in line 2 of page 9; the examiner takes the position that LCD involves a backlight).
With regards to claim 6. Liu disclose(s): A brightness adjustment device (figs 1-9), comprising: a processor (902; fig 9; [line 18+ in page 10]) : and a memory (904) for storing instructions executable by the processor (902), wherein the processor is configured to: detect brightness of an environment (110; figs 8-9; [lines 1-2 in page 9]) where a mobile terminal is located to acquire a brightness value (see fig 5); transmit a the brightness value acquired at a previous moment reaches a first preset value (see “reduction amount of the light”, “amount threshold” [line 28 page 5 – line 6 page 6]); determine whether there is an occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to a transmitting parameter of the adjust display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment when there is no occlusion, and maintain the display brightness of the mobile terminal when the occlusion is present (see step s43 for maintaining and s44 for adjusting; page 6), wherein the first preset value refers to a threshold value configured to trigger the display brightness of the mobile terminal to be adjusted ( “amount threshold” [page 6]; ). Kim does not disclose(s): transmit a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity Hayashi teaches transmit a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity [0059] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the device of Liu by transmit a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity as disclosed by Hayashi in order to precisely detect a distance of an object as taught/suggested by Hayashi ([0059]).
With regards to claim 7. Liu as modified disclose(s): The device of claim 6. wherein the processor is further configured to: Liu further disclose(s): determine whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter [0064-0065]. Hayashi further disclose(s): acquire a feedback parameter of an object in a detection region of the radar wave according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo [0036],
With regards to claim 8. Liu as modified disclose(s): The device of claim 7. Liu further disclose(s): the feedback parameter includes at least one of a distance parameter [lines 18-21 in page 6] the processor is further configured to perform at least of: determining whether there is the occlusion of which a distance to the mobile terminal is in a preset occlusion distance range according to the distance parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]) ([lines 10-16 in page 7]) or
With regards to claim 10. Liu as modified disclose(s): The device of claim 6, Liu further disclose(s): wherein the processor is configured to adjust backlight brightness of a display module of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment (see s61+ s64; [lines 21-35; page 7]; see LCD in line 2 of page 9; the examiner takes the position that LCD involves a backlight).
With regards to claim 11. Liu disclose(s): A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium (904, figs 1-9 [line 18+ in page 10]), instructions in the storage medium being executed by a processor (902; fig 9; [line 18+ in page 10]) of a brightness adjustment device to enable the brightness adjustment device to execute a brightness adjustment method that is applied to a mobile terminal, the brightness adjustment method comprising: detecting brightness of an environment (110; figs 8-9; [lines 1-2 in page 9]) where the mobile terminal is located to acquire a brightness value (see fig 5); transmitting a determining whether there is an occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to a transmitting parameter of the adjusting display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment when there is no occlusion; and maintaining the display brightness of the mobile terminal when the occlusion is present (see step s43 for maintaining and s44 for adjusting; page 6); wherein the first preset value refers to a threshold value configured to trigger the display brightness of the mobile terminal to be adjusted ( “amount threshold” [page 6]) Liu does not disclose(s): transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity Hayashi teaches transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity [0059] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the method of Liu by transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity as disclosed by Hayashi in order to precisely detect a distance of an object as taught/suggested by Hayashi ([0059]).
With regards to claim 12. Liu as modified disclose(s): The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11. wherein the determining whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the transmitting parameter of the determining whether the occlusion is causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]). Hayashi further disclose(s): acquiring a feedback parameter of an object in a detection region of the radar wave according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo [0036];
With regards to claim 13. Liu as modified disclose(s): The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 12. wherein: the feedback parameter includes at least one of a distance parameter [lines 18-21 in page 6] the determining whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]) includes at least one of: determining whether there is the occlusion of which a distance to the mobile terminal is in a preset occlusion distance range according to the distance parameter ([lines 10-16 in page 7]),
With regards to claim 15. Liu as modified disclose(s): The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11, wherein the adjusting the display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment further comprises; adjusting backlight brightness of a display module of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment (see s61+ s64; [lines 21-35; page 7]; see LCD in line 2 of page 9; the examiner takes the position that LCD involves a backlight).
Allowable Subject Matter Claim(s) 4, 9, and 14 is/are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter: With regards to claim 4, the prior art fails to teach or suggest a/an method requiring: determining whether the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than a second preset value, the second preset value being lower than the first preset value; determining whether there is a cover covering a display module of the mobile terminal according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo when the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than the second preset value; and controlling a screen of the mobile terminal to be turned off when there is the cover covering the display module, in combination with the other limitations of the claim. With regards to claim 9, the prior art fails to teach or suggest a/an processor requiring: determine whether the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than a second preset value. the second preset value being lower than the first preset value: and determine whether there is a cover covering a display module of the mobile terminal according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo when the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than the second preset value, and control a screen of the mobile terminal to be turned off when determining that there is the cover covering the display module, in combination with the other limitations of the claim. With regards to claim 14, the prior art fails to teach or suggest a/an non-transitory computer-readable storage medium requiring: determining whether the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than a second preset value, the second preset value being lower than the first preset value; determining whether there is a cover covering a display module of the mobile terminal according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo when the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than the second preset value; and controlling a screen of the mobile terminal to be turned off when the cover is covering the display module, in combination with the other limitations of the claim.
Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see page 11 of the Remarks, filed 6/20/2022, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 under 35USC103 have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Liu (CN 106548764 A; see translated portion) in view of Hayashi (US 20200393890 A1).
Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RENAN LUQUE whose telephone number is (571)270-1044. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 9:00AM-5:00PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Alexander H Taningco can be reached on 5712728048. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/RENAN LUQUE/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2896 | 2022-07-24T22:06:07 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the claimed invention(s) absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and effective filing dates of each claim that was not commonly owned as of the effective filing date of the later invention in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 102(b)(2)(C) for any potential 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) prior art against the later invention. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.",
"The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim(s) 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Liu (CN 106548764 A; see translated portion) in view of Hayashi (US 20200393890 A1) With regards to claim 1. Liu disclose(s): A brightness adjustment method that is applied to a mobile terminal (figs 1-9), comprising: detecting a brightness of an environment (110; figs 8-9; [lines 1-2 in page 9]) where the mobile terminal is located to acquire a brightness value (see fig 5); transmitting a determining whether there is an occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to a transmitting parameter of the adjusting display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment when there is no occlusion; and maintaining the display brightness of the mobile terminal when the occlusion is present (see step s43 for maintaining and s44 for adjusting; page 6), wherein the first preset value refers to a threshold value configured to trigger the display brightness of the mobile terminal to be adjusted ( “amount threshold” [page 6]; ).",
"Liu does not disclose(s): transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity Hayashi teaches transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity [0059] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the method of Liu by transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity as disclosed by Hayashi in order to precisely detect a distance of an object as taught/suggested by Hayashi ([0059]). With regards to claim 2. Liu as modified disclose(s): The method of claim 1, Liu further disclose(s): wherein the determining whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the transmitting parameter of the wave parameter of the wave further comprises: determining whether the occlusion is causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]). Hayashi further disclose(s): acquiring a feedback parameter of an object in a detection region of the radar wave according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo [0036]; With regards to claim 3.",
"Liu as modified disclose(s): The method of claim 2, Liu further disclose(s): wherein: the feedback parameter further includes at least one of a distance parameter [lines 18-21 in page 6] determining whether the occlusion is causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]) includes at least one of; determining whether there is the occlusion of which a distance to the mobile terminal is in a preset occlusion distance range according to the distance parameter ([lines 10-16 in page 7]); or With regards to claim 5. Liu as modified disclose(s): The method of claim 1, Liu further disclose(s): wherein adjusting the display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment further comprises: adjusting backlight brightness of a display module of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment (see s61+ s64; [lines 21-35; page 7]; see LCD in line 2 of page 9; the examiner takes the position that LCD involves a backlight). With regards to claim 6.",
"Liu disclose(s): A brightness adjustment device (figs 1-9), comprising: a processor (902; fig 9; [line 18+ in page 10]) : and a memory (904) for storing instructions executable by the processor (902), wherein the processor is configured to: detect brightness of an environment (110; figs 8-9; [lines 1-2 in page 9]) where a mobile terminal is located to acquire a brightness value (see fig 5); transmit a the brightness value acquired at a previous moment reaches a first preset value (see “reduction amount of the light”, “amount threshold” [line 28 page 5 – line 6 page 6]); determine whether there is an occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to a transmitting parameter of the adjust display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment when there is no occlusion, and maintain the display brightness of the mobile terminal when the occlusion is present (see step s43 for maintaining and s44 for adjusting; page 6), wherein the first preset value refers to a threshold value configured to trigger the display brightness of the mobile terminal to be adjusted ( “amount threshold” [page 6]; ). Kim does not disclose(s): transmit a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity Hayashi teaches transmit a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity [0059] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the device of Liu by transmit a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity as disclosed by Hayashi in order to precisely detect a distance of an object as taught/suggested by Hayashi ([0059]).",
"With regards to claim 7. Liu as modified disclose(s): The device of claim 6. wherein the processor is further configured to: Liu further disclose(s): determine whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter [0064-0065]. Hayashi further disclose(s): acquire a feedback parameter of an object in a detection region of the radar wave according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo [0036], With regards to claim 8. Liu as modified disclose(s): The device of claim 7. Liu further disclose(s): the feedback parameter includes at least one of a distance parameter [lines 18-21 in page 6] the processor is further configured to perform at least of: determining whether there is the occlusion of which a distance to the mobile terminal is in a preset occlusion distance range according to the distance parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]) ([lines 10-16 in page 7]) or With regards to claim 10. Liu as modified disclose(s): The device of claim 6, Liu further disclose(s): wherein the processor is configured to adjust backlight brightness of a display module of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment (see s61+ s64; [lines 21-35; page 7]; see LCD in line 2 of page 9; the examiner takes the position that LCD involves a backlight).",
"With regards to claim 11. Liu disclose(s): A non-transitory computer-readable storage medium (904, figs 1-9 [line 18+ in page 10]), instructions in the storage medium being executed by a processor (902; fig 9; [line 18+ in page 10]) of a brightness adjustment device to enable the brightness adjustment device to execute a brightness adjustment method that is applied to a mobile terminal, the brightness adjustment method comprising: detecting brightness of an environment (110; figs 8-9; [lines 1-2 in page 9]) where the mobile terminal is located to acquire a brightness value (see fig 5); transmitting a determining whether there is an occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to a transmitting parameter of the adjusting display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment when there is no occlusion; and maintaining the display brightness of the mobile terminal when the occlusion is present (see step s43 for maintaining and s44 for adjusting; page 6); wherein the first preset value refers to a threshold value configured to trigger the display brightness of the mobile terminal to be adjusted ( “amount threshold” [page 6]) Liu does not disclose(s): transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity Hayashi teaches transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity [0059] Before the effective filing date of the claimed invention, it would have been obvious for one of ordinary skill in the art to have modified the method of Liu by transmitting a radar wave and detecting an echo of the radar wave for detecting proximity as disclosed by Hayashi in order to precisely detect a distance of an object as taught/suggested by Hayashi ([0059]).",
"With regards to claim 12. Liu as modified disclose(s): The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11. wherein the determining whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the transmitting parameter of the determining whether the occlusion is causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]). Hayashi further disclose(s): acquiring a feedback parameter of an object in a detection region of the radar wave according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo [0036]; With regards to claim 13. Liu as modified disclose(s): The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 12. wherein: the feedback parameter includes at least one of a distance parameter [lines 18-21 in page 6] the determining whether there is the occlusion causing the decrease of the acquired brightness value according to the feedback parameter (“There is shelter in front of the light sensor” [line 16+ in page 5]; see also [line 29-32 in page 6]) includes at least one of: determining whether there is the occlusion of which a distance to the mobile terminal is in a preset occlusion distance range according to the distance parameter ([lines 10-16 in page 7]), With regards to claim 15.",
"Liu as modified disclose(s): The non-transitory computer-readable storage medium of claim 11, wherein the adjusting the display brightness of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment further comprises; adjusting backlight brightness of a display module of the mobile terminal according to the brightness value acquired at the present moment (see s61+ s64; [lines 21-35; page 7]; see LCD in line 2 of page 9; the examiner takes the position that LCD involves a backlight). Allowable Subject Matter Claim(s) 4, 9, and 14 is/are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.",
"The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter: With regards to claim 4, the prior art fails to teach or suggest a/an method requiring: determining whether the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than a second preset value, the second preset value being lower than the first preset value; determining whether there is a cover covering a display module of the mobile terminal according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo when the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than the second preset value; and controlling a screen of the mobile terminal to be turned off when there is the cover covering the display module, in combination with the other limitations of the claim. With regards to claim 9, the prior art fails to teach or suggest a/an processor requiring: determine whether the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than a second preset value.",
"the second preset value being lower than the first preset value: and determine whether there is a cover covering a display module of the mobile terminal according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo when the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than the second preset value, and control a screen of the mobile terminal to be turned off when determining that there is the cover covering the display module, in combination with the other limitations of the claim. With regards to claim 14, the prior art fails to teach or suggest a/an non-transitory computer-readable storage medium requiring: determining whether the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than a second preset value, the second preset value being lower than the first preset value; determining whether there is a cover covering a display module of the mobile terminal according to the transmitting parameter of the radar wave and the echo parameter of the echo when the brightness value acquired at the present moment is lower than the second preset value; and controlling a screen of the mobile terminal to be turned off when the cover is covering the display module, in combination with the other limitations of the claim.",
"Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see page 11 of the Remarks, filed 6/20/2022, with respect to the rejection(s) of claim(s) 1-3, 5-8, 10-13, and 15 under 35USC103 have been fully considered and are persuasive. Therefore, the rejection has been withdrawn. However, upon further consideration, a new ground(s) of rejection is made in view of Liu (CN 106548764 A; see translated portion) in view of Hayashi (US 20200393890 A1). Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to RENAN LUQUE whose telephone number is (571)270-1044. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 9:00AM-5:00PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool.",
"To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Alexander H Taningco can be reached on 5712728048. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair.",
"Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /RENAN LUQUE/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2896"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-07-24.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Piottey, J. The evidence clearly shows that the deceased, early in 1893, duly made and executed her last will and testament, disposing of all her property in the manner and to the persons stated in the judgment of the circuit court, and that she delivered it for safe keeping into the hands of Mr. Holzhauer, the notary who drew it. She died October 28, 1893, and the evidence shows in the full belief that her said will still remained in the hands and safe keeping of Holzhauer. Two days after the death of the testatrix, application having been made by Mrs. Strehlow, one of the devisees, he was unable to find it in his safe, where he kept divers wills which he had drawn, or elsewhere. He testified that he was under the impression that she had called for it, and that he had let her take it, and he so. testified, in substance, in the county court. But on the trial in the circuit court he was unable to say with any certainty that he had so delivered it, or to remember that he had ever *125parted with it to any one. At one time it appears that he .thought he might have delivered it to the county judge, after the death of the testatrix, and inquired at his office for it, and had made thorough search for it, but without avail. He further testified that, after the will was made, he could not remember what was done with it; that he remembered of having the will in his possession since that time, in his safe, but did not know what had happened to it; that he remembered that Mrs. Btrehlow came to him, after the death of the testatrix, and asked for it; that he searched for the will, and did not know where it was; that no one could have taken it out of his safe without his knowledge or consent; that the testatrix called at his office as many as three or four times for the will, and he had loaned it to her, or let her take it, and that he could not tell how long she had kept it on such occasions before returning it; that he did not remember when she got it the last time, or that she returned it; that, if she returned it, he would have had it in his safe at the time of her death; that she did not send any one to him to get it; and that he knew she did not return it the last time she got it, and that he had not got it; that, at the last time she called on him, she was weak, and walked with, difficulty. His testimony on the subject is quite unsatisfactory. The testatrix was a person considerably advanced in years, and her last illness was of brief duration. About three days before her death, it appears that she told her daughter, Mrs. Bfrehlow, that she had not made any change in her will; that it should remain as she had made it, and “ that Mr. Holz-hauer has the will.” Mrs. Otto testified that, on the Tuesday before she was taken sick, the testatrix stated to her how she had disposed of her property, and that “ the will was at Holzhauer’s; ” and it was shown that three days before her death she made substantially the same statement to Ida Weisenberg; that she had frequently spoken to her about *126the will, aad on each occasion had said that the will “ was over to Holzhauer’s,” and on the evening of that day she made the same statement, in substance, to Sophia Wichmann. Mrs. Lempke testified that the testatrix, then being quite weak, told her, three days before her death, that, if she “ could get up again, she would go to Holzhauer’s, and have her will qualified or destroyed or changed,” and told her that the will was at Holzhauer’s. After her death, it could not be found with her papers or effects. The evidence, as to her clear and repeated declarations, satisfactorily shows that she believed from a period of time when she became unable to go and get it, up to the time of her death, that Holzhauer still had and held her will. If it satisfactorily appeared that Holzhauer returned the will to her, and it was last known to be in her possession, and after her death could not be found, a prima, facie presumption would arise that she had destroyed it, with the intention of revoking it,— a presumption subject to be rebutted by competent evidence. Her declarations upon the subject of the existence or nonexistence of the will and its custody, up to or within a short time previous to her death, are competent evidence to rebut such presumption, and to show that she died in the belief that the will was still in existence as a valid disposition of her estate. This subject is fully considered in In re Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45, where the authorities on this subject are collated and cited by Oassoday, 0. J., and the point vital on this appeal is expressly ruled. • If Holzhauer delivered to her the will and she failed to return it, we think that the evidence is sufficient to rebut any presumption of revocation by its destruction by the testatrix or by her authority. If he is mistaken in this respect and the will was left with him, then, and in-any view that may be taken of the evidence, it was properly regarded as a lost will and established as such, and the judgment of the *127circuit court that it be allowed and admitted to probate in the county court, as provided by law, is correct, and should be affirmed. By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. | 09-09-2022 | [
"Piottey, J. The evidence clearly shows that the deceased, early in 1893, duly made and executed her last will and testament, disposing of all her property in the manner and to the persons stated in the judgment of the circuit court, and that she delivered it for safe keeping into the hands of Mr. Holzhauer, the notary who drew it. She died October 28, 1893, and the evidence shows in the full belief that her said will still remained in the hands and safe keeping of Holzhauer.",
"Two days after the death of the testatrix, application having been made by Mrs. Strehlow, one of the devisees, he was unable to find it in his safe, where he kept divers wills which he had drawn, or elsewhere. He testified that he was under the impression that she had called for it, and that he had let her take it, and he so. testified, in substance, in the county court. But on the trial in the circuit court he was unable to say with any certainty that he had so delivered it, or to remember that he had ever *125parted with it to any one. At one time it appears that he .thought he might have delivered it to the county judge, after the death of the testatrix, and inquired at his office for it, and had made thorough search for it, but without avail. He further testified that, after the will was made, he could not remember what was done with it; that he remembered of having the will in his possession since that time, in his safe, but did not know what had happened to it; that he remembered that Mrs. Btrehlow came to him, after the death of the testatrix, and asked for it; that he searched for the will, and did not know where it was; that no one could have taken it out of his safe without his knowledge or consent; that the testatrix called at his office as many as three or four times for the will, and he had loaned it to her, or let her take it, and that he could not tell how long she had kept it on such occasions before returning it; that he did not remember when she got it the last time, or that she returned it; that, if she returned it, he would have had it in his safe at the time of her death; that she did not send any one to him to get it; and that he knew she did not return it the last time she got it, and that he had not got it; that, at the last time she called on him, she was weak, and walked with, difficulty.",
"His testimony on the subject is quite unsatisfactory. The testatrix was a person considerably advanced in years, and her last illness was of brief duration. About three days before her death, it appears that she told her daughter, Mrs. Bfrehlow, that she had not made any change in her will; that it should remain as she had made it, and “ that Mr. Holz-hauer has the will.” Mrs. Otto testified that, on the Tuesday before she was taken sick, the testatrix stated to her how she had disposed of her property, and that “ the will was at Holzhauer’s; ” and it was shown that three days before her death she made substantially the same statement to Ida Weisenberg; that she had frequently spoken to her about *126the will, aad on each occasion had said that the will “ was over to Holzhauer’s,” and on the evening of that day she made the same statement, in substance, to Sophia Wichmann. Mrs. Lempke testified that the testatrix, then being quite weak, told her, three days before her death, that, if she “ could get up again, she would go to Holzhauer’s, and have her will qualified or destroyed or changed,” and told her that the will was at Holzhauer’s.",
"After her death, it could not be found with her papers or effects. The evidence, as to her clear and repeated declarations, satisfactorily shows that she believed from a period of time when she became unable to go and get it, up to the time of her death, that Holzhauer still had and held her will. If it satisfactorily appeared that Holzhauer returned the will to her, and it was last known to be in her possession, and after her death could not be found, a prima, facie presumption would arise that she had destroyed it, with the intention of revoking it,— a presumption subject to be rebutted by competent evidence. Her declarations upon the subject of the existence or nonexistence of the will and its custody, up to or within a short time previous to her death, are competent evidence to rebut such presumption, and to show that she died in the belief that the will was still in existence as a valid disposition of her estate. This subject is fully considered in In re Valentine's Will, 93 Wis. 45, where the authorities on this subject are collated and cited by Oassoday, 0. J., and the point vital on this appeal is expressly ruled.",
"• If Holzhauer delivered to her the will and she failed to return it, we think that the evidence is sufficient to rebut any presumption of revocation by its destruction by the testatrix or by her authority. If he is mistaken in this respect and the will was left with him, then, and in-any view that may be taken of the evidence, it was properly regarded as a lost will and established as such, and the judgment of the *127circuit court that it be allowed and admitted to probate in the county court, as provided by law, is correct, and should be affirmed. By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/8185412/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
EXAMINER'S AMENDMENT An examiner’s amendment to the record appears below. Should the changes and/or additions be unacceptable to applicant, an amendment may be filed as provided by 37 CFR 1.312. To ensure consideration of such an amendment, it MUST be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee. Authorization for this examiner’s amendment was given in an interview with Bryant Ash on January 6, 2022.
The application has been amended as follows: Claims 1, 6, 7, 14, and 18 are amended as seen below. Claim 4 is canceled.
-- 1. A textile component, comprising: a knitted component having a first ridge structure and a second ridge structure, the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure being biased to curl in a first direction and each including an apex; the knitted component having a first channel structure located between the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure, the first channel structure being biased to curl in a second direction being different than the first direction and including a nadir; and; a first bridge portion that has a first end secured to the first ridge structure and a second end secured to the second ridge structure, wherein the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops; and
6. The textile component of claim 1, wherein the knitted component comprises a first edge and an opposite second edge, wherein the first end and the second end of the first bridge portion are secured to the knitted component at the first edge, and wherein a second bridge portion is secured to the knitted component at [[a]] the second edge.
7. The textile component of claim 1, wherein the knitted component has a compacted position and [[the]] an extended position, and wherein a length of the knitted component is longer in the extended position than in the compacted position.
14. The textile component of claim 10, wherein the knitted component comprises a first edge and an opposite second edge, wherein the first end and the second end of the first bridge portion are secured to the knitted component at the first edge, and wherein a second bridge portion is secured to the knitted component at [[a]] the second edge.
18. A textile component, comprising: a knitted component having a first ridge structure and a second ridge structure, the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure being biased to curl in a first direction and each including an apex; the knitted component having a first channel structure located between the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure, the first channel structure being biased to a first bridge portion that has a first end secured to the first ridge structure and a second end secured to the second ridge structure, wherein the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops, wherein the apexes and the nadir are spaced apart from the first bridge portion, wherein a central portion of the first bridge portion extends from the first end to the second end, and wherein the central portion of the first bridge portion is excluded from the plurality of channel knit courses. --
REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: None of the prior art, alone or in combination, teaches a textile component comprising, in combination with other limitations: a knitted component having a first ridge structure, a second ridge structure, and a first channel structure extending between the first and second ridge structures, wherein the ridge structures each include an apex and the channel structure includes a nadir, wherein the ridge structures and the channel structure are biased to curl in opposite directions; the textile component further comprising a first bridge portion having a first end secured to the first ridge structure and a second end secured to the second ridge structure, wherein the apexes and the nadir are spaced apart from the first bridge portion; and wherein: a) the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops, or b) a central portion of the first bridge portion that extends from the first end to the second end lacks knitted loops. Woolley et al. (herein Woolley)(US Patent No. 3,307,379). Woolley teaches all of the claim limitations except wherein: a) the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops, or b) a central portion of the first bridge portion that extends from the first end to the second end lacks knitted loops. Instead, Woolley’s bridge portions are formed of the same kind of knitted structure as the ridge and channel structures and are explicitly and necessarily formed of knitted loops (see at least Figs. 1 and 4 and column 1, lines 30-50). Absent a teaching in the prior art, it would not have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have modified Woolley’s bridge portions to be formed without knitted loops, as doing so would change the entire structure of Woolley’s double-walled knitted fabric and impede Woolley’s object of providing an inner wall made of natural fiber for warmth and comfort and an outer wall made of nylon for durability (see column 1, lines 11-50). Furthermore, such a modification would be improper hindsight modification based solely upon Applicant’s disclosure. Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.” Claims 1-3 and 5-20 are allowed over the prior art of record.
Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOCELYN BRAVO whose telephone number is (571)270-0581. The examiner can normally be reached Mon - Fri 9:30am - 6:00pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Clinton Ostrup, can be reached at (571) 272-5559. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/JOCELYN BRAVO/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3732 | 2022-01-13T15:38:39 | [
"EXAMINER'S AMENDMENT An examiner’s amendment to the record appears below. Should the changes and/or additions be unacceptable to applicant, an amendment may be filed as provided by 37 CFR 1.312. To ensure consideration of such an amendment, it MUST be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee. Authorization for this examiner’s amendment was given in an interview with Bryant Ash on January 6, 2022. The application has been amended as follows: Claims 1, 6, 7, 14, and 18 are amended as seen below. Claim 4 is canceled. -- 1. A textile component, comprising: a knitted component having a first ridge structure and a second ridge structure, the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure being biased to curl in a first direction and each including an apex; the knitted component having a first channel structure located between the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure, the first channel structure being biased to curl in a second direction being different than the first direction and including a nadir; and; a first bridge portion that has a first end secured to the first ridge structure and a second end secured to the second ridge structure, wherein the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops; and 6. The textile component of claim 1, wherein the knitted component comprises a first edge and an opposite second edge, wherein the first end and the second end of the first bridge portion are secured to the knitted component at the first edge, and wherein a second bridge portion is secured to the knitted component at [[a]] the second edge.",
"7. The textile component of claim 1, wherein the knitted component has a compacted position and [[the]] an extended position, and wherein a length of the knitted component is longer in the extended position than in the compacted position. 14. The textile component of claim 10, wherein the knitted component comprises a first edge and an opposite second edge, wherein the first end and the second end of the first bridge portion are secured to the knitted component at the first edge, and wherein a second bridge portion is secured to the knitted component at [[a]] the second edge. 18. A textile component, comprising: a knitted component having a first ridge structure and a second ridge structure, the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure being biased to curl in a first direction and each including an apex; the knitted component having a first channel structure located between the first ridge structure and the second ridge structure, the first channel structure being biased to a first bridge portion that has a first end secured to the first ridge structure and a second end secured to the second ridge structure, wherein the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops, wherein the apexes and the nadir are spaced apart from the first bridge portion, wherein a central portion of the first bridge portion extends from the first end to the second end, and wherein the central portion of the first bridge portion is excluded from the plurality of channel knit courses.",
"-- REASONS FOR ALLOWANCE The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: None of the prior art, alone or in combination, teaches a textile component comprising, in combination with other limitations: a knitted component having a first ridge structure, a second ridge structure, and a first channel structure extending between the first and second ridge structures, wherein the ridge structures each include an apex and the channel structure includes a nadir, wherein the ridge structures and the channel structure are biased to curl in opposite directions; the textile component further comprising a first bridge portion having a first end secured to the first ridge structure and a second end secured to the second ridge structure, wherein the apexes and the nadir are spaced apart from the first bridge portion; and wherein: a) the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops, or b) a central portion of the first bridge portion that extends from the first end to the second end lacks knitted loops. Woolley et al.",
"(herein Woolley)(US Patent No. 3,307,379). Woolley teaches all of the claim limitations except wherein: a) the first bridge portion extends across the first channel structure without forming knitted loops, or b) a central portion of the first bridge portion that extends from the first end to the second end lacks knitted loops. Instead, Woolley’s bridge portions are formed of the same kind of knitted structure as the ridge and channel structures and are explicitly and necessarily formed of knitted loops (see at least Figs. 1 and 4 and column 1, lines 30-50). Absent a teaching in the prior art, it would not have been obvious to one having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the invention to have modified Woolley’s bridge portions to be formed without knitted loops, as doing so would change the entire structure of Woolley’s double-walled knitted fabric and impede Woolley’s object of providing an inner wall made of natural fiber for warmth and comfort and an outer wall made of nylon for durability (see column 1, lines 11-50).",
"Furthermore, such a modification would be improper hindsight modification based solely upon Applicant’s disclosure. Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.” Claims 1-3 and 5-20 are allowed over the prior art of record. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOCELYN BRAVO whose telephone number is (571)270-0581. The examiner can normally be reached Mon - Fri 9:30am - 6:00pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.",
"If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Clinton Ostrup, can be reached at (571) 272-5559. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /JOCELYN BRAVO/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3732"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-01-16.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED CORRESPONDENCE Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Status of Claims This is the first Office Action on the merits for application no. 17/326,546 filed on May 21st, 2021. Claims 1-11 are pending.
Priority Examiner acknowledges the Applicant’s claim to priority of application JP 2020-097646 filed on June 4th, 2020. A certified copy was received on June 22nd, 2021.
Information Disclosure Statement The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on May 21st, 2021 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement was considered by the Examiner.
Claim Objections Regarding Claim 4 (lines 2-3), please change the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” to - - [[a]] the circumferential direction of the side plate - - as antecedent basis has already been established in claim 1 (lines 17-18).
Regarding Claim 7 (line 3), please change the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” to - - [[a]] the circumferential direction of the side plate - - as antecedent basis has already been established in claim 1 (lines 17-18).
Claim 10 (lines 4-6), please change the recitation of “rotatably driven by drive force of a motor together with the pump impeller; a turbine runner arranged facing the pump impeller and rotatably driven by the hydraulic oil flow to rotatably drive an output shaft” to - - rotatably driven by the drive force of [[a]] the motor together with the pump impeller; a turbine runner arranged facing the pump impeller and rotatably driven by the hydraulic oil flow to rotatably drive [[an]] the output shaft - - as antecedent basis for these features has already been established in claim 1.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b):
(b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph:
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 1-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.
Regarding Claim 1 (last clause), in the recitation of “each weight attachment hole is formed in a long hole shape extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Claim 2 (line 3), in the recitation of “a center of rotation of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Regarding Claim 3 (lines 3-4), in the recitation of “a center of rotation of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Regarding Claim 4 (lines 2-3), in the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Regarding Claim 6 (lines 4-5 and 6-7), in the recitations of “a side plate opposing through-hole as a through-hole formed at a portion of the first side plate or the second side plate” and “each side plate opposing through-hole” it is unclear from the disclosure how many side plate opposing through-holes Applicant intends to recite. Applicant could recite “a side plate opposing through-hole as a through-hole formed at a portion of the first side plate [[or]] and the second side plate” (lines 4-5) to clarify the recitation. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Regarding Claim 7 (line 3), in the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Regarding Claim 9 (line 2), in the recitation of “the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite.
Claims 2-11 are rejected based upon their dependency to a rejected base claim.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1, 3-5 and 8-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Hoff (US 2021/0190187), in view of Heuver (US 10,821,819), and in view of Yabe et al. (US 5,947,253), hereinafter Yabe.
Regarding Claim 1, Hoff teaches a torque damper apparatus (Fig. 2, “torsional vibration damper” 100) comprising: an input-side plate (“cover plate” 130 and “cover plate” 132) which includes a pair of side plates (130, 132) having a first side plate (130) formed in an annular flat plate shape and an annular flat plate-shaped second side plate (132) arranged facing the first side plate (130) at a position apart from the first side plate (130) and rotatably driven together with the first side plate (130) and which is rotatably driven in response to drive force ([0005] - “a cover plate of the torsional vibration damper, a rotational torque in a circumferential direction; rotating, in the circumferential direction, the cover plate around an axis of rotation of the torsional vibration damper”); an annular flat plate-shaped center plate (“intermediate flange” 104) coupled to an output shaft (Fig. 16, “output hub” 422) and arranged between the first side plate (Fig. 2, 130) and the second side plate (132) in a state in which the center plate (104) is rotatable relative to both side plates (130, 132); and an elastic transmission body (“springs” 106) which includes an elastic body (106) and provided between the input-side plate (130, 132) and the center plate (104) to transmit rotary drive force of the input-side plate (130, 132) to the center plate (104; [0037] - “Cover plates 130 and 132, via drive surfaces 134 and 138, are arranged to transmit rotational torque RT1 to springs 106. Springs 106 are arranged to transmit rotational torque RT1 to intermediate flange 104”). Hoff does not teach “an input-side plate…which is rotatably driven in response to drive force from a motor”. In other words, Hoff does not explicitly disclose how the torque converter transmission is rotatably driven ([0061] - “Torque converter 400 includes: lock-up clutch 420 and output hub 422, non-rotatably connected to output flange 102. Lock-up clutch 420 includes piston plate 424 and drive plate 426. Output hub 422 is arranged to non-rotatably connect to an input shaft (not shown) of a transmission”). Heuver teaches an input-side plate (Fig. 2, “damper assembly” 260) is rotatably driven in response to drive force from a motor (“electric machine” 202; col. 1, line 13 - “Hybrid vehicles have incorporated electric motors coupled directly to torque converters to allow rotational output from the electric motors to be efficiently introduced into vehicle drivelines”). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was effectively filed to combine the torque converter transmission taught by Hoff and the electric motor taught by Heuver, such that “an input-side plate…which is rotatably driven in response to drive force from a motor”, as one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the result of the combination would have been predictable, and have the obvious advantage of providing the torque converter transmission taught by Hoff with an efficient source of power. Hoff or Heuver do not teach “wherein the input-side plate has, at a plate surface of at least one of the first side plate or the second side plate, multiple weight attachment holes as through-holes for attaching a balance weight for adjusting balance of the input-side plate upon rotary drive, and each weight attachment hole is formed in a long hole shape extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate, which is provided with the weight attachment holes, adjacent to an outer peripheral end portion thereof”. Yabe an input-side plate (Fig. 3, “retainer plate” 23) has, at a plate surface of at least one of a first side plate (23) or a second side plate, multiple weight attachment holes (“hole” 23C) as through-holes (see Figs. 9-10) for attaching a balance weight (Fig. 3, “unbalance-correcting weight” 40) for adjusting balance of the input-side plate (23) upon rotary drive (col. 3, line 29 - “weight 40 is fixed on the retainer plate 23 to correct unbalance”), and each weight attachment hole (23C) is formed in a long hole shape (see Figs. 3 and 9-10) extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate (23), which is provided with the weight attachment holes (23C), adjacent to an outer peripheral end portion thereof (see Fig. 3). Yabe also teaches “A lock-up clutch equipped with such dampers must be kept balanced dynamically during rotation. However, no balancing hole can be formed through the piston because pressures are applied on both sides of the piston. It was therefore proposed to form a balancing weight of such a folded clip type as shown in FIG. 13 and to bring it into fitting engagement with the retainer plate outwardly in a radial direction” (col. 1, line 55). “wherein the input-side plate has, at a plate surface of at least one of the first side plate or the second side plate, multiple weight attachment holes as through-holes for attaching a balance weight for adjusting balance of the input-side plate upon rotary drive, and each weight attachment hole is formed in a long hole shape extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate, which is provided with the weight attachment holes, adjacent to an outer peripheral end portion thereof”, as one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the result of the combination would have been predictable, and have the obvious advantage of balancing the torque damper taught by Hoff and Heuver.
Regarding Claim 3, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe teaches wherein the weight attachment holes (Fig. 3, 23C) are formed such that openings (23C) of the weight attachment holes (23C) overlap with each other at positions symmetrical about a center of rotation (see Fig. 1) of the side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) provided with the weight attachment holes (23C).
Regarding Claim 4, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe wherein each weight attachment hole (Fig. 3, 23C) is formed in a linear long hole shape (see Fig. 3) along a circumferential direction of the side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) provided with the weight attachment holes (23C).
Claim 5, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Hoff teaches wherein the input-side plate (Fig. 2, 130, 132) has a projecting portion (130, 132) formed in such a manner that part of a periphery of each of the first (130) and second side plates (132) projects in an axial direction (inward) of the side plates (130, 132).
Regarding Claim 8, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe teaches wherein the input-side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) includes, at a periphery of each weight attachment hole (23C), a weight fitting portion (Fig. 9, “raised portion” 23A) to be fitted to part of the balance weight (40) for defining a position of the balance weight (40) in each weight attachment hole (23C).
Regarding Claim 9, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe teaches wherein the balance weight (Fig. 3, 40) is formed in a clip shape (see Fig. 3) sandwiching the side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) provided with the weight attachment holes (23A).
Regarding Claim 10, Hoff teaches a torque converter (Fig. 16, “torque converter” 400) comprising: a torque converter cover (“cover” 402) forming a housing space housing hydraulic oil (inside the torque converter 100), having, in the housing space, a pump impeller (“impeller” 404) configured to cause a hydraulic oil flow, and rotatably driven by drive force of a motor (taught by Heuver) together with the pump impeller (404); “turbine” 406) arranged facing the pump impeller (404) and rotatably driven by the hydraulic oil flow to rotatably drive an output shaft (422); and the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1 (taught by Hoff, Heuver and Yabe).
Regarding Claim 11, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque converter according to claim 10, further comprising: a clutch apparatus (“lock-up clutch” 420) configured to transmit rotary drive force of the torque converter cover (402) to the input-side plate (130, 132) of the torque damper apparatus (100) or block the transmission, wherein the input-side plate (130, 132) is rotatably driven in response to the drive force from the motor (taught by Heuver) through each of the torque converter cover (402) and the clutch apparatus (420).
Allowable Subject Matter Claims 2 and 6-7 would be allowable if rewritten or amended to overcome the rejection(s) under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), 2nd paragraph, set forth in this Office Action and rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Reasons for allowance, if applicable, will be the subject of a separate communication to the Applicant or patent owner, pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.104 and MPEP § 1302.14. As allowable subject matter has been indicated, Applicant's reply must either comply with all formal requirements or specifically traverse each requirement not complied with. See 37 CFR 1.111(b) and MPEP § 707.07(a).
Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure. The prior art of Tauvron (US 5,447,218), Yamamoto (US 5,899,311), Kabayama (US 4,778,040) and Takehira (US 5,762,558) listed in the attached "Notice of References Cited" disclose similar torque damper balancing arrangements related to various aspects of the claimed invention. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to James J. Taylor II whose telephone number is (571)272-4074. The examiner can normally be reached M-F, 9:00 am - 5:00 pm EST. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Ernesto Suarez can be reached on 571-270-5565. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 /ERNESTO A SUAREZ/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3659 JAMES J. TAYLOR II Examiner Art Unit 3659
/J.J.T./Examiner, Art Unit 3659 | 2022-02-01T10:22:08 | [
"DETAILED CORRESPONDENCE Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Status of Claims This is the first Office Action on the merits for application no. 17/326,546 filed on May 21st, 2021. Claims 1-11 are pending. Priority Examiner acknowledges the Applicant’s claim to priority of application JP 2020-097646 filed on June 4th, 2020. A certified copy was received on June 22nd, 2021. Information Disclosure Statement The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on May 21st, 2021 is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement was considered by the Examiner.",
"Claim Objections Regarding Claim 4 (lines 2-3), please change the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” to - - [[a]] the circumferential direction of the side plate - - as antecedent basis has already been established in claim 1 (lines 17-18). Regarding Claim 7 (line 3), please change the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” to - - [[a]] the circumferential direction of the side plate - - as antecedent basis has already been established in claim 1 (lines 17-18). Claim 10 (lines 4-6), please change the recitation of “rotatably driven by drive force of a motor together with the pump impeller; a turbine runner arranged facing the pump impeller and rotatably driven by the hydraulic oil flow to rotatably drive an output shaft” to - - rotatably driven by the drive force of [[a]] the motor together with the pump impeller; a turbine runner arranged facing the pump impeller and rotatably driven by the hydraulic oil flow to rotatably drive [[an]] the output shaft - - as antecedent basis for these features has already been established in claim 1.",
"Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claims 1-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor, or for pre-AIA the applicant regards as the invention.",
"Regarding Claim 1 (last clause), in the recitation of “each weight attachment hole is formed in a long hole shape extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Claim 2 (line 3), in the recitation of “a center of rotation of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Regarding Claim 3 (lines 3-4), in the recitation of “a center of rotation of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates.",
"The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Regarding Claim 4 (lines 2-3), in the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Regarding Claim 6 (lines 4-5 and 6-7), in the recitations of “a side plate opposing through-hole as a through-hole formed at a portion of the first side plate or the second side plate” and “each side plate opposing through-hole” it is unclear from the disclosure how many side plate opposing through-holes Applicant intends to recite. Applicant could recite “a side plate opposing through-hole as a through-hole formed at a portion of the first side plate [[or]] and the second side plate” (lines 4-5) to clarify the recitation.",
"The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Regarding Claim 7 (line 3), in the recitation of “a circumferential direction of the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Regarding Claim 9 (line 2), in the recitation of “the side plate” it is unclear from the disclosure whether Applicant is referring to the first side plate, the second side plate or the input-side plate including the first and second side plates. The lack of clarity renders the claim indefinite. Claims 2-11 are rejected based upon their dependency to a rejected base claim.",
"Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office Action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.",
"Claims 1, 3-5 and 8-11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Hoff (US 2021/0190187), in view of Heuver (US 10,821,819), and in view of Yabe et al. (US 5,947,253), hereinafter Yabe. Regarding Claim 1, Hoff teaches a torque damper apparatus (Fig. 2, “torsional vibration damper” 100) comprising: an input-side plate (“cover plate” 130 and “cover plate” 132) which includes a pair of side plates (130, 132) having a first side plate (130) formed in an annular flat plate shape and an annular flat plate-shaped second side plate (132) arranged facing the first side plate (130) at a position apart from the first side plate (130) and rotatably driven together with the first side plate (130) and which is rotatably driven in response to drive force ([0005] - “a cover plate of the torsional vibration damper, a rotational torque in a circumferential direction; rotating, in the circumferential direction, the cover plate around an axis of rotation of the torsional vibration damper”); an annular flat plate-shaped center plate (“intermediate flange” 104) coupled to an output shaft (Fig. 16, “output hub” 422) and arranged between the first side plate (Fig. 2, 130) and the second side plate (132) in a state in which the center plate (104) is rotatable relative to both side plates (130, 132); and an elastic transmission body (“springs” 106) which includes an elastic body (106) and provided between the input-side plate (130, 132) and the center plate (104) to transmit rotary drive force of the input-side plate (130, 132) to the center plate (104; [0037] - “Cover plates 130 and 132, via drive surfaces 134 and 138, are arranged to transmit rotational torque RT1 to springs 106.",
"Springs 106 are arranged to transmit rotational torque RT1 to intermediate flange 104”). Hoff does not teach “an input-side plate…which is rotatably driven in response to drive force from a motor”. In other words, Hoff does not explicitly disclose how the torque converter transmission is rotatably driven ([0061] - “Torque converter 400 includes: lock-up clutch 420 and output hub 422, non-rotatably connected to output flange 102. Lock-up clutch 420 includes piston plate 424 and drive plate 426. Output hub 422 is arranged to non-rotatably connect to an input shaft (not shown) of a transmission”). Heuver teaches an input-side plate (Fig.",
"2, “damper assembly” 260) is rotatably driven in response to drive force from a motor (“electric machine” 202; col. 1, line 13 - “Hybrid vehicles have incorporated electric motors coupled directly to torque converters to allow rotational output from the electric motors to be efficiently introduced into vehicle drivelines”). It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention was effectively filed to combine the torque converter transmission taught by Hoff and the electric motor taught by Heuver, such that “an input-side plate…which is rotatably driven in response to drive force from a motor”, as one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the result of the combination would have been predictable, and have the obvious advantage of providing the torque converter transmission taught by Hoff with an efficient source of power. Hoff or Heuver do not teach “wherein the input-side plate has, at a plate surface of at least one of the first side plate or the second side plate, multiple weight attachment holes as through-holes for attaching a balance weight for adjusting balance of the input-side plate upon rotary drive, and each weight attachment hole is formed in a long hole shape extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate, which is provided with the weight attachment holes, adjacent to an outer peripheral end portion thereof”. Yabe an input-side plate (Fig.",
"3, “retainer plate” 23) has, at a plate surface of at least one of a first side plate (23) or a second side plate, multiple weight attachment holes (“hole” 23C) as through-holes (see Figs. 9-10) for attaching a balance weight (Fig. 3, “unbalance-correcting weight” 40) for adjusting balance of the input-side plate (23) upon rotary drive (col. 3, line 29 - “weight 40 is fixed on the retainer plate 23 to correct unbalance”), and each weight attachment hole (23C) is formed in a long hole shape (see Figs. 3 and 9-10) extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate (23), which is provided with the weight attachment holes (23C), adjacent to an outer peripheral end portion thereof (see Fig.",
"3). Yabe also teaches “A lock-up clutch equipped with such dampers must be kept balanced dynamically during rotation. However, no balancing hole can be formed through the piston because pressures are applied on both sides of the piston. It was therefore proposed to form a balancing weight of such a folded clip type as shown in FIG. 13 and to bring it into fitting engagement with the retainer plate outwardly in a radial direction” (col. 1, line 55). “wherein the input-side plate has, at a plate surface of at least one of the first side plate or the second side plate, multiple weight attachment holes as through-holes for attaching a balance weight for adjusting balance of the input-side plate upon rotary drive, and each weight attachment hole is formed in a long hole shape extending along a circumferential direction at an outer edge portion of the side plate, which is provided with the weight attachment holes, adjacent to an outer peripheral end portion thereof”, as one of ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that the result of the combination would have been predictable, and have the obvious advantage of balancing the torque damper taught by Hoff and Heuver. Regarding Claim 3, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe teaches wherein the weight attachment holes (Fig.",
"3, 23C) are formed such that openings (23C) of the weight attachment holes (23C) overlap with each other at positions symmetrical about a center of rotation (see Fig. 1) of the side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) provided with the weight attachment holes (23C). Regarding Claim 4, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe wherein each weight attachment hole (Fig. 3, 23C) is formed in a linear long hole shape (see Fig. 3) along a circumferential direction of the side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) provided with the weight attachment holes (23C). Claim 5, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Hoff teaches wherein the input-side plate (Fig. 2, 130, 132) has a projecting portion (130, 132) formed in such a manner that part of a periphery of each of the first (130) and second side plates (132) projects in an axial direction (inward) of the side plates (130, 132). Regarding Claim 8, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe teaches wherein the input-side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) includes, at a periphery of each weight attachment hole (23C), a weight fitting portion (Fig. 9, “raised portion” 23A) to be fitted to part of the balance weight (40) for defining a position of the balance weight (40) in each weight attachment hole (23C).",
"Regarding Claim 9, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1, Yabe teaches wherein the balance weight (Fig. 3, 40) is formed in a clip shape (see Fig. 3) sandwiching the side plate (taught in combination with Hoff) provided with the weight attachment holes (23A). Regarding Claim 10, Hoff teaches a torque converter (Fig. 16, “torque converter” 400) comprising: a torque converter cover (“cover” 402) forming a housing space housing hydraulic oil (inside the torque converter 100), having, in the housing space, a pump impeller (“impeller” 404) configured to cause a hydraulic oil flow, and rotatably driven by drive force of a motor (taught by Heuver) together with the pump impeller (404); “turbine” 406) arranged facing the pump impeller (404) and rotatably driven by the hydraulic oil flow to rotatably drive an output shaft (422); and the torque damper apparatus according to claim 1 (taught by Hoff, Heuver and Yabe).",
"Regarding Claim 11, Hoff, Heuver and Yabe teach the torque converter according to claim 10, further comprising: a clutch apparatus (“lock-up clutch” 420) configured to transmit rotary drive force of the torque converter cover (402) to the input-side plate (130, 132) of the torque damper apparatus (100) or block the transmission, wherein the input-side plate (130, 132) is rotatably driven in response to the drive force from the motor (taught by Heuver) through each of the torque converter cover (402) and the clutch apparatus (420). Allowable Subject Matter Claims 2 and 6-7 would be allowable if rewritten or amended to overcome the rejection(s) under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), 2nd paragraph, set forth in this Office Action and rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Reasons for allowance, if applicable, will be the subject of a separate communication to the Applicant or patent owner, pursuant to 37 CFR § 1.104 and MPEP § 1302.14.",
"As allowable subject matter has been indicated, Applicant's reply must either comply with all formal requirements or specifically traverse each requirement not complied with. See 37 CFR 1.111(b) and MPEP § 707.07(a). Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to Applicant's disclosure. The prior art of Tauvron (US 5,447,218), Yamamoto (US 5,899,311), Kabayama (US 4,778,040) and Takehira (US 5,762,558) listed in the attached \"Notice of References Cited\" disclose similar torque damper balancing arrangements related to various aspects of the claimed invention. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to James J. Taylor II whose telephone number is (571)272-4074. The examiner can normally be reached M-F, 9:00 am - 5:00 pm EST.",
"Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Ernesto Suarez can be reached on 571-270-5565. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.",
"Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 /ERNESTO A SUAREZ/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3659 JAMES J. TAYLOR II Examiner Art Unit 3659 /J.J.T./Examiner, Art Unit 3659"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-02-06.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
MEMORANDUM ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge. This is an action for review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying plaintiff’s claim for black lung benefits pursuant to the Federal Coal Mine. Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Plaintiff contends that the Secretary erred by denying him the benefit of the presumption of 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). The rebuttable presumption created by Section 921(c)(4) provides that, when certain conditions are met, a miner who is suffering from a totally disabling lung condition which does not show up on X-rays as pneumoconiosis will be presumed to be suffering from pneumoconiosis. Its primary function is to shift the burden of proof to the Secretary; when the presumption is invoked, the Secretary must come forward with evidence demonstrating that the totally disabling lung condition is not pneumoconiosis or did not arise out of coal mine employment. The operation of the rebut-table presumption was discussed by Judge Lively in Ansel v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1976). Only those miners who establish the following elements are entitled to the presumption: (1) Fifteen or more years’ employment in the underground mines, (2) a total disability, (3) a chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment, and (4) a causal relation between the total disability and the chronic respiratory or pulmonary impair*884ment, which in most cases means that the lung impairment is the primary reason for the total disability. If the Secretary finds that any of these elements have not been established, and such finding is supported by substantial evidence, then a claimant would not be entitled to the presumption. The Appeals Council found that plaintiff worked in the mines for at least fifteen years. This finding satisfied the first element of the presumption of Section 921(c)(4). A serious question exists whether this finding is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff alleged in his application for benefits that he worked in the mines for twelve to fourteen years. Noting this allegation, the Hearing Examiner limited his finding to a mining career of “more than ten years.” Several medical histories in the record contain statements made by plaintiff to his physicians that he worked in the mines for a period of less than fifteen years. The Appeals Council based its finding on plaintiff’s earnings record. We have examined this record and are far from convinced that it demonstrates a career in the mines of at least fifteen years’ duration. The record indicates that plaintiff worked in the mines at various times between 1937 and 1952. It further indicates, however, that he engaged in non-mining employment in 1944, 1945, part of 1943 and part of 1946. Although plaintiff’s absence from the mines during those years is admitted in the testimony he gave before the Hearing Examiner, the Appeals Council made no mention of it. If plaintiff did not work in the mines for at least fifteen years, he would not be eligible, as a matter of right, for the Section 921(c)(4) presumption. Since neither party has addressed this important question, the Court is hesitant to premise the decision in this case with respect to Section 921(c)(4) on plaintiff’s employment history alone. Accordingly, we will assume, arguendo, that plaintiff worked in the mines for at least fifteen years, although we express serious doubts as to the validity of this assumption. The second element of the Section 921(c)(4) presumption, the existence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment, appears to have been established by plaintiff. Three doctors examined him, and each concluded that he suffered from pneumoconiosis or chronic obstructive lung disease. There are no opinions to the contrary by doctors who personally examined plaintiff. As to the third element of Section 921(c)(4) presumption, the existence of a causal relation between the chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment, the Appeals Council found: “The Appeals Council has given careful consideration to all relevant evidence of record including the claimant’s testimony, reports of examinations, opinions of physicians, and results of blood gas studies. While it is noted that the claimant may have some symptoms of a respiratory impairment such as shortness of breath, a productive cough, occasional wheezing, and chest discomfort, physical examinations performed on January 5, 1971, August 13, 1973, December 12, 1974 and March 8,1976, noted no significant abnormalities concerning the lungs. Blood gas studies performed on August 13, 1973, were also interpreted as normal (Exhibit 27). Although one of the claimant’s physicians, Dr. John Burrell, has stated that he considers the claimant to be totally disabled (Exhibit 31), the Appeals Council notes that the objective evidence of record does not establish that the claimant has a significant pulmonary impairment nor that he was totally disabled because of a respiratory impairment on or before June 30, 1973. Further, the chest X-rays and the spirometric studies of record constitute probative and credible evidence of record regarding respiratory function and must be given significant weight in evaluating the claimant’s residual function capacity.” (Tr. 11). Plaintiff contends that this finding contravenes the holding in Ansel because the Secretary impermissibly relied on negative X-ray interpretations and pulmonary *885functions to prevent the presumption from being invoked. The Secretary concedes that the Appeals Counsel erroneously relied on negative X-ray interpretations in finding that plaintiff was not totally disabled by his lung condition. But it is contended by the Secretary that, apart from the X-ray reports, “other relevant evidence” exists which supports that finding. Specifically, the Secretary contends that Ansel does not preclude negative pulmonary function studies from being used to assess the severity of a lung impairment. Accordingly, it is the Secretary’s position that the “other relevant evidence” of record, which includes a negative arterial blood gas study and negative pulmonary function studies, supports the Appeals Council’s finding that plaintiff’s lung impairment is not severe enough to be totally disabling.1 The extent to which Ansel limits the use of negative pulmonary function studies to prevent the operation of or rebut the Section 921(c)(4) presumption was recently considered by this Court in Jeffries v. Mathews, 431 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D.Tenn.1977): “The Secretary did rely, in part, on negative pulmonary function studies to support his finding that plaintiff was not totally disabled. Ansel appears to have qualified the evidentiary value of negative pulmonary function studies in at least two respects: (1) they may not be relied upon to prove that a lung impairment is not pneumoconiosis, and (2) they alone will not support a finding that a claimant is not totally disabled by a lung impairment when there is significant medical evidence to the contrary. We do not read Ansel as holding that negative pulmonary function studies are irrelevant to the question of total disability. The Court is of the opinion that negative pulmonary function studies may be considered together with ‘other relevant evidence’ as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(c) in assessing the severity of the lung impairment. Negative pulmonary function studies, of course, are not conclusive on the question of total disability, but they are relevant to that question.” (footnote omitted). Id., at 1034-1035. Plaintiff contends that the reports of three physicians demonstrate that his lung condition is totally disabling. The Secretary, on the other hand, contends that the “other relevant evidence,” which consists primarily of a negative arterial blood gas study and negative pulmonary function studies, represents substantial evidence in support of the finding that plaintiff’s lung condition is not totally disabling. Doctor Leon Bogartz examined plaintiff in August of 1973. He' concluded that plaintiff suffered from a “significant” respiratory impairment, but did not state whether or not such condition was so severe as to be totally disabling. An arterial blood gas study was performed, and it yielded normal results. No clubbing or edema was noted, and plaintiff’s AP diameter was listed as normal. The X-ray relied on by Dr. Bogartz as demonstrating pneumoconiosis was later interpreted by two physicians as negative, and the pulmonary function study relied on by him was later found to be unacceptable because it was not supported by spirometric tracings. Doctor William Swann examined plaintiff in December of 1974, some eighteen months after the June 30, 1973 cut-off date. See Ingram v. Califano, 547 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1977); Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976). He did not state whether he considered plaintiff’s lung condition to be totally disabling. He based his diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, in part, on an X-ray that was subsequently reinterpreted as negative, and a pulmonary function study that was later determined to be invalid because of an *886excessive variation between the FEVi curves and an insufficient number of MW determinations. He concluded that there was no evidence of cyanosis, clubbing or edema, that breath sounds were equal, that there were no rales or wheezes, and that no nodes or masses were palpable in the neck. The most favorable evidence to plaintiff consists of a statement made by Dr. John Burrell. Dr. Burrell reported on October 11, 1974 that plaintiff had been treated by the Lake City Medical Group, of which Dr. Burrell is a member, since 1964, and diagnosed plaintiff as having chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and hypertension. Dr. Burrell stated: “It is my professional opinion that Mr. Collins is totally and permanently disabled from maintaining gainful employment in the coal mining industry or related industry with exposure to chronic dust, fumes, etc. (Enclosed are reports from Dr. Bogartz and Dr. Swann).” (Tr. 124). A report by a claimant’s treating physician of many years stating that the claimant is totally disabled by a lung condition normally is afforded significant weight when the only contradictory evidence consists of negative pulmonary function studies. See, e. g., Ansel v. Weinberger, supra; Cope v. Mathews, 415 F.Supp. 467 (E.D. Tenn.1976); Pike v. Mathews, 414 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Tenn.1976); Marlow v. Mathews, 412 F.Supp. 925 (E.D.Tenn.1976). In each of these cases, however, the reports of the treating physicians were well supported by medical findings, and they stated unequivocally that the claimant was totally disabled by a lung condition. Doctor Burrell’s report is not supported by any medical findings. He merely referred to the reports of Dr. Bogartz and Dr. Swann, which have been discussed above. Moreover, his statement that plaintiff was totally disabled by a lung condition was not unequivocal. Any person with a lung condition, whether or not it is totally disabling, should avoid exposure to coal dust and fumes. Thus, a statement that a person should avoid exposure to coal dust or fumes does not necessarily mean that the person’s lung condition prevents him from performing work that is comparable to coal mining but does not involve exposure to dust or fumes. We conclude that it was reasonable for the Secretary to find on the basis of the “other relevant evidence” of record that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his lung condition was severe enough to be totally disabling. Having failed to prove this element, plaintiff failed to invoke the presumption of Section 921(c)(4). We note parenthetically that a serious question exists whether plaintiff would have been entitled to benefits even if he had invoked the Section 921(c)(4) presumption. The presumption is rebutted by a showing that the totally disabling lung condition did not arise out of coal mine employment. Of course, there is a rebuttable presumption that any lung impairment of a person who worked in the mines for ten or more years arose out of mining employment, and it must be presumed that plaintiff’s lung condition stemmed from his work in the mines. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.416. The record in this case indicates, however, that plaintiff’s lung condition may have been caused by heavy cigarette smoking and exposure to sand and dust during his post-1952 employment in the construction industry. In particular, Dr. Bogartz stated: “Mr. Collins is a gentlemen who has been a heavy smoker and has worked for approximately 12 years in underground coal mining. It should be noted that he also worked with concrete and sand and this may contribute to his respiratory difficulties at the present time. . . (Tr. 118). In addition to the above statement, we note that plaintiff last worked in the mines almost twenty-five years ago, and that he performed heavy construction labor for seventeen years after leaving the mines. This strongly suggests that his exposure to coal dust in the mines did not render him totally disabled. *887For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, denied, and that the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, sustained. Order Accordingly.
. The Secretary suggests in his brief that pulmonary function studies alone are sufficient to support a finding that a lung condition is not totally disabling, and are thereby sufficient to defeat the Section 921(c)(4) presumption. A reading of Ansel refutes this proposition. The pulmonary function studies performed on the plaintiff in Ansel did not satisfy the interim criteria. The Court of Appeals found that the negative pulmonary function studies, standing alone, were insufficient to overcome a well documented and uncontradicted statement by plaintiffs treating physician of many years that plaintiff’s lung condition was totally disabling. | 11-26-2022 | [
"MEMORANDUM ROBERT L. TAYLOR, District Judge. This is an action for review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying plaintiff’s claim for black lung benefits pursuant to the Federal Coal Mine. Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. Plaintiff contends that the Secretary erred by denying him the benefit of the presumption of 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4). The rebuttable presumption created by Section 921(c)(4) provides that, when certain conditions are met, a miner who is suffering from a totally disabling lung condition which does not show up on X-rays as pneumoconiosis will be presumed to be suffering from pneumoconiosis. Its primary function is to shift the burden of proof to the Secretary; when the presumption is invoked, the Secretary must come forward with evidence demonstrating that the totally disabling lung condition is not pneumoconiosis or did not arise out of coal mine employment.",
"The operation of the rebut-table presumption was discussed by Judge Lively in Ansel v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1976). Only those miners who establish the following elements are entitled to the presumption: (1) Fifteen or more years’ employment in the underground mines, (2) a total disability, (3) a chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment, and (4) a causal relation between the total disability and the chronic respiratory or pulmonary impair*884ment, which in most cases means that the lung impairment is the primary reason for the total disability. If the Secretary finds that any of these elements have not been established, and such finding is supported by substantial evidence, then a claimant would not be entitled to the presumption. The Appeals Council found that plaintiff worked in the mines for at least fifteen years.",
"This finding satisfied the first element of the presumption of Section 921(c)(4). A serious question exists whether this finding is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff alleged in his application for benefits that he worked in the mines for twelve to fourteen years. Noting this allegation, the Hearing Examiner limited his finding to a mining career of “more than ten years.” Several medical histories in the record contain statements made by plaintiff to his physicians that he worked in the mines for a period of less than fifteen years. The Appeals Council based its finding on plaintiff’s earnings record. We have examined this record and are far from convinced that it demonstrates a career in the mines of at least fifteen years’ duration. The record indicates that plaintiff worked in the mines at various times between 1937 and 1952. It further indicates, however, that he engaged in non-mining employment in 1944, 1945, part of 1943 and part of 1946. Although plaintiff’s absence from the mines during those years is admitted in the testimony he gave before the Hearing Examiner, the Appeals Council made no mention of it. If plaintiff did not work in the mines for at least fifteen years, he would not be eligible, as a matter of right, for the Section 921(c)(4) presumption.",
"Since neither party has addressed this important question, the Court is hesitant to premise the decision in this case with respect to Section 921(c)(4) on plaintiff’s employment history alone. Accordingly, we will assume, arguendo, that plaintiff worked in the mines for at least fifteen years, although we express serious doubts as to the validity of this assumption. The second element of the Section 921(c)(4) presumption, the existence of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment, appears to have been established by plaintiff. Three doctors examined him, and each concluded that he suffered from pneumoconiosis or chronic obstructive lung disease. There are no opinions to the contrary by doctors who personally examined plaintiff. As to the third element of Section 921(c)(4) presumption, the existence of a causal relation between the chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment, the Appeals Council found: “The Appeals Council has given careful consideration to all relevant evidence of record including the claimant’s testimony, reports of examinations, opinions of physicians, and results of blood gas studies. While it is noted that the claimant may have some symptoms of a respiratory impairment such as shortness of breath, a productive cough, occasional wheezing, and chest discomfort, physical examinations performed on January 5, 1971, August 13, 1973, December 12, 1974 and March 8,1976, noted no significant abnormalities concerning the lungs.",
"Blood gas studies performed on August 13, 1973, were also interpreted as normal (Exhibit 27). Although one of the claimant’s physicians, Dr. John Burrell, has stated that he considers the claimant to be totally disabled (Exhibit 31), the Appeals Council notes that the objective evidence of record does not establish that the claimant has a significant pulmonary impairment nor that he was totally disabled because of a respiratory impairment on or before June 30, 1973. Further, the chest X-rays and the spirometric studies of record constitute probative and credible evidence of record regarding respiratory function and must be given significant weight in evaluating the claimant’s residual function capacity.” (Tr. 11). Plaintiff contends that this finding contravenes the holding in Ansel because the Secretary impermissibly relied on negative X-ray interpretations and pulmonary *885functions to prevent the presumption from being invoked. The Secretary concedes that the Appeals Counsel erroneously relied on negative X-ray interpretations in finding that plaintiff was not totally disabled by his lung condition. But it is contended by the Secretary that, apart from the X-ray reports, “other relevant evidence” exists which supports that finding. Specifically, the Secretary contends that Ansel does not preclude negative pulmonary function studies from being used to assess the severity of a lung impairment.",
"Accordingly, it is the Secretary’s position that the “other relevant evidence” of record, which includes a negative arterial blood gas study and negative pulmonary function studies, supports the Appeals Council’s finding that plaintiff’s lung impairment is not severe enough to be totally disabling.1 The extent to which Ansel limits the use of negative pulmonary function studies to prevent the operation of or rebut the Section 921(c)(4) presumption was recently considered by this Court in Jeffries v. Mathews, 431 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D.Tenn.1977): “The Secretary did rely, in part, on negative pulmonary function studies to support his finding that plaintiff was not totally disabled. Ansel appears to have qualified the evidentiary value of negative pulmonary function studies in at least two respects: (1) they may not be relied upon to prove that a lung impairment is not pneumoconiosis, and (2) they alone will not support a finding that a claimant is not totally disabled by a lung impairment when there is significant medical evidence to the contrary. We do not read Ansel as holding that negative pulmonary function studies are irrelevant to the question of total disability.",
"The Court is of the opinion that negative pulmonary function studies may be considered together with ‘other relevant evidence’ as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(c) in assessing the severity of the lung impairment. Negative pulmonary function studies, of course, are not conclusive on the question of total disability, but they are relevant to that question.” (footnote omitted). Id., at 1034-1035. Plaintiff contends that the reports of three physicians demonstrate that his lung condition is totally disabling. The Secretary, on the other hand, contends that the “other relevant evidence,” which consists primarily of a negative arterial blood gas study and negative pulmonary function studies, represents substantial evidence in support of the finding that plaintiff’s lung condition is not totally disabling.",
"Doctor Leon Bogartz examined plaintiff in August of 1973. He' concluded that plaintiff suffered from a “significant” respiratory impairment, but did not state whether or not such condition was so severe as to be totally disabling. An arterial blood gas study was performed, and it yielded normal results. No clubbing or edema was noted, and plaintiff’s AP diameter was listed as normal. The X-ray relied on by Dr. Bogartz as demonstrating pneumoconiosis was later interpreted by two physicians as negative, and the pulmonary function study relied on by him was later found to be unacceptable because it was not supported by spirometric tracings. Doctor William Swann examined plaintiff in December of 1974, some eighteen months after the June 30, 1973 cut-off date.",
"See Ingram v. Califano, 547 F.2d 904 (5th Cir. 1977); Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345 (6th Cir. 1976). He did not state whether he considered plaintiff’s lung condition to be totally disabling. He based his diagnosis of pneumoconiosis, in part, on an X-ray that was subsequently reinterpreted as negative, and a pulmonary function study that was later determined to be invalid because of an *886excessive variation between the FEVi curves and an insufficient number of MW determinations. He concluded that there was no evidence of cyanosis, clubbing or edema, that breath sounds were equal, that there were no rales or wheezes, and that no nodes or masses were palpable in the neck. The most favorable evidence to plaintiff consists of a statement made by Dr. John Burrell. Dr. Burrell reported on October 11, 1974 that plaintiff had been treated by the Lake City Medical Group, of which Dr. Burrell is a member, since 1964, and diagnosed plaintiff as having chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and hypertension.",
"Dr. Burrell stated: “It is my professional opinion that Mr. Collins is totally and permanently disabled from maintaining gainful employment in the coal mining industry or related industry with exposure to chronic dust, fumes, etc. (Enclosed are reports from Dr. Bogartz and Dr. Swann).” (Tr. 124). A report by a claimant’s treating physician of many years stating that the claimant is totally disabled by a lung condition normally is afforded significant weight when the only contradictory evidence consists of negative pulmonary function studies. See, e. g., Ansel v. Weinberger, supra; Cope v. Mathews, 415 F.Supp. 467 (E.D. Tenn.1976); Pike v. Mathews, 414 F.Supp. 848 (E.D.Tenn.1976); Marlow v. Mathews, 412 F.Supp. 925 (E.D.Tenn.1976).",
"In each of these cases, however, the reports of the treating physicians were well supported by medical findings, and they stated unequivocally that the claimant was totally disabled by a lung condition. Doctor Burrell’s report is not supported by any medical findings. He merely referred to the reports of Dr. Bogartz and Dr. Swann, which have been discussed above. Moreover, his statement that plaintiff was totally disabled by a lung condition was not unequivocal. Any person with a lung condition, whether or not it is totally disabling, should avoid exposure to coal dust and fumes. Thus, a statement that a person should avoid exposure to coal dust or fumes does not necessarily mean that the person’s lung condition prevents him from performing work that is comparable to coal mining but does not involve exposure to dust or fumes. We conclude that it was reasonable for the Secretary to find on the basis of the “other relevant evidence” of record that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his lung condition was severe enough to be totally disabling. Having failed to prove this element, plaintiff failed to invoke the presumption of Section 921(c)(4).",
"We note parenthetically that a serious question exists whether plaintiff would have been entitled to benefits even if he had invoked the Section 921(c)(4) presumption. The presumption is rebutted by a showing that the totally disabling lung condition did not arise out of coal mine employment. Of course, there is a rebuttable presumption that any lung impairment of a person who worked in the mines for ten or more years arose out of mining employment, and it must be presumed that plaintiff’s lung condition stemmed from his work in the mines. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.416. The record in this case indicates, however, that plaintiff’s lung condition may have been caused by heavy cigarette smoking and exposure to sand and dust during his post-1952 employment in the construction industry. In particular, Dr. Bogartz stated: “Mr.",
"Collins is a gentlemen who has been a heavy smoker and has worked for approximately 12 years in underground coal mining. It should be noted that he also worked with concrete and sand and this may contribute to his respiratory difficulties at the present time. . . (Tr. 118). In addition to the above statement, we note that plaintiff last worked in the mines almost twenty-five years ago, and that he performed heavy construction labor for seventeen years after leaving the mines. This strongly suggests that his exposure to coal dust in the mines did not render him totally disabled. *887For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, denied, and that the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, sustained. Order Accordingly. .",
"The Secretary suggests in his brief that pulmonary function studies alone are sufficient to support a finding that a lung condition is not totally disabling, and are thereby sufficient to defeat the Section 921(c)(4) presumption. A reading of Ansel refutes this proposition. The pulmonary function studies performed on the plaintiff in Ansel did not satisfy the interim criteria. The Court of Appeals found that the negative pulmonary function studies, standing alone, were insufficient to overcome a well documented and uncontradicted statement by plaintiffs treating physician of many years that plaintiff’s lung condition was totally disabling."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/8847798/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
542 F. Supp. 2d 526 (2008) Stephen K. VERRET, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. Angela Massey, Third Party Defendant. Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-636. United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division. February 14, 2008. *529 Banker H. Phares, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff. Jon E. Fisher, Department of Justice, Dallas, TX, for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff. Susan Jennifer Oliver, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, Third Party Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER MARCIA A. CRONE, District Judge. Pending before the court is Defendant United States of America's ("the Government") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 23). Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Stephen K. Verret's ("Verret") complaint against the Government for a refund of $408,918.66 assessed against him by the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") for employment and withholding taxes, penalties, and interest. Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment is warranted.
I. Background
Community Healthcare Foundation was a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, the primary business of which was the operation of Doctors Hospital located at 5500 39th Street in Groves, Texas.[1] By-Laws of the Board of Trustees of Doctors Hospital (the "By-Laws"), created by Community Healthcare Foundation, outlined the operational and managerial structure of Doctors Hospital. The By-Laws specified that the Board of Trustees (the "Board"), comprised of voluntary and unpaid members of the community, shall act as the governing body of Doctors Hospital. The By-Laws also provided for a Chairman of the Board and a Chief Administrative Executive Officer ("Executive Director" or "CEO") in addition to various other positions. In May 1976, at the age of twenty-two, Verret joined Doctors Hospital's Board. He served in various capacities on the Board during his approximately twenty-six-year tenure, including holding the position of Chairman of the Board from 1999 until his departure in 2002. In addition to his service on the Board, Verret, unlike his fellow Trustees, had a unique relationship with Doctors Hospital. Stoneburner-Verret Electric Company, Inc. ("Stoneburner"), a company in which Verret is a majority stockholder, performed and invoiced Doctors Hospital on repeated occasions for "electrical services." Also, Verret's wife was employed by Doctors Hospital as the Chief Operating Officer from January through March 2001. In 1999, NewCare Hospital Corporation ("NewCare"), a business involved in the operation and management of hospitals, contracted with Verret to assist with the recruitment of specialized physicians to *530 a lucrative new practice area for the hospital. Verret devoted a significant amount of time to this endeavor, laboring "between 22 and 30 hours a week" during 2001 alone. For these services, which oftentimes overlapped with his duties as Chairman, Verret was compensated between $70,000.00 and $80,000.00 per year. Despite its best efforts, Doctors Hospital's financial situation steadily deteriorated. During the first part of 2001, David Cottey ("Cottey"), Doctors Hospital's Executive Director, informed Verret and the Board that Doctors Hospital had failed to remit to the Government employment withholding taxes totaling approximately $400,000.00. The outstanding tax liability was ultimately satisfied with borrowed monies appropriated for the procurement of medical equipment. Cottey was informed by Verret, individually, and by the Board, collectively, however, that the payment of employment withholding taxes was of paramount importance and that, under no circumstances, should he fail to pay them again. Although the record does not indicate that the Board took any specific steps to devise, implement, or supervise a system of internal controls to ensure timely future payments, the Board repeatedly asked Cottey during 2001 about the status of Doctors Hospital's employment taxes. Each time, Cottey informed the Board that the employment taxes were current. By the end of 2001, Doctors Hospital's financial condition was precarious. Contrary to his prior assurances, Cottey informed Verret and the Board in November 2001 that the income and FICA taxes for the employees were delinquent for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. Verret has not presented evidence that any measures were taken by the Board at that time to ensure the satisfaction of the outstanding liability other than again "urging" the Executive Director to pay the taxes. When Cottey failed to comply with the Board's request, a search was initiated to find a suitable replacement for Cottey. Nevertheless, the Board continued to employ and rely on Cottey during the interim. The tax delinquency for the third and fourth quarters of 2001 ultimately gave rise to the instant action. The IRS found Verret, Cottey, and Angela Massey ("Massey"), who held positions as Doctors Hospital's Controller and Chief Financial Officer during the relevant period, to be "responsible parties" for the payment of federal withholding taxes under § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code.[2] The IRS settled with Cottey and assessed a penalty of $407,097.66 plus $1,821.00 of interest against Verret.[3] Verret has paid this assessment in full and on October 12, 2006, initiated the above-styled action to obtain a refund. The Government filed the instant *531 motion on October 15, 2007, seeking summary judgment on Verret's claim.
II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir.2003); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002). "A fact is `material' if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.'" Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505); accord Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir.2005); Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 471 (5th Cir.2001); Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir.1999); Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir.1994). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505. "An issue is `genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489 (emphasis in original). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505; accord EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir.2006); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 423 F.3d at 454; Harken Exploration Co., 261 F.3d at 471; Merritt-Campbell, Inc., 164 F.3d at 961. The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)). Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n. 3, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 11, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir.2004); Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir.2003); Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir.1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1160, 120 S. Ct. 1171, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (2000). "[T]he court must review the record `taken as a whole.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 *532 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348); see Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.2005). All the evidence must be construed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or resolving any factual disputes." Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1996); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097; Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 401 F.3d at 350; Smith, 391 F.3d at 624; Malacara, 353 F.3d at 398; Broum v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.2003); Harken Exploration Co., 261 F.3d at 471; Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 951, 122 S. Ct. 347, 151 L. Ed. 2d 262 (2001). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor. Palmer v. BRG of Go., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n. 5, 111 S. Ct. 401, 112 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505); Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir.2004); Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003); Martinez, 338 F.3d at 411; Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 815, 124 S. Ct. 66, 157 L. Ed. 2d 30 (2003); Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.2002). The evidence is construed "in favor of the nonmoving party, however, only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1999); accord Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Furthermore, "`only reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.'" Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n. 14, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting H.L. Hayden Co. of N. Y., Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir.1989)). "If the [nonmoving party's] theory is ... senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted." Id. at 468-69, 112 S. Ct. 2072. The nonmovant's burden is not satisfied by "`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by `conclusory allegations,' by `unsubstantiated assertions,'" by speculation, by the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute, or "by only a `scintilla' of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348; Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1994); Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.1994)); accord Warfield, 436 F.3d at 557; Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047. "Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Broum, 337 F.3d at 541; accord Hugh Symons Group, plc v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466, 468 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 386, 154 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2002); see Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 332 (5th Cir.2004); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir.2003). Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S. Ct. 1689, 123 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1993); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548; EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2005); Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 *533 (5th Cir.2004). "In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548.
B. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty
The Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") requires employers to withhold federal income and social security taxes, Federal Insurance Contribution Act ("FICA") taxes, and Medicare taxes from the wages of employees. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(a), 3402(a); see also Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 56 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1978); Lencyk v. Internal Revenue Serv., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (W.D.Tex.2005); Sutton v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 2d 559, 562 (E.D.Tex.2001) (citing Barnett v. Internal Revenue Serv., 988 F.2d 1449, 1453 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 990, 114 S. Ct. 546, 126 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1993)). These sums are commonly referred to as "trust funds" because the IRC provides that the monies are deemed to be "a special fund [held] in trust for the United States." 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a); see also Staff IT Inc. v. United States, Civ. A. No. H-H-04-2210, 2006 WL 314440, at *6 (S.D.Tex. Feb. 9, 2006), aff'd, 482 F.3d 792 (5th Cir.2007). Such funds, which are remitted to the government on a quarterly basis, are for the exclusive use of the United States and are not available to cover operational or business expenses. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(b), 3403, 7501(a). Nevertheless, "the funds accumulated during the quarter can be a tempting source of ready cash to a failing corporation beleaguered by creditors." Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243, 98 S. Ct. 1778. When net wages are paid to the employee, the taxes that were, or should have been, withheld are credited in full to the employee even if they are never remitted to the government. Id. at 243-45, 98 S. Ct. 1778. "Thus, unless the government can collect these taxes from the employer... the revenues are forever lost to the Government." Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (citing Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243-45, 98 S. Ct. 1778); see also USLIFE Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Harbison, 784 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir.1986); Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1153 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 842, 100 S. Ct. 82, 62 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1979). Section 6672 of the IRC provides the government with a mechanism, however, by which it may collect the taxes withheld and protect itself against such losses. Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (citing Wetzel v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 1451, 1455 (S.D.Miss. 1992)). That section imposes a penalty on any "person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax" withheld who willfully fails to do so. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a). The penalty is equal to the total amount of the tax not paid over and is itself referred to as a "tax" by the IRC. Id. at §§ 6671(a), 6672(a). The term "person," as defined by the IRC, includes "an officer or employee of a corporation ... who as such officer [or] employee ... is under a duty" to collect, account for, or pay over the withheld tax. Id. at § 6671(b). This is known as the "responsible person." Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453 & n. 6. An individual need not engage in all three of the activities listed in the statute in order to be held liable; involvement in any one of the three named activities is sufficient. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 250, 98 S. Ct. 1778. Thus, liability for a penalty is imposed only on (1) a responsible person (as defined in § 6671), who has (2) willfully failed to perform his or her duty to collect, account, or pay over the tax. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453; Turnbull v. United States, 929 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Star-Tel, Inc., *534 Civ. A. No. H-03-3904, 2005 WL 2810701, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 26, 2005); Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1032.
1. Responsible Person under § 6672
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit generally takes a broad view regarding who can be a responsible person for purposes of liability under § 6672. Dowdy v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-232, 2005 WL 1719899, at *6 (E.D.Tex. July 22, 2005); Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1034. Responsible persons may include "employees, stockholders, sureties, lenders and others outside the formal corporate organization." Vollmer Elec. Co. v. United States, Civ. A. No. SA-06-CA-360, 2007 WL 2048662, at *5 n. 46 (W.D.Tex. July 11, 2007). Responsibility "`for collecting, accounting for, or paying over employee withholding taxes is a question of duty, status, and authority.'" Renfro v. United States, Civ. A. No. 3:04-C2574, 2006 WL 2035657, at *3 (N.D.Tex. July 19, 2006) (quoting Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir.1989)); see Wood v. United States, 808 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir.1987) (citing Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir.1983)). "It is not necessary that an individual have the final or apocalyptic word as to which creditors should be paid in order to be subject to liability." United States v. Bogard, Civ. A. No. 4-88-492, 1991 WL 101535, at *4 (N.D.Tex. Apr. 19, 1991). In fact, one need not even have knowledge that he has such a duty or authority. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454. It is sufficient only that the individual has significant power, authority, and control over the disbursement of funds to find that he is a responsible person. Bogard, 1991 WL 101535, at *4 (citing Neckles v. United States, 579 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir.1978)). Thus, the crucial inquiry is whether the individual had the effective power to pay the taxes. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178; Howard, 711 F.2d at 734. In determining responsible person liability, the law disregards mechanical titles and functions of corporate officers and instead focuses on individuals who actually could have ensured the satisfaction of tax obligations. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 665 F.2d at 752 (citing Liddon v. United States, 448 F.2d 509, 512-13 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 1769, 32 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1971)). The Fifth Circuit, like other circuit courts, has developed certain indicia of responsibility that imply authority when a particular individual lacks the precise responsibility of withholding or paying employment taxes. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455. The court has noted that it: ... cannot ignore the extensive case law that narrowly constrains a fact finder's province in § 6672 cases. Thus, although "the facts ... are critical in ... any § 6672 case," we tend to agree with the other circuits that have held that certain facts will almost invariably prove dispositive of a finding of responsibility. Id. at 1454 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Factors considered by the Fifth Circuit to be indicative of responsible person status include whether a person: (i) is an officer or member of the board of directors; (ii) owns a substantial amount of stock in the company; (iii) manages the day-to-day operations of the business; (iv) has the authority to hire or fire employees; (v) makes decisions as to the disbursement of funds and payment of creditors; and (vi) possesses the authority to sign company checks. Logal v. United States, 195 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455). No single factor is dispositive. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455. A person cannot "disqualify himself from responsible [person] status simply because he does not *535 fit into every category." Raba v. United States, 977 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir.1992). In the Fifth Circuit, cases classifying an individual as a responsible person for purposes of liability under § 6672 are numerous. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454 n. 10 (citing cases). In fact, "cases not finding § 6672 responsibility are relatively few and far between." Id. at 1456. "[T]he rationale for the broad net of § 6672 responsibility serves a valuable prophylactic purpose: it encourages officers, directors, and other high-level employees to stay abreast of the company's withholding and payment of employee's taxes." Id. at 1456-57. This "broad net" of liability can extend beyond the most responsible person; in reality, multiple persons can be deemed responsible for purposes of § 6672 liability. Id. at 1455; see also Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178. Verret contends that he was not a responsible person under the meaning of the statute for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. The record before the court, however, belies this assertion. Verret joined the Board in 1976 and served continuously through March 2002. During his approximately twenty-six-year tenure, Verret held various positions, including Chairman of the Board from 1999 until his departure in 2002. Although Verret argues that "the Board did not have the `final word' as to what bills, including taxes, should or should not be paid," such authority is not necessary. See Bogard, 1991 WL 101535, at *4. Furthermore, a cursory review of the By-Laws reveals that the opposite is true. Article II, Section 1, states that the Board may ... delegate the management of the day-to-day operation of the Hospital to a management company or other person, provided that the business and affairs of the Corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised under the direction of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees shall have final responsibility for Hospital administrative activities and professional services, for the operation of the Hospital and for the quality of patient care at the Hospital. Article IV, Section 1, refers to the Executive Director as merely "a duly authorized representative of the Board ... [who] shall report to the Chairman of the Board." Moreover, the Executive Director, if requested, "shall make reports to each meeting of the Board ... regarding budget matters, personnel matters, staff and Professional Staff matters, and all other relevant matters." The By-Laws are replete with statements indicating that the Board retains final authority, including the ability to "review the performance of the Executive Director not less than annually." Additionally, Verret admitted at deposition that the Board was atop the "pecking order" of Doctors Hospital. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the Board delegated financial duties to a management company or to Cottey, as Executive Director, it would not necessarily divest itself of all financial responsibility. Indeed, multiple parties can be, and quite often are, held responsible. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178. Despite Verret's position as Chairman of the Board, he claims that "there is no evidence that anyone other than the CEO was responsible for the Hospital's day-to-day operations." The record, however, reveals a number of situations where Verret and the Board were involved in decisions impacting the operations of Doctors Hospital. For example, Verret's deposition testimony indicates that the Board, collectively, became concerned that John King ("King"), a physician performing a number of surgeries, would leave the hospital if certain equipment was not acquired. In order to procure this equipment and to ensure King's continued relationship with *536 the hospital, the Board secured a $500,000.00 loan. Although this loan was discussed by the Board following a review of a study performed by a certified public accountant, Verret concedes that he was one of only three individuals who actually negotiated the terms of this loan. Q: Well, you say you and the doctors obtained the loan. Who negotiated with whoever you borrowed the money from to actually get the loan? A: Dr. Morrell, myself, and a Dr. Keller. Ultimately, the loan was "a joint and several loan," personally guaranteed by a number of individuals, including Verret. Verret also involved himself in some of Doctors Hospital's tax activities.[4] He signed the company's IRS Form 990 for the 1999 and 2000 tax years as "Chairman."[5] Additionally, after learning of Cottey's initial failure to remit Doctors Hospital's withholding taxes in June or July 2001, the Board began requesting that Cottey provide proof that the payroll taxes were paid. Such "proof primarily included oral assurances and the presentation of financial statements to the Board with separate line item disclosure of tax liability. Individually, Verret personally instructed Cottey to pay the taxes before he paid anyone else. Then, upon learning of Cottey's second failure to remit withholding taxes in November 2001, Verret testified at deposition that he made additional inquiries. Q: Did you talk to anybody at Doctor's other than Mr. Cottey about the payroll taxes? A: At what time period? Q: After you first learned of the unpaid taxes? A: I talked to a gentleman by the name of Harry Baker, which [sic] was the CEO of Tri-Health Services, which was the new management company. Q: You spoke to him about the taxes? A: Of their plan to get the taxes paid. . . . Q: Okay. When did you talk to him? . . . A: First or second week of December of 01. Verret's taking the initiative to contact and discuss a plan to pay delinquent withholding taxes with the new management company confirms his involvement in Doctors Hospital's financial affairs particularly its tax affairs during the relevant period. The record also reveals that Verret, unlike other board members, spent a significant amount of time at Doctors Hospital. In 1999, the management company asked Verret to assist in recruiting physicians in the "industrial occupation business." Industrial *537 occupation, according to Verret, provided a "new stream of revenue that healthcare facilities were looking at bringing on board. It took care of drug screens, workmen comp injuries, and normally a hospital would contract directly with an employer to provide services at some rate." Verret's new role, for which he was compensated between $70,000.00 and $80,000.00 per year as a consultant, demanded "[b]etween 22 and 30 hours a week" during 2001 alone. This required Verret to spend a significant amount of time at Doctors Hospital, frequently eating breakfast and lunch at the hospital. Such activities overlapped with his duties as Chairman and were oftentimes indistinguishable. Massey, who understood Verret's role solely to be Chairman of the Board, stated that she saw Verret at the hospital often and that he would stop by "almost every day" and "talk with David Cottey." Verret's involvement in the development of new cash flow strategies, frequent presence, and nearly daily discussions with the Executive Director further demonstrate his participation in the operations of Doctors Hospital. Moreover, Verret presents no evidence disputing the Board's ability to hire and fire employees. Verret's own deposition testimony states that the Board, for which Verret served as Chairman, voted to allow Cottey to continue as Executive Director in 2001 even after Doctors Hospital's management company, NewCare, filed for bankruptcy. Verret indicates that the Board discussed terminating Cottey's employment after it learned of his first failure to remit withholding taxes.[6] Additionally, Massey indicated that Verret and the Board could "get rid of [her] in a heartbeat, and ... could get rid of David [Cottey]... if the need arose." Thus, this factor also weighs against Verret. Finally, Verret's authority to sign company checks is also indicative of his status as a responsible person under the statute. Verret argues, however, that Doctors Hospital's checkbooks were located in a locked closet in the accounting department and that the record is devoid of any instances where Verret signed a check on the company's behalf. He maintains that checkwriting authority rested with Cottey and his staff. Nevertheless, signature cards for each of Doctors Hospital's three bank accounts have been provided by the Government. Interestingly, although each account has four signatories, Verret is the only individual to be listed as a signatory on all three accounts. In fact, Verret's signature appears first on each signature card. There is no evidence that Verret ever requested and was denied access to the checkbooks in order to satisfy outstanding liabilities, including employment taxes. Massey, who had unrestricted access to the checkbooks, admitted that if a disagreement arose between Cottey and Verret, Verret would prevail as Chairman of the Board. While not conclusive, this factor weighs against Verret. In addition to deposition testimony, Verret presents the affidavit of Doctors Hospital's Controller during the relevant tax periods, Dena Whitmire ("Whitmire"), the affidavit of Dr. Rocco Morrell ("Dr.Morrell"), a fellow member of the Board, and the affidavit of Frank Butts ("Butts"), a certified public accountant ("C.P.A.") who *538 performed a six-month financial review of the hospital's records. In each affidavit, the affiant attributes financial responsibility to either Cottey or Massey. Dr. Morrell adds that the By-Laws do not confer any authority to make business and/or financial decisions concerning the operation of Doctors Hospital upon Verret. Further, Whitmire states that she "did not observe Mr. Verret exercising any power, authority or control over the payment of accounts of Doctors Hospital, including the payment of employment taxes." This evidence does not establish that Verret lacked responsibility as defined by the IRC, nor does it create an issue of material fact regarding his status. Indeed, it is undisputed that Verret did not actually pay the taxes at issue when due that is what gave rise to the assessment at the outset. Assuming arguendo that Cottey and Massey possessed primary responsibility for the payment of taxes, that fact alone does not relieve Verret of liability. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178. Additionally, the By-Laws refute Dr. Morrell's assertions. Moreover, Verret need not exercise his vested authority; it is sufficient to infer liability if he merely possessed the effective power to pay the taxes. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178; Howard, 711 F.2d at 734. At the very least, two of the affidavits are suspect and arguably self-motivated those of the Controller and a member of the Board, who are not necessarily immune from § 6672(a) liability themselves. With regard to Butts's affidavit, he merely performed a review, which was very limited in scope, for use by a secured creditor. In sum, these affidavits are not conclusive and are not particularly illuminating. The evidence, viewed as a whole, weighs in favor of responsible party status. See Logal, 195 F.3d at 232. "Once the Government offers an assessment into evidence, the burden of proof is on the tax-payer to disprove his responsible-person status or willfulness." Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453. Thus, Verret bears the burden of adducing evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to his responsible person status or willfulness. See, e.g., Sutton, 194 F.Supp.2d at 563. Here, the uncontested facts reveal that Verret (1) served approximately twenty-six years in various capacities on Doctors Hospital's Board, (2) held the position of Chairman of the Board during the relevant periods, (3) negotiated and personally guaranteed a $500,000.00 working capital loan for the hospital, (5) took steps to ensure payment of delinquent withholding taxes on a prior occasion after learning that the Executive Director had failed to do so, (6) actively participated in recruiting physicians and developing a new source of revenue for Doctors Hospital, (7) conversed with the Executive Director on almost a daily basis, (8) signed the company's IRS Form 990 for 1999 and 2000, (9) possessed, along with the Board, the authority to hire and fire high level employees, and (10) was a signatory on all of Doctors Hospital's checking accounts. Verret, in the court's opinion, clearly qualifies as a "responsible person."
2. Willfully Failing to Collect, Account for, or Pay Over Trust Fund Monies
Liability is imposed upon a responsible person only if he or she "willfully" fails to collect, account for, or pay over withheld taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 6672; see also Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1155. Once a court has determined that an individual is a "responsible person" under § 6672, the person must prove that he did not act willfully in order to avoid liability under that section. See Morgan v. United States, 937 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.1991) ("The responsible person bears the burden of proving [the] actions [taken] were not willful.") (citations *539 omitted). Willfulness under the statute "`requires a voluntary, conscious, and intentional act, but not a bad motive or evil intent.'" Renfro, 2006 WL 2035657, at *3 (quoting Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1457); see also Morgan, 937 F.2d at 285 (citing Gustin, 876 F.2d at 492; Wood, 808 F.2d at 415). Willfulness is normally established by evidence that the responsible person paid other creditors with knowledge that withholding taxes owed to the United States were in arrears at the time. Gustin, 876 F.2d at 492; Wood, 808 F.2d at 415; Howard, 711 F.2d at 736 (Willfulness requires a showing of a "considered decision not to fulfill one's obligation to pay taxes owed, evidenced by payments made to other creditors in knowledge that taxes are due."). "[I]n the case of individuals who are responsible persons `both before and after withholding tax liability accrues,' there is `a duty to use unencumbered funds acquired after the withholding obligation becomes payable to satisfy that obligation'; failure to do so when there is knowledge of the liability constitutes willfulness." Renfro, 2006 WL 2035657, at *3 (quoting Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1458). Courts have also concluded that a responsible person acted "willfully" if he recklessly disregarded a known or obvious risk that trust funds would not be paid over to the United States. Gustin, 876 F.2d at 492; Wood 808 F.2d at 415; see also Malloy v. United States, 17 F.3d 329, 332 (11th Cir.1994) (concurring with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation that something less than actual knowledge, specifically, "a reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk," is sufficient to satisfy the willfulness requirement); Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. Willfulness based upon reckless disregard does not require a high degree of recklessness. Indeed, "the purpose of the statute would be thwarted, just by compartmentalizing responsibilities within a business (however small) and adopting a `hear no evil-see no evil' policy." Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1987). Conduct amounting to mere negligence is insufficient to satisfy the willfulness standard under the statute. Morgan, 937 F.2d at 286 (citing Gustin 876 F.2d at 492). Responsible persons, however, act with reckless disregard and are thus "willful" under § 6672 where their conduct is grossly negligent. Wright, 809 F.2d at 427; accord United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Running, 7 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Reckless disregard in this context is tantamount to gross negligence."); Thomsen v. United States, 887 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir.1989). Gross negligence that leads to a finding of reckless disregard, willfulness, and thus liability for the unpaid trust fund taxes occurs when a responsible person: "(1) clearly ought to have known that (2) there was a grave risk the withholding taxes were not being paid and (3) he was in a position to find out for certain very easily." DeGraff v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (quoting Wright, 809 F.2d at 427); see also Phillips v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 73 F.3d 939, 944 n. 1 (9th Cir.1996) (following the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of willfulness as encompassing reckless disregard); Malloy, 17 F.3d at 332 n. 12; Thomsen, 887 F.2d at 18; In re Baker, Nos. 488-40565-MT-7, 1993 WL 183721, at *5 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1993). If a responsible officer knows the corporation has recently incurred a payroll tax delinquency and is aware of the deteriorating affairs of the corporation, he runs the risk of being held personally liable for the unpaid withheld payroll taxes if he fails to take steps to ascertain the state of the payroll tax liabilities or to institute effective financial controls to guard against nonpayment. Wright, 809 F.2d at 428. In this case, Verret claims that he did not become aware of Doctors Hospital's *540 delinquency for the relevant period until November 2001.[7] At or around the time Verret purportedly learned of the outstanding liability, Doctors Hospital made six federal tax deposits.[8] Plaintiff argues that following this series of payments and the retention of a new management company, he could reasonably "infer" that Doctors Hospital was current on its payroll taxes. Interestingly, Verret did not advert to these six deposits or any deposits for that matter until the Government supplemented the record with this information on February 4, 2008, pursuant to court order, suggesting that he was unaware of them prior to that date. Further, Verret's averments contradict the evidentiary record in a number of instances. First, despite his not being notified by the IRS about the outstanding tax liability until the fourth quarter of 2002[9], at deposition he testified that he voluntarily left Doctors Hospital in early 2002 because he "decided that the facility had this tax liability that [he] had been made aware of in November [2001] and that it was not being taken care of." Second, in Verret's Response to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, he discloses that after Cottey failed to make the necessary payments, as advised in November 2001, the Board, including Verret, "began its search for a replacement for the Executive Director." Third, Verret's deposition testimony reveals that he spoke with Harry Baker, CEO of the new management company, about a "plan to get the taxes paid" during the "[f]irst or second week of December '01." Thus, the record evidence refutes the notion that Verret inferred that the hospital was current on its tax obligations in November 2001. Simply asking the court to surmise that Verret "acted reasonably and easily could have believed that after these six (6) payments that the Hospital was current on its payroll taxes" is insufficient to meet his burden as a responsible person to adduce evidence disproving that he acted willfully, especially in view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453; Sutton, 194 F.Supp.2d at 563. At a minimum, Verret failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the taxes had in fact been paid and to resolve any uncertainty regarding the issue. To excuse him from liability when he did not investigate further in order to determine the true status of Doctors Hospital's tax obligations is unreasonable: [This] argument amounts to the position that even with knowledge of a corporation's financial straits a responsible officer may immunize himself from the consequences of his actions by wearing blinders which will shut out all knowledge of the liability for and the nonpayment of its withholding taxes. But such a deliberate or reckless disregard of the facts and known risks cannot blunt the impact of the penalty statute on those responsible for such nonpayment.... *541 Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 260 (6th Cir.1986) (citation omitted). The record reflects that Verret was Chairman of the Board throughout 2001, during which time Doctors Hospital failed to remit employment withholding taxes to the Government on two separate occasions. He was aware of the failure during the first part of 2001 and made some effort to remedy the situation. He also knew that it was primarily Cottey's responsibility as Executive Director to remit timely the required tax payments to the IRS and that he had failed to do so, resulting in two tax delinquencies one during the first part of 2001 and the second during the third and fourth quarters of 2001. Yet, as a member of the Board, charged by the By-Laws to "assure competence and procedure on the part of physicians, nurses or others appointed to work in the Hospital," Verret continued to employ and rely on Cottey; even after learning of his failure to comply with federal law, his misappropriation of corporate funds, and his untruthful assurances. The Board, with Verret at its helm, simply tolerated Cottey because "none of the board wanted to run a hospital." Moreover, Verret and the Board allowed the position of Controller and Chief Financial Officer of the hospital to be filled by an individual lacking a college degree or any accounting background other than the completion of one basic, introductory course, much less a C.P.A. license or other professional certification. While there is no evidence to suggest that Verret ever actually signed a check on behalf of Doctors Hospital, he was certainly aware of its declining financial situation. Verret, more than other members of the Board, arguably possessed greater insight into the seriousness of the hospital's financial problems. At deposition, Massey explained: We would sit daily with a piece of paper that we had a detailed spreadsheet that would tell us who we owed money to, how much we owed, how old it was. And you know, we would go we, Mr. Cottey, myself, Dena Whitmire, she was the controller. She provided the schedule. We would go through she would have the list of vendors who would call, threaten us, what have you, and then we would talk about it. But there generally I know I would say three times a week or so a lot of times Mr. Verret would come in, and Dr. Morrell would come in while we were doing those meetings. It should have been clear to any responsible person in Verret's position that Doctors Hospital was in financial trouble. He "must have known how tempting it is for a floundering company to use the money that it has withheld from its employees' paychecks for purposes seemingly more urgent that paying taxes currently." Wright, 809 F.2d at 427; see also Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243, 98 S. Ct. 1778. At the very least, Verret should have been cognizant of a grave risk that the payroll withholding taxes would not be remitted to the IRS after being informed of the second delinquency in November 2001. See DeGraff, 488 F.Supp.2d at 701. Despite this patent risk, Verret, who had the actual authority to inquire and to correct any tax problems, admittedly did nothing of substance. See DeGraff, 488 F.Supp.2d at 701. Q: Okay. Did you give him [Cottey] after November 1st, 2001, any instructions on what to pay? A: No, sir, I did not. Q: Did you take any additional steps after November 1st, 2001, to make sure that the taxes were getting paid? A: No, sir, I did not. Although the court acknowledges that Verret did not possess great financial expertise, *542 he did not even undertake the simple tasks of requesting cancelled checks documenting the tax payments or contacting the IRS to verify such payments. See In re Rutherford, 178 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1995). Q: Did you ask to see documents such as the actual payments to the IRS of I think Ms. Massey testified it was every two weeks? A: No, sir, I did not. Q: Did you ask to look at the actual payroll tax returns, Form 941s? A: No, sir, I did not. In fact, there is no indication that Verret questioned the status of Doctors Hospital's tax liability when he accepted significant compensation in 2002 after being notified of the tax delinquency in November 2001.[10] Only a slight inquiry would have revealed that Doctors Hospital's employment taxes were not being paid in full. While the record indicates that Verret "talked" to the management company about its plan to pay the taxes after learning of the earlier delinquency and that he received some periodic financial reports, there is no evidence regarding the implementation of any significant financial controls or the initiation of remedial action to ensure that the payments were actually made or that funds were preserved to satisfy withholding taxes. Aside from the Board's hiring a new management company and again delegating the primary tax responsibility, Verret took no action to assure the payment of taxes. Interestingly, when asked about the payroll taxes for his own company, Stoneburner, Verret indicated that the "taxes are paid because it's reviewed by a certified public accountant on a weekly basis." Yet Verret and the Board, aware that Doctors Hospital's financial position continued to deteriorate to the point of being classified as "very tight," seemed to be content with the oral assurances of someone Verret himself described as "no longer reliable." Apparently, Verret possessed the acumen and expertise to implement sufficient controls over his own affairs, but he neglected to exercise such care with respect to the hospital. It seems inconceivable that Verret, a twenty-six-year veteran of the Board, who spent significant amounts of time visiting the hospital and conversing with Cottey on a daily basis, was unaware of Cottey's failure to pay the hospital's employment taxes to the IRS. If Verret did not know of Cottey's failure to pay the trust fund tax liability to the IRS during the third and fourth quarters of 2001, it is because he chose not to know. Verret could have exercised substantial control over the decision-making process in order to ensure that Doctors Hospital paid its taxes. Rather, instead of verifying that the hospital's tax obligations were being met, he turned a blind eye to the situation and chose not to exert any authority over Cottey or the business affairs of Doctors Hospital. At a minimum, such actions constitute gross negligence or reckless disregard and, thus, a willful failure to collect, account for, or pay over taxes owed by Doctors Hospital. See Wright, 809 F.2d at 427. "The statute is harsh, but the danger against which it is directed that of failing to pay over money withheld from employees until it is too late, because the company has gone broke is an acute one against which, perhaps, only harsh measures are availing." Id. at 428.
3. Voluntary Board Member Protection
Finally, Verret argues that he is exempt from any penalty provided for in *543 § 6672(a) because he meets the requirements enumerated in § 6672(e) of the IRC. This section provides an exception to the Trust Fund Penalty for voluntary board members of tax-exempt organizations. Section 6672(e) states, in pertinent part: No penalty shall be imposed by subsection (a) on any unpaid, volunteer member of any board of trustees or directors of an organization exempt from tax under subtitle A if such member (1) is solely serving in an honorary capacity, (2) does not participate in the day-to-day or financial operations of the organization, and (3) does not have actual knowledge of the failure on which such penalty is imposed. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(e) (2001). Here, Verret does not fall within the ambit of the § 6672(e) exception because he was not serving solely in an honorary capacity as the Chairman of the Board of Doctors Hospital. During his twenty-six-year tenure as a Board member, Verret attended Board meetings, negotiated and personally guaranteed a $500,000.00 working capital loan to acquire new equipment, reviewed financial information, actively engaged in recruiting physicians and developing a new source of revenue for Doctors Hospital, conversed with the Executive Director on an almost daily basis, signed the hospital's IRS Form 990 for 1999 and 2000, and was a signatory on all of Doctors Hospital's checking accounts. He also actively participated in the selection and retention of outside companies to assist in the management of Doctors Hospital. Thus, Verret clearly played an active role in the management of Doctors Hospital and was not serving solely in an honorary capacity. Accordingly, Verret is not shielded from liability by § 6672(e) under the facts of this case. See Jefferson v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 (N.D.Ill.2006) (finding that the responsible party was not entitled to immunity under similar circumstances).
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Verret was a "responsible person" who acted "willfully." He is personally liable under 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) for the unpaid withholding taxes of Doctors Hospital. Accordingly, the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Verret's action for recovery of the sum of $408,918.66 and all statutory additions provided by law is dismissed with prejudice. NOTES [1] Due to financial difficulties beginning as early as 1995, Doctors Hospital filed for bankruptcy protection in 2003. [2] The Government has asserted a Third Party Complaint against Massey, the Third Party Defendant. The Government takes the position that Massey was a "responsible party" for the payment of federal withholding taxes collected by Community Healthcare Foundation during the third quarter of 2001. Although demand has been made upon Massey for the payment of the penalties and interest associated with these taxes, Massey has failed to pay the full amount of the assessment. The Government contends that Massey is indebted to the Government for $182,205.59 plus interest; however, the Government is not seeking summary judgment against her at this juncture. Thus, the current motion addresses only Verret's complaint. [3] Statutory penalties under § 6672 for responsible persons willfully failing to ensure payment of federal withholding taxes are joint and several. See Brown v. United States, 591 F.2d 1136, 1142 (5th Cir. 1979); 14 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 54:105 (Feb.2008). Responsible persons against whom a penalty under § 6672 has been assessed may seek contribution from other liable responsible persons. See 26 U.S.C. § 6672(d). [4] While the court appreciates that the board members volunteered their time and effort to Doctors Hospital and to the furtherance of medicine in this area, it has been recognized that:
There is a sufficient social value in having individuals agree to serve on the boards of hospitals, schools, houses of worship, and the like that society ought to be willing to permit such service to be unhindered by the risk of massive personal tax liability. Of course, unpaid service on the board of a not-for-profit institution should not confer automatic immunity from the strictures of section 6672. If a board does take an active role in an institution's financial affairs particularly its tax affairs ... the board members may well be deemed responsible persons. Simpson v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 43, 49 (E.D.N.Y.1987). [5] The company's 2001 IRS Form 990 was signed on June 30, 2003, by John Murphy, III, Chief Financial Officer at that time, and was received by the IRS on July 1, 2003. Verret left the Board in 2002. [6] When asked at deposition why Cottey's employment was not terminated after the Board learned of his initial failure to pay employment withholding taxes, Verret responded as follows:
It's a good question in hindsight. The facility had difficulty because of its financial position in recruiting new CEOs to come. It was discussed by the board, but none of the board wanted to run a hospital, and his credentials that he had submitted appeared that he had run several other companies, that he was going to get over this hump. [7] Verret points out that his knowledge of past (but eliminated) tax deficiencies does not automatically create an affirmative duty to investigate and absolutely prevent all future delinquencies. See id. at 429 (citing Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1579 (Fed.Cir. 1984)). ("[M]ere knowledge of a past deficiency does not impose strict liability on a responsible officer for delinquencies during his tenure."). [8] IRS transcripts, provided by the Government, indicate deposit transactions on November 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 2001, totaling $198,549.10. [9] At deposition, Verret responded as follows:
Q: When did you first hear from the IRS about these unpaid taxes? A: Last quarter of 2002. . . . Q: So after you had left? A: Correct. [10] Community Health Care Foundation's 2002 Form 990 indicates that Verret received $26,000.00 in compensation as "PRESIDENT/CHAIRMAN FULL-TIME THRU 6/30/02." | 10-30-2013 | [
"542 F. Supp. 2d 526 (2008) Stephen K. VERRET, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff, v. Angela Massey, Third Party Defendant. Civil Action No. 1:06-CV-636. United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division. February 14, 2008. *529 Banker H. Phares, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff. Jon E. Fisher, Department of Justice, Dallas, TX, for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff. Susan Jennifer Oliver, Attorney at Law, Beaumont, TX, Third Party Defendant. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER MARCIA A. CRONE, District Judge. Pending before the court is Defendant United States of America's (\"the Government\") Motion for Summary Judgment (# 23). Defendant seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff Stephen K. Verret's (\"Verret\") complaint against the Government for a refund of $408,918.66 assessed against him by the Internal Revenue Service (\"IRS\") for employment and withholding taxes, penalties, and interest. Having reviewed the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment is warranted.",
"I. Background Community Healthcare Foundation was a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization, the primary business of which was the operation of Doctors Hospital located at 5500 39th Street in Groves, Texas. [1] By-Laws of the Board of Trustees of Doctors Hospital (the \"By-Laws\"), created by Community Healthcare Foundation, outlined the operational and managerial structure of Doctors Hospital. The By-Laws specified that the Board of Trustees (the \"Board\"), comprised of voluntary and unpaid members of the community, shall act as the governing body of Doctors Hospital. The By-Laws also provided for a Chairman of the Board and a Chief Administrative Executive Officer (\"Executive Director\" or \"CEO\") in addition to various other positions. In May 1976, at the age of twenty-two, Verret joined Doctors Hospital's Board.",
"He served in various capacities on the Board during his approximately twenty-six-year tenure, including holding the position of Chairman of the Board from 1999 until his departure in 2002. In addition to his service on the Board, Verret, unlike his fellow Trustees, had a unique relationship with Doctors Hospital. Stoneburner-Verret Electric Company, Inc. (\"Stoneburner\"), a company in which Verret is a majority stockholder, performed and invoiced Doctors Hospital on repeated occasions for \"electrical services.\" Also, Verret's wife was employed by Doctors Hospital as the Chief Operating Officer from January through March 2001. In 1999, NewCare Hospital Corporation (\"NewCare\"), a business involved in the operation and management of hospitals, contracted with Verret to assist with the recruitment of specialized physicians to *530 a lucrative new practice area for the hospital. Verret devoted a significant amount of time to this endeavor, laboring \"between 22 and 30 hours a week\" during 2001 alone. For these services, which oftentimes overlapped with his duties as Chairman, Verret was compensated between $70,000.00 and $80,000.00 per year. Despite its best efforts, Doctors Hospital's financial situation steadily deteriorated.",
"During the first part of 2001, David Cottey (\"Cottey\"), Doctors Hospital's Executive Director, informed Verret and the Board that Doctors Hospital had failed to remit to the Government employment withholding taxes totaling approximately $400,000.00. The outstanding tax liability was ultimately satisfied with borrowed monies appropriated for the procurement of medical equipment. Cottey was informed by Verret, individually, and by the Board, collectively, however, that the payment of employment withholding taxes was of paramount importance and that, under no circumstances, should he fail to pay them again. Although the record does not indicate that the Board took any specific steps to devise, implement, or supervise a system of internal controls to ensure timely future payments, the Board repeatedly asked Cottey during 2001 about the status of Doctors Hospital's employment taxes. Each time, Cottey informed the Board that the employment taxes were current. By the end of 2001, Doctors Hospital's financial condition was precarious. Contrary to his prior assurances, Cottey informed Verret and the Board in November 2001 that the income and FICA taxes for the employees were delinquent for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. Verret has not presented evidence that any measures were taken by the Board at that time to ensure the satisfaction of the outstanding liability other than again \"urging\" the Executive Director to pay the taxes.",
"When Cottey failed to comply with the Board's request, a search was initiated to find a suitable replacement for Cottey. Nevertheless, the Board continued to employ and rely on Cottey during the interim. The tax delinquency for the third and fourth quarters of 2001 ultimately gave rise to the instant action. The IRS found Verret, Cottey, and Angela Massey (\"Massey\"), who held positions as Doctors Hospital's Controller and Chief Financial Officer during the relevant period, to be \"responsible parties\" for the payment of federal withholding taxes under § 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. [2] The IRS settled with Cottey and assessed a penalty of $407,097.66 plus $1,821.00 of interest against Verret. [3] Verret has paid this assessment in full and on October 12, 2006, initiated the above-styled action to obtain a refund.",
"The Government filed the instant *531 motion on October 15, 2007, seeking summary judgment on Verret's claim. II. Analysis A. Summary Judgment Standard Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment \"shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\" FED. R.CIV.P.",
"56(c). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986); Warfield v. Byron, 436 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir.2006); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986); Martinez v. Schlumberger, Ltd., 338 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir.2003); Terrebonne Parish Sch. Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 310 F.3d 870, 877 (5th Cir.2002). \"A fact is `material' if it `might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.'\" Bazan ex rel.",
"Bazan v. Hidalgo County, 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir.2001) (emphasis in original) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505); accord Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir.2005); Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 471 (5th Cir.2001); Merritt-Campbell, Inc. v. RxP Prods., Inc., 164 F.3d 957, 961 (5th Cir.1999); Burgos v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 20 F.3d 633, 635 (5th Cir.1994). \"Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.\" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505. \"An issue is `genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.\" Bazan, 246 F.3d at 489 (emphasis in original). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists \"if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.\"",
"Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505; accord EMCASCO Ins. Co. v. American Int'l Specialty Lines Ins. Co., 438 F.3d 519, 523 (5th Cir.2006); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 423 F.3d at 454; Harken Exploration Co., 261 F.3d at 471; Merritt-Campbell, Inc., 164 F.3d at 961. The moving party, however, need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir.1996) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994)). Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to show the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n. 3, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (quoting FED.R.CIV.P.",
"56(e)); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. 2505; Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 n. 11, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986); EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Smith ex rel. Estate of Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir.2004); Malacara v. Garber, 353 F.3d 393, 404 (5th Cir.2003); Rushing v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496, 505 (5th Cir.1999), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1160, 120 S. Ct. 1171, 145 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (2000). \"[T]he court must review the record `taken as a whole.'\" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097, 147 *532 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec.",
"Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348); see Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir.2005). All the evidence must be construed \"in the light most favorable to the non-moving party without weighing the evidence, assessing its probative value, or resolving any factual disputes.\" Williams v. Time Warner Operation, Inc., 98 F.3d 179, 181 (5th Cir.1996); see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150, 120 S. Ct. 2097; Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 401 F.3d at 350; Smith, 391 F.3d at 624; Malacara, 353 F.3d at 398; Broum v. City of Houston, 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir.2003); Harken Exploration Co., 261 F.3d at 471; Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. ), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 951, 122 S. Ct. 347, 151 L. Ed. 2d 262 (2001). The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor. Palmer v. BRG of Go., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 n. 5, 111 S. Ct. 401, 112 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S. Ct. 2505); Shields v. Twiss, 389 F.3d 142, 150 (5th Cir.2004); Martin v. Alamo Cmty.",
"Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir.2003); Martinez, 338 F.3d at 411; Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 507 (5th Cir. ), cert, denied, 540 U.S. 815, 124 S. Ct. 66, 157 L. Ed. 2d 30 (2003); Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir.2002). The evidence is construed \"in favor of the nonmoving party, however, only when an actual controversy exists, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts.\" Olabisiomotosho v. City of Houston, 185 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir.1999); accord Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. Furthermore, \"`only reasonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.'\" Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 469 n. 14, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 119 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1992) (emphasis in original) (quoting H.L. Hayden Co. of N. Y., Inc. v. Siemens Med.",
"Sys., Inc., 879 F.2d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir.1989)). \"If the [nonmoving party's] theory is ... senseless, no reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be granted.\" Id. at 468-69, 112 S. Ct. 2072. The nonmovant's burden is not satisfied by \"`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by `conclusory allegations,' by `unsubstantiated assertions,'\" by speculation, by the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute, or \"by only a `scintilla' of evidence.\" Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S. Ct. 3177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 695 (1990); Matsushita Elec. Indus.",
"Co., 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348; Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir.1994); Davis v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 14 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir.1994)); accord Warfield, 436 F.3d at 557; Boudreaux, 402 F.3d at 540; Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1047. \"Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.\" Broum, 337 F.3d at 541; accord Hugh Symons Group, plc v. Motorola, Inc., 292 F.3d 466, 468 (5th Cir. ), cert. denied 537 U.S. 950, 123 S. Ct. 386, 154 L. Ed. 2d 295 (2002); see Hockman v. Westward Commc'ns, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 332 (5th Cir.2004); Bridgmon v. Array Sys. Corp., 325 F.3d 572, 577 (5th Cir.2003).",
"Summary judgment is mandated if the nonmovant fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case on which he bears the burden of proof at trial. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590, 113 S. Ct. 1689, 123 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1993); Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548; EMCASCO Ins. Co., 438 F.3d at 523; Cutrera v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 429 F.3d 108, 110 (5th Cir. 2005); Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 *533 (5th Cir.2004). \"In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.\" Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548. B. Trust Fund Recovery Penalty The Internal Revenue Code (\"IRC\") requires employers to withhold federal income and social security taxes, Federal Insurance Contribution Act (\"FICA\") taxes, and Medicare taxes from the wages of employees.",
"See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(a), 3402(a); see also Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 242-43, 98 S. Ct. 1778, 56 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1978); Lencyk v. Internal Revenue Serv., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (W.D.Tex.2005); Sutton v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 2d 559, 562 (E.D.Tex.2001) (citing Barnett v. Internal Revenue Serv., 988 F.2d 1449, 1453 (5th Cir. ), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 990, 114 S. Ct. 546, 126 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1993)). These sums are commonly referred to as \"trust funds\" because the IRC provides that the monies are deemed to be \"a special fund [held] in trust for the United States.\" 26 U.S.C. § 7501(a); see also Staff IT Inc. v. United States, Civ. A. No. H-H-04-2210, 2006 WL 314440, at *6 (S.D.Tex.",
"Feb. 9, 2006), aff'd, 482 F.3d 792 (5th Cir.2007). Such funds, which are remitted to the government on a quarterly basis, are for the exclusive use of the United States and are not available to cover operational or business expenses. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(b), 3403, 7501(a). Nevertheless, \"the funds accumulated during the quarter can be a tempting source of ready cash to a failing corporation beleaguered by creditors.\" Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243, 98 S. Ct. 1778. When net wages are paid to the employee, the taxes that were, or should have been, withheld are credited in full to the employee even if they are never remitted to the government. Id. at 243-45, 98 S. Ct. 1778. \"Thus, unless the government can collect these taxes from the employer... the revenues are forever lost to the Government.\"",
"Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (citing Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243-45, 98 S. Ct. 1778); see also USLIFE Title Ins. Co. of Dallas v. Harbison, 784 F.2d 1238, 1242-43 (5th Cir.1986); Mazo v. United States, 591 F.2d 1151, 1153 (5th Cir. ), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 842, 100 S. Ct. 82, 62 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1979). Section 6672 of the IRC provides the government with a mechanism, however, by which it may collect the taxes withheld and protect itself against such losses.",
"Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (citing Wetzel v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 1451, 1455 (S.D.Miss. 1992)). That section imposes a penalty on any \"person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax\" withheld who willfully fails to do so. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a). The penalty is equal to the total amount of the tax not paid over and is itself referred to as a \"tax\" by the IRC. Id. at §§ 6671(a), 6672(a). The term \"person,\" as defined by the IRC, includes \"an officer or employee of a corporation ... who as such officer [or] employee ... is under a duty\" to collect, account for, or pay over the withheld tax. Id. at § 6671(b).",
"This is known as the \"responsible person.\" Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453 & n. 6. An individual need not engage in all three of the activities listed in the statute in order to be held liable; involvement in any one of the three named activities is sufficient. Slodov, 436 U.S. at 250, 98 S. Ct. 1778. Thus, liability for a penalty is imposed only on (1) a responsible person (as defined in § 6671), who has (2) willfully failed to perform his or her duty to collect, account, or pay over the tax. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453; Turnbull v. United States, 929 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir.1991); United States v. Star-Tel, Inc., *534 Civ.",
"A. No. H-03-3904, 2005 WL 2810701, at *3 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 26, 2005); Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1032. 1. Responsible Person under § 6672 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit generally takes a broad view regarding who can be a responsible person for purposes of liability under § 6672. Dowdy v. United States, No. 4:04-CV-232, 2005 WL 1719899, at *6 (E.D.Tex. July 22, 2005); Lencyk, 384 F.Supp.2d at 1034. Responsible persons may include \"employees, stockholders, sureties, lenders and others outside the formal corporate organization.\" Vollmer Elec. Co. v. United States, Civ. A.",
"No. SA-06-CA-360, 2007 WL 2048662, at *5 n. 46 (W.D.Tex. July 11, 2007). Responsibility \"`for collecting, accounting for, or paying over employee withholding taxes is a question of duty, status, and authority.'\" Renfro v. United States, Civ. A. No. 3:04-C2574, 2006 WL 2035657, at *3 (N.D.Tex. July 19, 2006) (quoting Gustin v. United States, 876 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir.1989)); see Wood v. United States, 808 F.2d 411, 415 (5th Cir.1987) (citing Howard v. United States, 711 F.2d 729, 734 (5th Cir.1983)). \"It is not necessary that an individual have the final or apocalyptic word as to which creditors should be paid in order to be subject to liability.\"",
"United States v. Bogard, Civ. A. No. 4-88-492, 1991 WL 101535, at *4 (N.D.Tex. Apr. 19, 1991). In fact, one need not even have knowledge that he has such a duty or authority. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454. It is sufficient only that the individual has significant power, authority, and control over the disbursement of funds to find that he is a responsible person. Bogard, 1991 WL 101535, at *4 (citing Neckles v. United States, 579 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir.1978)). Thus, the crucial inquiry is whether the individual had the effective power to pay the taxes. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178; Howard, 711 F.2d at 734.",
"In determining responsible person liability, the law disregards mechanical titles and functions of corporate officers and instead focuses on individuals who actually could have ensured the satisfaction of tax obligations. Commonwealth Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 665 F.2d at 752 (citing Liddon v. United States, 448 F.2d 509, 512-13 (5th Cir. ), cert, denied, 406 U.S. 918, 92 S. Ct. 1769, 32 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1971)). The Fifth Circuit, like other circuit courts, has developed certain indicia of responsibility that imply authority when a particular individual lacks the precise responsibility of withholding or paying employment taxes. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455.",
"The court has noted that it: ... cannot ignore the extensive case law that narrowly constrains a fact finder's province in § 6672 cases. Thus, although \"the facts ... are critical in ... any § 6672 case,\" we tend to agree with the other circuits that have held that certain facts will almost invariably prove dispositive of a finding of responsibility. Id. at 1454 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).",
"Factors considered by the Fifth Circuit to be indicative of responsible person status include whether a person: (i) is an officer or member of the board of directors; (ii) owns a substantial amount of stock in the company; (iii) manages the day-to-day operations of the business; (iv) has the authority to hire or fire employees; (v) makes decisions as to the disbursement of funds and payment of creditors; and (vi) possesses the authority to sign company checks.",
"Logal v. United States, 195 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455). No single factor is dispositive. Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455. A person cannot \"disqualify himself from responsible [person] status simply because he does not *535 fit into every category.\" Raba v. United States, 977 F.2d 941, 944 (5th Cir.1992). In the Fifth Circuit, cases classifying an individual as a responsible person for purposes of liability under § 6672 are numerous. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454 n. 10 (citing cases). In fact, \"cases not finding § 6672 responsibility are relatively few and far between.\" Id. at 1456. \"[T]he rationale for the broad net of § 6672 responsibility serves a valuable prophylactic purpose: it encourages officers, directors, and other high-level employees to stay abreast of the company's withholding and payment of employee's taxes.\" Id.",
"at 1456-57. This \"broad net\" of liability can extend beyond the most responsible person; in reality, multiple persons can be deemed responsible for purposes of § 6672 liability. Id. at 1455; see also Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178. Verret contends that he was not a responsible person under the meaning of the statute for the third and fourth quarters of 2001. The record before the court, however, belies this assertion.",
"Verret joined the Board in 1976 and served continuously through March 2002. During his approximately twenty-six-year tenure, Verret held various positions, including Chairman of the Board from 1999 until his departure in 2002. Although Verret argues that \"the Board did not have the `final word' as to what bills, including taxes, should or should not be paid,\" such authority is not necessary.",
"See Bogard, 1991 WL 101535, at *4. Furthermore, a cursory review of the By-Laws reveals that the opposite is true. Article II, Section 1, states that the Board may ... delegate the management of the day-to-day operation of the Hospital to a management company or other person, provided that the business and affairs of the Corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised under the direction of the Board of Trustees. The Board of Trustees shall have final responsibility for Hospital administrative activities and professional services, for the operation of the Hospital and for the quality of patient care at the Hospital. Article IV, Section 1, refers to the Executive Director as merely \"a duly authorized representative of the Board ... [who] shall report to the Chairman of the Board.\" Moreover, the Executive Director, if requested, \"shall make reports to each meeting of the Board ... regarding budget matters, personnel matters, staff and Professional Staff matters, and all other relevant matters.\" The By-Laws are replete with statements indicating that the Board retains final authority, including the ability to \"review the performance of the Executive Director not less than annually.\"",
"Additionally, Verret admitted at deposition that the Board was atop the \"pecking order\" of Doctors Hospital. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the Board delegated financial duties to a management company or to Cottey, as Executive Director, it would not necessarily divest itself of all financial responsibility. Indeed, multiple parties can be, and quite often are, held responsible. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178. Despite Verret's position as Chairman of the Board, he claims that \"there is no evidence that anyone other than the CEO was responsible for the Hospital's day-to-day operations.\" The record, however, reveals a number of situations where Verret and the Board were involved in decisions impacting the operations of Doctors Hospital. For example, Verret's deposition testimony indicates that the Board, collectively, became concerned that John King (\"King\"), a physician performing a number of surgeries, would leave the hospital if certain equipment was not acquired.",
"In order to procure this equipment and to ensure King's continued relationship with *536 the hospital, the Board secured a $500,000.00 loan. Although this loan was discussed by the Board following a review of a study performed by a certified public accountant, Verret concedes that he was one of only three individuals who actually negotiated the terms of this loan. Q: Well, you say you and the doctors obtained the loan. Who negotiated with whoever you borrowed the money from to actually get the loan? A: Dr. Morrell, myself, and a Dr. Keller. Ultimately, the loan was \"a joint and several loan,\" personally guaranteed by a number of individuals, including Verret. Verret also involved himself in some of Doctors Hospital's tax activities. [4] He signed the company's IRS Form 990 for the 1999 and 2000 tax years as \"Chairman.",
"\"[5] Additionally, after learning of Cottey's initial failure to remit Doctors Hospital's withholding taxes in June or July 2001, the Board began requesting that Cottey provide proof that the payroll taxes were paid. Such \"proof primarily included oral assurances and the presentation of financial statements to the Board with separate line item disclosure of tax liability. Individually, Verret personally instructed Cottey to pay the taxes before he paid anyone else. Then, upon learning of Cottey's second failure to remit withholding taxes in November 2001, Verret testified at deposition that he made additional inquiries. Q: Did you talk to anybody at Doctor's other than Mr. Cottey about the payroll taxes? A: At what time period? Q: After you first learned of the unpaid taxes? A: I talked to a gentleman by the name of Harry Baker, which [sic] was the CEO of Tri-Health Services, which was the new management company. Q: You spoke to him about the taxes? A: Of their plan to get the taxes paid.",
". . . Q: Okay. When did you talk to him? . . . A: First or second week of December of 01. Verret's taking the initiative to contact and discuss a plan to pay delinquent withholding taxes with the new management company confirms his involvement in Doctors Hospital's financial affairs particularly its tax affairs during the relevant period. The record also reveals that Verret, unlike other board members, spent a significant amount of time at Doctors Hospital. In 1999, the management company asked Verret to assist in recruiting physicians in the \"industrial occupation business.\" Industrial *537 occupation, according to Verret, provided a \"new stream of revenue that healthcare facilities were looking at bringing on board.",
"It took care of drug screens, workmen comp injuries, and normally a hospital would contract directly with an employer to provide services at some rate.\" Verret's new role, for which he was compensated between $70,000.00 and $80,000.00 per year as a consultant, demanded \"[b]etween 22 and 30 hours a week\" during 2001 alone. This required Verret to spend a significant amount of time at Doctors Hospital, frequently eating breakfast and lunch at the hospital. Such activities overlapped with his duties as Chairman and were oftentimes indistinguishable. Massey, who understood Verret's role solely to be Chairman of the Board, stated that she saw Verret at the hospital often and that he would stop by \"almost every day\" and \"talk with David Cottey.\" Verret's involvement in the development of new cash flow strategies, frequent presence, and nearly daily discussions with the Executive Director further demonstrate his participation in the operations of Doctors Hospital.",
"Moreover, Verret presents no evidence disputing the Board's ability to hire and fire employees. Verret's own deposition testimony states that the Board, for which Verret served as Chairman, voted to allow Cottey to continue as Executive Director in 2001 even after Doctors Hospital's management company, NewCare, filed for bankruptcy. Verret indicates that the Board discussed terminating Cottey's employment after it learned of his first failure to remit withholding taxes. [6] Additionally, Massey indicated that Verret and the Board could \"get rid of [her] in a heartbeat, and ... could get rid of David [Cottey]... if the need arose.\" Thus, this factor also weighs against Verret. Finally, Verret's authority to sign company checks is also indicative of his status as a responsible person under the statute. Verret argues, however, that Doctors Hospital's checkbooks were located in a locked closet in the accounting department and that the record is devoid of any instances where Verret signed a check on the company's behalf.",
"He maintains that checkwriting authority rested with Cottey and his staff. Nevertheless, signature cards for each of Doctors Hospital's three bank accounts have been provided by the Government. Interestingly, although each account has four signatories, Verret is the only individual to be listed as a signatory on all three accounts. In fact, Verret's signature appears first on each signature card. There is no evidence that Verret ever requested and was denied access to the checkbooks in order to satisfy outstanding liabilities, including employment taxes. Massey, who had unrestricted access to the checkbooks, admitted that if a disagreement arose between Cottey and Verret, Verret would prevail as Chairman of the Board.",
"While not conclusive, this factor weighs against Verret. In addition to deposition testimony, Verret presents the affidavit of Doctors Hospital's Controller during the relevant tax periods, Dena Whitmire (\"Whitmire\"), the affidavit of Dr. Rocco Morrell (\"Dr.Morrell\"), a fellow member of the Board, and the affidavit of Frank Butts (\"Butts\"), a certified public accountant (\"C.P.A.\") who *538 performed a six-month financial review of the hospital's records. In each affidavit, the affiant attributes financial responsibility to either Cottey or Massey. Dr. Morrell adds that the By-Laws do not confer any authority to make business and/or financial decisions concerning the operation of Doctors Hospital upon Verret. Further, Whitmire states that she \"did not observe Mr. Verret exercising any power, authority or control over the payment of accounts of Doctors Hospital, including the payment of employment taxes.\" This evidence does not establish that Verret lacked responsibility as defined by the IRC, nor does it create an issue of material fact regarding his status.",
"Indeed, it is undisputed that Verret did not actually pay the taxes at issue when due that is what gave rise to the assessment at the outset. Assuming arguendo that Cottey and Massey possessed primary responsibility for the payment of taxes, that fact alone does not relieve Verret of liability. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1455; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178. Additionally, the By-Laws refute Dr. Morrell's assertions. Moreover, Verret need not exercise his vested authority; it is sufficient to infer liability if he merely possessed the effective power to pay the taxes. See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1454; Turnbull, 929 F.2d at 178; Howard, 711 F.2d at 734.",
"At the very least, two of the affidavits are suspect and arguably self-motivated those of the Controller and a member of the Board, who are not necessarily immune from § 6672(a) liability themselves. With regard to Butts's affidavit, he merely performed a review, which was very limited in scope, for use by a secured creditor. In sum, these affidavits are not conclusive and are not particularly illuminating. The evidence, viewed as a whole, weighs in favor of responsible party status. See Logal, 195 F.3d at 232. \"Once the Government offers an assessment into evidence, the burden of proof is on the tax-payer to disprove his responsible-person status or willfulness.\"",
"Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453. Thus, Verret bears the burden of adducing evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact as to his responsible person status or willfulness. See, e.g., Sutton, 194 F.Supp.2d at 563. Here, the uncontested facts reveal that Verret (1) served approximately twenty-six years in various capacities on Doctors Hospital's Board, (2) held the position of Chairman of the Board during the relevant periods, (3) negotiated and personally guaranteed a $500,000.00 working capital loan for the hospital, (5) took steps to ensure payment of delinquent withholding taxes on a prior occasion after learning that the Executive Director had failed to do so, (6) actively participated in recruiting physicians and developing a new source of revenue for Doctors Hospital, (7) conversed with the Executive Director on almost a daily basis, (8) signed the company's IRS Form 990 for 1999 and 2000, (9) possessed, along with the Board, the authority to hire and fire high level employees, and (10) was a signatory on all of Doctors Hospital's checking accounts.",
"Verret, in the court's opinion, clearly qualifies as a \"responsible person.\" 2. Willfully Failing to Collect, Account for, or Pay Over Trust Fund Monies Liability is imposed upon a responsible person only if he or she \"willfully\" fails to collect, account for, or pay over withheld taxes. 26 U.S.C. § 6672; see also Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1155. Once a court has determined that an individual is a \"responsible person\" under § 6672, the person must prove that he did not act willfully in order to avoid liability under that section. See Morgan v. United States, 937 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir.1991) (\"The responsible person bears the burden of proving [the] actions [taken] were not willful.\") (citations *539 omitted). Willfulness under the statute \"`requires a voluntary, conscious, and intentional act, but not a bad motive or evil intent.'\"",
"Renfro, 2006 WL 2035657, at *3 (quoting Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1457); see also Morgan, 937 F.2d at 285 (citing Gustin, 876 F.2d at 492; Wood, 808 F.2d at 415). Willfulness is normally established by evidence that the responsible person paid other creditors with knowledge that withholding taxes owed to the United States were in arrears at the time. Gustin, 876 F.2d at 492; Wood, 808 F.2d at 415; Howard, 711 F.2d at 736 (Willfulness requires a showing of a \"considered decision not to fulfill one's obligation to pay taxes owed, evidenced by payments made to other creditors in knowledge that taxes are due.\").",
"\"[I]n the case of individuals who are responsible persons `both before and after withholding tax liability accrues,' there is `a duty to use unencumbered funds acquired after the withholding obligation becomes payable to satisfy that obligation'; failure to do so when there is knowledge of the liability constitutes willfulness.\" Renfro, 2006 WL 2035657, at *3 (quoting Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1458). Courts have also concluded that a responsible person acted \"willfully\" if he recklessly disregarded a known or obvious risk that trust funds would not be paid over to the United States. Gustin, 876 F.2d at 492; Wood 808 F.2d at 415; see also Malloy v. United States, 17 F.3d 329, 332 (11th Cir.1994) (concurring with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation that something less than actual knowledge, specifically, \"a reckless disregard of a known or obvious risk,\" is sufficient to satisfy the willfulness requirement); Mazo, 591 F.2d at 1154. Willfulness based upon reckless disregard does not require a high degree of recklessness.",
"Indeed, \"the purpose of the statute would be thwarted, just by compartmentalizing responsibilities within a business (however small) and adopting a `hear no evil-see no evil' policy.\" Wright v. United States, 809 F.2d 425, 427 (7th Cir. 1987). Conduct amounting to mere negligence is insufficient to satisfy the willfulness standard under the statute. Morgan, 937 F.2d at 286 (citing Gustin 876 F.2d at 492). Responsible persons, however, act with reckless disregard and are thus \"willful\" under § 6672 where their conduct is grossly negligent. Wright, 809 F.2d at 427; accord United States v. McCombs, 30 F.3d 310, 320 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Running, 7 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1993) (\"Reckless disregard in this context is tantamount to gross negligence. \"); Thomsen v. United States, 887 F.2d 12, 18 (1st Cir.1989).",
"Gross negligence that leads to a finding of reckless disregard, willfulness, and thus liability for the unpaid trust fund taxes occurs when a responsible person: \"(1) clearly ought to have known that (2) there was a grave risk the withholding taxes were not being paid and (3) he was in a position to find out for certain very easily.\" DeGraff v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (quoting Wright, 809 F.2d at 427); see also Phillips v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 73 F.3d 939, 944 n. 1 (9th Cir.1996) (following the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of willfulness as encompassing reckless disregard); Malloy, 17 F.3d at 332 n. 12; Thomsen, 887 F.2d at 18; In re Baker, Nos. 488-40565-MT-7, 1993 WL 183721, at *5 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1993). If a responsible officer knows the corporation has recently incurred a payroll tax delinquency and is aware of the deteriorating affairs of the corporation, he runs the risk of being held personally liable for the unpaid withheld payroll taxes if he fails to take steps to ascertain the state of the payroll tax liabilities or to institute effective financial controls to guard against nonpayment. Wright, 809 F.2d at 428. In this case, Verret claims that he did not become aware of Doctors Hospital's *540 delinquency for the relevant period until November 2001. [7] At or around the time Verret purportedly learned of the outstanding liability, Doctors Hospital made six federal tax deposits.",
"[8] Plaintiff argues that following this series of payments and the retention of a new management company, he could reasonably \"infer\" that Doctors Hospital was current on its payroll taxes. Interestingly, Verret did not advert to these six deposits or any deposits for that matter until the Government supplemented the record with this information on February 4, 2008, pursuant to court order, suggesting that he was unaware of them prior to that date. Further, Verret's averments contradict the evidentiary record in a number of instances.",
"First, despite his not being notified by the IRS about the outstanding tax liability until the fourth quarter of 2002[9], at deposition he testified that he voluntarily left Doctors Hospital in early 2002 because he \"decided that the facility had this tax liability that [he] had been made aware of in November [2001] and that it was not being taken care of.\" Second, in Verret's Response to the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, he discloses that after Cottey failed to make the necessary payments, as advised in November 2001, the Board, including Verret, \"began its search for a replacement for the Executive Director.\"",
"Third, Verret's deposition testimony reveals that he spoke with Harry Baker, CEO of the new management company, about a \"plan to get the taxes paid\" during the \"[f]irst or second week of December '01.\" Thus, the record evidence refutes the notion that Verret inferred that the hospital was current on its tax obligations in November 2001. Simply asking the court to surmise that Verret \"acted reasonably and easily could have believed that after these six (6) payments that the Hospital was current on its payroll taxes\" is insufficient to meet his burden as a responsible person to adduce evidence disproving that he acted willfully, especially in view of the overwhelming evidence to the contrary.",
"See Barnett, 988 F.2d at 1453; Sutton, 194 F.Supp.2d at 563. At a minimum, Verret failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain whether the taxes had in fact been paid and to resolve any uncertainty regarding the issue. To excuse him from liability when he did not investigate further in order to determine the true status of Doctors Hospital's tax obligations is unreasonable: [This] argument amounts to the position that even with knowledge of a corporation's financial straits a responsible officer may immunize himself from the consequences of his actions by wearing blinders which will shut out all knowledge of the liability for and the nonpayment of its withholding taxes. But such a deliberate or reckless disregard of the facts and known risks cannot blunt the impact of the penalty statute on those responsible for such nonpayment.... *541 Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 260 (6th Cir.1986) (citation omitted).",
"The record reflects that Verret was Chairman of the Board throughout 2001, during which time Doctors Hospital failed to remit employment withholding taxes to the Government on two separate occasions. He was aware of the failure during the first part of 2001 and made some effort to remedy the situation. He also knew that it was primarily Cottey's responsibility as Executive Director to remit timely the required tax payments to the IRS and that he had failed to do so, resulting in two tax delinquencies one during the first part of 2001 and the second during the third and fourth quarters of 2001. Yet, as a member of the Board, charged by the By-Laws to \"assure competence and procedure on the part of physicians, nurses or others appointed to work in the Hospital,\" Verret continued to employ and rely on Cottey; even after learning of his failure to comply with federal law, his misappropriation of corporate funds, and his untruthful assurances. The Board, with Verret at its helm, simply tolerated Cottey because \"none of the board wanted to run a hospital.\" Moreover, Verret and the Board allowed the position of Controller and Chief Financial Officer of the hospital to be filled by an individual lacking a college degree or any accounting background other than the completion of one basic, introductory course, much less a C.P.A.",
"license or other professional certification. While there is no evidence to suggest that Verret ever actually signed a check on behalf of Doctors Hospital, he was certainly aware of its declining financial situation. Verret, more than other members of the Board, arguably possessed greater insight into the seriousness of the hospital's financial problems. At deposition, Massey explained: We would sit daily with a piece of paper that we had a detailed spreadsheet that would tell us who we owed money to, how much we owed, how old it was. And you know, we would go we, Mr. Cottey, myself, Dena Whitmire, she was the controller. She provided the schedule.",
"We would go through she would have the list of vendors who would call, threaten us, what have you, and then we would talk about it. But there generally I know I would say three times a week or so a lot of times Mr. Verret would come in, and Dr. Morrell would come in while we were doing those meetings. It should have been clear to any responsible person in Verret's position that Doctors Hospital was in financial trouble. He \"must have known how tempting it is for a floundering company to use the money that it has withheld from its employees' paychecks for purposes seemingly more urgent that paying taxes currently.\" Wright, 809 F.2d at 427; see also Slodov, 436 U.S. at 243, 98 S. Ct. 1778.",
"At the very least, Verret should have been cognizant of a grave risk that the payroll withholding taxes would not be remitted to the IRS after being informed of the second delinquency in November 2001. See DeGraff, 488 F.Supp.2d at 701. Despite this patent risk, Verret, who had the actual authority to inquire and to correct any tax problems, admittedly did nothing of substance. See DeGraff, 488 F.Supp.2d at 701.",
"Q: Okay. Did you give him [Cottey] after November 1st, 2001, any instructions on what to pay? A: No, sir, I did not. Q: Did you take any additional steps after November 1st, 2001, to make sure that the taxes were getting paid? A: No, sir, I did not. Although the court acknowledges that Verret did not possess great financial expertise, *542 he did not even undertake the simple tasks of requesting cancelled checks documenting the tax payments or contacting the IRS to verify such payments. See In re Rutherford, 178 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1995).",
"Q: Did you ask to see documents such as the actual payments to the IRS of I think Ms. Massey testified it was every two weeks? A: No, sir, I did not. Q: Did you ask to look at the actual payroll tax returns, Form 941s? A: No, sir, I did not. In fact, there is no indication that Verret questioned the status of Doctors Hospital's tax liability when he accepted significant compensation in 2002 after being notified of the tax delinquency in November 2001.",
"[10] Only a slight inquiry would have revealed that Doctors Hospital's employment taxes were not being paid in full. While the record indicates that Verret \"talked\" to the management company about its plan to pay the taxes after learning of the earlier delinquency and that he received some periodic financial reports, there is no evidence regarding the implementation of any significant financial controls or the initiation of remedial action to ensure that the payments were actually made or that funds were preserved to satisfy withholding taxes. Aside from the Board's hiring a new management company and again delegating the primary tax responsibility, Verret took no action to assure the payment of taxes. Interestingly, when asked about the payroll taxes for his own company, Stoneburner, Verret indicated that the \"taxes are paid because it's reviewed by a certified public accountant on a weekly basis.\" Yet Verret and the Board, aware that Doctors Hospital's financial position continued to deteriorate to the point of being classified as \"very tight,\" seemed to be content with the oral assurances of someone Verret himself described as \"no longer reliable.\"",
"Apparently, Verret possessed the acumen and expertise to implement sufficient controls over his own affairs, but he neglected to exercise such care with respect to the hospital. It seems inconceivable that Verret, a twenty-six-year veteran of the Board, who spent significant amounts of time visiting the hospital and conversing with Cottey on a daily basis, was unaware of Cottey's failure to pay the hospital's employment taxes to the IRS. If Verret did not know of Cottey's failure to pay the trust fund tax liability to the IRS during the third and fourth quarters of 2001, it is because he chose not to know. Verret could have exercised substantial control over the decision-making process in order to ensure that Doctors Hospital paid its taxes. Rather, instead of verifying that the hospital's tax obligations were being met, he turned a blind eye to the situation and chose not to exert any authority over Cottey or the business affairs of Doctors Hospital. At a minimum, such actions constitute gross negligence or reckless disregard and, thus, a willful failure to collect, account for, or pay over taxes owed by Doctors Hospital. See Wright, 809 F.2d at 427.",
"\"The statute is harsh, but the danger against which it is directed that of failing to pay over money withheld from employees until it is too late, because the company has gone broke is an acute one against which, perhaps, only harsh measures are availing.\" Id. at 428. 3. Voluntary Board Member Protection Finally, Verret argues that he is exempt from any penalty provided for in *543 § 6672(a) because he meets the requirements enumerated in § 6672(e) of the IRC. This section provides an exception to the Trust Fund Penalty for voluntary board members of tax-exempt organizations. Section 6672(e) states, in pertinent part: No penalty shall be imposed by subsection (a) on any unpaid, volunteer member of any board of trustees or directors of an organization exempt from tax under subtitle A if such member (1) is solely serving in an honorary capacity, (2) does not participate in the day-to-day or financial operations of the organization, and (3) does not have actual knowledge of the failure on which such penalty is imposed.",
"26 U.S.C. § 6672(e) (2001). Here, Verret does not fall within the ambit of the § 6672(e) exception because he was not serving solely in an honorary capacity as the Chairman of the Board of Doctors Hospital. During his twenty-six-year tenure as a Board member, Verret attended Board meetings, negotiated and personally guaranteed a $500,000.00 working capital loan to acquire new equipment, reviewed financial information, actively engaged in recruiting physicians and developing a new source of revenue for Doctors Hospital, conversed with the Executive Director on an almost daily basis, signed the hospital's IRS Form 990 for 1999 and 2000, and was a signatory on all of Doctors Hospital's checking accounts. He also actively participated in the selection and retention of outside companies to assist in the management of Doctors Hospital. Thus, Verret clearly played an active role in the management of Doctors Hospital and was not serving solely in an honorary capacity.",
"Accordingly, Verret is not shielded from liability by § 6672(e) under the facts of this case. See Jefferson v. United States, 459 F. Supp. 2d 685, 690 (N.D.Ill.2006) (finding that the responsible party was not entitled to immunity under similar circumstances). III. Conclusion For the reasons set forth above, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Verret was a \"responsible person\" who acted \"willfully.\" He is personally liable under 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) for the unpaid withholding taxes of Doctors Hospital.",
"Accordingly, the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. Verret's action for recovery of the sum of $408,918.66 and all statutory additions provided by law is dismissed with prejudice. NOTES [1] Due to financial difficulties beginning as early as 1995, Doctors Hospital filed for bankruptcy protection in 2003. [2] The Government has asserted a Third Party Complaint against Massey, the Third Party Defendant. The Government takes the position that Massey was a \"responsible party\" for the payment of federal withholding taxes collected by Community Healthcare Foundation during the third quarter of 2001.",
"Although demand has been made upon Massey for the payment of the penalties and interest associated with these taxes, Massey has failed to pay the full amount of the assessment. The Government contends that Massey is indebted to the Government for $182,205.59 plus interest; however, the Government is not seeking summary judgment against her at this juncture. Thus, the current motion addresses only Verret's complaint. [3] Statutory penalties under § 6672 for responsible persons willfully failing to ensure payment of federal withholding taxes are joint and several.",
"See Brown v. United States, 591 F.2d 1136, 1142 (5th Cir. 1979); 14 Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation § 54:105 (Feb.2008). Responsible persons against whom a penalty under § 6672 has been assessed may seek contribution from other liable responsible persons. See 26 U.S.C. § 6672(d). [4] While the court appreciates that the board members volunteered their time and effort to Doctors Hospital and to the furtherance of medicine in this area, it has been recognized that: There is a sufficient social value in having individuals agree to serve on the boards of hospitals, schools, houses of worship, and the like that society ought to be willing to permit such service to be unhindered by the risk of massive personal tax liability. Of course, unpaid service on the board of a not-for-profit institution should not confer automatic immunity from the strictures of section 6672.",
"If a board does take an active role in an institution's financial affairs particularly its tax affairs ... the board members may well be deemed responsible persons. Simpson v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 43, 49 (E.D.N.Y.1987). [5] The company's 2001 IRS Form 990 was signed on June 30, 2003, by John Murphy, III, Chief Financial Officer at that time, and was received by the IRS on July 1, 2003. Verret left the Board in 2002. [6] When asked at deposition why Cottey's employment was not terminated after the Board learned of his initial failure to pay employment withholding taxes, Verret responded as follows: It's a good question in hindsight. The facility had difficulty because of its financial position in recruiting new CEOs to come. It was discussed by the board, but none of the board wanted to run a hospital, and his credentials that he had submitted appeared that he had run several other companies, that he was going to get over this hump.",
"[7] Verret points out that his knowledge of past (but eliminated) tax deficiencies does not automatically create an affirmative duty to investigate and absolutely prevent all future delinquencies. See id. at 429 (citing Godfrey v. United States, 748 F.2d 1568, 1579 (Fed.Cir. 1984)). (\"[M]ere knowledge of a past deficiency does not impose strict liability on a responsible officer for delinquencies during his tenure.\"). [8] IRS transcripts, provided by the Government, indicate deposit transactions on November 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, 2001, totaling $198,549.10. [9] At deposition, Verret responded as follows: Q: When did you first hear from the IRS about these unpaid taxes?",
"A: Last quarter of 2002. . . . Q: So after you had left? A: Correct. [10] Community Health Care Foundation's 2002 Form 990 indicates that Verret received $26,000.00 in compensation as \"PRESIDENT/CHAIRMAN FULL-TIME THRU 6/30/02.\""
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/2358756/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
JUDGE COFER delivered the opinion op the court. John G. Samuels, sheriff of Nelson County, having failed to pay into the treasury of the state on or before the 1st day of April, 1874, as required by section 8 of article 8 of chapter 92 of the General Statutes, the amount of the taxes of his county with which he was chargeable for the year 1873, this proceeding was instituted in the Franklin Circuit Court at its June term, 1874, against him and the sureties in his bond for the collection of the revenue for 1873; and judgment having been rendered on the 24th of June for the balance due, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 1st day of June, 1873, he and his sureties have appealed, and seek a reversal of that judgment on the sole ground that they are not liable under the statute for interest except from the first day of June, 1874. Whether the judgment is right depends upon the proper construction of section 6 of article 11 of chapter 92 of the General Statutes, which reads as follows: “Judgments when rendered against the defendants in cases referred to in the two preceding sections (i. e., actions or motions against officers collecting or receiving public moneys) shall be for the principal due, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 1st day of June preceding and until paid.” Counsel for appellants insist that the latter clause of the section should be read as if it was written “ from the preceding 1st day of June;” while the attorney-general maintains that the clause as written is plain and unambiguous, and that the judgment properly gives interest from the 1st day of June preceding—i. e., the 1st day of the June preceding the time when the money sought to be recovered ought to have been paid into the treasury. It seems to us that the word “preceding” refers to June, and not to the first day, as contended by appellants. Indeed the language seems plain, and it is only when we come to apply *493it to a case in hand that it is discovered that it works a supposed hardship, which counsel assume the legislature did not intend to impose, that there seems to be any difficulty. The sheriff was bound by the provisions of section 8 to pay the taxes for 1873 into the treasury by the 1st day of April, 1874; and not having done so, it is claimed that it would be unjust to subject him and his sureties to interest for ten months prior to the time when he was bound to pay, or, in other words, ten months before the money was due. On the other hand, the construction contended for by the appellants would enable the sheriffs to retain the revenue from sixty to ninety days after it should be paid in, without interest or penalty of any sort. But their construction, if adopted, would involve other consequences more unreasonable than either of those just adverted to. Section 1 of article 11 authorizes the auditor to proceed against delinquent sheriffs in the Franklin Circuit Court, or at his election in any other court having jurisdiction, to enforce payment by judgment and execution “at the next term succeeding such defalcation;” and section 17 of the same article gives to “the Franklin or any other circuit court” jurisdiction in such proceedings. If then two sheriffs make default, and the circuit court of the county of the residence of one of them commences on the first Monday in May, the auditor may proceed against him in that court, and under appellants’ construction judgment would be recovered for interest from the 1st day of June of the year before; while as to the other the auditor may again exercise his right to elect the court in which he will proceed, and commence proceedings in the Franklin Circuit Court, of which there is no term after the 1st of April until the fourth Monday in June, and in that case judgment could only be rendered for interest from the 1st day of- June of that year. The time from which sheriffs would be liable for interest would thus be made to depend in many cases, if not in all, upon the will of the auditor, and might be made *494unequal, and until proceedings were actually commenced would be-uncertain. "We can not suppose the legislature intended thus to make the liability-of sheriffs and their sureties and the rights of the commonwealth to depend upon the will of -a single officer, and especially when- the construction given to the statute by the auditor and the attorney-general, if viewed in the light of past legislation on this subject, does not impose upon collectors of the public revenue and their sureties any new or unusual liability. It. has'-always been, and probably always will be, found necessary to impose penalties upon .public officers who make default in the payment of public money in their hands; and it certainly never was intended to place it in their power, -as would be done by the' construction contended for, to hold public money for sixty or ninety days after it should have been paid into the treasury, without incurring any penalty whatever, and without even becoming liable for interest. It was accordingly provided by section 6 ' of article 9, chapter 83, Revised Statutes, that sheriffs failing to pay their revenue at the time prescribed by law (January 15th) and their sureties should be liable for interest at the rate of six per cent from the first day of the preceding June, besides twenty per cent damages on the unpaid principal, imposed by section 3, article 12, of the same chapter. The interest imposed by the General' Statutes- for the ten months preceding the time when the whole revenue shbuld- be paid in is' in the nature of a penalty for failure to pay by the time fixed by law, and is less than one half that previously imposed for the same default; and that too-when two and-a half months less time was allowed for collection than under 'the present law. ' ■ By this construction the time from which sheriffs and their sureties are liable for interest is fixed by the law, and will *495necessarily be tbe same as to all; and this is not only warranted by the language of the act, but is sustained by past legislation on the subject, and supported by reason and an evident public policy; while that contended for by the appellants necessitates a transposition of the words of the statute, and would offer a reward to defaulting officers. The judgment of the circuit court, giving interest from the first of June, 1873, on the balance not paid in on the first day of' April, 1874, accords with the only rational construction of the statute, and is therefore affirmed. | 07-29-2022 | [
"JUDGE COFER delivered the opinion op the court. John G. Samuels, sheriff of Nelson County, having failed to pay into the treasury of the state on or before the 1st day of April, 1874, as required by section 8 of article 8 of chapter 92 of the General Statutes, the amount of the taxes of his county with which he was chargeable for the year 1873, this proceeding was instituted in the Franklin Circuit Court at its June term, 1874, against him and the sureties in his bond for the collection of the revenue for 1873; and judgment having been rendered on the 24th of June for the balance due, with interest thereon at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 1st day of June, 1873, he and his sureties have appealed, and seek a reversal of that judgment on the sole ground that they are not liable under the statute for interest except from the first day of June, 1874.",
"Whether the judgment is right depends upon the proper construction of section 6 of article 11 of chapter 92 of the General Statutes, which reads as follows: “Judgments when rendered against the defendants in cases referred to in the two preceding sections (i. e., actions or motions against officers collecting or receiving public moneys) shall be for the principal due, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum from the 1st day of June preceding and until paid.” Counsel for appellants insist that the latter clause of the section should be read as if it was written “ from the preceding 1st day of June;” while the attorney-general maintains that the clause as written is plain and unambiguous, and that the judgment properly gives interest from the 1st day of June preceding—i. e., the 1st day of the June preceding the time when the money sought to be recovered ought to have been paid into the treasury.",
"It seems to us that the word “preceding” refers to June, and not to the first day, as contended by appellants. Indeed the language seems plain, and it is only when we come to apply *493it to a case in hand that it is discovered that it works a supposed hardship, which counsel assume the legislature did not intend to impose, that there seems to be any difficulty. The sheriff was bound by the provisions of section 8 to pay the taxes for 1873 into the treasury by the 1st day of April, 1874; and not having done so, it is claimed that it would be unjust to subject him and his sureties to interest for ten months prior to the time when he was bound to pay, or, in other words, ten months before the money was due.",
"On the other hand, the construction contended for by the appellants would enable the sheriffs to retain the revenue from sixty to ninety days after it should be paid in, without interest or penalty of any sort. But their construction, if adopted, would involve other consequences more unreasonable than either of those just adverted to. Section 1 of article 11 authorizes the auditor to proceed against delinquent sheriffs in the Franklin Circuit Court, or at his election in any other court having jurisdiction, to enforce payment by judgment and execution “at the next term succeeding such defalcation;” and section 17 of the same article gives to “the Franklin or any other circuit court” jurisdiction in such proceedings. If then two sheriffs make default, and the circuit court of the county of the residence of one of them commences on the first Monday in May, the auditor may proceed against him in that court, and under appellants’ construction judgment would be recovered for interest from the 1st day of June of the year before; while as to the other the auditor may again exercise his right to elect the court in which he will proceed, and commence proceedings in the Franklin Circuit Court, of which there is no term after the 1st of April until the fourth Monday in June, and in that case judgment could only be rendered for interest from the 1st day of- June of that year.",
"The time from which sheriffs would be liable for interest would thus be made to depend in many cases, if not in all, upon the will of the auditor, and might be made *494unequal, and until proceedings were actually commenced would be-uncertain. \"We can not suppose the legislature intended thus to make the liability-of sheriffs and their sureties and the rights of the commonwealth to depend upon the will of -a single officer, and especially when- the construction given to the statute by the auditor and the attorney-general, if viewed in the light of past legislation on this subject, does not impose upon collectors of the public revenue and their sureties any new or unusual liability. It.",
"has'-always been, and probably always will be, found necessary to impose penalties upon .public officers who make default in the payment of public money in their hands; and it certainly never was intended to place it in their power, -as would be done by the' construction contended for, to hold public money for sixty or ninety days after it should have been paid into the treasury, without incurring any penalty whatever, and without even becoming liable for interest. It was accordingly provided by section 6 ' of article 9, chapter 83, Revised Statutes, that sheriffs failing to pay their revenue at the time prescribed by law (January 15th) and their sureties should be liable for interest at the rate of six per cent from the first day of the preceding June, besides twenty per cent damages on the unpaid principal, imposed by section 3, article 12, of the same chapter.",
"The interest imposed by the General' Statutes- for the ten months preceding the time when the whole revenue shbuld- be paid in is' in the nature of a penalty for failure to pay by the time fixed by law, and is less than one half that previously imposed for the same default; and that too-when two and-a half months less time was allowed for collection than under 'the present law. ' ■ By this construction the time from which sheriffs and their sureties are liable for interest is fixed by the law, and will *495necessarily be tbe same as to all; and this is not only warranted by the language of the act, but is sustained by past legislation on the subject, and supported by reason and an evident public policy; while that contended for by the appellants necessitates a transposition of the words of the statute, and would offer a reward to defaulting officers. The judgment of the circuit court, giving interest from the first of June, 1873, on the balance not paid in on the first day of' April, 1874, accords with the only rational construction of the statute, and is therefore affirmed."
]
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Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:31520
EXHIBIT 46 Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:31521
USOO8871779B2
(12) United States Patent (10) Patent No.: US 8,871,779 B2 Buehler et al. (45) Date of Patent: Oct. 28, 2014 (54) PROCESS FOR PREPARING 5,922,876 A 7/1999 Huang MORPHINAN-6-ONE PRODUCTS WITH LOW 6,008.355 A 12/1999 Huang et al. LEVELS OF C.B-UNSATURATED KETONE 6,046,185. A 4/2000 Burgoyne et al. 6,177.567 B1 1/2001 Chiu et al. COMPOUNDS 6,312,662 B1 1 1/2001 Erion et al. (75) Inventors: Henry J. Buehler, St. Louis, MO (US); (Continued) William E. Dummitt, St. Louis, MO FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS (US); Anthony Mannino, Maryland Heights, MO (US); Dennis C. EP O 604 150 6, 1994 Aubuchon, Arnold, MO (US); Hong Gu, FR 1000543 2, 1952 Oak Park, CA (US) (Continued) (73) Assignee: Mallinckrodt LLC, Hazelwood, MO OTHER PUBLICATIONS (US) Weiss, “Derivatives of Morphine. I. 14-Hydroxydihydro (*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this morphinone'. Journal of the American Chemical Society, Nov. 20, patent is extended or adjusted under 35 1955, pp. 5891-5892. U.S.C. 154(b) by 996 days. (21) Appl. No.: 11/915,606 (Continued)
(22) PCT Filed: Mar. 2, 2007 Primary Examiner — Charanjit Aulakh (86). PCT No.: PCT/US2007/005256 (74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm — Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC S371 (c)(1), (2), (4) Date: Nov. 27, 2007 (57) ABSTRACT (87) PCT Pub. No.: WO2007/103105 The present invention generally relates to processes for pre PCT Pub. Date: Sep. 13, 2007 paring highly pure morphinan-6-one products. The processes (65) Prior Publication Data involve reducing the concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds present as impurities in morphinan 6 one prod US 2008/0312442 A1 Dec. 18, 2008 ucts or reaction mixtures including morphinan 6 one com pounds by treatment with a Sulfur-containing compound. (A) Related U.S. Application Data (60) Provisional application No. 60/778,258, filed on Mar. (A) 2, 2006. (51) Int. Cl. A6 IK3I/485 (2006.01) CO7D 489/04 (2006.01) CO7D 489/08 (2006.01) (52) U.S. Cl. sulfur CPC .................................... C07D489/08 (2013.01) containing USPC ............................................. 514/282:546/45 compound (58) Field of Classification Search (2) USPC ....................................... 546/45, 44; 514/282 See application file for complete search history. (56) References Cited U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 1479,293 A 1/1924 Freund 2009, 181 A 7/1935 Kabay 4,368,326 A 1/1983 Rice 4.410,700 A 10, 1983 Rice 4.414,417 A 11, 1983 Mestroni et al. 4,435,572 A 3/1984 Rapoport et al. 4,467,112 A 8, 1984 Matsuura et al. (2) 4,521,601 A 6, 1985 Rice 4,556,712 A 12, 1985 Rice 4,613,668 A 9, 1986 Rice 4,727, 146 A 2f1988 Rice 5,869,669 A 2/1999 Huang 6 Claims, No Drawings Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 3 of 25 PageID #:31522
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(Exhibit 2084, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Progress Report for Oct. 2006 from Erno Keskeny, dated Oct. 29. Jan. 9, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities 2006 (Exhibit 2056, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Summary for Dec. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler Monthly Report for Oct. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Nov. 2, (Exhibit 2086, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2006 (Exhibit 2057, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Apr. 27, 2009 Monthly Report for Apr. 2009 from Jen-Sen Dung to Weiss (1957) “Derivatives of Morphine. II. Demethylation of James Mencel (Exhibit 2087, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 14-hydroxycodeinone, 14-hydroxymorphinone and 8, 14 May 6, 2009 Development Highlights for Apr. 2009 from James Dihydroxydihydromorphinone'. J. Org. Chem. 22:1505-1508 Mencel to John Fowler (Exhibit 2088, filed in Interference No. (Exhibit 2058, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 105,893). Coop et al. (1998) "L-Selectride as a General Reagent for the Jan. 29, 2007 Monthly Report for Jan. 2007 from Jen-Sen Dung to O-Demethylation and N-Decarbomethoxylation of Opium Alkaloids James Mencel (Exhibit 2089, filed in Interference No. 105,893). and Derivatives”. J. Org. Chem. 63:4392-4396 (Exhibit 2059, filed in Feb. 7, 2007 Summary of Key Development Activities for Jan. 2007 Interference No. 105,893). from James Mencel to John Fowler (Exhibit 2090, filed in Interfer James C. Kraner (2006) SOFTToxTalk30(3):6 (Exhibit 2060, filed in ence No. 105,893). Interference No. 105,893). HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 199, Nov. 26, 2007 Declaration of James Mencel dated submitted Sep. 17, 2010 in U.S. (Exhibit 2092, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Appl. No. 1 1/866,840 (Exhibit 2061, filed in Interference No. HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 203, Nov. 28, 2007 105,893). (Exhibit 2093, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Casner et al. U.S Patent No. 7,153,966, issued on Dec. 26, 2006 HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 205, Nov. 28-29, (Exhibit 2062, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2007 (Exhibit 2094, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Chapman et al. U.S. Patent No. 7,129,248, issued on Oct. 31, 2006 HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 207, Nov. 28-29, (Exhibit 2063, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2007 (Exhibit 2095, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Declaration of James Mencel, dated Feb. 18, 2013 (Exhibit 2064. UK Patent Application 0624880.1, filed Dec. 14, 2006 (Exhibit 2096, filed in Interference No. 105,893). filed in Interference No. 105,893). Declaration of Erno M. Keskeny, Ph.D., dated Sep. 17, 2010 in U.S. U.S. Patent No. 8,217, 175 of Wang et al. (Assignee Mallinckrodt Appl. No. 1 1/866,840 (Exhibit 2065, filed in Interference No. LLC), issued on Jul. 10, 2012 (Exhibit 2097, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 105,893). Declaration of Jen-Sen Dung, Ph.D., dated Feb. 18, 2013 (Exhibit Notice of Allowance, mailed Oct. 21, 2010, in Dung U.S. Appl. No. 2066, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 1 1/866,840 (Exhibit 2098, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Email from Jen-Sen Dung to Helen Ogden dated Jul. 8, 2005 (Exhibit HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2011, p. 189, May 11, 2006 2067, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2099, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Email from Suzanne Currie to Jen-Sen Dung dated Jul. 11, 2005 Monthly Report for Jan. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Feb. 2, 2006 (Exhibit 2068, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2100, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 6 of 25 PageID #:31525
US 8,871,779 B2 Page 5
(56) References Cited Casner et al., U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2006/011 1383, “Preparation of Oxycodone” (filed Sep. 23, 2005; published May 25, 2006) OTHER PUBLICATIONS (Exhibit 1015, filed in IPR2014-00160). Documents from Patent Interference No. 105,553, Casner et al. v. Declaration of Nisha Patel, dated Feb. 19, 2013 (Exhibit 2101, filed in Chapman et al., Mar. 13, 2008 (Exhibit 1016, filed in IPR2014 Interference No. 105,893). 00.160). Pages from Johnson Matthey Empower system reflecting Nisha Endo Pharmaceuticals, Citizen Petition dated May 13, 2010 (Exhibit Patel's May-Jun. 2006 confirmation of ABUK content in sample 1017, filed in IPR2014-00160). Department of Health & Human Services, Re: Docket No. FDA 2128-189 (Exhibit 2103, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2010-P-0243, dated Nov. 8, 2010 (Exhibit 1018, filed in IPR2014 Excerpts from Laboratory Notebooks 844 and 845 of Robert Hogan, 00.160). Jan. 26, 2006; Apr. 27, 2006 (Exhibit 2104, filed in Interference No. Curriculum Vitae of Kevin Burgess, Ph.D., 2013 (Exhibit 1019, filed 105,893). in IPR2014-00160). Declaration of Robert Hogan, dated Jul. 12, 2013 (Exhibit 2105, filed Lewenstein et al., U.S. Patent No. 2,806,033, “Morphine Derivative” in Interference No. 105,893). (filed Aug. 3, 1955; issued Sep. 10, 1957) (Exhibit 1020, filed in Deposition Transcript of Stephen Husbands, Ph.D., dated Aug. 14. IPR2014-00160). 2013 (Exhibit 2106, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Huang, U.S. Patent No. 8,134,002, "Process for Preparing Deposition Transcript of James Janetka, Ph.D., dated Aug. 14, 2013 Oxymorphone” (filed May 2, 2007; issued Mar. 13, 2012) (Exhibit 1021, filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 2107, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Coop et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,291.675, “Methods of O-Demethyla Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, No. 12-1433, tion and N-Deprotection' (filed May 21, 1997; issued Sep. 18, 2001) 15 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 22, 2013) (Exhibit 2108, filed in Interference No. (Exhibit 1022, filed in IPR2014-00160). 105,893). Snupareket al., International Pub. No. WO 2006/019364, “A Method Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 7,851,482, filed on of Preparation of Oxycodone” (filed Aug. 16, 2005; published Feb. Nov. 18, 2013. 23, 2006) (Exhibit 1023, filed in IPR2014-00160). Dung et al., U.S. Patent No. 7,851.482, "Method for Making Anal Huang et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,922,876, "Preparation of gesics” (filed Oct. 3, 2007; issued Dec. 14, 2010) (Exhibit 1001, filed Oxymorphone from Morphine” (filed Jul. 16, 1998; issued Jul. 13, in IPR2014-00160). 1999) (Exhibit 1024, filed in IPR2014-00160). Declaration of Kevin Burgess, Ph.D., dated Nov. 18, 2013 (Exhibit Weiss, “Derivatives of Morphine. II. Demethylation of 1002, filed in IPR2014-00160). 14-hydroxycodeinone. 14-Hydroxymorphinone and 8, 14 Buehler et al., U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2008/0312442, “Process for Dihydroxydihydromorphinone” J. Org. Chem. 22:1505-1508 (1957) Preparing Morphinan-6-One Products with Low Levels of Alpha, (Exhibit 1025, filed in IPR2014-00160). Beta-Unsaturated Ketone Compounds” (filed Mar. 2, 2007: pub Eder et al., “Molecular Mechanisms of DNA Damage Initiated by lished Dec. 18, 2008) (Exhibit 1003, filed in IPR2014-00160). O.B-Unsaturated Carbonyl Compounds AS Criteria for Genotoxicity Buehler et al., U.S. Appl. No. 60/778.258, “Process for Preparing and Mutagenicity” Environ. Health Perspect. 88: 99-106 (1990) Morphinan-6-One Products with Low Levels of O.B-Unsaturated (Exhibit 1026, filed in IPR2014-00160). Ketone Compounds' (filed Mar. 2, 2006) (Exhibit 1004, filed in Eder et al., “The possible role of O.B-unsaturated carbonyl com IPR2014-00160). pounds in mutagenesis and carcinogenesis' Toxicol. Lett. 67: 87-103 Amendment dated Nov. 11, 2011 in U.S. Appl. No. 1 1/915,606 (1993) (Exhibit 1027, filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 1006, filed in IPR2014-00160). Department of Health & Human Services, Re: PSA1, datedMar. 24. FDA Approved Drug Label “OPANAR (Oxymorphone Hydrochlo 2008 (Exhibit 1028, filed in IPR2014-00160). ride) Tablets 5 mg and 10 mg” (Jun. 2006) (Exhibit 1008, filed in Wasmuth etal., “A Review of Oxymorphone Hydrochloride IPR2014-00160). (NUMORPHAN*) Analgesia Employed for General Surgery, Weigl et al., International Pub. No. WO 2006/084412, “Method for Including Clinical Experience with Five Hundred and Twenty-Eight Purifying Noroxymorphone Compounds” (filed Feb. 9, 2006; pub Patients' Cleveland Clin. O. 28:262-269 (1961) (Exhibit 1029, filed lished Aug. 17, 2006) (Exhibit 1009, filed in IPR2014-00160). in IPR2014-00160). Certified English translation of Weigl et al., International Pub. No. FDA Approved Drug Label “OPANARER (Oxymorphone Hydro WO 2006/084412, “Method for Purifying Noroxymorphone Com chloride) Extended-Release Tablets 5 mg, 10 mg, 20 mg, and 40 mg” pounds” (filed Feb. 9, 2006; published Aug. 17, 2006) (Exhibit 1010, (Jul. 2006) (Exhibit 1030, filed in IPR2014-00160). filed in IPR2014-00160). FORM 10-Q, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Weigl et al., U.S. Patent No. 8,227,609, “Process for Purifying for the quarterly period ended Sep. 30, 2006, Endo Pharmaceuticals Noroxymorphone Compounds” (filed Feb. 9, 2006; issued Jul. 24. Holdings Inc. (Exhibit 1031, filed in IPR2014-00160). 2012) (Exhibit 1011, filed in IPR2014-00160). Erno M. Keskeny, Notebook No. 2128, pp. 175 and 189, 2006 Berge et al., “Pharmaceutical Salts' J. Pharm. Sci. 66:1-19 (1977) (Exhibit 1032, filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 1012, filed in IPR2014-00160). Hudlicky, "Sodium Hydrosulfite is an Effective Reducing Agent.” Chapman et al., U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2005/0222 188, “Process Reductions in Organic Chemistry 2" Edition, pp. 165-169, 1996. for Preparing Oxycodone Hydrochloride Having Less Than 25 ppm File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,851.482 through Feb. 2, 2013 14-Hydroxycodeinone” (filed Mar. 30, 2005; published Oct. 6, 2005) (Exhibit 1005 filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 1013, filed in IPR2014-00160). Documents from Patent Interference No. 105,893, Dung et al. v. Huang et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,869,669, "Preparation of Buehler et al, dated Oct. 4, 2012-Sep. 25, 2013 (Exhibit 1007 filed in 14-Hydroxynormporphinones from Normorphinone Dienol IPR2014-00160). Acylates” (filed Jul 11, 1997; issued Feb. 9, 1999) (Exhibit 1014, filed in IPR2014-00160). * cited by examiner Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 7 of 25 PageID #:31526
US 8,871,779 B2 1. 2 PROCESS FOR PREPARING Barbier, A., “The Extraction of Opium Alkaloids.” Bull. Nar MORPHINAN-6-ONE PRODUCTS WITH LOW cotics, 1950, vol. 3, 22-29; Heumann, W. “The Manufacture LEVELS OF C.B-UNSATURATED KETONE of Alkaloids from Opium.” Bull. Narcotics, 1957, Vol. 2, COMPOUNDS 34-40; Lednicer and Mitscher, Organic Chemistry of Drug Synthesis, chapter 15, (Wiley 1977); French Patent No. CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 1,000,543 to Penau et al.; British Patent No. 713,689 to Wood APPLICATIONS et al.; and U.S. Pat. No. 2,009,181 to Kábay. Synthetic methods for producing various morphinan com This application is a national stage application of PCT/ 10 pounds are also known. These methods commonly utilize US2007/005256, filed Mar. 2, 2007, which claims the benefit 3-methoxy-phenylethylamine as a starting material and of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/778.258 filed Mar. 2, include a Grewe cyclization step. For example, in U.S. Pat. 2006. No. 4.368,326, Rice discloses a process for preparing a nor dihydrothebainone (e.g., 1-bromo-N-formylnordihydrothe FIELD OF THE INVENTION bainone) from a B.Y-hexahydroisoquinolone (e.g., 1-(2- 15 bromo-4'-methoxy-5'-hydroxybenzyl)-2formyl-1,3,4,5,7,8- The present invention generally relates to processes for hexahydroquinolin-6-one) by Grewe cyclization catalyzed preparing morphinan-6-one products. The processes involve using a Super acid catalyst alone or with a combination of an reducing the concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone com ammonium fluoride complex and trifluoromethanesulfonic pounds from reaction mixtures including morphinan-6-one acid. compounds. Many pharmaceutically desirable morphinan compounds BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION and analogs thereof have a ketone group on the C-ring of Formula (1) and a saturated bond between the two carbon The morphinan alkaloids represent a family of structurally atoms positioned C. and B to the ketone on the C-ring of related products of great medicinal importance. Particular 25 Formula (1). According to the common nomenclature, the morphinan compounds of pharmaceutical relevance include, ketone is present on the C(6) carbon atom, with the C. and B for example, codeine, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, mor carbon atoms being the C(7) and C(8) positions (see, e.g., phine, nalbuphine, nalmefene, naloxone, naltrexone, oxyc Formula (1)). Thus, these compounds may be referred to as odone, and oxymorphone. Generally, these compounds are morphinan-6-one compounds. Various processes for produc analgesics, which are used extensively for pain relief in the 30 ing morphinan-6-one compounds are known, many of which field of medicine due to their action as opiate receptor ago involve some form of catalytic hydrogenation of C.B-unsat nists. However, nalmefene, naloxone, naltrexone, and naltr urated ketone intermediate compounds at particular points in exone methyl bromide are opiate receptor antagonists, and the process. Commonly used catalysts include, for example, are used for reversal of narcotic/respiratory depression due to palladium and platinum. For example, in U.S. Pat. No. 6,177. opiate receptoragonists, as addiction therapies, and to reverse 35 567 to Chiu et al., 14-hydroxycodeinone (an C.B-unsaturated other undesirable side effects of opiate agonist use. Such as ketone compound) is converted to oxycodone by hydrogenat severe constipation. ing the C. B-unsaturation using conventional methods such as Morphinan compounds and analogs thereof typically have reduction by diphenylsilane and Pd(PhP)/ZnCl, or with a ring structure generally corresponding to Formula (1): Sodium hypophosphite in conjunction with a Pd/C catalyst in 40 aqueous acetic acid, or by Pd/C catalytic transfer hydrogena tion. (1) While these and other methods of reducing or removing the C.f3-unsaturation are generally effective, C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds may persistas impurities in the final prod 45 ucts of desirably C. B-saturated morphinan-6-one products, Such as oxycodone. Additionally, known hydrogenation methods may tend to undesirably reduce the ketone as well as reducing or removing the C.f3-unsaturation. Further, these and other hydrogenation methods are not normally capable of 50 efficiently and economically reducing the levels of 7,8-unsat uration to below 10 to 100 parts per million, or less. Some C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds show mutagenic activity in certain tests. Therefore, a need persists for pro Various methods are known for the synthesis of morphinan cesses for preparing highly pure morphinan-6-one products compounds corresponding to Formula (1). Conventional 55 having a relatively low concentration of C.B-unsaturated methods used in the commercial production of morphinan ketone compounds present as impurities therein. compounds typically involve the extraction of opium alka loids from poppies (papaver somniferum). Generally speak SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION ing, these processes involve the extraction of the alkaloids from opium in a liquid, precipitation of the alkaloids, sepa 60 Among the various aspects of the present invention is the ration of the raw alkaloids (e.g., morphine and secondary provision of a process for the preparation of morphinan-6-one alkaloids Such as papaverine, codeine, and thebaine), and products. The process involves reducing the concentration of purification of the various alkaloids, optionally followed by C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds which are present as semi-synthesis steps to produce particular morphinan com impurities in reaction mixtures including morphinan-6-one pounds. See, for example, Barbier, A., “The Extraction of 65 compounds. The process generally involves forming a reac Opium, Twenty-five years of commercial experience in the tion mixture including a morphinan-6-one compound and an treatment of opium.” Ann. Pharm. Franc., 1947, 5, 121-40; C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound and treating the reaction Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 8 of 25 PageID #:31527
US 8,871,779 B2 3 4 mixture with a sulfur-containing compound. In one embodi the morphinan-6-one compound comprises less than about ment, the Sulfur-containing compound is a Sulfur-containing 0.1% (by weight) morphinan-6-one product of the C.B-unsat inorganic acid or salt thereof. urated ketone compound. Briefly, therefore, the present invention is directed to a The present invention is also directed to a process for process for the preparation of a morphinan-6-one product, the preparing a morphinan-6-one product, the process compris process comprising: ing: forming a reaction mixture comprising a morphinan-6-one forming a reaction mixture comprising an O.B-unsaturated compound and an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound; ketone compound; treating the reaction mixture with a Sulfur-containing com 10 treating the reaction mixture with a Sulfur-containing com pound to reduce the concentration of the C. B-unsatur pound to reduce the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound ated ketone compound in the reaction mixture; and to form a morphinan-6-one compound; and recovering the morphinan-6-one compound to produce the recovering the morphinan-6-one compound to form the morphinan-6-one product; morphinan-6-one product, wherein 15 wherein the morphinan-6-one compound corresponds to Formula the morphinan-6-one compound corresponds to Formula (2): (2):
(2) (2)
25
30
the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound corresponds to For the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound corresponds to For mula (3): mula (3): 35
(3) (3)
40
45
X is —N(R,)— or - N'-(R1,R)—: X is —N(R,)— or - N'-(R1,R2)—: RandR are independently selected from hydrogen, Sub 50 RandR are independently selected from hydrogen, Sub stituted and unsubstituted acyl, acyloxy, alkenyl, alkoxy, stituted and unsubstituted acyl, acyloxy, alkenyl, alkoxy, alkoxyaryl, alkyl, alkylamino, alkylthio, alkynyl, amino, aryl, alkoxyaryl, alkyl, alkylamino, alkylthio, alkynyl, amino, aryl, arylalkoxy, carboalkoxy, carbonyl, carboxyalkenyl, carboxy arylalkoxy, carboalkoxy, carbonyl, carboxyalkenyl, carboxy alkyl, carboxyl, cyano, cyanoalkyl, cycloalkyl, cycloalkyla alkyl, carboxyl, cyano, cyanoalkyl, cycloalkyl, cycloalkyla lkyl, cycloalkylether, halo, haloalkoxy, haloalkyl, heteroaryl, 55 lkyl, cycloalkylether, halo, haloalkoxy, haloalkyl, heteroaryl, heterocyclic, hydroxyalkyl, hydroxyl, or nitro: heterocyclic, hydroxyalkyl, hydroxyl, or nitro: R is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, alkoxy, or R is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, alkoxy, or acyloxy; acyloxy; Ro is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, halo, keto, Ro is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, halo, keto, tosyl, mesyl, or trifluoromesyl; 60 tosyl, mesyl, or trifluoromesyl; Ra is hydrogen, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy: Ra is hydrogen, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy: R7 is hydrogen, alkyl, cycloalkyl, alkylcarboxy, alkyle R7 is hydrogen, alkyl, cycloalkyl, alkylcarboxy, alkyle necycloalkyl, alkoxycarbonyl, allyl, alkenyl, acyl, aryl, necycloalkyl, alkoxycarbonyl, allyl, alkenyl, acyl, aryl, formyl, formyl ester, formamide, benzyl, or an amino pro formyl, formyl ester, formamide, benzyl, or an amino pro tecting group; and 65 tecting group; and R7 and R7, are independently selected from hydrogen, R7 and R7, are independently selected from hydrogen, alkyl, alkenyl, allyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or benzylyl, and alkyl, alkenyl, allyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or benzylyl. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 9 of 25 PageID #:31528
US 8,871,779 B2 5 6 Other objects and features will be in part apparent and in When R, is hydrogen, alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or part pointed out hereinafter. benzyl, salts of the secondary or tertiary amine can beformed wherein the anion is chloride, bromide, acetate, formate, Sul DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION fate, bisulfate, bisulfite, oxalate, citrate, malate, tartrate, tri flate, trifluoroacetate, methane sulfonate, and the like. When The present invention is generally directed to processes for X is —N(R7R17)—, the counter-ion can be chloride, bro preparing highly pure morphinan-6-one products. The pro mide, iodide, trifluoroacetate, trifluoromethanesulfonate, cesses generally involve treating a reaction mixture including methane Sulfonate, acetate, p-toluenesulfonate, Sulfate, bisul a morphinan-6-one compound and an O.f3-unsaturated ketone fate, bisulfite, phosphate, hydrogen phosphate, dihydrogen compound with a Sulfur-containing compound. Advanta 10 phosphate, fumarate, oxalate, formate, tartrate, benzoate, and geously, the process effectively reduces the concentration of the like. undesirable C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds to acceptable In one preferred embodiment, R is hydroxy or protected levels without removing or otherwise affecting other more hydroxy. In another preferred embodiment, R is hydrogen. desirable compounds or Substituent groups or unsaturation 15 In either of the embodiments described above (i.e., when thereon. Moreover, the Sulfur-containing compound may be Ra is hydroxy or protected hydroxy or R is hydrogen), R utilized to reduce the concentration of C.B-unsaturated is either alkoxy, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy. In one par ketone compounds present in the reaction mixture from levels ticular embodiment, R is methoxy. of about 0.5% (by weight) or more to levels of not more than In any one of the embodiments described above, X is about 0.1% (by weight), or lower (e.g., about 0.01% (by —N(R7)— or —N (R7R7)—, wherein R7, R7, and weight), about 0.001% (by weight), or lower), with minimal R, are defined as above. Where X is N(R) , in one side reactions, ketone reduction, and/or any other undesirable particularly preferred embodiment R, is hydrogen, alkyl, effects. alkenyl, alkylcarboxy, or cycloalkyl. Where X is —N' Morphinan Products and Processes for Preparing the Same (R,R)—, in one particularly preferred embodiment R. Generally speaking, the morphinan-6-one products of 25 and Rz, are independently hydrogen, alkyl, alkenyl, or interest in the process of the present invention include mor cycloalkyl. phinan compounds having a keto group at the C(6) carbon Representative morphinan-6-one compounds correspond atom on the C-ring and a saturated bond between the C(7)and ing to Formula (2)(and the various preferred substituent C(8) carbonatoms on the C-ring (i.e., morphinan-6-one com group definitions described above) which can be treated pounds). More specifically, the morphinan-6-one compounds 30 according to the process described herein include, for are opiate receptor agonists or antagonists generally corre example, oxymorphone, naloxone, naltrexone, naltrexone sponding to Formula (2): methylbromide, nalbuphone, noroxymorphone, hydromor phone, hydrocodone, oxycodone, diethoxycarbonyl-noroxy 35 morphone, salts thereof, and the like. Additionally, deriva (2) tives of the above morphinan-6-one compounds which can be treated according to the process described herein include, for example, N-demethylated-, 10-hydroxy-, 10-halo, and 10-keto-morphinan-6-one derivatives, their protected ana 40 logs, and the like. The method of producing the above-described morphinan 6-one compounds for use in the present invention is not nar rowly critical, and various methods for producing morphi nan-6-one compounds are well known in the art. For example, 45 commercial processing methods for producing morphinan compounds typically involve the extraction of an opium alka wherein loid (e.g., thebaine) from poppies, followed by various con ventional precipitation and purification steps known to those X is —N(R,)— or —N*(R,R)—: of skill in the art. By way of further example, the morphinan RandR are independently selected from hydrogen, Sub 50 6-one compound oxycodone may be produced from thebaine stituted and unsubstituted acyl, acyloxy, alkenyl, alkoxy, in a substantially two-step process, as illustrated in Reaction alkoxyaryl, alkyl, alkylamino, alkylthio, alkynyl, amino, aryl, Scheme 1: arylalkoxy, carboalkoxy, carbonyl, carboxyalkenyl, carboxy alkyl, carboxyl, cyano, cyanoalkyl, cycloalkyl, cycloalkyla lkyl, cycloalkylether, halo, haloalkoxy, haloalkyl, heteroaryl, 55 heterocyclic, hydroxyalkyl, hydroxyl, or nitro: R is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, alkoxy, or acyloxy; Ro is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, halo, keto, tosyl, mesyl, or trifluoromesyl; He oxidation Ra is hydrogen, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy: R7 is hydrogen, alkyl, cycroalkyl, alkylcarboxy, alkyle necycloalkyl, alkoxycarbonyl, allyl, alkenyl, acyl, aryl, formyl, formyl ester, formamide, benzyl, or an amino pro tecting group; and R7 and R7, are independently selected from hydrogen, Thebaine alkyl, alkenyl, allyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or benzyl. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:31529
US 8,871,779 B2 7 8 -continued Reaction Conditions H3CO As noted above, the morphinan products produced from conventional processes for preparing morphinan-6-one com pounds also yield some amount of an O.B-unsaturated ketone present as an impurity; that is, both the morphinan-6-one compound corresponding to Formula (2) and the C.B-unsat urated ketone compound corresponding to Formula (3) are present in the morphinan product. The morphinan products produced from conventional mor 10 phinan processing methods typically comprise less than about 2% by weight of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. 14-hydroxycodeinone Preferably, the morphinan products comprise less than about 1% by weight of an O.B-unsaturated ketone compound. More preferably, the morphinan products comprise less than about catalytic hydrogenation 0.8% by weight of an O.B-unsaturated ketone compound. Still 15 more preferably, the morphinan products comprise less than about 0.5% by weight of an O.B-unsaturated ketone com pound. As noted above, however, it is desirable to minimize or further minimize the concentration of C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds present in Such products. According to the present invention, a reaction mixture is formed including a morphinan-6-one compound of Formula (2) and an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound of Formula (3). The morphinan-6-one compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound may be produced by any conventional method (such as those described above), and the morphinan oxycodone 6-one compound may exist as the free base or as a salt, such as the hydrochloride salt. The reaction mixture is treated with a Sulfur-containing compound to reduce the concentration of Alternatively, various synthetic methods for producing the the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound (either by forming above-described morphinan-6-one compounds are also additional morphinan-6-one compound or by facilitating the known. In these synthetic methods, a Grewe cyclization reac 30 removal of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound), and the tion is commonly used to form nordihydrothebainone prod morphinan-6-one compound is recovered to produce the desired morphinan-6-one product. This process is generically ucts such as by the processes described in U.S. Pat. Nos. illustrated in Reaction Scheme 2, wherein the reaction mix 4,368,326, 4,410,700, 4,521,601, 4,556,712, 4,613,668, ture including the morphinan-6-one compound and the C. B 4,727,146, the entire disclosures of which are hereby incor 35 unsaturated ketone compound is shown in brackets, and X, porated by reference herein. Additionally, various methods R. R. R. Rio, and Ra are defined as above. useful for the semi-synthesis of morphinan compounds and intermediates are known. For example, U.S. Pat. No. 6, 177, 567 to Chiu et al. and U.S. Pat. No. 6,008.355 to Huang et al. (each of which is hereby incorporated by reference herein) 40 describe methods for the synthesis of oxycodone from codeine. These and other conventional practices are generally applicable in carrying out the preparation of morphinan-6- one compounds and C. B-unsaturated ketone compounds that may be treated according to the processes described herein. 45 As noted above, in the various conventional processes for sulfur producing morphinan-6-one compounds described above, containing the resulting morphinan product typically also includes some compound amount of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound present as an impurity in addition to the desired morphinan-6-one com (2) 50 pound. The C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds present as impurities generally correspond to Formula (3):
(3) 55
60 (2) Various reaction mixtures (bracketed) including a morphi nan-6-one compound and an O.B-unsaturated ketone com 65 pound may be treated according to the processes described herein to yield various highly pure morphinan-6-one prod wherein X, R. R. R. Rio, and Ra are defined as above. ucts, as illustrated in Reaction Schemes 3-10. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 11 of 25 PageID #:31530
US 8,871,779 B2
Her Sulfur-containing compound
hydrocodone codeinone hydrocodone
He Sulfur-containing compound
Oxymorphone 14-hydroxymorphinone oxymorphone
--- Sulfur-containing compound
noroxymorphone 7,8-didehydronoroxymorphone noroxymorphone
-- Sulfur-containing compound
hydromorphone morphinone hydromorphone Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 12 of 25 PageID #:31531
US 8,871,779 B2 11 12
HO
He Sulfur-containing O compound 2.1.
O
maltrexone 7,8-didehydronaltrexone maltrexone
HO
Br Br
--- Sulfur-containing O2. -- compound 2. OH 1 O
naltrexone methyl bromide 7,8-didehydronaltrexone naltrexone methyl bromide methylbromide
HO
Her Sulfur-containing O% compound 2. OH 1
naloxone 7,8-didehydronaloxone l O naloxone
HO
Her Sulfur-containing Oz compound %
malbuphone 7,8-didehydronalbuphone malbuphone Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 13 of 25 PageID #:31532
US 8,871,779 B2 13 14 According to various embodiments, the reaction mixture is able quaternary ammonium salts for use as phase transfer formed by dissolving or otherwise dispersing the morphinan catalysts include tetraalkylammonium salts such as, for 6-one compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound example, tetramethyl-, tetraethyl-, tetrabutyl-, tetrahexyl-, in a media material (i.e., a morphinan product including the tetraoctyl-, methyltriphenyl-, methyltrioctyl-, benzyltrim morphinan-6-one compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone ethyl-, benzyltriethyl-, benzyltributyl-, hexadecyltrimethyl compound is dispersed in the media material). The reaction ammonium salts, and the like. Suitable salts include, for mixture is then treated with a Sulfur-containing compound. example, halide, hydroxide, bicarbonate, bisulfate, thiocyan Ideally, the morphinan-6-one compound and the C.B-unsat ate, tetrafluoroborate, and the like. Other phase transfer cata urated ketone compound are in Solution, but a heterogeneous lysts such as phosphonium salts may be suitable as well. mixture may also be treated according to the processes 10 A variety of sulfur-containing compounds may be utilized described herein. to treat the reaction mixture and reduce the concentration of The media material is desirably an aqueous media or an the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound according to the pro aqueous/organic solvent biphasic media. Exemplary aqueous cesses described herein. In various embodiments, the sulfur media for use in the process of the present invention includes, containing compound is a Sulfur-containing nucleophile. As for example, water, waterfalcohol mixtures, dilute inorganic 15 utilized herein, “nucleophile' refers to an ion or molecule that Solvents such as dilute Sulfuric acid, ethereal solvents such as donates a pair of electrons to an atomic nucleus to form a dioxane or tetrahydrofuran, combinations thereof, and the covalent bond. In other embodiments, the Sulfur-containing like. Exemplary organic solvents for use in aqueous/organic compound is a Sulfur-containing reducing agent. As utilized Solvent biphasic media includes, for example, butanone, ethyl herein, “reducing agent” refers to an agent having the ability acetate, butanol, diethyl ether, benzene, chloroform, tetra to add one or more electrons to an atom, ion or molecule. In chloroethylene, toluene, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, carbon tetra either of the two embodiments described above (i.e., when the chloride, dibutyl ether, cyclohexane, hexane, dipentyl ether, Sulfur-containing compound is a Sulfur-containing nucleo heptane, hexadecane, combinations thereof, and the like. phile or a Sulfur-containing reducing agent), the Sulfur-con Generally, a Sufficient amount of media material to Sub taining compound is a compound having the ability to effect stantially solubilize the morphinan-6-one compound and the 25 the reduction of and/or a 1.4 addition across the C. B-unsatur C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound in the reaction mixture is ated bond of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. desired. Higher amounts of media material may increase the In one embodiment, the Sulfur-containing compound is a costs of manufacturing, as the more dilute reaction mixture Sulfur-containing inorganic acid or salt thereof. Suitable Sul may require additional process cycle time, or require the fur-containing inorganic acids include, for example, hydro removal or excess media material during Subsequent process 30 sulfuric acid (HS); sulfurous acid (HSO); persulfuric acid ing steps. (HSOs); thiosulfurous acid (HSO); dithionous acid The weight ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one (HSO); disulfurous acid (H2SOs); dithionic acid compound in the reaction mixture is preferably from about (HSO); pyrosulfuric acid (H2SO4); peroxydisulfuric acid 1:1 to about 50:1. More preferably, the weight ratio of media (H2SOs); trithionic acid (H2SO); tetrathionic acid material to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction mix 35 (HSO); pentathionic acid (HSSO); chlorosulfonic acid ture is from about 1:1 to about 25:1. For example, the weight (HSOCl); furosulfonic acid (HSOF); sulfamic acid ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one compound in the (HSONH); salts thereof; and the like. reaction mixture may be from about 1:1 to about 5:1, from Generally, the Sulfur-containing inorganic acid salt may be about 1:1 to about 10:1, from about 1:1 to about 15:1, or from an alkali metal salt or an alkaline earth metal salt. For about 1:1 to about 20:1. Still more preferably, the weight ratio 40 example, the Salt may be a monovalent or divalent cation of media material to morphinan-6-one compound in the reac selected from Li", Na', K", Rb, Cs", Fr", Be", Mg, Ca", tion mixture is from about 5:1 to about 25:1. For example, the Sr*., Ba', or Ra". Preferably, the salt is selected from the weight ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one com group consisting of Li", Na', K", Mg", Ca", and combina pound in the reaction mixture may be from about 5:1 to about tions thereof. 10:1, from about 5:1 to about 15:1, or from about 5:1 to about 45 Alternatively, the Sulfur-containing inorganic acid salt may 20:1. Still more preferably, the weight ratio of media material be an ammonium salt (NH) or a quaternary ammonium salt. to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture is For example, the Sulfur-containing inorganic acid salt may be from about 5:1 to about 15:1. For example, the weight ratio of a tetraalkylated ammonium salt; that is, a quaternary ammo media material to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction nium salt Substituted with four alkyl groups preferably having mixture may be from about 5:1 to about 6:1, from about 5:1 to 50 from 1 to about 18 carbon atoms. Suitable tetraalkylated about 7:1, from about 5:1 to about 8:1, from about 5:1 to about ammonium salts include, for example, tetramethylammo 9:1, from about 5:1 to about 10:1, from about 5:1 to about nium salts, tetraethylammonium salts, tetrapropylammonium 11:1, from about 5:1 to about 12:1, from about 5:1 to about salts, tetrabutylammonium salts, and the like. 13:1, or from about 5:1 to about 14:1. Most preferably, the In one particular embodiment, the Sulfur-containing inor weight ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one com 55 ganic acid is dithionous acid (H2SO) or salts thereof. By pound in the reaction mixture is from about 5:1 to about 11:1. way of example, salts of dithionous acid include MHSO and It will be understood that some portion of the media material MSO, wherein M is selected from alkali metal salts, alka may be derived from the Sulfur-containing compound itself line earth metal salts, ammonium salt (NH), and quaternary (e.g., as water of hydration). ammonium salts. According to this embodiment, the C. B Optionally, a phase transfer catalyst may also be added to 60 unsaturated ketone compound is chemically reduced to form the aqueous/organic solvent biphasic media. The phase trans the morphinan-6-one compound upon treatment with the Sul fer catalyst is preferably any suitable composition for use in fur-containing compound, discussed in further detail below. the transfer of reactants (i.e., morphinan-6-one compounds, In another particular embodiment, the Sulfur-containing C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds, and/or Sulfur-containing inorganic acid is selected from the group consisting of Sulfu compounds) between the aqueous and organic solvent inter 65 rous acid (H2SOs); disulfurous acid (H2SOs); and salts face. Typically, the phase transfer catalyst is an ammonium thereof. By way of example, salts of sulfurous acid and dis based compound, Such as a quaternary ammonium salt. Suit ulfurous acid include MHSO, MSO, MHSOs, and Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 14 of 25 PageID #:31533
US 8,871,779 B2 15 16 MSOs wherein M is selected from alkali metal salts, alka one compound in the reaction mixture may be from about line earth metal salts, ammonium salt (NH), and quaternary 0.8:1 to about 1.0:1, from about 0.8:1 to about 1.2:1, from ammonium salts. According to this embodiment, the Sulfur about 0.8:1 to about 1.4:1, from about 0.8:1 to about 1.6:1, containing inorganic acid or salt thereof is one which disso from about 0.8:1 to about 1.8:1, from about 0.8:1 to about ciates into the bisulfite ion (HSO) and/or the sulfite ion 2.0:1, from about 0.8:1 to about 2.2:1, or from about 0.8:1 to (SO) in the reaction mixture. It will be understood by one about 2.4:1. of ordinary skill in the art that sulfurous acid (HSO) gener The treatment of the reaction mixture with the sulfur-con ally exists as a solution of SO (commonly about 6%) in taining compound may be carried out in ambient air or in an water. The pKa of sulfurous acid (HSO) is about 1.78 and its oxygen-free environment. Preferably, the treatment is carried ionization expression is: 10 out in an inert atmosphere Such as, for example, argon or nitrogen gas. The treatment is preferably carried out at a According to this embodiment, various 1.2- and 1.4-sul pressure of from about 0.5 atm to about 2.0 atm. More pref fonated addition products are formed from the morphinan-6- erably, the treatment is carried out at a pressure of from about one compound and the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound by 15 0.75 atm to about 1.5 atm; most preferably from about 0.9 atm reaction with the bisulfite ion and/or the sulfite ion, discussed to about 1.25 atm. in further detail below. In various embodiments, the pH of the reaction mixture In another particular embodiment, the Sulfur-containing during treatment with the Sulfur-containing compound is compound is a thiol having the formula: R SH, wherein Ris greater than about 3. Typically, the pH of the reaction mixture hydrocarbyl, substituted hydrocarbyl, or heterocyclo. For during treatment is less than about 10, although the upper pH example, R may be substituted or unsubstituted alkyl, alk limit may depend on the treatment time and/or solubility of enyl, alkynyl, or aryl. Exemplary thiols having the formula the various reaction mixture components. Preferably, the pH R—SH, wherein R is defined as above, include alkyl or aryl of the reaction mixture during treatment with the sulfur thiols such as methanethiol, ethanethiol, benzenethiol, and containing compound is from about 3 to about 9; more pref the like. Other exemplary thiols include thiocarboxylic acids 25 erably from about 6 to about 9. For example, the pH of the and salts thereof (e.g., thiobenzoic acid) and thiol-terminated reaction mixture during treatment with the Sulfur-containing carboxylic acids and salts thereof (e.g., thioglycolic acid compound may be about 3, about 4, about 5, about 6, about 7. (mercaptoacetic acid), mercaptopropionic acid, and the like). about 8, or about 9. Most preferably, the treatment occurs at a Still other exemplary thiols include amino acids (e.g., L- or pH of from about 6 to about 7.25. Upon the addition of the D.L-cysteine), other thiol-containing amines and/or quater 30 Sulfur-containing compound to the reaction mixture includ nary salts thereof (e.g., cysteamine HCl, thiocholine, and the ing the morphinan-6-one compound and the C.f3-unsaturated like), or polymer-bound thiols (e.g., polycysteine, polyviny ketone compound, the pH may be adjusted to the desired level larylthiol, and the like). In one preferred embodiment, the (e.g. using a base Such as ammonium hydroxide). Other Suit thiol is benzenethiol. Without being bound to one theory, it is able bases include, for example, Sodium hydroxide, potas believed that the thiol forms various 1,2- and 1,4-sulfonated 35 addition products from the morphinan-6-one compound and sium hydroxide, and the like. the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. The time of reaction is generally a function of the other The amount of Sulfur-containing compound utilized to variables in the reaction, such as pH, ratio of media material treat the reaction mixture may vary considerably according to to morphinan-6-one compound, amount of Sulfur-containing the various reaction mixture components (such as the particu 40 compound, and the like. Typically, some reduction of the lar morphinan-6-one compound, the C.B-unsaturated ketone concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone compound in the compound, and/or the media material) and concentrations reaction mixture can be observed after about 1 hour. Prefer thereof, time of reaction, temperature, pressure, and the like. ably, the reaction mixture is treated with the Sulfur-containing Relatively high usage rates of Sulfur-containing compound compound for at least about 1 hour. In some embodiments, the generally offer no significant advantages and tend to waste 45 time of reaction is less than about 24 hours. In other embodi chemicals and/or reactor Volume. ments, the time of reaction is from about 1 hour to about 18 The molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to morphi hours; in still other embodiments from about 1 hour to about nan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture is typically 15 hours; in still other embodiments from about 1 hour to greater than about 0.5:1. Preferably, the molar ratio of sulfur about 10 hours. More preferably, the reaction mixture is containing compound to morphinan-6-one compound in the 50 treated with the sulfur-containing compound for about 1 hour reaction mixture is from about 0.5:1 to about 3.0:1. For to about 5 hours. For example, the reaction mixture may be example, the molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to treated with the Sulfur-containing compound for about 1 hour, morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture may be for about 2 hours, for about 3 hours, for about 4 hours, or for from about 0.5:1 to about 0.8:1, from about 0.5:1 to about about 5 hours. 1.0:1, from about 0.5:1 to about 1.5:1, from about 0.5:1 to 55 The temperature of the reaction mixture during treatment about 2.0:1, or from about 0.5:1 to about 2.5:1. More prefer with the Sulfur-containing compound is generally from about ably, the molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to mor 0° C. to about 100° C. For example, the temperature of the phinan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture is from about reaction mixture during treatment with the Sulfur-containing 0.6:1 to about 2.8:1. For example, the molar ratio of sulfur compound may be from about 10° C. to about 90° C., from containing compound to morphinan-6-one compound in the 60 about 20°C. to about 80°C., or from about 30°C. to about 70° reaction mixture may be from about 0.6:1 to about 0.8:1, from C. Preferably, the temperature of the reaction mixture during about 0.6:1 to about 1.0:1, from about 0.6:1 to about 1.5:1, treatment with the Sulfur-containing compound is above from about 0.6:1 to about 2.0:1, or from about 0.6:1 to about room temperature. The preferred reaction temperature may 2.5:1. Most preferably, the molar ratio of sulfur-containing vary for each morphinan-6-one. More preferably, the tem compound to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction 65 perature of the reaction mixture during treatment with the mixture is from about 0.8:1 to about 2.5:1. For example, the sulfur-containing compound is from about 30°C. to about 50° molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to morphinan-6- C. For example, the temperature of the reaction mixture dur Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 15 of 25 PageID #:31534
US 8,871,779 B2 17 18 ing treatment with the Sulfur-containing compound may be 5811-5814; Louis-Andre et al., Tetrahedron Letters, Vol. 26, about 30° C., about 35° C., about 40° C., about 45° C., or No. 7, 1985, 831-832). By way of example, dithionous acid about 50° C. (H2SO4) and salts thereof (e.g., MHSO or MSO, Once the treatment is complete or has proceeded as long as wherein M is defined as above) operate according to this desired, the treated morphinan-6-one compound is recovered mechanism; other Sulfur-containing compounds, however, to produce the morphinan-6-one product. Advantageously, may also operate according to the same or a similar mecha the morphinan-6-one compound may be recovered from the nism. Reaction Scheme 11 generally illustrates the reduction reaction mixture without the use of an organic solvent. The of the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound (3) to form the absence of the need for organic solvents in the recovery desired morphinan-6-one compound (2) according to this process not only provides various environmental and material embodiment, wherein X, R. R. R. Rio, and Ra are defined handling benefits, but also results in a more efficient process as above.
Sulfur-containing compound
(2) (3) (2)
Suitable for industrial scale applications. Typically, the mor In an alternative embodiment, various 1.2- and 1.4-sul phinan-6-one compound is precipitated from the reaction 30 fonated addition products are formed during treatment that mixture as a base (or salt if desirable) and may then be readily assist in the removal of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone com converted into a generally more pharmaceutically acceptable pounds from the reaction mixture. As noted above, several form, if so desired. For example, the pH of the reaction Sulfur-containing compounds dissociate into various Sulfur mixture is typically adjusted to about 9-10 or greater with a 35 containing species. In particular, Sulfurous acid (H2SO). Suitable base Such as ammonium hydroxide, and the (desired) disulfurous acid (H2SOOs), and their salts dissociate into, precipitated compound recovered. Generally speaking, this among other things, bisulfite (HSOs) and sulfite (SO). Bisulfite has been shownto add via radical initiation across pH is at the point wherein opium alkaloids are not ionized. isolated double bonds (see, e.g., March, J., Advanced Organic The morphinan-6-one compounds can then be optionally Chemistry, p. 688, J. Wiley & Sons, 1985, 3d. ed.) and/or add converted into a form more physiologically tolerable, such as viaan ionic mechanism (see, e.g., Gilbert, E.; Sulfonation and the hydrochloride salt, e.g., oxycodone HCl, using conven Related Reactions, p. 152, Interscience, N.Y. 1965; Patai et tional methods known to those of skill in the art. For example, al., The Chemistry of Alkenes, p. 478, Interscience, London the morphinan-6-one base can be dissolved or otherwise dis 1965). Without being bound to one theory, it is believed that persed in water, reacted with an acid such as HCl, heated, and 45 when the reaction mixture is treated with sulfurous acid, cooled to precipitate the morphinan-6-one salt. By way of an disulfurous acid, or salts thereof and the pH is adjusted to alternative example, the morphinan-6-one base can be dis between about 3 and about 9, certain 1,2- and 1,4-addition Solved or otherwise dispersed in an alcohol solvent (e.g., products and adducts are stably and/or reversibly formed methanol, ethanol, etc.) or a solvent system (i.e., a mixture of from the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound and the morphi solvents), reacted with concentrated HCl or an HCl/alcohol 50 nan-6-one compound. It is further believed that the products mixture, and cooled to precipitate the morphinan-6-one are generally stable within the pH range of from about 3 to hydrochloride salt By way of another example, the morphi about 9, and adjusting the pH outside of this range after their nan-6-one base can be dissolved or otherwise dispersed in formation from the C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds and the morphinan-6-one compounds facilitates the removal of water, alcohol Solvent, or a solvent system, reacted with gas 55 the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound from the reaction mix eous HCl, heated, and cooled to precipitate the morphinan ture, resulting in a highly pure morphinan-6-one product. 6-one hydrochloride salt. One preferred embodiment of the present invention is illus Treatment Reaction Mechanisms trated in Reaction Schemes 12A and 12B, wherein X, R. R. Without being bound to one theory, it is believed that the R. Rio, and Ra are defined as above and M is a monovalent reduction of the concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone 60 or divalent cation. For example, M may be one or more alkali compounds in the reaction mixture is performed via different metal or alkaline earth metal monovalent or divalent cations mechanisms, depending on the particular Sulfur-containing from the Sulfur-containing compound. Alternatively, M may compound selected to treat the reaction mixture. be one or more monovalent or divalent cations from the In one embodiment, the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound alkaline compound (e.g., NaOH, KOH, NH4OH, etc.) used to is reduced by the Sulfur-containing compound to form the 65 adjust the pH of the reaction mixture to between about 3 and desired C.f3-saturated morphinan-6-one compound. See, e.g., about 9 after the addition of the sulfur-containing compound Camps et al., Tetrahedron Letters, Vol. 29, No. 45, 1988, to the reaction mixture. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 16 of 25 PageID #:31535
US 8,871,779 B2 19 20 containing compound at a pH of between about 3 and about 9. While it is understood that sulfurous acid, disulfurous acid, and salts thereof operate according to the mechanism illus trated in Reaction Schemes 12A, 12B, and 12C, other sulfur 5 containing compounds may also operate according to the same or a similar mechanism. For example, thiols (e.g., ben Zenethiol) may also operate according to the mechanism described in connection with Reaction Schemes 12A, 12B, and 12C. 10 Particularly, when the reaction mixture is treated with a Sulfur-containing compound and the pH of the reaction mix ture is adjusted to between about 3 and about 9, the morphi (2) nan-6-one compound (2) forms the reversible, water-soluble Sulfur-containing 3 < pH<9 15 12-bisulfite adduct (2A). Once the reaction mixture is suffi compound ciently in solution in the media material and/or the sulfur containing compound, dissociated Sulfur specie (such as sulfite and bisulfite) react more readily with the C.B-unsatur ated ketone compound (3) also present in the reaction mix 20 ture. As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 12B, one reaction between the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound (3) and the Sulfur-containing compound involves the rapid and reversible as 1,2-addition of the bisulfite to the carbonyl (similar to the reaction of the Sulfur-containing compound with the morphi nan-6-one compound illustrated in Reaction Scheme 12A) to (2A) form the reversible 1,2-adduct (3A) from the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound (3). Another reaction between the sulfur containing compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone com Reaction Scheme 12B
-- Sulfur-containing 3 <-3-3 pH<9 compound
(3) (3A)
Sulfur-containing compound
(3C)
As shown in Reaction Schemes 12A and 12B, various pound (3) is the slower 1,4-addition, forming the more stable 1.2-and 1,4-sulfonated compounds are formed from the mor- 1,4-addition product (3B). The introduction of the sulfonate phinan-6-one compound (2)(scheme 12A) and the C.B-unsat- 65 group in the B-position generally enhances the reactivity of urated ketone compound (3)(scheme 12B) upon treatment of the carbonyl group by destroying its conjugation with the a reaction mixture including these compounds with a Sulfur- double bond, such that the reversible product is a 1.2- and Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 17 of 25 PageID #:31536
US 8,871,779 B2 21 22 1,4-bis adduct (3C)(see Pataietal. The Chemistry of Alkenes, the pH outside of the range between about 3 and about 9 (i.e., p. 478, Interscience, London 1965). the pH is adjusted to less than about 3 or the pH is adjusted to Reaction Scheme 12C illustrates the removal of certain greater than about 9) with an acid (e.g., Sulfuric acid (H2SO4)) addition products formed in the reaction mixture according to or a base (e.g., ammonium hydroxide (NH4OH)) results in the Reaction Schemes 12A and 12B and the resulting highly pure decomposition of the 1,2-addition products of each com morphinan-6-one product, wherein X, R. R. R. Rio, Ra, pound, rendering the desired morphinan-6-one compound (2) and Mare defined as above. insoluble in water. The relatively more stable 1,4-addition
3 > pH > 9
(2A) (3C)
(2) (3B)
1. alkaline pH 2. removal of (3B) with mother liquor mixture
(2)
As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 12C, the removal of the product (3B) formed from the C.B-unsaturated ketone com C.f3-unsaturated ketone addition products is generally based pound remains and is water-soluble in the final mixture at an in the differences in solubility of the 1,4-addition product 65 alkaline pH (e.g., pH~9 or greater). The 1,4-addition product (3B) generated from the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound (3B) may thus be removed from the mixture with the mother and the desired morphinan-6-one compound (2). Adjusting liquor, leaving the insoluble morphinan-6-one base (2). The Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 18 of 25 PageID #:31537
US 8,871,779 B2 23 24 desired morphinan-6-one base may then be converted into a containing compound at a pH of between about 3 and about 9. more physiologically-tolerable salt form, such as the hydro As discussed above, while it is generally understood that chloride Salt, using methods known to those of skill in the art. Sulfurous acid, disulfurous acid, and salts thereof operate One particularly preferred embodiment of the present according to the mechanism described in Reaction Schemes invention is illustrated in Reaction Schemes 13A and 13B, 13A and 13B, other Sulfur-containing compounds may also wherein M is defined as above. operate according to the same or a similar mechanism. Particularly, when the reaction mixture is treated with a Sulfur-containing compound and the pH of the reaction mix ture is adjusted to between about 3 and about 9, oxycodone (20) forms the reversible, water-soluble 1,2-bisulfite adduct (20A). Once the reaction mixture is sufficiently in solution in the media material and the Sulfur-containing compound, dis Sociated Sulfur specie (such as Sulfite and bisulfite) react more readily with the 14-hydroxycodeinone (30) also present in the reaction mixture. As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 13B, one reaction between 14-hydroxycodeinone (30) and the sulfur-contain (20) ing compound involves the rapid and reversible 1.2-addition Sulfur-containing -3 < PTS H< 9 - of the sulfite to the carbonyl (similar to the reaction of the compound Sulfur-containing compound with oxycodone illustrated in Reaction Scheme 13A) to form the reversible 1,2-adduct (30A) from 14-hydroxycodeinone. Another reaction between the Sulfur-containing compound and 14-hydroxycodeinone (30) is the slower 1,4-addition, forming the more stable 1,4- addition product (30B). The introduction of the sulfonate group in the B-position generally enhances the reactivity of the carbonyl group by destroying its conjugation with the (20A) double bond, such that the reversible product is a 1.2- and 1,4-bis adduct (30C) (see Patai et al., The Chemistry of Alk enes, p. 478, Interscience, London 1965). Reaction Scheme 13B
-- Sulfur-containing Ps' compound
(30) (30A)
--- Sulfur-containing compound
As shown in Reaction Schemes 13A and 13B, various Reaction Scheme 13C illustrates the removal of Sulfonated compounds are formed from oxycodone (20) certain addition products formed in the reaction (scheme 13A) and the O.B-unsaturated ketone compound 65 mixture according to Reaction Schemes 13A and 13B and the 14-hydroxycodeinone (30)(scheme 13B) upon treatment of a resulting highly pure oxycodone, wherein M is defined as reaction mixture including these compounds with a Sulfur above. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 19 of 25 PageID #:31538
US 8,871,779 B2 25 26
(20A)
(20)
1. alkaline pH 2. removal of (30B) with mother liquor mixture
(20)
40 As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 13C, the removal of the bisulfites) in the reaction mixture and/or final morphinan-6- 14-hydroxycodeinone addition products is generally based one product. Accordingly, the residual Sulfur-containing spe on the differences in solubility of the 1,4-addition product cies may be optionally Substantially removed from the reac (30B) generated from 14-hydroxycodeinone and the desired tion mixture following the treatment with the sulfur 45 oxycodone (20). Adjusting the pH outside of the range containing compound using a variety of methods known to between about 3 and about 9 (i.e., the pH is adjusted to less those of skill in the art. than about 3 or greater than about 9) with an acid (e.g., As described above, in various embodiments 1.2- and 1,4- Sulfuric acid (H2SO4)) or a base (e.g., ammonium hydroxide sulfonated addition products may be formed by the reaction (NH4OH)) results in the decomposition of the 1,2-addition 50 of a Sulfur-containing compound with the morphinan-6-one products of each compound, rendering the desired oxycodone compound and the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound at a pH (20) insoluble in water. The relatively more stable 1,4-addi of between about 3 to about 9. The adjustment of the pH tion product (30B) formed from 14-hydroxycodeinone outside of this range eliminates the 1,2-addition products, remains and is water soluble in the final mixture at an alkaline renders the morphinan-6-one compound insoluble in water, pH (e.g., pH ~9 or greater). The 1,4-addition product (30B) 55 and the remaining water soluble 1,4-addition product can be may thus be removed from the mixture with the mother removed in the waste stream. liquor, leaving the insoluble oxycodone base (20). The oxy To optionally substantially remove the residual sulfur-con codone base may then be converted into a more physiologi taining species upon completion of the reaction with the cally-tolerable Salt form, such as the hydrochloride Salt, using Sulfur-containing compound, the pH of the reaction mixture methods known to those of skill in the art. 60 may be adjusted to less than about 3 (instead of adjusting the Removal of Residual Sulfur-Containing Species from the pH to greater than 9) with an acid (e.g., Sulfuric acid (HSO)) Reaction Mixture and manipulated prior to the precipitation of the morphinan Using the process described herein to reduce the concen 6-one compound as described in detail above. More prefer tration of C. B-unsaturated ketone compounds from a reaction ably, the pH is adjusted to less than about 2. The reduction in mixture by treating the reaction mixture with a Sulfur-con 65 pH converts any residual Sulfur species that may be present in taining compound may result in the undesirable accumulation the reaction mixture into SO gas, which typically has a of residual Sulfur-containing species (such as Sulfites and limited solubility in water. In one embodiment, the SO gas Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 20 of 25 PageID #:31539
US 8,871,779 B2 27 28 may then be optionally heat refluxed out of the reaction mix atoms. They may be straight or branched chain or cyclic and ture by conventional means known to those of skill in the art. include ethenyl, propenyl, isopropenyl, butenyl, isobutenyl, Typically, the reaction mixture is heat refluxed for about 2 hexenyl, and the like. hours to about 5 hours. The temperature and pressure during The term “alkynyl' as used herein describes groups which reflux are also generally variable. For example, the tempera 5 are preferably lower alkynyl containing from two to eight ture of the reaction mixture during reflux is typically from carbon atoms in the principal chain and up to 20 carbon about 20° C. to about 100° C., and the reflux may be per atoms. They may be straight or branched chain and include formed at a pressure of from about 0.003 atm to about 1.0 atm. ethynyl, propynyl, butynyl, isobutynyl, hexynyl, and the like. Alternatively, substantially all of the water (and the SO gas) The term “aromatic' as used herein alone or as part of may be optionally distilled off to a receiver tank and dis 10 another group denotes optionally substituted homo- or het carded. This procedure is also generally known to those of erocyclic aromatic groups. These aromatic groups are pref skill in the art. erably monocyclic, bicyclic, or tricyclic groups containing As discussed above, after treatment of the reaction mixture from 6 to 14 atoms in the ring portion. The term “aromatic' encompasses the “aryl and "heteroaryl groups defined with the Sulfur-containing compound to reduce the concen 15 below. tration of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound in the reac The term “aryl' as used herein alone or as part of another tion mixture, the morphinan-6-one compound is recovered to group denote optionally Substituted homocyclic aromatic produce the desired morphinan-6-one product. Generally groups, preferably monocyclic or bicyclic groups containing speaking, recovery refers to one or more of the precipitation, from 6 to 12 carbons in the ring portion, such as phenyl, filtration and drying of the morphinan-6-one base, the forma biphenyl, naphthyl, substituted phenyl, substituted biphenyl tion of the physiologically acceptable morphinan-6-one salt or substituted naphthyl. Phenyl and substituted phenyl are the (e.g., the hydrochloride salt), the removal of the residual more preferred aryl. Sulfur-containing species, and/or combinations thereof, to The terms “halogen.” “halide' or “halo' as used herein produce a morphinan-6-one product. alone or as part of another group refer to chlorine, bromine, The treatment of the reaction mixture with a sulfur-con 25 fluorine, and iodine. taining compound according to the various processes and The term "heteroatom' shall mean atoms other than carbon embodiments described herein significantly reduces the con and hydrogen. centration of C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds in the reac The terms "heterocyclo” or "heterocyclic” as used herein tion mixture, and a highly pure morphinan-6-one product alone or as part of another group denote optionally Substi may be produced therefrom. Typically, the morphinan-6-one 30 tuted, fully saturated or unsaturated, monocyclic or bicyclic, product comprises less than about 0.1% (by weight morphi aromatic or non-aromatic groups having at least one heteroa nan-6-one product) of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. tom in at least one ring, and preferably 5 or 6 atoms in each For example, the morphinan-6-one product may comprise ring. The heterocyclo group preferably has 1 or 2 oxygen less than about 0.05% (by weight morphinan-6-one product) atoms and/or 1 to 4 nitrogenatoms in the ring, and is bonded of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound Preferably, the mor 35 to the remainder of the molecule through a carbon or heteroa tom. Exemplary heterocyclo groups include heteroaromatics phinan-6-one product comprises less than about 0.01% (by Such as furyl, pyridyl, oxazolyl pyrrolyl, indolyl, quinolinyl, weight morphinan-6-one product) of an O.B-unsaturated or isoquinolinyl and the like. Exemplary Substituents include ketone compound. For example, the morphinan-6-one prod one or more of the following groups: hydrocarbyl, Substituted uct may comprise less than about 0.005% (by weight mor 40 hydrocarbyl, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, acyl, acyloxy, phinan-6-one product) of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone com alkoxy, alkenoxy, alkynoxy, aryloxy, halogen, amido, amino, pound. More preferably, the morphinan-6-one product cyano, ketals, acetals, esters and ethers. comprises less than about 0.001% (by weight morphinan-6- The term "heteroaromatic” as used herein alone or as part one product) of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. For of another group denote optionally Substituted aromatic example, the morphinan-6-one product may comprise less 45 groups having at least one heteroatom in at least one ring, and than about 0.0005% (by weight morphinan-6-one product) of preferably 5 or 6 atoms in each ring. The heteroaromatic an C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. Still more preferably, group preferably has 1 or 2 oxygenatoms, 1 or 2 sulfur atoms, no detectable amount of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone com and/or 1 to 4 nitrogenatoms in the ring, and may be bonded to pound is present in the morphinan-6-one product. the remainder of the molecule through a carbon or heteroa 50 tom. Exemplary heteroaromatics include furyl, thienyl, ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS pyridyl, oxazolyl pyrrolyl, indolyl, quinolinyl, or isoquino linyl and the like. Exemplary substituents include one or more The following definitions and methods are provided to of the following groups: hydrocarbyl, substituted hydrocar better define the present invention and to guide those of ordi byl, keto, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, acyl, acyloxy, alkoxy, nary skill in the art in the practice of the present invention. 55 alkenoxy, alkynoxy, ary toxy, halogen, amido, amino, nitro, Unless otherwise noted, terms are to be understood according cyano, thiol, ketals, acetals, esters and ethers. to conventional usage by those of ordinary skill in the relevant The term “acyl as used herein alone or as part of another art. group, denotes the moiety formed by removal of the hydroxy The term “alkyl as used herein describes groups which are group from the group —COOH of an organic carboxylic acid, preferably lower alkyl containing from one to eight carbon 60 e.g., RC(O)—, wherein R is R', RO , RRN-, or R'S , atoms in the principal chain and up to 20 carbonatoms. They R" is hydrocarbyl, heterosubstituted hydrocarbyl, or hetero may be straight or branched chain or cyclic and include cyclo, and R is hydrogen, hydrocarbyl or substituted hydro methyl, ethyl, propyl, isopropyl, allyl, benzyl, hexyl and the carbyl. like. The term “acyloxy, as used herein alone or as part of The term “alkenyl as used herein describes groups which 65 another group, denotes an acyl group as described above are preferably lower alkenyl containing from two to eight bonded through an oxygen linkage (-O ), e.g., RC(O)O— carbon atoms in the principal chain and up to 20 carbon wherein R is as defined in connection with the term “acyl.” Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 21 of 25 PageID #:31540
US 8,871,779 B2 29 30 The term "heteroaryl' as used herein alone or as part of Furthermore, it should be appreciated that all examples in the another group denote optionally Substituted aromatic groups present disclosure are provided as non-limiting examples. having at least one heteroatom in at least one ring, and pref erably 5 or 6 atoms in each ring. The heteroaryl group pref EXAMPLE 1. erably has 1 or 2 oxygen atoms and/or 1 to 4 nitrogen atoms in the ring, and is bonded to the remainder of the molecule In this Example, an oxycodone HCl sample was treated through a carbon. Exemplary heteroaryls include furyl, ben with a sulfur-containing compound according to the pro Zofuryl, oxazolyl, isoxazolyl, oxadiazolyl, benzoxazolyl, cesses described herein. benzoxadiazolyl pyrrolyl pyrazolyl, imidazolyl, triazolyl, To a 250 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a tetrazolyl pyridyl, pyrimidyl, pyrazinyl, pyridaZinyl, indolyl, 10 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera isoindolyl, indolizinyl, benzimidazolyl, indazolyl, benzotria ture control was added 10g of oxycodone HCl (0.028 moles: Zolyl, tetraZolopyridazinyl, carbazolyl, purinyl, quinolinyl, >0.3% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impu isoquinolinyl, imidazopyridyl and the like. Exemplary Sub rity). Next, with mixing 100 g of deoxygenated water (10 stituents include one or more of the following groups: hydro minute N purge) was added. The Solution pH was adjusted to 15 about 6 with ammonium hydroxide. Next, 5.0 g of sodium carbyl, substituted hydrocarbyl, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, acyl, acyloxy, alkoxy, alkenoxy, alkynoxy, aryloxy, halogen, dithionite (Na2SO4) was added. The pH was then adjusted to amido, amino, cyano, ketals, acetals, esters and ethers. about 7 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide. The result The terms “hydrocarbon and “hydrocarbyl as used ing mixture was stirred at 70° C. for about 16 hours. After about 16 hours, the pH was adjusted to about 9 with herein describe organic compounds or radicals consisting ammonium hydroxide, precipitating the oxycodone base. The exclusively of the elements carbon and hydrogen. These moi mixture was stirred for about 1 hour, and the precipitated eties include alkyl, alkenyl, alkynyl, and aryl moieties. These oxycodone base was filtered, washed with water, and dried moieties also include alkyl, alkenyl, alkynyl, and aryl moi overnight at 40°C. under reduced pressure. eties substituted with other aliphatic or cyclic hydrocarbon The oxycodone base sample was converted to the oxyc groups, such as alkaryl, alkenaryland alkynary1. Unless oth 25 odone HCl salt by dissolving about 14.5g of the oxycodone erwise indicated, these moieties preferably comprise 1 to 20 base in a 100 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a carbon atoms. mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera The “substituted hydrocarbyl moieties described herein ture control. Next, with mixing about 29 g of H2O and about are hydrocarbyl moieties which are substituted with at least 12.6 g of concentrated HCl was added. The resulting mixture 30 one atom other than carbon, including moieties in which a was heated to about 65° C.-75° C. until substantially all was carbon chain atom is Substituted with a hetero atom such as in Solution. The heat was then removed, resulting in the pre nitrogen, oxygen, silicon, phosphorous, boron, Sulfur, or a cipitation of the oxycodone HCl salt. The precipitated mix halogen atom. These Substituents include halogen, heterocy ture was stirred for about 1-3 hours at less than about 10° C. clo, alkoxy, alkenoxy, aryloxy, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, and filtered to collect the precipitated oxycodone HC1. 35 The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content was ana acyl, acyloxy, nitro, amino, amido, nitro, cyano, ketals, lyzed in the oxycodone base sample and the oxycodone HC1 acetals, esters and ethers. sample using an Agilent HPLC with MS interface capability. The term “hydroxy protecting group' refers to hydrocarbyl The results are illustrated in Table 1. and substituted hydrocarbyl moieties which bond to an hydroxy oxygen atom in a molecule so as to protect that 40 TABLE 1 oxygen atom from further reaction during synthesis. This protection allows reactions to occur selectively at another Initial 14- Final 14-OHC content reaction site on the same molecule. Examples of hydroxy OHC content Oxycodone base Oxycodone HCI protecting groups include, but are not limited to, ethers such (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) as methyl, t-butyl, benzyl, p-methoxybenzyl, p-nitrobenzyl, 45 O.3 O.OOOS O.OOOS allyl, trityl, methoxymethyl, methoxyethoxymethyl, ethoxy ethyl, tetrahydropyranyl, tetrahydrothiopyranyl, and trialkyl silyl ethers such as trimethylsilyl ether, triethylsilyl ether, dimethylarylsilyl ether, triisopropylsilyl ether and t-bu EXAMPLES 2A-2G 50 tyldimethylsilyl ether; esters such as benzoyl, acetyl, pheny lacetyl, formyl, mono-, di-, and trihaloacetyl Such as chloro In Examples 2A-2G, an oxycodone HCl sample was acetyl, dichloroacetyl, trichloroacetyl, trifluoroacetyl; and treated with a Sulfur-containing compound according to the carbonates including but not limited to alkyl carbonates hav processes described herein. The treatment was performed at ing from one to six carbon atoms such as methyl, ethyl, various temperatures, times of reaction, concentration of n-propyl, isopropyl. n-butyl, t-butyl, isobutyl, and n-pentyl: 55 reactants, and pH. alkyl carbonates having from one to six carbon atoms and Example 2A Substituted with one or more halogen atoms such as 2.2.2- trichloroethoxymethyl and 2.2.2-trichloroethyl; alkenyl car To a 100 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a bonates having from two to six carbon atoms such as vinyl 60 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera and allyl; cycloalkyl carbonates have from three to six carbon ture control was added 9.2 g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 atoms Such as cyclopropyl, cyclobutyl, cyclopentyl and moles; 0.13% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) cyclohexyl; and phenyl or benzyl carbonates optionally Sub impurity). Next, with mixing 36.2 g of HO and 40.3 g of 6 wt. stituted on the ring with one or more C alkoxy, or nitro. % SO/HO solution was added. The resulting mixture was Having described the invention in detail, it will be apparent 65 heated to about 30° C. and the solution pH was adjusted to that modifications and variations are possible without depart about 6 with ammonium hydroxide. The mixture was stirred ing the scope of the invention defined in the appended claims. for about 3 hours. The pH of the mixture was then adjusted to Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 22 of 25 PageID #:31541
US 8,871,779 B2 31 32 about 8.8-9.8 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. The precipitated oxycodone base was then filtered from the mother liquor, washed with about 25.73 g of HO, and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone content (14-OHC) in the oxycodone base was then measured as 5 described in the preceding Example. The experiment was repeated using identical reagents, amounts thereof, and conditions to form the oxycodone base sample. This oxycodone base sample was converted to the oxycodone HCl salt as described in the preceding example. 10 The 14-hydroxycodeinone content (14-OHC) in the oxyc odone base sample and the oxycodone HCl sample were then measured. Results and reaction conditions for this experiment are illustrated in Table 2. TABLE 2 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 1 30 3 6 10.2 18:1 O.13 O.OOO7 Not tested 2 30 3 6 10.2 18:1 O.13 O.OOO7 O.OOO7
Example 2B This Example was performed according to the process 30 described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.4 g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13% by weight 14-hy droxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 34.6 g of H2O and about 27.4 g of 6 wt.% SO/HO solution. The mixture was heated to about 50° C. Next, the pH was 35 adjusted to about 7 using ammonium hydroxide. The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0 g of concen trated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. 40 The solids were filtered and washed with about 28.0 g of H2O and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxycodone HCl salt formed according to the method described in the 45 preceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 3. TABLE 3 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 3 50 1 7 8.2 12:1 O.13 None None detected detected 4 50 5 7 8.2 12:1 O.13 OOOOOS O.OOOS
Example 2C 60
This Example was performed according to the process described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.1 g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13-0.14% by weight 65 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 7.0 g of HO and about 52.8g of 6 wt.% SO/HO Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 23 of 25 PageID #:31542
US 8,871 779 B2 33 34 Solution. The mixture was heated to either 10° C. or 50° C. Next, the pH was adjusted to 7 using ammonium hydroxide. The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0-2.5 g of 5 concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. The solids were filtered and washed with about 28.0 g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was 10 the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre ceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 4. TABLE 4
Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.)
5 50 1 7 8.2 2.4:1 O.13 None O.OOO6 detected 6 50 5 7 8.2 2.4:1 O.13 O.OOO15 OOOO4 7 10 5 7 8.2 2.4:1 O.14 O.OO1 Not tested
Example 2D This Example was performed according to the process described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.52g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13% by weight 14-hy droxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 72.24 g of HO and about 27.76 g of 6 wt.% SO/HO solution. The mixture was heated to about 50° C. Next, the pH was adjusted to about 7 using ammonium hydroxide. The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0-2.5 g of concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. The solids were filtered and washed with about 28.0 g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre ceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 5. TABLE 5
Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 8 50 1 7 13.1 12:1 O.13 O.OOO2 O.OOO3 50 5 7 13.1 12:1 O.13 None OOOO4 detected Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 24 of 25 PageID #:31543
US 8,871,779 B2 35 36 Example 2E Sulfuric acid was added as the pressure was decreased to This Example was performed according to the process about 0.11 atm and the solution temperature was increased to described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.5g of about 50-55° C. wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13-0.14% by weight The solution was then cooled to about 30° C. and the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 39.7 g of HO and about 55.6 g of 6 wt.% SO/HO solution pH adjusted to about 8.5-10 with concentrated Solution. The mixture was heated to either 10° C. or 50° C. Next, the pH was adjusted to about 7 using ammonium ammonium hydroxide. The solution was stirred for about 30 hydroxide. 10 minutes and filtered. The solids were filtered and washed with The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour about 2000 g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0-2.5 g of (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was mea concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 sured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in 15 minutes. The solids were filtered and washed with about 30.6 the oxycodone HCl salt formed by the method described in g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) the preceding example. The results and reaction conditions content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc are illustrated in Table 7. odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre 2O ceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 6. TABLE 6 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 10 50 1 7 12.3 2.4:1 O.13 None OOOO4 detected 11 50 5 7 12.3 2.4:1 O.13 None OOOO4 detected 12 10 5 7 12.3 2.4:1 O.13 O.OOO8 Not tested
Example 2F To a 22 L, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera TABLE 7 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 13 40 5 7 6.6 18:1 O.13 O.OOO1 O.OOOS
ture control was added 1840 g of wet oxycodone HCl (4.27 Example 2G moles, 0.13% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) To a 50 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a impurity). Next, with mixing 2706 g of H2O and 7717g of 6.4 55 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera wt.% SO/HO solution was added. The resulting mixture ture control was added 3.33 g of oxycodone HCl (0.0095 was heated to about 40°C. and the solution pH was adjusted moles; 0.2% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) to about 7 using concentrated ammonium hydroxide. The impurity). Next, with mixing 33.3 g of H2O and 0.83 g of mixture was stirred for about 5 hours. sodium bisulfite was added. The resulting mixture was heated 60 to about 30° C. and the solution pH was adjusted to about 7 After about 5 hours, the solution was adjusted to a pH of with ammoniumhydroxide. The mixture was stirred for about 15 hours. The pH of the mixture was then adjusted to about about 1.7 with the addition of 293.0 g concentrated sulfuric 8.8-9.8 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred acid (96-98%). The pressure was slowly reduced to about for about 60 minutes. The precipitated oxycodone base was 0.26 atm to facilitate the distillation/removal of unreacted 65 then filtered from the mother liquor, washed with about 10.0 g of HO, and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) SO. As the distillation progressed, 23.4 g of concentrated content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:31544
US 8,871,779 B2 37 38 the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre ceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 8. TABLE 8 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content
(g H2Operg SO, to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 14 30 15 7 10 O.84:1 O.2 O.OOO4 OOOO4
15 EXAMPLE 3 4. A hydrochloride Salt of a morphinan-6-one compound corresponding to Formula (2): In this Example, an oxymorphone HCl sample was treated with a sulfur-containing compound according to the pro cesses described herein. (2) To a 250 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera ture control was added 150g HO and 15 goxymorphone HC1 sample (0.044 moles; 0.3-0.5% by weight 14-hydroxymor phinone (14-OHM) impurity). Next, 7.5g of sodium bisulfite 25 (NaHSO) was added. The pH was then adjusted to about 7 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide, and the resulting mixture was stirred at 23°C. for about 16 hours. After about 16 hours, the pH was adjusted to about 8.8-9.8 with ammonium hydroxide and the Solution was cooled to 30 about 20°C. The precipitated oxymorphone base was filtered, washed with water (about 45 g), and dried for 4 hours at 65° C. comprising less than 0.001% measured by HPLC of an The oxymorphone base sample was analyzed using the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound corresponding to methods described above, and the sample contained no 35 Formula (3): detectable amount of 14-hydroxymorphinone or 14-hydroxy codeinone. This experiment was repeated using a 6 wt.% SO/HO solution in place of sodium bisulfite and similar (3) results were obtained. 40 EXAMPLE 4
In this Example, oxycodone base was treated with a thiol according to the processes described herein. To a 25 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a 45 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera ture control was added 3.0 g oxycodone base (0.01 motes: 0.3-0.5% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impu rity). Next, 18 g of chloroform was added, and the mixture was stirred at 70° C. until the oxycodone base was dissolved. 50 wherein the morphinan-6-one compound is oxymorphone After the mixture was substantially homogenous, 1.5 g of benzenethiol was added to the mixture with stirring. and wherein X is —N(R7)—: After about 16 hours, a sample was analyzed using the RandR are hydrogen; methods described in the preceding examples. HPLC area R is hydroxy: percent analysis indicated a 14-hydroxycodeinone level of 55 Ro is hydrogen; less than about 0.0022%. Ra is hydroxy; and What is claimed is: R, is methyl. 1. A hydrochloride Salt of oxymorphone comprising less 5. The hydrochloride salt of claim 4 comprising less than than 0.001% of 14-hydroxymorphinone. 0.0005% of 14-hydroxymorphinone. 2. The hydrochloride salt of claim 1 comprising less than 60 6. A pharmaceutical formulation comprising the oxymor 0.0005% of 14-hydroxymorphinone. phone hydrochloride according to claim 4. 3. A pharmaceutical acceptable form comprising the oxy morphone hydrochloride according to claim 1. k k k k k | 2020-04-29 | [
"Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 1 of 25 PageID #:31520 EXHIBIT 46 Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 2 of 25 PageID #:31521 USOO8871779B2 (12) United States Patent (10) Patent No. : US 8,871,779 B2 Buehler et al. (45) Date of Patent: Oct. 28, 2014 (54) PROCESS FOR PREPARING 5,922,876 A 7/1999 Huang MORPHINAN-6-ONE PRODUCTS WITH LOW 6,008.355 A 12/1999 Huang et al. LEVELS OF C.B-UNSATURATED KETONE 6,046,185.",
"A 4/2000 Burgoyne et al. 6,177.567 B1 1/2001 Chiu et al. COMPOUNDS 6,312,662 B1 1 1/2001 Erion et al. (75) Inventors: Henry J. Buehler, St. Louis, MO (US); (Continued) William E. Dummitt, St. Louis, MO FOREIGN PATENT DOCUMENTS (US); Anthony Mannino, Maryland Heights, MO (US); Dennis C. EP O 604 150 6, 1994 Aubuchon, Arnold, MO (US); Hong Gu, FR 1000543 2, 1952 Oak Park, CA (US) (Continued) (73) Assignee: Mallinckrodt LLC, Hazelwood, MO OTHER PUBLICATIONS (US) Weiss, “Derivatives of Morphine. I. 14-Hydroxydihydro (*) Notice: Subject to any disclaimer, the term of this morphinone'.",
"Journal of the American Chemical Society, Nov. 20, patent is extended or adjusted under 35 1955, pp. 5891-5892. U.S.C. 154(b) by 996 days. (21) Appl. No. : 11/915,606 (Continued) (22) PCT Filed: Mar. 2, 2007 Primary Examiner — Charanjit Aulakh (86). PCT No. : PCT/US2007/005256 (74) Attorney, Agent, or Firm — Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney PC S371 (c)(1), (2), (4) Date: Nov. 27, 2007 (57) ABSTRACT (87) PCT Pub. No. : WO2007/103105 The present invention generally relates to processes for pre PCT Pub. Date: Sep. 13, 2007 paring highly pure morphinan-6-one products.",
"The processes (65) Prior Publication Data involve reducing the concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds present as impurities in morphinan 6 one prod US 2008/0312442 A1 Dec. 18, 2008 ucts or reaction mixtures including morphinan 6 one com pounds by treatment with a Sulfur-containing compound. (A) Related U.S. Application Data (60) Provisional application No. 60/778,258, filed on Mar. (A) 2, 2006. (51) Int. Cl. A6 IK3I/485 (2006.01) CO7D 489/04 (2006.01) CO7D 489/08 (2006.01) (52) U.S. Cl. sulfur CPC .................................... C07D489/08 (2013.01) containing USPC ............................................. 514/282:546/45 compound (58) Field of Classification Search (2) USPC ....................................... 546/45, 44; 514/282 See application file for complete search history. (56) References Cited U.S. PATENT DOCUMENTS 1479,293 A 1/1924 Freund 2009, 181 A 7/1935 Kabay 4,368,326 A 1/1983 Rice 4.410,700 A 10, 1983 Rice 4.414,417 A 11, 1983 Mestroni et al. 4,435,572 A 3/1984 Rapoport et al. 4,467,112 A 8, 1984 Matsuura et al. (2) 4,521,601 A 6, 1985 Rice 4,556,712 A 12, 1985 Rice 4,613,668 A 9, 1986 Rice 4,727, 146 A 2f1988 Rice 5,869,669 A 2/1999 Huang 6 Claims, No Drawings Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 3 of 25 PageID #:31522 US 8,871,779 B2 Page 2 (56) References Cited Buehler Reply 2, filed on Aug. 30, 2013 in Interference No.",
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"105,893). Email from James Mencel to Jen-Sen Dung, Jennifer Goodall, Robert Corrected version of the Declaration of Dr. Erno Keskeny, admitted Hogan, Erno Keskeny dated May 11, 2006, copying Brian Fairley during the May 7, 2013 deposition of Dr. Erno Keskeny (Exhibit (Exhibit 2076, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2045X, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Apr. 28, 2004 Draft Process Outline Prepared at Macfarlan Smith for Corrected version of the Declaration of Dr. Erno Keskeny, admitted West Deptford (Exhibit 2077, filed in Interference No. 105,893). during the May 7, 2013 deposition of Dr. Erno Keskeny (Exhibit Jul. 9, 2004 letter to FDA regarding Jun. 30, 2004 meeting (Exhibit 2045Y, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2078, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Monthly Report for Nov. 2007 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Nov. 29. Jun. 6, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities 2007 (Exhibit 2047, filed in Interference No. 105,893).",
"Summary for May 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler Progress Report for Apr. 2006 from Erno Keskeny, dated Apr. 26. (Exhibit 2079, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2006 (Exhibit 2048, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Jul. 10, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities Monthly Report for May 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated May 30, Summary for Jun. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler 2006 (Exhibit 2049, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2080, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Progress Report for Jun. 2006 from Erno Keskeny, dated Jun. 26. Aug. 4, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities 2006 (Exhibit 2050, filed in Interference No. 105,893).",
"Summary for Jul. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler Monthly Report for Jun. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Jun. 30. (Exhibit 2081, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2006 (Exhibit 2051, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Sep. 8, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities Monthly Report for Jul. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Jul.31, 2006 Summary for Aug. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler (Exhibit 2052, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2082, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Progress Report for Aug. 2006 from Erno Keskeny, dated Aug. 24. Oct. 9, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities 2006 (Exhibit 2053, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Summary for Oct. Isic, Sep. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to Monthly Report for Aug. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Aug. 25. John Fowler (Exhibit 2083, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2006 (Exhibit 2054, filed in Interference No. 105,893).",
"Nov. 6, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities Progress Report for Sep. 2006 from Erno Keskeny, dated Sep. 29. Summary for Oct. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler 2006 (Exhibit 2055, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2084, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Progress Report for Oct. 2006 from Erno Keskeny, dated Oct. 29. Jan. 9, 2006 Chemical and Analytical Development Key Activities 2006 (Exhibit 2056, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Summary for Dec. 2006 by James Mencel addressed to John Fowler Monthly Report for Oct. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Nov. 2, (Exhibit 2086, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2006 (Exhibit 2057, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Apr. 27, 2009 Monthly Report for Apr.",
"2009 from Jen-Sen Dung to Weiss (1957) “Derivatives of Morphine. II. Demethylation of James Mencel (Exhibit 2087, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 14-hydroxycodeinone, 14-hydroxymorphinone and 8, 14 May 6, 2009 Development Highlights for Apr. 2009 from James Dihydroxydihydromorphinone'. J. Org. Chem. 22:1505-1508 Mencel to John Fowler (Exhibit 2088, filed in Interference No. (Exhibit 2058, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 105,893). Coop et al. (1998) \"L-Selectride as a General Reagent for the Jan. 29, 2007 Monthly Report for Jan. 2007 from Jen-Sen Dung to O-Demethylation and N-Decarbomethoxylation of Opium Alkaloids James Mencel (Exhibit 2089, filed in Interference No. 105,893). and Derivatives”. J. Org. Chem. 63:4392-4396 (Exhibit 2059, filed in Feb. 7, 2007 Summary of Key Development Activities for Jan. 2007 Interference No. 105,893). from James Mencel to John Fowler (Exhibit 2090, filed in Interfer James C. Kraner (2006) SOFTToxTalk30(3):6 (Exhibit 2060, filed in ence No. 105,893).",
"Interference No. 105,893). HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 199, Nov. 26, 2007 Declaration of James Mencel dated submitted Sep. 17, 2010 in U.S. (Exhibit 2092, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Appl. No. 1 1/866,840 (Exhibit 2061, filed in Interference No. HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 203, Nov. 28, 2007 105,893). (Exhibit 2093, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Casner et al.",
"U.S Patent No. 7,153,966, issued on Dec. 26, 2006 HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 205, Nov. 28-29, (Exhibit 2062, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2007 (Exhibit 2094, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Chapman et al. U.S. Patent No. 7,129,248, issued on Oct. 31, 2006 HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2012, p. 207, Nov. 28-29, (Exhibit 2063, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2007 (Exhibit 2095, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Declaration of James Mencel, dated Feb. 18, 2013 (Exhibit 2064. UK Patent Application 0624880.1, filed Dec. 14, 2006 (Exhibit 2096, filed in Interference No. 105,893). filed in Interference No. 105,893). Declaration of Erno M. Keskeny, Ph.D., dated Sep. 17, 2010 in U.S. U.S. Patent No.",
"8,217, 175 of Wang et al. (Assignee Mallinckrodt Appl. No. 1 1/866,840 (Exhibit 2065, filed in Interference No. LLC), issued on Jul. 10, 2012 (Exhibit 2097, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 105,893). Declaration of Jen-Sen Dung, Ph.D., dated Feb. 18, 2013 (Exhibit Notice of Allowance, mailed Oct. 21, 2010, in Dung U.S. Appl. No. 2066, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 1 1/866,840 (Exhibit 2098, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Email from Jen-Sen Dung to Helen Ogden dated Jul.",
"8, 2005 (Exhibit HPLC traces corresponding to Exhibit 2011, p. 189, May 11, 2006 2067, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2099, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Email from Suzanne Currie to Jen-Sen Dung dated Jul. 11, 2005 Monthly Report for Jan. 2006 from Jen-Sen Dung, dated Feb. 2, 2006 (Exhibit 2068, filed in Interference No. 105,893). (Exhibit 2100, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 6 of 25 PageID #:31525 US 8,871,779 B2 Page 5 (56) References Cited Casner et al., U.S. Patent Appl. Pub. No. 2006/011 1383, “Preparation of Oxycodone” (filed Sep. 23, 2005; published May 25, 2006) OTHER PUBLICATIONS (Exhibit 1015, filed in IPR2014-00160). Documents from Patent Interference No. 105,553, Casner et al.",
"v. Declaration of Nisha Patel, dated Feb. 19, 2013 (Exhibit 2101, filed in Chapman et al., Mar. 13, 2008 (Exhibit 1016, filed in IPR2014 Interference No. 105,893). 00.160). Pages from Johnson Matthey Empower system reflecting Nisha Endo Pharmaceuticals, Citizen Petition dated May 13, 2010 (Exhibit Patel's May-Jun. 2006 confirmation of ABUK content in sample 1017, filed in IPR2014-00160). Department of Health & Human Services, Re: Docket No. FDA 2128-189 (Exhibit 2103, filed in Interference No. 105,893). 2010-P-0243, dated Nov. 8, 2010 (Exhibit 1018, filed in IPR2014 Excerpts from Laboratory Notebooks 844 and 845 of Robert Hogan, 00.160). Jan. 26, 2006; Apr. 27, 2006 (Exhibit 2104, filed in Interference No. Curriculum Vitae of Kevin Burgess, Ph.D., 2013 (Exhibit 1019, filed 105,893). in IPR2014-00160).",
"Declaration of Robert Hogan, dated Jul. 12, 2013 (Exhibit 2105, filed Lewenstein et al., U.S. Patent No. 2,806,033, “Morphine Derivative” in Interference No. 105,893). (filed Aug. 3, 1955; issued Sep. 10, 1957) (Exhibit 1020, filed in Deposition Transcript of Stephen Husbands, Ph.D., dated Aug. 14. IPR2014-00160). 2013 (Exhibit 2106, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Huang, U.S. Patent No. 8,134,002, \"Process for Preparing Deposition Transcript of James Janetka, Ph.D., dated Aug. 14, 2013 Oxymorphone” (filed May 2, 2007; issued Mar.",
"13, 2012) (Exhibit 1021, filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 2107, filed in Interference No. 105,893). Coop et al., U.S. Patent No. 6,291.675, “Methods of O-Demethyla Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, No. 12-1433, tion and N-Deprotection' (filed May 21, 1997; issued Sep. 18, 2001) 15 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 22, 2013) (Exhibit 2108, filed in Interference No. (Exhibit 1022, filed in IPR2014-00160). 105,893). Snupareket al., International Pub. No. WO 2006/019364, “A Method Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No.",
"7,851,482, filed on of Preparation of Oxycodone” (filed Aug. 16, 2005; published Feb. Nov. 18, 2013. 23, 2006) (Exhibit 1023, filed in IPR2014-00160). Dung et al., U.S. Patent No. 7,851.482, \"Method for Making Anal Huang et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,922,876, \"Preparation of gesics” (filed Oct. 3, 2007; issued Dec. 14, 2010) (Exhibit 1001, filed Oxymorphone from Morphine” (filed Jul. 16, 1998; issued Jul. 13, in IPR2014-00160). 1999) (Exhibit 1024, filed in IPR2014-00160). Declaration of Kevin Burgess, Ph.D., dated Nov. 18, 2013 (Exhibit Weiss, “Derivatives of Morphine. II. Demethylation of 1002, filed in IPR2014-00160). 14-hydroxycodeinone. 14-Hydroxymorphinone and 8, 14 Buehler et al., U.S. Patent Appl. Pub.",
"No. 2008/0312442, “Process for Dihydroxydihydromorphinone” J. Org. Chem. 22:1505-1508 (1957) Preparing Morphinan-6-One Products with Low Levels of Alpha, (Exhibit 1025, filed in IPR2014-00160). Beta-Unsaturated Ketone Compounds” (filed Mar. 2, 2007: pub Eder et al., “Molecular Mechanisms of DNA Damage Initiated by lished Dec. 18, 2008) (Exhibit 1003, filed in IPR2014-00160). O.B-Unsaturated Carbonyl Compounds AS Criteria for Genotoxicity Buehler et al., U.S. Appl. No. 60/778.258, “Process for Preparing and Mutagenicity” Environ. Health Perspect. 88: 99-106 (1990) Morphinan-6-One Products with Low Levels of O.B-Unsaturated (Exhibit 1026, filed in IPR2014-00160). Ketone Compounds' (filed Mar.",
"2, 2006) (Exhibit 1004, filed in Eder et al., “The possible role of O.B-unsaturated carbonyl com IPR2014-00160). pounds in mutagenesis and carcinogenesis' Toxicol. Lett. 67: 87-103 Amendment dated Nov. 11, 2011 in U.S. Appl. No. 1 1/915,606 (1993) (Exhibit 1027, filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 1006, filed in IPR2014-00160). Department of Health & Human Services, Re: PSA1, datedMar. 24. FDA Approved Drug Label “OPANAR (Oxymorphone Hydrochlo 2008 (Exhibit 1028, filed in IPR2014-00160).",
"ride) Tablets 5 mg and 10 mg” (Jun. 2006) (Exhibit 1008, filed in Wasmuth etal., “A Review of Oxymorphone Hydrochloride IPR2014-00160). (NUMORPHAN*) Analgesia Employed for General Surgery, Weigl et al., International Pub. No. WO 2006/084412, “Method for Including Clinical Experience with Five Hundred and Twenty-Eight Purifying Noroxymorphone Compounds” (filed Feb. 9, 2006; pub Patients' Cleveland Clin. O. 28:262-269 (1961) (Exhibit 1029, filed lished Aug. 17, 2006) (Exhibit 1009, filed in IPR2014-00160). in IPR2014-00160). Certified English translation of Weigl et al., International Pub. No. FDA Approved Drug Label “OPANARER (Oxymorphone Hydro WO 2006/084412, “Method for Purifying Noroxymorphone Com chloride) Extended-Release Tablets 5 mg, 10 mg, 20 mg, and 40 mg” pounds” (filed Feb. 9, 2006; published Aug. 17, 2006) (Exhibit 1010, (Jul.",
"2006) (Exhibit 1030, filed in IPR2014-00160). filed in IPR2014-00160). FORM 10-Q, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Weigl et al., U.S. Patent No. 8,227,609, “Process for Purifying for the quarterly period ended Sep. 30, 2006, Endo Pharmaceuticals Noroxymorphone Compounds” (filed Feb. 9, 2006; issued Jul. 24. Holdings Inc. (Exhibit 1031, filed in IPR2014-00160). 2012) (Exhibit 1011, filed in IPR2014-00160). Erno M. Keskeny, Notebook No. 2128, pp. 175 and 189, 2006 Berge et al., “Pharmaceutical Salts' J. Pharm. Sci. 66:1-19 (1977) (Exhibit 1032, filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 1012, filed in IPR2014-00160). Hudlicky, \"Sodium Hydrosulfite is an Effective Reducing Agent.” Chapman et al., U.S. Patent Appl.",
"Pub. No. 2005/0222 188, “Process Reductions in Organic Chemistry 2\" Edition, pp. 165-169, 1996. for Preparing Oxycodone Hydrochloride Having Less Than 25 ppm File History of U.S. Patent No. 7,851.482 through Feb. 2, 2013 14-Hydroxycodeinone” (filed Mar. 30, 2005; published Oct. 6, 2005) (Exhibit 1005 filed in IPR2014-00160). (Exhibit 1013, filed in IPR2014-00160). Documents from Patent Interference No. 105,893, Dung et al. v. Huang et al., U.S. Patent No. 5,869,669, \"Preparation of Buehler et al, dated Oct. 4, 2012-Sep. 25, 2013 (Exhibit 1007 filed in 14-Hydroxynormporphinones from Normorphinone Dienol IPR2014-00160). Acylates” (filed Jul 11, 1997; issued Feb. 9, 1999) (Exhibit 1014, filed in IPR2014-00160).",
"* cited by examiner Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 7 of 25 PageID #:31526 US 8,871,779 B2 1. 2 PROCESS FOR PREPARING Barbier, A., “The Extraction of Opium Alkaloids.” Bull. Nar MORPHINAN-6-ONE PRODUCTS WITH LOW cotics, 1950, vol. 3, 22-29; Heumann, W. “The Manufacture LEVELS OF C.B-UNSATURATED KETONE of Alkaloids from Opium.” Bull. Narcotics, 1957, Vol. 2, COMPOUNDS 34-40; Lednicer and Mitscher, Organic Chemistry of Drug Synthesis, chapter 15, (Wiley 1977); French Patent No. CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED 1,000,543 to Penau et al. ; British Patent No. 713,689 to Wood APPLICATIONS et al.",
"; and U.S. Pat. No. 2,009,181 to Kábay. Synthetic methods for producing various morphinan com This application is a national stage application of PCT/ 10 pounds are also known. These methods commonly utilize US2007/005256, filed Mar. 2, 2007, which claims the benefit 3-methoxy-phenylethylamine as a starting material and of U.S. Provisional Application No. 60/778.258 filed Mar. 2, include a Grewe cyclization step. For example, in U.S. Pat. 2006. No. 4.368,326, Rice discloses a process for preparing a nor dihydrothebainone (e.g., 1-bromo-N-formylnordihydrothe FIELD OF THE INVENTION bainone) from a B.Y-hexahydroisoquinolone (e.g., 1-(2- 15 bromo-4'-methoxy-5'-hydroxybenzyl)-2formyl-1,3,4,5,7,8- The present invention generally relates to processes for hexahydroquinolin-6-one) by Grewe cyclization catalyzed preparing morphinan-6-one products. The processes involve using a Super acid catalyst alone or with a combination of an reducing the concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone com ammonium fluoride complex and trifluoromethanesulfonic pounds from reaction mixtures including morphinan-6-one acid.",
"compounds. Many pharmaceutically desirable morphinan compounds BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION and analogs thereof have a ketone group on the C-ring of Formula (1) and a saturated bond between the two carbon The morphinan alkaloids represent a family of structurally atoms positioned C. and B to the ketone on the C-ring of related products of great medicinal importance. Particular 25 Formula (1). According to the common nomenclature, the morphinan compounds of pharmaceutical relevance include, ketone is present on the C(6) carbon atom, with the C. and B for example, codeine, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, mor carbon atoms being the C(7) and C(8) positions (see, e.g., phine, nalbuphine, nalmefene, naloxone, naltrexone, oxyc Formula (1)). Thus, these compounds may be referred to as odone, and oxymorphone.",
"Generally, these compounds are morphinan-6-one compounds. Various processes for produc analgesics, which are used extensively for pain relief in the 30 ing morphinan-6-one compounds are known, many of which field of medicine due to their action as opiate receptor ago involve some form of catalytic hydrogenation of C.B-unsat nists. However, nalmefene, naloxone, naltrexone, and naltr urated ketone intermediate compounds at particular points in exone methyl bromide are opiate receptor antagonists, and the process. Commonly used catalysts include, for example, are used for reversal of narcotic/respiratory depression due to palladium and platinum. For example, in U.S. Pat. No. 6,177. opiate receptoragonists, as addiction therapies, and to reverse 35 567 to Chiu et al., 14-hydroxycodeinone (an C.B-unsaturated other undesirable side effects of opiate agonist use. Such as ketone compound) is converted to oxycodone by hydrogenat severe constipation. ing the C. B-unsaturation using conventional methods such as Morphinan compounds and analogs thereof typically have reduction by diphenylsilane and Pd(PhP)/ZnCl, or with a ring structure generally corresponding to Formula (1): Sodium hypophosphite in conjunction with a Pd/C catalyst in 40 aqueous acetic acid, or by Pd/C catalytic transfer hydrogena tion. (1) While these and other methods of reducing or removing the C.f3-unsaturation are generally effective, C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds may persistas impurities in the final prod 45 ucts of desirably C. B-saturated morphinan-6-one products, Such as oxycodone. Additionally, known hydrogenation methods may tend to undesirably reduce the ketone as well as reducing or removing the C.f3-unsaturation.",
"Further, these and other hydrogenation methods are not normally capable of 50 efficiently and economically reducing the levels of 7,8-unsat uration to below 10 to 100 parts per million, or less. Some C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds show mutagenic activity in certain tests. Therefore, a need persists for pro Various methods are known for the synthesis of morphinan cesses for preparing highly pure morphinan-6-one products compounds corresponding to Formula (1). Conventional 55 having a relatively low concentration of C.B-unsaturated methods used in the commercial production of morphinan ketone compounds present as impurities therein. compounds typically involve the extraction of opium alka loids from poppies (papaver somniferum). Generally speak SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION ing, these processes involve the extraction of the alkaloids from opium in a liquid, precipitation of the alkaloids, sepa 60 Among the various aspects of the present invention is the ration of the raw alkaloids (e.g., morphine and secondary provision of a process for the preparation of morphinan-6-one alkaloids Such as papaverine, codeine, and thebaine), and products. The process involves reducing the concentration of purification of the various alkaloids, optionally followed by C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds which are present as semi-synthesis steps to produce particular morphinan com impurities in reaction mixtures including morphinan-6-one pounds.",
"See, for example, Barbier, A., “The Extraction of 65 compounds. The process generally involves forming a reac Opium, Twenty-five years of commercial experience in the tion mixture including a morphinan-6-one compound and an treatment of opium.” Ann. Pharm. Franc., 1947, 5, 121-40; C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound and treating the reaction Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 8 of 25 PageID #:31527 US 8,871,779 B2 3 4 mixture with a sulfur-containing compound. In one embodi the morphinan-6-one compound comprises less than about ment, the Sulfur-containing compound is a Sulfur-containing 0.1% (by weight) morphinan-6-one product of the C.B-unsat inorganic acid or salt thereof. urated ketone compound.",
"Briefly, therefore, the present invention is directed to a The present invention is also directed to a process for process for the preparation of a morphinan-6-one product, the preparing a morphinan-6-one product, the process compris process comprising: ing: forming a reaction mixture comprising a morphinan-6-one forming a reaction mixture comprising an O.B-unsaturated compound and an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound; ketone compound; treating the reaction mixture with a Sulfur-containing com 10 treating the reaction mixture with a Sulfur-containing com pound to reduce the concentration of the C. B-unsatur pound to reduce the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound ated ketone compound in the reaction mixture; and to form a morphinan-6-one compound; and recovering the morphinan-6-one compound to produce the recovering the morphinan-6-one compound to form the morphinan-6-one product; morphinan-6-one product, wherein 15 wherein the morphinan-6-one compound corresponds to Formula the morphinan-6-one compound corresponds to Formula (2): (2): (2) (2) 25 30 the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound corresponds to For the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound corresponds to For mula (3): mula (3): 35 (3) (3) 40 45 X is —N(R,)— or - N'-(R1,R)—: X is —N(R,)— or - N'-(R1,R2)—: RandR are independently selected from hydrogen, Sub 50 RandR are independently selected from hydrogen, Sub stituted and unsubstituted acyl, acyloxy, alkenyl, alkoxy, stituted and unsubstituted acyl, acyloxy, alkenyl, alkoxy, alkoxyaryl, alkyl, alkylamino, alkylthio, alkynyl, amino, aryl, alkoxyaryl, alkyl, alkylamino, alkylthio, alkynyl, amino, aryl, arylalkoxy, carboalkoxy, carbonyl, carboxyalkenyl, carboxy arylalkoxy, carboalkoxy, carbonyl, carboxyalkenyl, carboxy alkyl, carboxyl, cyano, cyanoalkyl, cycloalkyl, cycloalkyla alkyl, carboxyl, cyano, cyanoalkyl, cycloalkyl, cycloalkyla lkyl, cycloalkylether, halo, haloalkoxy, haloalkyl, heteroaryl, 55 lkyl, cycloalkylether, halo, haloalkoxy, haloalkyl, heteroaryl, heterocyclic, hydroxyalkyl, hydroxyl, or nitro: heterocyclic, hydroxyalkyl, hydroxyl, or nitro: R is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, alkoxy, or R is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, alkoxy, or acyloxy; acyloxy; Ro is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, halo, keto, Ro is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, halo, keto, tosyl, mesyl, or trifluoromesyl; 60 tosyl, mesyl, or trifluoromesyl; Ra is hydrogen, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy: Ra is hydrogen, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy: R7 is hydrogen, alkyl, cycloalkyl, alkylcarboxy, alkyle R7 is hydrogen, alkyl, cycloalkyl, alkylcarboxy, alkyle necycloalkyl, alkoxycarbonyl, allyl, alkenyl, acyl, aryl, necycloalkyl, alkoxycarbonyl, allyl, alkenyl, acyl, aryl, formyl, formyl ester, formamide, benzyl, or an amino pro formyl, formyl ester, formamide, benzyl, or an amino pro tecting group; and 65 tecting group; and R7 and R7, are independently selected from hydrogen, R7 and R7, are independently selected from hydrogen, alkyl, alkenyl, allyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or benzylyl, and alkyl, alkenyl, allyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or benzylyl.",
"Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 9 of 25 PageID #:31528 US 8,871,779 B2 5 6 Other objects and features will be in part apparent and in When R, is hydrogen, alkyl, alkenyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or part pointed out hereinafter. benzyl, salts of the secondary or tertiary amine can beformed wherein the anion is chloride, bromide, acetate, formate, Sul DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION fate, bisulfate, bisulfite, oxalate, citrate, malate, tartrate, tri flate, trifluoroacetate, methane sulfonate, and the like. When The present invention is generally directed to processes for X is —N(R7R17)—, the counter-ion can be chloride, bro preparing highly pure morphinan-6-one products. The pro mide, iodide, trifluoroacetate, trifluoromethanesulfonate, cesses generally involve treating a reaction mixture including methane Sulfonate, acetate, p-toluenesulfonate, Sulfate, bisul a morphinan-6-one compound and an O.f3-unsaturated ketone fate, bisulfite, phosphate, hydrogen phosphate, dihydrogen compound with a Sulfur-containing compound. Advanta 10 phosphate, fumarate, oxalate, formate, tartrate, benzoate, and geously, the process effectively reduces the concentration of the like. undesirable C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds to acceptable In one preferred embodiment, R is hydroxy or protected levels without removing or otherwise affecting other more hydroxy.",
"In another preferred embodiment, R is hydrogen. desirable compounds or Substituent groups or unsaturation 15 In either of the embodiments described above (i.e., when thereon. Moreover, the Sulfur-containing compound may be Ra is hydroxy or protected hydroxy or R is hydrogen), R utilized to reduce the concentration of C.B-unsaturated is either alkoxy, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy. In one par ketone compounds present in the reaction mixture from levels ticular embodiment, R is methoxy. of about 0.5% (by weight) or more to levels of not more than In any one of the embodiments described above, X is about 0.1% (by weight), or lower (e.g., about 0.01% (by —N(R7)— or —N (R7R7)—, wherein R7, R7, and weight), about 0.001% (by weight), or lower), with minimal R, are defined as above. Where X is N(R) , in one side reactions, ketone reduction, and/or any other undesirable particularly preferred embodiment R, is hydrogen, alkyl, effects.",
"alkenyl, alkylcarboxy, or cycloalkyl. Where X is —N' Morphinan Products and Processes for Preparing the Same (R,R)—, in one particularly preferred embodiment R. Generally speaking, the morphinan-6-one products of 25 and Rz, are independently hydrogen, alkyl, alkenyl, or interest in the process of the present invention include mor cycloalkyl. phinan compounds having a keto group at the C(6) carbon Representative morphinan-6-one compounds correspond atom on the C-ring and a saturated bond between the C(7)and ing to Formula (2)(and the various preferred substituent C(8) carbonatoms on the C-ring (i.e., morphinan-6-one com group definitions described above) which can be treated pounds). More specifically, the morphinan-6-one compounds 30 according to the process described herein include, for are opiate receptor agonists or antagonists generally corre example, oxymorphone, naloxone, naltrexone, naltrexone sponding to Formula (2): methylbromide, nalbuphone, noroxymorphone, hydromor phone, hydrocodone, oxycodone, diethoxycarbonyl-noroxy 35 morphone, salts thereof, and the like. Additionally, deriva (2) tives of the above morphinan-6-one compounds which can be treated according to the process described herein include, for example, N-demethylated-, 10-hydroxy-, 10-halo, and 10-keto-morphinan-6-one derivatives, their protected ana 40 logs, and the like. The method of producing the above-described morphinan 6-one compounds for use in the present invention is not nar rowly critical, and various methods for producing morphi nan-6-one compounds are well known in the art.",
"For example, 45 commercial processing methods for producing morphinan compounds typically involve the extraction of an opium alka wherein loid (e.g., thebaine) from poppies, followed by various con ventional precipitation and purification steps known to those X is —N(R,)— or —N*(R,R)—: of skill in the art. By way of further example, the morphinan RandR are independently selected from hydrogen, Sub 50 6-one compound oxycodone may be produced from thebaine stituted and unsubstituted acyl, acyloxy, alkenyl, alkoxy, in a substantially two-step process, as illustrated in Reaction alkoxyaryl, alkyl, alkylamino, alkylthio, alkynyl, amino, aryl, Scheme 1: arylalkoxy, carboalkoxy, carbonyl, carboxyalkenyl, carboxy alkyl, carboxyl, cyano, cyanoalkyl, cycloalkyl, cycloalkyla lkyl, cycloalkylether, halo, haloalkoxy, haloalkyl, heteroaryl, 55 heterocyclic, hydroxyalkyl, hydroxyl, or nitro: R is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, alkoxy, or acyloxy; Ro is hydrogen, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, halo, keto, tosyl, mesyl, or trifluoromesyl; He oxidation Ra is hydrogen, hydroxy, or protected hydroxy: R7 is hydrogen, alkyl, cycroalkyl, alkylcarboxy, alkyle necycloalkyl, alkoxycarbonyl, allyl, alkenyl, acyl, aryl, formyl, formyl ester, formamide, benzyl, or an amino pro tecting group; and R7 and R7, are independently selected from hydrogen, Thebaine alkyl, alkenyl, allyl, cycloalkyl, aryl, or benzyl.",
"Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 10 of 25 PageID #:31529 US 8,871,779 B2 7 8 -continued Reaction Conditions H3CO As noted above, the morphinan products produced from conventional processes for preparing morphinan-6-one com pounds also yield some amount of an O.B-unsaturated ketone present as an impurity; that is, both the morphinan-6-one compound corresponding to Formula (2) and the C.B-unsat urated ketone compound corresponding to Formula (3) are present in the morphinan product. The morphinan products produced from conventional mor 10 phinan processing methods typically comprise less than about 2% by weight of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. 14-hydroxycodeinone Preferably, the morphinan products comprise less than about 1% by weight of an O.B-unsaturated ketone compound. More preferably, the morphinan products comprise less than about catalytic hydrogenation 0.8% by weight of an O.B-unsaturated ketone compound. Still 15 more preferably, the morphinan products comprise less than about 0.5% by weight of an O.B-unsaturated ketone com pound.",
"As noted above, however, it is desirable to minimize or further minimize the concentration of C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds present in Such products. According to the present invention, a reaction mixture is formed including a morphinan-6-one compound of Formula (2) and an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound of Formula (3). The morphinan-6-one compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound may be produced by any conventional method (such as those described above), and the morphinan oxycodone 6-one compound may exist as the free base or as a salt, such as the hydrochloride salt. The reaction mixture is treated with a Sulfur-containing compound to reduce the concentration of Alternatively, various synthetic methods for producing the the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound (either by forming above-described morphinan-6-one compounds are also additional morphinan-6-one compound or by facilitating the known. In these synthetic methods, a Grewe cyclization reac 30 removal of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound), and the tion is commonly used to form nordihydrothebainone prod morphinan-6-one compound is recovered to produce the desired morphinan-6-one product. This process is generically ucts such as by the processes described in U.S. Pat. Nos.",
"illustrated in Reaction Scheme 2, wherein the reaction mix 4,368,326, 4,410,700, 4,521,601, 4,556,712, 4,613,668, ture including the morphinan-6-one compound and the C. B 4,727,146, the entire disclosures of which are hereby incor 35 unsaturated ketone compound is shown in brackets, and X, porated by reference herein. Additionally, various methods R. R. R. Rio, and Ra are defined as above. useful for the semi-synthesis of morphinan compounds and intermediates are known. For example, U.S. Pat. No.",
"6, 177, 567 to Chiu et al. and U.S. Pat. No. 6,008.355 to Huang et al. (each of which is hereby incorporated by reference herein) 40 describe methods for the synthesis of oxycodone from codeine. These and other conventional practices are generally applicable in carrying out the preparation of morphinan-6- one compounds and C. B-unsaturated ketone compounds that may be treated according to the processes described herein. 45 As noted above, in the various conventional processes for sulfur producing morphinan-6-one compounds described above, containing the resulting morphinan product typically also includes some compound amount of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound present as an impurity in addition to the desired morphinan-6-one com (2) 50 pound.",
"The C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds present as impurities generally correspond to Formula (3): (3) 55 60 (2) Various reaction mixtures (bracketed) including a morphi nan-6-one compound and an O.B-unsaturated ketone com 65 pound may be treated according to the processes described herein to yield various highly pure morphinan-6-one prod wherein X, R. R. R. Rio, and Ra are defined as above. ucts, as illustrated in Reaction Schemes 3-10. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 11 of 25 PageID #:31530 US 8,871,779 B2 Her Sulfur-containing compound hydrocodone codeinone hydrocodone He Sulfur-containing compound Oxymorphone 14-hydroxymorphinone oxymorphone --- Sulfur-containing compound noroxymorphone 7,8-didehydronoroxymorphone noroxymorphone -- Sulfur-containing compound hydromorphone morphinone hydromorphone Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 12 of 25 PageID #:31531 US 8,871,779 B2 11 12 HO He Sulfur-containing O compound 2.1. O maltrexone 7,8-didehydronaltrexone maltrexone HO Br Br --- Sulfur-containing O2. -- compound 2.",
"OH 1 O naltrexone methyl bromide 7,8-didehydronaltrexone naltrexone methyl bromide methylbromide HO Her Sulfur-containing O% compound 2. OH 1 naloxone 7,8-didehydronaloxone l O naloxone HO Her Sulfur-containing Oz compound % malbuphone 7,8-didehydronalbuphone malbuphone Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 13 of 25 PageID #:31532 US 8,871,779 B2 13 14 According to various embodiments, the reaction mixture is able quaternary ammonium salts for use as phase transfer formed by dissolving or otherwise dispersing the morphinan catalysts include tetraalkylammonium salts such as, for 6-one compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound example, tetramethyl-, tetraethyl-, tetrabutyl-, tetrahexyl-, in a media material (i.e., a morphinan product including the tetraoctyl-, methyltriphenyl-, methyltrioctyl-, benzyltrim morphinan-6-one compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone ethyl-, benzyltriethyl-, benzyltributyl-, hexadecyltrimethyl compound is dispersed in the media material). The reaction ammonium salts, and the like.",
"Suitable salts include, for mixture is then treated with a Sulfur-containing compound. example, halide, hydroxide, bicarbonate, bisulfate, thiocyan Ideally, the morphinan-6-one compound and the C.B-unsat ate, tetrafluoroborate, and the like. Other phase transfer cata urated ketone compound are in Solution, but a heterogeneous lysts such as phosphonium salts may be suitable as well. mixture may also be treated according to the processes 10 A variety of sulfur-containing compounds may be utilized described herein. to treat the reaction mixture and reduce the concentration of The media material is desirably an aqueous media or an the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound according to the pro aqueous/organic solvent biphasic media. Exemplary aqueous cesses described herein. In various embodiments, the sulfur media for use in the process of the present invention includes, containing compound is a Sulfur-containing nucleophile.",
"As for example, water, waterfalcohol mixtures, dilute inorganic 15 utilized herein, “nucleophile' refers to an ion or molecule that Solvents such as dilute Sulfuric acid, ethereal solvents such as donates a pair of electrons to an atomic nucleus to form a dioxane or tetrahydrofuran, combinations thereof, and the covalent bond. In other embodiments, the Sulfur-containing like. Exemplary organic solvents for use in aqueous/organic compound is a Sulfur-containing reducing agent. As utilized Solvent biphasic media includes, for example, butanone, ethyl herein, “reducing agent” refers to an agent having the ability acetate, butanol, diethyl ether, benzene, chloroform, tetra to add one or more electrons to an atom, ion or molecule. In chloroethylene, toluene, 1,1,1-trichloroethane, carbon tetra either of the two embodiments described above (i.e., when the chloride, dibutyl ether, cyclohexane, hexane, dipentyl ether, Sulfur-containing compound is a Sulfur-containing nucleo heptane, hexadecane, combinations thereof, and the like. phile or a Sulfur-containing reducing agent), the Sulfur-con Generally, a Sufficient amount of media material to Sub taining compound is a compound having the ability to effect stantially solubilize the morphinan-6-one compound and the 25 the reduction of and/or a 1.4 addition across the C. B-unsatur C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound in the reaction mixture is ated bond of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound.",
"desired. Higher amounts of media material may increase the In one embodiment, the Sulfur-containing compound is a costs of manufacturing, as the more dilute reaction mixture Sulfur-containing inorganic acid or salt thereof. Suitable Sul may require additional process cycle time, or require the fur-containing inorganic acids include, for example, hydro removal or excess media material during Subsequent process 30 sulfuric acid (HS); sulfurous acid (HSO); persulfuric acid ing steps. (HSOs); thiosulfurous acid (HSO); dithionous acid The weight ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one (HSO); disulfurous acid (H2SOs); dithionic acid compound in the reaction mixture is preferably from about (HSO); pyrosulfuric acid (H2SO4); peroxydisulfuric acid 1:1 to about 50:1. More preferably, the weight ratio of media (H2SOs); trithionic acid (H2SO); tetrathionic acid material to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction mix 35 (HSO); pentathionic acid (HSSO); chlorosulfonic acid ture is from about 1:1 to about 25:1. For example, the weight (HSOCl); furosulfonic acid (HSOF); sulfamic acid ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one compound in the (HSONH); salts thereof; and the like. reaction mixture may be from about 1:1 to about 5:1, from Generally, the Sulfur-containing inorganic acid salt may be about 1:1 to about 10:1, from about 1:1 to about 15:1, or from an alkali metal salt or an alkaline earth metal salt.",
"For about 1:1 to about 20:1. Still more preferably, the weight ratio 40 example, the Salt may be a monovalent or divalent cation of media material to morphinan-6-one compound in the reac selected from Li\", Na', K\", Rb, Cs\", Fr\", Be\", Mg, Ca\", tion mixture is from about 5:1 to about 25:1. For example, the Sr*., Ba', or Ra\". Preferably, the salt is selected from the weight ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one com group consisting of Li\", Na', K\", Mg\", Ca\", and combina pound in the reaction mixture may be from about 5:1 to about tions thereof. 10:1, from about 5:1 to about 15:1, or from about 5:1 to about 45 Alternatively, the Sulfur-containing inorganic acid salt may 20:1.",
"Still more preferably, the weight ratio of media material be an ammonium salt (NH) or a quaternary ammonium salt. to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture is For example, the Sulfur-containing inorganic acid salt may be from about 5:1 to about 15:1. For example, the weight ratio of a tetraalkylated ammonium salt; that is, a quaternary ammo media material to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction nium salt Substituted with four alkyl groups preferably having mixture may be from about 5:1 to about 6:1, from about 5:1 to 50 from 1 to about 18 carbon atoms. Suitable tetraalkylated about 7:1, from about 5:1 to about 8:1, from about 5:1 to about ammonium salts include, for example, tetramethylammo 9:1, from about 5:1 to about 10:1, from about 5:1 to about nium salts, tetraethylammonium salts, tetrapropylammonium 11:1, from about 5:1 to about 12:1, from about 5:1 to about salts, tetrabutylammonium salts, and the like.",
"13:1, or from about 5:1 to about 14:1. Most preferably, the In one particular embodiment, the Sulfur-containing inor weight ratio of media material to morphinan-6-one com 55 ganic acid is dithionous acid (H2SO) or salts thereof. By pound in the reaction mixture is from about 5:1 to about 11:1. way of example, salts of dithionous acid include MHSO and It will be understood that some portion of the media material MSO, wherein M is selected from alkali metal salts, alka may be derived from the Sulfur-containing compound itself line earth metal salts, ammonium salt (NH), and quaternary (e.g., as water of hydration). ammonium salts. According to this embodiment, the C. B Optionally, a phase transfer catalyst may also be added to 60 unsaturated ketone compound is chemically reduced to form the aqueous/organic solvent biphasic media.",
"The phase trans the morphinan-6-one compound upon treatment with the Sul fer catalyst is preferably any suitable composition for use in fur-containing compound, discussed in further detail below. the transfer of reactants (i.e., morphinan-6-one compounds, In another particular embodiment, the Sulfur-containing C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds, and/or Sulfur-containing inorganic acid is selected from the group consisting of Sulfu compounds) between the aqueous and organic solvent inter 65 rous acid (H2SOs); disulfurous acid (H2SOs); and salts face. Typically, the phase transfer catalyst is an ammonium thereof. By way of example, salts of sulfurous acid and dis based compound, Such as a quaternary ammonium salt. Suit ulfurous acid include MHSO, MSO, MHSOs, and Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 14 of 25 PageID #:31533 US 8,871,779 B2 15 16 MSOs wherein M is selected from alkali metal salts, alka one compound in the reaction mixture may be from about line earth metal salts, ammonium salt (NH), and quaternary 0.8:1 to about 1.0:1, from about 0.8:1 to about 1.2:1, from ammonium salts.",
"According to this embodiment, the Sulfur about 0.8:1 to about 1.4:1, from about 0.8:1 to about 1.6:1, containing inorganic acid or salt thereof is one which disso from about 0.8:1 to about 1.8:1, from about 0.8:1 to about ciates into the bisulfite ion (HSO) and/or the sulfite ion 2.0:1, from about 0.8:1 to about 2.2:1, or from about 0.8:1 to (SO) in the reaction mixture. It will be understood by one about 2.4:1. of ordinary skill in the art that sulfurous acid (HSO) gener The treatment of the reaction mixture with the sulfur-con ally exists as a solution of SO (commonly about 6%) in taining compound may be carried out in ambient air or in an water. The pKa of sulfurous acid (HSO) is about 1.78 and its oxygen-free environment. Preferably, the treatment is carried ionization expression is: 10 out in an inert atmosphere Such as, for example, argon or nitrogen gas.",
"The treatment is preferably carried out at a According to this embodiment, various 1.2- and 1.4-sul pressure of from about 0.5 atm to about 2.0 atm. More pref fonated addition products are formed from the morphinan-6- erably, the treatment is carried out at a pressure of from about one compound and the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound by 15 0.75 atm to about 1.5 atm; most preferably from about 0.9 atm reaction with the bisulfite ion and/or the sulfite ion, discussed to about 1.25 atm. in further detail below. In various embodiments, the pH of the reaction mixture In another particular embodiment, the Sulfur-containing during treatment with the Sulfur-containing compound is compound is a thiol having the formula: R SH, wherein Ris greater than about 3.",
"Typically, the pH of the reaction mixture hydrocarbyl, substituted hydrocarbyl, or heterocyclo. For during treatment is less than about 10, although the upper pH example, R may be substituted or unsubstituted alkyl, alk limit may depend on the treatment time and/or solubility of enyl, alkynyl, or aryl. Exemplary thiols having the formula the various reaction mixture components. Preferably, the pH R—SH, wherein R is defined as above, include alkyl or aryl of the reaction mixture during treatment with the sulfur thiols such as methanethiol, ethanethiol, benzenethiol, and containing compound is from about 3 to about 9; more pref the like. Other exemplary thiols include thiocarboxylic acids 25 erably from about 6 to about 9. For example, the pH of the and salts thereof (e.g., thiobenzoic acid) and thiol-terminated reaction mixture during treatment with the Sulfur-containing carboxylic acids and salts thereof (e.g., thioglycolic acid compound may be about 3, about 4, about 5, about 6, about 7. (mercaptoacetic acid), mercaptopropionic acid, and the like). about 8, or about 9.",
"Most preferably, the treatment occurs at a Still other exemplary thiols include amino acids (e.g., L- or pH of from about 6 to about 7.25. Upon the addition of the D.L-cysteine), other thiol-containing amines and/or quater 30 Sulfur-containing compound to the reaction mixture includ nary salts thereof (e.g., cysteamine HCl, thiocholine, and the ing the morphinan-6-one compound and the C.f3-unsaturated like), or polymer-bound thiols (e.g., polycysteine, polyviny ketone compound, the pH may be adjusted to the desired level larylthiol, and the like). In one preferred embodiment, the (e.g. using a base Such as ammonium hydroxide).",
"Other Suit thiol is benzenethiol. Without being bound to one theory, it is able bases include, for example, Sodium hydroxide, potas believed that the thiol forms various 1,2- and 1,4-sulfonated 35 addition products from the morphinan-6-one compound and sium hydroxide, and the like. the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. The time of reaction is generally a function of the other The amount of Sulfur-containing compound utilized to variables in the reaction, such as pH, ratio of media material treat the reaction mixture may vary considerably according to to morphinan-6-one compound, amount of Sulfur-containing the various reaction mixture components (such as the particu 40 compound, and the like. Typically, some reduction of the lar morphinan-6-one compound, the C.B-unsaturated ketone concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone compound in the compound, and/or the media material) and concentrations reaction mixture can be observed after about 1 hour. Prefer thereof, time of reaction, temperature, pressure, and the like. ably, the reaction mixture is treated with the Sulfur-containing Relatively high usage rates of Sulfur-containing compound compound for at least about 1 hour.",
"In some embodiments, the generally offer no significant advantages and tend to waste 45 time of reaction is less than about 24 hours. In other embodi chemicals and/or reactor Volume. ments, the time of reaction is from about 1 hour to about 18 The molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to morphi hours; in still other embodiments from about 1 hour to about nan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture is typically 15 hours; in still other embodiments from about 1 hour to greater than about 0.5:1. Preferably, the molar ratio of sulfur about 10 hours. More preferably, the reaction mixture is containing compound to morphinan-6-one compound in the 50 treated with the sulfur-containing compound for about 1 hour reaction mixture is from about 0.5:1 to about 3.0:1.",
"For to about 5 hours. For example, the reaction mixture may be example, the molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to treated with the Sulfur-containing compound for about 1 hour, morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture may be for about 2 hours, for about 3 hours, for about 4 hours, or for from about 0.5:1 to about 0.8:1, from about 0.5:1 to about about 5 hours. 1.0:1, from about 0.5:1 to about 1.5:1, from about 0.5:1 to 55 The temperature of the reaction mixture during treatment about 2.0:1, or from about 0.5:1 to about 2.5:1. More prefer with the Sulfur-containing compound is generally from about ably, the molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to mor 0° C. to about 100° C. For example, the temperature of the phinan-6-one compound in the reaction mixture is from about reaction mixture during treatment with the Sulfur-containing 0.6:1 to about 2.8:1.",
"For example, the molar ratio of sulfur compound may be from about 10° C. to about 90° C., from containing compound to morphinan-6-one compound in the 60 about 20°C. to about 80°C., or from about 30°C. to about 70° reaction mixture may be from about 0.6:1 to about 0.8:1, from C. Preferably, the temperature of the reaction mixture during about 0.6:1 to about 1.0:1, from about 0.6:1 to about 1.5:1, treatment with the Sulfur-containing compound is above from about 0.6:1 to about 2.0:1, or from about 0.6:1 to about room temperature. The preferred reaction temperature may 2.5:1. Most preferably, the molar ratio of sulfur-containing vary for each morphinan-6-one. More preferably, the tem compound to morphinan-6-one compound in the reaction 65 perature of the reaction mixture during treatment with the mixture is from about 0.8:1 to about 2.5:1. For example, the sulfur-containing compound is from about 30°C.",
"to about 50° molar ratio of Sulfur-containing compound to morphinan-6- C. For example, the temperature of the reaction mixture dur Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 15 of 25 PageID #:31534 US 8,871,779 B2 17 18 ing treatment with the Sulfur-containing compound may be 5811-5814; Louis-Andre et al., Tetrahedron Letters, Vol. 26, about 30° C., about 35° C., about 40° C., about 45° C., or No. 7, 1985, 831-832). By way of example, dithionous acid about 50° C. (H2SO4) and salts thereof (e.g., MHSO or MSO, Once the treatment is complete or has proceeded as long as wherein M is defined as above) operate according to this desired, the treated morphinan-6-one compound is recovered mechanism; other Sulfur-containing compounds, however, to produce the morphinan-6-one product. Advantageously, may also operate according to the same or a similar mecha the morphinan-6-one compound may be recovered from the nism. Reaction Scheme 11 generally illustrates the reduction reaction mixture without the use of an organic solvent.",
"The of the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound (3) to form the absence of the need for organic solvents in the recovery desired morphinan-6-one compound (2) according to this process not only provides various environmental and material embodiment, wherein X, R. R. R. Rio, and Ra are defined handling benefits, but also results in a more efficient process as above. Sulfur-containing compound (2) (3) (2) Suitable for industrial scale applications. Typically, the mor In an alternative embodiment, various 1.2- and 1.4-sul phinan-6-one compound is precipitated from the reaction 30 fonated addition products are formed during treatment that mixture as a base (or salt if desirable) and may then be readily assist in the removal of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone com converted into a generally more pharmaceutically acceptable pounds from the reaction mixture. As noted above, several form, if so desired.",
"For example, the pH of the reaction Sulfur-containing compounds dissociate into various Sulfur mixture is typically adjusted to about 9-10 or greater with a 35 containing species. In particular, Sulfurous acid (H2SO). Suitable base Such as ammonium hydroxide, and the (desired) disulfurous acid (H2SOOs), and their salts dissociate into, precipitated compound recovered. Generally speaking, this among other things, bisulfite (HSOs) and sulfite (SO). Bisulfite has been shownto add via radical initiation across pH is at the point wherein opium alkaloids are not ionized. isolated double bonds (see, e.g., March, J., Advanced Organic The morphinan-6-one compounds can then be optionally Chemistry, p. 688, J. Wiley & Sons, 1985, 3d.",
"ed.) and/or add converted into a form more physiologically tolerable, such as viaan ionic mechanism (see, e.g., Gilbert, E.; Sulfonation and the hydrochloride salt, e.g., oxycodone HCl, using conven Related Reactions, p. 152, Interscience, N.Y. 1965; Patai et tional methods known to those of skill in the art. For example, al., The Chemistry of Alkenes, p. 478, Interscience, London the morphinan-6-one base can be dissolved or otherwise dis 1965). Without being bound to one theory, it is believed that persed in water, reacted with an acid such as HCl, heated, and 45 when the reaction mixture is treated with sulfurous acid, cooled to precipitate the morphinan-6-one salt.",
"By way of an disulfurous acid, or salts thereof and the pH is adjusted to alternative example, the morphinan-6-one base can be dis between about 3 and about 9, certain 1,2- and 1,4-addition Solved or otherwise dispersed in an alcohol solvent (e.g., products and adducts are stably and/or reversibly formed methanol, ethanol, etc.) or a solvent system (i.e., a mixture of from the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound and the morphi solvents), reacted with concentrated HCl or an HCl/alcohol 50 nan-6-one compound. It is further believed that the products mixture, and cooled to precipitate the morphinan-6-one are generally stable within the pH range of from about 3 to hydrochloride salt By way of another example, the morphi about 9, and adjusting the pH outside of this range after their nan-6-one base can be dissolved or otherwise dispersed in formation from the C.B-unsaturated ketone compounds and the morphinan-6-one compounds facilitates the removal of water, alcohol Solvent, or a solvent system, reacted with gas 55 the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound from the reaction mix eous HCl, heated, and cooled to precipitate the morphinan ture, resulting in a highly pure morphinan-6-one product. 6-one hydrochloride salt.",
"One preferred embodiment of the present invention is illus Treatment Reaction Mechanisms trated in Reaction Schemes 12A and 12B, wherein X, R. R. Without being bound to one theory, it is believed that the R. Rio, and Ra are defined as above and M is a monovalent reduction of the concentration of C.B-unsaturated ketone 60 or divalent cation. For example, M may be one or more alkali compounds in the reaction mixture is performed via different metal or alkaline earth metal monovalent or divalent cations mechanisms, depending on the particular Sulfur-containing from the Sulfur-containing compound. Alternatively, M may compound selected to treat the reaction mixture.",
"be one or more monovalent or divalent cations from the In one embodiment, the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound alkaline compound (e.g., NaOH, KOH, NH4OH, etc.) used to is reduced by the Sulfur-containing compound to form the 65 adjust the pH of the reaction mixture to between about 3 and desired C.f3-saturated morphinan-6-one compound. See, e.g., about 9 after the addition of the sulfur-containing compound Camps et al., Tetrahedron Letters, Vol. 29, No. 45, 1988, to the reaction mixture. Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 16 of 25 PageID #:31535 US 8,871,779 B2 19 20 containing compound at a pH of between about 3 and about 9. While it is understood that sulfurous acid, disulfurous acid, and salts thereof operate according to the mechanism illus trated in Reaction Schemes 12A, 12B, and 12C, other sulfur 5 containing compounds may also operate according to the same or a similar mechanism. For example, thiols (e.g., ben Zenethiol) may also operate according to the mechanism described in connection with Reaction Schemes 12A, 12B, and 12C.",
"10 Particularly, when the reaction mixture is treated with a Sulfur-containing compound and the pH of the reaction mix ture is adjusted to between about 3 and about 9, the morphi (2) nan-6-one compound (2) forms the reversible, water-soluble Sulfur-containing 3 < pH<9 15 12-bisulfite adduct (2A). Once the reaction mixture is suffi compound ciently in solution in the media material and/or the sulfur containing compound, dissociated Sulfur specie (such as sulfite and bisulfite) react more readily with the C.B-unsatur ated ketone compound (3) also present in the reaction mix 20 ture. As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 12B, one reaction between the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound (3) and the Sulfur-containing compound involves the rapid and reversible as 1,2-addition of the bisulfite to the carbonyl (similar to the reaction of the Sulfur-containing compound with the morphi nan-6-one compound illustrated in Reaction Scheme 12A) to (2A) form the reversible 1,2-adduct (3A) from the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound (3). Another reaction between the sulfur containing compound and the C.B-unsaturated ketone com Reaction Scheme 12B -- Sulfur-containing 3 <-3-3 pH<9 compound (3) (3A) Sulfur-containing compound (3C) As shown in Reaction Schemes 12A and 12B, various pound (3) is the slower 1,4-addition, forming the more stable 1.2-and 1,4-sulfonated compounds are formed from the mor- 1,4-addition product (3B). The introduction of the sulfonate phinan-6-one compound (2)(scheme 12A) and the C.B-unsat- 65 group in the B-position generally enhances the reactivity of urated ketone compound (3)(scheme 12B) upon treatment of the carbonyl group by destroying its conjugation with the a reaction mixture including these compounds with a Sulfur- double bond, such that the reversible product is a 1.2- and Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 17 of 25 PageID #:31536 US 8,871,779 B2 21 22 1,4-bis adduct (3C)(see Pataietal.",
"The Chemistry of Alkenes, the pH outside of the range between about 3 and about 9 (i.e., p. 478, Interscience, London 1965). the pH is adjusted to less than about 3 or the pH is adjusted to Reaction Scheme 12C illustrates the removal of certain greater than about 9) with an acid (e.g., Sulfuric acid (H2SO4)) addition products formed in the reaction mixture according to or a base (e.g., ammonium hydroxide (NH4OH)) results in the Reaction Schemes 12A and 12B and the resulting highly pure decomposition of the 1,2-addition products of each com morphinan-6-one product, wherein X, R. R. R. Rio, Ra, pound, rendering the desired morphinan-6-one compound (2) and Mare defined as above. insoluble in water.",
"The relatively more stable 1,4-addition 3 > pH > 9 (2A) (3C) (2) (3B) 1. alkaline pH 2. removal of (3B) with mother liquor mixture (2) As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 12C, the removal of the product (3B) formed from the C.B-unsaturated ketone com C.f3-unsaturated ketone addition products is generally based pound remains and is water-soluble in the final mixture at an in the differences in solubility of the 1,4-addition product 65 alkaline pH (e.g., pH~9 or greater). The 1,4-addition product (3B) generated from the C. B-unsaturated ketone compound (3B) may thus be removed from the mixture with the mother and the desired morphinan-6-one compound (2). Adjusting liquor, leaving the insoluble morphinan-6-one base (2).",
"The Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 18 of 25 PageID #:31537 US 8,871,779 B2 23 24 desired morphinan-6-one base may then be converted into a containing compound at a pH of between about 3 and about 9. more physiologically-tolerable salt form, such as the hydro As discussed above, while it is generally understood that chloride Salt, using methods known to those of skill in the art. Sulfurous acid, disulfurous acid, and salts thereof operate One particularly preferred embodiment of the present according to the mechanism described in Reaction Schemes invention is illustrated in Reaction Schemes 13A and 13B, 13A and 13B, other Sulfur-containing compounds may also wherein M is defined as above. operate according to the same or a similar mechanism.",
"Particularly, when the reaction mixture is treated with a Sulfur-containing compound and the pH of the reaction mix ture is adjusted to between about 3 and about 9, oxycodone (20) forms the reversible, water-soluble 1,2-bisulfite adduct (20A). Once the reaction mixture is sufficiently in solution in the media material and the Sulfur-containing compound, dis Sociated Sulfur specie (such as Sulfite and bisulfite) react more readily with the 14-hydroxycodeinone (30) also present in the reaction mixture. As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 13B, one reaction between 14-hydroxycodeinone (30) and the sulfur-contain (20) ing compound involves the rapid and reversible 1.2-addition Sulfur-containing -3 < PTS H< 9 - of the sulfite to the carbonyl (similar to the reaction of the compound Sulfur-containing compound with oxycodone illustrated in Reaction Scheme 13A) to form the reversible 1,2-adduct (30A) from 14-hydroxycodeinone. Another reaction between the Sulfur-containing compound and 14-hydroxycodeinone (30) is the slower 1,4-addition, forming the more stable 1,4- addition product (30B).",
"The introduction of the sulfonate group in the B-position generally enhances the reactivity of the carbonyl group by destroying its conjugation with the (20A) double bond, such that the reversible product is a 1.2- and 1,4-bis adduct (30C) (see Patai et al., The Chemistry of Alk enes, p. 478, Interscience, London 1965). Reaction Scheme 13B -- Sulfur-containing Ps' compound (30) (30A) --- Sulfur-containing compound As shown in Reaction Schemes 13A and 13B, various Reaction Scheme 13C illustrates the removal of Sulfonated compounds are formed from oxycodone (20) certain addition products formed in the reaction (scheme 13A) and the O.B-unsaturated ketone compound 65 mixture according to Reaction Schemes 13A and 13B and the 14-hydroxycodeinone (30)(scheme 13B) upon treatment of a resulting highly pure oxycodone, wherein M is defined as reaction mixture including these compounds with a Sulfur above.",
"Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 19 of 25 PageID #:31538 US 8,871,779 B2 25 26 (20A) (20) 1. alkaline pH 2. removal of (30B) with mother liquor mixture (20) 40 As illustrated in Reaction Scheme 13C, the removal of the bisulfites) in the reaction mixture and/or final morphinan-6- 14-hydroxycodeinone addition products is generally based one product. Accordingly, the residual Sulfur-containing spe on the differences in solubility of the 1,4-addition product cies may be optionally Substantially removed from the reac (30B) generated from 14-hydroxycodeinone and the desired tion mixture following the treatment with the sulfur 45 oxycodone (20). Adjusting the pH outside of the range containing compound using a variety of methods known to between about 3 and about 9 (i.e., the pH is adjusted to less those of skill in the art.",
"than about 3 or greater than about 9) with an acid (e.g., As described above, in various embodiments 1.2- and 1,4- Sulfuric acid (H2SO4)) or a base (e.g., ammonium hydroxide sulfonated addition products may be formed by the reaction (NH4OH)) results in the decomposition of the 1,2-addition 50 of a Sulfur-containing compound with the morphinan-6-one products of each compound, rendering the desired oxycodone compound and the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound at a pH (20) insoluble in water. The relatively more stable 1,4-addi of between about 3 to about 9.",
"The adjustment of the pH tion product (30B) formed from 14-hydroxycodeinone outside of this range eliminates the 1,2-addition products, remains and is water soluble in the final mixture at an alkaline renders the morphinan-6-one compound insoluble in water, pH (e.g., pH ~9 or greater). The 1,4-addition product (30B) 55 and the remaining water soluble 1,4-addition product can be may thus be removed from the mixture with the mother removed in the waste stream. liquor, leaving the insoluble oxycodone base (20). The oxy To optionally substantially remove the residual sulfur-con codone base may then be converted into a more physiologi taining species upon completion of the reaction with the cally-tolerable Salt form, such as the hydrochloride Salt, using Sulfur-containing compound, the pH of the reaction mixture methods known to those of skill in the art. 60 may be adjusted to less than about 3 (instead of adjusting the Removal of Residual Sulfur-Containing Species from the pH to greater than 9) with an acid (e.g., Sulfuric acid (HSO)) Reaction Mixture and manipulated prior to the precipitation of the morphinan Using the process described herein to reduce the concen 6-one compound as described in detail above. More prefer tration of C. B-unsaturated ketone compounds from a reaction ably, the pH is adjusted to less than about 2.",
"The reduction in mixture by treating the reaction mixture with a Sulfur-con 65 pH converts any residual Sulfur species that may be present in taining compound may result in the undesirable accumulation the reaction mixture into SO gas, which typically has a of residual Sulfur-containing species (such as Sulfites and limited solubility in water. In one embodiment, the SO gas Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 20 of 25 PageID #:31539 US 8,871,779 B2 27 28 may then be optionally heat refluxed out of the reaction mix atoms. They may be straight or branched chain or cyclic and ture by conventional means known to those of skill in the art. include ethenyl, propenyl, isopropenyl, butenyl, isobutenyl, Typically, the reaction mixture is heat refluxed for about 2 hexenyl, and the like. hours to about 5 hours. The temperature and pressure during The term “alkynyl' as used herein describes groups which reflux are also generally variable. For example, the tempera 5 are preferably lower alkynyl containing from two to eight ture of the reaction mixture during reflux is typically from carbon atoms in the principal chain and up to 20 carbon about 20° C. to about 100° C., and the reflux may be per atoms.",
"They may be straight or branched chain and include formed at a pressure of from about 0.003 atm to about 1.0 atm. ethynyl, propynyl, butynyl, isobutynyl, hexynyl, and the like. Alternatively, substantially all of the water (and the SO gas) The term “aromatic' as used herein alone or as part of may be optionally distilled off to a receiver tank and dis 10 another group denotes optionally substituted homo- or het carded.",
"This procedure is also generally known to those of erocyclic aromatic groups. These aromatic groups are pref skill in the art. erably monocyclic, bicyclic, or tricyclic groups containing As discussed above, after treatment of the reaction mixture from 6 to 14 atoms in the ring portion. The term “aromatic' encompasses the “aryl and \"heteroaryl groups defined with the Sulfur-containing compound to reduce the concen 15 below. tration of the C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound in the reac The term “aryl' as used herein alone or as part of another tion mixture, the morphinan-6-one compound is recovered to group denote optionally Substituted homocyclic aromatic produce the desired morphinan-6-one product. Generally groups, preferably monocyclic or bicyclic groups containing speaking, recovery refers to one or more of the precipitation, from 6 to 12 carbons in the ring portion, such as phenyl, filtration and drying of the morphinan-6-one base, the forma biphenyl, naphthyl, substituted phenyl, substituted biphenyl tion of the physiologically acceptable morphinan-6-one salt or substituted naphthyl. Phenyl and substituted phenyl are the (e.g., the hydrochloride salt), the removal of the residual more preferred aryl. Sulfur-containing species, and/or combinations thereof, to The terms “halogen.” “halide' or “halo' as used herein produce a morphinan-6-one product.",
"alone or as part of another group refer to chlorine, bromine, The treatment of the reaction mixture with a sulfur-con 25 fluorine, and iodine. taining compound according to the various processes and The term \"heteroatom' shall mean atoms other than carbon embodiments described herein significantly reduces the con and hydrogen. centration of C.f3-unsaturated ketone compounds in the reac The terms \"heterocyclo” or \"heterocyclic” as used herein tion mixture, and a highly pure morphinan-6-one product alone or as part of another group denote optionally Substi may be produced therefrom. Typically, the morphinan-6-one 30 tuted, fully saturated or unsaturated, monocyclic or bicyclic, product comprises less than about 0.1% (by weight morphi aromatic or non-aromatic groups having at least one heteroa nan-6-one product) of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. tom in at least one ring, and preferably 5 or 6 atoms in each For example, the morphinan-6-one product may comprise ring. The heterocyclo group preferably has 1 or 2 oxygen less than about 0.05% (by weight morphinan-6-one product) atoms and/or 1 to 4 nitrogenatoms in the ring, and is bonded of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound Preferably, the mor 35 to the remainder of the molecule through a carbon or heteroa tom.",
"Exemplary heterocyclo groups include heteroaromatics phinan-6-one product comprises less than about 0.01% (by Such as furyl, pyridyl, oxazolyl pyrrolyl, indolyl, quinolinyl, weight morphinan-6-one product) of an O.B-unsaturated or isoquinolinyl and the like. Exemplary Substituents include ketone compound. For example, the morphinan-6-one prod one or more of the following groups: hydrocarbyl, Substituted uct may comprise less than about 0.005% (by weight mor 40 hydrocarbyl, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, acyl, acyloxy, phinan-6-one product) of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone com alkoxy, alkenoxy, alkynoxy, aryloxy, halogen, amido, amino, pound. More preferably, the morphinan-6-one product cyano, ketals, acetals, esters and ethers. comprises less than about 0.001% (by weight morphinan-6- The term \"heteroaromatic” as used herein alone or as part one product) of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. For of another group denote optionally Substituted aromatic example, the morphinan-6-one product may comprise less 45 groups having at least one heteroatom in at least one ring, and than about 0.0005% (by weight morphinan-6-one product) of preferably 5 or 6 atoms in each ring.",
"The heteroaromatic an C.f3-unsaturated ketone compound. Still more preferably, group preferably has 1 or 2 oxygenatoms, 1 or 2 sulfur atoms, no detectable amount of an O.f3-unsaturated ketone com and/or 1 to 4 nitrogenatoms in the ring, and may be bonded to pound is present in the morphinan-6-one product. the remainder of the molecule through a carbon or heteroa 50 tom. Exemplary heteroaromatics include furyl, thienyl, ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINITIONS pyridyl, oxazolyl pyrrolyl, indolyl, quinolinyl, or isoquino linyl and the like. Exemplary substituents include one or more The following definitions and methods are provided to of the following groups: hydrocarbyl, substituted hydrocar better define the present invention and to guide those of ordi byl, keto, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, acyl, acyloxy, alkoxy, nary skill in the art in the practice of the present invention. 55 alkenoxy, alkynoxy, ary toxy, halogen, amido, amino, nitro, Unless otherwise noted, terms are to be understood according cyano, thiol, ketals, acetals, esters and ethers. to conventional usage by those of ordinary skill in the relevant The term “acyl as used herein alone or as part of another art. group, denotes the moiety formed by removal of the hydroxy The term “alkyl as used herein describes groups which are group from the group —COOH of an organic carboxylic acid, preferably lower alkyl containing from one to eight carbon 60 e.g., RC(O)—, wherein R is R', RO , RRN-, or R'S , atoms in the principal chain and up to 20 carbonatoms.",
"They R\" is hydrocarbyl, heterosubstituted hydrocarbyl, or hetero may be straight or branched chain or cyclic and include cyclo, and R is hydrogen, hydrocarbyl or substituted hydro methyl, ethyl, propyl, isopropyl, allyl, benzyl, hexyl and the carbyl. like. The term “acyloxy, as used herein alone or as part of The term “alkenyl as used herein describes groups which 65 another group, denotes an acyl group as described above are preferably lower alkenyl containing from two to eight bonded through an oxygen linkage (-O ), e.g., RC(O)O— carbon atoms in the principal chain and up to 20 carbon wherein R is as defined in connection with the term “acyl.” Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 21 of 25 PageID #:31540 US 8,871,779 B2 29 30 The term \"heteroaryl' as used herein alone or as part of Furthermore, it should be appreciated that all examples in the another group denote optionally Substituted aromatic groups present disclosure are provided as non-limiting examples. having at least one heteroatom in at least one ring, and pref erably 5 or 6 atoms in each ring.",
"The heteroaryl group pref EXAMPLE 1. erably has 1 or 2 oxygen atoms and/or 1 to 4 nitrogen atoms in the ring, and is bonded to the remainder of the molecule In this Example, an oxycodone HCl sample was treated through a carbon. Exemplary heteroaryls include furyl, ben with a sulfur-containing compound according to the pro Zofuryl, oxazolyl, isoxazolyl, oxadiazolyl, benzoxazolyl, cesses described herein. benzoxadiazolyl pyrrolyl pyrazolyl, imidazolyl, triazolyl, To a 250 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a tetrazolyl pyridyl, pyrimidyl, pyrazinyl, pyridaZinyl, indolyl, 10 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera isoindolyl, indolizinyl, benzimidazolyl, indazolyl, benzotria ture control was added 10g of oxycodone HCl (0.028 moles: Zolyl, tetraZolopyridazinyl, carbazolyl, purinyl, quinolinyl, >0.3% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impu isoquinolinyl, imidazopyridyl and the like. Exemplary Sub rity).",
"Next, with mixing 100 g of deoxygenated water (10 stituents include one or more of the following groups: hydro minute N purge) was added. The Solution pH was adjusted to 15 about 6 with ammonium hydroxide. Next, 5.0 g of sodium carbyl, substituted hydrocarbyl, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, acyl, acyloxy, alkoxy, alkenoxy, alkynoxy, aryloxy, halogen, dithionite (Na2SO4) was added. The pH was then adjusted to amido, amino, cyano, ketals, acetals, esters and ethers. about 7 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide. The result The terms “hydrocarbon and “hydrocarbyl as used ing mixture was stirred at 70° C. for about 16 hours. After about 16 hours, the pH was adjusted to about 9 with herein describe organic compounds or radicals consisting ammonium hydroxide, precipitating the oxycodone base.",
"The exclusively of the elements carbon and hydrogen. These moi mixture was stirred for about 1 hour, and the precipitated eties include alkyl, alkenyl, alkynyl, and aryl moieties. These oxycodone base was filtered, washed with water, and dried moieties also include alkyl, alkenyl, alkynyl, and aryl moi overnight at 40°C. under reduced pressure. eties substituted with other aliphatic or cyclic hydrocarbon The oxycodone base sample was converted to the oxyc groups, such as alkaryl, alkenaryland alkynary1. Unless oth 25 odone HCl salt by dissolving about 14.5g of the oxycodone erwise indicated, these moieties preferably comprise 1 to 20 base in a 100 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a carbon atoms. mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera The “substituted hydrocarbyl moieties described herein ture control. Next, with mixing about 29 g of H2O and about are hydrocarbyl moieties which are substituted with at least 12.6 g of concentrated HCl was added. The resulting mixture 30 one atom other than carbon, including moieties in which a was heated to about 65° C.-75° C. until substantially all was carbon chain atom is Substituted with a hetero atom such as in Solution.",
"The heat was then removed, resulting in the pre nitrogen, oxygen, silicon, phosphorous, boron, Sulfur, or a cipitation of the oxycodone HCl salt. The precipitated mix halogen atom. These Substituents include halogen, heterocy ture was stirred for about 1-3 hours at less than about 10° C. clo, alkoxy, alkenoxy, aryloxy, hydroxy, protected hydroxy, and filtered to collect the precipitated oxycodone HC1. 35 The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content was ana acyl, acyloxy, nitro, amino, amido, nitro, cyano, ketals, lyzed in the oxycodone base sample and the oxycodone HC1 acetals, esters and ethers. sample using an Agilent HPLC with MS interface capability. The term “hydroxy protecting group' refers to hydrocarbyl The results are illustrated in Table 1. and substituted hydrocarbyl moieties which bond to an hydroxy oxygen atom in a molecule so as to protect that 40 TABLE 1 oxygen atom from further reaction during synthesis. This protection allows reactions to occur selectively at another Initial 14- Final 14-OHC content reaction site on the same molecule.",
"Examples of hydroxy OHC content Oxycodone base Oxycodone HCI protecting groups include, but are not limited to, ethers such (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) as methyl, t-butyl, benzyl, p-methoxybenzyl, p-nitrobenzyl, 45 O.3 O.OOOS O.OOOS allyl, trityl, methoxymethyl, methoxyethoxymethyl, ethoxy ethyl, tetrahydropyranyl, tetrahydrothiopyranyl, and trialkyl silyl ethers such as trimethylsilyl ether, triethylsilyl ether, dimethylarylsilyl ether, triisopropylsilyl ether and t-bu EXAMPLES 2A-2G 50 tyldimethylsilyl ether; esters such as benzoyl, acetyl, pheny lacetyl, formyl, mono-, di-, and trihaloacetyl Such as chloro In Examples 2A-2G, an oxycodone HCl sample was acetyl, dichloroacetyl, trichloroacetyl, trifluoroacetyl; and treated with a Sulfur-containing compound according to the carbonates including but not limited to alkyl carbonates hav processes described herein.",
"The treatment was performed at ing from one to six carbon atoms such as methyl, ethyl, various temperatures, times of reaction, concentration of n-propyl, isopropyl. n-butyl, t-butyl, isobutyl, and n-pentyl: 55 reactants, and pH. alkyl carbonates having from one to six carbon atoms and Example 2A Substituted with one or more halogen atoms such as 2.2.2- trichloroethoxymethyl and 2.2.2-trichloroethyl; alkenyl car To a 100 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a bonates having from two to six carbon atoms such as vinyl 60 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera and allyl; cycloalkyl carbonates have from three to six carbon ture control was added 9.2 g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 atoms Such as cyclopropyl, cyclobutyl, cyclopentyl and moles; 0.13% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) cyclohexyl; and phenyl or benzyl carbonates optionally Sub impurity).",
"Next, with mixing 36.2 g of HO and 40.3 g of 6 wt. stituted on the ring with one or more C alkoxy, or nitro. % SO/HO solution was added. The resulting mixture was Having described the invention in detail, it will be apparent 65 heated to about 30° C. and the solution pH was adjusted to that modifications and variations are possible without depart about 6 with ammonium hydroxide.",
"The mixture was stirred ing the scope of the invention defined in the appended claims. for about 3 hours. The pH of the mixture was then adjusted to Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 22 of 25 PageID #:31541 US 8,871,779 B2 31 32 about 8.8-9.8 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. The precipitated oxycodone base was then filtered from the mother liquor, washed with about 25.73 g of HO, and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone content (14-OHC) in the oxycodone base was then measured as 5 described in the preceding Example. The experiment was repeated using identical reagents, amounts thereof, and conditions to form the oxycodone base sample. This oxycodone base sample was converted to the oxycodone HCl salt as described in the preceding example. 10 The 14-hydroxycodeinone content (14-OHC) in the oxyc odone base sample and the oxycodone HCl sample were then measured. Results and reaction conditions for this experiment are illustrated in Table 2.",
"TABLE 2 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 1 30 3 6 10.2 18:1 O.13 O.OOO7 Not tested 2 30 3 6 10.2 18:1 O.13 O.OOO7 O.OOO7 Example 2B This Example was performed according to the process 30 described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.4 g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13% by weight 14-hy droxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 34.6 g of H2O and about 27.4 g of 6 wt.% SO/HO solution. The mixture was heated to about 50° C. Next, the pH was 35 adjusted to about 7 using ammonium hydroxide. The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0 g of concen trated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes.",
"40 The solids were filtered and washed with about 28.0 g of H2O and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxycodone HCl salt formed according to the method described in the 45 preceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 3. TABLE 3 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.)",
"3 50 1 7 8.2 12:1 O.13 None None detected detected 4 50 5 7 8.2 12:1 O.13 OOOOOS O.OOOS Example 2C 60 This Example was performed according to the process described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.1 g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13-0.14% by weight 65 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 7.0 g of HO and about 52.8g of 6 wt.% SO/HO Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 23 of 25 PageID #:31542 US 8,871 779 B2 33 34 Solution. The mixture was heated to either 10° C. or 50° C. Next, the pH was adjusted to 7 using ammonium hydroxide.",
"The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0-2.5 g of 5 concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. The solids were filtered and washed with about 28.0 g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was 10 the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre ceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 4. TABLE 4 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.)",
"(% by wt.) 5 50 1 7 8.2 2.4:1 O.13 None O.OOO6 detected 6 50 5 7 8.2 2.4:1 O.13 O.OOO15 OOOO4 7 10 5 7 8.2 2.4:1 O.14 O.OO1 Not tested Example 2D This Example was performed according to the process described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.52g of wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13% by weight 14-hy droxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 72.24 g of HO and about 27.76 g of 6 wt.% SO/HO solution. The mixture was heated to about 50° C. Next, the pH was adjusted to about 7 using ammonium hydroxide. The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0-2.5 g of concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 minutes. The solids were filtered and washed with about 28.0 g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre ceding example. The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 5.",
"TABLE 5 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 8 50 1 7 13.1 12:1 O.13 O.OOO2 O.OOO3 50 5 7 13.1 12:1 O.13 None OOOO4 detected Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 24 of 25 PageID #:31543 US 8,871,779 B2 35 36 Example 2E Sulfuric acid was added as the pressure was decreased to This Example was performed according to the process about 0.11 atm and the solution temperature was increased to described in Example 2A. However, in this Example 9.5g of about 50-55° C. wet oxycodone HCl (0.02 moles; 0.13-0.14% by weight The solution was then cooled to about 30° C. and the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impurity) was mixed with about 39.7 g of HO and about 55.6 g of 6 wt.% SO/HO solution pH adjusted to about 8.5-10 with concentrated Solution. The mixture was heated to either 10° C. or 50° C. Next, the pH was adjusted to about 7 using ammonium ammonium hydroxide.",
"The solution was stirred for about 30 hydroxide. 10 minutes and filtered. The solids were filtered and washed with The resulting mixture was allowed to react for either 1 hour about 2000 g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone or 5 hours. At the end of the desired reaction time, the solution was adjusted to a pH of 8.8-9.8 with about 2.0-2.5 g of (14-OHC) content in the resulting oxycodone base was mea concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred for about 30 sured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in 15 minutes. The solids were filtered and washed with about 30.6 the oxycodone HCl salt formed by the method described in g of HO and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) the preceding example. The results and reaction conditions content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc are illustrated in Table 7. odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre 2O ceding example.",
"The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 6. TABLE 6 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO2 to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 10 50 1 7 12.3 2.4:1 O.13 None OOOO4 detected 11 50 5 7 12.3 2.4:1 O.13 None OOOO4 detected 12 10 5 7 12.3 2.4:1 O.13 O.OOO8 Not tested Example 2F To a 22 L, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera TABLE 7 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.)",
"13 40 5 7 6.6 18:1 O.13 O.OOO1 O.OOOS ture control was added 1840 g of wet oxycodone HCl (4.27 Example 2G moles, 0.13% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) To a 50 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a impurity). Next, with mixing 2706 g of H2O and 7717g of 6.4 55 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera wt.% SO/HO solution was added. The resulting mixture ture control was added 3.33 g of oxycodone HCl (0.0095 was heated to about 40°C. and the solution pH was adjusted moles; 0.2% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) to about 7 using concentrated ammonium hydroxide. The impurity).",
"Next, with mixing 33.3 g of H2O and 0.83 g of mixture was stirred for about 5 hours. sodium bisulfite was added. The resulting mixture was heated 60 to about 30° C. and the solution pH was adjusted to about 7 After about 5 hours, the solution was adjusted to a pH of with ammoniumhydroxide. The mixture was stirred for about 15 hours. The pH of the mixture was then adjusted to about about 1.7 with the addition of 293.0 g concentrated sulfuric 8.8-9.8 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide and stirred acid (96-98%). The pressure was slowly reduced to about for about 60 minutes. The precipitated oxycodone base was 0.26 atm to facilitate the distillation/removal of unreacted 65 then filtered from the mother liquor, washed with about 10.0 g of HO, and dried. The 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) SO. As the distillation progressed, 23.4 g of concentrated content in the resulting oxycodone base was measured, as was Case: 1:14-cv-10150 Document #: 581-48 Filed: 04/29/20 Page 25 of 25 PageID #:31544 US 8,871,779 B2 37 38 the 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) content in the oxyc odone HCl salt formed by the method described in the pre ceding example.",
"The results and reaction conditions in the various trials are illustrated in Table 8. TABLE 8 Molar Concentration Ratio of Initial Final 14-OHC content (g H2Operg SO, to 14-OHC Oxycodone Oxycodone Temperature Time Oxycodone Oxycodone content base HCI Trial (° C.) (hr.) pH HCI) HCI (% by wt.) (% by wt.) (% by wt.) 14 30 15 7 10 O.84:1 O.2 O.OOO4 OOOO4 15 EXAMPLE 3 4.",
"A hydrochloride Salt of a morphinan-6-one compound corresponding to Formula (2): In this Example, an oxymorphone HCl sample was treated with a sulfur-containing compound according to the pro cesses described herein. (2) To a 250 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera ture control was added 150g HO and 15 goxymorphone HC1 sample (0.044 moles; 0.3-0.5% by weight 14-hydroxymor phinone (14-OHM) impurity). Next, 7.5g of sodium bisulfite 25 (NaHSO) was added. The pH was then adjusted to about 7 with concentrated ammonium hydroxide, and the resulting mixture was stirred at 23°C. for about 16 hours. After about 16 hours, the pH was adjusted to about 8.8-9.8 with ammonium hydroxide and the Solution was cooled to 30 about 20°C. The precipitated oxymorphone base was filtered, washed with water (about 45 g), and dried for 4 hours at 65° C. comprising less than 0.001% measured by HPLC of an The oxymorphone base sample was analyzed using the C.B-unsaturated ketone compound corresponding to methods described above, and the sample contained no 35 Formula (3): detectable amount of 14-hydroxymorphinone or 14-hydroxy codeinone. This experiment was repeated using a 6 wt.% SO/HO solution in place of sodium bisulfite and similar (3) results were obtained.",
"40 EXAMPLE 4 In this Example, oxycodone base was treated with a thiol according to the processes described herein. To a 25 ml, 3 neck round bottom flask equipped with a 45 mechanical stirrer, N inlet, and thermocouple for tempera ture control was added 3.0 g oxycodone base (0.01 motes: 0.3-0.5% by weight 14-hydroxycodeinone (14-OHC) impu rity). Next, 18 g of chloroform was added, and the mixture was stirred at 70° C. until the oxycodone base was dissolved. 50 wherein the morphinan-6-one compound is oxymorphone After the mixture was substantially homogenous, 1.5 g of benzenethiol was added to the mixture with stirring. and wherein X is —N(R7)—: After about 16 hours, a sample was analyzed using the RandR are hydrogen; methods described in the preceding examples. HPLC area R is hydroxy: percent analysis indicated a 14-hydroxycodeinone level of 55 Ro is hydrogen; less than about 0.0022%.",
"Ra is hydroxy; and What is claimed is: R, is methyl. 1. A hydrochloride Salt of oxymorphone comprising less 5. The hydrochloride salt of claim 4 comprising less than than 0.001% of 14-hydroxymorphinone. 0.0005% of 14-hydroxymorphinone. 2. The hydrochloride salt of claim 1 comprising less than 60 6. A pharmaceutical formulation comprising the oxymor 0.0005% of 14-hydroxymorphinone. phone hydrochloride according to claim 4. 3. A pharmaceutical acceptable form comprising the oxy morphone hydrochloride according to claim 1. k k k k k"
]
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76 F.3d 374 NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.In Re: John Anthony NORRIS, Petitioner. No. 95-8108. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. Submitted: January 18, 1996.Decided: February 8, 1996.
John Anthony Norris, Petitioner Pro Se. Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM:
1 John Anthony Norris petitions this court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Fed. R.App. 21, requesting that we direct a magistrate judge to vacate an order and require proof of jurisdiction. Norris also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
2 We grant Norris's request to proceed in forma pauperis. However, mandamus is an extraordinary writ that should be granted only in unusual circumstances not present here. Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976). Further, mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re United Steelworkers, 595 U.S. 958, 960 (4th Cir.1979). Accordingly, we deny Norris's petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED | 04-17-2012 | [
"76 F.3d 374 NOTICE: Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Fourth Circuit.In Re: John Anthony NORRIS, Petitioner. No. 95-8108. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. Submitted: January 18, 1996.Decided: February 8, 1996. John Anthony Norris, Petitioner Pro Se. Before HAMILTON and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit Judge. PER CURIAM: 1 John Anthony Norris petitions this court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to Fed. R.App. 21, requesting that we direct a magistrate judge to vacate an order and require proof of jurisdiction. Norris also seeks leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 2 We grant Norris's request to proceed in forma pauperis. However, mandamus is an extraordinary writ that should be granted only in unusual circumstances not present here. Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394 (1976).",
"Further, mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. In re United Steelworkers, 595 U.S. 958, 960 (4th Cir.1979). Accordingly, we deny Norris's petition for writ of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. PETITION DENIED"
]
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999 S.W.2d 695 (1999) 67 Ark.App. 332 GREEN BAY PACKAGING, v. Edward BARTLETT. No. CA 99-205. Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division II. September 29, 1999. Michael E. Ryburn, Little Rock, for appellant. David H. McCormick, Russellville, for appellee. *696 MARGARET MEADS, Judge. Appellant, Green Bay Packaging, appeals from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission which found that appellee's headaches were a result of his compensable injury and that medical treatment provided for the headaches constituted reasonably necessary medical treatment for the injury. The Commission awarded accrued benefits to be paid in a lump sum without discount. At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), it was stipulated that appellee sustained a compensable injury in April 1996; that the claim was accepted as compensable; and that benefits were paid until November 1997, when appellant controverted the payment of additional benefits for medical care for appellee's headaches. The ALJ found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that appellee's severe headaches, which he suffered following the trauma to his head, were caused by the compensable injury, and that his treatment by Dr. J. Brett Ironside for headaches was reasonably necessary in connection with his compensable injury. The ALJ also found that appellee suffered facial disfigurement as a result of the injury and awarded benefits of $500. The full Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion. Appellee testified that he was injured in April 1996 when tightening some ropes with a winch. The handle slipped and hit him in the face five times, causing lacerations to his nose, forehead, and skull, and also over his right eye. Appellee received eighteen stitches at the hospital and was released to go home that night. Appellee underwent a rhinoplasty to repair his nose and was eventually referred to Dr. Ironside, a neurologist, because of severe headaches. Appellee said that he suffers a severe headache with massive forehead pain approximately every two weeks. He gets dizzy, has blurred vision, and is sometimes nauseous. When he gets a headache, he takes medicine prescribed by Dr. Ironside, and if that does not work he goes to the emergency room for a pain shot. Dr. Ironside, who has treated appellee for a little over a year, has tried several different medications but they have not helped. Appellee said he wants to return to Dr. Ironside because he does not believe everything has been tried. Appellee testified further that prior to his injury he never experienced any headaches like the ones he described, and he does not remember having headaches prior to April 22. Appellee testified further that he was a light-heavyweight boxer prior to his compensable injury, but was never knocked down, never received a concussion, never had any facial cuts, and never experienced headaches associated with his boxing career. He has not boxed since March 1996 when he was disqualified for a low blow. He was also involved in a fight at work in September 1996, but only got hit in the stomach. Dr. Ironside testified that appellee was referred to him by Dr. Jack Lyon, and appellee told him that he was having problems with headaches that started after the facial injury. He testified that appellee is still taking medication; they have made adjustments and tried to reduce the dosage but appellee has worsened; and there is no way to predict how long appellee's problem will last. Dr. Ironside stated that although the headaches could be caused by something else, it was his opinion that the compensable injury was definitely the defining point in regard to the headaches. Dr. Ironside was aware that appellee had been a boxer, but understood that the severe headaches started after the work incident. He said that appellee might have had heavy blows to the head while boxing, but he would be surprised if a boxer were able to strike a blow like a metal winch could. He testified further that appellee's condition has existed for over two years; that there are other medications that can be tried; that appellee is not headache free, but is now as good as he has been in almost two years; and if he does not get a whole lot worse, they may *697 have to be content with this. He said that headaches are subjective, but he has no reason to not believe appellee. Dr. Ironside testified that with a "high degree of certainty" the thing that started appellee's headaches was the head injury with the winch. Appellant argues on appeal that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings. When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision. Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark.App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark.App. 166, 912 S.W.2d 14 (1995). What constitutes reasonable and necessary medical treatment is a fact question for the Commission. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Engineering, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996). Appellant argues that appellee suffered headaches prior to his compensable injury; that Dr. Ironside and appellee testified that appellee had not improved during his course of treatment with Dr. Ironside; that there are no objective findings to corroborate appellee's headaches; and that Dr. Ironsides' conclusion that appellee's headaches were caused by his compensable injury is "speculation." We do not agree. In the first place, although appellant states that a March 18, 1996, report of Dr. Jack Lyon establishes that appellee had headaches before being hit in the face, this report as abstracted states only "most likely strep pharyngitis." Moreover, appellee testified that prior to his injury he never experienced any headaches like the ones he described, and he does not remember having headaches prior to April 22. It is the exclusive function of the Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996). Further, although there was testimony that appellee had not improved over his course of treatment, Dr. Ironside testified that there are other medications that can be tried. In regard to appellant's argument that there are no objective findings to support appellee's claim of headaches, Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 1999) requires that a compensable injury be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Appellant does not challenge the compensability of appellee's injury, but argues that it is "inconsistent" for the workers' compensation act to require objective findings to initiate a claim and yet not require objective findings after the burden of compensability has been met. It argues that the Commission is bound by the requirement of objective medical findings in most situations. Appellant has cited no case or statutory law that requires objective findings in this case. Appellee received a severe blow to the head resulting in multiple facial lacerations as well as a scalp laceration all requiring eighteen stitches and a subsequent rhinoplasty. Appellant does not argue that appellee's injury was noncompensable. Moreover, Dr. Ironside stated in a November 27, 1996, letter that appellee fell into the category of post-head-trauma syndrome with post-concussion headaches. We do not believe more is required. In regard to appellant's argument that Dr. Ironside's opinion is based on speculation, suffice it to say Dr. Ironside testified "with a high degree of certainty that the thing that got all this started was the head injury with the winch." *698 We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. Affirmed. ROAF and ROGERS, JJ., agree. | 10-30-2013 | [
"999 S.W.2d 695 (1999) 67 Ark.App. 332 GREEN BAY PACKAGING, v. Edward BARTLETT. No. CA 99-205. Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division II. September 29, 1999. Michael E. Ryburn, Little Rock, for appellant. David H. McCormick, Russellville, for appellee. *696 MARGARET MEADS, Judge. Appellant, Green Bay Packaging, appeals from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission which found that appellee's headaches were a result of his compensable injury and that medical treatment provided for the headaches constituted reasonably necessary medical treatment for the injury. The Commission awarded accrued benefits to be paid in a lump sum without discount. At the hearing before the administrative law judge (ALJ), it was stipulated that appellee sustained a compensable injury in April 1996; that the claim was accepted as compensable; and that benefits were paid until November 1997, when appellant controverted the payment of additional benefits for medical care for appellee's headaches.",
"The ALJ found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that appellee's severe headaches, which he suffered following the trauma to his head, were caused by the compensable injury, and that his treatment by Dr. J. Brett Ironside for headaches was reasonably necessary in connection with his compensable injury. The ALJ also found that appellee suffered facial disfigurement as a result of the injury and awarded benefits of $500. The full Commission affirmed and adopted the ALJ's opinion. Appellee testified that he was injured in April 1996 when tightening some ropes with a winch. The handle slipped and hit him in the face five times, causing lacerations to his nose, forehead, and skull, and also over his right eye. Appellee received eighteen stitches at the hospital and was released to go home that night. Appellee underwent a rhinoplasty to repair his nose and was eventually referred to Dr. Ironside, a neurologist, because of severe headaches. Appellee said that he suffers a severe headache with massive forehead pain approximately every two weeks. He gets dizzy, has blurred vision, and is sometimes nauseous. When he gets a headache, he takes medicine prescribed by Dr. Ironside, and if that does not work he goes to the emergency room for a pain shot. Dr. Ironside, who has treated appellee for a little over a year, has tried several different medications but they have not helped.",
"Appellee said he wants to return to Dr. Ironside because he does not believe everything has been tried. Appellee testified further that prior to his injury he never experienced any headaches like the ones he described, and he does not remember having headaches prior to April 22. Appellee testified further that he was a light-heavyweight boxer prior to his compensable injury, but was never knocked down, never received a concussion, never had any facial cuts, and never experienced headaches associated with his boxing career. He has not boxed since March 1996 when he was disqualified for a low blow. He was also involved in a fight at work in September 1996, but only got hit in the stomach. Dr. Ironside testified that appellee was referred to him by Dr. Jack Lyon, and appellee told him that he was having problems with headaches that started after the facial injury.",
"He testified that appellee is still taking medication; they have made adjustments and tried to reduce the dosage but appellee has worsened; and there is no way to predict how long appellee's problem will last. Dr. Ironside stated that although the headaches could be caused by something else, it was his opinion that the compensable injury was definitely the defining point in regard to the headaches. Dr. Ironside was aware that appellee had been a boxer, but understood that the severe headaches started after the work incident. He said that appellee might have had heavy blows to the head while boxing, but he would be surprised if a boxer were able to strike a blow like a metal winch could. He testified further that appellee's condition has existed for over two years; that there are other medications that can be tried; that appellee is not headache free, but is now as good as he has been in almost two years; and if he does not get a whole lot worse, they may *697 have to be content with this.",
"He said that headaches are subjective, but he has no reason to not believe appellee. Dr. Ironside testified that with a \"high degree of certainty\" the thing that started appellee's headaches was the head injury with the winch. Appellant argues on appeal that there is no substantial evidence to support the Commission's findings. When reviewing a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission and affirm that decision if it is supported by substantial evidence. Clark v. Peabody Testing Serv., 265 Ark. 489, 579 S.W.2d 360 (1979). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding; if reasonable minds could reach the Commission's conclusion, we must affirm its decision.",
"Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark.App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). The Commission has the duty of weighing medical evidence and, if the evidence is conflicting, its resolution is a question of fact for the Commission. Whaley v. Hardee's, 51 Ark.App. 166, 912 S.W.2d 14 (1995). What constitutes reasonable and necessary medical treatment is a fact question for the Commission. Gansky v. Hi-Tech Engineering, 325 Ark. 163, 924 S.W.2d 790 (1996). Appellant argues that appellee suffered headaches prior to his compensable injury; that Dr. Ironside and appellee testified that appellee had not improved during his course of treatment with Dr. Ironside; that there are no objective findings to corroborate appellee's headaches; and that Dr. Ironsides' conclusion that appellee's headaches were caused by his compensable injury is \"speculation.\" We do not agree. In the first place, although appellant states that a March 18, 1996, report of Dr. Jack Lyon establishes that appellee had headaches before being hit in the face, this report as abstracted states only \"most likely strep pharyngitis.\" Moreover, appellee testified that prior to his injury he never experienced any headaches like the ones he described, and he does not remember having headaches prior to April 22. It is the exclusive function of the Commission to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.",
"Kuhn v. Majestic Hotel, 324 Ark. 21, 918 S.W.2d 158 (1996). Further, although there was testimony that appellee had not improved over his course of treatment, Dr. Ironside testified that there are other medications that can be tried. In regard to appellant's argument that there are no objective findings to support appellee's claim of headaches, Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(D) (Supp. 1999) requires that a compensable injury be established by medical evidence supported by objective findings. Appellant does not challenge the compensability of appellee's injury, but argues that it is \"inconsistent\" for the workers' compensation act to require objective findings to initiate a claim and yet not require objective findings after the burden of compensability has been met. It argues that the Commission is bound by the requirement of objective medical findings in most situations. Appellant has cited no case or statutory law that requires objective findings in this case.",
"Appellee received a severe blow to the head resulting in multiple facial lacerations as well as a scalp laceration all requiring eighteen stitches and a subsequent rhinoplasty. Appellant does not argue that appellee's injury was noncompensable. Moreover, Dr. Ironside stated in a November 27, 1996, letter that appellee fell into the category of post-head-trauma syndrome with post-concussion headaches. We do not believe more is required. In regard to appellant's argument that Dr. Ironside's opinion is based on speculation, suffice it to say Dr. Ironside testified \"with a high degree of certainty that the thing that got all this started was the head injury with the winch.\" *698 We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. Affirmed. ROAF and ROGERS, JJ., agree."
]
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Case 2:19-bk-50340 Doc 4 Filed 01/21/19 Entered 01/21/19 15:09:14 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 2
Fill in this information to identify your case:
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Official Form 108 Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7 12/15
If you are an individual filing under chapter 7, you must fill out this form if: creditors have claims secured by your property, or you have leased personal property and the lease has not expired. You must file this form with the court within 30 days after you file your bankruptcy petition or by the date set for the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, unless the court extends the time for cause. You must also send copies to the creditors and lessors you list on the form
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Be as complete and accurate as possible. If more space is needed, attach a separate sheet to this form. On the top of any additional pages, write your name and case number (if known).
Part 1: List Your Creditors Who Have Secured Claims
1. For any creditors that you listed in Part 1 of Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property (Official Form 106D), fill in the information below. Identify the creditor and the property that is collateral What do you intend to do with the property that Did you claim the property secures a debt? as exempt on Schedule C?
Creditor's Huntington Bank Surrender the property. No name: Retain the property and redeem it. Retain the property and enter into a Yes Description of 18065 Marne Rd. Nashport, OH Reaffirmation Agreement. property 43830 Licking County Retain the property and [explain]: securing debt: Licking County Auditor Value
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Official Form 108 Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7 page 1
Software Copyright (c) 1996-2018 Best Case, LLC - www.bestcase.com Best Case Bankruptcy Case 2:19-bk-50340 Doc 4 Filed 01/21/19 Entered 01/21/19 15:09:14 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 2
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property Clean Retail Value Retain the property and [explain]: securing debt:
Part 2: List Your Unexpired Personal Property Leases For any unexpired personal property lease that you listed in Schedule G: Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases (Official Form 106G), fill in the information below. Do not list real estate leases. Unexpired leases are leases that are still in effect; the lease period has not yet ended. You may assume an unexpired personal property lease if the trustee does not assume it. 11 U.S.C. § 365(p)(2).
Describe your unexpired personal property leases Will the lease be assumed?
Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes
Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes
Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes
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Part 3: Sign Below
Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have indicated my intention about any property of my estate that secures a debt and any personal property that is subject to an unexpired lease.
X /s/ Lora Dawn Nethers X Lora Dawn Nethers Signature of Debtor 2 Signature of Debtor 1
Date January 21, 2019 Date
Official Form 108 Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7 page 2
Software Copyright (c) 1996-2018 Best Case, LLC - www.bestcase.com Best Case Bankruptcy | 2019-01-21 | [
"Case 2:19-bk-50340 Doc 4 Filed 01/21/19 Entered 01/21/19 15:09:14 Desc Main Document Page 1 of 2 Fill in this information to identify your case: Debtor 1 Lora Dawn Nethers First Name Middle Name Last Name Debtor 2 (Spouse if, filing) First Name Middle Name Last Name United States Bankruptcy Court for the: SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO Case number (if known) Check if this is an amended filing Official Form 108 Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7 12/15 If you are an individual filing under chapter 7, you must fill out this form if: creditors have claims secured by your property, or you have leased personal property and the lease has not expired.",
"You must file this form with the court within 30 days after you file your bankruptcy petition or by the date set for the meeting of creditors, whichever is earlier, unless the court extends the time for cause. You must also send copies to the creditors and lessors you list on the form If two married people are filing together in a joint case, both are equally responsible for supplying correct information. Both debtors must sign and date the form. Be as complete and accurate as possible. If more space is needed, attach a separate sheet to this form. On the top of any additional pages, write your name and case number (if known).",
"Part 1: List Your Creditors Who Have Secured Claims 1. For any creditors that you listed in Part 1 of Schedule D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property (Official Form 106D), fill in the information below. Identify the creditor and the property that is collateral What do you intend to do with the property that Did you claim the property secures a debt? as exempt on Schedule C? Creditor's Huntington Bank Surrender the property. No name: Retain the property and redeem it. Retain the property and enter into a Yes Description of 18065 Marne Rd. Nashport, OH Reaffirmation Agreement. property 43830 Licking County Retain the property and [explain]: securing debt: Licking County Auditor Value Creditor's OneMain Financial Surrender the property. No name: Retain the property and redeem it. Retain the property and enter into a Yes Description of 2014 Kawasaki KSF20BEF Reaffirmation Agreement. property 30,000 miles Retain the property and [explain]: securing debt: Debtor estimated value Creditor's Toyota Financial Services Surrender the property. No name: Retain the property and redeem it. Retain the property and enter into a Yes Description of 2016 Toyota Camry XLE 65,000 Reaffirmation Agreement. miles NADA Value Official Form 108 Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7 page 1 Software Copyright (c) 1996-2018 Best Case, LLC - www.bestcase.com Best Case Bankruptcy Case 2:19-bk-50340 Doc 4 Filed 01/21/19 Entered 01/21/19 15:09:14 Desc Main Document Page 2 of 2 Debtor 1 Lora Dawn Nethers Case number (if known) property Clean Retail Value Retain the property and [explain]: securing debt: Part 2: List Your Unexpired Personal Property Leases For any unexpired personal property lease that you listed in Schedule G: Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases (Official Form 106G), fill in the information below.",
"Do not list real estate leases. Unexpired leases are leases that are still in effect; the lease period has not yet ended. You may assume an unexpired personal property lease if the trustee does not assume it. 11 U.S.C. § 365(p)(2). Describe your unexpired personal property leases Will the lease be assumed? Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Lessor's name: No Description of leased Property: Yes Part 3: Sign Below Under penalty of perjury, I declare that I have indicated my intention about any property of my estate that secures a debt and any personal property that is subject to an unexpired lease.",
"X /s/ Lora Dawn Nethers X Lora Dawn Nethers Signature of Debtor 2 Signature of Debtor 1 Date January 21, 2019 Date Official Form 108 Statement of Intention for Individuals Filing Under Chapter 7 page 2 Software Copyright (c) 1996-2018 Best Case, LLC - www.bestcase.com Best Case Bankruptcy"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/58388015/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
H.O. Harkness died April 5, 1911, seised of certain real property, and leaving a wife and five minor children. Mrs. Harkness, as administratrix of the estate, sold certain of said property, which sales were attacked in Harkness v. Utah Power Light Co., 49 Idaho 756, 291 P. 1051, and Harkness v.Hartwick, 49 Idaho 794, 292 P. 592. Mr. J.H. Wylie Sessions later succeeded Mrs. Harkness as administrator, and sold the McCammon waterworks in question herein to J.C. Jensen, who in turn sold them to respondent. Appellants, the minor heirs, now of age, with the exception of one who appears by guardian, brought this action in time, under the authority of C. S., secs. 7652 and 7653, to set aside said sale. A general demurrer to the amended complaint was sustained. Various grounds of attack upon the proceedings leading up to the sale, other than fraud, urged herein, are sufficiently similar to those considered in the two cases mentioned above, to be controlled by the rulings therein, and are unavailing to appellant. One of the previous decisions did not pass on the ground of fraud: "No charge of fraud or inadequacy of price is alleged in the complaint; . . . ." (Harkness v. Utah Power Light Co.,supra.) The other held the complaint defective because *Page 571 it did not charge the purchaser with knowledge of, or participation in, the fraud, or that the heirs were damaged by the alleged fraudulent acts. The complaint herein alleges as follows: "That plaintiffs say they are informed and believe and upon that ground charge the facts to be, that the said J. Wylie Sessions, as administrator of the said estate, and the said J.C. Jensen, entered into a secret arrangement whereby the said Wylie Sessions did sell the entire property of the said estate for 90% of its appraised valuation, and that upon such sale being made the said Jensen did then transfer said property to various parties who had indicated to the said administrator their intention of buying certain portions of the same. That these plaintiffs are informed and believe and upon that ground charge the fact to be, that the said administrator, previous to the time that the sale of said property was made by him to the said Jensen, had received offers for said property in separate parcels from various parties which should have brought sums in excess of the amount actually received by and through the sale of the property in bulk to the said Jensen, and that notwithstanding said fact, the said administrator, in order that he and the said Jensen might profit by the sale of said property in bulk, conspired with each other to bring about the sale of the property in bulk. That the said administrator had, prior to the time that said sale was made to the said Jensen of the property of said Estate, received an offer from the Village of McCammon for the purchase of the said Gravity Water System in the sum of $10,000; and notwithstanding said fact, the said administrator, in order to carry out the secret arrangement made with the said Jensen, and for the purpose of defrauding the said Estate, unlawfully and wrongfully failed to report to the Probate Court an offer for the purchase of said property in the sum of $10,000, but concealed said fact and accepted a bid for all the property of said Estate, which included at said time the Gravity Water system, at a price less than the value of said property, and less by a sum of $2500.00 that *Page 572 the said administrator had been tendered and offered by the said Village of McCammon. That these plaintiffs are informed and believe and upon that ground charge the fact to be, that the defendant knew of the fraud that was being perpetrated by and between the said administrator and the said Jensen. "Plaintiffs further allege that the said J.C. Jensen did not have any money with which to consummate the purchase of said property for the sum of $85,000.00 or any considerable portion thereof, and that the said administrator well knew said fact and was merely using the said J.C. Jensen as an ostensible purchaser of said property in order to further his scheme to consummate the sale of the property of said Estate at a less value than that which it was reasonably worth, or that which he had been offered for the same. That the said defendants well knew that the said J.C. Jensen did not intend to buy the said Gravity Water System and knew that he was merely used as a go-between to permit the said Sessions and the said Jensen to carry out their schemes and to purchase the said property from the said Estate at a less amount than that which the said defendant was willing to pay for the same. That the last appraisal of said property sold to said Jensen valued the said property at $94,041.18." Such allegations were not in the other complaints. It is also alleged that the attorney for the minors was the attorney for the administrator who made the sale, and alleges fraud and collusion by reason thereof, and in connection therewith. Both under the implied holding in the previous decisions, and on other authority, the complaint herein as to fraud is sufficient. (Murray v. Southerland, 125 N.C. 175, 34 S.E. 270;Morton v. Blades Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 31, 56 S.E. 551; McQueenv. McDaniel, 18 Ky. Law, 954, 38 S.W. 880; 24 C. J. 675.) Collusion and conspiracy are considered as extrinsic fraud, hence available to appellants. (Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600, 10 Ann. Cas. 444, 88 P. 82, 9 L.R.A., N.S., *Page 573 524; 34 C. J. 474; 3 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 1235, p. 2576; Black on Judgments, sec. 370, p. 588.) Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer as to the fraud alleged, and permit an answer and trial. Costs to appellants. Lee, C.J., and Varian and McNaughton, JJ., concur. Budge, J., dissents. | 07-05-2016 | [
"H.O. Harkness died April 5, 1911, seised of certain real property, and leaving a wife and five minor children. Mrs. Harkness, as administratrix of the estate, sold certain of said property, which sales were attacked in Harkness v. Utah Power Light Co., 49 Idaho 756, 291 P. 1051, and Harkness v.Hartwick, 49 Idaho 794, 292 P. 592. Mr. J.H. Wylie Sessions later succeeded Mrs. Harkness as administrator, and sold the McCammon waterworks in question herein to J.C. Jensen, who in turn sold them to respondent. Appellants, the minor heirs, now of age, with the exception of one who appears by guardian, brought this action in time, under the authority of C. S., secs. 7652 and 7653, to set aside said sale.",
"A general demurrer to the amended complaint was sustained. Various grounds of attack upon the proceedings leading up to the sale, other than fraud, urged herein, are sufficiently similar to those considered in the two cases mentioned above, to be controlled by the rulings therein, and are unavailing to appellant. One of the previous decisions did not pass on the ground of fraud: \"No charge of fraud or inadequacy of price is alleged in the complaint; . . . .\" (Harkness v. Utah Power Light Co.,supra.) The other held the complaint defective because *Page 571 it did not charge the purchaser with knowledge of, or participation in, the fraud, or that the heirs were damaged by the alleged fraudulent acts. The complaint herein alleges as follows: \"That plaintiffs say they are informed and believe and upon that ground charge the facts to be, that the said J. Wylie Sessions, as administrator of the said estate, and the said J.C. Jensen, entered into a secret arrangement whereby the said Wylie Sessions did sell the entire property of the said estate for 90% of its appraised valuation, and that upon such sale being made the said Jensen did then transfer said property to various parties who had indicated to the said administrator their intention of buying certain portions of the same.",
"That these plaintiffs are informed and believe and upon that ground charge the fact to be, that the said administrator, previous to the time that the sale of said property was made by him to the said Jensen, had received offers for said property in separate parcels from various parties which should have brought sums in excess of the amount actually received by and through the sale of the property in bulk to the said Jensen, and that notwithstanding said fact, the said administrator, in order that he and the said Jensen might profit by the sale of said property in bulk, conspired with each other to bring about the sale of the property in bulk. That the said administrator had, prior to the time that said sale was made to the said Jensen of the property of said Estate, received an offer from the Village of McCammon for the purchase of the said Gravity Water System in the sum of $10,000; and notwithstanding said fact, the said administrator, in order to carry out the secret arrangement made with the said Jensen, and for the purpose of defrauding the said Estate, unlawfully and wrongfully failed to report to the Probate Court an offer for the purchase of said property in the sum of $10,000, but concealed said fact and accepted a bid for all the property of said Estate, which included at said time the Gravity Water system, at a price less than the value of said property, and less by a sum of $2500.00 that *Page 572 the said administrator had been tendered and offered by the said Village of McCammon.",
"That these plaintiffs are informed and believe and upon that ground charge the fact to be, that the defendant knew of the fraud that was being perpetrated by and between the said administrator and the said Jensen. \"Plaintiffs further allege that the said J.C. Jensen did not have any money with which to consummate the purchase of said property for the sum of $85,000.00 or any considerable portion thereof, and that the said administrator well knew said fact and was merely using the said J.C. Jensen as an ostensible purchaser of said property in order to further his scheme to consummate the sale of the property of said Estate at a less value than that which it was reasonably worth, or that which he had been offered for the same. That the said defendants well knew that the said J.C. Jensen did not intend to buy the said Gravity Water System and knew that he was merely used as a go-between to permit the said Sessions and the said Jensen to carry out their schemes and to purchase the said property from the said Estate at a less amount than that which the said defendant was willing to pay for the same.",
"That the last appraisal of said property sold to said Jensen valued the said property at $94,041.18.\" Such allegations were not in the other complaints. It is also alleged that the attorney for the minors was the attorney for the administrator who made the sale, and alleges fraud and collusion by reason thereof, and in connection therewith. Both under the implied holding in the previous decisions, and on other authority, the complaint herein as to fraud is sufficient. (Murray v. Southerland, 125 N.C. 175, 34 S.E. 270;Morton v. Blades Lumber Co., 144 N.C. 31, 56 S.E. 551; McQueenv. McDaniel, 18 Ky. Law, 954, 38 S.W. 880; 24 C. J. 675.) Collusion and conspiracy are considered as extrinsic fraud, hence available to appellants. (Donovan v. Miller, 12 Idaho 600, 10 Ann. Cas. 444, 88 P. 82, 9 L.R.A., N.S., *Page 573 524; 34 C. J. 474; 3 Freeman on Judgments, sec. 1235, p. 2576; Black on Judgments, sec.",
"370, p. 588.) Judgment reversed and cause remanded, with instructions to overrule the demurrer as to the fraud alleged, and permit an answer and trial. Costs to appellants. Lee, C.J., and Varian and McNaughton, JJ., concur. Budge, J., dissents."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/3409524/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Per Curiam.
Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the requested writ of mandamus. The court of appeals determined that appellee district board did not possess a clear legal duty pursuant to R.C. 343.012(B) to ascertain, apportion, and equitably divide the assets of the six-county district. The court of appeals concluded that the district board had substantially complied *614with R.C. 343.012(B). In so holding, the court of appeals declined to address the issue of whether appellants possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a preliminary matter, the appellee board asserts that appellants are not entitled to a writ of mandamus because appellants possess an adequate remedy at law, i.e., an action to vacate the counties’ June 1993 contract. See R.C. 2731.05 (writ of mandamus will not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law). However, it is evident that appellants seek to enforce R.C. 343.012(B). While mandamus may not ordinarily be employed as a substitute for an action at law to recover money, underlying public duties having their basis in law may be compelled by a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Levin v. Schremp (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 733, 735, 654 N.E.2d 1258, 1260. In addition, although a writ of mandamus cannot issue to control a public body’s exercise of discretion, it can be issued to compel the public body to exercise such discretion when it has a clear legal duty to do so. See State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 534, 653 N.E.2d 349, 354. Mandamus is also appropriate to correct any abuse of discretion in the proceedings of the district board. See, e.g., State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701, 704-705; State ex rel. Kelly v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 413, 414, 639 N.E.2d 78, 79. Based on the foregoing, appellants properly sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district board to comply with R.C. 343.012(B), since appellants do not possess an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As to the remaining prerequisites for a writ of mandamus, i.e., clear legal right and clear legal duty, appellants contend that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the district board had complied with R.C. 343.012(B). R.C. 343.012(B) provides: “ * * * Upon the withdrawal of a county from a joint district, the board of directors shall ascertain, apportion, and order a division of the funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district, either in money or in kind, on any equitable basis between the district and the withdrawing county consistent with the agreement to establish and maintain the district entered into and ratified under division (A) of section 343.01 of the Revised Code and the prior contributions of the withdrawing county.” “In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. * * * In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.” State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. Under R.C. 343.012(B), after the withdrawal of counties from a joint solid waste management district, the board of directors of the district must (1) ascertain, (2) apportion, and *615(3) order an equitable division of certain assets of the district consistent with the initial agreement establishing the district and prior contributions of the withdrawing counties. Upon withdrawal, the district board must initially “ascertain” the funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district. In that “ascertain” is not defined in R.C. Chapter 343, it must be accorded its usual, normal or customary meaning. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 651 N.E.2d 995, 998; R.C. 1.42. “Ascertain” means “to render certain or definite.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 114. The minutes of the six-county district board’s 1993 meetings reveal no ascertainment of the district assets specified in R.C. 343.012(B). Jackson County Commissioner Robert Willis conceded that the June 1993 meeting minutes did not reflect any discussion of the nature, extent, or amount of the six-county district’s assets other than a brief reference to the counties’ June 1993 agreement. The counties’ June 1993 agreement merely stated that the counties “now desire to ascertain, ap[p]ortion and order a division” of the district assets but did not evidence any actual ascertainment of district assets. The court of appeals relied on evidence that the counties had access to district balance sheets and financial information to conclude that the six-county board substantially complied with the requirement of R.C. 343.012(B) to ascertain district assets. However, Willis admitted that without the district fiscal officers present at the board’s June 11, 1993 meeting, the board would not have had access to any comprehensive financial reports. Additionally, Gallia County Commissioner Harold Montgomery testified that the district balance sheets merely showed the amounts appropriated for the use of the district and did not reflect the revenues received by the district. Finally, the court of appeals itself noted that the district balance sheets did not include all of the pertinent assets. Accordingly, it is evident that the district board did not comply with the R.C. 343.012(B) requirement of ascertaining district assets. The court of appeals further concluded that the six-county board substantially complied with the R.C. 343.012(B) requirements of apportionment and equitable division of district assets. The court of appeals determined that the division, which was based on the district board’s December 1993 financial report and which gave appellants less than ten percent of the six-county district’s assets, was equitable because appellants secured the remaining counties’ consent to their withdrawal by promising to limit their demands to a maximum of $50,000, which is what they received. The court of appeals erred in so holding for the following reasons. Initially, R.C. 343.012(B) presupposes the remaining counties’ consent to the withdrawal of other counties prior to the imposition of the specified duties, which only arise *616“[u]pon the withdrawal of a county from a joint district * * Therefore, the consent of the remaining counties is not considered in determining the existence of a duty to equitably divide district assets. As appellants note, consent to withdrawal is not one of the assets specified in R.C. 343.012(B) (“funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district”). Second, the equitable division of district assets must be consistent with the counties’ initial agreement to establish and maintain the district and the prior contributions of the withdrawing counties. R.C. 343.012(B). The record discloses a recitation in the counties’ June 1993 agreement that the district board considered the counties’ original agreement and the prior contributions of Athens and Hocking Counties. However, according to the counties’ 1989 agreement, appellants were responsible for approximately forty-six percent of the six-county district’s costs and operating expenses if the district fees were insufficient to cover these costs and expenses. Receiving less than ten percent of the district assets under these circumstances does not appear equitable for purposes of R.C. 343.012(B). Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in holding that the district board substantially complied with R.C. 343.012(B). However, a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis thereof. State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 637 N.E.2d 306, 309. Appellees pled several affirmative defenses in their answer to appellants’ amended complaint, including waiver. Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. State ex rel. Ryan v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 362, 368, 643 N.E.2d 1122, 1128. “ ‘As a general rule, the doctrine of waiver is applicable to all personal rights and privileges, whether secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the Constitution, provided that the waiver does not violate public policy.’ ” Sanitary Commercial Serv., Inc. v. Shank (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 178, 180, 566 N.E.2d 1215, 1218, quoting State ex rel. Hess v. Akron (1937), 132 Ohio St. 305, 307, 8 O.O. 76, 77, 7 N.E.2d 411, 413. In Shank, supra, we held that a party aggrieved by an order from the Director of Environmental Protection could waive his statutory right to appeal by entering into a settlement agreement supported by sufficient consideration. Similarly, in the case at bar, appellants Athens and Hocking Counties entered into the June 1993 agreement with the remaining four counties. The agreement specifically referred to the R.C. 343.012(B) division of district assets and provided that Athens and Hocking Counties “release and forever discharge the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District, their successors and/or assigns, from all debts, claims,. demands, damages, *617actions, causes of action whatsoever, past, present or future which can or may ever be asserted.” Six-county district Board Chairman Daubenmier conceded that the plain language of the counties’ June 1993 agreement waived any claim that the withdrawing counties possessed. The agreement was signed by all of the commissioners of Athens and Hocking Counties as well as by their respective counsel. It was supported by sufficient consideration, ie., the consent of the remaining four counties to the withdrawal. Without the withdrawing counties’ agreement to accept a maximum potential amount of $50,000 as the proposed R.C. 343.012(B) division of district assets, the remaining counties would not have consented to their withdrawal. Further, as the court of appeals determined, the June 1993 agreement was not against public.policy. See Gugle v. Loeser (1944), 143 Ohio St. 362, 28 O.O. 318, 55 N.E.2d 580, paragraph one of the syllabus (“Agreements voluntarily and fairly made between competent persons are usually valid and enforceable, and the principle that agreements opposed to public policy are not enforceable should be applied cautiously and only in circumstances patently within the reasons on which that doctrine rests.”). Although the withdrawing counties did not receive what they might have been entitled to under a division of district assets pursuant to R.C. 343.012(B), their resolutions confirmed that their withdrawal from the six-county district was in their best interests. There is nothing in R.C. Chapter 343 which precludes withdrawing counties from waiving their right to ascertainment, apportionment, and equitable division of district assets under R.C. 343.012(B) in order to receive the remaining counties’ consent to their withdrawal. Cf. Shank, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 181, 566 N.E.2d at 1218 (nothing in Ohio Constitution or in R.C. Chapter 3745 bars waiver of right to appeal). In addition, settlement agreements such as the June 1993 agreement executed by the parties here are valid, enforceable, and highly favored in the law. Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502, 660 N.E.2d 431, 432. For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals properly denied the writ of mandamus. It would be incongruous to permit appellants, who voluntarily signed the agreement while represented by counsel, to obtain the benefits of the June 1993 agreement (the consent of the remaining counties to their withdrawal from the six-county district plus up to $50,000 in planning expenses for their new district) without accepting the accompanying burdens (release of any claims, including those under R.C. 343.012[B], to further district assets). See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland Hts./Univ. Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 652 N.E.2d 750, 752. Finally, as the court of appeals noted, “[i]f the contract is invalid, then the consents are invalid * * * [and] the clear legal *618duty required of respondents under R.C. 343.012(B) to equitably divide the assets would not arise until the consents were obtained.” Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Stratton, JJ., concur. | 07-21-2022 | [
"Per Curiam. Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in denying the requested writ of mandamus. The court of appeals determined that appellee district board did not possess a clear legal duty pursuant to R.C. 343.012(B) to ascertain, apportion, and equitably divide the assets of the six-county district. The court of appeals concluded that the district board had substantially complied *614with R.C. 343.012(B). In so holding, the court of appeals declined to address the issue of whether appellants possessed an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As a preliminary matter, the appellee board asserts that appellants are not entitled to a writ of mandamus because appellants possess an adequate remedy at law, i.e., an action to vacate the counties’ June 1993 contract. See R.C. 2731.05 (writ of mandamus will not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law).",
"However, it is evident that appellants seek to enforce R.C. 343.012(B). While mandamus may not ordinarily be employed as a substitute for an action at law to recover money, underlying public duties having their basis in law may be compelled by a writ of mandamus. State ex rel. Levin v. Schremp (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 733, 735, 654 N.E.2d 1258, 1260. In addition, although a writ of mandamus cannot issue to control a public body’s exercise of discretion, it can be issued to compel the public body to exercise such discretion when it has a clear legal duty to do so.",
"See State ex rel. Huntington Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Duryee (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 530, 534, 653 N.E.2d 349, 354. Mandamus is also appropriate to correct any abuse of discretion in the proceedings of the district board. See, e.g., State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701, 704-705; State ex rel. Kelly v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 413, 414, 639 N.E.2d 78, 79. Based on the foregoing, appellants properly sought a writ of mandamus to compel the district board to comply with R.C. 343.012(B), since appellants do not possess an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As to the remaining prerequisites for a writ of mandamus, i.e., clear legal right and clear legal duty, appellants contend that the court of appeals erred in concluding that the district board had complied with R.C. 343.012(B). R.C.",
"343.012(B) provides: “ * * * Upon the withdrawal of a county from a joint district, the board of directors shall ascertain, apportion, and order a division of the funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district, either in money or in kind, on any equitable basis between the district and the withdrawing county consistent with the agreement to establish and maintain the district entered into and ratified under division (A) of section 343.01 of the Revised Code and the prior contributions of the withdrawing county.” “In construing a statute, a court’s paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute. * * * In determining legislative intent, the court first looks to the language in the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.” State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594-595, 589 N.E.2d 1319, 1323. Under R.C. 343.012(B), after the withdrawal of counties from a joint solid waste management district, the board of directors of the district must (1) ascertain, (2) apportion, and *615(3) order an equitable division of certain assets of the district consistent with the initial agreement establishing the district and prior contributions of the withdrawing counties. Upon withdrawal, the district board must initially “ascertain” the funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district. In that “ascertain” is not defined in R.C.",
"Chapter 343, it must be accorded its usual, normal or customary meaning. State ex rel. Herman v. Klopfleisch (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 581, 584, 651 N.E.2d 995, 998; R.C. 1.42. “Ascertain” means “to render certain or definite.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6 Ed.1990) 114. The minutes of the six-county district board’s 1993 meetings reveal no ascertainment of the district assets specified in R.C. 343.012(B). Jackson County Commissioner Robert Willis conceded that the June 1993 meeting minutes did not reflect any discussion of the nature, extent, or amount of the six-county district’s assets other than a brief reference to the counties’ June 1993 agreement. The counties’ June 1993 agreement merely stated that the counties “now desire to ascertain, ap[p]ortion and order a division” of the district assets but did not evidence any actual ascertainment of district assets. The court of appeals relied on evidence that the counties had access to district balance sheets and financial information to conclude that the six-county board substantially complied with the requirement of R.C.",
"343.012(B) to ascertain district assets. However, Willis admitted that without the district fiscal officers present at the board’s June 11, 1993 meeting, the board would not have had access to any comprehensive financial reports. Additionally, Gallia County Commissioner Harold Montgomery testified that the district balance sheets merely showed the amounts appropriated for the use of the district and did not reflect the revenues received by the district. Finally, the court of appeals itself noted that the district balance sheets did not include all of the pertinent assets. Accordingly, it is evident that the district board did not comply with the R.C. 343.012(B) requirement of ascertaining district assets.",
"The court of appeals further concluded that the six-county board substantially complied with the R.C. 343.012(B) requirements of apportionment and equitable division of district assets. The court of appeals determined that the division, which was based on the district board’s December 1993 financial report and which gave appellants less than ten percent of the six-county district’s assets, was equitable because appellants secured the remaining counties’ consent to their withdrawal by promising to limit their demands to a maximum of $50,000, which is what they received. The court of appeals erred in so holding for the following reasons.",
"Initially, R.C. 343.012(B) presupposes the remaining counties’ consent to the withdrawal of other counties prior to the imposition of the specified duties, which only arise *616“[u]pon the withdrawal of a county from a joint district * * Therefore, the consent of the remaining counties is not considered in determining the existence of a duty to equitably divide district assets. As appellants note, consent to withdrawal is not one of the assets specified in R.C.",
"343.012(B) (“funds on hand, credits, and real and personal property of the district”). Second, the equitable division of district assets must be consistent with the counties’ initial agreement to establish and maintain the district and the prior contributions of the withdrawing counties. R.C. 343.012(B). The record discloses a recitation in the counties’ June 1993 agreement that the district board considered the counties’ original agreement and the prior contributions of Athens and Hocking Counties. However, according to the counties’ 1989 agreement, appellants were responsible for approximately forty-six percent of the six-county district’s costs and operating expenses if the district fees were insufficient to cover these costs and expenses. Receiving less than ten percent of the district assets under these circumstances does not appear equitable for purposes of R.C. 343.012(B). Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals erred in holding that the district board substantially complied with R.C. 343.012(B).",
"However, a reviewing court is not authorized to reverse a correct judgment merely because erroneous reasons were assigned as a basis thereof. State ex rel. Carter v. Schotten (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 89, 92, 637 N.E.2d 306, 309. Appellees pled several affirmative defenses in their answer to appellants’ amended complaint, including waiver. Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right. State ex rel. Ryan v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 362, 368, 643 N.E.2d 1122, 1128. “ ‘As a general rule, the doctrine of waiver is applicable to all personal rights and privileges, whether secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the Constitution, provided that the waiver does not violate public policy.’ ” Sanitary Commercial Serv., Inc. v. Shank (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 178, 180, 566 N.E.2d 1215, 1218, quoting State ex rel. Hess v. Akron (1937), 132 Ohio St. 305, 307, 8 O.O.",
"76, 77, 7 N.E.2d 411, 413. In Shank, supra, we held that a party aggrieved by an order from the Director of Environmental Protection could waive his statutory right to appeal by entering into a settlement agreement supported by sufficient consideration. Similarly, in the case at bar, appellants Athens and Hocking Counties entered into the June 1993 agreement with the remaining four counties. The agreement specifically referred to the R.C. 343.012(B) division of district assets and provided that Athens and Hocking Counties “release and forever discharge the Athens, Gallia, Hocking, Jackson, Meigs, and Vinton Joint Solid Waste Management District, their successors and/or assigns, from all debts, claims,. demands, damages, *617actions, causes of action whatsoever, past, present or future which can or may ever be asserted.” Six-county district Board Chairman Daubenmier conceded that the plain language of the counties’ June 1993 agreement waived any claim that the withdrawing counties possessed. The agreement was signed by all of the commissioners of Athens and Hocking Counties as well as by their respective counsel.",
"It was supported by sufficient consideration, ie., the consent of the remaining four counties to the withdrawal. Without the withdrawing counties’ agreement to accept a maximum potential amount of $50,000 as the proposed R.C. 343.012(B) division of district assets, the remaining counties would not have consented to their withdrawal. Further, as the court of appeals determined, the June 1993 agreement was not against public.policy. See Gugle v. Loeser (1944), 143 Ohio St. 362, 28 O.O. 318, 55 N.E.2d 580, paragraph one of the syllabus (“Agreements voluntarily and fairly made between competent persons are usually valid and enforceable, and the principle that agreements opposed to public policy are not enforceable should be applied cautiously and only in circumstances patently within the reasons on which that doctrine rests.”). Although the withdrawing counties did not receive what they might have been entitled to under a division of district assets pursuant to R.C. 343.012(B), their resolutions confirmed that their withdrawal from the six-county district was in their best interests.",
"There is nothing in R.C. Chapter 343 which precludes withdrawing counties from waiving their right to ascertainment, apportionment, and equitable division of district assets under R.C. 343.012(B) in order to receive the remaining counties’ consent to their withdrawal. Cf. Shank, supra, 57 Ohio St.3d at 181, 566 N.E.2d at 1218 (nothing in Ohio Constitution or in R.C. Chapter 3745 bars waiver of right to appeal). In addition, settlement agreements such as the June 1993 agreement executed by the parties here are valid, enforceable, and highly favored in the law. Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502, 660 N.E.2d 431, 432. For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals properly denied the writ of mandamus. It would be incongruous to permit appellants, who voluntarily signed the agreement while represented by counsel, to obtain the benefits of the June 1993 agreement (the consent of the remaining counties to their withdrawal from the six-county district plus up to $50,000 in planning expenses for their new district) without accepting the accompanying burdens (release of any claims, including those under R.C.",
"343.012[B], to further district assets). See State ex rel. Johnson v. Cleveland Hts./Univ. Hts. School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 189, 192, 652 N.E.2d 750, 752. Finally, as the court of appeals noted, “[i]f the contract is invalid, then the consents are invalid * * * [and] the clear legal *618duty required of respondents under R.C. 343.012(B) to equitably divide the assets would not arise until the consents were obtained.” Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. Moyer, C.J., Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney, Pfeifer, Cook and Stratton, JJ., concur."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/6773717/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
EXHIBIT 31.1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(a) I, James C. Granger, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010, of Wireless Ronin Technologies, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. Dated: May 7, 2010 By: /s/ James C. Granger James C. Granger President and Chief Executive Officer | [
"EXHIBIT 31.1 CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO EXCHANGE ACT RULE 13a-14(a) I, James C. Granger, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2010, of Wireless Ronin Technologies, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4.",
"The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5.",
"The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. Dated: May 7, 2010 By: /s/ James C. Granger James C. Granger President and Chief Executive Officer"
]
| https://applica-public.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/contract-discovery/edgar.txt.xz | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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b' CLOSEOUT FOR M97110040\n\n\n\n On 3 November 1997, a program officer\' informed OIG that he had received an allegation of\n violation of confidential peer review and intellectual theft from a scientist2 he spoke with\n during a site visit. The scientist said while he was attending a recent professional meeting3\n he had been told by some colleagues that two researchers4(subjects 1 and 2) who collaborate\n together had begun a project on the idea described in his NSF proposalsS and that one of\n subject 1\'s graduate students6had abruptly changed research projects to one that the scientist\n suspected was based on his idea. He thought that these researchers\' interests were different\n from his own and that they had become interested in this area after receiving his NSF\n proposals for peer review. He believed the ideas had been taken from his proposals, but he\n had been unable to check the meeting abstracts to see if their work was related to his idea.\n\n Consistent with NSF policy to keep the identity of reviewers confidential, OIG neither\n affirms nor denies that either subject, or their collaborators, were involved in the review of\n the scientist\'s proposal. OIG provided the scientist with copies of abstracts from the meeting\n that had been published by the two researchers7 and asked for his assessment of the similarity\n of their content to his proposal idea. The scientist said he had carefully reviewed the pattern\n of subject 1\'s research, and had concluded that the subject was "already working along a\n convergent path" to the scientist\'s work. He believed it was possible that the subject could\n have come up with the same ideas before, or at the same time, he had. He also said that he\n had reviewed subject 2\'s work. He concluded that subject 2\'s work that was related to his\n was derived from subject 2\'s collaboration with subject 1.\n\n\n\n\n -\n OIG concluded that there was no substance to the allegation of violation of confidential peer\n review. This inquiry is closed and no further action will be taken in this case.\n\n cc: Staff Scientist, Legal, AIG-Oversight, IG\n\n \' The program officer is D r . He is a program officer for sensory systems in the\n program of the Division in the Driecotraet-,b\n The scientist is Dr. h a faculty member in the Department 0 4at\n-university b- lni\n \' The meeting was the m n n u a l meeting of the p-\n The first researcher, su a faculty member in the Department o-f\nt the University her, subject 2,-si a faculty member in\n the Department-a-university.\n \'The scientist had submitted three proposals to NSF, only two of which are relevant to this case. These ar-\n -and its revision, Proposal i ) - 4\n s entitled\n . Proposal is\n entitled Both\n proposals were declined.\n The graduate student\'s identity is unknown.\n \' The abstracts are available on the internet at http://www-bstract.htrn.\n\n page 1 of 1\n\x0c' | 1998 | [
"b' CLOSEOUT FOR M97110040\\n\\n\\n\\n On 3 November 1997, a program officer\\' informed OIG that he had received an allegation of\\n violation of confidential peer review and intellectual theft from a scientist2 he spoke with\\n during a site visit. The scientist said while he was attending a recent professional meeting3\\n he had been told by some colleagues that two researchers4(subjects 1 and 2) who collaborate\\n together had begun a project on the idea described in his NSF proposalsS and that one of\\n subject 1\\'s graduate students6had abruptly changed research projects to one that the scientist\\n suspected was based on his idea.",
"He thought that these researchers\\' interests were different\\n from his own and that they had become interested in this area after receiving his NSF\\n proposals for peer review. He believed the ideas had been taken from his proposals, but he\\n had been unable to check the meeting abstracts to see if their work was related to his idea.\\n\\n Consistent with NSF policy to keep the identity of reviewers confidential, OIG neither\\n affirms nor denies that either subject, or their collaborators, were involved in the review of\\n the scientist\\'s proposal. OIG provided the scientist with copies of abstracts from the meeting\\n that had been published by the two researchers7 and asked for his assessment of the similarity\\n of their content to his proposal idea.",
"The scientist said he had carefully reviewed the pattern\\n of subject 1\\'s research, and had concluded that the subject was \"already working along a\\n convergent path\" to the scientist\\'s work. He believed it was possible that the subject could\\n have come up with the same ideas before, or at the same time, he had. He also said that he\\n had reviewed subject 2\\'s work. He concluded that subject 2\\'s work that was related to his\\n was derived from subject 2\\'s collaboration with subject 1.\\n\\n\\n\\n\\n -\\n OIG concluded that there was no substance to the allegation of violation of confidential peer\\n review. This inquiry is closed and no further action will be taken in this case.\\n\\n cc: Staff Scientist, Legal, AIG-Oversight, IG\\n\\n \\' The program officer is D r . He is a program officer for sensory systems in the\\n program of the Division in the Driecotraet-,b\\n The scientist is Dr. h a faculty member in the Department 0 4at\\n-university b- lni\\n \\' The meeting was the m n n u a l meeting of the p-\\n The first researcher, su a faculty member in the Department o-f\\nt the University her, subject 2,-si a faculty member in\\n the Department-a-university.\\n \\'The scientist had submitted three proposals to NSF, only two of which are relevant to this case. These ar-\\n -and its revision, Proposal i ) - 4\\n s entitled\\n .",
"Proposal is\\n entitled Both\\n proposals were declined.\\n The graduate student\\'s identity is unknown.\\n \\' The abstracts are available on the internet at http://www-bstract.htrn.\\n\\n page 1 of 1\\n\\x0c'"
]
| https://archive.org/download/us-inspectors-general.bulk/us-inspectors-general.bulk.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Exhibit Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-35535 of Sun Bancorp, Inc. on Form S-8 of our report dated June 29, 2007, relating to the statement of net assets as of December 31, 2006, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 11-K of the Sun National Bank 401(k) Plan for the year ended December 31, 2007. /s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP Philadelphia, Pennsylvania June | [
"Exhibit Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statement No. 333-35535 of Sun Bancorp, Inc. on Form S-8 of our report dated June 29, 2007, relating to the statement of net assets as of December 31, 2006, appearing in the Annual Report on Form 11-K of the Sun National Bank 401(k) Plan for the year ended December 31, 2007. /s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP Philadelphia, Pennsylvania June"
]
| https://applica-public.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/contract-discovery/edgar.txt.xz | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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50 Haw. 130 (1967) 433 P.2d 131 STATE OF HAWAII v. FRANK KAMAHALU KEKAUALUA. No. 4626. Supreme Court of Hawaii. November 1, 1967. RICHARDSON, C.J., MIZUHA, MARUMOTO, LEVINSON, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KING IN PLACE OF ABE, J., DISQUALIFIED. George S. Yuda (Ushijima, Nakamoto and Yuda of counsel) for defendant-appellant. Mamoru Shimokusu, Deputy County Attorney (Yoshito Tanaka, County Attorney, with him on the brief) for plaintiff-appellee. OPINION OF THE COURT BY MIZUHA, J. Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to rape. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending first, that the evidence is insufficient to prove he "intended to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by force and against her will"; and second, that he "was not identified beyond a reasonable doubt to be the person who committed the offense." Both contentions are without merit. The complainant testified to the effect she was asleep on her bed when suddenly awakened to find her assailant with his face covered with a pair of her panties sitting on her thighs with his legs on both sides of her body. The assailant had his hands around her throat and was lightly massaging it. As she screamed and struggled with her assailant, the sheet which covered her slipped down and her body, dressed only in a pantie, was exposed. The complainant was menstruating at the time and her pad was soaked through to her pantie, which was bloody. He was crouched over her in a bent position and she was unable to move her arms *131 as they were pinned to the bed. When the sheet slipped down, the assailant moaned and groaned as he looked down on her body and then punched her in the left eye three or four times, saying several times, "shut up, woman." The assailant had not removed his trousers and complainant was unable to state that he had his zipper down. As complainant continued screaming, he got off the bed, took off the pantie from his face and ran out the rear door. The complainant wrapped a sheet around her body and ran after her assailant. As she was standing by her mailbox she saw him get into a red car with a black top, which was a convertible. She went back into her home, wrote down the license number which she testified to as "311624," and then ran to her neighbor's home for help. She told the neighbor that a man was trying to kill her. As a result of the attack, her neck and the area of her face surrounding her eye were bruised. Complainant was unable to identify her assailant but could generally describe his physical features. However, she identified the defendant as being the person who had wandered into the basement of her house two or three weeks before the incident, ostensibly looking for the owner of the house for whom he worked several years before. Defendant admitted he owned a red and black Oldsmobile convertible, license number 3H624. The general physical description of the defendant and his car by the complaining witness and her neighbor who saw him leave the residence, together with the testimony of the witnesses who placed a red colored car near the home of the complainant, point to the defendant as the person who committed the offense. A police officer also testified that on the same morning he pursued defendant who was driving away from the complainant's home at a high rate of speed at a point two miles from said home. After talking to defendant at approximately 8:15 a.m., he returned to routine patrolling. At 8:17 a.m., he received a call in his car to investigate the complaint made by the complainant. Defendant denied being at complainant's home two or three weeks prior to the incident and testified that he was nowhere near complainant's residence that morning. However, he did state that no *132 one other than himself had driven his car during the morning of the incident. His alibi was rejected by the jury. The crime of assault with intent to commit rape requires the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an assault, with the specific intent to have intercourse, and with the specific intent to use sufficient force to overcome the woman's will. The jury's finding of the requisite intent and force is clearly reflected in its verdict. See Territory v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350, 353; State v. Dizon, 47 Haw. 444, 465, 390 P.2d 759, 771. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence. State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54. When a jury verdict involves conflicting evidence and depends on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury. Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492; State v. Carvelo, supra at 33; State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 251, 377 P.2d 688, 692; State v. Arena, 46 Haw. 315, 324, 379 P.2d 594, 601; State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 533, 423 P.2d 438, 445. There is substantial evidence on the record to warrant the verdict against the defendant. Judgment affirmed. CONCURRING OPINION OF LEVINSON, J. I agree with the majority opinion that the conviction should be affirmed. I believe, however, that we should clarify the test we use in reviewing convictions in criminal cases, and the precise way in which the test functions. Moreover, I think we should recognize the difficulty inherent in establishing the requisite *133 elements of specific intent, which I do not think the majority opinion does.
Test on Appeal in Criminal Cases As the majority opinion indicates, there are several decisions of this court stating the test to be applied in reviewing a conviction. After scrutinizing those cases, I find little discussion justifying the test and little indication of how the test is to be applied. As one member of the court, I think it is our duty, particularly in criminal cases, to be precise not only as to the applicable test, but also as to the manner in which it functions. I do not think that the majority opinion or our previous decisions satisfy either of the requirements. The majority opinion says: "* * * the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury." Our most recent prior pronouncement in this area was in State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 423 P.2d 438 (1967), where this court approvingly quoted from a previous case the test to be applied: "The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact." 49 Haw. at 533, 423 P.2d at 445, quoting from State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw. 245, 251, 377 P.2d 688, 692 (1962). In that case we also quoted favorably from State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54 (1961), that the court must affirm a conviction if there is "any substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla." Our prior cases make clear, and I agree, that "this court will not attempt to reconcile conflicting evidence," Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492 (1952), and that the court should not interfere with a jury decision based on "credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence," State v. Carvelo, supra at 33, 361 P.2d at 54. I do not think that these decisions should be interpreted to preclude this court from determining whether, as a *134 matter of law, the evidence is such that reasonable men should have a reasonable doubt as to an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. This is the place at which I part company with the majority opinion. I would limit the aforementioned cases specifying the test to be applied on appeal to review of the jury's factual conclusions. I would permit this court to inquire into the range of reasonable inferences from the facts as found and supported by substantial evidence. As to basic test to be used in determining whether the jury's factual conclusions should be sustained, I find that the phrase "substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla," is inherently inconsistent. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957) defines "scintilla of evidence" as "a metaphorical expression to describe a very insignificant or trifling item or particle of evidence." The inconsistency between equating substantial evidence with evidence barely exceeding an insignificant quantum is obvious. If substantial evidence is necessary, the qualifying phrase is meaningless and confusing and therefore should be omitted. If only more than a scintilla is necessary, less than substantial evidence is sufficient. I would accept the jury's finding of fact where it is supported by substantial evidence, defined as evidence which would justify a reasonable man in making the finding. Once the facts are established by applying the foregoing test, this court has the obligation to determine whether the jury acted in accordance with the proper legal standard in finding that the defendant was guilty. We must determine whether the facts were capable of a reasonable inference of innocence. If they were, the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty. If in such circumstances it failed to do so and the jury convicted the defendant, it is clear that the jury applied an incorrect standard in its deliberations. Its duty is to acquit the defendant unless the evidence excludes every reasonable inference of innocence. It is improper for a jury to weigh two conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which is consistent with innocence, and to determine which is the more probable. As long as there is a reasonable inference of innocence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof. This approach does not require the court to *135 weigh evidence or to determine credibility of witnesses. It requires the court to protect a defendant from being convicted by less than the constitutionally mandated standard. I recognize that this distinction may not have been expressed in prior decisions by other appellate courts. However, it has been held that a court may reverse a conviction where it determines that it is "impossible that a jury of reasonable men could have fairly reached the conclusion that the appellant, in what he did, necessarily intended to commit rape." Hammond v. United States, 127 F.2d 752, 753 (D.C. Cir.1942). It is a short step from this type of analysis, determining whether any reasonable inference would be consistent with guilt, to an inquiry into whether any reasonable inference would be consistent with innocence. Adopting a similar approach, the supreme court of Utah affirmed a conviction on the grounds that We conclude that the finding of the court that the evidence excluded all reasonable doubt of his intention to commit rape was within the bounds of reason. State v. Waters, 122 Utah 592, 596, 253 P.2d 357, 359 (1953). In reviewing the conviction in this case, I accept, as the majority opinion does, the prosecutrix's testimony, but I think that we must determine whether such testimony justifies a reasonable man in having a reasonable doubt as to an essential element of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape.
Intent to Have Intercourse I agree that the evidence would not support a reasonable inference that the defendant did not intend to have intercourse with the prosecutrix. But I think that the question of an individual's state of mind is so complex and so difficult to determine that we should indicate precisely the evidence supporting our conclusion. The defendant had masked his face, entered the bedroom, climbed on the bed, was straddling the sleeping woman, and was stroking her neck. On the other hand, he had not removed his trousers and there was no evidence that he had unzipped his trousers. He had climbed on the prosecutrix without removing *136 the sheet from her body, and he had begun by stroking her neck and not her genitals. The facts in each assault with intent to rape case generally differ from all the others and I have been unable to find, and counsel have not cited, any case with substantially the same facts. In the leading case in this jurisdiction, Territory v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350 (1949), this court sustained a conviction on proof that the defendant broke into his neighbor's bedroom at night, touched the sleeping prosecutrix's genitals, and, while standing beside her, started to remove his trousers. In the instant case, the defendant was in a position to have intercourse but had not removed his trousers. The defendant's lack of preparation would appear to provide some grounds for distinguishing the present case from the Noguchi case. It must be recognized, however, that the defendant's exposure of his body is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of intent to have intercourse, People v. Meichtry, 37 Cal. 2d 385, 389, 231 P.2d 847, 849 (1951). There are cases in other jurisdictions where convictions were reversed on evidence showing merely that the defendant broke into the woman's house or attacked her in an isolated place by grabbing her throat or throwing her onto the ground, People v. Bridges, 28 Ill. 2d 165, 190 N.E.2d 719, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Spurlock v. State, 130 So. 155 (Miss. 1930); Mungilla v. State, 118 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938). In the Spurlock case, the defendant, a negro, broke into a woman's house, grabbed her throat and choked her. She screamed and he opened a knife. When she continued to scream, he ran away. The main difference between this case and the Spurlock case, where the court stated it "painstakingly examined this record" and found no evidence of any intention by the defendant "to gratify lust," 130 So. at 156, is that here the defendant was straddling over the woman. It is not inconceivable that the defendant was interested in something less than intercourse but I think the facts as the jury must have found them were insufficient, although barely so, to support a reasonable inference that the defendant was interested in something other than intercourse.
*137 Intent to Use Force
The majority opinion does not discuss the issue of intent to use force. Invariably the basic assault will involve some use of force. The force which the defendant must intend to use is that necessary to overcome the prosecutrix's resistance. The use of force merely to quiet a screaming woman is not sufficient, cf. People v. Richardson, 18 Ill. 2d 329, 333, 164 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1960). The evidence is not as clear as the majority opinion intimates. If the defendant had intended to use force, the most natural thing for him to have done while the prosecutrix was still asleep would have been to prepare himself by removing or unzipping his trousers. He would have removed the sheet. He would not have awakened the prosecutrix by massaging her neck lightly. When he punched her, he may have been trying to quiet her and not to overcome her will. If these facts stood alone, I would find them sufficient to justify a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to use force to overcome her will. There are, however, other facts which vitiate whatever doubt those facts create. The defendant had pinned her arms before waking her. He said nothing to attempt to convince her to yield willingly. He continued to struggle with her even after it was apparent she did not intend to submit voluntarily. He had masked his face. He testified he did not know her personally. The only basis for inferring that she would submit to a masked stranger was that she would yield to any man. For this there is no support. In view of these facts, there is no basis on which the jury could reasonably have doubted that the defendant intended, at some time during the assault, to use whatever force may have been necessary to overcome her will. See State v. Johnson, 243 Minn. 296, 67 N.W.2d 639 (1954), State v. La Vine, 68 Wash.2d 83, 411 P.2d 436 (1966). The fact that he desisted is no defense and does not negate the finding that the defendant acted with the intent to use force. | 10-30-2013 | [
"50 Haw. 130 (1967) 433 P.2d 131 STATE OF HAWAII v. FRANK KAMAHALU KEKAUALUA. No. 4626. Supreme Court of Hawaii. November 1, 1967. RICHARDSON, C.J., MIZUHA, MARUMOTO, LEVINSON, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE KING IN PLACE OF ABE, J., DISQUALIFIED. George S. Yuda (Ushijima, Nakamoto and Yuda of counsel) for defendant-appellant. Mamoru Shimokusu, Deputy County Attorney (Yoshito Tanaka, County Attorney, with him on the brief) for plaintiff-appellee. OPINION OF THE COURT BY MIZUHA, J. Defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to rape. He appeals from the judgment of conviction, contending first, that the evidence is insufficient to prove he \"intended to have sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix by force and against her will\"; and second, that he \"was not identified beyond a reasonable doubt to be the person who committed the offense.\" Both contentions are without merit. The complainant testified to the effect she was asleep on her bed when suddenly awakened to find her assailant with his face covered with a pair of her panties sitting on her thighs with his legs on both sides of her body.",
"The assailant had his hands around her throat and was lightly massaging it. As she screamed and struggled with her assailant, the sheet which covered her slipped down and her body, dressed only in a pantie, was exposed. The complainant was menstruating at the time and her pad was soaked through to her pantie, which was bloody. He was crouched over her in a bent position and she was unable to move her arms *131 as they were pinned to the bed. When the sheet slipped down, the assailant moaned and groaned as he looked down on her body and then punched her in the left eye three or four times, saying several times, \"shut up, woman.\" The assailant had not removed his trousers and complainant was unable to state that he had his zipper down. As complainant continued screaming, he got off the bed, took off the pantie from his face and ran out the rear door.",
"The complainant wrapped a sheet around her body and ran after her assailant. As she was standing by her mailbox she saw him get into a red car with a black top, which was a convertible. She went back into her home, wrote down the license number which she testified to as \"311624,\" and then ran to her neighbor's home for help. She told the neighbor that a man was trying to kill her. As a result of the attack, her neck and the area of her face surrounding her eye were bruised. Complainant was unable to identify her assailant but could generally describe his physical features. However, she identified the defendant as being the person who had wandered into the basement of her house two or three weeks before the incident, ostensibly looking for the owner of the house for whom he worked several years before. Defendant admitted he owned a red and black Oldsmobile convertible, license number 3H624. The general physical description of the defendant and his car by the complaining witness and her neighbor who saw him leave the residence, together with the testimony of the witnesses who placed a red colored car near the home of the complainant, point to the defendant as the person who committed the offense.",
"A police officer also testified that on the same morning he pursued defendant who was driving away from the complainant's home at a high rate of speed at a point two miles from said home. After talking to defendant at approximately 8:15 a.m., he returned to routine patrolling. At 8:17 a.m., he received a call in his car to investigate the complaint made by the complainant. Defendant denied being at complainant's home two or three weeks prior to the incident and testified that he was nowhere near complainant's residence that morning. However, he did state that no *132 one other than himself had driven his car during the morning of the incident. His alibi was rejected by the jury. The crime of assault with intent to commit rape requires the prosecution to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed an assault, with the specific intent to have intercourse, and with the specific intent to use sufficient force to overcome the woman's will.",
"The jury's finding of the requisite intent and force is clearly reflected in its verdict. See Territory v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350, 353; State v. Dizon, 47 Haw. 444, 465, 390 P.2d 759, 771. The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses or the weight of the evidence. State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54. When a jury verdict involves conflicting evidence and depends on the determination of credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury. Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492; State v. Carvelo, supra at 33; State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw.",
"245, 251, 377 P.2d 688, 692; State v. Arena, 46 Haw. 315, 324, 379 P.2d 594, 601; State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 533, 423 P.2d 438, 445. There is substantial evidence on the record to warrant the verdict against the defendant. Judgment affirmed. CONCURRING OPINION OF LEVINSON, J. I agree with the majority opinion that the conviction should be affirmed. I believe, however, that we should clarify the test we use in reviewing convictions in criminal cases, and the precise way in which the test functions. Moreover, I think we should recognize the difficulty inherent in establishing the requisite *133 elements of specific intent, which I do not think the majority opinion does. Test on Appeal in Criminal Cases As the majority opinion indicates, there are several decisions of this court stating the test to be applied in reviewing a conviction.",
"After scrutinizing those cases, I find little discussion justifying the test and little indication of how the test is to be applied. As one member of the court, I think it is our duty, particularly in criminal cases, to be precise not only as to the applicable test, but also as to the manner in which it functions. I do not think that the majority opinion or our previous decisions satisfy either of the requirements. The majority opinion says: \"* * * the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdict of the jury.\" Our most recent prior pronouncement in this area was in State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 423 P.2d 438 (1967), where this court approvingly quoted from a previous case the test to be applied: \"The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact.\" 49 Haw. at 533, 423 P.2d at 445, quoting from State v. Tamanaha, 46 Haw.",
"245, 251, 377 P.2d 688, 692 (1962). In that case we also quoted favorably from State v. Carvelo, 45 Haw. 16, 33, 361 P.2d 45, 54 (1961), that the court must affirm a conviction if there is \"any substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla.\" Our prior cases make clear, and I agree, that \"this court will not attempt to reconcile conflicting evidence,\" Territory v. Ebarra, 39 Haw. 488, 492 (1952), and that the court should not interfere with a jury decision based on \"credibility of witnesses or the weight of the evidence,\" State v. Carvelo, supra at 33, 361 P.2d at 54. I do not think that these decisions should be interpreted to preclude this court from determining whether, as a *134 matter of law, the evidence is such that reasonable men should have a reasonable doubt as to an essential element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.",
"This is the place at which I part company with the majority opinion. I would limit the aforementioned cases specifying the test to be applied on appeal to review of the jury's factual conclusions. I would permit this court to inquire into the range of reasonable inferences from the facts as found and supported by substantial evidence. As to basic test to be used in determining whether the jury's factual conclusions should be sustained, I find that the phrase \"substantial evidence amounting to more than a mere scintilla,\" is inherently inconsistent. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1957) defines \"scintilla of evidence\" as \"a metaphorical expression to describe a very insignificant or trifling item or particle of evidence.\" The inconsistency between equating substantial evidence with evidence barely exceeding an insignificant quantum is obvious. If substantial evidence is necessary, the qualifying phrase is meaningless and confusing and therefore should be omitted.",
"If only more than a scintilla is necessary, less than substantial evidence is sufficient. I would accept the jury's finding of fact where it is supported by substantial evidence, defined as evidence which would justify a reasonable man in making the finding. Once the facts are established by applying the foregoing test, this court has the obligation to determine whether the jury acted in accordance with the proper legal standard in finding that the defendant was guilty.",
"We must determine whether the facts were capable of a reasonable inference of innocence. If they were, the trial court should have directed a verdict of not guilty. If in such circumstances it failed to do so and the jury convicted the defendant, it is clear that the jury applied an incorrect standard in its deliberations. Its duty is to acquit the defendant unless the evidence excludes every reasonable inference of innocence. It is improper for a jury to weigh two conflicting reasonable inferences, one of which is consistent with innocence, and to determine which is the more probable. As long as there is a reasonable inference of innocence, the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proof.",
"This approach does not require the court to *135 weigh evidence or to determine credibility of witnesses. It requires the court to protect a defendant from being convicted by less than the constitutionally mandated standard. I recognize that this distinction may not have been expressed in prior decisions by other appellate courts. However, it has been held that a court may reverse a conviction where it determines that it is \"impossible that a jury of reasonable men could have fairly reached the conclusion that the appellant, in what he did, necessarily intended to commit rape.\" Hammond v. United States, 127 F.2d 752, 753 (D.C. Cir.1942). It is a short step from this type of analysis, determining whether any reasonable inference would be consistent with guilt, to an inquiry into whether any reasonable inference would be consistent with innocence.",
"Adopting a similar approach, the supreme court of Utah affirmed a conviction on the grounds that We conclude that the finding of the court that the evidence excluded all reasonable doubt of his intention to commit rape was within the bounds of reason. State v. Waters, 122 Utah 592, 596, 253 P.2d 357, 359 (1953). In reviewing the conviction in this case, I accept, as the majority opinion does, the prosecutrix's testimony, but I think that we must determine whether such testimony justifies a reasonable man in having a reasonable doubt as to an essential element of the crime of assault with intent to commit rape. Intent to Have Intercourse I agree that the evidence would not support a reasonable inference that the defendant did not intend to have intercourse with the prosecutrix.",
"But I think that the question of an individual's state of mind is so complex and so difficult to determine that we should indicate precisely the evidence supporting our conclusion. The defendant had masked his face, entered the bedroom, climbed on the bed, was straddling the sleeping woman, and was stroking her neck. On the other hand, he had not removed his trousers and there was no evidence that he had unzipped his trousers. He had climbed on the prosecutrix without removing *136 the sheet from her body, and he had begun by stroking her neck and not her genitals.",
"The facts in each assault with intent to rape case generally differ from all the others and I have been unable to find, and counsel have not cited, any case with substantially the same facts. In the leading case in this jurisdiction, Territory v. Noguchi, 38 Haw. 350 (1949), this court sustained a conviction on proof that the defendant broke into his neighbor's bedroom at night, touched the sleeping prosecutrix's genitals, and, while standing beside her, started to remove his trousers. In the instant case, the defendant was in a position to have intercourse but had not removed his trousers. The defendant's lack of preparation would appear to provide some grounds for distinguishing the present case from the Noguchi case.",
"It must be recognized, however, that the defendant's exposure of his body is not an absolute prerequisite to a finding of intent to have intercourse, People v. Meichtry, 37 Cal. 2d 385, 389, 231 P.2d 847, 849 (1951). There are cases in other jurisdictions where convictions were reversed on evidence showing merely that the defendant broke into the woman's house or attacked her in an isolated place by grabbing her throat or throwing her onto the ground, People v. Bridges, 28 Ill. 2d 165, 190 N.E.2d 719, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Spurlock v. State, 130 So. 155 (Miss. 1930); Mungilla v. State, 118 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 1938). In the Spurlock case, the defendant, a negro, broke into a woman's house, grabbed her throat and choked her. She screamed and he opened a knife.",
"When she continued to scream, he ran away. The main difference between this case and the Spurlock case, where the court stated it \"painstakingly examined this record\" and found no evidence of any intention by the defendant \"to gratify lust,\" 130 So. at 156, is that here the defendant was straddling over the woman. It is not inconceivable that the defendant was interested in something less than intercourse but I think the facts as the jury must have found them were insufficient, although barely so, to support a reasonable inference that the defendant was interested in something other than intercourse.",
"*137 Intent to Use Force The majority opinion does not discuss the issue of intent to use force. Invariably the basic assault will involve some use of force. The force which the defendant must intend to use is that necessary to overcome the prosecutrix's resistance. The use of force merely to quiet a screaming woman is not sufficient, cf. People v. Richardson, 18 Ill. 2d 329, 333, 164 N.E.2d 61, 63 (1960). The evidence is not as clear as the majority opinion intimates.",
"If the defendant had intended to use force, the most natural thing for him to have done while the prosecutrix was still asleep would have been to prepare himself by removing or unzipping his trousers. He would have removed the sheet. He would not have awakened the prosecutrix by massaging her neck lightly. When he punched her, he may have been trying to quiet her and not to overcome her will. If these facts stood alone, I would find them sufficient to justify a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to use force to overcome her will. There are, however, other facts which vitiate whatever doubt those facts create. The defendant had pinned her arms before waking her. He said nothing to attempt to convince her to yield willingly. He continued to struggle with her even after it was apparent she did not intend to submit voluntarily.",
"He had masked his face. He testified he did not know her personally. The only basis for inferring that she would submit to a masked stranger was that she would yield to any man. For this there is no support. In view of these facts, there is no basis on which the jury could reasonably have doubted that the defendant intended, at some time during the assault, to use whatever force may have been necessary to overcome her will. See State v. Johnson, 243 Minn. 296, 67 N.W.2d 639 (1954), State v. La Vine, 68 Wash.2d 83, 411 P.2d 436 (1966). The fact that he desisted is no defense and does not negate the finding that the defendant acted with the intent to use force."
]
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DETAILED ACTION
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status.
Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114 A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 05/20/2022 has been entered. Allowable Subject Matter Claim 16 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter: After search the prior art regarded as nearest the claimed invention is Ederer (US20080001331 – previously of record). Ederer discloses a method for printing multiple fused objects comprising a second region in contact with the objects wherein the second further comprises an unfused region and a fused region surrounding each of the objects (abstract, para 0051, Fig. 4). Harryson (US2003013382 – previously of record) further discloses the use of non-fusing printing fluid to boundaries of the individual objects (para 0014). Ederer and Harryson, as well as other prior art returned in the search, fail to disclose wherein at least one of the plurality of objects is printed using first and second fusing printing fluids, first and second non-fusing printing fluids, and wherein the first fusing and first non-fusing printing fluids are the same color and the second fusing and second non-fusing printing fluids are different color yet a different color from the first fusing and non-fusing printing fluids. The Examiner is unable to discern a reasonable rationale from the prior art that such features are taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see page 6 paragraph 4, filed 05/20/2022, with respect to the prior rejections under 35 U.S.C. §112(b) have been fully considered and are persuasive. The rejections of 01/13/2022 have been withdrawn. Applicant's remaining arguments filed 05/20/2022 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant first argues that the Harryson in view of Ederer does not disclose the combination of fusing and non-fusing printing fluids disguises at least some of the design information about an object being fabricated (pg 9 ln 6-9). While the Examiner agrees that Harryson and Ederer are not directed toward disguising the parts being produced, the effect would be substantially the same if the same color is used for the non-fusing and fusing printing fluids (see discussion below in reference to claim 1). Applicant further argues that Harryson in view of Ederer does not teach wherein the second region forms the boundary around each one of the plurality of objects. While the Examiner agrees that Harryson and Ederer are not directed toward disguising the parts being produced, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1 includes wherein the fused portion of the second region forms a complete/solid box. See MPEP 2111. The arguments regarding claims 5, 11, and 8 are directed toward the supplemental prior art not teaching the features of claim 1 argued as not addressed by Harryson or Ederer. For the reasons stated above, these arguments are not persuasive. If Applicant believes anything contained herein is unclear or incorrect, Applicant is encouraged to schedule an interview.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d): (d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph: Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
Claims 2 and 3 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends. Claim 2 contains the limitation “wherein the first region directly physically touches the second region” in lines 1-2. However, claim 1, from which claim 2 depends, contains the limitation “wherein the second region formed around the boundary of each one of the plurality of objects comprises: a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region” in lines 19-21. As parent claim 1 requires the second region to physically contact the first region, the second region must touch the first region and claim 2 fails to further limit as it only requires the same limitation. Claim 3 recites the limitation “wherein the second region at least partially surrounds the first region” in lines 1-2. However, claim 1, from which claim 3 indirectly depends, contains the limitation “wherein the second region formed around the boundary of each one of the plurality of objects comprises: a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region…” in lines 18-21. However, if the second region is formed around the boundary and comprises a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region, it would be impossible for the second region to not “at least partially sounds the first region.” As such, claim 3 fails to further limit the parent claim. Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claim(s) 1-3, 7, 9, 10, and 16 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Harryson (US20030133822 – previously of record) in view of Ederer (US20080001331).
In reference to claim 1: Harrison discloses a method (abstract), comprising: generating, by a processing system of an additive manufacturing system, a model for fabricating a plurality of objects via an additive manufacturing process, wherein the model includes a first region defining the object and a second region defining a sacrificial artifact (para 0003, ); controlling, by the processing system, a print engine of the additive manufacturing system to fabricate the plurality of objects via the additive manufacturing process, using a fusing printing fluid (para 0014 additive B2); and controlling, by the processing system, the print engine to fabricate the sacrificial artifact simultaneously with fabricating the object, via the additive manufacturing process, using a non-fusing printing fluid wherein the non-fusing printing fluid is applied to boundaries of the first region defining the object, wherein the second region comprises a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region and is fabricated using the non-fusing printing fluid (para 0014 additive B1, Fig. 5). While Harryson discloses printing separate “portions” (Fig. 5 numeral 37), Harryson does not explicitly disclose printing multiple objects simultaneously or an additional portion that directly physically contacts the buffer portion without directly physically contacting the first region, where the additional region is fabricated using the fusing printing fluid, or wherein the second region is formed around the boundary of each one of the plurality of objects. However, this would be obvious in view of Ederer. Ederer teaches a method of generating a plurality of 3D object by utilizing a fluid to bind a powder (abstract, para 0012; Fig. 4). Ederer further teaches printing a surrounding wall to reduce the working field and reduce the amount of powder used (paras 0041-0042). Ederer also discloses that multiple boxes may be printed as desired (paras 0050-0051). It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of Harryson with the multiple objects and additional portion of Ederer in order to reduce the amount of powder required during processing. Modified Harryson does not disclose wherein the sacrificial artiface obscures a shape and dimension of each one of the plurality of objects or the fusing printing fluid and the non-fusing printing fluid are a same color before and after fusing to hide a number of the plurality of objects that are printed as well as a geometry of each one of the plurality of objects. However, it would also have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to choose from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, i.e. using the same or different colors before and after fusing, with a reasonable expectation of success. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See MPEP 2143. Further, the color before and after fusing is interpreted as an aesthetic design change which cannot be relied upon to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art (MPEP 2144.04(I)). If a same color is used it will necessarily obscure the size, shape, and number of the plurality of objects.
In reference to claim 2: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the first region directly physically touches the second region (Fig. 5).
In reference to claim 3: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the second region at least partially surrounds the first region (Fig. 5).
In reference to claim 7: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the fusing printing fluid causes a powder to fuse when exposed to a quantity energy, but the non-fusing printing fluid prevents the powder from fusing when exposed to the quantity of energy (paras 0018-0024).
In reference to claim 9: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises an agent that chemically weakens a fusing process (para 0043).
In reference to claim 10: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises an agent that physically weakens a fusing process (para 0023).
In reference to claim 16: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, modified Harry son does not explicitly teach wherein at least one of the plurality of objects is printed using a first colored fusing printing fluid, a second colored fusing printing fluid, a first colored non-fusing printing fluid, and a second colored non-fusing printing fluid, wherein the first colored fusing printing fluid and the first colored non- fusing printing fluid have a same color and the second colored fusing printing fluid and the second colored non-fusing printing fluid have a same color, wherein the first colored fusing printing fluid is used on a first portion of the object and the first colored non-fusing printing fluid is used adjacent to the first colored fusing printing fluid, and wherein a second colored fusing printing fluid on a second portion of the object and the second colored non-fusing printing fluid is used adjacent to the second colored fusing printing fluid. However, as discussed above, the claim does not require that the first colored fusing agent and second colored fusing agent are different materials or colors nor does the claim require that the first colored non-fusing agent and the second colored non-fusing agent are different materials or colors. As such, if using a well-known print head, such as that in Ederer (para 0056), the claim would be met by using separate supplies of the same materials such as when the initial supply is exhausted or to increase printing capacity by using separate supplies for separate areas.
Claims 5 and 11 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Harryson and Ederer as applied to claims 1 and 7, above, and further in view of Collins (US20040251574 – previously of record).
In reference to claim 5: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson does not disclose wherein the fabricating the sacrificial artifact is performed using a combination of the non-fusing printing fluid and a fusing printing fluid. However, a rationale to support a conclusion that a claim would have been obvious is that all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 538, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (See MPEP 2143 and 2143.02). As applied to the instant application, Collins teaches an additive manufacturing process using powder and binder (abstract, para 0015). Collins further teaches utilizing a release agent which dissolves previously bound material (para 0039). It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of Harryson with the method of Collins because all of the claimed elements are known in the prior art and the combination yields predictable results, the method utilizes a known technique to form the borders of the object.
In reference to claim 11: In addition to the discussion of claim 7, above, Harryson does not disclose wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises an agent that breaks down a fused solid material after fusing. However, a rationale to support a conclusion that a claim would have been obvious is that all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 538, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (See MPEP 2143 and 2143.02). As applied to the instant application, Collins teaches an additive manufacturing process using powder and binder (abstract, para 0015). Collins further teaches utilizing a release agent which dissolves previously bound material (para 0039). It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of Harryson with the method of Collins because all of the claimed elements are known in the prior art and the combination yields predictable results, the method utilizes a known technique to form the borders of the object.
Claims 8 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Harryson and Ederer as applied to claim 7, above, and further in view of De Pena (US20160332380 – previously of record). In addition to the discussion of claim 7, above, Harryson does not disclose wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises a cooling agent. However, this is taught by De Pena. De Pena teaches an additive manufacturing process using powder and binder (paras 0009 and 0023). De Pena further teaches using a coalescence modifier agent to reduce or control coalescence bleed (para 0045)(preventing coalescing based on a temperature is interpreted as a cooling agent because the material will not absorb the energy and will have a reduced temperature).
Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ANDREW L SWANSON whose telephone number is (571)272-1724. The examiner can normally be reached M-Th 0800-1900 and every other Friday 0800-1600. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Phillip Tucker can be reached on (571)272-1095. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/ANDREW L SWANSON/ Examiner, Art Unit 1745 /MATTHEW J DANIELS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1742 | 2022-06-18T18:33:49 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114 A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection.",
"Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on 05/20/2022 has been entered. Allowable Subject Matter Claim 16 is objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. The following is a statement of reasons for the indication of allowable subject matter: After search the prior art regarded as nearest the claimed invention is Ederer (US20080001331 – previously of record). Ederer discloses a method for printing multiple fused objects comprising a second region in contact with the objects wherein the second further comprises an unfused region and a fused region surrounding each of the objects (abstract, para 0051, Fig.",
"4). Harryson (US2003013382 – previously of record) further discloses the use of non-fusing printing fluid to boundaries of the individual objects (para 0014). Ederer and Harryson, as well as other prior art returned in the search, fail to disclose wherein at least one of the plurality of objects is printed using first and second fusing printing fluids, first and second non-fusing printing fluids, and wherein the first fusing and first non-fusing printing fluids are the same color and the second fusing and second non-fusing printing fluids are different color yet a different color from the first fusing and non-fusing printing fluids. The Examiner is unable to discern a reasonable rationale from the prior art that such features are taught, suggested, or otherwise rendered obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments, see page 6 paragraph 4, filed 05/20/2022, with respect to the prior rejections under 35 U.S.C.",
"§112(b) have been fully considered and are persuasive. The rejections of 01/13/2022 have been withdrawn. Applicant's remaining arguments filed 05/20/2022 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant first argues that the Harryson in view of Ederer does not disclose the combination of fusing and non-fusing printing fluids disguises at least some of the design information about an object being fabricated (pg 9 ln 6-9). While the Examiner agrees that Harryson and Ederer are not directed toward disguising the parts being produced, the effect would be substantially the same if the same color is used for the non-fusing and fusing printing fluids (see discussion below in reference to claim 1).",
"Applicant further argues that Harryson in view of Ederer does not teach wherein the second region forms the boundary around each one of the plurality of objects. While the Examiner agrees that Harryson and Ederer are not directed toward disguising the parts being produced, the broadest reasonable interpretation of claim 1 includes wherein the fused portion of the second region forms a complete/solid box. See MPEP 2111. The arguments regarding claims 5, 11, and 8 are directed toward the supplemental prior art not teaching the features of claim 1 argued as not addressed by Harryson or Ederer.",
"For the reasons stated above, these arguments are not persuasive. If Applicant believes anything contained herein is unclear or incorrect, Applicant is encouraged to schedule an interview. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(d): (d) REFERENCE IN DEPENDENT FORMS.—Subject to subsection (e), a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers. The following is a quotation of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, fourth paragraph: Subject to the following paragraph [i.e., the fifth paragraph of pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112], a claim in dependent form shall contain a reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the subject matter claimed.",
"A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers. Claims 2 and 3 rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(d) or pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, 4th paragraph, as being of improper dependent form for failing to further limit the subject matter of the claim upon which it depends, or for failing to include all the limitations of the claim upon which it depends. Claim 2 contains the limitation “wherein the first region directly physically touches the second region” in lines 1-2. However, claim 1, from which claim 2 depends, contains the limitation “wherein the second region formed around the boundary of each one of the plurality of objects comprises: a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region” in lines 19-21. As parent claim 1 requires the second region to physically contact the first region, the second region must touch the first region and claim 2 fails to further limit as it only requires the same limitation.",
"Claim 3 recites the limitation “wherein the second region at least partially surrounds the first region” in lines 1-2. However, claim 1, from which claim 3 indirectly depends, contains the limitation “wherein the second region formed around the boundary of each one of the plurality of objects comprises: a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region…” in lines 18-21. However, if the second region is formed around the boundary and comprises a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region, it would be impossible for the second region to not “at least partially sounds the first region.” As such, claim 3 fails to further limit the parent claim. Applicant may cancel the claim(s), amend the claim(s) to place the claim(s) in proper dependent form, rewrite the claim(s) in independent form, or present a sufficient showing that the dependent claim(s) complies with the statutory requirements. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C.",
"103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.",
"2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. Claim(s) 1-3, 7, 9, 10, and 16 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Harryson (US20030133822 – previously of record) in view of Ederer (US20080001331). In reference to claim 1: Harrison discloses a method (abstract), comprising: generating, by a processing system of an additive manufacturing system, a model for fabricating a plurality of objects via an additive manufacturing process, wherein the model includes a first region defining the object and a second region defining a sacrificial artifact (para 0003, ); controlling, by the processing system, a print engine of the additive manufacturing system to fabricate the plurality of objects via the additive manufacturing process, using a fusing printing fluid (para 0014 additive B2); and controlling, by the processing system, the print engine to fabricate the sacrificial artifact simultaneously with fabricating the object, via the additive manufacturing process, using a non-fusing printing fluid wherein the non-fusing printing fluid is applied to boundaries of the first region defining the object, wherein the second region comprises a buffer portion that directly physically contacts the first region and is fabricated using the non-fusing printing fluid (para 0014 additive B1, Fig. 5).",
"While Harryson discloses printing separate “portions” (Fig. 5 numeral 37), Harryson does not explicitly disclose printing multiple objects simultaneously or an additional portion that directly physically contacts the buffer portion without directly physically contacting the first region, where the additional region is fabricated using the fusing printing fluid, or wherein the second region is formed around the boundary of each one of the plurality of objects. However, this would be obvious in view of Ederer. Ederer teaches a method of generating a plurality of 3D object by utilizing a fluid to bind a powder (abstract, para 0012; Fig. 4). Ederer further teaches printing a surrounding wall to reduce the working field and reduce the amount of powder used (paras 0041-0042). Ederer also discloses that multiple boxes may be printed as desired (paras 0050-0051).",
"It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of Harryson with the multiple objects and additional portion of Ederer in order to reduce the amount of powder required during processing. Modified Harryson does not disclose wherein the sacrificial artiface obscures a shape and dimension of each one of the plurality of objects or the fusing printing fluid and the non-fusing printing fluid are a same color before and after fusing to hide a number of the plurality of objects that are printed as well as a geometry of each one of the plurality of objects. However, it would also have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention to choose from a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, i.e.",
"using the same or different colors before and after fusing, with a reasonable expectation of success. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1385 (2007). See MPEP 2143. Further, the color before and after fusing is interpreted as an aesthetic design change which cannot be relied upon to patentably distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art (MPEP 2144.04(I)). If a same color is used it will necessarily obscure the size, shape, and number of the plurality of objects. In reference to claim 2: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the first region directly physically touches the second region (Fig.",
"5). In reference to claim 3: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the second region at least partially surrounds the first region (Fig. 5). In reference to claim 7: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the fusing printing fluid causes a powder to fuse when exposed to a quantity energy, but the non-fusing printing fluid prevents the powder from fusing when exposed to the quantity of energy (paras 0018-0024). In reference to claim 9: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises an agent that chemically weakens a fusing process (para 0043).",
"In reference to claim 10: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson further discloses wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises an agent that physically weakens a fusing process (para 0023). In reference to claim 16: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, modified Harry son does not explicitly teach wherein at least one of the plurality of objects is printed using a first colored fusing printing fluid, a second colored fusing printing fluid, a first colored non-fusing printing fluid, and a second colored non-fusing printing fluid, wherein the first colored fusing printing fluid and the first colored non- fusing printing fluid have a same color and the second colored fusing printing fluid and the second colored non-fusing printing fluid have a same color, wherein the first colored fusing printing fluid is used on a first portion of the object and the first colored non-fusing printing fluid is used adjacent to the first colored fusing printing fluid, and wherein a second colored fusing printing fluid on a second portion of the object and the second colored non-fusing printing fluid is used adjacent to the second colored fusing printing fluid. However, as discussed above, the claim does not require that the first colored fusing agent and second colored fusing agent are different materials or colors nor does the claim require that the first colored non-fusing agent and the second colored non-fusing agent are different materials or colors.",
"As such, if using a well-known print head, such as that in Ederer (para 0056), the claim would be met by using separate supplies of the same materials such as when the initial supply is exhausted or to increase printing capacity by using separate supplies for separate areas. Claims 5 and 11 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Harryson and Ederer as applied to claims 1 and 7, above, and further in view of Collins (US20040251574 – previously of record).",
"In reference to claim 5: In addition to the discussion of claim 1, above, Harryson does not disclose wherein the fabricating the sacrificial artifact is performed using a combination of the non-fusing printing fluid and a fusing printing fluid. However, a rationale to support a conclusion that a claim would have been obvious is that all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art.",
"KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 538, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (See MPEP 2143 and 2143.02). As applied to the instant application, Collins teaches an additive manufacturing process using powder and binder (abstract, para 0015). Collins further teaches utilizing a release agent which dissolves previously bound material (para 0039). It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of Harryson with the method of Collins because all of the claimed elements are known in the prior art and the combination yields predictable results, the method utilizes a known technique to form the borders of the object. In reference to claim 11: In addition to the discussion of claim 7, above, Harryson does not disclose wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises an agent that breaks down a fused solid material after fusing.",
"However, a rationale to support a conclusion that a claim would have been obvious is that all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination would have yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 538, 416, 82 USPQ2d 1385, 1395 (2007) (See MPEP 2143 and 2143.02). As applied to the instant application, Collins teaches an additive manufacturing process using powder and binder (abstract, para 0015). Collins further teaches utilizing a release agent which dissolves previously bound material (para 0039).",
"It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to combine the method of Harryson with the method of Collins because all of the claimed elements are known in the prior art and the combination yields predictable results, the method utilizes a known technique to form the borders of the object. Claims 8 is/are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Harryson and Ederer as applied to claim 7, above, and further in view of De Pena (US20160332380 – previously of record). In addition to the discussion of claim 7, above, Harryson does not disclose wherein the non-fusing printing fluid comprises a cooling agent. However, this is taught by De Pena. De Pena teaches an additive manufacturing process using powder and binder (paras 0009 and 0023).",
"De Pena further teaches using a coalescence modifier agent to reduce or control coalescence bleed (para 0045)(preventing coalescing based on a temperature is interpreted as a cooling agent because the material will not absorb the energy and will have a reduced temperature). Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to ANDREW L SWANSON whose telephone number is (571)272-1724. The examiner can normally be reached M-Th 0800-1900 and every other Friday 0800-1600. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Phillip Tucker can be reached on (571)272-1095.",
"The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /ANDREW L SWANSON/ Examiner, Art Unit 1745 /MATTHEW J DANIELS/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1742"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-06-19.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Ministère de l'Environnement, modgee Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme SIF/ORCO sors Direction Inventaire et Aménagement Forestier |
Concession Forestière n°40/11
PLAN DE GESTION COUVRANT LA PERIODE DE PREPARATION
DU PLAN D’AMENAGEMENT (4 ans)
Période 2012-2015
Date : Juin 2012
FORET RESSOURCES MANAGEMENT Espace Fréjorgues-Ouest - 60, rue Henri Fabre 34130 MAUGUIO - Gd Montpellier - FRANCE Tél. : +33 (0)4 67 20 08 09 - Fax : +33 (0)4 67 20 08 12 E-mail : frm@frm-france.com - Internet : www.frm-france.com
Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SOMMAIRE
1
1.1 Dénomination du 1.2 Présentation de la soci: 13 Localisation du titre forestier 14 Climat et géographie de la zone concerné 1.5 Contexte socio-économique et contribution de la société au développement local. 1.6 Bref Historique des activités forestières passées sur le titre forestier 1.6.1 Exploitation passée sur cette Concession Forestière …… 1.6.2 Transformation des grumes issues de la Concession Forestière.
2 PROCESSUS D’AMENAGEMENT ET DE CERTIFICATION VOULU PAR LA SOCIETE 2.1 L'élaboration du plan d'aménagement du 2.2 Vers la certification de légalité et de gestion durable des act
és
3 REGLEMENT D'EXPLOITATION SUR LES 4 PREMIERES AAC ….…................... 3.1.1 Localisation des 4 premières AAC 3.1.2 Description des 4 AAC
3.1.3 Evaluation de la ressource exploitable sur les 4 prochaines années. 3.1.4 Infrastructures à créer 3.2 Règles d'intervention en milieu forestier
3.2.1 Description technique des opérations forestières 3.2.2 Mesures de réduction, d'atténuation et de compensation des impacts sur l'environnement et la faune
3.2.3 Diverses mesures de gestion. 4 PROGRAMME INDUSTRIEL EN LIAISON AVEC CETTE GARANTIE D’APPROVISIONNEMENT
6 SYNTHESE GENERALE DU PLAN DE GESTION SUR 4 ANS 36 6.1 Chronogramme de l’ensemble des activitées.. 6.2 Programme d'exploitation, industriel et social
LISTE DES CARTES ....mmmmnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnanssannnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnneennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnneenn
LISTE DES TABLEAUX .…....…mmmnennnmnennnnnnennnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnnt 39 LISTE DES FIGURES............nnnrnnnnnnmernennnnnmnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnne 39 LISTE DES ANNEXES .…......…nmmmnennnnnnnenmnnennennnnnnennennennennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnns 40
Plan de Gestion
couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 2
Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIGLES ET ACRONYMES EMPLOYES DANS LA SUITE DU TEXTE
Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe
Blocs d'Aménagement Quinquennaux
Concession Forestière
Direction Inventaire et Aménagement Forestier
Diamètre Minimum d'Exploitabilité
Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit
Garantie d'Approvisionnement
Global Positioning System (Système de positionnement par satellite)
Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme
Plan de Gestion
couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 3 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIF/ORCO |:
INTRODUCTION
Ce premier Plan de Gestion de la Concession Forestière n°40/11 a été rédigé dans le cadre du Projet d'Aménagement des concessions forestières de la société SIFORCO, conformément à l’Arrêté n°028/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 du 11 août 2008 fixant les modèles des contrats de concession d'exploitation des produits forestiers et des cahiers des charges y afférent.
Ce Plan de Gestion couvre la période allant de 2012 à 2015.
Ce document a pour vocation d'être à la fois un outil de terrain au service des responsables de l'exploitation forestière sur les 4 premières AAC et un outil de suivi pour le MECNT.
Ce document a été élaboré conformément à :
+__ L'arrêté ministériel n°028/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 fixant les modèles de contrat de concession d'exploitation des produits forestiers et de cahier des charges y afférent en date du 11 août 2008 (dans son annexe 1, articles 1, 10 et 14);
+ __Le Guide Opérationnel ayant trait au canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal, car il n'existe pas encore de Guide ayant trait au canevas d’autorisation d'exploitation forestière anticipée et au cahier des charges provisoires.
Les recommandations du Guide Opérationnel ayant trait au canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal ont été adaptées du fait que le Plan d'Aménagement de cette Concession Forestière est en préparation.
Plan de Gestion
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Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIF/ORCO |:
1 CONTEXTE
1.1 DENOMINATION DU TITRE
Les différentes dénominations employées dans ce Plan de Gestion sont explicitées ci-dessous.
LE TITRE FORESTIER : Le titre forestier porte actuellement la référence du contrat de la Concession Forestière n°040/11 datant du 24 octobre 2011 (Annexe 3), abrégé en CF 40/11.
La dénomination adoptée est CF 40/11-Bolobo, accolant le nom de la ville limitrophe.
Cette concession est issue de la conversion de la Garantie d'Approvisionnement 18/00, telle qu'elle est définie par la « convention n°018/CAB/MIN/AFF-EDT/00 du 9 novembre 2000 portant octroi d'une Garantie d'Approvisionnement en matière ligneuse » (Annexe 1) et qui avait été déclarée convertible en contrat de concession forestière par notification n°4844/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 du 06/10/2008 (Annexe 2).
LE BLOC FORESTIER :
Pour sa gestion interne, SIFORCO a constitué des blocs incluant de un à trois titres forestiers limitrophes. Ce Plan de Gestion concerne le bloc K3, comprenant un seul titre. Cette dénomination n’a aucun caractère officiel.
Le Tableau 1 reprend l'ensemble des dénominations et regroupements qui seront utilisés tout le long de ce document.
1.2 PRESENTATION DE LA SOCIETE
La SIFORCO (Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo) est présente en RDC, dans les activités d'exploitation forestière et de transformation industrielle du bois, depuis 1972. Cette société est détenue par CONGOLESE TIMBER dont l'actionnaire principal a longtemps été le Groupe DANZER.
En fin d'année 2011, le Groupe DANZER a décidé de céder CONGOLESE TIMBER et a ainsi suspendu les activités d'exploitation forestière et de transformation du bois de SIFORCO en décembre 2011. Le changement d'actionnariat de CONGOLESE TIMBER s'est opéré en début d'année 2012 avec une reprise du capital par monsieur Elwyn Blattner, devenu actionnaire principal de CONGOLESE TIMBER.
Depuis ce début d'année, CONGOLESE TIMBER détient également la société SEDAF (Société d'Entreprise et de Développement Africain), autre entité œuvrant dans les activités d'exploitation forestière en RDC. Un contrat a d’ailleurs été établi entre les sociétés SEDAF et SIFORCO, dans lequel SEDAF délègue les activités de gestion et d'exploitation forestière à la SIFORCO.
Plan de Gestion
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Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIF/ORCO |:
La cession de CONGOLESE TIMBER a entrainé un arrêt complet des activités d'exploitation forestière et de transformation du bois de la SIFORCO de décembre 2011 à mai 2012. L'entreprise est donc aujourd'hui en pleine période de relance des activités.
Entre 1998 et 2003, en raison de la guerre en RDC dans la région de ses projets forestiers, l’activité d'exploitation forestière avait déjà été suspendue, mais la société avait maintenu une présence permanente dans le pays pour assurer une certaine protection de ses biens.
Les activités de production avaient seulement repris au début de l’année 2003, d'abord sur une seule GA (K8, GA 02/89-Aketi), puis en 2005 sur une deuxième GA exploitée pour le compte de la société SEDAF. En 2005, le rythme des activités, aussi bien en forêt qu’au niveau industriel, était encore bien inférieur à celui d'avant la guerre. La relance des activités avait été fortement affectée par les crises internationales des marchés du bois tropical, en 2008-2009. L'année 2010 avait été marquée par un retour à une production supérieure à 100 000 m dans l'année, pour la première fois depuis 1998. L'année 2012 connaîtra vraisemblablement une baisse des productions compte-tenu du contexte de reprise de la société.
Jusqu'en 2011, la production de la SIFORCO restait encore inférieure à son niveau d'avant-guerre, et un doute existait encore sur la stabilité des marchés à moyen terme. Cependant, depuis la fin des années 70, SIFORCO (et précédemment SIFORZAL) est le premier producteur de grumes en RDC, ayant assuré en moyenne environ 40% de la production nationale sur les 20 dernières années.
SIFORCO prévoit de démarrer les activités d'exploitation dans le courant du second semestre de l’année 2012 dans la CF 40/11 — Bolobo.
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Juin 2012 8 8 & 8 8 & & 8 É 8 #, à Ë 5 5 8 £ 8 Ë 8 8 8 8 o —— ÉÉÉPÉPPPÉÉSÉPPLEÉPPPÉÉS EPS III SES Années
Figure 1 : Evolution de la production de grumes par SIFORCO de 1977 à 2011
Avec l'abandon du bloc K8 — Bumba (GA n°02/89 et n°25/04) au début de l’année 2012, la société SIFORCO est à ce jour attributaire de 7 titres forestiers en RDC, qui ont été déclarés convertibles en concessions forestières, et totalisent une superficie d'environ 1,5 millions d'hectares. Pour sa gestion interne SIFORCO les a regroupés en 4 blocs, chaque bloc contient de un à trois titres forestiers. Les 7 Concessions Forestières composant ces 4 blocs et leur superficie sont précisées dans le Tableau 1. Pour atteindre ces seuils d'équilibre économique, la SIFORCO a constitué 3 Superficies Sous Aménagement (SSA, constituées de un ou deux blocs forestiers), et prévoit le fonctionnement d'un chantier de production sur chacun des blocs.
Tableau 1 : Concessions Forestières attribuées à SIFORCO
. Superficie SIG
N° Garantie . A
SsA Blocs d' si Province du re de CF
\a)
SSA Bolobo-Mushie | K3Bolobo | 018/CAB/MIN/AFF/EDT/00 040/11 Bandundu 194 641
K2 Bolombo | _007/CAB/MIN/ECNT95 026/11 Equateur 291 665 Djolu KT Mentole 026/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 02741 Equateur 212 868 027/CAB/MIN/ÆCN-EF/04 028/11 221 176 028/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 030/11 318 799 SSA Aketi-Basoko K9 Bolila | 029/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 03111 Orientale 217785
030/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 03211
SSA Bongandanga-
Comme précisé précédemment SIFORCO intervient également les titres forestiers attribués à SEDAF, au travers d’un contrat dans lequel SEDAF délègue les activités de gestion et d'exploitation forestière
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à SIFORCO. Les Garanties d'Approvisionnement, qui ont été déclarés convertibles en concessions forestières, composent un nouveau bloc (bloc K10 Yakata) et leur superficie sont précisées dans le Tableau 2. Ces trois Garanties d'Approvisionnement constitueront aussi une seule Superficie Sous Aménagement.
Tableau 2 : Garanties d'Approvisionnement attribuées à SEDAF
N° Garantie d'approvisionnement
001/CAB/MIN/ECNPF/98
SSA Yakata- Orientale
K10 Yakata 003/CAB/MIN/ECNPF/98 219 200 002/CAB/MIN/ECNPF/98 Equateur 200 533
Mombongo
La base industrielle de SIFORCO est située à Maluku, à quatre-vingts kilomètres au nord de Kinshasa. Elle est composée d'une scierie et une usine de tranchage, cette dernière étant désormais à l'arrêt.
L'importance stratégique du transport fluvial en RDC avait poussé la société à se doter d’une importante flotte fluviale et de moyens propres pour la maintenance de ses équipements. Cette stratégie a été révisée suite à la cession de CONGOLESE TIMBER à monsieur Elwyn Blattner et le transport fluvial est aujourd'hui assuré par la société de Transport Fluvial et de Commerce de l'Equateur (T.F.C.E.), filiale de GBE (Groupe Blattner Elwyn).
1.3 LOCALISATION DU TITRE FORESTIER
La SSA Bolobo-Mushie est située au Nord de la République Démocratique du Congo sur la rive gauche du fleuve Congo. Ce massif s'étend entre les latitudes 2°00’ et 2°35’ Sud et les longitudes 16°25’ et 17°05’ Est (Carte 1).
Sur le plan administratif, cette Concession Forestière est située dans :
Province : Bandundu District des Hauts Plateaux District de Mai Ndombe Territoires : Mushie et Yumbi Territoire : Inongo Secteurs : Mbali et Mongana Secteur : Basengele
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République Démocratique du Congo FORET À RESSOURCES
Carte de situation de la concession K3 de SIFORCO MANAGEMENT
Fond de carte : image ortho rectifiée Landsat 7 ETM+ du 18 février 2001 et Landsat 7 ETM+ du 8 février 2003.
Système de coordonnées : UTM WGS84, zone 335$.
FRM, juin 2011
16*300E
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Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
1.4 CLIMAT ET GEOGRAPHIE DE LA ZONE CONCERNEE
Les relevés présentés correspondent aux données comprises entre 1980 et 1990 relevés dans la station de Bandundu (à 120 km au sud est de la CF 40/11).
La CF 40/11 bénéficie d’un climat chaud et humide. Le total des précipitations moyennes annuelles est élevé, de l’ordre de 1 700 mm/an. Au sud et à l’est du massif forestier congolais, une saison sèche relativement marquée apparaît de juin à août. Cette dernière tend néanmoins à disparaître en remontant vers le nord, à l'approche du cœur de la cuvette congolaise. Il est également à noter qu'une très légère baisse des précipitations s'observe en janvier et février.
300
Bandundu (1580mm) 250
200
150 | 100 | 50 | 0 = En B
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Figure 2 : Courbe de pluviométrie sur Bandundu
Le relief dans la Concession Forestière est relativement peu marqué, avec une ligne de partage des eaux au sein de la concession : la partie Nord appartient au bassin versant du fleuve Congo alors que la partie Sud fait partie du bassin versant de la rivière Leboma. Pour l'essentiel, les écosystèmes sont des forêts denses humides, avec des zones anthropisées et une part importante de savanes, ces deux types d'occupation occupant 28% de la CF 40/11, principalement dans les zones Centrale, Nord et Ouest.
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1.5 CONTEXTE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE ET CONTRIBUTION DE LA SOCIETE AU DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL
Aucune étude socio-économique récente n’est disponible. Afin de caractériser l’environnement socio- économique et culturel des populations locales et d’avoir une base solide pour renforcer les liens et l'insertion de la société dans le contexte local, SIFORCO a mené une étude socio-économique dans le cadre de l'élaboration du plan d'aménagement. Les enquêtes de terrain de l'Etude Socio- Economique du bloc forestier K3 ont eu lieu entre janvier et août 2011. Le rapport est en cours de révision et sera déposé auprès de l'Administration forestière au cours de l’année 2012.
Cette étude socio-économique, réalisée pour l'élaboration du plan d'aménagement, a permis de :
+ Faire un recensement de la population ;
+ Étudier les interactions entre cette population et la forêt afin de prévenir un éventuel impact négatif de l'exploitation sur les ressources valorisées par la population, et de proposer des mesures de gestion durable des ressources forestières valorisées localement ;
+ Évaluer les besoins des populations en matière d’infrastructures et de services publics, en préparation de la négociation régulière d'accords concernant la clause sociale du cahier des charges de la concession ;
+ Connaître leurs pratiques culturales (par exemple nombres d'hectares défrichés annuellement par foyer, quantité et type de bois récolté par foyer).
La CF 40/11 est située sur trois territoires dans la Province de Bandundu. La carte en Annexe 4 représente l'architecture administrative des Territoires couverts par la CF 40/11.
La situation du bloc K3 vis-à-vis de l’organisation administrative et coutumière est décrite par le tableau ci-dessous.
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Concession Forestière n°40/11
Juin 2012
RDC
Tableau 3 : Organisation administrative et coutumière du territoire couvert par la CF 40/11 -
Bolobo dans la Province de Bandundu (Bloc K3)
Province
District
Territoire
Secteur | Groupement
Localité
Bandundu
Mushie
Baboma
Mbali Nord
Bobala Bondamu
Isale
Kesomi
Mpoko
Ngantoko
Nsenu
Hauts Plateaux
Yumbi
Banunu /
Mongana Batende
Bobele
Botsini
Ilebo Mangala
Kikanyikale
Kimbeke
Kisa
Kitaba
Maka Maka
Malebo
Mansele
Maninka (Camp Banzi)
Mike
Molende
Motala
Mpee
Mpoko
Nganya
Botanankosso (Ngila)
Ngoo
Nkolo
Bokobamwe
Mai Ndombe
Inongo
Besengele Mbelo
Botangeli
Empokekaso
Lodimo
Lokalu
Lonio
Maliba
Moloki-sambo
Nganda malebo
Nsele
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La population habitant à l'intérieur de la CF 40/11 a été estimée à 45 000 habitants répartis en 20 localités, avec deux tiers de la population sur le territoire de Yumbi. La densité est inégale dans la concession, variant de 9 habitants/km? (Groupement Baboma) à 50,3 habitants/km? (district des Hauts Plateaux).
Deux groupes ethnolinguistiques se retrouvent dans la zone d'étude, les Banunu Bobangi et les Batende. Le premier groupe est concentré sur les rives du fleuve Congo et les Batende se retrouvent à l'intérieur de la Concession Forestière. Des tensions entre les deux groupes ont été source de conflits, les plus récents datant de 2006.
1.6 BREF HISTORIQUE DES ACTIVITES FORESTIERES PASSEES SUR LE TITRE FORESTIER
1.6.1 Exploitation passée sur cette Concession Forestière
La société SOBOPLAC a exploité sur la zone avant les années 60. Cependant, faute d'archives concernant cette activité passée, les zones exploitées à l'époque n’ont pu être localisées.
Hormis l'exploitation de SOBOPLAC, l'état actuel des connaissances ne fait état d'aucune autre exploitation sur la zone. Cependant l'accès relativement facile depuis le fleuve Congo laisse penser que la zone a pu être exploitée après la société SOBOPLAC. Des précisions sur cet aspect pourront être apportées suite aux informations recueillies pour l'élaboration du Rapport des Etudes Socio- économiques.
La société SIFORCO n'a pas encore entamé l'exploitation forestière sur la CF 40/11, cependant des travaux d'ouverture de routes et de prospection ont été engagés afin de lancer l'exploitation dans les meilleurs délais. Le matériel prévu pour l'exploitation est présenté à titre indicatif dans le Tableau 4.
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Tableau 4 : Matériel d'exploitation prévu pour la mise en exploitation de la CF 40/11
Activité Matériel Nombre Tracteur à chenille (bull) : type 2 CATERPILLAR D7 Construction et Chargeur frontal "godet" 1 entretien de route A Niveleuse 1 Benne 1 Débardeur 2 Débardage Tracteur à chenille (bull) : type 1 CATERPILLAR D7 Manutention et Chargeur frontal "fourchette" 2 transport des grumes | Camions grumiers 2 Camion 1 Transport du personnel -— Pick-up 2 Mécanique / service / : ravitaillement Camion L
1.6.2 Transformation des grumes issues de la Concession Forestière
SIFORCO dispose d’un important site industriel à Maluku, au bord du fleuve Congo, à 80 km de Kinshasa, implanté dans les années 70. Les grumes issues de l'exploitation de K3 seront acheminées vers Maluku, par flottage (radeau) et par barge.
Avant l'arrêt des activités en décembre 2011, SIFORCO transformait ses bois en sciage, avec une capacité de 9 000 m° grumes/mois de grumes entrée usine en deux rotations journalières, soit une capacité d'environ 100 000 m° grumes/an, incluant 1 mois d'arrêt dans l’année. La consommation était d'environ 90 000 m° grumes/an, avec une unité principale de sciage constituée d'une scie de tête (BRENTA), d'une scie de reprise multi-lames (LINCK), 2 déligneuses (UKIAH), 1 dédoubleuse, 2 ébouteuses et d’une ligne de triage. En 2010 a été installée une CD 10 et au cours de 2011 deux ébouteuses et une déligneuse ont été installées afin d'améliorer la production. Cette ligne étant destinée à la production de dimensions standards.
En ce qui concerne la production de débités séchés, aux deux séchoirs présents sur place (5 chambres de séchage), la SIFORCO a ajouté de nouveaux séchoirs en 2011, permettant d'atteindre une capacité d'environ 1 200 m / mois, permettant ainsi le séchage de la moitié de la production de débités. Le séchage se fait sur un cycle de 2 mois, composé d'un mois de pré-séchage à l’air puis un mois en séchoir.
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Les grumes entrées en scierie étaient valorisées comme suit : + 31 % de débités vendus sur les marchés d'exportation ; +35 % de débités vendus sur le marché local (y compris une partie vendue en vrac en benne) ;
+ Le reste est soit brûlé par des charbonniers, soit brûlé dans l'usine, une partie de l'énergie étant valorisée pour la production de chaleur des séchoirs.
La société SIFORCO a une unité de production de placages tranchés, qui a été fermée en 2009. L'arrêt de cette unité de transformation, d’une capacité de 12 000 m° de grumes par an, avait été décidé du fait de la faible disponibilité en grumes de qualité « tranche » et de la nécessité d'investir dans des séchoirs plus performants, rendant l’activité non viable.
Un atelier de récupération de produits connexes du premier sciage assurait une production d'environ 150 m‘/mois de débités. Un deuxième atelier de récupération était en cours d'installation, avec 2 déligneuses multi-lames et un dédoubleur. Cette installation aurait permis de produire environ 150 m°/mois de débités supplémentaires, doublant ainsi la capacité de récupération et permettant ainsi d'augmenter le rendement à l'exportation de 1,5%.
2 PROCESSUS D’AMENAGEMENT ET DE CERTIFICATION VOULU PAR LA SOCIETE
2.1 L'ELABORATION DU PLAN D’AMENAGEMENT DU TITRE FORESTIER
Les 7 titres attribués à SIFORCO ont été convertis en concessions forestières. La société SIFORCO peut donc désormais initier le projet d'aménagement de sa concession et disposera pour ce faire d'un délai de 4 ans à compter de la signature du contrat de concession.
Pour être appuyé dans l'élaboration de ses Plans d'aménagement, la SIFORCO a signé depuis fin 2010 des contrats d'appui technique avec le bureau d'étude FORET RESSOURCES MANAGEMENT (FRM), leader dans ce domaine en Afrique Centrale.
Les méthodes de travail employées par la Cellule Aménagement SIFORCO pour effectuer l'inventaire d'aménagement sont décrites dans le Protocole d'inventaire d'Aménagement, déposé auprès du Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature, Eaux et Forêts pour validation le 11 mars 2011.
Ces méthodologies de travail répondent aux prescriptions contenues dans les Guides Opérationnels ayant trait :
+ au modèle de rapport d'inventaire d'aménagement ; + aux normes d'inventaire d'aménagement forestier ;
+ aux normes d'élaboration du plan de sondage de l'inventaire d'aménagement ;
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+ aux normes de stratification forestière ;
+ __ à l'attestation de conformité du plan de sondage ;
+ au protocole de vérification et d'approbation du rapport d'inventaire d'aménagement ; + aux listes des essences forestières de la République Démocratique du Congo ;
+ au canevas et guide de réalisation des études socio-économiques.
Le protocole d'inventaire a été déposé auprès du MECNT le 11 mars 2011.
Le Rapport d'étude socio-économique sur la zone d'emprise de la CF 40/11 est en cours de réalisation.
Les accords constituant la clause sociale du cahier des charges ont été signés le 18 août 2011.
Les différentes étapes qui restent à conduire pour la mise sous gestion durable de la CF 40/11 sont les suivantes :
+ Dépôt auprès du MECNT du présent Plan de Gestion, 2012 ;
+ __ Réalisation de l'inventaire d'aménagement forestier, 2013 - 2014 ;
+ Réalisation de travaux cartographiques à travers la constitution d’une base de données cartographiques sous SIG, 2012 ;
+ Dépôt du Rapport d'inventaire d'aménagement, 2014 ;
+ __ Préparation et dépôt du Plan d'Aménagement auprès du MECNT, 2014 pour une mise en œuvre au début 2015 ;
+ __ Mise en œuvre du Plan d'Aménagement dès l'adoption de celui-ci : préparation et mise en œuvre des documents de gestion (Plan de Gestion et Plan Annuel d'Opérations),
2.2 VERS LA CERTIFICATION DE LEGALITE ET DE GESTION DURABLE DES ACTIVITES
La politique de SIFORCO cible une gestion durable des ressources forestières, en s’impliquant dans une application stricte des textes de lois, l'amélioration continue des pratiques et une intégration dans le tissu socio-économique local. Les productions du bloc K8 étaient certifiées TLTV (TIMBER LEGALITY & TRACEABILITY VERIFICATION, numéro SGS-TLTV/LP-VLC-0005) depuis 2007. Un audit réalisé en juillet 2011, a permis à SIFORCO d'obtenir la certification TLTV pour ses productions issues du bloc K3, ainsi que celles du bloc K10 dont est attributaire la société SEDAF mais pour lequel la gestion et l'exploitation sont assurées par SIFORCO au travers d’un contrat liant les deux sociétés.
La SIFORCO ne cherche pas à être certifiée sur l'ensemble de sa gestion à moyen terme, car elle préfère se consacrer à la mise sous aménagement de ses trois SSA.
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Toutefois, Un programme de mise en œuvre de techniques d'Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit sera initié.
3 REGLEMENT D'EXPLOITATION SUR LES 4 PREMIERES AAC
3.1.1 Localisation des 4 premières AAC
Comme prévu par les dispositions réglementaires, ce Plan de Gestion a été préparé pour 4 AAC, couvrant la période allant de 2012 à 2015. L'entrée en vigueur du Plan d'Aménagement est prévue pour début 2015 (cf. 2.1). Il définira notamment les Blocs d'Aménagement Quinquennaux (BAQ) en tenant compte des superficies exploitées d'ici là et de l'analyse des études techniques réalisées.
Dès l'approbation du Plan d'Aménagement, le premier Plan de Gestion Quinquennal sera produit et rendra caduque le présent Plan de Gestion. Le premier BAQ est prévu pour couvrir la période 2015 — 2019 et il sera alors associé à la signature d'une clause sociale couvrant cette même période de 5 ans.
Dans la mesure du possible et en fonction des résultats des différentes études, le premier BAQ intégrera la ou les AAC prévues en exploitation par ce Plan de Gestion et qui n'auraient pas encore été exploitées.
3.1.1.1 Surface utile retenue
La surface utile retenue est calculée à partir d’une première interprétation des images satellitales conduite lors des travaux de pré-stratification effectués en 2010 par FRM et SIFORCO. La carte de pré-stratification est jointe en Annexe 5 de ce Plan de Gestion. Ces résultats seront affinés à partir des travaux de terrain d'inventaire d'aménagement.
On trouvera dans le Tableau 5 un récapitulatif des surfaces calculées sous SIG (projection UTM zone 33 Sud) par types interprétés :
Tableau 5: Résultats de la stratification préliminaire du Bloc K3
Types d'occupation du sol Surface (ha) % du total Forêt utile 112 599 59% Forêt non-utile 78 274 41% dont Zones marécageuses 25 843 14% Zones anthropisées 8 634 5% Savanes 43797 23% TOTAL 190 872 100%
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Cette concession est caractérisée par une forte présence des savanes, qui couvrent près d’un quart de la surface. La superficie totale est de 190 872 ha et la superficie utile totale est de 112 599 ha, ce qui correspond à 59% de la superficie totale.
3.1.1.2 Superficie des 4 premières AAC
Conformément à l'arrêté ministériel n°028/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 (article 14) la surface de °" de la superficie totale de la forêt productive concédée, soit 4 504 ha de surface utile maximale (112 599 hectares divisés par 25), soit 18 016 ha au maximum pour les 4 AAC.
chacune des 4 premières AAC ne doit pas dépasser 1/25
Suivant les prescriptions du Guide Opérationnel définissant le canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal, le découpage de ces AAC au sein des BAQ s’est basé sur les principes suivants :
+ __le territoire dans lequel s'inscrit l'AAC intègre des superficies non productives. En revanche la superficie prise en compte pour le dimensionnement de l’'AAC correspond à la superficie utile incluse dans ce territoire ;
+ un écart de 5% sur la superficie utile a été toléré entre la plus grande et de la plus petite des AAC.
Pour les besoins de réalisation des inventaires d'exploitation et de planification de sa production, SIFORCO a établi sur l'ensemble de la SSA un découpage en parcelles de 1 000 ha (rectangle de 2km par 5). Le découpage en AAC s’est appuyé dans la mesure du possible sur les limites de ces parcelles.
3.1.2 Description des 4 AAC
3.1.2.1 Justification et localisation des 4 AAC
Ce Plan de Gestion a été préparé pour 4 AAC comme prévu par les dispositions réglementaires et il couvre la période allant de 2012 à 2015. L'entrée en vigueur du Plan d'Aménagement est prévue pour début 2015 (cf. 2.1). Il définira notamment les Blocs d'Aménagement Quinquennaux (BAQ) en tenant compte des superficies exploitées jusque là et de l'analyse des études techniques réalisées.
L'exploitation durable des forêts de la CF 40/11 - Bolobo par SIFORCO n'a pas encore commencé. L'implantation des infrastructures nécessaires au lancement des activités a débuté en mai 2012. L'installation d’une base-vie et la remise en état d'une partie du réseau routier existant, indispensable pour permettre l'accès au titre forestier et l'évacuation des productions, sont les premières étapes dans l'installation sur la CF 40/11. Dans cette optique, les 4 AAC vont se placer dans la partie ouest de la Concession Forestière, profitant de la proximité du fleuve Congo pour l'évacuation du bois et de la facilité d'accès à la zone, garanti par la construction relativement aisée d'une route principale à travers des savanes.
Dès l'approbation du Plan d'Aménagement, le premier Plan de Gestion Quinquennal sera produit et il sera alors associé à la signature de clauses sociales couvrant cette même période de 5 ans. Ces dernières seront signées avec les communautés locales dont les territoires coutumiers se superposent avec les 5 AAC prévues en exploitation de 2015 à 2019.
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3.1.2.2 Superficie des 4 premières AAC
Le principe du découpage de ces AAC s’est basé sur les prescriptions du Guide Opérationnel définissant le canevas d'autorisation d'exploitation forestière anticipée. Le Tableau 6 donne les superficies des AAC et la Carte 2 leur localisation.
Tableau 6 : Superficies des 4 Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe
Superficie totale du Superficie non Superficie Date théorique
AAC territoire délimité productive productive d'ouverture (ha) (ha) (ha)
1 9215 4 805 4410 01/01/2012
2 8 028 3707 4321 01/01/2013
3 5 243 749 4 494 01/01/2014
4 5 524 1043 4481 01/01/2015 Moyenne 7 003 2576 4427 Somme 28 010 10 304 17 706
La superficie productive est de 17 706 ha, légèrement inférieure aux 4/25 autorisés par la loi. Conformément au Guide Opérationnel ayant trait au canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal, le découpage en AAC doit être équisurface avec une tolérance de 5 %. Le principe de calcul de cet écart est repris ci-dessous : Ecart = Sa Sp x 100 Sp Avec: Sg: superficie de la plus grande AAC Sp : superficie de la plus petite AAC
Si on applique cette formule dans le cas présent on obtient :
4 494—4 321
3321 = 4,0%, soit un écart inférieur à la tolérance de 5%.
La Carte 2 localise les 4 AAC. La Carte 3 présente le réseau routier prévisionnel pour l'évacuation des bois.
Le Tableau 7 donne les coordonnées géographiques indicatives de quelques points remarquables permettant de délimiter les 4 AAC sur les segments naturels de la limite. Il est à noter que les coordonnées réelles pourront légèrement différer pour s'adapter aux limites des blocs délimités sur le terrain.
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Bone mous République Démocratique du Congo FORET ES on Assiettes annuelles de coupe de la CF 40/11 MANAGEMENT 2012-2015
163
a 2
Zone non inventoriée
Loue | Marécage
Savane
Zone anthropisée
Tic cs CRT ES) * X ’:
16°300"E FRM, juin 2012
République Démocratique du Congo l Réseau prévisionnel de pistes de la CF 40/11 2012-2015
Réseau de pistes —— Piste principale prévue
Piste secondaire prévue — Piste principale existente AAC 5m : |
ES :
L_E Tire cer ° Village —— Réseau hydrographique
FRM, juin 2012
SIF/ORCO
Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00
Décembre 2011
RDC
Tableau 7 : Points remarquables permettant la délimitation des 4 AAC
Degrés, minutes, secondes
Degrés décimaux
UTM, zone 33 sud (en mètres)
couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2011 - 2014)
Point Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude 1 16,4627 -2,1951 16° 27'45,578"E | 2° 11° 42,506" S 662656,6 9757290,3 2 16,5076 -2,2146 16° 30° 27,189"E | 2° 1252695" S 667647,8 9755129,6 3 16,6149 -2,2146 16° 36' 53,775" E | 2° 1252695" S 679592,6 9755117,0 4 16,5903 -2,3064 16° 35'25,205"E | 2° 18°22,863"S 676844,8 9744978,8 5 16,6180 -2,3064 16° 37'4,919"E | 2°18°22,861"S 679925,7 9744975,4 6 16,6252 -2,3425 16° 37' 30,745"E | 2° 20° 33,091" S 680719,0 9740974,4 7 16,5876 -2,3425 16° 35 15,258" E | 2° 20° 33,091" S 676533,0 9740979,2 8 16,5876 -2,3562 16° 35'15,258"E | 2°21°22,432"S 676531,3 9739463,6 9 16,5422 -2,4117 16° 32° 32,002"E | 2°24°41,978"S 671480,6 9733340,3 10 16,5329 -2,4117 16° 31 58,450" E | 2° 24°41,990"S 670444,0 9733341,1 11 16,5203 -2,3787 16° 31° 12,989"E | 2°22°43,331"S 669043,6 9736987,2 12 16,5656 -2,3787 16° 33 56,102"E | 2°22°43,331"S 674082,9 9736981,6 13 16,4804 -2,3064 16° 28'49,474"E | 2°18°22,867"S 664618,3 9744991,8 14 16,5058 -2,3064 16° 30' 20,862"E | 2°18°22,867"S 667441,8 9744988,9 15 16,5058 -2,2883 16° 30' 20,862"E | 2°17°17,747"S 667443,9 9746988,9 16 16,5424 -2,2883 16° 32°32,677"E | 2°17°17,742"S 671516,5 9746984,8 17 16,4168 -2,1901 16° 25"0,593"E | 2°11°24,421"S 657559,6 9757850,6 18 16,4347 -2,1901 16° 26° 5,005"E | 2°11°24,462"S 659549,7 9757847,5 19 16,4347 -2,1952 16° 26° 5,005"E | 2°11°42,552"S 659549,2 9757291,9 E Plan de Gestion Page 22 M
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En théorie, une AAC est ouverte en début de chaque année. Selon l'arrêté ministériel n°036/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/2006 du 5 octobre 2006 (article 11), les AAC peuvent être ouvertes durant deux ans consécutifs et chaque AAC devra être définitivement fermée deux ans après sa date d'ouverture effective.
La durée d'application du Plan d'Aménagement est de 25 ans, et la surface sera découpée en 25 AAC. Chaque Assiette Annuelle de Coupe ne sera ouverte à l'exploitation qu'une seule fois pendant la durée de mise en œuvre du Plan d'Aménagement.
3.1.3 Evaluation de la ressource exploitable sur les 4 prochaines années
La ressource exploitable a été estimée à partir d'un inventaire de sondage réalisé en 2010. Des layons de comptage établis dans l’ensemble de la concession ont permis de sonder 371 ha, avec 63 placettes de 4 ha et 17 placettes de 7 ha.
Les équipes de terrain ont identifié et comptabilisé les tiges d’une liste restreinte d'essences à partir des Diamètres d'Exploitation fixés par la société. A partir des effectifs comptabilisés des différentes essences et leurs diamètres, des tarifs de cubage à une entrée établis par le SPIAF ont été appliqués. Ceux-ci permettent de donner le volume des fûts, ou volume brut, en fonction du diamètre à 1,30 mètre du sol ou au-dessous des contreforts (DHP).
Pour passer des volumes bruts aux volumes nets, c’est-à dire aux volumes commerciaux réellement mobilisables, nous avons appliqué un coefficient de récolement, qui est le produit d’un coefficient de prélèvement et d’un coefficient de valorisation.
Ces coefficients sont définis comme suit : + Coefficients de prélèvement : proportion du volume des tiges de DHP supérieur au DME dont la qualité justifie l'abattage pour la commercialisation ou la transformation.
+ Coefficients de valorisation : proportion du volume fût abattu qui est effectivement commercialisé ou transformé.
+ Coefficients de récolement : proportion du volume fût sur pied qui est effectivement commercialisé ou transformé. C'est le produit des coefficients de prélèvement et de valorisation.
L'évaluation des productions s'est faite par application d'un dernier coefficient, le coefficient de décision d'exploitation. Ce coefficient tient compte de la possibilité de commercialisation des essences sur les marchés, en fonction des coûts de revient de leur production. Les valeurs fixées ont été prudentes, pour garantir une marge de sécurité dans les évaluations de volume, pour les essences de la Classe 2, pour lesquelles le marché est plus exigeant dans la qualité et plus fluctuant dans la demande.
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Cependant, les volumes annoncés ici ne sont donnés qu'à titre indicatif afin de planifier les opérations et d’asseoir une estimation des montants disponibles pour le fonds de développement, en vue des négociations avec les populations locales. Ils seront ajustés au fur et à mesure de la mise en œuvre du Plan de Gestion.
Tableau 8 : Résultats des inventaires de sondage
Nombre de | Nombre pieds pieds Vol net Décision Vol net à Essence | inventoriés | inventoriés a el sosr eco disponible | d'exploitation exploiter (DME> DME | (DME> DME | ("° Prutiha) C0) {m° net/ha) (%) {m° net/ha) expl) expliha)
Doussie 3 0,01 0,04 56% 0,02 100% 0,02 Iroko 3 0,01 0,08 64% 0,05 100% 0,05 Kosipo 3 0,01 0,14 40% 0,05 100% 0,05 Sapell 9 0,02 0,35 68% 0,24 100% 0,24 Sipo 1 0,00 0,05 68% 0,03 100% 0,03 Tiama 24 0,06 0,53 43% 0,23 100% 0,23 Wenge 197 0,53 3,39 42% 1,42 100% 1,42 Total Classe 1 2,05 2,05 Bilinga 28 0,08 0,53 56% 0,30 50% 0,15 Bossé 3 0,01 0,07 42% 0,03 50% 0,02 Dibetou 19 0,05 0,33 42% 0,14 50% 0,07 Longhi 2 0,06 0.38 30% 0,11 50% 0,06 Blanc ” " ° d ° ” Padouk 2 0,01 0,03 36% 0,01 50% 0,01 rouge Tali 60 0,16 1,61 36% 0,58 50% 0,29 Tola 6 0,02 0,19 30% 0,06 50% 0,03 Total Classe 2 1,22 50% 0,61
TOTAL GENERAL 3,28 2,66
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Tableau 9 : Estimation du volume récoltable sur la zone d'exploitation des 4 AAC (surface utile de 17 705 ha)
Essence Vol net à exploiter Volume total Production moyenne {m? net/ha) (m? net) annuelle (m nets/an) Doussie 0,02 439 110 Iroko 0,05 930 232 Kosipo 0,05 957 239 Sapelli 0,24 4 269 1067 Sipo 0,03 565 141 Tiama 0,23 3 997 999 Wenge 1,42 25 202 6 300 Total Classe 1 2,05 36 359 9 090 Bilinga 0,15 2613 653 Bossé 0,02 271 68 Dibetou 0,07 1213 303 Longhi Blanc 0,06 1 006 251 Padouk rouge 0,01 100 25 Tali 0,29 5 120 1280 Tola 0,03 501 125 Total Classe 2 0,61 10 824 2706 TOTAL GENERAL 2,66 47183 11796
Selon les prévisions, SIFORCO devrait pouvoir mobiliser environ 11 796 m° net de grumes annuellement sur les 4 ans de durée du Plan de Gestion, soit environ 1 000 m/mois. Il est important de rappeler la nature indicative et prévisionnelle de ces volumes qui pourront différer des volumes qui seront effectivement prélevés. Divers éléments peuvent affecter ces volumes, notamment les Diamètres Minimums réels d'Exploitation, l'amélioration des rendements par l'application des règles EFIR, la valorisation de nouvelles essences ou au contraire l'impossibilité de valoriser une essence dont la rentabilité n’est plus garantie.
3.1.4 Infrastructures à créer
Le tracé prévisionnel des routes principales et secondaires pour la période 2012-2015 de ce Plan de Gestion est présenté sur la Carte 3.
Le tracé ici présenté est provisoire, et pourra être modifié suite aux résultats des inventaires d'exploitation.
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Tableau 10 : Longueur prévisionnelle des pistes principales et secondaires à créer lors du Plan de Gestion 2012-2015 (km)
Route principale Route secondaire Total AAC 1 10 21 31 AAC2 0 29 29 AAC 3 0 22 22 AAC 4 0 26 26
En dehors des AAC 6 0 6 Moyenne (km/an) 4 24,5 28,5 Total 16 98 114
SIFORCO installera sur le territoire de la CF 40/11-Bolobo une base-vie. Dans un premier temps, les infrastructures seront temporaires, afin de pouvoir répondre aux besoins immédiats de démarrage des activités d'exploitation forestière. Progressivement, une base-vie définitive sera établie, elle comprendra à terme des habitations en matériau durable, un établissement scolaire, un dispensaire équipé et doté d’une pharmacie, un accès à l’eau potable, une cantine, des équipements de loisirs.
3.2 REGLES D’INTERVENTION EN MILIEU FORESTIER
La société appliquera comme norme d'intervention les préconisations émises dans les Guides Opérationnels, et en particulier celles des Normes d'Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit (EFIR) et des Normes d'inventaire d'exploitation. La partie qui suit présente une synthèse des opérations et mesures à mettre en œuvre, conformément aux normes citées ci-dessus.
3.2.1 Description technique des opérations forestières
3.2.1.1 L'inventaire d'exploitation
L'inventaire d'exploitation sera conduit de façon à répondre aux prescriptions contenues dans le Guide Opérationnel définissant les Normes d'inventaire d'Exploitation.
Les arbres à identifier lors de l'inventaire d'exploitation et à protéger lors de l'exploitation sont de 5 types :
+ les arbres exploitables ;
Ce sont les arbres d'essences exploitées, ayant atteint le Diamètre Minimum d'Exploitabilité (DME), fixé par la loi et dont la qualité justifie la valorisation. Ces arbres seront numérotés sur carte et leur numéro sera marqué à la peinture.
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+ les arbres d’essences exploitables mais de mauvaise qualité ; Ce sont les arbres d'essences exploitées, ayant atteint le DME, mais ayant un défaut rédhibitoire. Ces arbres seront marqués d’un « V ».
+ les arbres d’avenir ;
Ce sont ces arbres qui reconstitueront le potentiel exploitable pour les rotations ultérieures. Ils sont donc à protéger afin que ce potentiel puisse se reconstituer. Les arbres à protéger étant menacés par l'exploitation seront marqués d’un « @ », il s’agit de tiges situées au bord des pistes de débardages et à proximité des arbres à abattre.
+ les arbres patrimoniaux ;
Une équipe sera constituée pour assurer une concertation préalable au sujet de l'exploitation avec les populations locales. Elle sera chargée de réaliser une cartographie sociale en collaboration avec les populations locales dont le territoire coutumier se superpose avec l'AAC. Les arbres et les territoires ayant une importance sociale particulière seront marqués sur le terrain et cartographiés (Zone sacrée, arbres patrimoniaux, etc.). Les arbres concernés seront marqués d’un « P ».
+ les semenciers ; Certaines tiges seront identifiées et préservées pour jouer le rôle de semenciers. Elles seront marquées d’un « P » lors du pistage.
Tige d'avemir ‘ Arbre refusé Arbre à protéger (mauvaise qualité)
Figure 3 : Marquage des tiges d’avenir, des arbres patrimoniaux et des arbres de mauvaise qualité (source : FRM, Normes d'inventaire d’exploitation, juillet 2007)
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Les documents cartographiques établis grâce aux données collectées par l'inventaire d'exploitation donneront la localisation :
des tiges exploitables ; des tiges préservées comme semenciers ; des tiges patrimoniales ;
et des tiges d'avenir.
3.2.1.2 Zones hors exploitation
Certaines zones sont particulièrement sensibles à une mise en exploitation. Afin de les protéger, leur
exclusion de l'exploitation s'avère nécessaire. Cette mise en défend va permettre de réduire l'impact
sur les populations riveraines, la ressource et l’environnement.
Les zones à exclure sont les suivantes, conformément au Guide Opérationnel concernant l'Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit :
zones non exploitables : zones marécageuses, zones à forte pente (pente supérieure où égale à 30%) et zones de rochers ;
zones à valeur culturelle ou religieuse : forêts ou arbres sacrés ;
zones d'importance écologique, scientifique ou touristique : zones à très grande diversité floristique ou faunique, habitats d'espèces endémiques, habitats uniques et fragiles, etc. ;
zones sensibles, c'est-à-dire en bordure des cours d'eau permanents, des marigots, autour des marécages. Largeur minimum des zones sensibles :
o largeur < 10m: 50 m sur chaque rive ;
o ravines : 10 m de chaque côté ;
o ruisseaux ou marigots : 20 m de chaque côté ;
o marécages : 10 m à partir de la limite ; o tête de source : 150 m autour.
3.2.1.3 Réseau routier et parcs à grumes
Afin de limiter les impacts directs et indirects, le réseau routier et de parcs à grumes sera planifié et optimisé sur le terrain en :
évitant les peuplements « pauvres » en tiges à exploiter de manière à réduire les superficies touchées notamment par les pistes de débardage ;
contournant les zones de forte pente, marécageuses, sensibles, etc. ; limitant autant que possible la surface des parcs à grumes ; respectant une déforestation maximum de 30 m pour les routes et leur emprise ;
maintenant des ponts de canopée, au minimum tous les 5 kilomètres, et en ouvrant les andains (pour permettre le passage de la faune) ;
construisant et en maintenant des structures de drainage appropriées pour collecter et évacuer les eaux ;
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+ évitant la perturbation des cours d'eau ;
+ préservant les arbres d’avenir et patrimoniaux dans la planification.
3.2.1.4 Abattage contrôlé
Des formations en abattage contrôlé seront dispensées pour garantir la mise en œuvre de techniques d'abattage contrôlé.
3.2.1.5 Usage des produits de traitement des bois
L'usage des produits de traitement suit les règles d'application de ces produits, conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur. Les travailleurs sont équipés de tenues spéciales, afin d'éviter tout contact du produit avec la peau ou les yeux. L'ensemble de ces mesures assurent les conditions de sécurité et de santé des travailleurs et tendent à éviter la pollution des eaux, du sol, de la flore et de la microfaune.
3.2.1.6 Débusquage et débardage
Le débusquage et le débardage constituent les premières étapes de transport des bois en grumes, plus précisément de l'endroit d'abattage au parc de chargement. L'impact de ces deux étapes se manifeste tant sur le sol que sur le peuplement résiduel.
Ces impacts inévitables seront néanmoins réduits en :
+ réalisant un tracé optimal pour le débardage des grumes (le plus direct et le moins large) en évitant des virages trop serrés ;
+ évitant les arbres à protéger ;
+ limitant au minimum les franchissements de cours d’eau et dans le cas où ceci est impossible, en prenant des précautions (lit de billes perpendiculaire à la berge, passage par un lit rocheux...) ;
+ limitant l’utilisation des bulldozers au débusquage en choisissant d'autres moyens d'extraction en cas de pente forte ;
+ utilisant au maximum le treuil et le câble pour le débardage là où la dimension et le poids des grumes le permettent.
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Piste principale Piste principale Piste secondaire PRE @e \ Piste secondaire
&---..
@---—
Parc Parc
Figure 4: Tracé idéal des pistes de débardage, tracé à l’avance en fonction des cartes d'inventaire d'exploitation (Source : FRM, Normes d'inventaire d'exploitation, juillet 2007)
3.2.1.7 Chargement et transport
Afin de limiter les impacts causés par le chargement et le transport de bois (accidents, pollutions et
transport illégal de viande de brousse), les mesures suivantes seront appliquées :
charger de façon adéquate les grumiers (pas au-delà de leur capacité utile) ;
évacuer les bois des parcs à grumes dans un délai n'excédant pas deux mois, en donnant priorité aux essences susceptibles d’être attaquées par les insectes ou les champignons ;
respecter les limitations de vitesse établies par l'entreprise ; ne jamais transporter de passagers non autorisés dans les grumiers ; interdire le transport de viande de brousse ;
interdire la présence de toute arme à feu à bord des véhicules.
3.2.1.8 Opérations post-exploitation
Afin de laisser les zones exploitées dans un état qui facilite la régénération ultérieure et éviter toute
atteinte supplémentaire à l’environnement lors de la période de la rotation, des opérations pourront
être conduites après l'exploitation lorsque cela s'avère nécessaire, notamment :
la réhabilitation des parcs à grumes ; le retrait de tous les débris d'exploitation dans les zones de protection des berges, et de tout obstacle freinant le libre passage des eaux ;
la fermeture à la circulation des routes qui ne seront pas utilisées avant la prochaine rotation. La fermeture des routes sera faite à l'aide de grumes, de fossés creusés ou de barrières cadenassées.
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3.2.2 Mesures de réduction, d’atténuation et de compensation des impacts sur l’environnement et la faune
3.2.2.1 Diamètres Minimums d'Exploitation (DME)
Dans l'attente des conclusions et de la validation du Plan d'Aménagement de cette concession, la société respectera les diamètres d'abattage (Diamètres Minimum d'Exploitation) tels que définis dans le Guide Opérationnel « Liste des essences forestières de la RDC ».
Ce diamètre sera mesuré conformément à l'annexe 5 du Guide Opérationnel portant sur les normes d'inventaire d'aménagement forestier.
3.2.2.2 Ouvrage de franchissement (ponts, ponceaux, digues, etc.)
Les ouvrages de franchissement seront construits de manière à ne pas changer les directions naturelles ou entraver les cours d’eau, afin de ne pas perturber l'alimentation en eau des populations, et de prévenir les risques d’inondations.
3.2.2.3 Réduction de l'impact sur la faune sauvage
Toutes les activités liées à la chasse commerciale sont interdites dans le cadre de l'exploitation forestière. Il s'agit notamment de la chasse elle-même, du commerce de viande de brousse dans le camp forestier, du transport de la viande de chasse et des produits forestiers d’origine animale par les véhicules de la société, et du commerce d'armes et/ou des minutions. Au travers de notes de service, la société va informer son personnel de cette interdiction passible, en cas d'infraction, de sanctions.
Des réunions de sensibilisation seront organisées auprès des travailleurs et des populations, sur les lois et réglementations qui s'appliquent en RDC : période de chasse, espèces protégées, techniques autorisées, permis de port d'armes.
3.2.3 Diverses mesures de gestion
3.2.3.1 Arbres de chantier routier
La société procédera à l'abattage de tous les arbres dont l'enlèvement est jugé nécessaire lors des travaux du tracé des routes d'évacuation ou par la confection d'ouvrages d'art.
S'il s'agit de bois d'œuvre dont le diamètre est supérieur ou égal au diamètre minimum d'exploitation, ils seront portés au carnet de chantier après numérotation, mais ne donneront pas lieu à un paiement quelconque, ni aux taxes lorsqu'ils sont utilisés pour la construction de ponts ou d'ouvrages relatifs aux routes forestières et s'ils n’ont pas été commercialisés.
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3.2.3.2 Matérialisation des limites des AAC
Lorsqu'il n'existe pas de limites naturelles, la société matérialisera les limites de chaque Assiette Annuelle de Coupe. Les layons tracés pour délimiter les parcelles peuvent être considérés comme une matérialisation de limite.
3.2.8.3 Matérialisation des zones de protection
Les limites des zones tampons bordant les cours d’eau ou les zones marécageuses seront délimitées par un marquage à la peinture.
4 PROGRAMME INDUSTRIEL EN LIAISON AVEC CETTE GARANTIE D’APPROVISIONNEMENT
La production estimée de K10 (titres forestiers SEDAF) est d'environ 100 000 m° par an, celle de K3 de 12 000 m‘/an, soit une production totale d'environ 112 000 m. Avec une capacité annuelle de transformation de 120 000 m° (avec 3 rotations) l'unité industrielle de Maluku est en mesure de respecter l'obligation règlementaire de transformer plus de 70% des grumes produites à court terme.
Il n'est pas prévu sur le court terme d'investissements industriels visant à augmenter la capacité de transformation locale des grumes produites (entrée grumes dans les usines). Les priorités sont plutôt données à une amélioration des rendements matière des usines actuelles et à une augmentation de la valeur ajoutée (séchage, transformation plus poussée).
Cependant, SIFORCO est en train de préparer la mise en exploitation des blocs forestiers K2 et K7. Les inventaires ont été menés afin de connaître la ressource disponible. En définissant des AAC de superficie égale au 1/25" de la superficie utile totale, la production de l'ensemble K2 et K7 est estimée provisoirement à environ 95 000 m‘/an. Ceci engendrera, une fois l'exploitation mise en œuvre sur tous les massifs forestiers concédés à SIFORCO, une production de bois supérieure à l'actuelle capacité de transformation. Dans l'attente de la mise en œuvre d'investissements lui permettant de respecter son obligation règlementaire de transformer plus de 70% de sa production de grumes, SIFORCO a fait le choix de définir des superficies d'AAC inférieures au 1/25°"% de la superficie utile totale. La production objective des blocs forestiers K2 et K7 est ainsi fixé à environ 25 000 m° par an sur les quatre prochaines années. Pour les investissements futurs, les orientations seront guidées par le niveau et les caractéristiques technologiques de la ressource disponible, évaluée par les études techniques préalables à l'aménagement et les volumes mobilisables dans le cadre de l'aménagement.
Le Plan de Gestion de la SSA Aketi-Basoko prévoyait une production annuelle d'environ 95 000 m°. Cependant, au début de l’année 2012, SIFORCO a remis à disposition de l'Etat congolais, les GA 02/89 et 25/04 constituant le bloc forestier K8. Le Plan de Gestion de la SSA Aketi-Basoko sera donc révisé en ne tenant compte que des superficies du bloc K9 et les prévisions de production seront intégrées dans la définition de la stratégie industrielle de SIFORCO.
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ee Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC | SIF/ORCO + Juin 2012
5 PROGRAMME SOCIAL RATTACHE A LA GARANTIE D’APPROVISIONNEMENT
SIFORCO est en train de prendre les dispositions pour s'installer sur la CF 40/11. Actuellement, aucune infrastructure n’a été construite. La mise en place d’une base vie sur le site devra répondre à des mesures spécifiques qui porteront sur :
Les conditions de vie des ayants droit SIFORCO à travers les points suivants :
+ la santé : mesures liées à la fourniture d’un suivi médical et de soins de santé primaire par une équipe professionnelle, dans des locaux équipés et adaptés : construction d’infrastructures de santé, approvisionnement en produits pharmaceutiques, mise à disposition de personnel médical,.… ;
+ __ l'éducation de base : mesures liées à la scolarisation, par des enseignants qualifiés dans des locaux adaptés, des enfants des travailleurs dans la base vie : construction d'infrastructures scolaires, mise à disposition de personnel enseignant, .… ;
+ la sécurité alimentaire : mesures liées à l’approvisionnement de la base vie et des campements temporaires en forêt en produits alimentaires permettant une nutrition saine, équilibrée et adaptée : Appui auprès de communautés locales pour l'organisation des filières et pour l’approvisionnement de la base-vie, sensibilisation des employés et de leurs ayants droit sur l'importance d’un régime alimentaire équilibré, .… ;
+__ l’habitat et l'hygiène : mesures liées à la qualité de l’habitat, à l'hygiène, à la prévention sanitaire et à la sécurité dans la base vie: construction d'une base-vie en matériaux durables,
aménagement de sources pour permettre l'accès à l’eau potable,
Les conditions de travail des employés SIFORCO à travers les points suivants :
+ le plan d'embauche et de formation professionnelle : mesures liées à la formation et à la valorisation des parcours professionnels du personnel permanent SIFORCO : élaboration d'un plan d'embauche, mise en place de procédures d'évaluation des compétences professionnelles des travailleurs, élaboration d’un plan de formation, élaboration de procédures de travail et diffusion des fiches de postes,.… ;
+ __la sécurité et les conditions de travail : mesures de sécurité liées à l’activité professionnelle des salariés SIFORCO : Inscription des règles de sécurité dans les procédures de travail, fourniture des équipements de sécurité à l’ensemble des travailleurs, mise en place d’un système de suivi des accidents du travail, mise à niveau du parc automobile en matière de sécurité, .… ;
+ __le développement socioculturel : mesures liées au développement socioculturel et à l'accès à l'information des travailleurs, palliant au déficit socioculturel en raison de l'isolement relatif de la base vie: développement des activités socioculturel en fonction de la demande, fourniture d'équipement de base, organisation de rencontres avec les associations sportives villageoises environnantes, ….
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SIF/ORCO |:
Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
Conformément à l'Arrêté Ministériel__n°023/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/28/JEB/10 du 7 juin 2010, le concessionnaire a signé un accord avec les populations constituant la clause sociale de son cahier
des charges. Cet accord entre la société et les populations locales permet de définir les conditions de la contribution du concessionnaire aux besoins de ces dernières en matière d’infrastructures sociales collectives (éducation, santé, alimentation en eau potable, routes d'accès.….).
L'accord aboutit à une liste de réalisations sociales à effectuer pendant la durée du Plan de Gestion, financées grâce à une ristourne versée par la société au prorata des productions réalisées.
Le montant de cette ristourne est versé sur un fonds de développement local propre au Groupement Batende. Il est indexé sur le volume exploité par la société, l'indexation étant variable selon les
essences. L'Arr St n°023/10 stipule que la société doit alimenter le fonds de
développement à hauteur de 2 à 5 dollars par m°.
Afin d’avoir d’une meilleure base pour les négociations avec les populations locales, une estimation des volumes annuels récoltés par essence a été faite (cf. 3.1.3).
Les négociations avec le Groupement Batende (appelé également Tiene) du Secteur Mongama se sont déroulées à Yumbi et les accords ont été signés le 18 août 2011. La Clause Sociale est annexée au Cahier de Charges provisoire associé à ce Plan de Gestion (Annexe 6). Il est à noter que la clause sociale signée s'est basée sur une première estimation des volumes, préalable à la délimitation précise des Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe. Les volumes employés dans la clause sociale pour évaluer la ristourne, de 48°036 m° pour les 4 AAC, sont légèrement supérieurs aux volumes évalués dans le présent Plan de Gestion, de 47 183 m.
Les prévisions de récolte au sein du Groupement Batende (ou Tiene) et les ristournes à verser sur le Fonds de développement sont présentées dans le Tableau 11, sur la base des montants unitaires par essence négociés avec les populations du Groupement Batende.
Plan de Gestion
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Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIF/ORCO |:
Tableau 11 : Montant total de la ristourne accordée au groupement Batende sur le bloc K3 (Surface utile de 17706 ha)
Prix négocié dans Eu | Ge | on | eme | Mar (m* net) (SUSIm°) (SUS) Doussie 0,02 439 4 1758 Iroko 0,05 930 4 3719 Kosipo 0,05 957 4 3 827 Sapelli 0,24 4 269 4 17 078 Sipo 0,03 565 4 2258 Tiama 0,23 3 997 4 15 990 Wenge 1,42 25 202 5 126 008 Total Classe 1 2,05 36 359 - 170 637 Bilinga 0,15 2613 3 7 840 Bossé 0,02 271 3 814 Dibetou 0,07 1213 3 3 639 Longhi Blanc 0,06 1 006 3 3017 Padouk rouge 0,01 100 3 301 Tali 0,29 5 120 3 15 359 Tola 0,03 501 3 1 503 Total Classe 2 0,61 10 824 - 32 473 SARL 2,66 47183 - 203 110
Le budget annuel prévisionnel est de 50 778 $US disponible sur les fonds de développement, soit un montant total de 203 110 $US sur les 4 ans de mise en œuvre du Plan de Gestion.
Les tableaux en Annexe 7 présentent les réalisations négociées avec les populations riveraines. Les négociations de la clause sociale se sont basées sur une première évaluation faite sur la base de 4 AAC théoriques d'une surface utile 18 016 ha, donnant une ristourne estimée à 206 752 $US. La délimitation réelle des AAC est présentée dans ce document (cf. Carte 2), couvrant une surface utile de 17 706 ha. Ceci explique la différence entre le tableau présenté ici et celui de l'Annexe 6. Cependant, cette somme sera réévaluée en fonction du volume réellement prélevé, de même que le calendrier effectif des réalisations.
Conformément à l’Arrêté Ministériel 023/10, SIFORCO s'est engagé à verser à la signature de l'accord, une avance de 10% du coût total des travaux d'infrastructures socio-économiques, soit 15 775 $US sur le compte du fonds de développement destiné à CLG et CLS.
Avec les recettes réelles du Fonds de Développement basées sur la production, SIFORCO financera les réalisations listées dans la clause sociale du cahier des charges.
Plan de Gestion
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Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
| SIF/ORCO | :
Le chronogramme prévisionnel des réalisations n'ayant pu être arrêté au moment de la signature de la clause sociale, des négociations seront engagées rapidement afin de définir l’ordre de réalisation des infrastructures prévues sur la période de 4 ans.
Le comité local de suivi a été élu lors de la négociation des accords constituant la clause sociale du cahier des charges. Il se réunira en session ordinaire tous les trois mois sur convocation de
l’Administrateur de Territoire. Ces réunions auront comme but d'examiner l'avancement des travaux, l’état et la gestion du fonds de développement.
6 SYNTHESE GENERALE DU PLAN DE GESTION SUR 4 ANS
6.1 CHRONOGRAMME DE L'ENSEMBLE DES ACTIVITEES
La planification prévisionnelle des activités sur la durée du présent Plan de Gestion est présentée par le chronogramme ci-dessous.
Plan de Gestion
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PRE Concession Forestière n°40/11 SIF/ORCO Juin 2012
RDC
Tableau 12 : Chronogramme prévisionnel des activités sur la durée du Plan de Gestion
[Préparation au cahier des charges provisoire" DE EE PE EE CET ms sausss sous | EE DS SE RS EE RE Préparation du plan d'aménagement
(Dépétauprouente aimentre demarage __Joepusae mas | | | [Fran de sondage detente aménagement | | EE A EE ET ES
[agree sono onomques |
Era aménagemen ] |
[Fraser es rapport cat préimares | |
D Fréparton quan saménagement | |
[se en œure au tan gAméragemens
lise en exploitation forestière inventaires d'exploitation AAC1-AAC2 AAC2-AAC3 AAC1 BAQ1 Aménagement du camp des travailleurs
Exploitation
Opérations post-exploitation
Mise en œuvre de la clause sociale du cahier des charges Infrastructures socio-économiques [ |
Consultation avec les populations riveraines
Négociation des clauses sociales sur les 5 premières années sous Aménagement
LE Plan de Gestion Se ë couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 37 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIF/ORCO |:
6.2 PROGRAMME D'EXPLOITATION, INDUSTRIEL ET SOCIAL
Le présent Plan de Gestion est un document de référence pour les 4 prochaines années dans la Concession Forestière n°40/11. L'exploitation forestière va avoir lieu sur la partie Ouest de la CF 40/11, sur une surface totale de 28 010 ha. Sur la zone ainsi délimitée, 17 706 ha ont été identifiés comme surface utile.
Le volume exploitable prévisionnel est de 47 183 m°, dont 25 202 m° de Wenge (cf. Tableau 9).
SIFORCO a investi dans un outil industriel performant, permettant une amélioration des rendements matières et une meilleure valorisation des produits dans la chaîne de production. A court terme, l'outil de transformation de Maluku, avec une capacité d'entrée de 100 000 m/an, sera en mesure d'assurer la transformation de la ressource exploitée sur les massifs forestiers mis en exploitation (K3et K10). A moyen terme, avec l'ouverture du chantier sur K2 et K7, la société mettra en place un programme d'investissements, lequel permettra l'augmentation des capacités de production.
En ce qui concerne le fonds de développement, un montant total de 203 110 $US est prévu pour la réalisation des œuvres sociales. Ceci correspond à un budget annuel prévisionnel de 50 778 $US. Les montant des investissements sociaux s'élève à 165 401 $ US. Ce montant sera employé dans la construction de deux grandes écoles, à Ngo et à Ngania, un Centre de Santé à Ilebo Mangala et un pont sur la rivière Letoko. Le reste du fonds est destiné au coût d'entretien des infrastructures et au fonctionnement des différentes structures assurant le suivi du Fond de Développement.
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ZRT Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012
SIF/ORCO |:
LISTE DES CARTES
Carte 1 : Localisation de la Concession Forestière 40/11... 9 Carte 2 : Localisation des 4 premières AAC
Carte 3 : Carte du réseau routier prévisionnel 2012-2015.
LISTE DES TABLEAUX
Tableau 1 : Concessions Forestières attribuées à SIFORCO. Tableau 2 : Garanties d'Approvisionnement attribuées à SEDAF
Tableau 3 : Organisation administrative et coutumière du territoire couvert par la CF 40/11 - Bolobo dans la Province de Bandundu (Bloc K3)
Tableau 4 : Matériel d’exploitation prévu pour la mise en exploitation de la CF 40/11 Tableau 5: Résultats de la stratification préliminaire du Bloc K3
Tableau 6 : Superficies des 4 Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe Tableau 7 : Points remarquables permettant la délimitation des 4 AAC... Tableau 8 : Résultats des inventaires de sondage Tableau 9 : Estimation du volume récoltable sur la zone d’exploitation des 4 AAC (surface utile de 17 705
Tableau 11 : Montant total de la ristourne accordée au groupement Batende sur le bloc K3 (Surface utile de 17706 ha) .35
Tableau 12 : Chronogramme prévisionnel des activités sur la durée du Plan de Gestion
LISTE DES FIGURES
Figure 1 : Evolution de la production de grumes par SIFORCO de 1977 à 2011... 7 Figure 2 : Courbe de pluviométrie sur Bandundu nn 10
Figure 3 : Marquage des tiges d’avenir, des arbres patrimoniaux et des arbres de mauvaise qualité (source : FRM, Normes d’inventaire d’exploitation, juillet 2007)
Plan de Gestion
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SIF/ORCO |:
LISTE DES ANNEXES
Annexe 1 : Convention portant octroi de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00 en matière
ligneuse Annexe 2 : Arrêté ministériel notifiant la convertibilité de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement Annexe 3 : Contrat de la Concession Forestière n°040/11 Annexe 4 : Carte administrative des Territoires sur la CF 40/11 Annexe 5 : Carte de pré-stratification
Annexe 6 : Accord signé en 2011 avec le Groupement Batende
Annexe 7 : Budgets prévi
jonnels des fonds de développement
Plan de Gestion
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Convention portant octroi de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement 018/CAB/MIN/AFF/EDT/00 en matière ligneuse attribuée à SIFORCO
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGS MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES FONCIERES, ENVIRONNEMENT
ET DEVELOPPEMENT TOURISTIQUE
LE MINISTRE
GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT
) CONVENTION N°0.48 CAB/MIN/AFF-EDT/00 DU û 3 NOV 2000 PORTANT OCTROI D'UNE GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT EN MATIERE LIGNEUSE
ENTRE : LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Représentée par le Ministre des Affaires Foncières, Environnement et Développement Touristique, : Monsieur le Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA
Ci-après dénommé le Ministre ET : SIFORCO Représentée par Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE Son Directeur-Gérant Ci-après dénommé l'Exploitant
PRELIMINAIRE
Vu le Décret-loi Constitutionnel n° 003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l'organisation et à l'exercice du pouvoir en République Démocratique du Congo tel que modifié et complété par ie Décret-toi Constitutionnel n° 074 du 25 mai 1998, le Décret-loi n° 122 du 21 septembre 1999 :
Vu telle que modifiée à ce jour, l'Ordonnance n° 75-231 du 22 juillet 1975 fixant les attributions du Département de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme ;
Revu l'Ordannace n° 77-022 du 22 février 1977 : Vu la loi foncière n° 73-024 du 20 juillet 1973 ; Vu l'Ordonnancé n° 79-244 du 16 octobre, spécialement en ses articles 3, 4 et 7 :
- : Vu le Décret n° 113 du 1° septembre 2000 portant nomination des Membres du Gouvernement de Salut Publiez — l oo
2-2. - Vu la responsabilité du Ministré des Affaires Foncières,-Environnement et Développement Touristique d'assurer la pérennité des ressources forestières, grâte à une Saine' gestion forestière, Utilisant toutes méthodes, directives et mesures dans l'utilisation des ressources disponibles ;
Vu la nécessité de mettre en valeur les ressources forestières de l'État, pour soutenir une activité économique prospère par l'exploitation rationnelle, la transformation et.la-mise.en marche des LS produits exploités ; TT : u DT. :
Vu la nécessité d'assurer à l'éxpioitant ün-approÿisionnement sûr et-continu en. matière . - Prèmièfe pour son usirie-de transformation Située-däns {a localité de MALUKU, -District : TSHANGE, ‘-:
Commuñe : MALUKU, Province : KINSHASAr4 -tapäcité annuelle prévüe de 60.000 m3 de : . Produits finis, nécessitant un approvisionnementn grümes de 140.000 m3. - .
Vu que l'Exploitant a répondu de façon satisfaisante aux critères et aux procédures de la décision n° 002/CCE/DECNT/84,
ILA ETE ARRETE ET CONVENU CE QUI SUIT :
Article 1%:
Article 2
Aricle3 :
La garantie d'approvisionnement porte sur un volume annuel de 36.000 m3 de grumes réparti comme suit :
ESSENCES VOLUME (m3) Iroko 3.500 Tiama 2.300 Kosipo 2.200 Sapelli 6.500 Sipo 4.500 Wenge 7.000 Latandza 700 Bomanga 1.500 Bosse clair 3.500 Dibetou 1.000 Padouk 1.300 Tola 1.000 Tshitola 1.000 Total 36.000
:Ces bois seront prélevés dans une unité d'exploitation localisée comme suit :
Province : BANDUNDU District: des plateaux Tenitoire : BOLOBO Localité : _ NKOLO Lieu : NGANIA Superficie : 160.000 ha
Cette forêt ou portion de forêt est circonscrite dans les limites suivantes :
Au Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village NKOLO au bord du fleuve Congo, Passant par les villages : NGENIA, KEMBEKE, NGANIA, LONIA jusqu'à EPOKWANKOSO
“_- 7 _ ivière-LEBOMA, de ja rivière LEBOMA jusqu'à son croisement avec je
: LOBINI, - A l'Est : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village EPOKWANKOSO
AJusqu'au village LOBINI; suivre la rivière LOBINI jusqu'à son croisement . avec la rivière LEKURU.- ee : |
Article 4 :
Article 5 :
Article 6 :
-3- ps
A l'Ouest : par la rivière PANSOLA, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village NKOLO jusqu'à sa source, tracer une ligne droite jusqu'à la source de l'une des branches de la rivière LETOKO. Suivre ensuite la rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre la route jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière GAMPOKO en passant par les villages : EKANYKALE 1, MADYA et NDELE. Suivre enfin la rivière GAMPOKO jusqu'à la source, au village BUSINA.
Les grumes ainsi récoltées devront être strictement utilisées pour leur transformation à l'usine décrite ci-dessus, ou dirigées à l'exportation suivant la réglementation en vigueur. .
Aussi, aucune grume ne pourra être vendue à des tiers, à moins d'autorisation écrite du Ministère.
Le Ministère accordera à l'Exploitant les droits suivants sur son unité d'exploitation :
5.1. Le droit exclusif de récolter les arbres exploitables explicitement identifiés à l'article premier
5.2. Le droit de construire les infrastructures nécessaires exclusivement aux exploitations forestières, sans préjudice des droits connus aux tiers ;
Les infrastructures routières construites par l'Exploitant sont propriétés de l'Etat à la fin du contrat.
5.8. Le droit de flottage de radeaux et de navigation privée sur les cours d'eau et les lacs, ainsi que le droit d'utiliser les routes publiques pour transporter, à titre privé, des produits forestiers exploités ainsi que les produits de transformation.
En contre partie, l'Exploitant sera souris, de façon inconditionnelle, aux cbligations Suivantes :
6.1. Maintenir en opération son usine de transformation au niveau d'opération prévu dans.le contrat ;
6.2. Assurer la protection forestière de l'unité d'exploitation ;
63. Présenter dans les détails prévus toutes demandes annuelles de permis de coupe, “tout rapport trimestriel et rapport après coupe, ou d'autres rapports prévus par la réglementation en vigueur ;
- 6.4 Payer toutes les taxes et redevances forestières-prévues par la réglementation en = vigueur ; =
6.5. Informer le Ministère de tout changement d'adresse, de tout projet de transfert de location, d'échange: de donation, de fusion, de vente affectant la propriété:de - l'usine de transformation, objet du contrat et d'en Gbtenir la-ratifiation du Ministère ;
igleméntation-sur l'exploitation la commercialisation et l'expdrtation : réstiers ; DU Le D TLC :
ae
-4- .
6.7. Aviser le Ministère de tout changement dans la destination des grumes exploitées
k et en obtenir l'autorisation du Ministère ;
j 6.8. Respecter toutes décisions prises par le Ministère en matière d'aménagement forestier ;
6.9. Procéder à la récolte minimale de 10 m3 de bois à l'hectare sur les superficies exploitables.
Article 7 : La présente convention est effective à la date de sa signature jusqu'au mois d'Octobre .2025. ° :
Article 8 : Le non respect dés clauses de la convention par l'exploitant entraînera la résiliation immédiate et automatique de la présente.
Fait à Kinshasa, le Û 9 NOV 2000
SIGNATAIRES AUTORISES LE MINISTRE Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE = Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA= SIFORCO B.P. 8434 Kinshasa e
Fait à six exemplaires
1. Exploitant
2. Cabinet du Ministre
8. Secrétaire Général à l'ECN
4. Direction de ta GFC
5. Gouvemeur de Province _ :
6. Coordinateur Provincial de l'ECN oo
Annexe 2
Arrêté ministériel notifiant la convertibilité de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00 attribuée à SIFORCO
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Kinshasa, le ï Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme
S ICAB/MINECN-TIS/JEB/2008
Le Ministre
À Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général de la SIFGRCO à Kinshasa/Maluku
Objet : Notification de la recommandation de la Commission Interministérielle de Conversion des Anciens Titres Forestiers Votre requête n°108
Monsieur l’Adrministrateur Directeur Général,
À l'issue de ses travaux, La Commission interrninistérielle de conversion des anciens titres forestiers a constaté que votre Garantie d’Approvisionnement n°018/00 du 09/11/2006, située dans le Territoire de Bolobo, Province du Bandundu remplit les critères de convertibilité définis par le Décret n°05/116 du 24 octobre 2005 fixant les modalités de conversion des anciens titres forestiers en contrats de concession forestière et portant extension du moratoire en matière d'octroi des titres d'exploitation forestière tel que modifié et complété par le décret n°08/02 du 21 janvier 2008,
Par conséquent, votre titre est jugé convertible en contrat de concession forestière.
Vous êtes invité, à dater de la réception de la présente, à vous mettre en contact avec Le Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme pour les prochaines étapes.
Vuillez agréer, Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général, L’ expression ile ma considération distinguée.
Averne Pape Îlec (Ex-des Ciriques) n°15 Kinshas@/Goinbe BP. 123487 E-mail: rde_minev@pehoo.fr
Annexe 3
Contrat de la Concession Forestière n°040/11 du 24 octobre 2011 attribuée à SIFORCO
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme
CONTRAT DE CONCESSION FORESTIERE N° ..{49.../11 du di. issu de la conversion de la Garantie d'approvisionnement N°018/CAB/MIN/AFF- EDT/00 du 09/11/2000 jugée convertible suivant la notification N°4844/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 du 06/10/2008
Le présent contrat de concession forestière est conclu entre : d'une part,
Le Ministre de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme, agissant au nom de la République Démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommé « l'autorité concédante » ;
et d'autre part,
La société d'exploitation forestière SIFORCO, immatriculée au registre de commerce sous Le numéro Kinshasa 5016, représentée par Monsieur Dieter HAAG, Administrateur Directeur Général, ayant son siège au Quartier Mota Mbumbwa, Kinshasa/Maluku, en République Démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommée « Le concessionnaire »;
Article 1°: L'objet du présent contrat est de définir les droits et obligations des parties. Il est complété par le cahier des charges ci-annexé.
Le cahier des charges comporte en annexe, un plan de gestion préparé par le concessionnaire et approuvé par l'administration et décrivant l'ensemble des investissements et des activités qui seront entreprises et réalisées par le concessionnaire pendant Les quatre premières années du contrat de concession. Le cahier des charges fait partie intégrante du présent contrat de concession,
Article 2 : Le présent contrat porte sur une concession forestière d'une superficie de 194.641 hectares dont La situation géographique et les limites sont décrites ci-après : 1. Localisation administrative:
1. Secteur : Mongama
2. Territoires : Yumbi, Mushi et Inongo 3, District : Plateaux et Mayi Ndombe 4, Province : Bandundu,
I. Délimitation physique :
Au Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village NKOLO au bord du fleuve Congo, passant par les villages: NGENIA, KEMBEKE, NGANIA, LONIA jusqu'à EPOKWANKOSO ;
Au Sud : par la route d'intérêt général en partant de La localité BUSINA jusqu'au village IKULUMAKA, suivre La rivière MAMBO jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière LEBOMA, de la rivière LEBOMA jusqu'à son croisement avec le sentier MALEBO, suivre Le sentier jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière LOBINI.
A l'Est : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village EPOKWANKOSO jusqu'au village LOBINI; suivre la rivière LOBINI jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière LEKURU ;
A l'Ouest : par la rivière PANSOLA, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village NKOLO jusqu'à sa source, tracer une ligne droite jusqu'à La source de lune des branches de la rivière LETOKO. Suivre ensuite La rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre La route jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière GAMPOKO en passant par les villages EKANYKALE 1, MADYA et NDELE, Suivre enfin La rivière GAMPOKO jusqu'à (a source, au village BUSINA.
La carte de La concession forestière est jointe en annexe au présent contrat.
Article 3 : La durée du contrat de concession est de vingt-cinq ans renouvelables dans les conditions fixées à l'article 8 ci-dessous.
Article 4 :
L'Etat garantit au concessionnaire la jouissance pleine et entière des droits qui lui sont conférés par la loi et Le présent contrat de concession. Pendant toute La durée du contrat, le concessionnaire ne peut être privé en tout ou partie de son droit d'exploiter sa concession, sauf en cas de non respect de ses obligations légales, réglementaires ou contractuelles, où pour cause d'utilité publique, et dans dernier cas moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité, conformément au dr commun,
s. Article 5 :
Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 13 du présent contrat, Le concessionnaire a un droit exclusif d'exploitation du bois d'œuvre se trouvant dans les limites de sa concession,
Article 6:
Le concessionnaire est tenu de respecter les droits d'usage traditionnels des communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains de La concession tels que définis aux articles 36, 37 et 44 du code forestier. IL lui est interdit de créer toute entrave à l'exercice par les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains des droits d'usage forestiers ainsi reconnus.
Article 7:
Le concessionnaire bénéficie d’une servitude de passage sur les fonds riverains, destinée à favoriser l'accès à sa concession et l'évacuation de sa production. Il exerce cette servitude uniquement dans les limites de ce qui est strictement nécessaire à son droit de passage.
Le tracé de toute route ou de toute voie d'accès ou d'évacuation à partir du territoire de La concession doit être soumis à une consultation avec les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains durant la préparation du plan d'aménagement.
En cas de différend sur le tracé des voies d'accès ou d'évacuation à La concession, le concessionnaire fera appel aux mécanismes de règlement des différends définis aux articles 103 et 104 du code forestier.
Article 8:
A l'expiration du contrat de concession, le concessionnaire peut demander le renouvellement de son contrat dans les conditions déterminées par les règlements en vigueur et à condition que les obligations découlant du présent contrat et du cahier des charges aient été exécutées.
A cette occasion, le concessionnaire fournit les preuves de mise à jour de son plan d'aménagement et du cahier des charges sur la période de renouvellement.
Le renouvellement du contrat est cependant refusé par l'autorité concédante en cas de violation de l’une des quelconques dispositions du présent contrat et ahier des charges et notamment dans l'un des cas ci-après: . Le non payement de la redevance de superficie et/ou de toutes autres taxes
et redevances forestières échues applicables à l'exploitation de la concession;
2. l'exploitation forestière illégale dûment constatée;
3. le commerce illégal des produits fores- tiers dûment constaté conformément aux lois en vigueur;
4. la violation des obligations sociales et environnementales et de celles relatives aux engagements d'investissements industriels imposées par le présent contrat en vertu des dispositions légales et règlementaires en vigueur;
5. la corruption, Le dol ou la violence ou leur tentative dûment constatés.
Article 9:
Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 115 du code forestier, le concessionnaire est tenu de s'installer sur la superficie concédée et d'y exécuter ses droits et obligations tels qu'ils découlent du présent contrat, du cahier des charges et du plan de gestion visé à l'article 10 ci-dessous.
En particulier, il doit:
LE à
3.
matérialiser Les limites de la concession et de l'assiette annuelle de coupe ; respecter les règles relatives à l'exploitation du bois, notamment les limites des assiettes annuelles de coupe et Le diamètre minimum par essence; mettre en œuvre les mesures environnementales et de protection de la biodiversité inscrites au présent contrat, y compris les mesures convenues dans le plan de relance dans le cas d'une conversion ou dans la proposition technique dans le cas de l'adjudication selon les termes du cahier des charges;
réaliser Les infrastructures socio-économiques et des services sociaux au profit des communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains contenues dans Le plan de relance dans le cadre d'une conversion ou dans la proposition technique dans le cas d’une adjudication et définies dans le cahier des charges;
réaliser Les investissements, y compris l'acquisition des équipements prévus, la remise en état ou la modernisation de l'outil de transformation, ainsi que le recrutement du personnel nécessaire et autres activités prévues dans La proposition du plan de relance, dans le cas d'une concession où dans La proposition technique dans Le cas d’une adjudication, et écrits dans le cahier des charges;
payer la redevance de superficie forestière et toutes autres taxes et redevances en vigueur liées à l'exploitation de la concession, dans les dél prescrits par La réglementation fiscale. Article 10:
Le concessionnaire s'engage à préparer et à soumettre pour approbation à l'administration chargée des forêts, dans une période maximum de quatre ans, le plan d'aménagement conformément à la législation et à la réglementation en vigueur. Ce plan doit comprendre l'ensemble des obligations du concessionnaire en vue d'assurer une gestion durable de la forêt concédée. Approuvé par l'administration, il devient partie intégrante du présent contrat.
Dans l'intervalle qui sépare La signature du présent contrat de l'approbation du plan, le concessionnaire exploite La forêt concédée en conformité avec un plan de gestion.
Le plan de gestion doit être soumis par le concessionnaire à l'administration chargée des forêts et approuvé en même temps que le contrat de concession. Ce plan de gestion constitue l'ensemble des engagements du concessionnaire pour l'exploitation de la forêt concédée avant l'approbation du plan d'aménagement.
Ces engagements découlent des propositions formulées dans Le plan de relance en cas, de conversion ou dans les propositions techniques en cas d’adjudication. Le plan de gestion indique:
1. les quatre premières assiettes annuelles de coupe ;
2. le calendrier et Les modalités de consultation avec les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones sur le contenu et les modalités de réalisation du plan socio-économique y compris les infrastructures en leur faveur pour la durée de la concession ;
3. la description des activités de protection de l'environnement et de La conservation de la biodiversité et notamment les mesures de réduction, d'atténuation et de compensation de tout impact négatif des activités du concessionnaire sur l'environnement ;
4, la mise en place pendant les quatre premières années d'exploitation, des investissements industriels souscrits.
Les termes et engagements du plan de gestion seront incorporés dans le cahier des charges annexé au présent contrat.
Si, à l'expiration de La période de quatre ans, Les circonstances ne permettent pas au concessionnaire de présenter Le plan d'aménagement, il peut sur une demande motivée, obtenir de l'administration chargée des forêts, une prolongation de délai, lequel ne peut excéder une année.
La préparation du plan de gestion et du plan d'aménagement de la concession ne lieu à une diffusion de toute documentation appropriée auprès des communautés locales et/ou des peuples autochtones riverains et à une consultation régulière avec eux sur les questions intéressant La concession et Leurs droits. L'administration peut assister aux séances de consultations.
Article 11: Le concessionnaire est tenu de respecter La législation en vigueur en matière de protection de l'environnement et de conservation de la diversité biologique.
IL contribue, en particulier sur toute l'étendue de sa concession, à La lutte contre les feux de brousse, le braconnage et l'exploitation illégale du bois.
IL s'assure que les activités de La concession ne provoquent ni ne favorisent des actes de braconnage ou de dégradation de l'environnement. A cette fin, le concessionnaire définit et met en œuvre sur le territoire de la concession des mesures appropriées de contrôle pour :
1. interdire le transport des armes à feu et des armes de chasse dans les véhicules de l'entreprise;
2. fermer Les routes et chemins d'accès aux aires d'exploitation;
3. interdire l'accès des véhicules étrangers, sauf sur les voies d'intérêt public;
4. interdire les activités de braconnage notamment pour les employés et leurs familles, en mettant à leur disposition à prix coûtants, des aliments alternatifs aux gibiers;
5. mettre en œuvre des mesures de sauvegarde environnementales adéquates telles qu’elles découlent du plan de relance dans le cas d'une conversion ou des propositions techniques dans le cas d'une adjudication;
6. minimiser, réduire ou compenser tant à l'intérieur de la concession que dans ses environs immédiats, tout impact négatif sur l'environnement, des travaux de réalisation d'infrastructures.
Article 12:
Le concessionnaire est tenu de respecter la mise en réserve de certaines essences et toutes restrictions édictées par l'administration chargée des forêts dans le but de protéger la diversité biologique. Cette mise en réserve se fait sur base de l'inventaire des ressources forestières ou en cours d'exploitation.
La liste des essences forestières dont l'exploitation est interdite est reprise dans les clauses particulières du cahier des charges en annexe.
Article 13:
Le concessionnaire est tenu de matérialiser physiquement les limites de la concession, des blocs quinquennaux et des assiettes annuelles de coupe formément à la réglementation en vigueur, Aucune exploitation ne peut êt,
ntamée avant la matérialisation des limites de l'assiette annuelle de cou; Article 14:
Pendant la période précédent l'approbation du plan d'aménagement, le concessionnaire exploite une seule assiette annuelle de coupe qui 1/25° ne saurait être supérieure de la superficie totale concédée.
La coupe annuelle ainsi autorisée est définitivement clôturée Le 31 décembre de l'année à laquelle elle s'applique, Le concessionnaire est autorisé à y prélever toutes les essences forestières et de diamètres autorisés par l'arrêté relatif à l'exploitation forestière et Le plan d'aménagement.
Les diamètres minimaux de coupe prévus par le plan d'aménagement doivent tenir compte de la nécessité de maintenir suffisamment d'arbres semenciers pour La régénération de chaque essence.
En outre, dès qu’il y a un risque d'altération importante de la couverture végétale ou d'altération du sol, le plan d'aménagement indique toutes essences confondues, un nombre maximum de pieds exploitables par assiette annuelle de coupe.
Article 15:
Le diamètre minimum d'aménagement est fixé sur base de l'inventaire et des calculs de régénération par essence et par concession en tenant compte des besoins de régénération de chaque essence, Le diamètre minimum d'aménagement est Le diamètre à partir duquel Le plan d'aménagement prévoit Le prélèvement des essences forestières définies dans le cycle de coupe où rotation,
En aucun cas, le diamètre minimum d'aménagement ne peut être inférieur au diamètre minimum d'exploitation. Le diamètre minimum d'exploitation est le diamètre au-dessous du- quel l'exploitation d'une essence forestière est interdite.
Pendant la période qui précède l'approbation du plan d'aménagement, le concessionnaire applique le diamètre minimum fixé par l'administration centrale chargée des forêts.
Article 16: Le concessionnaire est tenu de procéder au marquage des bois qu'il coupe conformément à la réglementation en matière d'exploitation forestière,
Article 17:
Le concessionnaire s'engage à réaliser des infrastructures socio-économiques et à
fournir des services sociaux au profit des communautés locales et/ou peuples utochtones tels qu'ils sont définis dans le cahier des charges. Pendant la période de préparation du plan d'aménagement, le concessionnaire consulte les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains sur Le plan socio-économique et les infrastructures qui feront l'objet du cahier des charges définitif qui sera annexé au plan d'aménagement.
Celui-ci couvrira les cinq années qui suivent l'approbation du plan d'aménagement et sera actualisé tous Les cinq ans.
Nonobstant l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, le concessionnaire s'engage à mettre en œuvre, dans le cadre des consultations avec les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains, un plan socio-économique, y compris les infrastructures socio-économiques et services sociaux, pour La période du plan d'aménagement.
Article 18 : Le concessionnaire n’est pas concerné par l'exécution des dispositions de l'article 82 du code forestier relatives à La garantie bancaire.
Article 19:
Le concessionnaire est tenu au paiement régulier et dans Les délais légaux des taxes et redevances forestières en vigueur et ne peut bénéficier d'aucune exonération.
Article 20:
Le concessionnaire souscrit une police d'assurance contre les conséquences pécuniaires de la responsabilité civile pouvant lui incomber du fait de l'exploitation de sa concession, notamment contre les risques de vol et d'incendie des installations concédées.
A défaut d'être couverts par une clause expresse de la police d'assurance étendant le bénéfice aux sous-traitants de la forêt concédée, ceux-ci doivent justifier d'une assurance particulière.
Article 21: Le concessionnaire peut, après en avoir informé par écrit l'autorité oncédante, sous traiter tout ou partie de certains travaux, notamment: 1. l'élaboration du plan d'aménagement de la concession ; 2. la récolte du bois ; 3. la construction et l'entretien du réseau d'évacuation des produits (| forestiers ainsi que des parcs à grumes ; : \
k 8
\ 4. la construction et l'entretien des infrastructures socio-économiques au profit des communautés locales ;
5. le transport des produits forestiers;
6. toute autre activité relative à l'exploitation forestière.
Toutefois, le concessionnaire demeure responsable tant envers l'autorité concédante en ce qui concerne le respect des obligations légales, réglementaires ou contractuelles qu'à l'égard des tiers pour ce qui concerne les dom- mages éventuels,
Article 22: Le concessionnaire a la faculté de renoncer au bénéfice de la concession avant l'expiration du contrat de concession forestière.
Nonobstant la renonciation, le concessionnaire reste débiteur du paiement intégral des taxes et redevances forestières échues.
Article 23:
En cas de non respect par le concessionnaire de l’une des quelconques clauses du présent contrat et/ou du cahier des charges et après une mise en demeure assortie d'un délai ne dépassant pas trois mois, l'autorité concédante prescrit toutes mesures conservatoires destinées à assurer le respect des dispositions du présent contrat et du cahier des charges. Le contrat est résilié notamment dans l'un des cas ci-après:
1. le non payement des taxes et redevances liées à l'exploitation de la concession, après expiration des délais légaux de mise en demeure
2. le défaut d'élaboration et d'approbation du plan d'aménagement de
la concession dans les délais légaux conformément à l'article 10 ci-
dessus;
l'exploitation du bois d'œuvre en dehors du périmètre autorisé;
4. la commission de tout acte ou tentative d'acte de corruption, de dol ou de violence dûment constaté;
5. La violation répétée, après mise en demeure conformément au point 1, d'obligations sociales et environnementales découlant du présent contrat et du cahier des charges.
ww
L'état de cessation de paiement du concessionnaire constitue une cause de déchéance et entraîne la résiliation du présent contrat,
Article 24:
Les infractions mentionnées à l'alinéa 2 de l'article 23 ci-dessus, sont
constatées par Les inspecteurs forestiers, les fonctionnaires assermentés et les ütres officiers de police judiciaire dans leur ressort respectif conformément ux dispositions des articles 127 et suivants du Code forestier. L'alinéa ci-dessus, s'applique aussi à la violation des obligations du présent contrat et du cahier des charges.
Article 25: L'autorité concédante constate la déchéance et procède à La résiliation du contrat de concession par voie d'arrêté. Elle notifie cet arrêté au concessionnaire par lettre recommandée ou au porteur avec accusé de réception.
L'arrêté est publié au journal officiel et une copie est transmise aux cadastres forestiers national et provincial concerne.
Article 26:
En cas de résiliation du contrat de concession ou de déchéance, le concessionnaire dispose des recours légaux devant les juridictions compétentes.
Article 27:
Nonobstant les dispositions de l'article 8 ci-dessus, Le présent contrat prend fin le 23/10/2036. Le concessionnaire peut solliciter le renouvellement du contrat un an avant la date de son expiration. La décision de refus de renouvellement peut faire l'objet de recours devant les juridictions compétentes.
Article 28: A La fin de la concession, Le concessionnaire établit Les inventaires et procède aux opérations de liquidation conformément à La législation en vigueur.
Article 29:
A la fin de la concession, un bilan de clôture des comptes est dressé par le concessionnaire dans un délai maximum de six mois à compter de la date d'expiration du présent contrat de concession,
Le concessionnaire recouvre les créances dues, règle Les dettes, dresse le solde de ces opérations et clôture tous les comptes financiers.
Article 30: Tout différend relatif à l'interprétation ou l'exécution du présent contrat de concession et du cahier des charges sera réglé à l'amiable.
En cas d'échec, le Litige sera soumis aux juridictions compétentes à moins que
$ parties conviennent de recourir à l'arbitrage prévu par les articles 159 à 74 du Code de procédure civile.
10 Article 31:
Le présent contrat ainsi que le cahier des charges sont publiés au Journal Officiel, déposés au Cadastre Forestier National, notifiés aux autorités provinciales et locales du ressort, et rendus publics par tout moyen approprié dans les localités riveraines de la concession.
Les frais de publication au Journal Officiel du présent contrat, y compris Le cahier des charges, sont à charge du concessionnaire,
Article 32: Le présent contrat de concession forestière entre en vigueur pour le concessionnaire, à la date de sa signature.
Fait à Kinshasa en double exemplaire, Le 191 Lil IÙ
Pour le congéssionnaire Pour la République
José E.B. ENDUNDO
Admihfistrateur Directeur Ministre de l'Environn
Général Conservation de La Natur Tourisme AVENANT N° 01 AU CONTRAT DE CONCESSION FORESTIERE N° 040/11 DU 24 OCTOBRE 2011
Le présent Avenant n°1 est conclu entre : d'une part,
Le Ministre de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme, agissant au nom de la République démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommée + l'autorité concédante » ;
Et d'autre part,
La société d'exploitation forestière SIFORCO, immatriculée au registre de commerce sous le numéro 5016-Kinshasa, représentée par Monsieur Dieter HAAG, Administrateur Directeur Général, ayant son siège au Quartier Mota Mbumbwa, Kinshasa/Maluku, en République Démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommée « le concessionnaire » ;
Article 1°:
L'alinéa 2 de l'article 7 du contrat n°040 du 24/10/ 2011 est modifié comme suit :
- Le tracé de toute route ou de toute voie d'accès ou d'évacuation en dehors du » « territoire de la concession doit être soumis à une consultation avec les - - communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains durant La préparation » « du plan d'aménagement ».
Article 2 :
L'alinéa 2 de l’article 14 du contrat n°040 susmentionné est supprimé et remplacé par Les dispositions ci-après :
« Une assiette de coupe n'est ouverte à l'exploitation qu’une seule fois pendant +
«la durée de la rotation, L'exploitation peut cependant se poursuivre pour le »
« compte de l'année qui suit immédiatement. Le concessionnaire est autorisé à y »
« prélever toutes Les essences forestières et de diamètres autorisés par l'arrêté » relatif à l'exploitation forestière et du plan d'aménagement ».
« Dans tous les cas, une assiette annuelle de coupe est définitivement fermi
- deux ans après sa date d'ouverture ». Article 3 : ILest inséré un article 19bis au contrat n°040 susmentionné libellé comme suit :
+ Eu égard au régime transitoire applicable à La présente concession issue de la » « conversion d'un ancien titre forestier en vertu des articles 155 de La loi « n°011/2002 du 29 août 2002 portant code forestier, 15 alinéa 1 et 19 alinéa 1 du » « décret n°05/116 du 24 octobre 2005 fixant les modalités de conversion des » « anciens titres forestiers et 1 de l'arrêté interministériel n° 010 du 17 mars 2004 » « portant mesures économiques pour le développement de La ‘filière bois’ et de la » - gestion durable des forêts, ainsi qu'à l'obligation faite au concessionnaire » « d'élaborer un plan d'aménagement, le taux de la redevance de superficie » « payable » pendant la durée du présent contrat reste celui fixé par l’article 1 de » « l'arrêté interministériel n° 10 susmentionné ».
Fajt à Kinshasa en double exemplaire, Le 13/12/2011
Pour le concgssionn, Pour la République
G José E.B. ENDUNDO
ecteur Général Ministre de l'Environnemen Conservation de la N
Adminigtrateur et Annexe 4
Carte administrative des Territoires sur la CF 40/11
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
LEO YUMEN
République Démocratique du Congo
Carte administrative du bloc K3 de SIFORCO
170€
FORET : RESSOURCES MANAGEMENT
° Village Territoire — Réseau routier Er Inongo E_] CF 40/11 - Bolobo = Mushie
| Yumbi
Fond de carte : image ortho rectifiée Landsat 7 ETM+ du 08 fevrier 2003 (P181R62), image ortho rectifiée Landsat 7 ETM+ du 18 fevrier 2001 (P181R61)
Système de coordonnées : Universal Transverse Mercator, datum WGS84, zone 34 Nord. Limites administratives indicatives, leur tracé n'a pas de valeur juridique
FRM, juin 2012
Annexe 5
Carte de pré-stratification de la GA 18/00
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
Ztpublique Démocratique di Congo EE roRET Bloc Bolobo K3 - Garantie d'Approvisionnement 018/00 « r RESSOURCES
: MA)
Stratification pour la détermination des surfaces forestières utiles
| 1 imite de la Garantie d'Approvisionnement
Types d'occupation du sol
C1 forêt utile
M zone marécageuse MM savane
zone anthropisée Réseau hydrographi
permanent temporaire
Sounces :Iages Landeut 7 ETM+ 181-61 du 18,02/200 1 «t 181.62 du 08/02/2003 FR SIFORCO, Ms 2009
Annexe 6
Protocole d'accord signé en 2011 avec le Groupement Batende sur le secteur de Mongana et Procès-Verbaux des réunions de 2011
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO
Ministère de l'Environnement,
Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme siÿorco|
Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo
CLAUSE SOCIALE
SSA BOLOBO MUSHIE
GA 018/00 (Bloc K3)
Groupement Batende
ANNEXES DU PLAN DE GESTION
Juillet 2001 COUVRANT LA PERIODE DE PREPARATION
DU PLAN D'AMENAGEMENT (4 ans) POUR LA SSA Bolobo-Mushie
Page 1
T Entité administrative et coutumière
Soctere INDUSTRIELLE
SIF/ORCO | MR...
ACCORD CONSTITUANT LA CLAUSE SOCIALE DU CAHIER DES CHARGES DU CONTRAT DE CONCESSION. FORESTIERE
Entre : 1. La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) etou le peuple autochtone, TIENE
dont la(les) liste(s) des composantes est (sont) reprise(s) en Annexe 1 ;
Situé(e)(s) dans : Le Groupement BATENDE le Secteur de MONGAMA. le Territoire de YUMBE... le District de PLATEAUX la Province de BANDUNDU. en République Démocratique du Congo, représenté(e)(s) par : Mr(s) / Mme(s) / Mlle(s)
- MBIÈME NDELA, CHEF DE GROUPEMENT
- MBENGE OKUSA, CHEF DE TERRE NGO
- NKAMA LUC, CHEF DE TERRE KITABA... n
- NKUMINGO FRANCOIS, CHEF DE TERRE MADIA........................,........, - BOKOTE MABANKOLE, CHEF DE TERRE KIBILI...........................,
- MWANIA LIBATA MUFULU, CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA II.
- LEBATA MBAKA HENOC, CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA |.
- NKELE NGWE, CHEF DE TERRE KINGWE
- LOKWA SEKIWA, SECRETAIRE CLS
- BOMPETI ALPHONSE, PRESIDENT CLG MOWENL ESEKX
et ci-après dénommé(e)(s) «la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) » et/ou «le peuple . autochtone », d'une part ; Et 2. la Société d'Exploitation Forestière SIFORCO (Société Forestière Industrielle du “,- Congo) immatriculé(e) au registre de commerce sous le numéro Kinshasa 5016, ayant
son siège à Maluku BP 8434 KIN 1, quartier Mota Mbumbwa, commune de Maluku, ville /;
; de Kinshasa, en République Démocratique du Congo et représenté(e) par Mr Dietel HAAG Administrateur Directeur Générale de la Siforco
\ . \ D et ci-après dénommé(e) « le concessionnaire forestier », d'autre part ; L
Etant préalablement entendu que : K "la Société d'exploitation forestière est titulaire du titre forestier N°018/00 du 09/11/2000
jugé convertible en 7] rat de concession forestière, comme notifié par lettre & ü
Sociere INbusrateuLe Entité administrative et coutumière SIF/ORCO | SR is
N°4844/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 du 06 Octobre 2008 (Annexe 2) et couvrant une superficie de 160 000 hectares ;
" la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone est (sont) riverain(e)(s) de la concession forestière concernée ;
“ Les forêts concédées sont situées à GROUPEMENT BATENDE et ont comme limites issues de la GA :
Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village Nkolo au bord du fleuve Congo, passant par les villages : Ngenia, Kembeke, Ngania, Lonia jusqu'à Epokwankoso ;
Sud: par la route d'intérêt général en partant de la localité Busina jusqu'au village Ikulumaka, suivre la rivière Leboma jusqu'à son croisement avec le sentier Malebo, suivre le chantier jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière Lobini.
A PEst : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village Epokwankoso jusqu'au village Lobini jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière Lekuru.
A l'Ouest : par la rivière Pansola, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village Nkolo jusqu'à la source de l’une des branches de la rivière Letoko. Suivre ensuite la rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre la route jusqu'à la rivière Gampoko en passant par les villages Ekanykale 1, Madya et Ndele. Suivre enfin la rivière Gampoko jusqu’ à la source ay village Busine.
" La susdite forêt fait partie de celles sur lesquelles la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone jouissent de droits coutumiers ainsi qu’en atteste la carte en Annexe 3 établie à la suite d'un zonage participatif ;
“ _les limites de la partie de la concession forestière concernée par le présent contrat (cf. article 2 ci-dessous) ont été fixées de commun accord entre parties, particulièrement par rapport au(x) terroir(s) de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et sont consignées dans le plan de gestion, et dans le plan d'aménagement de la concession au moment de son approbation ;
* Mr_ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA, Administrateur de Territoire, assiste à la signature du présent accord en qualité de témoin et garant de la bonne application du présent contrat.
né. IL EST CONVENU CE QUI SUIT :
f Chapitre 1°’ : Des dispositions générales b
< fl # Article 1°:
Le présent accord constitue la clause sociale du cahier des charges du contrat concession forestière.
Ÿ
V4 Il a pour objet principal, conformément à l'article 13 de l'annexe 2 de l'arrêté n° à 28/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 du 7 août 2008 fixant les modèles de contrat de concession d'exploitation des produits forestiers et de cahier des charges y afférent, d'organiser la mise \ en œuvre des engagements du concessionnaire forestier relatifs à la réalisation des |
P* ‘
Entité administrative et coutumière
SocIETE INDUSTRIELLE
StF/ORCO | rene
infrastructures socio-économiques et services sociaux au profit de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone.
I! vise aussi à régler les rapports entre les parties en ce qui concerne la gestion de la concession forestière.
Article 2 :
Pendant la période de préparation du plan d'aménagement, cet accord fait partie du plan de gestion, annexé au cahier des charges, qui décrit l'ensemble des investissements et des activités qui sont entreprises et réalisées par le concessionnaire pendant les quatre premières années du contrat de concession, et se rapporte aux quatre premières assiettes annuelles de coupe, conformément à l’article 1 de l’annexe1 de l'arrêté n° 28/CAB/MIN/ECN- T/27/JEB/08 précité.
Lorsque le plan d'aménagement, annexé de son cahier des charges, est approuvé, cet accord couvre alors une période de cinq années, comme l'indique l’article 17 de l'annexe 1 de l'arrêté n°28/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 précité, et se rapporte à un nouveau bloc de cinq assiettes annuelles de coupes.
Article 3 : Les parties peuvent de commun accord et moyennant un avenant, modifier une quelconque clause du présent accord.
Chapitre 2 : Obligations des parties Section 1ère : Obligations du concessionnaire forestier
Article 4 :
Les obligations spécifiques légales, telles que prescrites par l’article 89, Alinéa 3, point c, du Code forestier, incombant au concessionnaire forestier en matière d'infrastructures économiques et des services sociaux portent spécialement sur la construction, l'aménagement des routes ; la réfection, l'équipement des installations hospitalières et scolaires ; les faciliter en matière de transport des personnes et des biens. La liste des infrastructures et des services sociaux financés par le Fonds de Développement résulte de différentes réunions de concertation entre les deux parties (Annexe 4).
Dans ce cadre, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à financier à travers le Fonds de Développement (cf. article 11), au profit de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone, la réalisation des infrastructures socio-économiques financées par le fond de développement :
- Construction, aménagement des routes : L'estimation des couts de réfection/construction des routes et le type d’engins(} LA affectés à ces travaux, sont détaillés en Annexe 5 de la clause sociale. Le cout de construction d'une route non latéritée est calculé à 10 000 USD par Km
Entité administrative et coutumière
SocreTE INDUSTRIELLE
SrF/ORCO | fier
La carte provisoire en Annexe 8 intitulée « Surface forestière des entités administratives et coutumières du secteur .............................. » reprend le tronçon de route décidé ci-dessus.
Le coût estimatif des travaux : Nombre de km * coût du km
- Construction ou Réfection des routes, équipement des installations hospitalières et scolaires :
Localisation Type de! Surface Cout Nombre Cout total prévue bâtiment au sol unitaire (en USD) (USD) Ecole 180 m? 50 958 Ecole 200 m° 53 917 NGO et NGANIA | Ecole 250 m° 60 000 2! 120.000 US Poste de santé | 100 m° 18 875 ILEBO MANGALA | Centre de santé | 200 m? 37 750 1 37.750 US
Il est à noter que les couts estimés et présentés ici peuvent être soumis à un ajustement. (augmentation des prix des matériaux sur le marché national ou international).
- Autres : Matériels (de construction, agricole, par la couture, capture d’eau le
CONSTRUCTION D'UN PONT SUR LA RIVIERE LETOKO POUR UN MONTANT DE 7.651 SUS.
Pour les groupements dont l'exploitation n'a pas encore commencée, l'avance 10% peut permettre de financer le matériel souhaité ci-dessus.
- Facilités en matière de transport des personnes et des biens :
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Socrere INousrRreuLe Entité administrative et coutumière Fo RI SIF/ORCO | Free
Article 5 : Comme indiqué à l'article 3 de l'annexe 2 de l'arrêté n° 28/CAB/MIN/ECN-
T/27/JEB/08 précité, sont apportées en annexes ci-jointes des informations plus détaillées se rapportant aux engagements prévus à l’article 4 du présent accord et concernant : 1) les plans et spécifications des infrastructures (plans des infrastructures en Annexe 6); 2) leur localisation et la désignation des bénéficiaires (Carte en Annexe 8); 3) les coûts estimatifs s’y rapportant (Devis en Annexe 5 et Annexe 6); 4) le chronogramme prévisionnel de réalisation des infrastructures et de fourniture des services sera annexé à la suite des négociations ;
Les spécifications des réalisations prévues ont été fixées de commun accord entre les représentants de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et les représentants de l’entreprise d'exploitation forestière.
Concernant le choix du Maitre d'ouvrage des travaux, la désignation se fera après une analyse technique, financière et de faisabilité, des offres, par toutes les parties et par décision consensuelle.
En ce qui concerne les travaux de construction et d'aménagement des routes et pistes, il est noté de manière indicative pour chaque tronçon concerné :
- le plan du tracé et le kilométrage qui lui correspond (voir en Annexe 8);
- la nature des travaux routiers à réaliser (ouverture, réhabilitation, etc.) ;
- les ouvrages d'art à installer (ponts, radiers,.….) ;
- les engins et le matériel à mobiliser pour la réalisation (bulldozer, chargeuse, niveleuse, camion benne, etc.) ;
- les temps d'utilisation à prévoir pour chaque engin et matériel ;
- les coûts d'utilisation correspondants par unité de temps.
Il est à noter, que les réalisations débuteront lors du démarrage l'exploitation et suivront le rythme de la production.
Article 6 : Les coûts d'entretien et de maintenance des infrastructures sont à considérer spécialement dans la mesure où ils vont devoir s'appliquer bien au-delà de la période
s d'exploitation des 4 ou 5 assiettes annuelles de coupe sur lesquelles sont prélevées les
assurée par le Fonds de Développement (cf. article 11), selon le mécanisme suivant :
- affectation, chaque année et quelle que soit la zone exploitée, de 10% du total d ristournes de manière à mutualiser les coûts récurrents se rapportant aux infrastructures déjà réalisées sur l'ensemble de la concession; un rogramme prévisionnel chiffré d'entretien et de maintenance, sur les 4 ou 5 années à venir, des
Æ infrastructures socio-économiques déjà réalisées au bénéfice de l'ensemble des
Ke RC4 >
ressources forestières et calculées les ristournes, destinées à financer la réalisation des 7 infrastructures socio-économiques au bénéfice de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du … peuple autochtone ayant(s) droit. a) La prise en charge de ces coûts d'entretien et de maintenance des infrastructures est
Socrere InpusrrreuLe
SIF/ORCO | Sn
Entité administrative et coutumière
communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains ayants droit sur la Concession forestière sera établi avec le comité local de gestion.
Sont donnés ci-après à titre i réalisées :
ndicatif des coûts d'entretien des infrastructures
-_ Couts d'entretien des routes par embauche d'un ou plusieurs cantonniers pour les
travaux d'entretien avec l'achat di de 500 USD par Km et par an;
o Couts d'entretien mécanisé des fois par an;
o Couts d'entretien d'un bâtiment
bâtiment/an.
Cependant le choix des mécanismes comité local de Gestion.
Si les frais d'entretien dépassent la p financera pas les frais Supplémentaires.
Article 7 :
e matériel (belles, brouettes, machettes…) = budget routes = 1500 USD par km avec une rotation de 2 estimé sur la base d'un forfait de 2000 USD par
d’entretien et les décisions sont à la charge du
rovision réalisée pendant l'exploitation, Siforco ne
Certains coûts de fonctionnement des _ installations hospitalières et scolaires,
notamment les rémunérations des e ressort de l'Etat.
nseignants et des personnels de santé, sont du
Si des retards venaient à être constatés dans le déploiement des personnels administratifs, le Comité de Gestion Local, prévu à l’article 12 ci-dessous, peut, de manière
personnes aptes à remplir ces fonctions.
Article 8 : Concernant les frais de fonction:
ement autres que les rémunérations des personnels
d'éducation et de santé, c'est-à-dire les fournitures scolaires, les produits pharmaceutiques, etc. le concessionnaire apporte sa contribution en finançant gratuitement le transport depuis Kinshasa ou une autre ville plus proche.
Article 9 :
d'œuvre de son entreprise au sein de
À compétences égales, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à recruter la main
la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple
autochtone et si présence de poste(s) vacant(s).
Article 10 : « Conformément à l’article 44 du code forestier, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à "respecter l'exercice, par la(les) Communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone des 1
droits d'usage traditionnels lui reconnus par la loi notamment : - le prélèvement de bois de chauffe (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) ; - la récolte des fruits Sauvage et chenilles (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) ; - la récolte des plantes médicinales (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) : - la pratique de la chasse et de la pêche coutumières des espèces non protégées (non
autorisé dans la zone en exploitation)
Le Le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à faire mention des modalités d'exercice des
droits définis à l'article 1èr ci-dessus dan .. t
Socxere InbusrrreuLE Entité administrative et coutumière siF/ORCO | Free … .
Article 11 :
Il est institué un fonds dénommé « Fonds de Développement » pour financer la réalisation des infrastructures définies à l’article 4 ci-dessus ainsi que les dépenses prévues aux articles 6 et 7.
Le Fonds de Développement est constitué du versement par le concessionnaire d’une ristourne de deux à cinq dollars américains par mètre cube de bois d'œuvre prélevé dans la concession forestière, selon le classement de l'essence concernée, publié dans le guide opérationnel de la Direction Inventaire et Aménagernent Forestiers. Les volumes de bois considérés sont portés sur les déclarations trimestrielles de production de bois d'œuvre.
La détermination des volumes et du montant par essence, en fonction des résultats
d'inventaires de sondage sur la surface forestière appartenant au groupement BATENDE Secteur MONGAMA est précisée en Annexe 7 de cette clause.
Une catégorie « autres essences » est prévue avec une ristourne de 2 dollars/m”, elle concerne les essences non exploitées actuellement mais potentiellement utiles dans le futur.
Vu la faible précision d'un inventaire de sondage, ce volume est donné uniquement à titre indicatif et a pour seul objectif de calculer le 10% de préfinancement et d'établir une première dimension de la contribution de SIFORCO au Fonds de développement.
Le montant réel affecté au fonds de développement dépend du volume prélevé dans la concession au fur et à mesure de l'avancement de l'exploitation.
Une carte de la surface forestière du groupement BATENDE du Secteur MONGAMA, faisant suite à l'identification des droits coutumiers établis selon un zonage participatif, est jointe en Annexe 8.
Toutefois, pour permettre le démarrage immédiat des travaux, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à dégager, à la signature du présent accord, un préfinancement de 10% du coût total des travaux d'infrastructures socio- économiques présentés à l'article 4 ci-dessus, soit le montant de 15.775 $US. Ces 10% constituent une avance sur les ristournes à verser sur les volumes de bois prélevés dans le bloc d'exploitation considéré qui regroupe, selon les cas, 4 ou 5 assiettes annuelles de coupe et sont remboursables à la fin de la période considérée.
Article 12 : Le Fonds de Développement est géré par un Comité Local de Gestion (CLG) composé d'un délégué du concessionnaire forestier et d'au moins cinq représentants élus de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone. Sur demande de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone, le oncessionnaire forestier accepte qu'un représentant de la société civile fasse partie du CLG A) en qualité d’observateur.
La prise de décision dans le CLG se fait par consensus de tous les membres.
ee Article 13 :
L Outre un président désigné par les membres de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et travaillant sous la supervision du chef de fa communauté et/ou du peuple autochtone, le CLG comprend un trésorier, un secrétaire rapporteur et plusieurs conseillers.
Dès sa mise en place, le CLG est installé officiellement par l'Administrateur de
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Le PV d'installation du CLG est annexé au présent contrat, reprenant la liste des noms des membres. (Annexe 9 Membres à identifier dans le formulaire Siforco pour le CLG et le CLS).
Le Comité local de Gestion ne pourra siéger qu'en présence de tous les membres. En cas d'empêchement majeur d'un des membres, un suppléant pourra être désigné.
Le CLG se réunit en session ordinaire tous les 3 mois sur convocation de son Président.
Article 14 :
Le Fonds de Développement est consigné auprès du concessionnaire forestier ou d'un tiers défini d’un commun accord par les parties, si d'autres facilités bancaires ne sont pas disponibles.
Dans ce cas, celui-ci s'engage à rendre accessibles les ressources financières au CLG, selon des modalités fixées de commun accord par les parties.
Notamment, les ressources financières sont gérées par le CLG. Le décaissement des fonds se fait après apposition des signatures du président du CLG, du Trésorier, du délégué du concessionnaire forestier et de la Direction de Siforco.
A l'issue des négociations, il en résulte que le groupement BATENDE approuve et souhaite que le fonds de développement soit consigné auprès du concessionnaire forestier SIFORCO.
OU, si, il souhaite faire appel à un Tiers ;
Les Tiers recevant le fonds de développement doivent présenter des garanties et des facilités bancaires (la Rawbank, Biac, BCDC à Kinshasa seulement) pour le bon déroulement des réalisations. à Section 2 : Obligations de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone
Article 15 : La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à concourir à
la gestion durable de la concession forestière et à contribuer à la pleine et libre jouissance par le concessionnaire de ses droits.
Article 16 :
la lutte contre le braconnage et l'exploitation illégale dans la concession forestière et à ‘ sensibiliser ses (leurs) membres à cette fin. Article 17 : / La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à collaborer avec le concessionnaire forestier pour maîtriser tout incendie survenu à l'intérieur de la forêt NN
concédée ou dans une aire herbeuse attenante à la susdite forêt.
prendre toute disposition appropriée pour que ses membres contribuent à la protection du personnel et du patrimoine d'exploitation du concessionnaire forestier.
è HE Sp Ne
Article 18 : La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à / & 2 Socuere ENusrRrELLE Entité administrative et coutumière F ORCO | Sono . ue
Tout préjudice subi du fait d'actes de violence ou de voies de fait sur le personnel du concessionnaire forestier ou d'actes de vandalisme sur son patrimoine d'exploitation perpétrés par un ou plusieurs membres de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone, entraîne réparation. Les dégats seront débités sur le fonds de développement de la ou des communauté(s) responsables.
Article 19 :
La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à collaborer avec le concessionnaire forestier pour que les voies établies par ce dernier pour l'évacuation de son bois ne soient pas utilisées par d’autres exploitants, sauf exercice d’un droit lié à une servitude légale ou conventionnelle.
De même, la communauté locale et/ou le peuple autochtone s’abstiennent de favoriser l'accès à des fins illégales des susdites voies aux communautés et/ou peuples autochtones non riverains de la concession forestière.
Chapitre 3 : Suivi de la mise en œuvre du présent contrat
Article 20 : Aux fins d'assurer le suivi et l'évaluation de l'exécution des engagements pris en vertu du présent contrat, il est institué un Comité Local de Suivi (CLS).
Article 21 :
Le CLS est présidé par l'Administrateur de Territoire ou son délégué et est composé d'un délégué du concessionnaire forestier et d'au moins trois représentants élus de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) etfou du peuple autochtone en dehors des membres du CLG.
Les parties acceptent que l'ONG C.D.C COMITE DE DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE, représentée par Mr / Mme / Mile YVES MOWENI siège en qualité de membre effectif du CLS.
Le PV d'installation du CLS est annexé au présent contrat, reprenant la liste des noms des membres. (Annexe 9 Membres à identifier dans le formulaire Siforco pour le CLG et le CLS).
Article 22 : Le CLS examine le rapport trimestriel d'activités du CLG, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la réalisation des infrastructures socio-économiques et le calendrier y afférent. Il peut, en cas de besoin, entendre le président ou tout autre membre du CLG. Il peut également faire appel à une expertise qualifiée pour l’éclairer sur toute question #. inscrite à l'ordre du jour de sa réunion.
Article 23 : 7 Le CLS se réunit en session ordinaire tous les trois mois sur convocation de 4 rncminigrateer de Territoire.
ut aussi, à tout moment et selon le besoin, tenir une session sur convocation de l’Administrateur de Territoire, à l'initiative de l'une des / parties au présent contrat. ) 1 à
Ses décisions sont prises par consensus et sont consignées dans un procès-verbal signé par tous les membres présents. É
. \s Des
l'administration centrale des forêts pour son annexion au contrat de concession forestière.
stF/ORCO
Article 24 :
Entité administrative et coutumière
SOCIETE INDUSTRIELLE Er FORESTIERE Du ConGo
Il est versé aux membres du CLG et du CLS représentants de la communauté locale et/ou du peuple autochtone un jeton de présence dont le taux est fixé de commun accord entre les
parties à 20 US $US par séance de travail. Le calendrier d'intervention des membres du CLG et du CLS sera validé au préalable par chacun des comités respectifs, avec le souci de ne pas dépasser annuellement la limite fixée
ci-après.
Les frais d'organisation des réunions des deux comités inclus les jetons de présence sont prélevés sur le Fonds de Développement.
Il a été conclu d'un commun accord, que les frais des deux comités, sont évalués à 10% du fonds de développement dont la répartition est la suivante : 6 % pour le CLG et 4 % pour le
CLS.
Toutefois, la somme totale des frais, couvrant les dépenses prévues aux alinéas ci-dessus, peut-être majorée mais ne peut excéder 10% du financement total des travaux de réalisation des infrastructures concernées par le présent accord.
Le montant sera précisé dans la planification budgétaire de la communauté locale du Groupement BATENDE du secteur MONGAMA,
Article 25 :
Chapitre 4 : Clauses diverses
Section 1 : Règlement des différends
Tout litige ou contestation né de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution du présent accord est, si possible, réglé à l'amiable entre les parties.
A défaut d'un arrangement, les parties s'engagent à soumettre le litige à la commission de règlement des différends forestiers organisée par l'arrêté ministériel n° 103/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/JEB/09 du 16 juin 2009.
Au cas où le différend persiste, la partie non satisfaite peut saisir le tribunal compétent de droit commun.
Article 26 :
Pour l'exécution du présent contrat, la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone ont le droit de se faire assister par une personne physique ou une ONG de leur
choix.
Section 2 : Dispositions finales
Article 27 :
Le présent accord, qui produit ses effets à la date de sa signature par les parties et l'Administrateur de Territoire en tant que témoin et garant de la bonne application du présent contrat, remplace et annule tout autre accord qui aurait existé entre les parties au présent |
accord.
Article 28 :
Le présent accord est établi en cinq (5) exemplaires originaux et remis à ghacune d
parties, à l’Administrateur de Territoire, à l'administration forestière provinciale et à
Socrere INDUSTRIELLE ET FORESTIERE pu Conco
S1F/ORCO
Entité administrative et coutumière
Fait à YUMBI, le 18 Aout 2011
Pour le concessionnaire forestier
Nom
DIETER HAAG
Emmanuel ZOLA MVIBUDULU
Titre
ADG
DIREX
re
Pour la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone
Nom Titre Signature MBIEME NDELE CHEF DE GR BATENDE TEE MBENGE CKUSA CHEF DE TERRE NGO bhtsu NKAMA LUC CHEF DE TERRE KITABA 4 BOKOTE MABANKOLE | CHEF DE TERRE KIBILI D MWANIA _LIBATA MUFULU | CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKAII
LEBATA MBAKA ENOC
CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA |
NKELE NGWE
CHEF DE TERRE KINGWE
NKUMINGO FRANCOIS
CHEF DE TERRE MADIA
BOMPEF MOWEN!
PRESIDENT CLG
LOKWA SEKIWA
SECRETAIRE CLS
T Entité administrative et coutumière
Socxere INDUSTRIELLE
SIF/ORCO | ie...
Pour l'administration forestière
Nom Titre signature
J.B. BATELAMA SUPERVISEUR ENV/YUMBI
Pour la société civile
Nom Titre Tampon et signature
BANGO JULES PRESIDENT Fe
NKOKO JEAN VICE PRESIDENT LI] b.
Pour le Secteur MONGAMA : LOFAFER4+ A oérthee Agpol Leerber
AS
Pour le District des Plateaux ILUNGA NSELE
— <<. À
L'Administrateur du Térritoir
Nom Titre Tampon et signa
ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA AT.
le Sociere INvusrRreLL Le s1F/GRCO Er FORESTIERE
Entité administrative et coutumière
LES AUTRES MEMBRES DES COMITES LOCAUX DE GESTION ET DE SUIVI
ANGARANGE MPEN qosept CLE 2e 2 NEVIABRLI -TACEUS
CRC 3, BofRKA-NoNGe. EC CtG PP G NKUMBIEMNE-NKesy
AKELE ŒAMEA pit
cia e
JNrumantote keékvlie CLG R Joke Kw Ska CLS UE
a) Hu naba- uBALNE GA 7 Hkoko Lino ANTONE Css
Co MOWENr-EÉAKA CS 4 A RAR IACA - Jèe ce e
ENGan sa péabo ta E£
— Entité administrative et coutumière
Soctere INbusrRzELLE
SIF/ORCO | MR ie
Listes des Annexes :
Annexe 1 : Composantes de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) concernée(s) par ce Cahier des Charges provisoire
Annexe 2: Arrêté ministériel de notification de convertibilité n° N°4859/CAB/MIN/ECN- T/15/JEB/2008 du 06 Octobre 2008
Annexe 3: Carte des territoires coutumiers de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) (signée par toutes les parties prenantes)
Annexe 4 : Compte rendu des réunions et courriers échangés dans le cadre de la négociation de l'accord portant clause sociale
Annexe 5 : Devis pour la construction des routes, Annexe 6 : Plan et devis pour la construction des écoles et Dispensaires Annexe 7 : Détermination des volumes par essence et des ristournes associées.
Annexe 8: Surface forestière des entités administratives et coutumières du secteur 1
Annexe 9 : PV d'installation des membres des Comités Locaux de Gestion et de Suivi
Membres à identifier dans le formulaire Siforco pour le CLG et le CLS
Annexe10 supp à intégrer : Budget prévisionnel du Fonds de Développement et Chronogramme prévisionnel de réalisation des infrastructures
14 Socrere INDusrRteLLE
SIF/ORCO | ie
TERRITOIRE DE YUMBI / Gpt BATENDE Cubage:
Fond de developpement calculé ($) 206 752
Investissements sociaux: 1 Grande Ecole à NGO 60.000 1 grande Ecole à NGANIA 60.000
1 Centre de santé à ILEBO MANGALA 37.750 Montant total des investissements sociaux 157 750 Avance sur les investissements = % des DRE) 15 775 Coût d'entretien des infrastructures (10% 20 675 Fonctionnement CLG et CLS (10 % du fonds local de développement) 20 675
Solde - 8 100
Pour permettre le démarrage immédiat des travaux, la SIFORCO s'engage à
+ dégager, à la signature du présent accord, un préfinancement de 10%+* du coût total des investissements, soit 15 775 $, comme l'indique le tableau ci-haut. Ce montant constitue une avance sur les ristournes à verser sur les volumes de bois prélevés dans le bloc d'exploitation considéré.
Fait à... YUMBI...... 18 aout... 2011
PROCES-VERBAL D’INSTALLATION DU COMITE LOCAL DE GESTION DU GROUPEMENT TIENE/BATENDE, SECTEUR DE MONGAMA
L’an deux mille one, le dix-huitième jour du mois d’août, vers 09h30?.
Nous, Antoine ZOATOMBINA, officier de police judiciaire à compétence générale et Administrateur du Territoire de YUMBI, avons procédé à l'installation du comité local de gestion du fonds de développement du Groupement TIENE/BATENDE, Secteur MONGAMA dans le Territoire de YUMBJI, lequel sera généré par l’exploitation du bois SIFORCO.
Ce comité est donc composé de :
Président : MOWENI ESEKA Secrétaire : BOPAKA NONGO Trésorier : NKUMABALI JACQUES
Conseillers : - NKUMANGOTO ANDRE - NGAMANGO MPETI JOSEPH - NKELE SHIMITA - NGAMISA OKADIO - NKUMBIEME NKOSI - REPRESENTANT DU CONCESSIONNAIRE, À POURVOIR
Ce P.V d'installation que nous signons est sincère et véritable au jour, mois et an que dessus.
L’officier de Police 2 J ciäire,
ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA
Administrateur du Territoire PROCES-VERBAL D’INSTALLATION DU COMITE LOCAL DE SUIVI DU GROUPEMENT TIENE / BATENDE, SECTEUR MONGAMA
L’an deux mille onze, le dix-huitième jour du mois d’août, vers 09h30”.
Nous, Antoine ZOATOMBINA, officier de police judiciaire à compétence générale et Administrateur du Territoire de YUMBI, avons procédé à l'installation du comité local de suivi de fonds de développement du Groupement TIENE/BATENDE, Secteur de MONGAMA dans le Territoire de YUMBI, lequel sera généré par l’exploitation du bois de SIFORCO.
Ce comité est donc composé de :
Président : L’ADMINISTRATEUR DU TERRITOIRE DE YUMBI Secrétaire : LOKWA SEKIWA
Conseillers : - NKUMADIA MUKWALIKA - MABIALA BOKIESE -MOWENI EKAKA - NKOKO KIMBU - REPRESENTANT DU CONCESSIONNAIRE, À POURVOIR - ONG : CDC = COMITE DU DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE
Ce P.V d'installation que nous signons est sincère et véritable au jour, mois et an que dessus.
L’officier de Police Ji défaire,
ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA Administrateur du Territoire RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Kinshasa, le ï Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme
S ICAB/MINECN-TIS/JEB/2008
Le Ministre
À Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général de la SIFGRCO à Kinshasa/Maluku
Objet : Notification de la recommandation de la Commission Interministérielle de Conversion des Anciens Titres Forestiers Votre requête n°108
Monsieur l’Adrministrateur Directeur Général,
À l'issue de ses travaux, La Commission interrninistérielle de conversion des anciens titres forestiers a constaté que votre Garantie d’Approvisionnement n°018/00 du 09/11/2006, située dans le Territoire de Bolobo, Province du Bandundu remplit les critères de convertibilité définis par le Décret n°05/116 du 24 octobre 2005 fixant les modalités de conversion des anciens titres forestiers en contrats de concession forestière et portant extension du moratoire en matière d'octroi des titres d'exploitation forestière tel que modifié et complété par le décret n°08/02 du 21 janvier 2008,
Par conséquent, votre titre est jugé convertible en contrat de concession forestière.
Vous êtes invité, à dater de la réception de la présente, à vous mettre en contact avec Le Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme pour les prochaines étapes.
Vuillez agréer, Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général, L’ expression ile ma considération distinguée.
Averne Pape Îlec (Ex-des Ciriques) n°15 Kinshas@/Goinbe BP. 123487 E-mail: rde_minev@pehoo.fr
REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGS MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES FONCIERES, ENVIRONNEMENT ETDEVELOPPEMENT TOURISTIQUE
LE MINISTRE
GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT
. { CONVENTION N°O48 CAB/MIN/AFF-EDT/00 DU 09 NOY 2000 PORTANT OCTROI D'UNE GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT EN MATIERE LIGNEUSE
ENTRE : LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Représentée par le Ministre des Affaires Foncières, Environnement et Développement Touristique, Monsieur le Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA
Ci-après dénommé ie Ministre ET : SIFORCO Représentée par Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE Son Directeur-Gérant Ci-après dénommé l'Exploitant
PRELIMINAIRE
Vu le Décret-loi Constitutionnel n° 003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l'organisation et à l'exercice
du pauvoir en République Démocratique du Congo tel que modifié et complété par le Décret-loi Constitutionnel n° 074 du 25 mai 1998, le Décret-loi n° 122 du 21 septembre 1999 ;
Vu telle que modifiée à ce jour, l'Ordonnance n° 75-231 du 22 juillet 1975 fixent les attributions du Département de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme :
Revu l'Ordonnace n° 77-022 du 22 février 1977 ; Vu la loi foncière n° 73-021 du 20 juillet 1973 ; Vu l'Ordonnance n° 79-244 du 46 octobre, spécialement en ses articles 3,4et7;
- = Vule Décret n° 113 du 1° septembre 2000 portant nomination des Membres du Gouvernement de Salut Publier — en
—- +: - Vu la responsabilité du Minisiré des Affaires Foncières,-Environnement et Développement Touristique d'assurer la pérennité des ressources forestières, grâce à une saine gestion forestière, Utilisant toutes méthodes, directives et mesures dans l'utilisation des ressources disporibles ;
Vu la nécessité de mettre en valeur les ressources forestières de l'Etat, Pour soutenir une activité économique prospère par l'exploitation rationnelle, la transformation et-la-mise.en marche des produits “exploités ; TT re 2. Dot -
Vu la nécessité d'assurer À l'éxploitant
èmière pour son usine-de transformation situë Oramuñe : MALUKU, Province : KINSHASA: oduits finis; nécessitant un appravisionneém
-2-
Vu que l'Exploitant a répondu de façon satisfaisante aux critères et aux procédures de la décision n° 002/CCE/DECNT/84,
ILA ETE ARRETE ET CONVENU CE QUI SUIT :
Article 1%:
Article 2
Arücie 3 :
La garantie d'approvisionnement porte sur Un volume annuel de 36.000 m3 de grumes réparti comme suit :
ESSENCES VOLUME (m3) Iroko 3,500 Tiama 2.300 Kosipo 2.200 Sapelli 6.500 Sipo 4.500 Wenge 7.000 Latandza 700 Bomanga 1,500 Bosse clair 3.500 Dibetou 1.000 Padouk 1.300 Tola 1.000 Tshitola 1.000 Total 36.000
:Ces bois seront prélevés dans une unité d'exploitation localisée comme suit :
Province : BANDUNDU District : des plateaux Territoire : BOLOBO Localité: NKOLO Lieu : NGANIA Superficie : 160.000 ha
Cette forêt ou portion de forêt est circonscrite dans les limites suivantes :
Au Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du Village NKOLO au bord du fleuve Congo, Passant par les villages : NGEN, IA, KEMBEKE, NGANIA, LONIA jusqu'à EPOKWANKOSO Au Sud > par la route d'intérêt généralen partant de la localité BUSINA jusqu'au Village IKULUMAKA, suivre [a rivière MAMBO jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière-LEBOMA, de la rivière LEBOMA jusqu'à son crojsement avec le 7 sentier MALEBO, suivre. le sentier jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière LOBINI. _ A l'Est : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village EPOKWANKOSO Jusqu'au village LOBINI; suivre la rivière LOBINI jusqu'à son croisement ._avec la rivière LEKURU.- -L - :
Article 4 :
Article 8 :
Article 6 :
-3-
À l'Ouest : par ja rivière PANSOLA, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village NKOLO jusqu'à sa Source, tracer une ligne droite jusqu'à la source de l'une des branches de la rivière LETOKO. Suivre ensuite la rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre la route jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière GAMPOKO en passant par les villages : EKANYKALE |, MADYA et NDELE. Suivre enfin la rivière GAMPOKO jusqu'à ta source, au village BUSINA.
Les grumes ainsi récoltées devront être strictement utilisées pour leur transformation à l'usine décrite ci-dessus, ou dirigées à l'exportation suivant la réglementation en vigueur. : °
Aussi, aucune grume ne pourra être vendue à des tiers, à moins d'autorisation écrite du Ministère,
Le Ministère accordera à l'Exploitant les droits suivants sur son unité d'exploitation :
5.1. Le droit exclusif de récolter les arbres exploitables explicitement identifiés à l'article premier
5.2. Le droit de construire les infrastructures nécessaires exclusivement aux exploitations forestières, sans préjudice des droits connus aux tiers ;
Les infrastructures routières construites par l'Exploitant sont propriétés de l'Etat à la fin du contrat.
5.8. Le droit de flottage de radeaux et de navigation privée sur les cours d'eau et les lacs, ainsi que le droit d'utiliser les routes publiques pour transporter, à titre privé, des produits forestiers exploités ainsi que les produits de transformation.
En contre partie, l'Exploitant sera soumis, de façon inconditionnelle, aux obligations Suivantes :
6.1. Maintenir en opération son usine de transformation au niveau d'opération prévu dans.ie contrat ;
6.2. Assurer la protection forestière de l'unité d'exploitation ;
68. Présenter dans les détails prévus toutes demandes annuelles de permis de coupe, “tout rapport trimestriel et rapport après coupe, ou d'autres rapports prévus par la réglementation en vigueur ;
- 64 Payer toutes les taxes et redevances forestières.prévues par la réglementation en — vigueur ; =
6.5. Informer le Ministère de tout changement d'adresse, de tout projet de transfert de -location, d'échange: de donation, de fusion, de vente affectant la propriété:de l'usine de transformation, objet du contrat et d'en 6btenir la-ratification du Ministère :
6.6. Respecter |
ëgieméntation-sur l'exploitation, la commercialisation étl - des prod: © ‘ © D
sstiers';
'exprtation : -4- 6.7. Aviser le Ministère de tout changement dans la destination des grumes exploitées et en obtenir l'autorisation du Ministère ;
6.8. Respecter toutes décisions prises par le Ministère en matière d'aménagement forestier ;
6.9. Procéder à la récolte minimale de 10 m3 de bois à l'hectare sur les superficies exploitables.
Article 7 : La présente convention est effective à la date de sa signature jusqu'au mois d'Octobre 2025. l l
Article 8 : Le non respect dés clauses de la convention par l'exploitant entraînera la résiliation immédiate et automatique de la présente.
Faitä Kinéhasa le :Q Q Nÿy 2000
SIGNATAIRES AUTORISES LE MINISTRE Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE = Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA= SIFORCO . B.P. 8434 Kinshasa 2 PR, ni 7DSD2
Fait à six exemplaires
1. Exploitant
2. Cabinet du Ministre
3. Secrétaire Général à l'ECN
4, Direction de ta GFC
5. Gouverneur de Province _ :
6. Coordinateur Provincial d& VECN : .
Die ve eur VUS Liu Bes ue vis UULE EUL
SIFORCO mai-11 Cahier de charge
Couts construction routes 2011
D |
———
Machines GO, Lub, Pieces
721[D7H 44 100,00 €| Û 723[D7H 39 700,00 € 727[D74 39 300,00 € 813[966€ 21 000,00 € 4612638 30 000,00 € 299[Toyota 10 100,00 €
184 200,00 €] $ 244 986,00 |
Amortissement
Amortissement/an 721|D7H 100 000,00 € | $ 133 000,00 723]D7H 100 000,00 € | $ 133 000,00 727|D7H 100 000,00 € | $ 133 000,00 813/966C 60 000,00 € | $ 79 800,00 4612638 1G 000,00 € | $ 13 300,00 299/Toyota 10 000,00 €] $ 13 300,00 | Tovote 655/120G |___50000,00€ | $ 66 500,00 Personelle
25 Personnes
67 669,17€|$ 90 000,00
Autres frais de pers.
27 067,67 € | $ 36 000,00
Fotai S 942 886,00
Admin 40% S 7 282 865,80 :
Fotal $ 1225 751,80 __] |
Total/km $ 10 214,60
—1,
rabe à SIFORCO mai-11
Cahier de charge Ï
Couts entretien routes - Devis 2011
Machines GO, Lub, Pieces
721|D7H 44 100,00 € 655/12G 27 900,00 € 299|Toyota 10 147,00 €
—— 82147,00€] $ 112 541,39
Amortissement
Amortissement/ 6 mois
721|D7H 50 000,00 € | $ 68 500,00 655/12G 25 000,00 € | $ 34 250,00 299|Toyota 10 000,00 € |:$ 13 700,00 un + — Personnel 5 Personnes 13533,83€|$ 18 541,35 Autres frais de pers. 6766,92€ |$ 9 270,68 TT Sous-Total $ 256 803,42 Admin 30% - $ 77 041,03 + Total $ 333 844,45 $ 2 782,04
Total/km 5 2000
SIFORCO._Devis_infrastructures sociales_Mai 2011 Page 1
SIFORCO Engengele Bumba Mai 11
DESIGNATION
Semelle Fondation Poteaux en" BA" Ceinture en" BA"
Fers à Béton fil de recuit 50 kg
Bois de Charpente Bois de coffrage et divers Bois de Menuiserie Mobilier
Pointes Ordinaires Pointes à Béton Pointes à Tôles
Tôles de Couverture
Accessoires et divers
SIFORCO Engengele Bumba
DESIGNATION
SIFORCO._Devis_infrastructures sociales_Maïi 2011
Dimension ou volume
Mai 11
PRIX TOTAL
Semelle Fondation
Dalle Chappe Enduits Crépis
4 000
Bois de coffrage et divers
Bois de Menuiserie Mobilier
Pointes Ordinaires Pointes à Béton Pointes à Tôles
[Tôles de Couverture
Accessoires et divers
Graves et Sables
Peinture Chaux Contre plaqué
350 kgs
Page t SIFORCO_Devis_infrastructures sociales_Mai 2011 Page
SIFORCO Engengele Bumba Mai 11
DESIGNATION
Semelle Fondation Poteaux en" BA" Ceinture en" BA" Dalle Chappe Enduits Crépis
30 de 10
Bois de Charpente Sm Bois de coffrage et divers 12m Bois de Menuiserie am Mobilier êm
Pointes Ordinaires 80 kgs Pointes à Béton 25 kgs Pointes à Tôles 40 kgs
T$les de Couverture 325
Accessoires et divers
Graves et Sables
Contre plaqué
Transports
Eau
SIFORCO_Devis_infrastructures sociales_Mai 2011 Page 1
SIFORCO Engengele Bumba Mai 2011
DESIGNATION Dimension ou volume PRIX TOTAL
Semelle Fondation 4 000 Poteaux en" BA" Ceinture en" BA"
10 de 10
Bois de coffrage et divers Bois de Menuiserie Mobilier
Pointes Ordinaires Pointes à Béton Pointes à Tôles
Tiies de Couverture
Accessoires et divers
128 220
> ( investissements)
10% CLG+CLS
Fait à YUMBI, le 18 aout 2011
Pour la communauté locale ;
resioenr Clé ME SECreTaive CLG l TRESORIER
RRP CONGO
Souree des données: Les GPS surterain:
- tumetion sur one image Lara (PAS 1 PI2DE) Proaction UTM33S Qatum MID 1994 Féalisée à SIFORCO Maui Far F BATEROLO SURA TE
Frs
SECTEUR MONGAMA, GROUPEMENT TIENE et CONCESSION SIFORCO K3
heu
Locañté
Chetheu de Secteur
00e
Cheflieu de Territoire os Route
she RMère
22% Limite concession partie Yumbi à 4 premières années d'exploitation
Fe. Fleuve Congo
TS rertoire de Vumbi
Chetlieu de Groupement
CONCESSION SIFORCO K3ET SA PARTIE DE YUMBI
HUSHIE
PROCES-VERBAL DE LA REUNION SUR LA NEGOCIATION ET LA SIGNATURE DES CLAUSES SOCIALES, TENUE A YUMBI ENTRE LA SIFORCO ET LES REPRESENTANTS DU GROUPEMENT BATENDE SECTEUR MONGAMA DANS LE TERRITOIRE DE YUMBI
L'an deux mille onze, le dix-huitième jour du mois d’août, s’est tenue à YUMBI une réunion portant sur la négociation et la signature de la clause sociale du cahier des charges du Groupement Batende, Secteur Mongama dans le titre 018 et ce, conformément à l'arrêté 023.
A. Installation des CLG et CLS
Les comités locaux (CLG et CLS) démocratiquement élus par la population riveraine ont été installés par l’ Administrateur du Territoire de YUMBI. B. Résolutions prises
A l'issue de discussions, les parties en présence se sont convenues ce qui suit :
1. Les taux par essence conclus et exigés pour alimenter le fonds de développement sont repris dans un tableau en annexe. Après s’être convenus sur ce tableau croisé, quatre groupes d’essences se dégagent :
1% groupe: 5 dollars américains 2°" groupe : 4 dollars américains 3°" groupe : 3 dollars américains 4% groupe : 2 dollars américains
2. Les tableaux conçus comportent les volumes issus des sondages effectués par la Société et les montants y afférents. Ils sont annexés aux contrats. HS
EN Ils s’y dégagent un volume estimatif de 48.035 m pour un montant théorique total de nn 1
206.752 SUS. LÉ.
La clé de ventilation succincte est la suivante :
Fonctionnement a 20.675,2 $US Frais d’entretien des infrastructures : 20.672,2 $US 1 Avance / Préfinancement :16.540,1 SUS LAN
Réalisations sociales / Investissem. : 165.401 SUS
3. Eu égard aux montants alloués au fonds de développement, les infrastructures soëio-économiques présentées par les populations riveraines ont été validées. , F
4. Le Groupement concerné approuve et souhaite que les fonds de développement soient consignés auprès du concessionnaire forestier SIFORCO. 5. Le choix des entrepreneurs de l’ouvrage : pont Letoko retenu est laissé à la compétence du comité local de gestion et ce en rapport avec le budget disponibilisé dans le fonds de éveloppement, soit un montant de 7.651 SUS.
6. La désignation des entrepreneurs se fera après analyse technique, financière et de faisabilité, des
offres, par toutes les parties et la décision sera prise par consensus. » D 27 , FT Gi ÉT- Ve a) Ê = : HUE 14 ©) 7 Ÿ A É : lle vaù FO /
2
7. En vue de sauvegarder la faisabilité de l’intégralité des infrastructures retenues dans les clauses sociales, la population riveraine demande a ce que la Société SIFORCO verse 4,87 % sur les investissements des infrastructures en lieu et place de 10 % exiges par la loi,
8. La prise de décision dans le CLG et CLS se fait par consensus de tous les membres. SIFORCO de son côté s’engage à rendre accessibles les ressources financières au CLG, selon des
modalités fixées de commun accord par les parties.
9. Les ressources financières sont gérées par le CLG. Le décaissement des fonds se fait après apposition des signatures du président du CLG, du Trésorier, du délégué du concessionnaire forestier et de la Direction de SIFORCO.
10. Les frais liés aux jetons de présence des membres des deux comités et ceux de fonctionnement sont évalués à 10 % de fonds de développement. La répartition entre les comités est 6% pour le CLG et 4 % pour le CLS.
11. Le taux de jetons de présence est fixé de commun accord entre les parties à 20 SUS par seance de travail.
12. Les parties signataires se conviennent de travailler dans la paix et les conflits potentiels doivent être réglés suivant l’esprit du code forestier et de l’arrêté 023.
En foi de quoi, nous dressons le présent procès-verbal conjointement signé par les parties en présence.
Pour les autorités politico-administratives
1) Mr. ILUNGA NSELE, C.D.D.A
2) Mr. ANTOINE ZOATO)]
Pour l’administration forestière :
1) JEAN BAPTISTE BATELAMA, SUPERVISEUR ve Ÿ D
L,
//
Pour la Société civile :
1) BANGO JULES, PRESIDENT 2) NKOKO JEAN, V/PRESIDENT
- Pour le Groupement :
1) MBIEME NDELA, CHEF DE GROUPEMENT EN Pour les Chefs de Terre :
1) MBENGE OKUSA, CHEF DE TERRENGO dt 6
2) NKAMA LUC, CHEF DE TERRE KITABA : “A
}
3
Nez
NKUMIMGO FRANCOIS, CHEF DE TERRE MADIA 4
4
Le
L- À BOKOTE MABANKOLE, CHEF DE TERRE KIBILI DA
5) MWANIA LIBATA, CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA II À CA
6) LEBATA MBAKA ENOC, CHEF DE TERRE BIRAKAI
2
7) NKELE NGWE, CHEF DE TERRE KINGWE dr 8) MAYO NKOTA NDAVO, CHEF DE TERRE BOKUSU F CO FEN=
9) MPUU SIMON, CHEF DE TERRE MPOKO MBOLE 2
Pour les comites locaux CLG et CLS : MewEnN) ESEkK4 PresrmenT CLe MSÿ Scruhire ECS LehA Se RAR Ve Connu CL NeAMANGS Mer PR dep
TRELRER CLA N UMA BAL à - ae quec Un L TI
sec. FPE RON CLG Re Annexe 7
Budgets prévisionnels des fonds de développement
Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015)
Dépenses prévisionnelles sur fonds de développement
Société SIFORCO Concession GA 018/00 - Bandundu Groupement Batende
Coût unitaire Montant total
Réalisations Spécifications Quantité [6] [6] Voir annexes Clauses
Grande Ecole NGo sociales ecole 1 60 000! 60 000 Voir annexes Clauses
Grande Ecole NGANIA sociales Centre 1 60 000! 60 000 Voir annexes Clauses
Centre de santé llebo MANGALA sociales Centre 1 37 750) 37 750
Construction d'un pont sur la rivière Avec les 10% d'avance sur le
Letoko à préciser montant des infrastructures [Pont 1 15 775
Coût unitaire Montant total
(] ($)
Fonctionnement des comités de suivi et] de gestion 10% du montant total du Fonds de développement L2 10%| 206 675 20 668]
Total des dépenses sur le fonds de développement 178 418
Coût unitaire Montant total Réalisation ï (S) Coût d'entretien et de maintenance sur les 20 ans restants de la rotation Provision sur les recettes du Fonds 4 10%| 206675
|
Total des dépenses (S) 199 085
Montant restant à affecter par le CLG (S) 7 590
Total des recettes (S) 206 675 | 2012-06-01 | [
"REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Ministère de l'Environnement, modgee Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme SIF/ORCO sors Direction Inventaire et Aménagement Forestier | Concession Forestière n°40/11 PLAN DE GESTION COUVRANT LA PERIODE DE PREPARATION DU PLAN D’AMENAGEMENT (4 ans) Période 2012-2015 Date : Juin 2012 FORET RESSOURCES MANAGEMENT Espace Fréjorgues-Ouest - 60, rue Henri Fabre 34130 MAUGUIO - Gd Montpellier - FRANCE Tél. : +33 (0)4 67 20 08 09 - Fax : +33 (0)4 67 20 08 12 E-mail : frm@frm-france.com - Internet : www.frm-france.com Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SOMMAIRE 1 1.1 Dénomination du 1.2 Présentation de la soci: 13 Localisation du titre forestier 14 Climat et géographie de la zone concerné 1.5 Contexte socio-économique et contribution de la société au développement local.",
"1.6 Bref Historique des activités forestières passées sur le titre forestier 1.6.1 Exploitation passée sur cette Concession Forestière …… 1.6.2 Transformation des grumes issues de la Concession Forestière. 2 PROCESSUS D’AMENAGEMENT ET DE CERTIFICATION VOULU PAR LA SOCIETE 2.1 L'élaboration du plan d'aménagement du 2.2 Vers la certification de légalité et de gestion durable des act és 3 REGLEMENT D'EXPLOITATION SUR LES 4 PREMIERES AAC ….…................... 3.1.1 Localisation des 4 premières AAC 3.1.2 Description des 4 AAC 3.1.3 Evaluation de la ressource exploitable sur les 4 prochaines années. 3.1.4 Infrastructures à créer 3.2 Règles d'intervention en milieu forestier 3.2.1 Description technique des opérations forestières 3.2.2 Mesures de réduction, d'atténuation et de compensation des impacts sur l'environnement et la faune 3.2.3 Diverses mesures de gestion.",
"4 PROGRAMME INDUSTRIEL EN LIAISON AVEC CETTE GARANTIE D’APPROVISIONNEMENT 6 SYNTHESE GENERALE DU PLAN DE GESTION SUR 4 ANS 36 6.1 Chronogramme de l’ensemble des activitées.. 6.2 Programme d'exploitation, industriel et social LISTE DES CARTES ....mmmmnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnanssannnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnneennnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnnneenn LISTE DES TABLEAUX .…....…mmmnennnmnennnnnnennnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnnt 39 LISTE DES FIGURES............nnnrnnnnnnmernennnnnmnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnennnnnnnne 39 LISTE DES ANNEXES .…......…nmmmnennnnnnnenmnnennennnnnnennennennennnnnnnnnennnnnnnnnennnnnnns 40 Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 2 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIGLES ET ACRONYMES EMPLOYES DANS LA SUITE DU TEXTE Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe Blocs d'Aménagement Quinquennaux Concession Forestière Direction Inventaire et Aménagement Forestier Diamètre Minimum d'Exploitabilité Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit Garantie d'Approvisionnement Global Positioning System (Système de positionnement par satellite) Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 3 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: INTRODUCTION Ce premier Plan de Gestion de la Concession Forestière n°40/11 a été rédigé dans le cadre du Projet d'Aménagement des concessions forestières de la société SIFORCO, conformément à l’Arrêté n°028/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 du 11 août 2008 fixant les modèles des contrats de concession d'exploitation des produits forestiers et des cahiers des charges y afférent.",
"Ce Plan de Gestion couvre la période allant de 2012 à 2015. Ce document a pour vocation d'être à la fois un outil de terrain au service des responsables de l'exploitation forestière sur les 4 premières AAC et un outil de suivi pour le MECNT. Ce document a été élaboré conformément à : +__ L'arrêté ministériel n°028/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 fixant les modèles de contrat de concession d'exploitation des produits forestiers et de cahier des charges y afférent en date du 11 août 2008 (dans son annexe 1, articles 1, 10 et 14); + __Le Guide Opérationnel ayant trait au canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal, car il n'existe pas encore de Guide ayant trait au canevas d’autorisation d'exploitation forestière anticipée et au cahier des charges provisoires. Les recommandations du Guide Opérationnel ayant trait au canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal ont été adaptées du fait que le Plan d'Aménagement de cette Concession Forestière est en préparation. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 4 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: 1 CONTEXTE 1.1 DENOMINATION DU TITRE Les différentes dénominations employées dans ce Plan de Gestion sont explicitées ci-dessous.",
"LE TITRE FORESTIER : Le titre forestier porte actuellement la référence du contrat de la Concession Forestière n°040/11 datant du 24 octobre 2011 (Annexe 3), abrégé en CF 40/11. La dénomination adoptée est CF 40/11-Bolobo, accolant le nom de la ville limitrophe. Cette concession est issue de la conversion de la Garantie d'Approvisionnement 18/00, telle qu'elle est définie par la « convention n°018/CAB/MIN/AFF-EDT/00 du 9 novembre 2000 portant octroi d'une Garantie d'Approvisionnement en matière ligneuse » (Annexe 1) et qui avait été déclarée convertible en contrat de concession forestière par notification n°4844/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 du 06/10/2008 (Annexe 2). LE BLOC FORESTIER : Pour sa gestion interne, SIFORCO a constitué des blocs incluant de un à trois titres forestiers limitrophes. Ce Plan de Gestion concerne le bloc K3, comprenant un seul titre.",
"Cette dénomination n’a aucun caractère officiel. Le Tableau 1 reprend l'ensemble des dénominations et regroupements qui seront utilisés tout le long de ce document. 1.2 PRESENTATION DE LA SOCIETE La SIFORCO (Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo) est présente en RDC, dans les activités d'exploitation forestière et de transformation industrielle du bois, depuis 1972. Cette société est détenue par CONGOLESE TIMBER dont l'actionnaire principal a longtemps été le Groupe DANZER. En fin d'année 2011, le Groupe DANZER a décidé de céder CONGOLESE TIMBER et a ainsi suspendu les activités d'exploitation forestière et de transformation du bois de SIFORCO en décembre 2011. Le changement d'actionnariat de CONGOLESE TIMBER s'est opéré en début d'année 2012 avec une reprise du capital par monsieur Elwyn Blattner, devenu actionnaire principal de CONGOLESE TIMBER. Depuis ce début d'année, CONGOLESE TIMBER détient également la société SEDAF (Société d'Entreprise et de Développement Africain), autre entité œuvrant dans les activités d'exploitation forestière en RDC. Un contrat a d’ailleurs été établi entre les sociétés SEDAF et SIFORCO, dans lequel SEDAF délègue les activités de gestion et d'exploitation forestière à la SIFORCO. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 5 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: La cession de CONGOLESE TIMBER a entrainé un arrêt complet des activités d'exploitation forestière et de transformation du bois de la SIFORCO de décembre 2011 à mai 2012. L'entreprise est donc aujourd'hui en pleine période de relance des activités.",
"Entre 1998 et 2003, en raison de la guerre en RDC dans la région de ses projets forestiers, l’activité d'exploitation forestière avait déjà été suspendue, mais la société avait maintenu une présence permanente dans le pays pour assurer une certaine protection de ses biens. Les activités de production avaient seulement repris au début de l’année 2003, d'abord sur une seule GA (K8, GA 02/89-Aketi), puis en 2005 sur une deuxième GA exploitée pour le compte de la société SEDAF. En 2005, le rythme des activités, aussi bien en forêt qu’au niveau industriel, était encore bien inférieur à celui d'avant la guerre. La relance des activités avait été fortement affectée par les crises internationales des marchés du bois tropical, en 2008-2009.",
"L'année 2010 avait été marquée par un retour à une production supérieure à 100 000 m dans l'année, pour la première fois depuis 1998. L'année 2012 connaîtra vraisemblablement une baisse des productions compte-tenu du contexte de reprise de la société. Jusqu'en 2011, la production de la SIFORCO restait encore inférieure à son niveau d'avant-guerre, et un doute existait encore sur la stabilité des marchés à moyen terme. Cependant, depuis la fin des années 70, SIFORCO (et précédemment SIFORZAL) est le premier producteur de grumes en RDC, ayant assuré en moyenne environ 40% de la production nationale sur les 20 dernières années.",
"SIFORCO prévoit de démarrer les activités d'exploitation dans le courant du second semestre de l’année 2012 dans la CF 40/11 — Bolobo. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 6 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC SIF/ORCO |: Juin 2012 8 8 & 8 8 & & 8 É 8 #, à Ë 5 5 8 £ 8 Ë 8 8 8 8 o —— ÉÉÉPÉPPPÉÉSÉPPLEÉPPPÉÉS EPS III SES Années Figure 1 : Evolution de la production de grumes par SIFORCO de 1977 à 2011 Avec l'abandon du bloc K8 — Bumba (GA n°02/89 et n°25/04) au début de l’année 2012, la société SIFORCO est à ce jour attributaire de 7 titres forestiers en RDC, qui ont été déclarés convertibles en concessions forestières, et totalisent une superficie d'environ 1,5 millions d'hectares. Pour sa gestion interne SIFORCO les a regroupés en 4 blocs, chaque bloc contient de un à trois titres forestiers.",
"Les 7 Concessions Forestières composant ces 4 blocs et leur superficie sont précisées dans le Tableau 1. Pour atteindre ces seuils d'équilibre économique, la SIFORCO a constitué 3 Superficies Sous Aménagement (SSA, constituées de un ou deux blocs forestiers), et prévoit le fonctionnement d'un chantier de production sur chacun des blocs. Tableau 1 : Concessions Forestières attribuées à SIFORCO . Superficie SIG N° Garantie . A SsA Blocs d' si Province du re de CF \\a) SSA Bolobo-Mushie | K3Bolobo | 018/CAB/MIN/AFF/EDT/00 040/11 Bandundu 194 641 K2 Bolombo | _007/CAB/MIN/ECNT95 026/11 Equateur 291 665 Djolu KT Mentole 026/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 02741 Equateur 212 868 027/CAB/MIN/ÆCN-EF/04 028/11 221 176 028/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 030/11 318 799 SSA Aketi-Basoko K9 Bolila | 029/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 03111 Orientale 217785 030/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/04 03211 SSA Bongandanga- Comme précisé précédemment SIFORCO intervient également les titres forestiers attribués à SEDAF, au travers d’un contrat dans lequel SEDAF délègue les activités de gestion et d'exploitation forestière Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 7 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: à SIFORCO. Les Garanties d'Approvisionnement, qui ont été déclarés convertibles en concessions forestières, composent un nouveau bloc (bloc K10 Yakata) et leur superficie sont précisées dans le Tableau 2. Ces trois Garanties d'Approvisionnement constitueront aussi une seule Superficie Sous Aménagement.",
"Tableau 2 : Garanties d'Approvisionnement attribuées à SEDAF N° Garantie d'approvisionnement 001/CAB/MIN/ECNPF/98 SSA Yakata- Orientale K10 Yakata 003/CAB/MIN/ECNPF/98 219 200 002/CAB/MIN/ECNPF/98 Equateur 200 533 Mombongo La base industrielle de SIFORCO est située à Maluku, à quatre-vingts kilomètres au nord de Kinshasa. Elle est composée d'une scierie et une usine de tranchage, cette dernière étant désormais à l'arrêt. L'importance stratégique du transport fluvial en RDC avait poussé la société à se doter d’une importante flotte fluviale et de moyens propres pour la maintenance de ses équipements. Cette stratégie a été révisée suite à la cession de CONGOLESE TIMBER à monsieur Elwyn Blattner et le transport fluvial est aujourd'hui assuré par la société de Transport Fluvial et de Commerce de l'Equateur (T.F.C.E.",
"), filiale de GBE (Groupe Blattner Elwyn). 1.3 LOCALISATION DU TITRE FORESTIER La SSA Bolobo-Mushie est située au Nord de la République Démocratique du Congo sur la rive gauche du fleuve Congo. Ce massif s'étend entre les latitudes 2°00’ et 2°35’ Sud et les longitudes 16°25’ et 17°05’ Est (Carte 1). Sur le plan administratif, cette Concession Forestière est située dans : Province : Bandundu District des Hauts Plateaux District de Mai Ndombe Territoires : Mushie et Yumbi Territoire : Inongo Secteurs : Mbali et Mongana Secteur : Basengele Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 8 République Démocratique du Congo FORET À RESSOURCES Carte de situation de la concession K3 de SIFORCO MANAGEMENT Fond de carte : image ortho rectifiée Landsat 7 ETM+ du 18 février 2001 et Landsat 7 ETM+ du 8 février 2003. Système de coordonnées : UTM WGS84, zone 335$.",
"FRM, juin 2011 16*300E SIF/ORCO | :% Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 1.4 CLIMAT ET GEOGRAPHIE DE LA ZONE CONCERNEE Les relevés présentés correspondent aux données comprises entre 1980 et 1990 relevés dans la station de Bandundu (à 120 km au sud est de la CF 40/11). La CF 40/11 bénéficie d’un climat chaud et humide. Le total des précipitations moyennes annuelles est élevé, de l’ordre de 1 700 mm/an. Au sud et à l’est du massif forestier congolais, une saison sèche relativement marquée apparaît de juin à août. Cette dernière tend néanmoins à disparaître en remontant vers le nord, à l'approche du cœur de la cuvette congolaise. Il est également à noter qu'une très légère baisse des précipitations s'observe en janvier et février. 300 Bandundu (1580mm) 250 200 150 | 100 | 50 | 0 = En B JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC Figure 2 : Courbe de pluviométrie sur Bandundu Le relief dans la Concession Forestière est relativement peu marqué, avec une ligne de partage des eaux au sein de la concession : la partie Nord appartient au bassin versant du fleuve Congo alors que la partie Sud fait partie du bassin versant de la rivière Leboma.",
"Pour l'essentiel, les écosystèmes sont des forêts denses humides, avec des zones anthropisées et une part importante de savanes, ces deux types d'occupation occupant 28% de la CF 40/11, principalement dans les zones Centrale, Nord et Ouest. Plan de Gestion P 10 couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) age Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: 1.5 CONTEXTE SOCIO-ECONOMIQUE ET CONTRIBUTION DE LA SOCIETE AU DEVELOPPEMENT LOCAL Aucune étude socio-économique récente n’est disponible. Afin de caractériser l’environnement socio- économique et culturel des populations locales et d’avoir une base solide pour renforcer les liens et l'insertion de la société dans le contexte local, SIFORCO a mené une étude socio-économique dans le cadre de l'élaboration du plan d'aménagement. Les enquêtes de terrain de l'Etude Socio- Economique du bloc forestier K3 ont eu lieu entre janvier et août 2011. Le rapport est en cours de révision et sera déposé auprès de l'Administration forestière au cours de l’année 2012.",
"Cette étude socio-économique, réalisée pour l'élaboration du plan d'aménagement, a permis de : + Faire un recensement de la population ; + Étudier les interactions entre cette population et la forêt afin de prévenir un éventuel impact négatif de l'exploitation sur les ressources valorisées par la population, et de proposer des mesures de gestion durable des ressources forestières valorisées localement ; + Évaluer les besoins des populations en matière d’infrastructures et de services publics, en préparation de la négociation régulière d'accords concernant la clause sociale du cahier des charges de la concession ; + Connaître leurs pratiques culturales (par exemple nombres d'hectares défrichés annuellement par foyer, quantité et type de bois récolté par foyer). La CF 40/11 est située sur trois territoires dans la Province de Bandundu. La carte en Annexe 4 représente l'architecture administrative des Territoires couverts par la CF 40/11. La situation du bloc K3 vis-à-vis de l’organisation administrative et coutumière est décrite par le tableau ci-dessous.",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 11 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 Juin 2012 RDC Tableau 3 : Organisation administrative et coutumière du territoire couvert par la CF 40/11 - Bolobo dans la Province de Bandundu (Bloc K3) Province District Territoire Secteur | Groupement Localité Bandundu Mushie Baboma Mbali Nord Bobala Bondamu Isale Kesomi Mpoko Ngantoko Nsenu Hauts Plateaux Yumbi Banunu / Mongana Batende Bobele Botsini Ilebo Mangala Kikanyikale Kimbeke Kisa Kitaba Maka Maka Malebo Mansele Maninka (Camp Banzi) Mike Molende Motala Mpee Mpoko Nganya Botanankosso (Ngila) Ngoo Nkolo Bokobamwe Mai Ndombe Inongo Besengele Mbelo Botangeli Empokekaso Lodimo Lokalu Lonio Maliba Moloki-sambo Nganda malebo Nsele Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 12 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: La population habitant à l'intérieur de la CF 40/11 a été estimée à 45 000 habitants répartis en 20 localités, avec deux tiers de la population sur le territoire de Yumbi. La densité est inégale dans la concession, variant de 9 habitants/km? (Groupement Baboma) à 50,3 habitants/km? (district des Hauts Plateaux).",
"Deux groupes ethnolinguistiques se retrouvent dans la zone d'étude, les Banunu Bobangi et les Batende. Le premier groupe est concentré sur les rives du fleuve Congo et les Batende se retrouvent à l'intérieur de la Concession Forestière. Des tensions entre les deux groupes ont été source de conflits, les plus récents datant de 2006. 1.6 BREF HISTORIQUE DES ACTIVITES FORESTIERES PASSEES SUR LE TITRE FORESTIER 1.6.1 Exploitation passée sur cette Concession Forestière La société SOBOPLAC a exploité sur la zone avant les années 60. Cependant, faute d'archives concernant cette activité passée, les zones exploitées à l'époque n’ont pu être localisées. Hormis l'exploitation de SOBOPLAC, l'état actuel des connaissances ne fait état d'aucune autre exploitation sur la zone. Cependant l'accès relativement facile depuis le fleuve Congo laisse penser que la zone a pu être exploitée après la société SOBOPLAC.",
"Des précisions sur cet aspect pourront être apportées suite aux informations recueillies pour l'élaboration du Rapport des Etudes Socio- économiques. La société SIFORCO n'a pas encore entamé l'exploitation forestière sur la CF 40/11, cependant des travaux d'ouverture de routes et de prospection ont été engagés afin de lancer l'exploitation dans les meilleurs délais. Le matériel prévu pour l'exploitation est présenté à titre indicatif dans le Tableau 4. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 13 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: Tableau 4 : Matériel d'exploitation prévu pour la mise en exploitation de la CF 40/11 Activité Matériel Nombre Tracteur à chenille (bull) : type 2 CATERPILLAR D7 Construction et Chargeur frontal \"godet\" 1 entretien de route A Niveleuse 1 Benne 1 Débardeur 2 Débardage Tracteur à chenille (bull) : type 1 CATERPILLAR D7 Manutention et Chargeur frontal \"fourchette\" 2 transport des grumes | Camions grumiers 2 Camion 1 Transport du personnel -— Pick-up 2 Mécanique / service / : ravitaillement Camion L 1.6.2 Transformation des grumes issues de la Concession Forestière SIFORCO dispose d’un important site industriel à Maluku, au bord du fleuve Congo, à 80 km de Kinshasa, implanté dans les années 70. Les grumes issues de l'exploitation de K3 seront acheminées vers Maluku, par flottage (radeau) et par barge. Avant l'arrêt des activités en décembre 2011, SIFORCO transformait ses bois en sciage, avec une capacité de 9 000 m° grumes/mois de grumes entrée usine en deux rotations journalières, soit une capacité d'environ 100 000 m° grumes/an, incluant 1 mois d'arrêt dans l’année.",
"La consommation était d'environ 90 000 m° grumes/an, avec une unité principale de sciage constituée d'une scie de tête (BRENTA), d'une scie de reprise multi-lames (LINCK), 2 déligneuses (UKIAH), 1 dédoubleuse, 2 ébouteuses et d’une ligne de triage. En 2010 a été installée une CD 10 et au cours de 2011 deux ébouteuses et une déligneuse ont été installées afin d'améliorer la production. Cette ligne étant destinée à la production de dimensions standards. En ce qui concerne la production de débités séchés, aux deux séchoirs présents sur place (5 chambres de séchage), la SIFORCO a ajouté de nouveaux séchoirs en 2011, permettant d'atteindre une capacité d'environ 1 200 m / mois, permettant ainsi le séchage de la moitié de la production de débités. Le séchage se fait sur un cycle de 2 mois, composé d'un mois de pré-séchage à l’air puis un mois en séchoir.",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 14 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: Les grumes entrées en scierie étaient valorisées comme suit : + 31 % de débités vendus sur les marchés d'exportation ; +35 % de débités vendus sur le marché local (y compris une partie vendue en vrac en benne) ; + Le reste est soit brûlé par des charbonniers, soit brûlé dans l'usine, une partie de l'énergie étant valorisée pour la production de chaleur des séchoirs. La société SIFORCO a une unité de production de placages tranchés, qui a été fermée en 2009. L'arrêt de cette unité de transformation, d’une capacité de 12 000 m° de grumes par an, avait été décidé du fait de la faible disponibilité en grumes de qualité « tranche » et de la nécessité d'investir dans des séchoirs plus performants, rendant l’activité non viable.",
"Un atelier de récupération de produits connexes du premier sciage assurait une production d'environ 150 m‘/mois de débités. Un deuxième atelier de récupération était en cours d'installation, avec 2 déligneuses multi-lames et un dédoubleur. Cette installation aurait permis de produire environ 150 m°/mois de débités supplémentaires, doublant ainsi la capacité de récupération et permettant ainsi d'augmenter le rendement à l'exportation de 1,5%. 2 PROCESSUS D’AMENAGEMENT ET DE CERTIFICATION VOULU PAR LA SOCIETE 2.1 L'ELABORATION DU PLAN D’AMENAGEMENT DU TITRE FORESTIER Les 7 titres attribués à SIFORCO ont été convertis en concessions forestières. La société SIFORCO peut donc désormais initier le projet d'aménagement de sa concession et disposera pour ce faire d'un délai de 4 ans à compter de la signature du contrat de concession. Pour être appuyé dans l'élaboration de ses Plans d'aménagement, la SIFORCO a signé depuis fin 2010 des contrats d'appui technique avec le bureau d'étude FORET RESSOURCES MANAGEMENT (FRM), leader dans ce domaine en Afrique Centrale. Les méthodes de travail employées par la Cellule Aménagement SIFORCO pour effectuer l'inventaire d'aménagement sont décrites dans le Protocole d'inventaire d'Aménagement, déposé auprès du Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature, Eaux et Forêts pour validation le 11 mars 2011.",
"Ces méthodologies de travail répondent aux prescriptions contenues dans les Guides Opérationnels ayant trait : + au modèle de rapport d'inventaire d'aménagement ; + aux normes d'inventaire d'aménagement forestier ; + aux normes d'élaboration du plan de sondage de l'inventaire d'aménagement ; Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 15 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: + aux normes de stratification forestière ; + __ à l'attestation de conformité du plan de sondage ; + au protocole de vérification et d'approbation du rapport d'inventaire d'aménagement ; + aux listes des essences forestières de la République Démocratique du Congo ; + au canevas et guide de réalisation des études socio-économiques. Le protocole d'inventaire a été déposé auprès du MECNT le 11 mars 2011. Le Rapport d'étude socio-économique sur la zone d'emprise de la CF 40/11 est en cours de réalisation. Les accords constituant la clause sociale du cahier des charges ont été signés le 18 août 2011. Les différentes étapes qui restent à conduire pour la mise sous gestion durable de la CF 40/11 sont les suivantes : + Dépôt auprès du MECNT du présent Plan de Gestion, 2012 ; + __ Réalisation de l'inventaire d'aménagement forestier, 2013 - 2014 ; + Réalisation de travaux cartographiques à travers la constitution d’une base de données cartographiques sous SIG, 2012 ; + Dépôt du Rapport d'inventaire d'aménagement, 2014 ; + __ Préparation et dépôt du Plan d'Aménagement auprès du MECNT, 2014 pour une mise en œuvre au début 2015 ; + __ Mise en œuvre du Plan d'Aménagement dès l'adoption de celui-ci : préparation et mise en œuvre des documents de gestion (Plan de Gestion et Plan Annuel d'Opérations), 2.2 VERS LA CERTIFICATION DE LEGALITE ET DE GESTION DURABLE DES ACTIVITES La politique de SIFORCO cible une gestion durable des ressources forestières, en s’impliquant dans une application stricte des textes de lois, l'amélioration continue des pratiques et une intégration dans le tissu socio-économique local.",
"Les productions du bloc K8 étaient certifiées TLTV (TIMBER LEGALITY & TRACEABILITY VERIFICATION, numéro SGS-TLTV/LP-VLC-0005) depuis 2007. Un audit réalisé en juillet 2011, a permis à SIFORCO d'obtenir la certification TLTV pour ses productions issues du bloc K3, ainsi que celles du bloc K10 dont est attributaire la société SEDAF mais pour lequel la gestion et l'exploitation sont assurées par SIFORCO au travers d’un contrat liant les deux sociétés.",
"La SIFORCO ne cherche pas à être certifiée sur l'ensemble de sa gestion à moyen terme, car elle préfère se consacrer à la mise sous aménagement de ses trois SSA. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 16 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 | SIF/ORCO | : Toutefois, Un programme de mise en œuvre de techniques d'Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit sera initié. 3 REGLEMENT D'EXPLOITATION SUR LES 4 PREMIERES AAC 3.1.1 Localisation des 4 premières AAC Comme prévu par les dispositions réglementaires, ce Plan de Gestion a été préparé pour 4 AAC, couvrant la période allant de 2012 à 2015. L'entrée en vigueur du Plan d'Aménagement est prévue pour début 2015 (cf.",
"2.1). Il définira notamment les Blocs d'Aménagement Quinquennaux (BAQ) en tenant compte des superficies exploitées d'ici là et de l'analyse des études techniques réalisées. Dès l'approbation du Plan d'Aménagement, le premier Plan de Gestion Quinquennal sera produit et rendra caduque le présent Plan de Gestion. Le premier BAQ est prévu pour couvrir la période 2015 — 2019 et il sera alors associé à la signature d'une clause sociale couvrant cette même période de 5 ans. Dans la mesure du possible et en fonction des résultats des différentes études, le premier BAQ intégrera la ou les AAC prévues en exploitation par ce Plan de Gestion et qui n'auraient pas encore été exploitées. 3.1.1.1 Surface utile retenue La surface utile retenue est calculée à partir d’une première interprétation des images satellitales conduite lors des travaux de pré-stratification effectués en 2010 par FRM et SIFORCO. La carte de pré-stratification est jointe en Annexe 5 de ce Plan de Gestion.",
"Ces résultats seront affinés à partir des travaux de terrain d'inventaire d'aménagement. On trouvera dans le Tableau 5 un récapitulatif des surfaces calculées sous SIG (projection UTM zone 33 Sud) par types interprétés : Tableau 5: Résultats de la stratification préliminaire du Bloc K3 Types d'occupation du sol Surface (ha) % du total Forêt utile 112 599 59% Forêt non-utile 78 274 41% dont Zones marécageuses 25 843 14% Zones anthropisées 8 634 5% Savanes 43797 23% TOTAL 190 872 100% Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 17 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: Cette concession est caractérisée par une forte présence des savanes, qui couvrent près d’un quart de la surface.",
"La superficie totale est de 190 872 ha et la superficie utile totale est de 112 599 ha, ce qui correspond à 59% de la superficie totale. 3.1.1.2 Superficie des 4 premières AAC Conformément à l'arrêté ministériel n°028/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 (article 14) la surface de °\" de la superficie totale de la forêt productive concédée, soit 4 504 ha de surface utile maximale (112 599 hectares divisés par 25), soit 18 016 ha au maximum pour les 4 AAC. chacune des 4 premières AAC ne doit pas dépasser 1/25 Suivant les prescriptions du Guide Opérationnel définissant le canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal, le découpage de ces AAC au sein des BAQ s’est basé sur les principes suivants : + __le territoire dans lequel s'inscrit l'AAC intègre des superficies non productives.",
"En revanche la superficie prise en compte pour le dimensionnement de l’'AAC correspond à la superficie utile incluse dans ce territoire ; + un écart de 5% sur la superficie utile a été toléré entre la plus grande et de la plus petite des AAC. Pour les besoins de réalisation des inventaires d'exploitation et de planification de sa production, SIFORCO a établi sur l'ensemble de la SSA un découpage en parcelles de 1 000 ha (rectangle de 2km par 5). Le découpage en AAC s’est appuyé dans la mesure du possible sur les limites de ces parcelles. 3.1.2 Description des 4 AAC 3.1.2.1 Justification et localisation des 4 AAC Ce Plan de Gestion a été préparé pour 4 AAC comme prévu par les dispositions réglementaires et il couvre la période allant de 2012 à 2015. L'entrée en vigueur du Plan d'Aménagement est prévue pour début 2015 (cf. 2.1). Il définira notamment les Blocs d'Aménagement Quinquennaux (BAQ) en tenant compte des superficies exploitées jusque là et de l'analyse des études techniques réalisées. L'exploitation durable des forêts de la CF 40/11 - Bolobo par SIFORCO n'a pas encore commencé.",
"L'implantation des infrastructures nécessaires au lancement des activités a débuté en mai 2012. L'installation d’une base-vie et la remise en état d'une partie du réseau routier existant, indispensable pour permettre l'accès au titre forestier et l'évacuation des productions, sont les premières étapes dans l'installation sur la CF 40/11. Dans cette optique, les 4 AAC vont se placer dans la partie ouest de la Concession Forestière, profitant de la proximité du fleuve Congo pour l'évacuation du bois et de la facilité d'accès à la zone, garanti par la construction relativement aisée d'une route principale à travers des savanes. Dès l'approbation du Plan d'Aménagement, le premier Plan de Gestion Quinquennal sera produit et il sera alors associé à la signature de clauses sociales couvrant cette même période de 5 ans.",
"Ces dernières seront signées avec les communautés locales dont les territoires coutumiers se superposent avec les 5 AAC prévues en exploitation de 2015 à 2019. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 18 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 | SIF/ORCO | : 3.1.2.2 Superficie des 4 premières AAC Le principe du découpage de ces AAC s’est basé sur les prescriptions du Guide Opérationnel définissant le canevas d'autorisation d'exploitation forestière anticipée. Le Tableau 6 donne les superficies des AAC et la Carte 2 leur localisation. Tableau 6 : Superficies des 4 Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe Superficie totale du Superficie non Superficie Date théorique AAC territoire délimité productive productive d'ouverture (ha) (ha) (ha) 1 9215 4 805 4410 01/01/2012 2 8 028 3707 4321 01/01/2013 3 5 243 749 4 494 01/01/2014 4 5 524 1043 4481 01/01/2015 Moyenne 7 003 2576 4427 Somme 28 010 10 304 17 706 La superficie productive est de 17 706 ha, légèrement inférieure aux 4/25 autorisés par la loi.",
"Conformément au Guide Opérationnel ayant trait au canevas du Plan de Gestion Quinquennal, le découpage en AAC doit être équisurface avec une tolérance de 5 %. Le principe de calcul de cet écart est repris ci-dessous : Ecart = Sa Sp x 100 Sp Avec: Sg: superficie de la plus grande AAC Sp : superficie de la plus petite AAC Si on applique cette formule dans le cas présent on obtient : 4 494—4 321 3321 = 4,0%, soit un écart inférieur à la tolérance de 5%.",
"La Carte 2 localise les 4 AAC. La Carte 3 présente le réseau routier prévisionnel pour l'évacuation des bois. Le Tableau 7 donne les coordonnées géographiques indicatives de quelques points remarquables permettant de délimiter les 4 AAC sur les segments naturels de la limite. Il est à noter que les coordonnées réelles pourront légèrement différer pour s'adapter aux limites des blocs délimités sur le terrain.",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 19 Bone mous République Démocratique du Congo FORET ES on Assiettes annuelles de coupe de la CF 40/11 MANAGEMENT 2012-2015 163 a 2 Zone non inventoriée Loue | Marécage Savane Zone anthropisée Tic cs CRT ES) * X ’: 16°300\"E FRM, juin 2012 République Démocratique du Congo l Réseau prévisionnel de pistes de la CF 40/11 2012-2015 Réseau de pistes —— Piste principale prévue Piste secondaire prévue — Piste principale existente AAC 5m : | ES : L_E Tire cer ° Village —— Réseau hydrographique FRM, juin 2012 SIF/ORCO Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00 Décembre 2011 RDC Tableau 7 : Points remarquables permettant la délimitation des 4 AAC Degrés, minutes, secondes Degrés décimaux UTM, zone 33 sud (en mètres) couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2011 - 2014) Point Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude Longitude Latitude 1 16,4627 -2,1951 16° 27'45,578\"E | 2° 11° 42,506\" S 662656,6 9757290,3 2 16,5076 -2,2146 16° 30° 27,189\"E | 2° 1252695\" S 667647,8 9755129,6 3 16,6149 -2,2146 16° 36' 53,775\" E | 2° 1252695\" S 679592,6 9755117,0 4 16,5903 -2,3064 16° 35'25,205\"E | 2° 18°22,863\"S 676844,8 9744978,8 5 16,6180 -2,3064 16° 37'4,919\"E | 2°18°22,861\"S 679925,7 9744975,4 6 16,6252 -2,3425 16° 37' 30,745\"E | 2° 20° 33,091\" S 680719,0 9740974,4 7 16,5876 -2,3425 16° 35 15,258\" E | 2° 20° 33,091\" S 676533,0 9740979,2 8 16,5876 -2,3562 16° 35'15,258\"E | 2°21°22,432\"S 676531,3 9739463,6 9 16,5422 -2,4117 16° 32° 32,002\"E | 2°24°41,978\"S 671480,6 9733340,3 10 16,5329 -2,4117 16° 31 58,450\" E | 2° 24°41,990\"S 670444,0 9733341,1 11 16,5203 -2,3787 16° 31° 12,989\"E | 2°22°43,331\"S 669043,6 9736987,2 12 16,5656 -2,3787 16° 33 56,102\"E | 2°22°43,331\"S 674082,9 9736981,6 13 16,4804 -2,3064 16° 28'49,474\"E | 2°18°22,867\"S 664618,3 9744991,8 14 16,5058 -2,3064 16° 30' 20,862\"E | 2°18°22,867\"S 667441,8 9744988,9 15 16,5058 -2,2883 16° 30' 20,862\"E | 2°17°17,747\"S 667443,9 9746988,9 16 16,5424 -2,2883 16° 32°32,677\"E | 2°17°17,742\"S 671516,5 9746984,8 17 16,4168 -2,1901 16° 25\"0,593\"E | 2°11°24,421\"S 657559,6 9757850,6 18 16,4347 -2,1901 16° 26° 5,005\"E | 2°11°24,462\"S 659549,7 9757847,5 19 16,4347 -2,1952 16° 26° 5,005\"E | 2°11°42,552\"S 659549,2 9757291,9 E Plan de Gestion Page 22 M Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00 RDC Décembre 2011 SIF/ORCO |: En théorie, une AAC est ouverte en début de chaque année.",
"Selon l'arrêté ministériel n°036/CAB/MIN/ECN-EF/2006 du 5 octobre 2006 (article 11), les AAC peuvent être ouvertes durant deux ans consécutifs et chaque AAC devra être définitivement fermée deux ans après sa date d'ouverture effective. La durée d'application du Plan d'Aménagement est de 25 ans, et la surface sera découpée en 25 AAC. Chaque Assiette Annuelle de Coupe ne sera ouverte à l'exploitation qu'une seule fois pendant la durée de mise en œuvre du Plan d'Aménagement. 3.1.3 Evaluation de la ressource exploitable sur les 4 prochaines années La ressource exploitable a été estimée à partir d'un inventaire de sondage réalisé en 2010. Des layons de comptage établis dans l’ensemble de la concession ont permis de sonder 371 ha, avec 63 placettes de 4 ha et 17 placettes de 7 ha.",
"Les équipes de terrain ont identifié et comptabilisé les tiges d’une liste restreinte d'essences à partir des Diamètres d'Exploitation fixés par la société. A partir des effectifs comptabilisés des différentes essences et leurs diamètres, des tarifs de cubage à une entrée établis par le SPIAF ont été appliqués. Ceux-ci permettent de donner le volume des fûts, ou volume brut, en fonction du diamètre à 1,30 mètre du sol ou au-dessous des contreforts (DHP). Pour passer des volumes bruts aux volumes nets, c’est-à dire aux volumes commerciaux réellement mobilisables, nous avons appliqué un coefficient de récolement, qui est le produit d’un coefficient de prélèvement et d’un coefficient de valorisation. Ces coefficients sont définis comme suit : + Coefficients de prélèvement : proportion du volume des tiges de DHP supérieur au DME dont la qualité justifie l'abattage pour la commercialisation ou la transformation. + Coefficients de valorisation : proportion du volume fût abattu qui est effectivement commercialisé ou transformé.",
"+ Coefficients de récolement : proportion du volume fût sur pied qui est effectivement commercialisé ou transformé. C'est le produit des coefficients de prélèvement et de valorisation. L'évaluation des productions s'est faite par application d'un dernier coefficient, le coefficient de décision d'exploitation. Ce coefficient tient compte de la possibilité de commercialisation des essences sur les marchés, en fonction des coûts de revient de leur production. Les valeurs fixées ont été prudentes, pour garantir une marge de sécurité dans les évaluations de volume, pour les essences de la Classe 2, pour lesquelles le marché est plus exigeant dans la qualité et plus fluctuant dans la demande. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2011 - 2014) Page 23 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 Juin 2012 RDC Cependant, les volumes annoncés ici ne sont donnés qu'à titre indicatif afin de planifier les opérations et d’asseoir une estimation des montants disponibles pour le fonds de développement, en vue des négociations avec les populations locales.",
"Ils seront ajustés au fur et à mesure de la mise en œuvre du Plan de Gestion. Tableau 8 : Résultats des inventaires de sondage Nombre de | Nombre pieds pieds Vol net Décision Vol net à Essence | inventoriés | inventoriés a el sosr eco disponible | d'exploitation exploiter (DME> DME | (DME> DME | (\"° Prutiha) C0) {m° net/ha) (%) {m° net/ha) expl) expliha) Doussie 3 0,01 0,04 56% 0,02 100% 0,02 Iroko 3 0,01 0,08 64% 0,05 100% 0,05 Kosipo 3 0,01 0,14 40% 0,05 100% 0,05 Sapell 9 0,02 0,35 68% 0,24 100% 0,24 Sipo 1 0,00 0,05 68% 0,03 100% 0,03 Tiama 24 0,06 0,53 43% 0,23 100% 0,23 Wenge 197 0,53 3,39 42% 1,42 100% 1,42 Total Classe 1 2,05 2,05 Bilinga 28 0,08 0,53 56% 0,30 50% 0,15 Bossé 3 0,01 0,07 42% 0,03 50% 0,02 Dibetou 19 0,05 0,33 42% 0,14 50% 0,07 Longhi 2 0,06 0.38 30% 0,11 50% 0,06 Blanc ” \" ° d ° ” Padouk 2 0,01 0,03 36% 0,01 50% 0,01 rouge Tali 60 0,16 1,61 36% 0,58 50% 0,29 Tola 6 0,02 0,19 30% 0,06 50% 0,03 Total Classe 2 1,22 50% 0,61 TOTAL GENERAL 3,28 2,66 Plan de Gest lan de Gestion Page 24 couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: Tableau 9 : Estimation du volume récoltable sur la zone d'exploitation des 4 AAC (surface utile de 17 705 ha) Essence Vol net à exploiter Volume total Production moyenne {m?",
"net/ha) (m? net) annuelle (m nets/an) Doussie 0,02 439 110 Iroko 0,05 930 232 Kosipo 0,05 957 239 Sapelli 0,24 4 269 1067 Sipo 0,03 565 141 Tiama 0,23 3 997 999 Wenge 1,42 25 202 6 300 Total Classe 1 2,05 36 359 9 090 Bilinga 0,15 2613 653 Bossé 0,02 271 68 Dibetou 0,07 1213 303 Longhi Blanc 0,06 1 006 251 Padouk rouge 0,01 100 25 Tali 0,29 5 120 1280 Tola 0,03 501 125 Total Classe 2 0,61 10 824 2706 TOTAL GENERAL 2,66 47183 11796 Selon les prévisions, SIFORCO devrait pouvoir mobiliser environ 11 796 m° net de grumes annuellement sur les 4 ans de durée du Plan de Gestion, soit environ 1 000 m/mois.",
"Il est important de rappeler la nature indicative et prévisionnelle de ces volumes qui pourront différer des volumes qui seront effectivement prélevés. Divers éléments peuvent affecter ces volumes, notamment les Diamètres Minimums réels d'Exploitation, l'amélioration des rendements par l'application des règles EFIR, la valorisation de nouvelles essences ou au contraire l'impossibilité de valoriser une essence dont la rentabilité n’est plus garantie. 3.1.4 Infrastructures à créer Le tracé prévisionnel des routes principales et secondaires pour la période 2012-2015 de ce Plan de Gestion est présenté sur la Carte 3. Le tracé ici présenté est provisoire, et pourra être modifié suite aux résultats des inventaires d'exploitation. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 25 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: Tableau 10 : Longueur prévisionnelle des pistes principales et secondaires à créer lors du Plan de Gestion 2012-2015 (km) Route principale Route secondaire Total AAC 1 10 21 31 AAC2 0 29 29 AAC 3 0 22 22 AAC 4 0 26 26 En dehors des AAC 6 0 6 Moyenne (km/an) 4 24,5 28,5 Total 16 98 114 SIFORCO installera sur le territoire de la CF 40/11-Bolobo une base-vie. Dans un premier temps, les infrastructures seront temporaires, afin de pouvoir répondre aux besoins immédiats de démarrage des activités d'exploitation forestière.",
"Progressivement, une base-vie définitive sera établie, elle comprendra à terme des habitations en matériau durable, un établissement scolaire, un dispensaire équipé et doté d’une pharmacie, un accès à l’eau potable, une cantine, des équipements de loisirs. 3.2 REGLES D’INTERVENTION EN MILIEU FORESTIER La société appliquera comme norme d'intervention les préconisations émises dans les Guides Opérationnels, et en particulier celles des Normes d'Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit (EFIR) et des Normes d'inventaire d'exploitation. La partie qui suit présente une synthèse des opérations et mesures à mettre en œuvre, conformément aux normes citées ci-dessus. 3.2.1 Description technique des opérations forestières 3.2.1.1 L'inventaire d'exploitation L'inventaire d'exploitation sera conduit de façon à répondre aux prescriptions contenues dans le Guide Opérationnel définissant les Normes d'inventaire d'Exploitation. Les arbres à identifier lors de l'inventaire d'exploitation et à protéger lors de l'exploitation sont de 5 types : + les arbres exploitables ; Ce sont les arbres d'essences exploitées, ayant atteint le Diamètre Minimum d'Exploitabilité (DME), fixé par la loi et dont la qualité justifie la valorisation. Ces arbres seront numérotés sur carte et leur numéro sera marqué à la peinture. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 26 — Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC SIF/ORCO : Juin 2012 + les arbres d’essences exploitables mais de mauvaise qualité ; Ce sont les arbres d'essences exploitées, ayant atteint le DME, mais ayant un défaut rédhibitoire.",
"Ces arbres seront marqués d’un « V ». + les arbres d’avenir ; Ce sont ces arbres qui reconstitueront le potentiel exploitable pour les rotations ultérieures. Ils sont donc à protéger afin que ce potentiel puisse se reconstituer. Les arbres à protéger étant menacés par l'exploitation seront marqués d’un « @ », il s’agit de tiges situées au bord des pistes de débardages et à proximité des arbres à abattre. + les arbres patrimoniaux ; Une équipe sera constituée pour assurer une concertation préalable au sujet de l'exploitation avec les populations locales. Elle sera chargée de réaliser une cartographie sociale en collaboration avec les populations locales dont le territoire coutumier se superpose avec l'AAC.",
"Les arbres et les territoires ayant une importance sociale particulière seront marqués sur le terrain et cartographiés (Zone sacrée, arbres patrimoniaux, etc.). Les arbres concernés seront marqués d’un « P ». + les semenciers ; Certaines tiges seront identifiées et préservées pour jouer le rôle de semenciers. Elles seront marquées d’un « P » lors du pistage. Tige d'avemir ‘ Arbre refusé Arbre à protéger (mauvaise qualité) Figure 3 : Marquage des tiges d’avenir, des arbres patrimoniaux et des arbres de mauvaise qualité (source : FRM, Normes d'inventaire d’exploitation, juillet 2007) Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 27 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 Les documents cartographiques établis grâce aux données collectées par l'inventaire d'exploitation donneront la localisation : des tiges exploitables ; des tiges préservées comme semenciers ; des tiges patrimoniales ; et des tiges d'avenir.",
"3.2.1.2 Zones hors exploitation Certaines zones sont particulièrement sensibles à une mise en exploitation. Afin de les protéger, leur exclusion de l'exploitation s'avère nécessaire. Cette mise en défend va permettre de réduire l'impact sur les populations riveraines, la ressource et l’environnement. Les zones à exclure sont les suivantes, conformément au Guide Opérationnel concernant l'Exploitation Forestière à Impact Réduit : zones non exploitables : zones marécageuses, zones à forte pente (pente supérieure où égale à 30%) et zones de rochers ; zones à valeur culturelle ou religieuse : forêts ou arbres sacrés ; zones d'importance écologique, scientifique ou touristique : zones à très grande diversité floristique ou faunique, habitats d'espèces endémiques, habitats uniques et fragiles, etc.",
"; zones sensibles, c'est-à-dire en bordure des cours d'eau permanents, des marigots, autour des marécages. Largeur minimum des zones sensibles : o largeur < 10m: 50 m sur chaque rive ; o ravines : 10 m de chaque côté ; o ruisseaux ou marigots : 20 m de chaque côté ; o marécages : 10 m à partir de la limite ; o tête de source : 150 m autour. 3.2.1.3 Réseau routier et parcs à grumes Afin de limiter les impacts directs et indirects, le réseau routier et de parcs à grumes sera planifié et optimisé sur le terrain en : évitant les peuplements « pauvres » en tiges à exploiter de manière à réduire les superficies touchées notamment par les pistes de débardage ; contournant les zones de forte pente, marécageuses, sensibles, etc. ; limitant autant que possible la surface des parcs à grumes ; respectant une déforestation maximum de 30 m pour les routes et leur emprise ; maintenant des ponts de canopée, au minimum tous les 5 kilomètres, et en ouvrant les andains (pour permettre le passage de la faune) ; construisant et en maintenant des structures de drainage appropriées pour collecter et évacuer les eaux ; Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 28 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 + évitant la perturbation des cours d'eau ; + préservant les arbres d’avenir et patrimoniaux dans la planification.",
"3.2.1.4 Abattage contrôlé Des formations en abattage contrôlé seront dispensées pour garantir la mise en œuvre de techniques d'abattage contrôlé. 3.2.1.5 Usage des produits de traitement des bois L'usage des produits de traitement suit les règles d'application de ces produits, conformément aux lois et règlements en vigueur. Les travailleurs sont équipés de tenues spéciales, afin d'éviter tout contact du produit avec la peau ou les yeux. L'ensemble de ces mesures assurent les conditions de sécurité et de santé des travailleurs et tendent à éviter la pollution des eaux, du sol, de la flore et de la microfaune. 3.2.1.6 Débusquage et débardage Le débusquage et le débardage constituent les premières étapes de transport des bois en grumes, plus précisément de l'endroit d'abattage au parc de chargement. L'impact de ces deux étapes se manifeste tant sur le sol que sur le peuplement résiduel. Ces impacts inévitables seront néanmoins réduits en : + réalisant un tracé optimal pour le débardage des grumes (le plus direct et le moins large) en évitant des virages trop serrés ; + évitant les arbres à protéger ; + limitant au minimum les franchissements de cours d’eau et dans le cas où ceci est impossible, en prenant des précautions (lit de billes perpendiculaire à la berge, passage par un lit rocheux...) ; + limitant l’utilisation des bulldozers au débusquage en choisissant d'autres moyens d'extraction en cas de pente forte ; + utilisant au maximum le treuil et le câble pour le débardage là où la dimension et le poids des grumes le permettent.",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 29 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 Piste principale Piste principale Piste secondaire PRE @e \\ Piste secondaire &---.. @---— Parc Parc Figure 4: Tracé idéal des pistes de débardage, tracé à l’avance en fonction des cartes d'inventaire d'exploitation (Source : FRM, Normes d'inventaire d'exploitation, juillet 2007) 3.2.1.7 Chargement et transport Afin de limiter les impacts causés par le chargement et le transport de bois (accidents, pollutions et transport illégal de viande de brousse), les mesures suivantes seront appliquées : charger de façon adéquate les grumiers (pas au-delà de leur capacité utile) ; évacuer les bois des parcs à grumes dans un délai n'excédant pas deux mois, en donnant priorité aux essences susceptibles d’être attaquées par les insectes ou les champignons ; respecter les limitations de vitesse établies par l'entreprise ; ne jamais transporter de passagers non autorisés dans les grumiers ; interdire le transport de viande de brousse ; interdire la présence de toute arme à feu à bord des véhicules. 3.2.1.8 Opérations post-exploitation Afin de laisser les zones exploitées dans un état qui facilite la régénération ultérieure et éviter toute atteinte supplémentaire à l’environnement lors de la période de la rotation, des opérations pourront être conduites après l'exploitation lorsque cela s'avère nécessaire, notamment : la réhabilitation des parcs à grumes ; le retrait de tous les débris d'exploitation dans les zones de protection des berges, et de tout obstacle freinant le libre passage des eaux ; la fermeture à la circulation des routes qui ne seront pas utilisées avant la prochaine rotation.",
"La fermeture des routes sera faite à l'aide de grumes, de fossés creusés ou de barrières cadenassées. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 30 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 3.2.2 Mesures de réduction, d’atténuation et de compensation des impacts sur l’environnement et la faune 3.2.2.1 Diamètres Minimums d'Exploitation (DME) Dans l'attente des conclusions et de la validation du Plan d'Aménagement de cette concession, la société respectera les diamètres d'abattage (Diamètres Minimum d'Exploitation) tels que définis dans le Guide Opérationnel « Liste des essences forestières de la RDC ». Ce diamètre sera mesuré conformément à l'annexe 5 du Guide Opérationnel portant sur les normes d'inventaire d'aménagement forestier.",
"3.2.2.2 Ouvrage de franchissement (ponts, ponceaux, digues, etc.) Les ouvrages de franchissement seront construits de manière à ne pas changer les directions naturelles ou entraver les cours d’eau, afin de ne pas perturber l'alimentation en eau des populations, et de prévenir les risques d’inondations. 3.2.2.3 Réduction de l'impact sur la faune sauvage Toutes les activités liées à la chasse commerciale sont interdites dans le cadre de l'exploitation forestière. Il s'agit notamment de la chasse elle-même, du commerce de viande de brousse dans le camp forestier, du transport de la viande de chasse et des produits forestiers d’origine animale par les véhicules de la société, et du commerce d'armes et/ou des minutions. Au travers de notes de service, la société va informer son personnel de cette interdiction passible, en cas d'infraction, de sanctions. Des réunions de sensibilisation seront organisées auprès des travailleurs et des populations, sur les lois et réglementations qui s'appliquent en RDC : période de chasse, espèces protégées, techniques autorisées, permis de port d'armes. 3.2.3 Diverses mesures de gestion 3.2.3.1 Arbres de chantier routier La société procédera à l'abattage de tous les arbres dont l'enlèvement est jugé nécessaire lors des travaux du tracé des routes d'évacuation ou par la confection d'ouvrages d'art.",
"S'il s'agit de bois d'œuvre dont le diamètre est supérieur ou égal au diamètre minimum d'exploitation, ils seront portés au carnet de chantier après numérotation, mais ne donneront pas lieu à un paiement quelconque, ni aux taxes lorsqu'ils sont utilisés pour la construction de ponts ou d'ouvrages relatifs aux routes forestières et s'ils n’ont pas été commercialisés. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 31 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: 3.2.3.2 Matérialisation des limites des AAC Lorsqu'il n'existe pas de limites naturelles, la société matérialisera les limites de chaque Assiette Annuelle de Coupe. Les layons tracés pour délimiter les parcelles peuvent être considérés comme une matérialisation de limite. 3.2.8.3 Matérialisation des zones de protection Les limites des zones tampons bordant les cours d’eau ou les zones marécageuses seront délimitées par un marquage à la peinture. 4 PROGRAMME INDUSTRIEL EN LIAISON AVEC CETTE GARANTIE D’APPROVISIONNEMENT La production estimée de K10 (titres forestiers SEDAF) est d'environ 100 000 m° par an, celle de K3 de 12 000 m‘/an, soit une production totale d'environ 112 000 m. Avec une capacité annuelle de transformation de 120 000 m° (avec 3 rotations) l'unité industrielle de Maluku est en mesure de respecter l'obligation règlementaire de transformer plus de 70% des grumes produites à court terme.",
"Il n'est pas prévu sur le court terme d'investissements industriels visant à augmenter la capacité de transformation locale des grumes produites (entrée grumes dans les usines). Les priorités sont plutôt données à une amélioration des rendements matière des usines actuelles et à une augmentation de la valeur ajoutée (séchage, transformation plus poussée). Cependant, SIFORCO est en train de préparer la mise en exploitation des blocs forestiers K2 et K7. Les inventaires ont été menés afin de connaître la ressource disponible. En définissant des AAC de superficie égale au 1/25\" de la superficie utile totale, la production de l'ensemble K2 et K7 est estimée provisoirement à environ 95 000 m‘/an. Ceci engendrera, une fois l'exploitation mise en œuvre sur tous les massifs forestiers concédés à SIFORCO, une production de bois supérieure à l'actuelle capacité de transformation.",
"Dans l'attente de la mise en œuvre d'investissements lui permettant de respecter son obligation règlementaire de transformer plus de 70% de sa production de grumes, SIFORCO a fait le choix de définir des superficies d'AAC inférieures au 1/25°\"% de la superficie utile totale. La production objective des blocs forestiers K2 et K7 est ainsi fixé à environ 25 000 m° par an sur les quatre prochaines années. Pour les investissements futurs, les orientations seront guidées par le niveau et les caractéristiques technologiques de la ressource disponible, évaluée par les études techniques préalables à l'aménagement et les volumes mobilisables dans le cadre de l'aménagement. Le Plan de Gestion de la SSA Aketi-Basoko prévoyait une production annuelle d'environ 95 000 m°. Cependant, au début de l’année 2012, SIFORCO a remis à disposition de l'Etat congolais, les GA 02/89 et 25/04 constituant le bloc forestier K8. Le Plan de Gestion de la SSA Aketi-Basoko sera donc révisé en ne tenant compte que des superficies du bloc K9 et les prévisions de production seront intégrées dans la définition de la stratégie industrielle de SIFORCO.",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 32 ee Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC | SIF/ORCO + Juin 2012 5 PROGRAMME SOCIAL RATTACHE A LA GARANTIE D’APPROVISIONNEMENT SIFORCO est en train de prendre les dispositions pour s'installer sur la CF 40/11. Actuellement, aucune infrastructure n’a été construite.",
"La mise en place d’une base vie sur le site devra répondre à des mesures spécifiques qui porteront sur : Les conditions de vie des ayants droit SIFORCO à travers les points suivants : + la santé : mesures liées à la fourniture d’un suivi médical et de soins de santé primaire par une équipe professionnelle, dans des locaux équipés et adaptés : construction d’infrastructures de santé, approvisionnement en produits pharmaceutiques, mise à disposition de personnel médical,.… ; + __ l'éducation de base : mesures liées à la scolarisation, par des enseignants qualifiés dans des locaux adaptés, des enfants des travailleurs dans la base vie : construction d'infrastructures scolaires, mise à disposition de personnel enseignant, .… ; + la sécurité alimentaire : mesures liées à l’approvisionnement de la base vie et des campements temporaires en forêt en produits alimentaires permettant une nutrition saine, équilibrée et adaptée : Appui auprès de communautés locales pour l'organisation des filières et pour l’approvisionnement de la base-vie, sensibilisation des employés et de leurs ayants droit sur l'importance d’un régime alimentaire équilibré, .… ; +__ l’habitat et l'hygiène : mesures liées à la qualité de l’habitat, à l'hygiène, à la prévention sanitaire et à la sécurité dans la base vie: construction d'une base-vie en matériaux durables, aménagement de sources pour permettre l'accès à l’eau potable, Les conditions de travail des employés SIFORCO à travers les points suivants : + le plan d'embauche et de formation professionnelle : mesures liées à la formation et à la valorisation des parcours professionnels du personnel permanent SIFORCO : élaboration d'un plan d'embauche, mise en place de procédures d'évaluation des compétences professionnelles des travailleurs, élaboration d’un plan de formation, élaboration de procédures de travail et diffusion des fiches de postes,.… ; + __la sécurité et les conditions de travail : mesures de sécurité liées à l’activité professionnelle des salariés SIFORCO : Inscription des règles de sécurité dans les procédures de travail, fourniture des équipements de sécurité à l’ensemble des travailleurs, mise en place d’un système de suivi des accidents du travail, mise à niveau du parc automobile en matière de sécurité, .… ; + __le développement socioculturel : mesures liées au développement socioculturel et à l'accès à l'information des travailleurs, palliant au déficit socioculturel en raison de l'isolement relatif de la base vie: développement des activités socioculturel en fonction de la demande, fourniture d'équipement de base, organisation de rencontres avec les associations sportives villageoises environnantes, ….",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 33 SIF/ORCO |: Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 Conformément à l'Arrêté Ministériel__n°023/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/28/JEB/10 du 7 juin 2010, le concessionnaire a signé un accord avec les populations constituant la clause sociale de son cahier des charges. Cet accord entre la société et les populations locales permet de définir les conditions de la contribution du concessionnaire aux besoins de ces dernières en matière d’infrastructures sociales collectives (éducation, santé, alimentation en eau potable, routes d'accès.….). L'accord aboutit à une liste de réalisations sociales à effectuer pendant la durée du Plan de Gestion, financées grâce à une ristourne versée par la société au prorata des productions réalisées. Le montant de cette ristourne est versé sur un fonds de développement local propre au Groupement Batende. Il est indexé sur le volume exploité par la société, l'indexation étant variable selon les essences. L'Arr St n°023/10 stipule que la société doit alimenter le fonds de développement à hauteur de 2 à 5 dollars par m°.",
"Afin d’avoir d’une meilleure base pour les négociations avec les populations locales, une estimation des volumes annuels récoltés par essence a été faite (cf. 3.1.3). Les négociations avec le Groupement Batende (appelé également Tiene) du Secteur Mongama se sont déroulées à Yumbi et les accords ont été signés le 18 août 2011. La Clause Sociale est annexée au Cahier de Charges provisoire associé à ce Plan de Gestion (Annexe 6). Il est à noter que la clause sociale signée s'est basée sur une première estimation des volumes, préalable à la délimitation précise des Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe.",
"Les volumes employés dans la clause sociale pour évaluer la ristourne, de 48°036 m° pour les 4 AAC, sont légèrement supérieurs aux volumes évalués dans le présent Plan de Gestion, de 47 183 m. Les prévisions de récolte au sein du Groupement Batende (ou Tiene) et les ristournes à verser sur le Fonds de développement sont présentées dans le Tableau 11, sur la base des montants unitaires par essence négociés avec les populations du Groupement Batende. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 34 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: Tableau 11 : Montant total de la ristourne accordée au groupement Batende sur le bloc K3 (Surface utile de 17706 ha) Prix négocié dans Eu | Ge | on | eme | Mar (m* net) (SUSIm°) (SUS) Doussie 0,02 439 4 1758 Iroko 0,05 930 4 3719 Kosipo 0,05 957 4 3 827 Sapelli 0,24 4 269 4 17 078 Sipo 0,03 565 4 2258 Tiama 0,23 3 997 4 15 990 Wenge 1,42 25 202 5 126 008 Total Classe 1 2,05 36 359 - 170 637 Bilinga 0,15 2613 3 7 840 Bossé 0,02 271 3 814 Dibetou 0,07 1213 3 3 639 Longhi Blanc 0,06 1 006 3 3017 Padouk rouge 0,01 100 3 301 Tali 0,29 5 120 3 15 359 Tola 0,03 501 3 1 503 Total Classe 2 0,61 10 824 - 32 473 SARL 2,66 47183 - 203 110 Le budget annuel prévisionnel est de 50 778 $US disponible sur les fonds de développement, soit un montant total de 203 110 $US sur les 4 ans de mise en œuvre du Plan de Gestion.",
"Les tableaux en Annexe 7 présentent les réalisations négociées avec les populations riveraines. Les négociations de la clause sociale se sont basées sur une première évaluation faite sur la base de 4 AAC théoriques d'une surface utile 18 016 ha, donnant une ristourne estimée à 206 752 $US. La délimitation réelle des AAC est présentée dans ce document (cf. Carte 2), couvrant une surface utile de 17 706 ha.",
"Ceci explique la différence entre le tableau présenté ici et celui de l'Annexe 6. Cependant, cette somme sera réévaluée en fonction du volume réellement prélevé, de même que le calendrier effectif des réalisations. Conformément à l’Arrêté Ministériel 023/10, SIFORCO s'est engagé à verser à la signature de l'accord, une avance de 10% du coût total des travaux d'infrastructures socio-économiques, soit 15 775 $US sur le compte du fonds de développement destiné à CLG et CLS. Avec les recettes réelles du Fonds de Développement basées sur la production, SIFORCO financera les réalisations listées dans la clause sociale du cahier des charges.",
"Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 35 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 | SIF/ORCO | : Le chronogramme prévisionnel des réalisations n'ayant pu être arrêté au moment de la signature de la clause sociale, des négociations seront engagées rapidement afin de définir l’ordre de réalisation des infrastructures prévues sur la période de 4 ans. Le comité local de suivi a été élu lors de la négociation des accords constituant la clause sociale du cahier des charges. Il se réunira en session ordinaire tous les trois mois sur convocation de l’Administrateur de Territoire. Ces réunions auront comme but d'examiner l'avancement des travaux, l’état et la gestion du fonds de développement.",
"6 SYNTHESE GENERALE DU PLAN DE GESTION SUR 4 ANS 6.1 CHRONOGRAMME DE L'ENSEMBLE DES ACTIVITEES La planification prévisionnelle des activités sur la durée du présent Plan de Gestion est présentée par le chronogramme ci-dessous. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 36 PRE Concession Forestière n°40/11 SIF/ORCO Juin 2012 RDC Tableau 12 : Chronogramme prévisionnel des activités sur la durée du Plan de Gestion [Préparation au cahier des charges provisoire\" DE EE PE EE CET ms sausss sous | EE DS SE RS EE RE Préparation du plan d'aménagement (Dépétauprouente aimentre demarage __Joepusae mas | | | [Fran de sondage detente aménagement | | EE A EE ET ES [agree sono onomques | Era aménagemen ] | [Fraser es rapport cat préimares | | D Fréparton quan saménagement | | [se en œure au tan gAméragemens lise en exploitation forestière inventaires d'exploitation AAC1-AAC2 AAC2-AAC3 AAC1 BAQ1 Aménagement du camp des travailleurs Exploitation Opérations post-exploitation Mise en œuvre de la clause sociale du cahier des charges Infrastructures socio-économiques [ | Consultation avec les populations riveraines Négociation des clauses sociales sur les 5 premières années sous Aménagement LE Plan de Gestion Se ë couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 37 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: 6.2 PROGRAMME D'EXPLOITATION, INDUSTRIEL ET SOCIAL Le présent Plan de Gestion est un document de référence pour les 4 prochaines années dans la Concession Forestière n°40/11. L'exploitation forestière va avoir lieu sur la partie Ouest de la CF 40/11, sur une surface totale de 28 010 ha.",
"Sur la zone ainsi délimitée, 17 706 ha ont été identifiés comme surface utile. Le volume exploitable prévisionnel est de 47 183 m°, dont 25 202 m° de Wenge (cf. Tableau 9). SIFORCO a investi dans un outil industriel performant, permettant une amélioration des rendements matières et une meilleure valorisation des produits dans la chaîne de production. A court terme, l'outil de transformation de Maluku, avec une capacité d'entrée de 100 000 m/an, sera en mesure d'assurer la transformation de la ressource exploitée sur les massifs forestiers mis en exploitation (K3et K10). A moyen terme, avec l'ouverture du chantier sur K2 et K7, la société mettra en place un programme d'investissements, lequel permettra l'augmentation des capacités de production. En ce qui concerne le fonds de développement, un montant total de 203 110 $US est prévu pour la réalisation des œuvres sociales. Ceci correspond à un budget annuel prévisionnel de 50 778 $US. Les montant des investissements sociaux s'élève à 165 401 $ US.",
"Ce montant sera employé dans la construction de deux grandes écoles, à Ngo et à Ngania, un Centre de Santé à Ilebo Mangala et un pont sur la rivière Letoko. Le reste du fonds est destiné au coût d'entretien des infrastructures et au fonctionnement des différentes structures assurant le suivi du Fond de Développement. Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2011 - 2014) Page 38 ZRT Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: LISTE DES CARTES Carte 1 : Localisation de la Concession Forestière 40/11... 9 Carte 2 : Localisation des 4 premières AAC Carte 3 : Carte du réseau routier prévisionnel 2012-2015. LISTE DES TABLEAUX Tableau 1 : Concessions Forestières attribuées à SIFORCO.",
"Tableau 2 : Garanties d'Approvisionnement attribuées à SEDAF Tableau 3 : Organisation administrative et coutumière du territoire couvert par la CF 40/11 - Bolobo dans la Province de Bandundu (Bloc K3) Tableau 4 : Matériel d’exploitation prévu pour la mise en exploitation de la CF 40/11 Tableau 5: Résultats de la stratification préliminaire du Bloc K3 Tableau 6 : Superficies des 4 Assiettes Annuelles de Coupe Tableau 7 : Points remarquables permettant la délimitation des 4 AAC... Tableau 8 : Résultats des inventaires de sondage Tableau 9 : Estimation du volume récoltable sur la zone d’exploitation des 4 AAC (surface utile de 17 705 Tableau 11 : Montant total de la ristourne accordée au groupement Batende sur le bloc K3 (Surface utile de 17706 ha) .35 Tableau 12 : Chronogramme prévisionnel des activités sur la durée du Plan de Gestion LISTE DES FIGURES Figure 1 : Evolution de la production de grumes par SIFORCO de 1977 à 2011... 7 Figure 2 : Courbe de pluviométrie sur Bandundu nn 10 Figure 3 : Marquage des tiges d’avenir, des arbres patrimoniaux et des arbres de mauvaise qualité (source : FRM, Normes d’inventaire d’exploitation, juillet 2007) Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 39 Concession Forestière n°40/11 RDC Juin 2012 SIF/ORCO |: LISTE DES ANNEXES Annexe 1 : Convention portant octroi de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00 en matière ligneuse Annexe 2 : Arrêté ministériel notifiant la convertibilité de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement Annexe 3 : Contrat de la Concession Forestière n°040/11 Annexe 4 : Carte administrative des Territoires sur la CF 40/11 Annexe 5 : Carte de pré-stratification Annexe 6 : Accord signé en 2011 avec le Groupement Batende Annexe 7 : Budgets prévi jonnels des fonds de développement Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Page 40 Annexe 1 Convention portant octroi de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement 018/CAB/MIN/AFF/EDT/00 en matière ligneuse attribuée à SIFORCO Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGS MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES FONCIERES, ENVIRONNEMENT ET DEVELOPPEMENT TOURISTIQUE LE MINISTRE GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT ) CONVENTION N°0.48 CAB/MIN/AFF-EDT/00 DU û 3 NOV 2000 PORTANT OCTROI D'UNE GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT EN MATIERE LIGNEUSE ENTRE : LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Représentée par le Ministre des Affaires Foncières, Environnement et Développement Touristique, : Monsieur le Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA Ci-après dénommé le Ministre ET : SIFORCO Représentée par Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE Son Directeur-Gérant Ci-après dénommé l'Exploitant PRELIMINAIRE Vu le Décret-loi Constitutionnel n° 003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l'organisation et à l'exercice du pouvoir en République Démocratique du Congo tel que modifié et complété par ie Décret-toi Constitutionnel n° 074 du 25 mai 1998, le Décret-loi n° 122 du 21 septembre 1999 : Vu telle que modifiée à ce jour, l'Ordonnance n° 75-231 du 22 juillet 1975 fixant les attributions du Département de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme ; Revu l'Ordannace n° 77-022 du 22 février 1977 : Vu la loi foncière n° 73-024 du 20 juillet 1973 ; Vu l'Ordonnancé n° 79-244 du 16 octobre, spécialement en ses articles 3, 4 et 7 : - : Vu le Décret n° 113 du 1° septembre 2000 portant nomination des Membres du Gouvernement de Salut Publiez — l oo 2-2.",
"- Vu la responsabilité du Ministré des Affaires Foncières,-Environnement et Développement Touristique d'assurer la pérennité des ressources forestières, grâte à une Saine' gestion forestière, Utilisant toutes méthodes, directives et mesures dans l'utilisation des ressources disponibles ; Vu la nécessité de mettre en valeur les ressources forestières de l'État, pour soutenir une activité économique prospère par l'exploitation rationnelle, la transformation et.la-mise.en marche des LS produits exploités ; TT : u DT. : Vu la nécessité d'assurer à l'éxpioitant ün-approÿisionnement sûr et-continu en. matière . - Prèmièfe pour son usirie-de transformation Située-däns {a localité de MALUKU, -District : TSHANGE, ‘-: Commuñe : MALUKU, Province : KINSHASAr4 -tapäcité annuelle prévüe de 60.000 m3 de : . Produits finis, nécessitant un approvisionnementn grümes de 140.000 m3. - . Vu que l'Exploitant a répondu de façon satisfaisante aux critères et aux procédures de la décision n° 002/CCE/DECNT/84, ILA ETE ARRETE ET CONVENU CE QUI SUIT : Article 1%: Article 2 Aricle3 : La garantie d'approvisionnement porte sur un volume annuel de 36.000 m3 de grumes réparti comme suit : ESSENCES VOLUME (m3) Iroko 3.500 Tiama 2.300 Kosipo 2.200 Sapelli 6.500 Sipo 4.500 Wenge 7.000 Latandza 700 Bomanga 1.500 Bosse clair 3.500 Dibetou 1.000 Padouk 1.300 Tola 1.000 Tshitola 1.000 Total 36.000 :Ces bois seront prélevés dans une unité d'exploitation localisée comme suit : Province : BANDUNDU District: des plateaux Tenitoire : BOLOBO Localité : _ NKOLO Lieu : NGANIA Superficie : 160.000 ha Cette forêt ou portion de forêt est circonscrite dans les limites suivantes : Au Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village NKOLO au bord du fleuve Congo, Passant par les villages : NGENIA, KEMBEKE, NGANIA, LONIA jusqu'à EPOKWANKOSO “_- 7 _ ivière-LEBOMA, de ja rivière LEBOMA jusqu'à son croisement avec je : LOBINI, - A l'Est : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village EPOKWANKOSO AJusqu'au village LOBINI; suivre la rivière LOBINI jusqu'à son croisement .",
"avec la rivière LEKURU.- ee : | Article 4 : Article 5 : Article 6 : -3- ps A l'Ouest : par la rivière PANSOLA, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village NKOLO jusqu'à sa source, tracer une ligne droite jusqu'à la source de l'une des branches de la rivière LETOKO. Suivre ensuite la rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre la route jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière GAMPOKO en passant par les villages : EKANYKALE 1, MADYA et NDELE. Suivre enfin la rivière GAMPOKO jusqu'à la source, au village BUSINA. Les grumes ainsi récoltées devront être strictement utilisées pour leur transformation à l'usine décrite ci-dessus, ou dirigées à l'exportation suivant la réglementation en vigueur. . Aussi, aucune grume ne pourra être vendue à des tiers, à moins d'autorisation écrite du Ministère. Le Ministère accordera à l'Exploitant les droits suivants sur son unité d'exploitation : 5.1. Le droit exclusif de récolter les arbres exploitables explicitement identifiés à l'article premier 5.2.",
"Le droit de construire les infrastructures nécessaires exclusivement aux exploitations forestières, sans préjudice des droits connus aux tiers ; Les infrastructures routières construites par l'Exploitant sont propriétés de l'Etat à la fin du contrat. 5.8. Le droit de flottage de radeaux et de navigation privée sur les cours d'eau et les lacs, ainsi que le droit d'utiliser les routes publiques pour transporter, à titre privé, des produits forestiers exploités ainsi que les produits de transformation. En contre partie, l'Exploitant sera souris, de façon inconditionnelle, aux cbligations Suivantes : 6.1. Maintenir en opération son usine de transformation au niveau d'opération prévu dans.le contrat ; 6.2.",
"Assurer la protection forestière de l'unité d'exploitation ; 63. Présenter dans les détails prévus toutes demandes annuelles de permis de coupe, “tout rapport trimestriel et rapport après coupe, ou d'autres rapports prévus par la réglementation en vigueur ; - 6.4 Payer toutes les taxes et redevances forestières-prévues par la réglementation en = vigueur ; = 6.5. Informer le Ministère de tout changement d'adresse, de tout projet de transfert de location, d'échange: de donation, de fusion, de vente affectant la propriété:de - l'usine de transformation, objet du contrat et d'en Gbtenir la-ratifiation du Ministère ; igleméntation-sur l'exploitation la commercialisation et l'expdrtation : réstiers ; DU Le D TLC : ae -4- . 6.7. Aviser le Ministère de tout changement dans la destination des grumes exploitées k et en obtenir l'autorisation du Ministère ; j 6.8. Respecter toutes décisions prises par le Ministère en matière d'aménagement forestier ; 6.9. Procéder à la récolte minimale de 10 m3 de bois à l'hectare sur les superficies exploitables. Article 7 : La présente convention est effective à la date de sa signature jusqu'au mois d'Octobre .2025.",
"° : Article 8 : Le non respect dés clauses de la convention par l'exploitant entraînera la résiliation immédiate et automatique de la présente. Fait à Kinshasa, le Û 9 NOV 2000 SIGNATAIRES AUTORISES LE MINISTRE Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE = Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA= SIFORCO B.P. 8434 Kinshasa e Fait à six exemplaires 1. Exploitant 2. Cabinet du Ministre 8. Secrétaire Général à l'ECN 4. Direction de ta GFC 5. Gouvemeur de Province _ : 6. Coordinateur Provincial de l'ECN oo Annexe 2 Arrêté ministériel notifiant la convertibilité de la Garantie d’Approvisionnement 18/00 attribuée à SIFORCO Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Kinshasa, le ï Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme S ICAB/MINECN-TIS/JEB/2008 Le Ministre À Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général de la SIFGRCO à Kinshasa/Maluku Objet : Notification de la recommandation de la Commission Interministérielle de Conversion des Anciens Titres Forestiers Votre requête n°108 Monsieur l’Adrministrateur Directeur Général, À l'issue de ses travaux, La Commission interrninistérielle de conversion des anciens titres forestiers a constaté que votre Garantie d’Approvisionnement n°018/00 du 09/11/2006, située dans le Territoire de Bolobo, Province du Bandundu remplit les critères de convertibilité définis par le Décret n°05/116 du 24 octobre 2005 fixant les modalités de conversion des anciens titres forestiers en contrats de concession forestière et portant extension du moratoire en matière d'octroi des titres d'exploitation forestière tel que modifié et complété par le décret n°08/02 du 21 janvier 2008, Par conséquent, votre titre est jugé convertible en contrat de concession forestière. Vous êtes invité, à dater de la réception de la présente, à vous mettre en contact avec Le Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme pour les prochaines étapes.",
"Vuillez agréer, Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général, L’ expression ile ma considération distinguée. Averne Pape Îlec (Ex-des Ciriques) n°15 Kinshas@/Goinbe BP. 123487 E-mail: rde_minev@pehoo.fr Annexe 3 Contrat de la Concession Forestière n°040/11 du 24 octobre 2011 attribuée à SIFORCO Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme CONTRAT DE CONCESSION FORESTIERE N° ..{49.../11 du di. issu de la conversion de la Garantie d'approvisionnement N°018/CAB/MIN/AFF- EDT/00 du 09/11/2000 jugée convertible suivant la notification N°4844/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 du 06/10/2008 Le présent contrat de concession forestière est conclu entre : d'une part, Le Ministre de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme, agissant au nom de la République Démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommé « l'autorité concédante » ; et d'autre part, La société d'exploitation forestière SIFORCO, immatriculée au registre de commerce sous Le numéro Kinshasa 5016, représentée par Monsieur Dieter HAAG, Administrateur Directeur Général, ayant son siège au Quartier Mota Mbumbwa, Kinshasa/Maluku, en République Démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommée « Le concessionnaire »; Article 1°: L'objet du présent contrat est de définir les droits et obligations des parties. Il est complété par le cahier des charges ci-annexé.",
"Le cahier des charges comporte en annexe, un plan de gestion préparé par le concessionnaire et approuvé par l'administration et décrivant l'ensemble des investissements et des activités qui seront entreprises et réalisées par le concessionnaire pendant Les quatre premières années du contrat de concession. Le cahier des charges fait partie intégrante du présent contrat de concession, Article 2 : Le présent contrat porte sur une concession forestière d'une superficie de 194.641 hectares dont La situation géographique et les limites sont décrites ci-après : 1. Localisation administrative: 1. Secteur : Mongama 2. Territoires : Yumbi, Mushi et Inongo 3, District : Plateaux et Mayi Ndombe 4, Province : Bandundu, I. Délimitation physique : Au Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village NKOLO au bord du fleuve Congo, passant par les villages: NGENIA, KEMBEKE, NGANIA, LONIA jusqu'à EPOKWANKOSO ; Au Sud : par la route d'intérêt général en partant de La localité BUSINA jusqu'au village IKULUMAKA, suivre La rivière MAMBO jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière LEBOMA, de la rivière LEBOMA jusqu'à son croisement avec le sentier MALEBO, suivre Le sentier jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière LOBINI.",
"A l'Est : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village EPOKWANKOSO jusqu'au village LOBINI; suivre la rivière LOBINI jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière LEKURU ; A l'Ouest : par la rivière PANSOLA, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village NKOLO jusqu'à sa source, tracer une ligne droite jusqu'à La source de lune des branches de la rivière LETOKO. Suivre ensuite La rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre La route jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière GAMPOKO en passant par les villages EKANYKALE 1, MADYA et NDELE, Suivre enfin La rivière GAMPOKO jusqu'à (a source, au village BUSINA. La carte de La concession forestière est jointe en annexe au présent contrat. Article 3 : La durée du contrat de concession est de vingt-cinq ans renouvelables dans les conditions fixées à l'article 8 ci-dessous.",
"Article 4 : L'Etat garantit au concessionnaire la jouissance pleine et entière des droits qui lui sont conférés par la loi et Le présent contrat de concession. Pendant toute La durée du contrat, le concessionnaire ne peut être privé en tout ou partie de son droit d'exploiter sa concession, sauf en cas de non respect de ses obligations légales, réglementaires ou contractuelles, où pour cause d'utilité publique, et dans dernier cas moyennant une juste et préalable indemnité, conformément au dr commun, s. Article 5 : Sous réserve des dispositions de l'article 13 du présent contrat, Le concessionnaire a un droit exclusif d'exploitation du bois d'œuvre se trouvant dans les limites de sa concession, Article 6: Le concessionnaire est tenu de respecter les droits d'usage traditionnels des communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains de La concession tels que définis aux articles 36, 37 et 44 du code forestier.",
"IL lui est interdit de créer toute entrave à l'exercice par les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains des droits d'usage forestiers ainsi reconnus. Article 7: Le concessionnaire bénéficie d’une servitude de passage sur les fonds riverains, destinée à favoriser l'accès à sa concession et l'évacuation de sa production. Il exerce cette servitude uniquement dans les limites de ce qui est strictement nécessaire à son droit de passage. Le tracé de toute route ou de toute voie d'accès ou d'évacuation à partir du territoire de La concession doit être soumis à une consultation avec les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains durant la préparation du plan d'aménagement. En cas de différend sur le tracé des voies d'accès ou d'évacuation à La concession, le concessionnaire fera appel aux mécanismes de règlement des différends définis aux articles 103 et 104 du code forestier. Article 8: A l'expiration du contrat de concession, le concessionnaire peut demander le renouvellement de son contrat dans les conditions déterminées par les règlements en vigueur et à condition que les obligations découlant du présent contrat et du cahier des charges aient été exécutées.",
"A cette occasion, le concessionnaire fournit les preuves de mise à jour de son plan d'aménagement et du cahier des charges sur la période de renouvellement. Le renouvellement du contrat est cependant refusé par l'autorité concédante en cas de violation de l’une des quelconques dispositions du présent contrat et ahier des charges et notamment dans l'un des cas ci-après: . Le non payement de la redevance de superficie et/ou de toutes autres taxes et redevances forestières échues applicables à l'exploitation de la concession; 2. l'exploitation forestière illégale dûment constatée; 3. le commerce illégal des produits fores- tiers dûment constaté conformément aux lois en vigueur; 4. la violation des obligations sociales et environnementales et de celles relatives aux engagements d'investissements industriels imposées par le présent contrat en vertu des dispositions légales et règlementaires en vigueur; 5. la corruption, Le dol ou la violence ou leur tentative dûment constatés. Article 9: Conformément aux dispositions de l'article 115 du code forestier, le concessionnaire est tenu de s'installer sur la superficie concédée et d'y exécuter ses droits et obligations tels qu'ils découlent du présent contrat, du cahier des charges et du plan de gestion visé à l'article 10 ci-dessous.",
"En particulier, il doit: LE à 3. matérialiser Les limites de la concession et de l'assiette annuelle de coupe ; respecter les règles relatives à l'exploitation du bois, notamment les limites des assiettes annuelles de coupe et Le diamètre minimum par essence; mettre en œuvre les mesures environnementales et de protection de la biodiversité inscrites au présent contrat, y compris les mesures convenues dans le plan de relance dans le cas d'une conversion ou dans la proposition technique dans le cas de l'adjudication selon les termes du cahier des charges; réaliser Les infrastructures socio-économiques et des services sociaux au profit des communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains contenues dans Le plan de relance dans le cadre d'une conversion ou dans la proposition technique dans le cas d’une adjudication et définies dans le cahier des charges; réaliser Les investissements, y compris l'acquisition des équipements prévus, la remise en état ou la modernisation de l'outil de transformation, ainsi que le recrutement du personnel nécessaire et autres activités prévues dans La proposition du plan de relance, dans le cas d'une concession où dans La proposition technique dans Le cas d’une adjudication, et écrits dans le cahier des charges; payer la redevance de superficie forestière et toutes autres taxes et redevances en vigueur liées à l'exploitation de la concession, dans les dél prescrits par La réglementation fiscale. Article 10: Le concessionnaire s'engage à préparer et à soumettre pour approbation à l'administration chargée des forêts, dans une période maximum de quatre ans, le plan d'aménagement conformément à la législation et à la réglementation en vigueur.",
"Ce plan doit comprendre l'ensemble des obligations du concessionnaire en vue d'assurer une gestion durable de la forêt concédée. Approuvé par l'administration, il devient partie intégrante du présent contrat. Dans l'intervalle qui sépare La signature du présent contrat de l'approbation du plan, le concessionnaire exploite La forêt concédée en conformité avec un plan de gestion. Le plan de gestion doit être soumis par le concessionnaire à l'administration chargée des forêts et approuvé en même temps que le contrat de concession. Ce plan de gestion constitue l'ensemble des engagements du concessionnaire pour l'exploitation de la forêt concédée avant l'approbation du plan d'aménagement.",
"Ces engagements découlent des propositions formulées dans Le plan de relance en cas, de conversion ou dans les propositions techniques en cas d’adjudication. Le plan de gestion indique: 1. les quatre premières assiettes annuelles de coupe ; 2. le calendrier et Les modalités de consultation avec les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones sur le contenu et les modalités de réalisation du plan socio-économique y compris les infrastructures en leur faveur pour la durée de la concession ; 3. la description des activités de protection de l'environnement et de La conservation de la biodiversité et notamment les mesures de réduction, d'atténuation et de compensation de tout impact négatif des activités du concessionnaire sur l'environnement ; 4, la mise en place pendant les quatre premières années d'exploitation, des investissements industriels souscrits.",
"Les termes et engagements du plan de gestion seront incorporés dans le cahier des charges annexé au présent contrat. Si, à l'expiration de La période de quatre ans, Les circonstances ne permettent pas au concessionnaire de présenter Le plan d'aménagement, il peut sur une demande motivée, obtenir de l'administration chargée des forêts, une prolongation de délai, lequel ne peut excéder une année. La préparation du plan de gestion et du plan d'aménagement de la concession ne lieu à une diffusion de toute documentation appropriée auprès des communautés locales et/ou des peuples autochtones riverains et à une consultation régulière avec eux sur les questions intéressant La concession et Leurs droits. L'administration peut assister aux séances de consultations. Article 11: Le concessionnaire est tenu de respecter La législation en vigueur en matière de protection de l'environnement et de conservation de la diversité biologique. IL contribue, en particulier sur toute l'étendue de sa concession, à La lutte contre les feux de brousse, le braconnage et l'exploitation illégale du bois.",
"IL s'assure que les activités de La concession ne provoquent ni ne favorisent des actes de braconnage ou de dégradation de l'environnement. A cette fin, le concessionnaire définit et met en œuvre sur le territoire de la concession des mesures appropriées de contrôle pour : 1. interdire le transport des armes à feu et des armes de chasse dans les véhicules de l'entreprise; 2. fermer Les routes et chemins d'accès aux aires d'exploitation; 3. interdire l'accès des véhicules étrangers, sauf sur les voies d'intérêt public; 4. interdire les activités de braconnage notamment pour les employés et leurs familles, en mettant à leur disposition à prix coûtants, des aliments alternatifs aux gibiers; 5. mettre en œuvre des mesures de sauvegarde environnementales adéquates telles qu’elles découlent du plan de relance dans le cas d'une conversion ou des propositions techniques dans le cas d'une adjudication; 6. minimiser, réduire ou compenser tant à l'intérieur de la concession que dans ses environs immédiats, tout impact négatif sur l'environnement, des travaux de réalisation d'infrastructures.",
"Article 12: Le concessionnaire est tenu de respecter la mise en réserve de certaines essences et toutes restrictions édictées par l'administration chargée des forêts dans le but de protéger la diversité biologique. Cette mise en réserve se fait sur base de l'inventaire des ressources forestières ou en cours d'exploitation. La liste des essences forestières dont l'exploitation est interdite est reprise dans les clauses particulières du cahier des charges en annexe. Article 13: Le concessionnaire est tenu de matérialiser physiquement les limites de la concession, des blocs quinquennaux et des assiettes annuelles de coupe formément à la réglementation en vigueur, Aucune exploitation ne peut êt, ntamée avant la matérialisation des limites de l'assiette annuelle de cou; Article 14: Pendant la période précédent l'approbation du plan d'aménagement, le concessionnaire exploite une seule assiette annuelle de coupe qui 1/25° ne saurait être supérieure de la superficie totale concédée.",
"La coupe annuelle ainsi autorisée est définitivement clôturée Le 31 décembre de l'année à laquelle elle s'applique, Le concessionnaire est autorisé à y prélever toutes les essences forestières et de diamètres autorisés par l'arrêté relatif à l'exploitation forestière et Le plan d'aménagement. Les diamètres minimaux de coupe prévus par le plan d'aménagement doivent tenir compte de la nécessité de maintenir suffisamment d'arbres semenciers pour La régénération de chaque essence. En outre, dès qu’il y a un risque d'altération importante de la couverture végétale ou d'altération du sol, le plan d'aménagement indique toutes essences confondues, un nombre maximum de pieds exploitables par assiette annuelle de coupe. Article 15: Le diamètre minimum d'aménagement est fixé sur base de l'inventaire et des calculs de régénération par essence et par concession en tenant compte des besoins de régénération de chaque essence, Le diamètre minimum d'aménagement est Le diamètre à partir duquel Le plan d'aménagement prévoit Le prélèvement des essences forestières définies dans le cycle de coupe où rotation, En aucun cas, le diamètre minimum d'aménagement ne peut être inférieur au diamètre minimum d'exploitation. Le diamètre minimum d'exploitation est le diamètre au-dessous du- quel l'exploitation d'une essence forestière est interdite.",
"Pendant la période qui précède l'approbation du plan d'aménagement, le concessionnaire applique le diamètre minimum fixé par l'administration centrale chargée des forêts. Article 16: Le concessionnaire est tenu de procéder au marquage des bois qu'il coupe conformément à la réglementation en matière d'exploitation forestière, Article 17: Le concessionnaire s'engage à réaliser des infrastructures socio-économiques et à fournir des services sociaux au profit des communautés locales et/ou peuples utochtones tels qu'ils sont définis dans le cahier des charges. Pendant la période de préparation du plan d'aménagement, le concessionnaire consulte les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains sur Le plan socio-économique et les infrastructures qui feront l'objet du cahier des charges définitif qui sera annexé au plan d'aménagement.",
"Celui-ci couvrira les cinq années qui suivent l'approbation du plan d'aménagement et sera actualisé tous Les cinq ans. Nonobstant l'alinéa 2 ci-dessus, le concessionnaire s'engage à mettre en œuvre, dans le cadre des consultations avec les communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains, un plan socio-économique, y compris les infrastructures socio-économiques et services sociaux, pour La période du plan d'aménagement. Article 18 : Le concessionnaire n’est pas concerné par l'exécution des dispositions de l'article 82 du code forestier relatives à La garantie bancaire.",
"Article 19: Le concessionnaire est tenu au paiement régulier et dans Les délais légaux des taxes et redevances forestières en vigueur et ne peut bénéficier d'aucune exonération. Article 20: Le concessionnaire souscrit une police d'assurance contre les conséquences pécuniaires de la responsabilité civile pouvant lui incomber du fait de l'exploitation de sa concession, notamment contre les risques de vol et d'incendie des installations concédées. A défaut d'être couverts par une clause expresse de la police d'assurance étendant le bénéfice aux sous-traitants de la forêt concédée, ceux-ci doivent justifier d'une assurance particulière. Article 21: Le concessionnaire peut, après en avoir informé par écrit l'autorité oncédante, sous traiter tout ou partie de certains travaux, notamment: 1. l'élaboration du plan d'aménagement de la concession ; 2. la récolte du bois ; 3. la construction et l'entretien du réseau d'évacuation des produits (| forestiers ainsi que des parcs à grumes ; : \\ k 8 \\ 4. la construction et l'entretien des infrastructures socio-économiques au profit des communautés locales ; 5. le transport des produits forestiers; 6. toute autre activité relative à l'exploitation forestière.",
"Toutefois, le concessionnaire demeure responsable tant envers l'autorité concédante en ce qui concerne le respect des obligations légales, réglementaires ou contractuelles qu'à l'égard des tiers pour ce qui concerne les dom- mages éventuels, Article 22: Le concessionnaire a la faculté de renoncer au bénéfice de la concession avant l'expiration du contrat de concession forestière. Nonobstant la renonciation, le concessionnaire reste débiteur du paiement intégral des taxes et redevances forestières échues. Article 23: En cas de non respect par le concessionnaire de l’une des quelconques clauses du présent contrat et/ou du cahier des charges et après une mise en demeure assortie d'un délai ne dépassant pas trois mois, l'autorité concédante prescrit toutes mesures conservatoires destinées à assurer le respect des dispositions du présent contrat et du cahier des charges. Le contrat est résilié notamment dans l'un des cas ci-après: 1. le non payement des taxes et redevances liées à l'exploitation de la concession, après expiration des délais légaux de mise en demeure 2. le défaut d'élaboration et d'approbation du plan d'aménagement de la concession dans les délais légaux conformément à l'article 10 ci- dessus; l'exploitation du bois d'œuvre en dehors du périmètre autorisé; 4. la commission de tout acte ou tentative d'acte de corruption, de dol ou de violence dûment constaté; 5. La violation répétée, après mise en demeure conformément au point 1, d'obligations sociales et environnementales découlant du présent contrat et du cahier des charges.",
"ww L'état de cessation de paiement du concessionnaire constitue une cause de déchéance et entraîne la résiliation du présent contrat, Article 24: Les infractions mentionnées à l'alinéa 2 de l'article 23 ci-dessus, sont constatées par Les inspecteurs forestiers, les fonctionnaires assermentés et les ütres officiers de police judiciaire dans leur ressort respectif conformément ux dispositions des articles 127 et suivants du Code forestier. L'alinéa ci-dessus, s'applique aussi à la violation des obligations du présent contrat et du cahier des charges. Article 25: L'autorité concédante constate la déchéance et procède à La résiliation du contrat de concession par voie d'arrêté. Elle notifie cet arrêté au concessionnaire par lettre recommandée ou au porteur avec accusé de réception.",
"L'arrêté est publié au journal officiel et une copie est transmise aux cadastres forestiers national et provincial concerne. Article 26: En cas de résiliation du contrat de concession ou de déchéance, le concessionnaire dispose des recours légaux devant les juridictions compétentes. Article 27: Nonobstant les dispositions de l'article 8 ci-dessus, Le présent contrat prend fin le 23/10/2036. Le concessionnaire peut solliciter le renouvellement du contrat un an avant la date de son expiration.",
"La décision de refus de renouvellement peut faire l'objet de recours devant les juridictions compétentes. Article 28: A La fin de la concession, Le concessionnaire établit Les inventaires et procède aux opérations de liquidation conformément à La législation en vigueur. Article 29: A la fin de la concession, un bilan de clôture des comptes est dressé par le concessionnaire dans un délai maximum de six mois à compter de la date d'expiration du présent contrat de concession, Le concessionnaire recouvre les créances dues, règle Les dettes, dresse le solde de ces opérations et clôture tous les comptes financiers. Article 30: Tout différend relatif à l'interprétation ou l'exécution du présent contrat de concession et du cahier des charges sera réglé à l'amiable. En cas d'échec, le Litige sera soumis aux juridictions compétentes à moins que $ parties conviennent de recourir à l'arbitrage prévu par les articles 159 à 74 du Code de procédure civile. 10 Article 31: Le présent contrat ainsi que le cahier des charges sont publiés au Journal Officiel, déposés au Cadastre Forestier National, notifiés aux autorités provinciales et locales du ressort, et rendus publics par tout moyen approprié dans les localités riveraines de la concession.",
"Les frais de publication au Journal Officiel du présent contrat, y compris Le cahier des charges, sont à charge du concessionnaire, Article 32: Le présent contrat de concession forestière entre en vigueur pour le concessionnaire, à la date de sa signature. Fait à Kinshasa en double exemplaire, Le 191 Lil IÙ Pour le congéssionnaire Pour la République José E.B. ENDUNDO Admihfistrateur Directeur Ministre de l'Environn Général Conservation de La Natur Tourisme AVENANT N° 01 AU CONTRAT DE CONCESSION FORESTIERE N° 040/11 DU 24 OCTOBRE 2011 Le présent Avenant n°1 est conclu entre : d'une part, Le Ministre de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme, agissant au nom de la République démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommée + l'autorité concédante » ; Et d'autre part, La société d'exploitation forestière SIFORCO, immatriculée au registre de commerce sous le numéro 5016-Kinshasa, représentée par Monsieur Dieter HAAG, Administrateur Directeur Général, ayant son siège au Quartier Mota Mbumbwa, Kinshasa/Maluku, en République Démocratique du Congo, ci-après dénommée « le concessionnaire » ; Article 1°: L'alinéa 2 de l'article 7 du contrat n°040 du 24/10/ 2011 est modifié comme suit : - Le tracé de toute route ou de toute voie d'accès ou d'évacuation en dehors du » « territoire de la concession doit être soumis à une consultation avec les - - communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains durant La préparation » « du plan d'aménagement ».",
"Article 2 : L'alinéa 2 de l’article 14 du contrat n°040 susmentionné est supprimé et remplacé par Les dispositions ci-après : « Une assiette de coupe n'est ouverte à l'exploitation qu’une seule fois pendant + «la durée de la rotation, L'exploitation peut cependant se poursuivre pour le » « compte de l'année qui suit immédiatement. Le concessionnaire est autorisé à y » « prélever toutes Les essences forestières et de diamètres autorisés par l'arrêté » relatif à l'exploitation forestière et du plan d'aménagement ». « Dans tous les cas, une assiette annuelle de coupe est définitivement fermi - deux ans après sa date d'ouverture ». Article 3 : ILest inséré un article 19bis au contrat n°040 susmentionné libellé comme suit : + Eu égard au régime transitoire applicable à La présente concession issue de la » « conversion d'un ancien titre forestier en vertu des articles 155 de La loi « n°011/2002 du 29 août 2002 portant code forestier, 15 alinéa 1 et 19 alinéa 1 du » « décret n°05/116 du 24 octobre 2005 fixant les modalités de conversion des » « anciens titres forestiers et 1 de l'arrêté interministériel n° 010 du 17 mars 2004 » « portant mesures économiques pour le développement de La ‘filière bois’ et de la » - gestion durable des forêts, ainsi qu'à l'obligation faite au concessionnaire » « d'élaborer un plan d'aménagement, le taux de la redevance de superficie » « payable » pendant la durée du présent contrat reste celui fixé par l’article 1 de » « l'arrêté interministériel n° 10 susmentionné ».",
"Fajt à Kinshasa en double exemplaire, Le 13/12/2011 Pour le concgssionn, Pour la République G José E.B. ENDUNDO ecteur Général Ministre de l'Environnemen Conservation de la N Adminigtrateur et Annexe 4 Carte administrative des Territoires sur la CF 40/11 Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) LEO YUMEN République Démocratique du Congo Carte administrative du bloc K3 de SIFORCO 170€ FORET : RESSOURCES MANAGEMENT ° Village Territoire — Réseau routier Er Inongo E_] CF 40/11 - Bolobo = Mushie | Yumbi Fond de carte : image ortho rectifiée Landsat 7 ETM+ du 08 fevrier 2003 (P181R62), image ortho rectifiée Landsat 7 ETM+ du 18 fevrier 2001 (P181R61) Système de coordonnées : Universal Transverse Mercator, datum WGS84, zone 34 Nord.",
"Limites administratives indicatives, leur tracé n'a pas de valeur juridique FRM, juin 2012 Annexe 5 Carte de pré-stratification de la GA 18/00 Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Ztpublique Démocratique di Congo EE roRET Bloc Bolobo K3 - Garantie d'Approvisionnement 018/00 « r RESSOURCES : MA) Stratification pour la détermination des surfaces forestières utiles | 1 imite de la Garantie d'Approvisionnement Types d'occupation du sol C1 forêt utile M zone marécageuse MM savane zone anthropisée Réseau hydrographi permanent temporaire Sounces :Iages Landeut 7 ETM+ 181-61 du 18,02/200 1 «t 181.62 du 08/02/2003 FR SIFORCO, Ms 2009 Annexe 6 Protocole d'accord signé en 2011 avec le Groupement Batende sur le secteur de Mongana et Procès-Verbaux des réunions de 2011 Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme siÿorco| Société Industrielle et Forestière du Congo CLAUSE SOCIALE SSA BOLOBO MUSHIE GA 018/00 (Bloc K3) Groupement Batende ANNEXES DU PLAN DE GESTION Juillet 2001 COUVRANT LA PERIODE DE PREPARATION DU PLAN D'AMENAGEMENT (4 ans) POUR LA SSA Bolobo-Mushie Page 1 T Entité administrative et coutumière Soctere INDUSTRIELLE SIF/ORCO | MR... ACCORD CONSTITUANT LA CLAUSE SOCIALE DU CAHIER DES CHARGES DU CONTRAT DE CONCESSION.",
"FORESTIERE Entre : 1. La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) etou le peuple autochtone, TIENE dont la(les) liste(s) des composantes est (sont) reprise(s) en Annexe 1 ; Situé(e)(s) dans : Le Groupement BATENDE le Secteur de MONGAMA. le Territoire de YUMBE... le District de PLATEAUX la Province de BANDUNDU. en République Démocratique du Congo, représenté(e)(s) par : Mr(s) / Mme(s) / Mlle(s) - MBIÈME NDELA, CHEF DE GROUPEMENT - MBENGE OKUSA, CHEF DE TERRE NGO - NKAMA LUC, CHEF DE TERRE KITABA... n - NKUMINGO FRANCOIS, CHEF DE TERRE MADIA........................,........, - BOKOTE MABANKOLE, CHEF DE TERRE KIBILI..........................., - MWANIA LIBATA MUFULU, CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA II. - LEBATA MBAKA HENOC, CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA |. - NKELE NGWE, CHEF DE TERRE KINGWE - LOKWA SEKIWA, SECRETAIRE CLS - BOMPETI ALPHONSE, PRESIDENT CLG MOWENL ESEKX et ci-après dénommé(e)(s) «la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) » et/ou «le peuple . autochtone », d'une part ; Et 2. la Société d'Exploitation Forestière SIFORCO (Société Forestière Industrielle du “,- Congo) immatriculé(e) au registre de commerce sous le numéro Kinshasa 5016, ayant son siège à Maluku BP 8434 KIN 1, quartier Mota Mbumbwa, commune de Maluku, ville /; ; de Kinshasa, en République Démocratique du Congo et représenté(e) par Mr Dietel HAAG Administrateur Directeur Générale de la Siforco \\ .",
"\\ D et ci-après dénommé(e) « le concessionnaire forestier », d'autre part ; L Etant préalablement entendu que : K \"la Société d'exploitation forestière est titulaire du titre forestier N°018/00 du 09/11/2000 jugé convertible en 7] rat de concession forestière, comme notifié par lettre & ü Sociere INbusrateuLe Entité administrative et coutumière SIF/ORCO | SR is N°4844/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/15/JEB/2008 du 06 Octobre 2008 (Annexe 2) et couvrant une superficie de 160 000 hectares ; \" la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone est (sont) riverain(e)(s) de la concession forestière concernée ; “ Les forêts concédées sont situées à GROUPEMENT BATENDE et ont comme limites issues de la GA : Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village Nkolo au bord du fleuve Congo, passant par les villages : Ngenia, Kembeke, Ngania, Lonia jusqu'à Epokwankoso ; Sud: par la route d'intérêt général en partant de la localité Busina jusqu'au village Ikulumaka, suivre la rivière Leboma jusqu'à son croisement avec le sentier Malebo, suivre le chantier jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière Lobini. A PEst : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village Epokwankoso jusqu'au village Lobini jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière Lekuru.",
"A l'Ouest : par la rivière Pansola, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village Nkolo jusqu'à la source de l’une des branches de la rivière Letoko. Suivre ensuite la rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre la route jusqu'à la rivière Gampoko en passant par les villages Ekanykale 1, Madya et Ndele. Suivre enfin la rivière Gampoko jusqu’ à la source ay village Busine. \"",
"La susdite forêt fait partie de celles sur lesquelles la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone jouissent de droits coutumiers ainsi qu’en atteste la carte en Annexe 3 établie à la suite d'un zonage participatif ; “ _les limites de la partie de la concession forestière concernée par le présent contrat (cf. article 2 ci-dessous) ont été fixées de commun accord entre parties, particulièrement par rapport au(x) terroir(s) de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et sont consignées dans le plan de gestion, et dans le plan d'aménagement de la concession au moment de son approbation ; * Mr_ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA, Administrateur de Territoire, assiste à la signature du présent accord en qualité de témoin et garant de la bonne application du présent contrat. né. IL EST CONVENU CE QUI SUIT : f Chapitre 1°’ : Des dispositions générales b < fl # Article 1°: Le présent accord constitue la clause sociale du cahier des charges du contrat concession forestière.",
"Ÿ V4 Il a pour objet principal, conformément à l'article 13 de l'annexe 2 de l'arrêté n° à 28/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 du 7 août 2008 fixant les modèles de contrat de concession d'exploitation des produits forestiers et de cahier des charges y afférent, d'organiser la mise \\ en œuvre des engagements du concessionnaire forestier relatifs à la réalisation des | P* ‘ Entité administrative et coutumière SocIETE INDUSTRIELLE StF/ORCO | rene infrastructures socio-économiques et services sociaux au profit de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone.",
"I! vise aussi à régler les rapports entre les parties en ce qui concerne la gestion de la concession forestière. Article 2 : Pendant la période de préparation du plan d'aménagement, cet accord fait partie du plan de gestion, annexé au cahier des charges, qui décrit l'ensemble des investissements et des activités qui sont entreprises et réalisées par le concessionnaire pendant les quatre premières années du contrat de concession, et se rapporte aux quatre premières assiettes annuelles de coupe, conformément à l’article 1 de l’annexe1 de l'arrêté n° 28/CAB/MIN/ECN- T/27/JEB/08 précité. Lorsque le plan d'aménagement, annexé de son cahier des charges, est approuvé, cet accord couvre alors une période de cinq années, comme l'indique l’article 17 de l'annexe 1 de l'arrêté n°28/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/27/JEB/08 précité, et se rapporte à un nouveau bloc de cinq assiettes annuelles de coupes. Article 3 : Les parties peuvent de commun accord et moyennant un avenant, modifier une quelconque clause du présent accord.",
"Chapitre 2 : Obligations des parties Section 1ère : Obligations du concessionnaire forestier Article 4 : Les obligations spécifiques légales, telles que prescrites par l’article 89, Alinéa 3, point c, du Code forestier, incombant au concessionnaire forestier en matière d'infrastructures économiques et des services sociaux portent spécialement sur la construction, l'aménagement des routes ; la réfection, l'équipement des installations hospitalières et scolaires ; les faciliter en matière de transport des personnes et des biens. La liste des infrastructures et des services sociaux financés par le Fonds de Développement résulte de différentes réunions de concertation entre les deux parties (Annexe 4). Dans ce cadre, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à financier à travers le Fonds de Développement (cf. article 11), au profit de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone, la réalisation des infrastructures socio-économiques financées par le fond de développement : - Construction, aménagement des routes : L'estimation des couts de réfection/construction des routes et le type d’engins(} LA affectés à ces travaux, sont détaillés en Annexe 5 de la clause sociale.",
"Le cout de construction d'une route non latéritée est calculé à 10 000 USD par Km Entité administrative et coutumière SocreTE INDUSTRIELLE SrF/ORCO | fier La carte provisoire en Annexe 8 intitulée « Surface forestière des entités administratives et coutumières du secteur .............................. » reprend le tronçon de route décidé ci-dessus. Le coût estimatif des travaux : Nombre de km * coût du km - Construction ou Réfection des routes, équipement des installations hospitalières et scolaires : Localisation Type de! Surface Cout Nombre Cout total prévue bâtiment au sol unitaire (en USD) (USD) Ecole 180 m? 50 958 Ecole 200 m° 53 917 NGO et NGANIA | Ecole 250 m° 60 000 2!",
"120.000 US Poste de santé | 100 m° 18 875 ILEBO MANGALA | Centre de santé | 200 m? 37 750 1 37.750 US Il est à noter que les couts estimés et présentés ici peuvent être soumis à un ajustement. (augmentation des prix des matériaux sur le marché national ou international). - Autres : Matériels (de construction, agricole, par la couture, capture d’eau le CONSTRUCTION D'UN PONT SUR LA RIVIERE LETOKO POUR UN MONTANT DE 7.651 SUS. Pour les groupements dont l'exploitation n'a pas encore commencée, l'avance 10% peut permettre de financer le matériel souhaité ci-dessus. - Facilités en matière de transport des personnes et des biens : © Socrere INousrRreuLe Entité administrative et coutumière Fo RI SIF/ORCO | Free Article 5 : Comme indiqué à l'article 3 de l'annexe 2 de l'arrêté n° 28/CAB/MIN/ECN- T/27/JEB/08 précité, sont apportées en annexes ci-jointes des informations plus détaillées se rapportant aux engagements prévus à l’article 4 du présent accord et concernant : 1) les plans et spécifications des infrastructures (plans des infrastructures en Annexe 6); 2) leur localisation et la désignation des bénéficiaires (Carte en Annexe 8); 3) les coûts estimatifs s’y rapportant (Devis en Annexe 5 et Annexe 6); 4) le chronogramme prévisionnel de réalisation des infrastructures et de fourniture des services sera annexé à la suite des négociations ; Les spécifications des réalisations prévues ont été fixées de commun accord entre les représentants de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et les représentants de l’entreprise d'exploitation forestière.",
"Concernant le choix du Maitre d'ouvrage des travaux, la désignation se fera après une analyse technique, financière et de faisabilité, des offres, par toutes les parties et par décision consensuelle. En ce qui concerne les travaux de construction et d'aménagement des routes et pistes, il est noté de manière indicative pour chaque tronçon concerné : - le plan du tracé et le kilométrage qui lui correspond (voir en Annexe 8); - la nature des travaux routiers à réaliser (ouverture, réhabilitation, etc.) ; - les ouvrages d'art à installer (ponts, radiers,.….)",
"; - les engins et le matériel à mobiliser pour la réalisation (bulldozer, chargeuse, niveleuse, camion benne, etc.) ; - les temps d'utilisation à prévoir pour chaque engin et matériel ; - les coûts d'utilisation correspondants par unité de temps. Il est à noter, que les réalisations débuteront lors du démarrage l'exploitation et suivront le rythme de la production. Article 6 : Les coûts d'entretien et de maintenance des infrastructures sont à considérer spécialement dans la mesure où ils vont devoir s'appliquer bien au-delà de la période s d'exploitation des 4 ou 5 assiettes annuelles de coupe sur lesquelles sont prélevées les assurée par le Fonds de Développement (cf.",
"article 11), selon le mécanisme suivant : - affectation, chaque année et quelle que soit la zone exploitée, de 10% du total d ristournes de manière à mutualiser les coûts récurrents se rapportant aux infrastructures déjà réalisées sur l'ensemble de la concession; un rogramme prévisionnel chiffré d'entretien et de maintenance, sur les 4 ou 5 années à venir, des Æ infrastructures socio-économiques déjà réalisées au bénéfice de l'ensemble des Ke RC4 > ressources forestières et calculées les ristournes, destinées à financer la réalisation des 7 infrastructures socio-économiques au bénéfice de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du … peuple autochtone ayant(s) droit. a) La prise en charge de ces coûts d'entretien et de maintenance des infrastructures est Socrere InpusrrreuLe SIF/ORCO | Sn Entité administrative et coutumière communautés locales et/ou peuples autochtones riverains ayants droit sur la Concession forestière sera établi avec le comité local de gestion. Sont donnés ci-après à titre i réalisées : ndicatif des coûts d'entretien des infrastructures -_ Couts d'entretien des routes par embauche d'un ou plusieurs cantonniers pour les travaux d'entretien avec l'achat di de 500 USD par Km et par an; o Couts d'entretien mécanisé des fois par an; o Couts d'entretien d'un bâtiment bâtiment/an. Cependant le choix des mécanismes comité local de Gestion.",
"Si les frais d'entretien dépassent la p financera pas les frais Supplémentaires. Article 7 : e matériel (belles, brouettes, machettes…) = budget routes = 1500 USD par km avec une rotation de 2 estimé sur la base d'un forfait de 2000 USD par d’entretien et les décisions sont à la charge du rovision réalisée pendant l'exploitation, Siforco ne Certains coûts de fonctionnement des _ installations hospitalières et scolaires, notamment les rémunérations des e ressort de l'Etat.",
"nseignants et des personnels de santé, sont du Si des retards venaient à être constatés dans le déploiement des personnels administratifs, le Comité de Gestion Local, prévu à l’article 12 ci-dessous, peut, de manière personnes aptes à remplir ces fonctions. Article 8 : Concernant les frais de fonction: ement autres que les rémunérations des personnels d'éducation et de santé, c'est-à-dire les fournitures scolaires, les produits pharmaceutiques, etc. le concessionnaire apporte sa contribution en finançant gratuitement le transport depuis Kinshasa ou une autre ville plus proche. Article 9 : d'œuvre de son entreprise au sein de À compétences égales, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à recruter la main la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et si présence de poste(s) vacant(s). Article 10 : « Conformément à l’article 44 du code forestier, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à \"respecter l'exercice, par la(les) Communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone des 1 droits d'usage traditionnels lui reconnus par la loi notamment : - le prélèvement de bois de chauffe (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) ; - la récolte des fruits Sauvage et chenilles (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) ; - la récolte des plantes médicinales (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) : - la pratique de la chasse et de la pêche coutumières des espèces non protégées (non autorisé dans la zone en exploitation) Le Le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à faire mention des modalités d'exercice des droits définis à l'article 1èr ci-dessus dan .. t Socxere InbusrrreuLE Entité administrative et coutumière siF/ORCO | Free … .",
"Article 11 : Il est institué un fonds dénommé « Fonds de Développement » pour financer la réalisation des infrastructures définies à l’article 4 ci-dessus ainsi que les dépenses prévues aux articles 6 et 7. Le Fonds de Développement est constitué du versement par le concessionnaire d’une ristourne de deux à cinq dollars américains par mètre cube de bois d'œuvre prélevé dans la concession forestière, selon le classement de l'essence concernée, publié dans le guide opérationnel de la Direction Inventaire et Aménagernent Forestiers.",
"Les volumes de bois considérés sont portés sur les déclarations trimestrielles de production de bois d'œuvre. La détermination des volumes et du montant par essence, en fonction des résultats d'inventaires de sondage sur la surface forestière appartenant au groupement BATENDE Secteur MONGAMA est précisée en Annexe 7 de cette clause. Une catégorie « autres essences » est prévue avec une ristourne de 2 dollars/m”, elle concerne les essences non exploitées actuellement mais potentiellement utiles dans le futur. Vu la faible précision d'un inventaire de sondage, ce volume est donné uniquement à titre indicatif et a pour seul objectif de calculer le 10% de préfinancement et d'établir une première dimension de la contribution de SIFORCO au Fonds de développement. Le montant réel affecté au fonds de développement dépend du volume prélevé dans la concession au fur et à mesure de l'avancement de l'exploitation. Une carte de la surface forestière du groupement BATENDE du Secteur MONGAMA, faisant suite à l'identification des droits coutumiers établis selon un zonage participatif, est jointe en Annexe 8. Toutefois, pour permettre le démarrage immédiat des travaux, le concessionnaire forestier s'engage à dégager, à la signature du présent accord, un préfinancement de 10% du coût total des travaux d'infrastructures socio- économiques présentés à l'article 4 ci-dessus, soit le montant de 15.775 $US.",
"Ces 10% constituent une avance sur les ristournes à verser sur les volumes de bois prélevés dans le bloc d'exploitation considéré qui regroupe, selon les cas, 4 ou 5 assiettes annuelles de coupe et sont remboursables à la fin de la période considérée. Article 12 : Le Fonds de Développement est géré par un Comité Local de Gestion (CLG) composé d'un délégué du concessionnaire forestier et d'au moins cinq représentants élus de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone. Sur demande de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone, le oncessionnaire forestier accepte qu'un représentant de la société civile fasse partie du CLG A) en qualité d’observateur. La prise de décision dans le CLG se fait par consensus de tous les membres. ee Article 13 : L Outre un président désigné par les membres de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone et travaillant sous la supervision du chef de fa communauté et/ou du peuple autochtone, le CLG comprend un trésorier, un secrétaire rapporteur et plusieurs conseillers. Dès sa mise en place, le CLG est installé officiellement par l'Administrateur de ©) eric Socrere Inbusrrueute Entité administrative et coutumière SIF 6 RCO | rose RE ss eee eeseneseee rene Le PV d'installation du CLG est annexé au présent contrat, reprenant la liste des noms des membres. (Annexe 9 Membres à identifier dans le formulaire Siforco pour le CLG et le CLS).",
"Le Comité local de Gestion ne pourra siéger qu'en présence de tous les membres. En cas d'empêchement majeur d'un des membres, un suppléant pourra être désigné. Le CLG se réunit en session ordinaire tous les 3 mois sur convocation de son Président. Article 14 : Le Fonds de Développement est consigné auprès du concessionnaire forestier ou d'un tiers défini d’un commun accord par les parties, si d'autres facilités bancaires ne sont pas disponibles. Dans ce cas, celui-ci s'engage à rendre accessibles les ressources financières au CLG, selon des modalités fixées de commun accord par les parties. Notamment, les ressources financières sont gérées par le CLG. Le décaissement des fonds se fait après apposition des signatures du président du CLG, du Trésorier, du délégué du concessionnaire forestier et de la Direction de Siforco. A l'issue des négociations, il en résulte que le groupement BATENDE approuve et souhaite que le fonds de développement soit consigné auprès du concessionnaire forestier SIFORCO. OU, si, il souhaite faire appel à un Tiers ; Les Tiers recevant le fonds de développement doivent présenter des garanties et des facilités bancaires (la Rawbank, Biac, BCDC à Kinshasa seulement) pour le bon déroulement des réalisations. à Section 2 : Obligations de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone Article 15 : La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à concourir à la gestion durable de la concession forestière et à contribuer à la pleine et libre jouissance par le concessionnaire de ses droits.",
"Article 16 : la lutte contre le braconnage et l'exploitation illégale dans la concession forestière et à ‘ sensibiliser ses (leurs) membres à cette fin. Article 17 : / La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à collaborer avec le concessionnaire forestier pour maîtriser tout incendie survenu à l'intérieur de la forêt NN concédée ou dans une aire herbeuse attenante à la susdite forêt. prendre toute disposition appropriée pour que ses membres contribuent à la protection du personnel et du patrimoine d'exploitation du concessionnaire forestier. è HE Sp Ne Article 18 : La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à / & 2 Socuere ENusrRrELLE Entité administrative et coutumière F ORCO | Sono .",
"ue Tout préjudice subi du fait d'actes de violence ou de voies de fait sur le personnel du concessionnaire forestier ou d'actes de vandalisme sur son patrimoine d'exploitation perpétrés par un ou plusieurs membres de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou du peuple autochtone, entraîne réparation. Les dégats seront débités sur le fonds de développement de la ou des communauté(s) responsables. Article 19 : La(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone s'engagent à collaborer avec le concessionnaire forestier pour que les voies établies par ce dernier pour l'évacuation de son bois ne soient pas utilisées par d’autres exploitants, sauf exercice d’un droit lié à une servitude légale ou conventionnelle. De même, la communauté locale et/ou le peuple autochtone s’abstiennent de favoriser l'accès à des fins illégales des susdites voies aux communautés et/ou peuples autochtones non riverains de la concession forestière. Chapitre 3 : Suivi de la mise en œuvre du présent contrat Article 20 : Aux fins d'assurer le suivi et l'évaluation de l'exécution des engagements pris en vertu du présent contrat, il est institué un Comité Local de Suivi (CLS).",
"Article 21 : Le CLS est présidé par l'Administrateur de Territoire ou son délégué et est composé d'un délégué du concessionnaire forestier et d'au moins trois représentants élus de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) etfou du peuple autochtone en dehors des membres du CLG. Les parties acceptent que l'ONG C.D.C COMITE DE DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE, représentée par Mr / Mme / Mile YVES MOWENI siège en qualité de membre effectif du CLS. Le PV d'installation du CLS est annexé au présent contrat, reprenant la liste des noms des membres. (Annexe 9 Membres à identifier dans le formulaire Siforco pour le CLG et le CLS). Article 22 : Le CLS examine le rapport trimestriel d'activités du CLG, particulièrement en ce qui concerne la réalisation des infrastructures socio-économiques et le calendrier y afférent. Il peut, en cas de besoin, entendre le président ou tout autre membre du CLG. Il peut également faire appel à une expertise qualifiée pour l’éclairer sur toute question #. inscrite à l'ordre du jour de sa réunion.",
"Article 23 : 7 Le CLS se réunit en session ordinaire tous les trois mois sur convocation de 4 rncminigrateer de Territoire. ut aussi, à tout moment et selon le besoin, tenir une session sur convocation de l’Administrateur de Territoire, à l'initiative de l'une des / parties au présent contrat. ) 1 à Ses décisions sont prises par consensus et sont consignées dans un procès-verbal signé par tous les membres présents. É . \\s Des l'administration centrale des forêts pour son annexion au contrat de concession forestière. stF/ORCO Article 24 : Entité administrative et coutumière SOCIETE INDUSTRIELLE Er FORESTIERE Du ConGo Il est versé aux membres du CLG et du CLS représentants de la communauté locale et/ou du peuple autochtone un jeton de présence dont le taux est fixé de commun accord entre les parties à 20 US $US par séance de travail. Le calendrier d'intervention des membres du CLG et du CLS sera validé au préalable par chacun des comités respectifs, avec le souci de ne pas dépasser annuellement la limite fixée ci-après. Les frais d'organisation des réunions des deux comités inclus les jetons de présence sont prélevés sur le Fonds de Développement. Il a été conclu d'un commun accord, que les frais des deux comités, sont évalués à 10% du fonds de développement dont la répartition est la suivante : 6 % pour le CLG et 4 % pour le CLS.",
"Toutefois, la somme totale des frais, couvrant les dépenses prévues aux alinéas ci-dessus, peut-être majorée mais ne peut excéder 10% du financement total des travaux de réalisation des infrastructures concernées par le présent accord. Le montant sera précisé dans la planification budgétaire de la communauté locale du Groupement BATENDE du secteur MONGAMA, Article 25 : Chapitre 4 : Clauses diverses Section 1 : Règlement des différends Tout litige ou contestation né de l'interprétation ou de l'exécution du présent accord est, si possible, réglé à l'amiable entre les parties. A défaut d'un arrangement, les parties s'engagent à soumettre le litige à la commission de règlement des différends forestiers organisée par l'arrêté ministériel n° 103/CAB/MIN/ECN-T/JEB/09 du 16 juin 2009. Au cas où le différend persiste, la partie non satisfaite peut saisir le tribunal compétent de droit commun. Article 26 : Pour l'exécution du présent contrat, la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone ont le droit de se faire assister par une personne physique ou une ONG de leur choix. Section 2 : Dispositions finales Article 27 : Le présent accord, qui produit ses effets à la date de sa signature par les parties et l'Administrateur de Territoire en tant que témoin et garant de la bonne application du présent contrat, remplace et annule tout autre accord qui aurait existé entre les parties au présent | accord. Article 28 : Le présent accord est établi en cinq (5) exemplaires originaux et remis à ghacune d parties, à l’Administrateur de Territoire, à l'administration forestière provinciale et à Socrere INDUSTRIELLE ET FORESTIERE pu Conco S1F/ORCO Entité administrative et coutumière Fait à YUMBI, le 18 Aout 2011 Pour le concessionnaire forestier Nom DIETER HAAG Emmanuel ZOLA MVIBUDULU Titre ADG DIREX re Pour la(les) communauté(s) locale(s) et/ou le peuple autochtone Nom Titre Signature MBIEME NDELE CHEF DE GR BATENDE TEE MBENGE CKUSA CHEF DE TERRE NGO bhtsu NKAMA LUC CHEF DE TERRE KITABA 4 BOKOTE MABANKOLE | CHEF DE TERRE KIBILI D MWANIA _LIBATA MUFULU | CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKAII LEBATA MBAKA ENOC CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA | NKELE NGWE CHEF DE TERRE KINGWE NKUMINGO FRANCOIS CHEF DE TERRE MADIA BOMPEF MOWEN!",
"PRESIDENT CLG LOKWA SEKIWA SECRETAIRE CLS T Entité administrative et coutumière Socxere INDUSTRIELLE SIF/ORCO | ie... Pour l'administration forestière Nom Titre signature J.B. BATELAMA SUPERVISEUR ENV/YUMBI Pour la société civile Nom Titre Tampon et signature BANGO JULES PRESIDENT Fe NKOKO JEAN VICE PRESIDENT LI] b. Pour le Secteur MONGAMA : LOFAFER4+ A oérthee Agpol Leerber AS Pour le District des Plateaux ILUNGA NSELE — <<. À L'Administrateur du Térritoir Nom Titre Tampon et signa ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA AT. le Sociere INvusrRreLL Le s1F/GRCO Er FORESTIERE Entité administrative et coutumière LES AUTRES MEMBRES DES COMITES LOCAUX DE GESTION ET DE SUIVI ANGARANGE MPEN qosept CLE 2e 2 NEVIABRLI -TACEUS CRC 3, BofRKA-NoNGe.",
"EC CtG PP G NKUMBIEMNE-NKesy AKELE ŒAMEA pit cia e JNrumantote keékvlie CLG R Joke Kw Ska CLS UE a) Hu naba- uBALNE GA 7 Hkoko Lino ANTONE Css Co MOWENr-EÉAKA CS 4 A RAR IACA - Jèe ce e ENGan sa péabo ta E£ — Entité administrative et coutumière Soctere INbusrRzELLE SIF/ORCO | MR ie Listes des Annexes : Annexe 1 : Composantes de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) concernée(s) par ce Cahier des Charges provisoire Annexe 2: Arrêté ministériel de notification de convertibilité n° N°4859/CAB/MIN/ECN- T/15/JEB/2008 du 06 Octobre 2008 Annexe 3: Carte des territoires coutumiers de la (des) communauté(s) locale(s) (signée par toutes les parties prenantes) Annexe 4 : Compte rendu des réunions et courriers échangés dans le cadre de la négociation de l'accord portant clause sociale Annexe 5 : Devis pour la construction des routes, Annexe 6 : Plan et devis pour la construction des écoles et Dispensaires Annexe 7 : Détermination des volumes par essence et des ristournes associées.",
"Annexe 8: Surface forestière des entités administratives et coutumières du secteur 1 Annexe 9 : PV d'installation des membres des Comités Locaux de Gestion et de Suivi Membres à identifier dans le formulaire Siforco pour le CLG et le CLS Annexe10 supp à intégrer : Budget prévisionnel du Fonds de Développement et Chronogramme prévisionnel de réalisation des infrastructures 14 Socrere INDusrRteLLE SIF/ORCO | ie TERRITOIRE DE YUMBI / Gpt BATENDE Cubage: Fond de developpement calculé ($) 206 752 Investissements sociaux: 1 Grande Ecole à NGO 60.000 1 grande Ecole à NGANIA 60.000 1 Centre de santé à ILEBO MANGALA 37.750 Montant total des investissements sociaux 157 750 Avance sur les investissements = % des DRE) 15 775 Coût d'entretien des infrastructures (10% 20 675 Fonctionnement CLG et CLS (10 % du fonds local de développement) 20 675 Solde - 8 100 Pour permettre le démarrage immédiat des travaux, la SIFORCO s'engage à + dégager, à la signature du présent accord, un préfinancement de 10%+* du coût total des investissements, soit 15 775 $, comme l'indique le tableau ci-haut.",
"Ce montant constitue une avance sur les ristournes à verser sur les volumes de bois prélevés dans le bloc d'exploitation considéré. Fait à... YUMBI...... 18 aout... 2011 PROCES-VERBAL D’INSTALLATION DU COMITE LOCAL DE GESTION DU GROUPEMENT TIENE/BATENDE, SECTEUR DE MONGAMA L’an deux mille one, le dix-huitième jour du mois d’août, vers 09h30?. Nous, Antoine ZOATOMBINA, officier de police judiciaire à compétence générale et Administrateur du Territoire de YUMBI, avons procédé à l'installation du comité local de gestion du fonds de développement du Groupement TIENE/BATENDE, Secteur MONGAMA dans le Territoire de YUMBJI, lequel sera généré par l’exploitation du bois SIFORCO. Ce comité est donc composé de : Président : MOWENI ESEKA Secrétaire : BOPAKA NONGO Trésorier : NKUMABALI JACQUES Conseillers : - NKUMANGOTO ANDRE - NGAMANGO MPETI JOSEPH - NKELE SHIMITA - NGAMISA OKADIO - NKUMBIEME NKOSI - REPRESENTANT DU CONCESSIONNAIRE, À POURVOIR Ce P.V d'installation que nous signons est sincère et véritable au jour, mois et an que dessus. L’officier de Police 2 J ciäire, ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA Administrateur du Territoire PROCES-VERBAL D’INSTALLATION DU COMITE LOCAL DE SUIVI DU GROUPEMENT TIENE / BATENDE, SECTEUR MONGAMA L’an deux mille onze, le dix-huitième jour du mois d’août, vers 09h30”.",
"Nous, Antoine ZOATOMBINA, officier de police judiciaire à compétence générale et Administrateur du Territoire de YUMBI, avons procédé à l'installation du comité local de suivi de fonds de développement du Groupement TIENE/BATENDE, Secteur de MONGAMA dans le Territoire de YUMBI, lequel sera généré par l’exploitation du bois de SIFORCO. Ce comité est donc composé de : Président : L’ADMINISTRATEUR DU TERRITOIRE DE YUMBI Secrétaire : LOKWA SEKIWA Conseillers : - NKUMADIA MUKWALIKA - MABIALA BOKIESE -MOWENI EKAKA - NKOKO KIMBU - REPRESENTANT DU CONCESSIONNAIRE, À POURVOIR - ONG : CDC = COMITE DU DEVELOPPEMENT COMMUNAUTAIRE Ce P.V d'installation que nous signons est sincère et véritable au jour, mois et an que dessus.",
"L’officier de Police Ji défaire, ANTOINE ZOATOMBINA Administrateur du Territoire RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Kinshasa, le ï Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme S ICAB/MINECN-TIS/JEB/2008 Le Ministre À Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général de la SIFGRCO à Kinshasa/Maluku Objet : Notification de la recommandation de la Commission Interministérielle de Conversion des Anciens Titres Forestiers Votre requête n°108 Monsieur l’Adrministrateur Directeur Général, À l'issue de ses travaux, La Commission interrninistérielle de conversion des anciens titres forestiers a constaté que votre Garantie d’Approvisionnement n°018/00 du 09/11/2006, située dans le Territoire de Bolobo, Province du Bandundu remplit les critères de convertibilité définis par le Décret n°05/116 du 24 octobre 2005 fixant les modalités de conversion des anciens titres forestiers en contrats de concession forestière et portant extension du moratoire en matière d'octroi des titres d'exploitation forestière tel que modifié et complété par le décret n°08/02 du 21 janvier 2008, Par conséquent, votre titre est jugé convertible en contrat de concession forestière. Vous êtes invité, à dater de la réception de la présente, à vous mettre en contact avec Le Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme pour les prochaines étapes. Vuillez agréer, Monsieur l’Administrateur Directeur Général, L’ expression ile ma considération distinguée.",
"Averne Pape Îlec (Ex-des Ciriques) n°15 Kinshas@/Goinbe BP. 123487 E-mail: rde_minev@pehoo.fr REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGS MINISTERE DES AFFAIRES FONCIERES, ENVIRONNEMENT ETDEVELOPPEMENT TOURISTIQUE LE MINISTRE GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT . { CONVENTION N°O48 CAB/MIN/AFF-EDT/00 DU 09 NOY 2000 PORTANT OCTROI D'UNE GARANTIE D'APPROVISIONNEMENT EN MATIERE LIGNEUSE ENTRE : LA REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO Représentée par le Ministre des Affaires Foncières, Environnement et Développement Touristique, Monsieur le Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA Ci-après dénommé ie Ministre ET : SIFORCO Représentée par Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE Son Directeur-Gérant Ci-après dénommé l'Exploitant PRELIMINAIRE Vu le Décret-loi Constitutionnel n° 003 du 27 mai 1997 relatif à l'organisation et à l'exercice du pauvoir en République Démocratique du Congo tel que modifié et complété par le Décret-loi Constitutionnel n° 074 du 25 mai 1998, le Décret-loi n° 122 du 21 septembre 1999 ; Vu telle que modifiée à ce jour, l'Ordonnance n° 75-231 du 22 juillet 1975 fixent les attributions du Département de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme : Revu l'Ordonnace n° 77-022 du 22 février 1977 ; Vu la loi foncière n° 73-021 du 20 juillet 1973 ; Vu l'Ordonnance n° 79-244 du 46 octobre, spécialement en ses articles 3,4et7; - = Vule Décret n° 113 du 1° septembre 2000 portant nomination des Membres du Gouvernement de Salut Publier — en —- +: - Vu la responsabilité du Minisiré des Affaires Foncières,-Environnement et Développement Touristique d'assurer la pérennité des ressources forestières, grâce à une saine gestion forestière, Utilisant toutes méthodes, directives et mesures dans l'utilisation des ressources disporibles ; Vu la nécessité de mettre en valeur les ressources forestières de l'Etat, Pour soutenir une activité économique prospère par l'exploitation rationnelle, la transformation et-la-mise.en marche des produits “exploités ; TT re 2.",
"Dot - Vu la nécessité d'assurer À l'éxploitant èmière pour son usine-de transformation situë Oramuñe : MALUKU, Province : KINSHASA: oduits finis; nécessitant un appravisionneém -2- Vu que l'Exploitant a répondu de façon satisfaisante aux critères et aux procédures de la décision n° 002/CCE/DECNT/84, ILA ETE ARRETE ET CONVENU CE QUI SUIT : Article 1%: Article 2 Arücie 3 : La garantie d'approvisionnement porte sur Un volume annuel de 36.000 m3 de grumes réparti comme suit : ESSENCES VOLUME (m3) Iroko 3,500 Tiama 2.300 Kosipo 2.200 Sapelli 6.500 Sipo 4.500 Wenge 7.000 Latandza 700 Bomanga 1,500 Bosse clair 3.500 Dibetou 1.000 Padouk 1.300 Tola 1.000 Tshitola 1.000 Total 36.000 :Ces bois seront prélevés dans une unité d'exploitation localisée comme suit : Province : BANDUNDU District : des plateaux Territoire : BOLOBO Localité: NKOLO Lieu : NGANIA Superficie : 160.000 ha Cette forêt ou portion de forêt est circonscrite dans les limites suivantes : Au Nord : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du Village NKOLO au bord du fleuve Congo, Passant par les villages : NGEN, IA, KEMBEKE, NGANIA, LONIA jusqu'à EPOKWANKOSO Au Sud > par la route d'intérêt généralen partant de la localité BUSINA jusqu'au Village IKULUMAKA, suivre [a rivière MAMBO jusqu'à sa jonction avec la rivière-LEBOMA, de la rivière LEBOMA jusqu'à son crojsement avec le 7 sentier MALEBO, suivre. le sentier jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière LOBINI. _ A l'Est : par la route d'intérêt général, en partant du village EPOKWANKOSO Jusqu'au village LOBINI; suivre la rivière LOBINI jusqu'à son croisement ._avec la rivière LEKURU.- -L - : Article 4 : Article 8 : Article 6 : -3- À l'Ouest : par ja rivière PANSOLA, en partant de sa jonction avec le fleuve Congo, au village NKOLO jusqu'à sa Source, tracer une ligne droite jusqu'à la source de l'une des branches de la rivière LETOKO.",
"Suivre ensuite la rivière jusqu'à son croisement avec la route d'intérêt général, prendre la route jusqu'à son croisement avec la rivière GAMPOKO en passant par les villages : EKANYKALE |, MADYA et NDELE. Suivre enfin la rivière GAMPOKO jusqu'à ta source, au village BUSINA. Les grumes ainsi récoltées devront être strictement utilisées pour leur transformation à l'usine décrite ci-dessus, ou dirigées à l'exportation suivant la réglementation en vigueur. : ° Aussi, aucune grume ne pourra être vendue à des tiers, à moins d'autorisation écrite du Ministère, Le Ministère accordera à l'Exploitant les droits suivants sur son unité d'exploitation : 5.1. Le droit exclusif de récolter les arbres exploitables explicitement identifiés à l'article premier 5.2. Le droit de construire les infrastructures nécessaires exclusivement aux exploitations forestières, sans préjudice des droits connus aux tiers ; Les infrastructures routières construites par l'Exploitant sont propriétés de l'Etat à la fin du contrat. 5.8. Le droit de flottage de radeaux et de navigation privée sur les cours d'eau et les lacs, ainsi que le droit d'utiliser les routes publiques pour transporter, à titre privé, des produits forestiers exploités ainsi que les produits de transformation.",
"En contre partie, l'Exploitant sera soumis, de façon inconditionnelle, aux obligations Suivantes : 6.1. Maintenir en opération son usine de transformation au niveau d'opération prévu dans.ie contrat ; 6.2. Assurer la protection forestière de l'unité d'exploitation ; 68. Présenter dans les détails prévus toutes demandes annuelles de permis de coupe, “tout rapport trimestriel et rapport après coupe, ou d'autres rapports prévus par la réglementation en vigueur ; - 64 Payer toutes les taxes et redevances forestières.prévues par la réglementation en — vigueur ; = 6.5. Informer le Ministère de tout changement d'adresse, de tout projet de transfert de -location, d'échange: de donation, de fusion, de vente affectant la propriété:de l'usine de transformation, objet du contrat et d'en 6btenir la-ratification du Ministère : 6.6.",
"Respecter | ëgieméntation-sur l'exploitation, la commercialisation étl - des prod: © ‘ © D sstiers'; 'exprtation : -4- 6.7. Aviser le Ministère de tout changement dans la destination des grumes exploitées et en obtenir l'autorisation du Ministère ; 6.8. Respecter toutes décisions prises par le Ministère en matière d'aménagement forestier ; 6.9. Procéder à la récolte minimale de 10 m3 de bois à l'hectare sur les superficies exploitables. Article 7 : La présente convention est effective à la date de sa signature jusqu'au mois d'Octobre 2025. l l Article 8 : Le non respect dés clauses de la convention par l'exploitant entraînera la résiliation immédiate et automatique de la présente. Faitä Kinéhasa le :Q Q Nÿy 2000 SIGNATAIRES AUTORISES LE MINISTRE Monsieur Frédéric FLASSE = Prof. Anatole BISHIKWABO CHUBAKA= SIFORCO . B.P.",
"8434 Kinshasa 2 PR, ni 7DSD2 Fait à six exemplaires 1. Exploitant 2. Cabinet du Ministre 3. Secrétaire Général à l'ECN 4, Direction de ta GFC 5. Gouverneur de Province _ : 6. Coordinateur Provincial d& VECN : . Die ve eur VUS Liu Bes ue vis UULE EUL SIFORCO mai-11 Cahier de charge Couts construction routes 2011 D | ——— Machines GO, Lub, Pieces 721[D7H 44 100,00 €| Û 723[D7H 39 700,00 € 727[D74 39 300,00 € 813[966€ 21 000,00 € 4612638 30 000,00 € 299[Toyota 10 100,00 € 184 200,00 €] $ 244 986,00 | Amortissement Amortissement/an 721|D7H 100 000,00 € | $ 133 000,00 723]D7H 100 000,00 € | $ 133 000,00 727|D7H 100 000,00 € | $ 133 000,00 813/966C 60 000,00 € | $ 79 800,00 4612638 1G 000,00 € | $ 13 300,00 299/Toyota 10 000,00 €] $ 13 300,00 | Tovote 655/120G |___50000,00€ | $ 66 500,00 Personelle 25 Personnes 67 669,17€|$ 90 000,00 Autres frais de pers. 27 067,67 € | $ 36 000,00 Fotai S 942 886,00 Admin 40% S 7 282 865,80 : Fotal $ 1225 751,80 __] | Total/km $ 10 214,60 —1, rabe à SIFORCO mai-11 Cahier de charge Ï Couts entretien routes - Devis 2011 Machines GO, Lub, Pieces 721|D7H 44 100,00 € 655/12G 27 900,00 € 299|Toyota 10 147,00 € —— 82147,00€] $ 112 541,39 Amortissement Amortissement/ 6 mois 721|D7H 50 000,00 € | $ 68 500,00 655/12G 25 000,00 € | $ 34 250,00 299|Toyota 10 000,00 € |:$ 13 700,00 un + — Personnel 5 Personnes 13533,83€|$ 18 541,35 Autres frais de pers.",
"6766,92€ |$ 9 270,68 TT Sous-Total $ 256 803,42 Admin 30% - $ 77 041,03 + Total $ 333 844,45 $ 2 782,04 Total/km 5 2000 SIFORCO._Devis_infrastructures sociales_Mai 2011 Page 1 SIFORCO Engengele Bumba Mai 11 DESIGNATION Semelle Fondation Poteaux en\" BA\" Ceinture en\" BA\" Fers à Béton fil de recuit 50 kg Bois de Charpente Bois de coffrage et divers Bois de Menuiserie Mobilier Pointes Ordinaires Pointes à Béton Pointes à Tôles Tôles de Couverture Accessoires et divers SIFORCO Engengele Bumba DESIGNATION SIFORCO._Devis_infrastructures sociales_Maïi 2011 Dimension ou volume Mai 11 PRIX TOTAL Semelle Fondation Dalle Chappe Enduits Crépis 4 000 Bois de coffrage et divers Bois de Menuiserie Mobilier Pointes Ordinaires Pointes à Béton Pointes à Tôles [Tôles de Couverture Accessoires et divers Graves et Sables Peinture Chaux Contre plaqué 350 kgs Page t SIFORCO_Devis_infrastructures sociales_Mai 2011 Page SIFORCO Engengele Bumba Mai 11 DESIGNATION Semelle Fondation Poteaux en\" BA\" Ceinture en\" BA\" Dalle Chappe Enduits Crépis 30 de 10 Bois de Charpente Sm Bois de coffrage et divers 12m Bois de Menuiserie am Mobilier êm Pointes Ordinaires 80 kgs Pointes à Béton 25 kgs Pointes à Tôles 40 kgs T$les de Couverture 325 Accessoires et divers Graves et Sables Contre plaqué Transports Eau SIFORCO_Devis_infrastructures sociales_Mai 2011 Page 1 SIFORCO Engengele Bumba Mai 2011 DESIGNATION Dimension ou volume PRIX TOTAL Semelle Fondation 4 000 Poteaux en\" BA\" Ceinture en\" BA\" 10 de 10 Bois de coffrage et divers Bois de Menuiserie Mobilier Pointes Ordinaires Pointes à Béton Pointes à Tôles Tiies de Couverture Accessoires et divers 128 220 > ( investissements) 10% CLG+CLS Fait à YUMBI, le 18 aout 2011 Pour la communauté locale ; resioenr Clé ME SECreTaive CLG l TRESORIER RRP CONGO Souree des données: Les GPS surterain: - tumetion sur one image Lara (PAS 1 PI2DE) Proaction UTM33S Qatum MID 1994 Féalisée à SIFORCO Maui Far F BATEROLO SURA TE Frs SECTEUR MONGAMA, GROUPEMENT TIENE et CONCESSION SIFORCO K3 heu Locañté Chetheu de Secteur 00e Cheflieu de Territoire os Route she RMère 22% Limite concession partie Yumbi à 4 premières années d'exploitation Fe.",
"Fleuve Congo TS rertoire de Vumbi Chetlieu de Groupement CONCESSION SIFORCO K3ET SA PARTIE DE YUMBI HUSHIE PROCES-VERBAL DE LA REUNION SUR LA NEGOCIATION ET LA SIGNATURE DES CLAUSES SOCIALES, TENUE A YUMBI ENTRE LA SIFORCO ET LES REPRESENTANTS DU GROUPEMENT BATENDE SECTEUR MONGAMA DANS LE TERRITOIRE DE YUMBI L'an deux mille onze, le dix-huitième jour du mois d’août, s’est tenue à YUMBI une réunion portant sur la négociation et la signature de la clause sociale du cahier des charges du Groupement Batende, Secteur Mongama dans le titre 018 et ce, conformément à l'arrêté 023. A. Installation des CLG et CLS Les comités locaux (CLG et CLS) démocratiquement élus par la population riveraine ont été installés par l’ Administrateur du Territoire de YUMBI. B. Résolutions prises A l'issue de discussions, les parties en présence se sont convenues ce qui suit : 1. Les taux par essence conclus et exigés pour alimenter le fonds de développement sont repris dans un tableau en annexe.",
"Après s’être convenus sur ce tableau croisé, quatre groupes d’essences se dégagent : 1% groupe: 5 dollars américains 2°\" groupe : 4 dollars américains 3°\" groupe : 3 dollars américains 4% groupe : 2 dollars américains 2. Les tableaux conçus comportent les volumes issus des sondages effectués par la Société et les montants y afférents. Ils sont annexés aux contrats. HS EN Ils s’y dégagent un volume estimatif de 48.035 m pour un montant théorique total de nn 1 206.752 SUS. LÉ. La clé de ventilation succincte est la suivante : Fonctionnement a 20.675,2 $US Frais d’entretien des infrastructures : 20.672,2 $US 1 Avance / Préfinancement :16.540,1 SUS LAN Réalisations sociales / Investissem.",
": 165.401 SUS 3. Eu égard aux montants alloués au fonds de développement, les infrastructures soëio-économiques présentées par les populations riveraines ont été validées. , F 4. Le Groupement concerné approuve et souhaite que les fonds de développement soient consignés auprès du concessionnaire forestier SIFORCO. 5. Le choix des entrepreneurs de l’ouvrage : pont Letoko retenu est laissé à la compétence du comité local de gestion et ce en rapport avec le budget disponibilisé dans le fonds de éveloppement, soit un montant de 7.651 SUS. 6. La désignation des entrepreneurs se fera après analyse technique, financière et de faisabilité, des offres, par toutes les parties et la décision sera prise par consensus. » D 27 , FT Gi ÉT- Ve a) Ê = : HUE 14 ©) 7 Ÿ A É : lle vaù FO / 2 7. En vue de sauvegarder la faisabilité de l’intégralité des infrastructures retenues dans les clauses sociales, la population riveraine demande a ce que la Société SIFORCO verse 4,87 % sur les investissements des infrastructures en lieu et place de 10 % exiges par la loi, 8.",
"La prise de décision dans le CLG et CLS se fait par consensus de tous les membres. SIFORCO de son côté s’engage à rendre accessibles les ressources financières au CLG, selon des modalités fixées de commun accord par les parties. 9. Les ressources financières sont gérées par le CLG. Le décaissement des fonds se fait après apposition des signatures du président du CLG, du Trésorier, du délégué du concessionnaire forestier et de la Direction de SIFORCO. 10. Les frais liés aux jetons de présence des membres des deux comités et ceux de fonctionnement sont évalués à 10 % de fonds de développement.",
"La répartition entre les comités est 6% pour le CLG et 4 % pour le CLS. 11. Le taux de jetons de présence est fixé de commun accord entre les parties à 20 SUS par seance de travail. 12. Les parties signataires se conviennent de travailler dans la paix et les conflits potentiels doivent être réglés suivant l’esprit du code forestier et de l’arrêté 023. En foi de quoi, nous dressons le présent procès-verbal conjointement signé par les parties en présence. Pour les autorités politico-administratives 1) Mr. ILUNGA NSELE, C.D.D.A 2) Mr. ANTOINE ZOATO)] Pour l’administration forestière : 1) JEAN BAPTISTE BATELAMA, SUPERVISEUR ve Ÿ D L, // Pour la Société civile : 1) BANGO JULES, PRESIDENT 2) NKOKO JEAN, V/PRESIDENT - Pour le Groupement : 1) MBIEME NDELA, CHEF DE GROUPEMENT EN Pour les Chefs de Terre : 1) MBENGE OKUSA, CHEF DE TERRENGO dt 6 2) NKAMA LUC, CHEF DE TERRE KITABA : “A } 3 Nez NKUMIMGO FRANCOIS, CHEF DE TERRE MADIA 4 4 Le L- À BOKOTE MABANKOLE, CHEF DE TERRE KIBILI DA 5) MWANIA LIBATA, CHEF DE TERRE BIKAKA II À CA 6) LEBATA MBAKA ENOC, CHEF DE TERRE BIRAKAI 2 7) NKELE NGWE, CHEF DE TERRE KINGWE dr 8) MAYO NKOTA NDAVO, CHEF DE TERRE BOKUSU F CO FEN= 9) MPUU SIMON, CHEF DE TERRE MPOKO MBOLE 2 Pour les comites locaux CLG et CLS : MewEnN) ESEkK4 PresrmenT CLe MSÿ Scruhire ECS LehA Se RAR Ve Connu CL NeAMANGS Mer PR dep TRELRER CLA N UMA BAL à - ae quec Un L TI sec.",
"FPE RON CLG Re Annexe 7 Budgets prévisionnels des fonds de développement Plan de Gestion couvrant la période de préparation du Plan d'Aménagement (2012 - 2015) Dépenses prévisionnelles sur fonds de développement Société SIFORCO Concession GA 018/00 - Bandundu Groupement Batende Coût unitaire Montant total Réalisations Spécifications Quantité [6] [6] Voir annexes Clauses Grande Ecole NGo sociales ecole 1 60 000! 60 000 Voir annexes Clauses Grande Ecole NGANIA sociales Centre 1 60 000! 60 000 Voir annexes Clauses Centre de santé llebo MANGALA sociales Centre 1 37 750) 37 750 Construction d'un pont sur la rivière Avec les 10% d'avance sur le Letoko à préciser montant des infrastructures [Pont 1 15 775 Coût unitaire Montant total (] ($) Fonctionnement des comités de suivi et] de gestion 10% du montant total du Fonds de développement L2 10%| 206 675 20 668] Total des dépenses sur le fonds de développement 178 418 Coût unitaire Montant total Réalisation ï (S) Coût d'entretien et de maintenance sur les 20 ans restants de la rotation Provision sur les recettes du Fonds 4 10%| 206675 | Total des dépenses (S) 199 085 Montant restant à affecter par le CLG (S) 7 590 Total des recettes (S) 206 675"
]
| https://api.resourcecontracts.org/contract/2663/text | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. | 11-28-2022 | [
"C. A. 2d Cir. Certiorari denied. Justice Sotomayor took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/9240232/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Examiner’s Statement of Reason for Allowance
Claims 1-13 are allowed. The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: The prior art of record teaches various microphone devices thereon, for example US 2012/0014542 is the closest prior art and teaches a narrow directional condenser microphone in which a unidirectional condenser microphone unit configured by arranging a diaphragm and a backplate opposedly via a spacer is arranged on the rear end side of an acoustic tube, wherein the narrow directional condenser microphone is provided with a unit pair assembly configured by opposedly combining two of the condenser microphone units with the diaphragm side thereof being parallel to each other, and the unit pair assembly is arranged on the rear end side of the acoustic tube in such a manner that the condenser microphone units are arranged symmetrically with respect to the tube axis of the acoustic tube. However, the prior art of record fails to teach claim 1, a unidirectional microphone comprising: a case having a shape of a bottomed cylinder and including a sound hole in a bottom thereof; a ring-shaped diaphragm fixed to the bottom in the case; a vibrating membrane stretched on the diaphragm; a backplate which has a shape of a bottomed cylinder and is housed in the case in a nested manner such that an air gap to serve as a sound propagation path is formed between the backplate and an inner surface of the case, the backplate including an aperture serving as a sound propagation path in a side face thereof; a spacer positioned between the diaphragm and the backplate to fix the diaphragm and the backplate, and including a notch serving as a sound propagation path in a portion thereof; and a base plate covering a top opening of the case and including a hole serving as a sound propagation path; and claim 2, a unidirectional microphone comprising: a case having a shape of a bottomed cylinder and including a sound hole in a bottom thereof; a ring-shaped diaphragm fixed to the bottom in the case; a vibrating membrane stretched on the diaphragm; a backplate which has a shape of a bottomed cylinder and is housed in the case in a nested manner such that an air gap to serve as a sound propagation path is formed between the backplate and an inner surface of the case, the backplate including an aperture serving as a sound propagation path in a side face thereof and including a recess serving as a sound propagation path on an underside of a bottom thereof; a spacer positioned between the diaphragm and the backplate to fix the diaphragm and the backplate; and a base plate covering a top opening of the case and including a hole serving as a sound propagation path. The prior art teachings neither anticipate nor render obvious the allowable subject matter in combination with the other claimed limitations.
The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure.
Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.”
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to TUAN DUC NGUYEN whose telephone number is (571)272-8163. The examiner can normally be reached 6:30-3:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, George Eng can be reached on 571-272-7495. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/TUAN D NGUYEN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2699 | 2022-09-02T15:07:03 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Examiner’s Statement of Reason for Allowance Claims 1-13 are allowed. The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: The prior art of record teaches various microphone devices thereon, for example US 2012/0014542 is the closest prior art and teaches a narrow directional condenser microphone in which a unidirectional condenser microphone unit configured by arranging a diaphragm and a backplate opposedly via a spacer is arranged on the rear end side of an acoustic tube, wherein the narrow directional condenser microphone is provided with a unit pair assembly configured by opposedly combining two of the condenser microphone units with the diaphragm side thereof being parallel to each other, and the unit pair assembly is arranged on the rear end side of the acoustic tube in such a manner that the condenser microphone units are arranged symmetrically with respect to the tube axis of the acoustic tube.",
"However, the prior art of record fails to teach claim 1, a unidirectional microphone comprising: a case having a shape of a bottomed cylinder and including a sound hole in a bottom thereof; a ring-shaped diaphragm fixed to the bottom in the case; a vibrating membrane stretched on the diaphragm; a backplate which has a shape of a bottomed cylinder and is housed in the case in a nested manner such that an air gap to serve as a sound propagation path is formed between the backplate and an inner surface of the case, the backplate including an aperture serving as a sound propagation path in a side face thereof; a spacer positioned between the diaphragm and the backplate to fix the diaphragm and the backplate, and including a notch serving as a sound propagation path in a portion thereof; and a base plate covering a top opening of the case and including a hole serving as a sound propagation path; and claim 2, a unidirectional microphone comprising: a case having a shape of a bottomed cylinder and including a sound hole in a bottom thereof; a ring-shaped diaphragm fixed to the bottom in the case; a vibrating membrane stretched on the diaphragm; a backplate which has a shape of a bottomed cylinder and is housed in the case in a nested manner such that an air gap to serve as a sound propagation path is formed between the backplate and an inner surface of the case, the backplate including an aperture serving as a sound propagation path in a side face thereof and including a recess serving as a sound propagation path on an underside of a bottom thereof; a spacer positioned between the diaphragm and the backplate to fix the diaphragm and the backplate; and a base plate covering a top opening of the case and including a hole serving as a sound propagation path.",
"The prior art teachings neither anticipate nor render obvious the allowable subject matter in combination with the other claimed limitations. The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.” Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to TUAN DUC NGUYEN whose telephone number is (571)272-8163. The examiner can normally be reached 6:30-3:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool.",
"To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, George Eng can be reached on 571-272-7495. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.",
"/TUAN D NGUYEN/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2699"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-09-11.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1, 3-6, 11, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Hupfer, US 2003/0057709. Regarding claim 1, Hupfer discloses an armrest assembly mounted on a console of a vehicle, comprising: a console main body (4) provided with a storage box (6) in which a space (8) is formed, the console main body being installed between a driver seat and a passenger seat of a vehicle [0012]; an armrest (3) pivotably connected to the storage box, the armrest being configured to support an arm of a passenger riding in the vehicle, and the armrest further being configured to open and close an upper portion of the storage box; a button member (14) connected to the console main body and configured to be operated by the passenger to unlock the armrest; an operating unit (13) configured to lock or unlock the armrest from the console main body when button member is operated; and a console cover (Forward portion of 4)configured to cover a portion in which the button member and the operating unit are installed in the console main body, the console cover further configured to expose an upper end of the button member; wherein an upper end of the armrest, a surface of the console cover, and the upper end of the button member are disposed on the same surface from the armrest to the console cover (Fig. 1, 2). Regarding claim 3, Hupfer discloses the button member (14) is slidably connected to the console main body (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 4, Hupfer discloses a button guide (20) configured to guide sliding of the button member in the console main body [0017]. Regarding claim 5, Hupfer discloses the operating unit includes a locking hook (15) pivotably installed in the console main body and configured to lock one side of the armrest, and unlock the armrest when an operating force is transferred from the button member (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 6, Hupfer discloses the locking hook is (15) elastically supported to be pivoted in a direction of locking the armrest (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 11, Hupfer discloses the button member (14) includes: a button knob having an upper end exposed to the console cover and configured to be operated by the passenger; and a button rod (25) formed to extend from the button knob in a sliding direction of the button member and configured to transfer the operating force input to the button knob to the operating unit (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 12, Hupfer discloses a hook-catching part (12) to which an end portion of the locking hook (15) is caught and fixed is formed in the armrest (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Hupfer. Regarding claim 2, Hupfer discloses all of the limitations of claim 1 as above, and shows the same surface on which the upper end of the armrest, the surface of the console cover, and the upper end of the button member are disposed is a substantially planar surface but does not show these elements arranged on a curved surface. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the armrest assembly as shown by Hupfer by providing the upper end of the armrest, the surface of the console cover, and the upper end of the button member disposed on a curved surface, since it has been held that a change in the shape of a prior art device is a design consideration within the level of skill of one skilled in the art. In re Dailey, 149 USPQ 47 (CCPA 1966). Allowable Subject Matter Claims 7-10 and 13-19 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Claim 20 is allowed.
Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon, but considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure is listed on the attached PTO-892. The cited references all disclose related vehicle armrest assembly latching structures. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to E TURNER HICKS whose telephone number is (571)272-4739. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 9:00-5:00. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Glenn Dayoan can be reached on (571) 272-6659. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/ETH/ Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3612 /D Glenn Dayoan/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3612 | 2022-07-24T22:06:07 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a)(1) the claimed invention was patented, described in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale or otherwise available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. (a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention. Claims 1, 3-6, 11, and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.",
"102(a)(1) as being anticipated by Hupfer, US 2003/0057709. Regarding claim 1, Hupfer discloses an armrest assembly mounted on a console of a vehicle, comprising: a console main body (4) provided with a storage box (6) in which a space (8) is formed, the console main body being installed between a driver seat and a passenger seat of a vehicle [0012]; an armrest (3) pivotably connected to the storage box, the armrest being configured to support an arm of a passenger riding in the vehicle, and the armrest further being configured to open and close an upper portion of the storage box; a button member (14) connected to the console main body and configured to be operated by the passenger to unlock the armrest; an operating unit (13) configured to lock or unlock the armrest from the console main body when button member is operated; and a console cover (Forward portion of 4)configured to cover a portion in which the button member and the operating unit are installed in the console main body, the console cover further configured to expose an upper end of the button member; wherein an upper end of the armrest, a surface of the console cover, and the upper end of the button member are disposed on the same surface from the armrest to the console cover (Fig.",
"1, 2). Regarding claim 3, Hupfer discloses the button member (14) is slidably connected to the console main body (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 4, Hupfer discloses a button guide (20) configured to guide sliding of the button member in the console main body [0017]. Regarding claim 5, Hupfer discloses the operating unit includes a locking hook (15) pivotably installed in the console main body and configured to lock one side of the armrest, and unlock the armrest when an operating force is transferred from the button member (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 6, Hupfer discloses the locking hook is (15) elastically supported to be pivoted in a direction of locking the armrest (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]).",
"Regarding claim 11, Hupfer discloses the button member (14) includes: a button knob having an upper end exposed to the console cover and configured to be operated by the passenger; and a button rod (25) formed to extend from the button knob in a sliding direction of the button member and configured to transfer the operating force input to the button knob to the operating unit (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]). Regarding claim 12, Hupfer discloses a hook-catching part (12) to which an end portion of the locking hook (15) is caught and fixed is formed in the armrest (Fig. 1, 2; [0015-0017]).",
"Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.",
"Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim 2 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Hupfer. Regarding claim 2, Hupfer discloses all of the limitations of claim 1 as above, and shows the same surface on which the upper end of the armrest, the surface of the console cover, and the upper end of the button member are disposed is a substantially planar surface but does not show these elements arranged on a curved surface. It would have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to modify the armrest assembly as shown by Hupfer by providing the upper end of the armrest, the surface of the console cover, and the upper end of the button member disposed on a curved surface, since it has been held that a change in the shape of a prior art device is a design consideration within the level of skill of one skilled in the art.",
"In re Dailey, 149 USPQ 47 (CCPA 1966). Allowable Subject Matter Claims 7-10 and 13-19 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Claim 20 is allowed. Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon, but considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure is listed on the attached PTO-892. The cited references all disclose related vehicle armrest assembly latching structures.",
"Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to E TURNER HICKS whose telephone number is (571)272-4739. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 9:00-5:00. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Glenn Dayoan can be reached on (571) 272-6659. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free).",
"If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /ETH/ Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3612 /D Glenn Dayoan/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 3612"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-07-24.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions Applicant’s election without traverse of claims 1-17 in the reply filed on July 23, 2021 is acknowledged. Claims 18-22 and 23-27 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to nonelected inventions, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on July 23, 2021.
Priority Applicant’s claim for the benefit of domestic prior-filed application 62/505,106 filed on May 11, 2017 under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) or under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) is acknowledged. Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 (a)-(d) under Application Number PCT/US18/32173, filed on May 10, 2018.
Information Disclosure Statement The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on November 11, 2019 was filed before the mailing date of the first action on the merits. The submission is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner.
Status of Claims This first action on the merits is in response to the election filed on July 23, 2021, for the application filed on November 11, 2019. Claims 1-17 are pending and have been examined.
Claim Objections Claim 8 is objected to because of the following informalities: Line 3: “a social media account associated with to a gift sender” should read “a social media account associated with a gift sender” Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b) The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
Claims 6-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention.
Claim 6 recites: “periodically transmitting.” The term "periodically" in claim 6 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term "periodically" is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Therefore, claim 6 is rejected. Examiner will interpret “periodically transmitting” as “transmitting.”
Claim 7 recites: “immediately upon acceptance of the gift card.” The term "immediately" in claim 7 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term "immediately" is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Therefore, claim 7 is rejected. Claims 8-9 inherit the deficiencies of claim 7, and are therefore also rejected. immediately upon acceptance of the gift card” as “upon acceptance of the gift card.”
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. The claim(s) recite(s) an abstract idea. This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception.
Under Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo test the claims are directed to statutory categories. Specifically, the method, as claimed in claims 1-17, is directed to a process. While the claims fall within a statutory category, under revised Step 2A, Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, hereinafter referred to as the “2019 PEG”, the claimed invention recites the abstract idea of product advertising. Specifically, representative claim 1 recites the abstract idea of: initiating a gift card purchase by a purchaser via interaction with a gift card service; transmitting, by the gift card service, an initial gift notification to a recipient, the initial gift notification comprising: identification of the purchaser, and information descriptive of one or more redemption locations at which a supplemental gift notification may be delivered; wherein the initial gift notification excludes additional description of the gift to be subsequently provided in the supplemental gift notification; detecting, by the recipient, the presence associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, the recipient reporting the detection to the gift card service; and transmitting, by the gift card service, a supplemental gift notification to the recipient, the supplemental gift notification comprising the additional description of the gift excluded from the initial gift notification. Under revised Step 2A, Prong 1 of the 2019 PEG, it is necessary to evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception by referring to subject matter groupings articulated in the guidance. When considering the 2019 PEG, the claims recite an abstract idea. For example, representative claim 1 recites the abstract idea of product advertising, as noted above. This concept is considered to be a certain method of organizing human activity. Certain methods of organizing human activity are defined by the 2019 PEG as including “fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” In this case, the abstract idea recited in representative claim 1 is a certain method of organizing human activity because organizing a gift card purchase is a sales activity. Thus, representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Under revised Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 PEG, if it is determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, it is then necessary to evaluate whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application of that exception. In this case, representative claim 1 includes additional elements such as an electronic gift card purchase, one or more network-connected servers, a recipient personal electronic device, and a nearby wireless beacon. Although reciting additional elements, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they merely amount to no more than a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use. The courts have identified various examples of limitations as merely indicating a field of use/technological environment in which to FairWarning v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly, specifying that the abstract idea of product advertising occurs within an electronic world merely indicates a field of use in which to apply the abstract idea because this requirement merely limits the claims to the computer field, i.e., to execution on a generic computer. As such, representative claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Under Step 2B of the 2019 PEG, if it is determined that the claims recite a judicial exception that is not integrated into a practical application of that exception, it is then necessary to evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself). In this case, as noted above, the additional elements recited in independent claim 1 are recited and described in a generic manner merely amount to no more than a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use. Even when considered as an ordered combination, the additional elements of representative claim 1 do not add anything that is not already present when they considered individually. In Alice, the court considered the additional elements “as an ordered combination,” and determined that “the computer components ... ‘ad[d] nothing ... that is not already present when the steps are considered separately’" and simply recite intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer." Id. (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 101 USPQ2d at 1972). Similarly, when viewed as a whole, representative claim 1 simply conveys the abstract idea itself facilitated by generic computing components. Therefore, under Step 2B of the Alice/Mayo test, there are no meaningful limitations in representative claim 1 that transforms the judicial exception into a patent eligible application such that the claims amount to significantly more than the judicial exception itself.
Dependent claims 2-17 do not aid in the eligibility of independent claim 1. For example, claims 5, 7, 10, and 14-17 merely further define the abstract limitations of claim 1. Additionally, claims 2-4, 6, 8-9, and 11-12 merely provide further embellishments of the limitations recited in independent claim 1. Furthermore, it is noted that claims 7-14 and 17 include additional elements of an electronic account, a personal electronic device associated with the gift sender, a mobile app, a camera integrated within the recipient personal electronic device, a nearby wireless beacon associated with one or more interim locations, and a retailer electronic device. However, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they merely amount to a general link to a particular technological environment or field of use. These additional elements are merely generic elements and are likewise described in a generic manner in Applicant’s specification. Additionally, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more because they merely amount to a general link to a particular technological environment or field of use. Thus, dependent claims 2-17 are also ineligible.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being obvious over Isaacson et. al. (US 20120245987 A1, herein referred to as Isaacson), in view of Meyyappan et. al. (US 20210019797 A1, herein referred to as Meyyappan).
With respect to claim 1, Isaacson discloses: A method for implementing the exchange of electronic gift cards, comprising {Isaacson, see at least: figs 2A, 3; [0017] a method aspect of this disclosure includes receiving an identification of a giver of a gift card and a recipient of the gift card}: initiating an electronic gift card purchase by a purchaser via interaction with a gift card service comprising one or more network-connected servers {Isaacson, see at least: fig 3; fig 22, #2210; [0127] The system receives an identification of a giver of a gift card and a recipient of the gift card at a first time (302); [0096] Assume that a giver desires to give a $50 virtual gift card to a recipient. The interface 202 enables the giver to either input identification information and recipient account information or have it prepopulated based on a previous login … The system 100 identifies, via the giver selection, a predictive approach, or some other approach, a recipient … and an amount that the giver desires to give to the recipient. The recipient credit/debit card data/account is identified via a secure communication to a database or inserted by the giver or recipient if necessary or possible. Through one or more different methods, the giver account and recipient account are identified; [0099] The giver can click a "give" button that begins the transaction. Upon triggering the transaction, information is transmitted to block 204 that will withdraw, hold the amount ($50), or reserve in a line of credit from a giver account and associate it with the recipient credit/debit card account and the policy for managing the gift card; [0088] It can be appreciated that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100 with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability; [0089] The basic components are known to those of skill in the art and appropriate variations are contemplated depending on the type of device, such as whether the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a desktop computer, or a computer server}; transmitting, by the gift card service, an initial gift notification to a recipient personal electronic device associated with a recipient, the initial gift notification comprising {Isaacson, see at least: fig 2, #206; fig 3, #306; [0101] the information received from block 202 can identify a recipient account such : identification of the purchaser, and information descriptive of one or more redemption locations at which a supplemental gift notification may be delivered {Isaacson, see at least: [0101] Optional block 206 involves sending a notice to the recipient ... One example notification simply states "George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden, please use your Visa and $50 will be applied to your purchase at Olive Garden."}; wherein the initial gift notification excludes additional description of the gift to be subsequently provided in the supplemental gift notification {Isaacson, see at least: fig 27; [0231] The system first receives, from a giver, a first identification of a recipient and a second identification of a gift object costing an indeterminate amount of money at a first time (2702). The system optionally determines an estimated maximum amount of money of the gift object (2704). The system can also optionally confirm with the giver that the estimated maximum amount of money is acceptable as a gift card (2706). The system reserves the estimated maximum amount of money from a giver account (2708). The system identifies a recipient payment mode (2710). Upon the recipient using the recipient payment mode to make a purchase of the gift object at a second time that is later than the first time (2712), the system ; the recipient personal electronic device reporting to one or more of the servers associated with the gift card service {Isaacson, see at least: fig 1; figs 4A-4B; fig 15B; fig 19; fig 26, #2604, 2614; [0088] It can be appreciated that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100 with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability; [0089] The basic components are known to those of skill in the art and appropriate variations are contemplated depending on the type of device, such as whether the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a desktop computer, or a computer server}; and transmitting, by the gift card service, a supplemental gift notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the supplemental gift notification comprising the additional description of the gift excluded from the initial gift notification {Isaacson, see at least: fig 2, #212; fig 3, #312; [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction. One example of this step includes providing information on a physical receipt associated with the qualifying transaction; [0130] An optional feature is the system providing a notification to the giver and/or the recipient (312); [0131] The system can receive an identification of a giver of a gift card and a recipient of the gift card, and associate the giver with a giver account and the recipient with a recipient account. The system can associate a policy with the gift card and monitor transactions of the recipient using the recipient account. Then the system can receive information based on the monitoring that the recipient has made a transaction using the recipient account according to the policy, and apply an amount of money from the giver account for the transaction according to the policy; [0231] Upon the recipient using the recipient payment mode to make a purchase of the gift object at a second time that is later than the first time (2712), the system identifies an actual cost of the . Although disclosing a method for sending gift cards from a purchaser to a recipient, Isaacson does not disclose: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the beacon detection to one or more of the servers. However, Meyyappan teaches: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the beacon detection {Meyyappan, see at least: [0021] Some merchants include locator beacons 146. The locator beacons 146 broadcast unique identifiers that, when received by a user device 106, allow the user device 106 to transmit its location as wi2151thin the merchant 108 (i.e., within a brick and mortar location of the merchant 108); [0034] The user is determined to be within a proximity of a merchant at 1104. The social media computing system 102 determines that the user is within proximity of the merchant 108; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106}.
With respect to claim 2, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: in which the supplemental gift notification comprises a description of a specific dollar amount of the gift card {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction; [0134] Notifications can include a description of an object of the purchase to which the amount of money was applied, a purchase time, a purchase date, and a merchant; [0245] The control engine has the information associated with the management of the virtual gift card such that communication can occur with the recipient via email, text messages, and so forth to notify the recipient of $15 remaining in the virtual gift card}.
With respect to claim 3, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: in which the supplemental gift notification comprises a description of an item for which the gift card may be redeemed {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction. One example of this step includes providing information on a physical receipt associated with the qualifying transaction; [0132] The condition that dictates the policy can restrict the virtual gift card to a retailer, a group of retailers, a geographical region, a class of goods or services, an item, a time range, a date range, and/or a maximum per-transaction value; [0149] the amount can be a gift card including a restriction to a purchase of any .
With respect to claim 4, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: in which the supplemental gift notification comprises an identification of a retailer at which the gift card may be redeemed {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] The after purchase notification can also include details about the policy for any remainder amount. The notice can state "I hope you enjoyed your Olive Garden Gift Card! You have $15 remaining on this gift card for your next Olive Garden purchase"; [0134] Notifications can include a description of an object of the purchase to which the amount of money was applied, a purchase time, a purchase date, and a merchant}.
With respect to claim 5, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: at the time of delivery of the supplemental gift notification, querying the recipient for acceptance or rejection of the gift card {Isaacson, see at least: [0103] the email can provide some information such as "George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden. Do you know George and do you want to accept this gift card?" The system can require the recipient to click a confirmation button link or perform some other interaction to confirm that the recipient desires to use the gift card; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; upon acceptance of the gift card, delivering a value associated with the gift card to a gift card collection associated with the recipient {Isaacson, see at least: fig 7; [0103] the email can provide some information such as "George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden. Do you know George and do you want to accept this gift card?" The system can require the recipient to click a confirmation button link or perform some other interaction to confirm that the recipient desires to use the gift card; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc}; and upon rejection of the gift card, delivering a value associated with the gift card to a gift card collection associated with the purchaser {Isaacson, see at least: figs 7-8; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0270] amounts not used will be processed as disclosed herein to be returned either to the giver payment account or the recipient payment account or for other purposes according to the policy; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc}. Although disclosing accepting or rejecting the gift card, Isaacson does not disclose: a card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: a card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included the mobile wallet as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users 104 to send payments … to other users and to the merchants 108. (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).
With respect to claim 6, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: transmitting, by the gift card service to the recipient, reminder notifications of one or more gift cards available within the gift card associated with the recipient {Isaacson, see at least: fig 5E; fig 10, #1004, 1008; [0171] additional optional actions which can be taken, such as send a message, send a reminder or suggestion, or any other additional communication option for the giver to communicate with the recipient; [0173] A system configured to practice the method identifies a user, which can be a giver and/or recipient of a gift card (1002) and retrieves a list of pending gift cards associated with the user, wherein each gift card in the list is associated with a payment mode of the user such that upon the recipient using a recipient payment mode to make a purchase, an amount of money associated with one of the pending gift cards is applied to the purchase (1004). The system retrieves current status information for the list of pending gift cards (1006). The system presents at least part of the list of pending gift cards to the user (1008). Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth}. Although disclosing the reminder notifications, Isaacson does not disclose: the card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: the card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included the mobile wallet as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users 104 to send payments … to other users and to the merchants 108. (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).
With respect to claim 7, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: upon acceptance of the gift card, sending thank you note to the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0103] the email can provide some information such as "George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden. Do you know George and do you want to accept this gift card?" The system can require the recipient to click a confirmation button link or perform some other interaction to confirm that the recipient desires to use the gift card; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; and transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the . Although disclosing sending a thank you note to the gift sender, Isaacson does not disclose: querying the recipient for entry of content; and transmitting the content to an electronic account. However, Meyyappan teaches: querying the recipient for entry of content {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts. For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}; and transmitting the content to an electronic account {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts. For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}.
With respect to claim 8, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 7. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises an account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc.}; and posting content to a social media account {Isaacson, see at least: [0294] The social media message can be a tweet, a Facebook posting, a text message, a video message, an image, a tag, a friend request, metadata, and/or any other communication via a social network; [0154] a person who desires to be a gift card recipient can register their identity on VirtualGiftCard and share that identity with their friends, family, workplace, schoolmates, and even post it on Facebook or some other public forum or social network in order to elicit or otherwise promote others to give the recipient virtual gift cards; [0267] As a simple example, a social network such as Facebook can establish that posts using the word "GiveAGiftTo" trigger a gift. Thus, a giver can post "GiveAGiftTo recipient for Olive Garden for $50". Facebook can recognize the reserved word "GiveAGiftTo" and trigger a gift processing service to parse the post}.
transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender. However, Meyyappan teaches: transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request to “Snapoffers.” In the arrangement shown in FIG. 3, the message receiving account “Snapoffers” is an account with the social media service that can receive messages from other users of the social media service; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included being able to send customized messages to a social media account as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users to send and receive messages with contacts (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).
With respect to claim 9, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 7. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note content to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises transmitting the thank you note content to a personal electronic device associated with the gift sender via mobile app notification {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this .
With respect to claim 10, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: at the time of delivery of the supplemental gift notification, enabling sending thank you note to the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] Email notifications can also be provided to the giver, recipient, and/or a third party. After the giver gives the virtual gift card, the giver may desire to receive a notification when the recipient redeems the. After the giver sends the virtual gift card, the giver can receive an email that identifies that the recipient used the gift card for dinner on a certain date; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; and transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc.; [0204] multiple givers on . Although disclosing sending a thank you note to the gift sender, Isaacson does not disclose: querying the recipient for entry of content; and transmitting the content to an electronic account. However, Meyyappan teaches: querying the recipient for entry of content {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts. For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}; and transmitting the content to an electronic account {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts. For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}.
With respect to claim 11, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 10. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises an account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc.}; and posting content to a social media account {Isaacson, see at least: [0294] The social media message can be a tweet, a Facebook posting, a text message, a video message, an image, a tag, a friend request, metadata, and/or any other communication via a social network; [0154] a person who desires to be a gift card recipient can register their identity on VirtualGiftCard and share that identity with their friends, family, workplace, schoolmates, and even post it on Facebook or some other public forum or social network in order to elicit or otherwise promote others to give the recipient virtual gift cards; [0267] As a simple example, a social network such as Facebook can establish that posts using the word "GiveAGiftTo" trigger a gift. Thus, a giver can post "GiveAGiftTo recipient for Olive Garden for $50". Facebook can recognize the reserved word "GiveAGiftTo" and trigger a gift processing service to parse the post}.
transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender. However, Meyyappan teaches: transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request to “Snapoffers.” In the arrangement shown in FIG. 3, the message receiving account “Snapoffers” is an account with the social media service that can receive messages from other users of the social media service; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included being able to send customized messages to a social media account as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users to send and receive messages with contacts (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).
With respect to claim 12, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 10. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note content to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises transmitting the thank you note content to a personal electronic device associated with the gift sender via mobile app notification {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this .
With respect to claim 13, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 10. Isaacson further discloses: the thank you note {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; and an image captured by a camera integrated within the recipient personal electronic device {Isaacson, see at least: [0258] Bob can use the mobile device to capture an image of the receipt}. Although disclosing a thank you note and the ability to capture images using an electronic device, Isaacson does not disclose: in which the content comprises an image. However, Meyyappan teaches: in which the content comprises an image {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0015] The messages may include text, pictures, videos, audio, hyperlinks, and other content; [0036] a set of user interfaces (1200, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, and 1800) are shown in FIGS. 12 through 18, which demonstrate a back and forth message session that occurs while the merchant 108 is temporarily permitted to send offers to the user 104}.
With respect to claim 14, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: the recipient personal electronic device reporting to one or more of the servers associated with the gift card service {Isaacson, see at least: fig 1; figs 4A-4B; fig 15B; fig 19; fig 26, #2604, 2614; [0088] It can be appreciated that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100 with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability; [0089] The basic components are known to those of skill in the art and appropriate variations are contemplated depending on the type of device, such as whether the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a desktop computer, or a computer server}; and transmitting, by the gift card service, a gift notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the gift notification comprising information indicative of the one or more redemption locations {Isaacson, see at least: fig 2, #212; fig 3, #312; [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction. One example of this step includes providing information on a physical receipt associated with the qualifying transaction; [0130] An optional feature is the system providing a notification to the giver and/or the recipient (312); [0131] . Although disclosing personal electronic devices in connection to one or more servers associated with the gift card service and the ability to send notifications, Isaacson does not disclose: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one or more interim locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the interim location wireless beacon detection; and transmitting an interim notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the interim notification comprising information. However, Meyyappan teaches: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one or more interim locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the interim location wireless beacon detection {Meyyappan, see at least: [0021] Some merchants include locator beacons 146. The locator beacons 146 broadcast unique identifiers that, when received by a user device 106, allow the user device 106 to transmit its location as wi2151thin the merchant 108 (i.e., within a brick and mortar location of the merchant 108); [0034] The user is determined to be within a proximity of a merchant at 1104. The social media computing system 102 determines that the user is within proximity of the merchant 108; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106; [0037] Updated user location information is received at 1108. The updated user location information is received by the social media computing system 102 form the user device 106. The updated user location information may be received on a regular bases (e.g., every set period of time, continuously, etc.). The updated user location information may relate to updated beacon identifiers, updated GPS coordinates, updated cell tower location information, updated wireless network SSID information, or the like. Based on the updated user location information, the social media computing system 102 determines whether the user is still within the designated proximity of the merchant at 1110. If the user is still within the designated proximity, method 1100 returns to step 1108}; and transmitting an interim notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the interim notification comprising information {Meyyappan, see at least: [0027] The offer 502 includes an identification of the merchant (“MERCH”), an identification of the price (“$9.99), an indication of the offer's expiration (“15 minutes”), and an invitation for the user to accept or reject the offer by replying to the message containing the offer. Referring again to FIG. 2, after transmitting the offer at 210, the transmitted offer is marked as sent at 212; [0028] the computing system 102 determines whether to . It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included sending merchant offers based on location as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to present new opportunities for merchants to reach a large customer base (Meyyappan, see: [0002]).
With respect to claim 15, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: upon rejection of the gift card, querying the gift giver for identification of a new recipient for the gift {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver ... The portal can provide a way for the recipient to identify a regifting recipient and transfer all or part of the remaining balance to the regifting recipient as a new virtual gift card. The recipient can also add an amount to bump up the amount to a round number ... Such opportunity may be set by the giver, system, or any appropriate entity. All the options disclosed herein for a giver are available to the recipient (as a new giver) who is regifting all or a portion of a received gift card to a new recipient}.
With respect to claim 16, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: upon expiration of a predetermined time period following acceptance of the gift card during which the gift card is not redeemed, returning the gift to the purchaser by the gift card service by transferring the gift card from the gift card collection associated with the recipient to the gift card collection associated with the purchaser {Isaacson, see at least: [0165] Each policy can include an expiration date after which the policy is not enforced; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0270] Remainder amounts not used will be processed as disclosed herein to be returned either to the giver payment account or the recipient payment account or for other purposes according to the policy}. Although disclosing an expiration date and the transfer of the gift card back to the sender, Isaacson does not disclose: the card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: the card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included the mobile wallet as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users 104 to send payments … to other users and to the merchants 108. (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).
With respect to claim 17, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: transmitting, from the gift card service to a retailer electronic device, a notification of the presence at a retailer location, the notification further comprising indication of a gift card available within a recipient gift card collection available for redemption at the retailer location {Isaacson, see at least: [0112] The system can notify the merchant from which the recipient is making the purchase, such as Red Lobster. Location-based services can identify that the recipient of a Red Lobster gift card is at a Red Lobster location. The notification can inform the wait staff at Red Lobster that it is the recipient's birthday and request that they sing "Happy Birthday" to the recipient. Alternatively, the notification to the merchant can provide some information regarding recipient preferences for food, products, or service, such as "the recipient prefers Diet Coke with no ice". Then the wait staff can act on the notification information to provide customized service to the recipient in such a way that the experience is a pleasant surprise to the recipient. In this manner, the merchant can know of people who are at their location and have gift cards}. Although disclosing notifications for available gift cards, Isaacson does not disclose: in which the step of detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, further comprises: transmitting the presence of the recipient's personal electronic device at a retailer location associated with the wireless beacon, and the card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: in which the step of detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, further comprises {Meyyappan, see at least: [0021] Some merchants include locator beacons 146. The locator beacons 146 broadcast unique identifiers that, when received by a user device 106, allow the user device 106 to transmit its location as wi2151thin the merchant 108 (i.e., within a brick and mortar location of the : transmitting a presence of the recipient's personal electronic device at a retailer location associated with the wireless beacon {Meyyappan, see at least: [0034] The user is determined to be within a proximity of a merchant at 1104. The social media computing system 102 determines that the user is within proximity of the merchant 108}, and the card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included beacons determining a presence of the electronic device as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to permit a merchant to send an offer to a user of a social media platform based on a location (Meyyappan, see: [0033]).
Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure: Perez (2012 NPL) was used to understand the convenience of accessing and storing gift cards using mobile phones in place of physical gift cards. Zamer (US 20160086249 A1) was used to understand how a system may suggests gifts to buy based on a user’s location in a store.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KATHERINE A BARLOW whose telephone number is (571)272-5820. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Thurs 8:00am-6:00pm EST. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Marissa Thein can be reached on (571) 272-6764. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a
/KATHERINE A BARLOW/ Examiner, Art Unit 3625 /ALLISON G WOOD/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3625 | 2021-08-15T10:54:42 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Election/Restrictions Applicant’s election without traverse of claims 1-17 in the reply filed on July 23, 2021 is acknowledged. Claims 18-22 and 23-27 are withdrawn from further consideration pursuant to 37 CFR 1.142(b) as being drawn to nonelected inventions, there being no allowable generic or linking claim. Election was made without traverse in the reply filed on July 23, 2021. Priority Applicant’s claim for the benefit of domestic prior-filed application 62/505,106 filed on May 11, 2017 under 35 U.S.C. 119(e) or under 35 U.S.C. 120, 121, 365(c), or 386(c) is acknowledged. Acknowledgment is made of applicant’s claim for foreign priority under 35 U.S.C. 119 (a)-(d) under Application Number PCT/US18/32173, filed on May 10, 2018.",
"Information Disclosure Statement The information disclosure statement (IDS) submitted on November 11, 2019 was filed before the mailing date of the first action on the merits. The submission is in compliance with the provisions of 37 CFR 1.97. Accordingly, the information disclosure statement is being considered by the examiner. Status of Claims This first action on the merits is in response to the election filed on July 23, 2021, for the application filed on November 11, 2019. Claims 1-17 are pending and have been examined. Claim Objections Claim 8 is objected to because of the following informalities: Line 3: “a social media account associated with to a gift sender” should read “a social media account associated with a gift sender” Appropriate correction is required.",
"Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 112(b) The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112(b): (b) CONCLUSION.—The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph: The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention. Claims 6-9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 112(b) or 35 U.S.C. 112 (pre-AIA ), second paragraph, as being indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which the inventor or a joint inventor (or for applications subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 112, the applicant), regards as the invention. Claim 6 recites: “periodically transmitting.” The term \"periodically\" in claim 6 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite.",
"The term \"periodically\" is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Therefore, claim 6 is rejected. Examiner will interpret “periodically transmitting” as “transmitting.” Claim 7 recites: “immediately upon acceptance of the gift card.” The term \"immediately\" in claim 7 is a relative term which renders the claim indefinite. The term \"immediately\" is not defined by the claim, the specification does not provide a standard for ascertaining the requisite degree, and one of ordinary skill in the art would not be reasonably apprised of the scope of the invention. Therefore, claim 7 is rejected. Claims 8-9 inherit the deficiencies of claim 7, and are therefore also rejected. immediately upon acceptance of the gift card” as “upon acceptance of the gift card.” Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 35 U.S.C.",
"101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. Claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. The claim(s) recite(s) an abstract idea. This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. The claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. Under Step 1 of the Alice/Mayo test the claims are directed to statutory categories.",
"Specifically, the method, as claimed in claims 1-17, is directed to a process. While the claims fall within a statutory category, under revised Step 2A, Prong 1 of the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, hereinafter referred to as the “2019 PEG”, the claimed invention recites the abstract idea of product advertising. Specifically, representative claim 1 recites the abstract idea of: initiating a gift card purchase by a purchaser via interaction with a gift card service; transmitting, by the gift card service, an initial gift notification to a recipient, the initial gift notification comprising: identification of the purchaser, and information descriptive of one or more redemption locations at which a supplemental gift notification may be delivered; wherein the initial gift notification excludes additional description of the gift to be subsequently provided in the supplemental gift notification; detecting, by the recipient, the presence associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, the recipient reporting the detection to the gift card service; and transmitting, by the gift card service, a supplemental gift notification to the recipient, the supplemental gift notification comprising the additional description of the gift excluded from the initial gift notification.",
"Under revised Step 2A, Prong 1 of the 2019 PEG, it is necessary to evaluate whether the claim recites a judicial exception by referring to subject matter groupings articulated in the guidance. When considering the 2019 PEG, the claims recite an abstract idea. For example, representative claim 1 recites the abstract idea of product advertising, as noted above. This concept is considered to be a certain method of organizing human activity. Certain methods of organizing human activity are defined by the 2019 PEG as including “fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” In this case, the abstract idea recited in representative claim 1 is a certain method of organizing human activity because organizing a gift card purchase is a sales activity. Thus, representative claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Under revised Step 2A, Prong 2 of the 2019 PEG, if it is determined that the claims recite a judicial exception, it is then necessary to evaluate whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application of that exception. In this case, representative claim 1 includes additional elements such as an electronic gift card purchase, one or more network-connected servers, a recipient personal electronic device, and a nearby wireless beacon.",
"Although reciting additional elements, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they merely amount to no more than a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use. The courts have identified various examples of limitations as merely indicating a field of use/technological environment in which to FairWarning v. Iatric Sys., 839 F.3d 1089, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Similarly, specifying that the abstract idea of product advertising occurs within an electronic world merely indicates a field of use in which to apply the abstract idea because this requirement merely limits the claims to the computer field, i.e., to execution on a generic computer. As such, representative claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.",
"Under Step 2B of the 2019 PEG, if it is determined that the claims recite a judicial exception that is not integrated into a practical application of that exception, it is then necessary to evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself). In this case, as noted above, the additional elements recited in independent claim 1 are recited and described in a generic manner merely amount to no more than a general link of the use of the abstract idea to a particular technological environment or field of use. Even when considered as an ordered combination, the additional elements of representative claim 1 do not add anything that is not already present when they considered individually. In Alice, the court considered the additional elements “as an ordered combination,” and determined that “the computer components ... ‘ad[d] nothing ... that is not already present when the steps are considered separately’\" and simply recite intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer.\" Id.",
"(citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79, 101 USPQ2d at 1972). Similarly, when viewed as a whole, representative claim 1 simply conveys the abstract idea itself facilitated by generic computing components. Therefore, under Step 2B of the Alice/Mayo test, there are no meaningful limitations in representative claim 1 that transforms the judicial exception into a patent eligible application such that the claims amount to significantly more than the judicial exception itself. Dependent claims 2-17 do not aid in the eligibility of independent claim 1. For example, claims 5, 7, 10, and 14-17 merely further define the abstract limitations of claim 1. Additionally, claims 2-4, 6, 8-9, and 11-12 merely provide further embellishments of the limitations recited in independent claim 1. Furthermore, it is noted that claims 7-14 and 17 include additional elements of an electronic account, a personal electronic device associated with the gift sender, a mobile app, a camera integrated within the recipient personal electronic device, a nearby wireless beacon associated with one or more interim locations, and a retailer electronic device.",
"However, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they merely amount to a general link to a particular technological environment or field of use. These additional elements are merely generic elements and are likewise described in a generic manner in Applicant’s specification. Additionally, the additional elements do not amount to significantly more because they merely amount to a general link to a particular technological environment or field of use. Thus, dependent claims 2-17 are also ineligible. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C.",
"102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C.",
"103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. Claims 1-17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being obvious over Isaacson et. al. (US 20120245987 A1, herein referred to as Isaacson), in view of Meyyappan et. al. (US 20210019797 A1, herein referred to as Meyyappan). With respect to claim 1, Isaacson discloses: A method for implementing the exchange of electronic gift cards, comprising {Isaacson, see at least: figs 2A, 3; [0017] a method aspect of this disclosure includes receiving an identification of a giver of a gift card and a recipient of the gift card}: initiating an electronic gift card purchase by a purchaser via interaction with a gift card service comprising one or more network-connected servers {Isaacson, see at least: fig 3; fig 22, #2210; [0127] The system receives an identification of a giver of a gift card and a recipient of the gift card at a first time (302); [0096] Assume that a giver desires to give a $50 virtual gift card to a recipient. The interface 202 enables the giver to either input identification information and recipient account information or have it prepopulated based on a previous login … The system 100 identifies, via the giver selection, a predictive approach, or some other approach, a recipient … and an amount that the giver desires to give to the recipient. The recipient credit/debit card data/account is identified via a secure communication to a database or inserted by the giver or recipient if necessary or possible.",
"Through one or more different methods, the giver account and recipient account are identified; [0099] The giver can click a \"give\" button that begins the transaction. Upon triggering the transaction, information is transmitted to block 204 that will withdraw, hold the amount ($50), or reserve in a line of credit from a giver account and associate it with the recipient credit/debit card account and the policy for managing the gift card; [0088] It can be appreciated that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100 with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability; [0089] The basic components are known to those of skill in the art and appropriate variations are contemplated depending on the type of device, such as whether the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a desktop computer, or a computer server}; transmitting, by the gift card service, an initial gift notification to a recipient personal electronic device associated with a recipient, the initial gift notification comprising {Isaacson, see at least: fig 2, #206; fig 3, #306; [0101] the information received from block 202 can identify a recipient account such : identification of the purchaser, and information descriptive of one or more redemption locations at which a supplemental gift notification may be delivered {Isaacson, see at least: [0101] Optional block 206 involves sending a notice to the recipient ... One example notification simply states \"George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden, please use your Visa and $50 will be applied to your purchase at Olive Garden.",
"\"}; wherein the initial gift notification excludes additional description of the gift to be subsequently provided in the supplemental gift notification {Isaacson, see at least: fig 27; [0231] The system first receives, from a giver, a first identification of a recipient and a second identification of a gift object costing an indeterminate amount of money at a first time (2702). The system optionally determines an estimated maximum amount of money of the gift object (2704). The system can also optionally confirm with the giver that the estimated maximum amount of money is acceptable as a gift card (2706). The system reserves the estimated maximum amount of money from a giver account (2708). The system identifies a recipient payment mode (2710). Upon the recipient using the recipient payment mode to make a purchase of the gift object at a second time that is later than the first time (2712), the system ; the recipient personal electronic device reporting to one or more of the servers associated with the gift card service {Isaacson, see at least: fig 1; figs 4A-4B; fig 15B; fig 19; fig 26, #2604, 2614; [0088] It can be appreciated that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100 with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability; [0089] The basic components are known to those of skill in the art and appropriate variations are contemplated depending on the type of device, such as whether the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a desktop computer, or a computer server}; and transmitting, by the gift card service, a supplemental gift notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the supplemental gift notification comprising the additional description of the gift excluded from the initial gift notification {Isaacson, see at least: fig 2, #212; fig 3, #312; [0122] Feature 212 of FIG.",
"2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction. One example of this step includes providing information on a physical receipt associated with the qualifying transaction; [0130] An optional feature is the system providing a notification to the giver and/or the recipient (312); [0131] The system can receive an identification of a giver of a gift card and a recipient of the gift card, and associate the giver with a giver account and the recipient with a recipient account.",
"The system can associate a policy with the gift card and monitor transactions of the recipient using the recipient account. Then the system can receive information based on the monitoring that the recipient has made a transaction using the recipient account according to the policy, and apply an amount of money from the giver account for the transaction according to the policy; [0231] Upon the recipient using the recipient payment mode to make a purchase of the gift object at a second time that is later than the first time (2712), the system identifies an actual cost of the . Although disclosing a method for sending gift cards from a purchaser to a recipient, Isaacson does not disclose: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the beacon detection to one or more of the servers. However, Meyyappan teaches: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the beacon detection {Meyyappan, see at least: [0021] Some merchants include locator beacons 146.",
"The locator beacons 146 broadcast unique identifiers that, when received by a user device 106, allow the user device 106 to transmit its location as wi2151thin the merchant 108 (i.e., within a brick and mortar location of the merchant 108); [0034] The user is determined to be within a proximity of a merchant at 1104. The social media computing system 102 determines that the user is within proximity of the merchant 108; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106}.",
"With respect to claim 2, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: in which the supplemental gift notification comprises a description of a specific dollar amount of the gift card {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction; [0134] Notifications can include a description of an object of the purchase to which the amount of money was applied, a purchase time, a purchase date, and a merchant; [0245] The control engine has the information associated with the management of the virtual gift card such that communication can occur with the recipient via email, text messages, and so forth to notify the recipient of $15 remaining in the virtual gift card}. With respect to claim 3, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: in which the supplemental gift notification comprises a description of an item for which the gift card may be redeemed {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction.",
"One example of this step includes providing information on a physical receipt associated with the qualifying transaction; [0132] The condition that dictates the policy can restrict the virtual gift card to a retailer, a group of retailers, a geographical region, a class of goods or services, an item, a time range, a date range, and/or a maximum per-transaction value; [0149] the amount can be a gift card including a restriction to a purchase of any . With respect to claim 4, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: in which the supplemental gift notification comprises an identification of a retailer at which the gift card may be redeemed {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] The after purchase notification can also include details about the policy for any remainder amount. The notice can state \"I hope you enjoyed your Olive Garden Gift Card!",
"You have $15 remaining on this gift card for your next Olive Garden purchase\"; [0134] Notifications can include a description of an object of the purchase to which the amount of money was applied, a purchase time, a purchase date, and a merchant}. With respect to claim 5, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: at the time of delivery of the supplemental gift notification, querying the recipient for acceptance or rejection of the gift card {Isaacson, see at least: [0103] the email can provide some information such as \"George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden. Do you know George and do you want to accept this gift card?\" The system can require the recipient to click a confirmation button link or perform some other interaction to confirm that the recipient desires to use the gift card; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; upon acceptance of the gift card, delivering a value associated with the gift card to a gift card collection associated with the recipient {Isaacson, see at least: fig 7; [0103] the email can provide some information such as \"George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden.",
"Do you know George and do you want to accept this gift card?\" The system can require the recipient to click a confirmation button link or perform some other interaction to confirm that the recipient desires to use the gift card; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc}; and upon rejection of the gift card, delivering a value associated with the gift card to a gift card collection associated with the purchaser {Isaacson, see at least: figs 7-8; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0270] amounts not used will be processed as disclosed herein to be returned either to the giver payment account or the recipient payment account or for other purposes according to the policy; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth.",
"In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc}. Although disclosing accepting or rejecting the gift card, Isaacson does not disclose: a card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: a card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included the mobile wallet as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users 104 to send payments … to other users and to the merchants 108. (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).",
"With respect to claim 6, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: transmitting, by the gift card service to the recipient, reminder notifications of one or more gift cards available within the gift card associated with the recipient {Isaacson, see at least: fig 5E; fig 10, #1004, 1008; [0171] additional optional actions which can be taken, such as send a message, send a reminder or suggestion, or any other additional communication option for the giver to communicate with the recipient; [0173] A system configured to practice the method identifies a user, which can be a giver and/or recipient of a gift card (1002) and retrieves a list of pending gift cards associated with the user, wherein each gift card in the list is associated with a payment mode of the user such that upon the recipient using a recipient payment mode to make a purchase, an amount of money associated with one of the pending gift cards is applied to the purchase (1004). The system retrieves current status information for the list of pending gift cards (1006). The system presents at least part of the list of pending gift cards to the user (1008).",
"Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth}. Although disclosing the reminder notifications, Isaacson does not disclose: the card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: the card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included the mobile wallet as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users 104 to send payments … to other users and to the merchants 108. (Meyyappan, see: [0015]). With respect to claim 7, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: upon acceptance of the gift card, sending thank you note to the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0103] the email can provide some information such as \"George has given you a $50 virtual gift card to Olive Garden.",
"Do you know George and do you want to accept this gift card?\" The system can require the recipient to click a confirmation button link or perform some other interaction to confirm that the recipient desires to use the gift card; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; and transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the .",
"Although disclosing sending a thank you note to the gift sender, Isaacson does not disclose: querying the recipient for entry of content; and transmitting the content to an electronic account. However, Meyyappan teaches: querying the recipient for entry of content {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts. For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}; and transmitting the content to an electronic account {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts. For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}.",
"With respect to claim 8, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 7. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises an account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc. }; and posting content to a social media account {Isaacson, see at least: [0294] The social media message can be a tweet, a Facebook posting, a text message, a video message, an image, a tag, a friend request, metadata, and/or any other communication via a social network; [0154] a person who desires to be a gift card recipient can register their identity on VirtualGiftCard and share that identity with their friends, family, workplace, schoolmates, and even post it on Facebook or some other public forum or social network in order to elicit or otherwise promote others to give the recipient virtual gift cards; [0267] As a simple example, a social network such as Facebook can establish that posts using the word \"GiveAGiftTo\" trigger a gift. Thus, a giver can post \"GiveAGiftTo recipient for Olive Garden for $50\".",
"Facebook can recognize the reserved word \"GiveAGiftTo\" and trigger a gift processing service to parse the post}. transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender. However, Meyyappan teaches: transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request to “Snapoffers.” In the arrangement shown in FIG. 3, the message receiving account “Snapoffers” is an account with the social media service that can receive messages from other users of the social media service; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes}.",
"It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included being able to send customized messages to a social media account as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users to send and receive messages with contacts (Meyyappan, see: [0015]). With respect to claim 9, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 7. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note content to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises transmitting the thank you note content to a personal electronic device associated with the gift sender via mobile app notification {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this . With respect to claim 10, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: at the time of delivery of the supplemental gift notification, enabling sending thank you note to the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0122] Email notifications can also be provided to the giver, recipient, and/or a third party. After the giver gives the virtual gift card, the giver may desire to receive a notification when the recipient redeems the.",
"After the giver sends the virtual gift card, the giver can receive an email that identifies that the recipient used the gift card for dinner on a certain date; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; and transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth. In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc.",
"; [0204] multiple givers on . Although disclosing sending a thank you note to the gift sender, Isaacson does not disclose: querying the recipient for entry of content; and transmitting the content to an electronic account. However, Meyyappan teaches: querying the recipient for entry of content {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts.",
"For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}; and transmitting the content to an electronic account {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106; [0015] The social media platform, for example, allows the users 104 to send and receive messages with contacts.",
"For example, a first user of the social media platform that is a registered contact with a second user of the social media platform can send messages to the second user}. With respect to claim 11, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 10. Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises an account associated with the gift sender {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this information via a virtual gift card management portal such as a web site, smart phone application, automated speech interface, and so forth.",
"In one aspect, the interface sorts the gift cards. For instance, the user can sort the gift cards by sent and received, date of the gift card, amount available or outstanding, merchant, friend, policies, etc. }; and posting content to a social media account {Isaacson, see at least: [0294] The social media message can be a tweet, a Facebook posting, a text message, a video message, an image, a tag, a friend request, metadata, and/or any other communication via a social network; [0154] a person who desires to be a gift card recipient can register their identity on VirtualGiftCard and share that identity with their friends, family, workplace, schoolmates, and even post it on Facebook or some other public forum or social network in order to elicit or otherwise promote others to give the recipient virtual gift cards; [0267] As a simple example, a social network such as Facebook can establish that posts using the word \"GiveAGiftTo\" trigger a gift. Thus, a giver can post \"GiveAGiftTo recipient for Olive Garden for $50\".",
"Facebook can recognize the reserved word \"GiveAGiftTo\" and trigger a gift processing service to parse the post}. transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender. However, Meyyappan teaches: transmitting the content to an account associated with the sender comprises posting the content to a social media account associated with the sender {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0023] The user can type in a request into the “send a chat” bar 302 and click the send button 304 to send an offer request to “Snapoffers.” In the arrangement shown in FIG. 3, the message receiving account “Snapoffers” is an account with the social media service that can receive messages from other users of the social media service; [0036] The user 104 responds in user interface 1300 with a message indicating that the user 104 is interested in shoes}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included being able to send customized messages to a social media account as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users to send and receive messages with contacts (Meyyappan, see: [0015]). With respect to claim 12, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 10.",
"Isaacson further discloses: in which the step of transmitting the thank you note content to an electronic account associated with the gift sender comprises transmitting the thank you note content to a personal electronic device associated with the gift sender via mobile app notification {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0173] Users can access this .",
"With respect to claim 13, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 10. Isaacson further discloses: the thank you note {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver}; and an image captured by a camera integrated within the recipient personal electronic device {Isaacson, see at least: [0258] Bob can use the mobile device to capture an image of the receipt}.",
"Although disclosing a thank you note and the ability to capture images using an electronic device, Isaacson does not disclose: in which the content comprises an image. However, Meyyappan teaches: in which the content comprises an image {Meyyappan, see at least: figs 3-10, 12-18; [0015] The messages may include text, pictures, videos, audio, hyperlinks, and other content; [0036] a set of user interfaces (1200, 1300, 1400, 1500, 1600, 1700, and 1800) are shown in FIGS.",
"12 through 18, which demonstrate a back and forth message session that occurs while the merchant 108 is temporarily permitted to send offers to the user 104}. With respect to claim 14, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: the recipient personal electronic device reporting to one or more of the servers associated with the gift card service {Isaacson, see at least: fig 1; figs 4A-4B; fig 15B; fig 19; fig 26, #2604, 2614; [0088] It can be appreciated that the disclosure may operate on a computing device 100 with more than one processor 120 or on a group or cluster of computing devices networked together to provide greater processing capability; [0089] The basic components are known to those of skill in the art and appropriate variations are contemplated depending on the type of device, such as whether the device 100 is a small, handheld computing device, a desktop computer, or a computer server}; and transmitting, by the gift card service, a gift notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the gift notification comprising information indicative of the one or more redemption locations {Isaacson, see at least: fig 2, #212; fig 3, #312; [0122] Feature 212 of FIG. 2A is an optional feature that represents a notification to the giver and/or the recipient after the transaction.",
"One example of this step includes providing information on a physical receipt associated with the qualifying transaction; [0130] An optional feature is the system providing a notification to the giver and/or the recipient (312); [0131] . Although disclosing personal electronic devices in connection to one or more servers associated with the gift card service and the ability to send notifications, Isaacson does not disclose: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one or more interim locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the interim location wireless beacon detection; and transmitting an interim notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the interim notification comprising information. However, Meyyappan teaches: detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one or more interim locations, the recipient personal electronic device reporting the interim location wireless beacon detection {Meyyappan, see at least: [0021] Some merchants include locator beacons 146. The locator beacons 146 broadcast unique identifiers that, when received by a user device 106, allow the user device 106 to transmit its location as wi2151thin the merchant 108 (i.e., within a brick and mortar location of the merchant 108); [0034] The user is determined to be within a proximity of a merchant at 1104.",
"The social media computing system 102 determines that the user is within proximity of the merchant 108; [0035] Direct communication between the merchant and the user via the social networking platform is temporarily enabled at 1106. The social media computing system 102 enables the merchant 108 to send messages with offers to the user 106; [0037] Updated user location information is received at 1108. The updated user location information is received by the social media computing system 102 form the user device 106.",
"The updated user location information may be received on a regular bases (e.g., every set period of time, continuously, etc.). The updated user location information may relate to updated beacon identifiers, updated GPS coordinates, updated cell tower location information, updated wireless network SSID information, or the like. Based on the updated user location information, the social media computing system 102 determines whether the user is still within the designated proximity of the merchant at 1110. If the user is still within the designated proximity, method 1100 returns to step 1108}; and transmitting an interim notification to the recipient personal electronic device, the interim notification comprising information {Meyyappan, see at least: [0027] The offer 502 includes an identification of the merchant (“MERCH”), an identification of the price (“$9.99), an indication of the offer's expiration (“15 minutes”), and an invitation for the user to accept or reject the offer by replying to the message containing the offer.",
"Referring again to FIG. 2, after transmitting the offer at 210, the transmitted offer is marked as sent at 212; [0028] the computing system 102 determines whether to . It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included sending merchant offers based on location as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to present new opportunities for merchants to reach a large customer base (Meyyappan, see: [0002]). With respect to claim 15, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: upon rejection of the gift card, querying the gift giver for identification of a new recipient for the gift {Isaacson, see at least: [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver ...",
"The portal can provide a way for the recipient to identify a regifting recipient and transfer all or part of the remaining balance to the regifting recipient as a new virtual gift card. The recipient can also add an amount to bump up the amount to a round number ... Such opportunity may be set by the giver, system, or any appropriate entity. All the options disclosed herein for a giver are available to the recipient (as a new giver) who is regifting all or a portion of a received gift card to a new recipient}. With respect to claim 16, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 5. Isaacson discloses – further comprising: upon expiration of a predetermined time period following acceptance of the gift card during which the gift card is not redeemed, returning the gift to the purchaser by the gift card service by transferring the gift card from the gift card collection associated with the recipient to the gift card collection associated with the purchaser {Isaacson, see at least: [0165] Each policy can include an expiration date after which the policy is not enforced; [0170] This interface can also include a menu for additional options, such as regifting, merging, sending a thank you message to the giver, and rejecting or returning the virtual gift card to the giver; [0270] Remainder amounts not used will be processed as disclosed herein to be returned either to the giver payment account or the recipient payment account or for other purposes according to the policy}.",
"Although disclosing an expiration date and the transfer of the gift card back to the sender, Isaacson does not disclose: the card wallet. However, Meyyappan teaches: the card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}. It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included the mobile wallet as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to allow the users 104 to send payments … to other users and to the merchants 108. (Meyyappan, see: [0015]).",
"With respect to claim 17, Isaacson and Meyyappan teach the method of claim 1. Isaacson further discloses: transmitting, from the gift card service to a retailer electronic device, a notification of the presence at a retailer location, the notification further comprising indication of a gift card available within a recipient gift card collection available for redemption at the retailer location {Isaacson, see at least: [0112] The system can notify the merchant from which the recipient is making the purchase, such as Red Lobster. Location-based services can identify that the recipient of a Red Lobster gift card is at a Red Lobster location. The notification can inform the wait staff at Red Lobster that it is the recipient's birthday and request that they sing \"Happy Birthday\" to the recipient. Alternatively, the notification to the merchant can provide some information regarding recipient preferences for food, products, or service, such as \"the recipient prefers Diet Coke with no ice\".",
"Then the wait staff can act on the notification information to provide customized service to the recipient in such a way that the experience is a pleasant surprise to the recipient. In this manner, the merchant can know of people who are at their location and have gift cards}. Although disclosing notifications for available gift cards, Isaacson does not disclose: in which the step of detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, further comprises: transmitting the presence of the recipient's personal electronic device at a retailer location associated with the wireless beacon, and the card wallet.",
"However, Meyyappan teaches: in which the step of detecting, by the recipient personal electronic device, the presence of a nearby wireless beacon associated with one of the one or more redemption locations, further comprises {Meyyappan, see at least: [0021] Some merchants include locator beacons 146. The locator beacons 146 broadcast unique identifiers that, when received by a user device 106, allow the user device 106 to transmit its location as wi2151thin the merchant 108 (i.e., within a brick and mortar location of the : transmitting a presence of the recipient's personal electronic device at a retailer location associated with the wireless beacon {Meyyappan, see at least: [0034] The user is determined to be within a proximity of a merchant at 1104. The social media computing system 102 determines that the user is within proximity of the merchant 108}, and the card wallet {Meyyappan, see at least: [0015] The payment logic allows the users 104 to send payments (e.g., via credit card, via bank account, via mobile wallet, etc.) to other users and to the merchants 108}.",
"It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was filed to have included beacons determining a presence of the electronic device as taught by Meyyappan in the gift card exchange method of Isaacson in order to permit a merchant to send an offer to a user of a social media platform based on a location (Meyyappan, see: [0033]). Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure: Perez (2012 NPL) was used to understand the convenience of accessing and storing gift cards using mobile phones in place of physical gift cards. Zamer (US 20160086249 A1) was used to understand how a system may suggests gifts to buy based on a user’s location in a store. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to KATHERINE A BARLOW whose telephone number is (571)272-5820.",
"The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Thurs 8:00am-6:00pm EST. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Marissa Thein can be reached on (571) 272-6764. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a /KATHERINE A BARLOW/ Examiner, Art Unit 3625 /ALLISON G WOOD/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3625"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2021-08-15.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Campbell, J., (dissenting). Plaintiff sued in ejectment to recover land granted by him and his ancestor to be used for railway purposes, which he claims has reverted for breach of condition in not maintaining the line across it for the purpose of running the usual trains of freight and passengers. The court below held the condition broken, and the estate forfeited. The case is substantially as follows: In 1872 the Chicago & Canada Southern Bailway Company was engaged in building a railway from Detroit river to Fayette, in Ohio, not very far south of the state line. Its course took it through Lenawee county in a general direction of *618about south, thirty degrees west, crossing the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway at Corbus, a station between two and three miles north-east of the land in question, and going through Grosvenor, a station about the same distance south-west. The Chicago & Canada Southern Railway continued to run its trains over the railway through both these places until 1879, when it became consolidated in business with the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern, which thereafter had charge of all the running arrangements. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern had a track running between Corbus and Lenawee junction, more nearly east and west, which passed through two other stations between, and another track through Lena-wee junction, passing through Grosvenor. In 1879 the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern, in runing from Detroit river to Fayette, used its own tracks between Grosvenor and Corbus, through Lenawee junction, and left off the use, for regular trains of the Canada Southern, of the space between Grosvenor and Corbus, on the original track of the latter, making no other change along either line. No station ever existed on the Canada Southern between Grosvenor and Corbus, which were the nearest stopping places to plaintiff’s land on that line. The maps do not indicate the wagon roads, but, in actual distance, one or more of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern road stations west of Corbus would seem to be about as near to plaintiff as Grosvenor or Corbus. On August 23, 1872, plaintiff and his associates in title executed to the Chicago & Canada Southern Railway Company a warranty deed of the right to enter upon-, construct, maintain, and operate its road in and upon the N. E. £ of the N. E. £ of section 16, the north £ of the N. W. £ of section 15, and all that part of the west £ o( the S. W. £ of section 10, township 7 south, of' range 5, east, that lies within fifty feet of the center line q£ said *619railway company’s track, as the same is located on the S. E. corner oí said W. i- of said section 10, and to use and occupy for its railroad a strip of land 100 feet in width across said above-described premises as the same is now located thereon by said company, except 20 feet off the north side of said right of way from the highway 10 rods west; reference being had, for a more definite description of said strip of land, to the map of the route of said company, on file in the office of the register of deeds for said county of Lenawee; said company to construct one farm crossing with cattle-guards, and one crossing with gates, upon the above-described premises; also to construct a ditch, etc. The habendum clause is— “ To have and to hold said strip of land, for the uses and purposes aforesaid and incidental thereto, to said railway company, its successors and assigns, forever.” The condition is in these words: “ If the said railway company, its successors or assigns, should fail to complete said railway through said premises, and to put the same in operation, within three years from the date hereof, or if, after such railway is completed and put into operation, it should cease to be used an<J operated as a railroad, then, in either event, this release shall cease to be operative, and the right of way granted thereunder shall terminate.” The release was made for a money consideration of $1,400. After the combination made in 1879, the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern ceased to run regular trains over the old right of way between Corbus and Gfrosvenor, over plaintiff’s land; and that track has been used almost exclusively as a side track for storage of cars. There was testimony that it was kept in repair, on which there was some conflict, and since suit brought it has been used more or less for trains. There was also testimony, which does not seem to us of any importance on this issue, *620tending to show such conduct in regard to storage of cars and neglect of local neatness, and such failure to keep the ground in good order, as created annoyance in the enjoyment of the farming premises. We have not been able to construe this deed as it appeared to the circuit judge. The doctrine is familiar that conditions of forfeiture are to be construed strictly, and cannot be enforced so as to destroy an estate, unless such is the necessary result from the language used; and our statutes have gone further, and forbidden the enforcement of forfeitures, unless the conditions are— “Of actual and substantial benefit to the party to whom, or in whose favor, they are to be performed.” How. Stat. § 5562. The right granted was for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating the railz-oad, and puz-poses “incidental thereto.” The location of the strip of 100 feet is by reference to the map of the route of the company, which covered its line through the county, if not more, under the railroad laws; and the railroad itself is one thing, and not a series of detached parcels. Neither is a company confined to a single line of rails, but it may make such intersections, side tracks, and other conveniences as business may require. Places for storage azid movement of cars are as necessary as any other facilities, and are a part of the maintenance of every road in the transaction of its business. Had this road kept up its trains on this cut-off between Coz-bus and G-rosvenor, it could not be seriously claimed that a parrallel side track, for the whole distance, could not be kept up, in the ordinary use of its right of way, for the purposes now complained of. In order to arrive at the construction claimed by plaintiff, it is necessary to introduce two changes in the language of the condition, and add to the words “used and *621operated as a railroad/’ “by running its trains over the said strip oí land.’’ These are not unimportant changes. The deed contains certain conditions for the benefit of the premises themselves, which are not secured by any forfeiture clause. One is the construction of two kinds of crossings; the other is the construction of an important ditch. It is obvious to any one that a failure to do either of these things might work serious mischief, and, therefore, that they, if made conditions, would be substantial. But they are not included in the defeasance at all. The deed says nothing about the running of trains, but it does contemplate that the railroad shall not be abandoned. When we consider in what way a railroad would help the landholder, as we are bound to do in order to see whether the condition is of substantial benefit, we fail to see the force of the plaintiff’s contention. It is evident enough that the railroad referred to is the railroad which leads to the different termini at either end. It would do no good to any one to have a railway merely crossing plaintiff’s land, and leading nowhere. It could only help him by being a thoroughfare, and could only help him then because he could get access to it somewhere. There is nothing in this deed which requires a station on or near plaintiff’s farm. To reach it, he must resort to some station. As the road is now used, there has been no change in the stations, and all of them are as accessible as before. It has never been deemed a benefit to any one to have his land crossed by a railway, when no trains stop there. As a matter-of common sense, it is a harm, and not a benefit, to have trains crossing one’s premises, and substantial damages are granted for doing so. It is better for any one to have his neighbors’ lands occupied, rather than his own, unless his own lands are made more accessible. If the *622deed called for the running of trains over plaintiff’s land, it would be at least worthy of consideration whether such a condition was beneficial. But, with the general experience to the contrary, we do not think we are justified in adding such a condition to the language of the deed, for the express purpose of making it a cause of forfeiture. We think the fair meaning of the clause confines the forfeiture to the substantial abandonment of a railroad, and not of a part of the use of the small fraction of it between Oorbus and Grosvenor; and, further, that this particular part cannot be regarded as abandoned while it is used for the every-day necessities of a railroad in its course of business, as this is. Dilapidation, and neglect in keeping the road on this strip in nice order, are not made grounds of forfeiture. If defendants allow or cause nuisances or other wrongs, the law has remedies which are adequate. There is no covenant or condition against using one or more tracks for any legitimate purpose, so long as the roadways and crossings and drainage are provided. Offensive articles are no more and no less a nuisance than if a track were used for running trains, and another, or more, for storage of cars, and abuses of all‘sorts can be redressed by other remedies. We think the estate was not forfeited. The judgment should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted. Champlin, J., concurred with Campbell, J. | 09-08-2022 | [
"Campbell, J., (dissenting). Plaintiff sued in ejectment to recover land granted by him and his ancestor to be used for railway purposes, which he claims has reverted for breach of condition in not maintaining the line across it for the purpose of running the usual trains of freight and passengers. The court below held the condition broken, and the estate forfeited. The case is substantially as follows: In 1872 the Chicago & Canada Southern Bailway Company was engaged in building a railway from Detroit river to Fayette, in Ohio, not very far south of the state line.",
"Its course took it through Lenawee county in a general direction of *618about south, thirty degrees west, crossing the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway at Corbus, a station between two and three miles north-east of the land in question, and going through Grosvenor, a station about the same distance south-west. The Chicago & Canada Southern Railway continued to run its trains over the railway through both these places until 1879, when it became consolidated in business with the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern, which thereafter had charge of all the running arrangements. The Lake Shore & Michigan Southern had a track running between Corbus and Lenawee junction, more nearly east and west, which passed through two other stations between, and another track through Lena-wee junction, passing through Grosvenor. In 1879 the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern, in runing from Detroit river to Fayette, used its own tracks between Grosvenor and Corbus, through Lenawee junction, and left off the use, for regular trains of the Canada Southern, of the space between Grosvenor and Corbus, on the original track of the latter, making no other change along either line. No station ever existed on the Canada Southern between Grosvenor and Corbus, which were the nearest stopping places to plaintiff’s land on that line. The maps do not indicate the wagon roads, but, in actual distance, one or more of the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern road stations west of Corbus would seem to be about as near to plaintiff as Grosvenor or Corbus.",
"On August 23, 1872, plaintiff and his associates in title executed to the Chicago & Canada Southern Railway Company a warranty deed of the right to enter upon-, construct, maintain, and operate its road in and upon the N. E. £ of the N. E. £ of section 16, the north £ of the N. W. £ of section 15, and all that part of the west £ o( the S. W. £ of section 10, township 7 south, of' range 5, east, that lies within fifty feet of the center line q£ said *619railway company’s track, as the same is located on the S. E. corner oí said W. i- of said section 10, and to use and occupy for its railroad a strip of land 100 feet in width across said above-described premises as the same is now located thereon by said company, except 20 feet off the north side of said right of way from the highway 10 rods west; reference being had, for a more definite description of said strip of land, to the map of the route of said company, on file in the office of the register of deeds for said county of Lenawee; said company to construct one farm crossing with cattle-guards, and one crossing with gates, upon the above-described premises; also to construct a ditch, etc.",
"The habendum clause is— “ To have and to hold said strip of land, for the uses and purposes aforesaid and incidental thereto, to said railway company, its successors and assigns, forever.” The condition is in these words: “ If the said railway company, its successors or assigns, should fail to complete said railway through said premises, and to put the same in operation, within three years from the date hereof, or if, after such railway is completed and put into operation, it should cease to be used an<J operated as a railroad, then, in either event, this release shall cease to be operative, and the right of way granted thereunder shall terminate.” The release was made for a money consideration of $1,400. After the combination made in 1879, the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern ceased to run regular trains over the old right of way between Corbus and Gfrosvenor, over plaintiff’s land; and that track has been used almost exclusively as a side track for storage of cars. There was testimony that it was kept in repair, on which there was some conflict, and since suit brought it has been used more or less for trains.",
"There was also testimony, which does not seem to us of any importance on this issue, *620tending to show such conduct in regard to storage of cars and neglect of local neatness, and such failure to keep the ground in good order, as created annoyance in the enjoyment of the farming premises. We have not been able to construe this deed as it appeared to the circuit judge. The doctrine is familiar that conditions of forfeiture are to be construed strictly, and cannot be enforced so as to destroy an estate, unless such is the necessary result from the language used; and our statutes have gone further, and forbidden the enforcement of forfeitures, unless the conditions are— “Of actual and substantial benefit to the party to whom, or in whose favor, they are to be performed.” How. Stat.",
"§ 5562. The right granted was for the purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating the railz-oad, and puz-poses “incidental thereto.” The location of the strip of 100 feet is by reference to the map of the route of the company, which covered its line through the county, if not more, under the railroad laws; and the railroad itself is one thing, and not a series of detached parcels. Neither is a company confined to a single line of rails, but it may make such intersections, side tracks, and other conveniences as business may require. Places for storage azid movement of cars are as necessary as any other facilities, and are a part of the maintenance of every road in the transaction of its business. Had this road kept up its trains on this cut-off between Coz-bus and G-rosvenor, it could not be seriously claimed that a parrallel side track, for the whole distance, could not be kept up, in the ordinary use of its right of way, for the purposes now complained of. In order to arrive at the construction claimed by plaintiff, it is necessary to introduce two changes in the language of the condition, and add to the words “used and *621operated as a railroad/’ “by running its trains over the said strip oí land.’’ These are not unimportant changes. The deed contains certain conditions for the benefit of the premises themselves, which are not secured by any forfeiture clause.",
"One is the construction of two kinds of crossings; the other is the construction of an important ditch. It is obvious to any one that a failure to do either of these things might work serious mischief, and, therefore, that they, if made conditions, would be substantial. But they are not included in the defeasance at all. The deed says nothing about the running of trains, but it does contemplate that the railroad shall not be abandoned. When we consider in what way a railroad would help the landholder, as we are bound to do in order to see whether the condition is of substantial benefit, we fail to see the force of the plaintiff’s contention.",
"It is evident enough that the railroad referred to is the railroad which leads to the different termini at either end. It would do no good to any one to have a railway merely crossing plaintiff’s land, and leading nowhere. It could only help him by being a thoroughfare, and could only help him then because he could get access to it somewhere. There is nothing in this deed which requires a station on or near plaintiff’s farm. To reach it, he must resort to some station. As the road is now used, there has been no change in the stations, and all of them are as accessible as before.",
"It has never been deemed a benefit to any one to have his land crossed by a railway, when no trains stop there. As a matter-of common sense, it is a harm, and not a benefit, to have trains crossing one’s premises, and substantial damages are granted for doing so. It is better for any one to have his neighbors’ lands occupied, rather than his own, unless his own lands are made more accessible. If the *622deed called for the running of trains over plaintiff’s land, it would be at least worthy of consideration whether such a condition was beneficial. But, with the general experience to the contrary, we do not think we are justified in adding such a condition to the language of the deed, for the express purpose of making it a cause of forfeiture. We think the fair meaning of the clause confines the forfeiture to the substantial abandonment of a railroad, and not of a part of the use of the small fraction of it between Oorbus and Grosvenor; and, further, that this particular part cannot be regarded as abandoned while it is used for the every-day necessities of a railroad in its course of business, as this is.",
"Dilapidation, and neglect in keeping the road on this strip in nice order, are not made grounds of forfeiture. If defendants allow or cause nuisances or other wrongs, the law has remedies which are adequate. There is no covenant or condition against using one or more tracks for any legitimate purpose, so long as the roadways and crossings and drainage are provided. Offensive articles are no more and no less a nuisance than if a track were used for running trains, and another, or more, for storage of cars, and abuses of all‘sorts can be redressed by other remedies. We think the estate was not forfeited. The judgment should be reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.",
"Champlin, J., concurred with Campbell, J."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/7934485/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
DETAILED ACTION Claims 22-31 are allowed and renumbered as 1-10.
Reasons for Allowance The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: Claim 22: The prior art of record, Hotti et al (U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20030084073) teaches an invention in the area of distributed system and database security. The invention relates to a method and an arrangement for increasing the level of trust between a master and a replica database by allowing the master database to perform an "unpredictable" audit of the replica database whenever deemed appropriate by the master database. The master database may for example define and generate an audit application and send it to at least one replica database using push synchronization and force the replica database to perform the audit application. The master database may also prepare expected results of the audit of the replica database and store them for later verification. After auditing the replica database may synchronize the results of the audit back to the master database for verification. The information flow between the master and replica databases is advantageously encrypted in a secure manner.
The prior art of record, Corcoran (U.S. Patent No. 9411835) teaches a method of validating data between a first system and at least one second system, wherein the first and second systems have corresponding data volumes, the method comprising isolating first and second data volumes in the first and second systems respectively, wherein the first and second data volumes comprise the corresponding data volumes; generating a checksum for the first and second data volumes; comparing the checksum between the first and second data volumes; and indicating an error if the checksum between the first and second data volumes is different; and inserting results into a database for reporting, for event monitoring or for statistical analysis. The prior art of records do not render obvious to one ordinary skilled in the art at the time of applicant’s invention nor anticipate the combination of claimed elements including “receiving a hash of production data that resides at a production volume of a production site; storing the hash to a replica site journal of a replica site; receiving an
Claims 23-31:
Relevant Prior Art Wei et al, U.S. Patent No. 9405815, is directed to a computing system for recovering volumes in a distributed computing environment while reducing downtime of storage servers. In an embodiment, a storage server contacts a control plane after a storage failure has occurred. If the storage server hosts an authoritative copy of an offline volume, the storage server is requested to restore the volume. Non-authoritative volumes are removed from the storage server and the storage server provides read access to the restored volume while resuming storage services. The above reference is pertinent arts listed in PTO-892 from. It is directed to the same field of invention to the state of art.
Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.”
Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Nan Hutton whose telephone number is 571-270-1223. The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 8AM-5PM. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Hosain Alam can be reached on 571-272-3978. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/NAN HUTTON/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2154 03/21/2022 | 2022-04-01T11:53:23 | [
"Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . DETAILED ACTION Claims 22-31 are allowed and renumbered as 1-10. Reasons for Allowance The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: Claim 22: The prior art of record, Hotti et al (U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 20030084073) teaches an invention in the area of distributed system and database security. The invention relates to a method and an arrangement for increasing the level of trust between a master and a replica database by allowing the master database to perform an \"unpredictable\" audit of the replica database whenever deemed appropriate by the master database. The master database may for example define and generate an audit application and send it to at least one replica database using push synchronization and force the replica database to perform the audit application.",
"The master database may also prepare expected results of the audit of the replica database and store them for later verification. After auditing the replica database may synchronize the results of the audit back to the master database for verification. The information flow between the master and replica databases is advantageously encrypted in a secure manner. The prior art of record, Corcoran (U.S. Patent No. 9411835) teaches a method of validating data between a first system and at least one second system, wherein the first and second systems have corresponding data volumes, the method comprising isolating first and second data volumes in the first and second systems respectively, wherein the first and second data volumes comprise the corresponding data volumes; generating a checksum for the first and second data volumes; comparing the checksum between the first and second data volumes; and indicating an error if the checksum between the first and second data volumes is different; and inserting results into a database for reporting, for event monitoring or for statistical analysis.",
"The prior art of records do not render obvious to one ordinary skilled in the art at the time of applicant’s invention nor anticipate the combination of claimed elements including “receiving a hash of production data that resides at a production volume of a production site; storing the hash to a replica site journal of a replica site; receiving an Claims 23-31: Relevant Prior Art Wei et al, U.S. Patent No. 9405815, is directed to a computing system for recovering volumes in a distributed computing environment while reducing downtime of storage servers. In an embodiment, a storage server contacts a control plane after a storage failure has occurred.",
"If the storage server hosts an authoritative copy of an offline volume, the storage server is requested to restore the volume. Non-authoritative volumes are removed from the storage server and the storage server provides read access to the restored volume while resuming storage services. The above reference is pertinent arts listed in PTO-892 from. It is directed to the same field of invention to the state of art. Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.” Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Nan Hutton whose telephone number is 571-270-1223.",
"The examiner can normally be reached on M-F 8AM-5PM. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Hosain Alam can be reached on 571-272-3978. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only.",
"For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /NAN HUTTON/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2154 03/21/2022"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-04-03.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Citation Nr: 1435349
Decision Date: 08/07/14 Archive Date: 08/20/14
DOCKET NO. 10-42 332 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Boise, Idaho
THE ISSUE
Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss disability.
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: Tiffany Bodger, Attorney
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
Dan Brook, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Navy from September 1944 to June 1946, so during World War II. He was as a Machinist Mate and, throughout his service, assigned primarily to Construction Battalions.
He appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a December 2009 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) determining there was new and material evidence since prior, final and binding, April and November 1998 rating decisions initially considering and denying his claim for service connection for hearing loss. Irrespective of what the RO had determined regarding whether there was new and material evidence to reopen this claim, so, too, was the Board required to make this threshold preliminary determination, before proceeding further, because this initial determination affected the Board's jurisdiction to adjudicate this claim on its underlying merits, meaning on a de novo basis. See Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In a June 2013 decision, the Board determined that new and material evidence had been submitted and, therefore, that this claim for service connection for bilateral hearing loss disability could be reopened. However, the Board then proceeded to deny this claim on its underlying merits.
The Veteran appealed the Board's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims (Court/CAVC). In an April 2014 Order, the Court granted a Joint Motion - thereby vacating the Board's decision denying this claim and remanding it back to the Board for further development and readjudication consistent with the terms of the Joint Motion. And to comply with this Order, the Board in turn is remanding the claim to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ).
Please also note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2013). 38 U.S.C.A. § 7107(a) (2) (West 2002).
REMAND
In the Joint Motion, the parties indicated that in August 2010 a VA audiologist (who had earlier examined the Veteran in June 2010) opined that the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss was not related to his service because "a hearing loss for VA purposes was not seen in the right ear until 1974 and in the left ear until 1984." The parties pointed out the Court previously has found that, when audiometric test results at a Veteran's separation from service do not meet the regulatory requirements for a ratable "disability" (see 38 C.F.R. § 3.385), the Veteran nevertheless may establish his entitlement to service connection for a hearing loss disability by submitting evidence that the current disability is causally related to his service. See, e.g., Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 160 (1993).
The parties found that the VA examiner who concluded unfavorably had failed to consider that the Veteran's non-disabling level of hearing loss shown as early as 1965 with gradual worsening thereafter could indicate that his current hearing loss disability is related to his service. Additionally, the parties indicated the examiner did not address treatise information submitted by the Veteran in December 2009 regarding the gradual nature of hearing loss and did not address an attached note from a private audiologist. Therefore, the parties found the examiner's opinion and rationale were inadequate, warranting remand of the Veteran's claim for a supplemental medical nexus opinion.
An October 2013 medical nexus opinion provided by a private otolaryngologist (ear, nose & throat (ENT) specialist, submitted in July 2014) indicated it is more likely than not that the Veteran's current condition of noise-induced hearing loss and tinnitus was caused by noise exposure during the time of his military service. This commenting otolaryngologist observed the Veteran had a history of noise exposure while on active duty in the military of sufficient intensity and duration to contribute to his current hearing loss. This otolaryngologist noted that he had reviewed the service treatment records and more contemporaneous medical history. He also noted that "(the Veteran's) separation audiogram did not show significant hearing loss, but this is irrelevant given the current knowledge regarding noise-induced hearing loss."
There is no separation audiogram of record, however, and no indication the Veteran was provided any actual audiometric testing at the time of his June 1946 separation examination. Instead, during that examination watch, coin click, whispered voice and spoken voice testing was administered with normal findings on all tests. Thus, the non-audiometric hearing testing, which was performed at separation, did not include an indication of hearing loss, whether "significant" or otherwise. Consequently, given that the October 2013 otolaryngologist referred to a
non-existent separation audiogram and did not discuss the normal findings, albeit from the non-audiometric (so less scientific) testing, it does not appear that he actually reviewed the Veteran's service treatment records. Accordingly, given the inadequacies of both the August 2010 VA audiological opinion and this October 2013 private otolaryngologist's opinion, still additional medical comment is needed concerning the etiology of the Veteran's current hearing loss disability.
Accordingly, this claim is REMANDED for the following additional development and consideration:
(Please note, this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c). Expedited handling is requested.)
1. Return the claims file to the VA examiner that performed the June 2010 VA audiological examination, who also provided the August 2010 audiological opinion, for an addendum opinion.
The examiner should review the claims file, including the report of the Veteran's August 1944 military entrance examination; the June 1946 separation examination; the numerous reports of post-service hearing testing dating from 1965 to the present; the Veteran's August 2009 statement describing his noise exposure during his service; a document entitled "Causes of Hearing Loss" submitted in September 2009, which includes a description of noise-induced hearing loss; a November 2009 letter from a private audiologist, noting "high frequency notch hearing loss"; a June 2009 printout (submitted in December 2009) pertaining to the sound levels produced by blank firing cannons and some other noise sources; the Veteran's December 2009 Notice of Disagreement (NOD, describing noise exposure from the guns he fired in service; the June 2010 VA audiological examination report; the August 2010 VA audiological opinion; the Veteran's October 2010 Substantive Appeal (on VA Form 9); a May 2013 brief from the Veteran's initial representative, citing studies pertaining to the limitations of the whispered voice test and to delayed and progressive ear damage, describing some of the Veteran's post-service employment, and noting that he had a bilateral "boilermakers notch" in both ears by 1965; the October 2013 private medical opinion indicating that it is more likely than not that the Veteran's current noise-induced hearing loss was caused by noise exposure during his service; and any other information deemed pertinent - including, as an example, the contrary findings reported in the 2005 study of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) disputing any notion that there is such thing as "delayed-onset" hearing loss.
The examiner is then asked to provide an opinion as to the likelihood (very likely, as likely as not, or unlikely) that the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss disability was caused by or is the result of his noise exposure during his military service.
Because of the difference of opinion to date on whether the Veteran's current hearing loss is attributable to the noise exposure during his service, it is essential the examiner discuss the underlying rationale for his opinion, whether favorable or unfavorable to the claim, if necessary citing to specific evidence in the file (or elsewhere, such as in the way of medical treatise) supporting conclusions.
In providing this explanation, the examiner must specifically address the significance of the Veteran having some hearing loss in 1965 (albeit not to a disabling level by VA standards, meaning according to the threshold minimum requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 to have actually constituted a ratable disability); the notation in "Causes of Hearing Loss in Adults" indicating that "noise induced (hearing) loss usually develops gradually and painlessly"; the finding by the November 2009 private audiologist and the October 2013 private otolaryngologist that the Veteran has a high frequency notched hearing loss consistent with noise exposure; the study regarding "delayed and progressive ear damage" referenced in the May 2013 brief by the Veteran's initial representative; the October 2013 private otolaryngologist's finding that studies of industrial hearing loss clearly document that the effects of noise are cumulative and may not be manifested until later in life; and any other pertinent information added to the record since July 2014. The examiner should also consider the results of the contrary study performed in 2005 by the IOM disputing the notion there is such thing as
"delayed-onset" hearing loss.
If, for whatever reason, the June 2010 VA examining audiologist is unavailable to provide this further comment, then have someone else with the necessary qualifications do so. This may require having the Veteran re-examined, but whether re-examination is necessary is left to the designee's discretion.
2. Review this supplemental opinion to ensure it complies with the remand directives. If it does not, take appropriate corrective action. 38 C.F.R. § 4.2.
3. Then readjudicate this claim in light of this and all other additional evidence. If this claim continues to be denied, send the Veteran and his attorney a supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) and give them opportunity to respond to it before returning the file to the Board for further appellate consideration of this claim.
The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument concerning this claim the Board is remanding. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999).
This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the Court for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2013).
_________________________________________________
KEITH W. ALLEN
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the Board is appealable to the Court. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2013). | 08-07-2014 | [
"Citation Nr: 1435349 Decision Date: 08/07/14 Archive Date: 08/20/14 DOCKET NO. 10-42 332 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Boise, Idaho THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss disability. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Tiffany Bodger, Attorney ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Dan Brook, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran served on active duty in the United States Navy from September 1944 to June 1946, so during World War II. He was as a Machinist Mate and, throughout his service, assigned primarily to Construction Battalions. He appealed to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) from a December 2009 rating decision by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) determining there was new and material evidence since prior, final and binding, April and November 1998 rating decisions initially considering and denying his claim for service connection for hearing loss. Irrespective of what the RO had determined regarding whether there was new and material evidence to reopen this claim, so, too, was the Board required to make this threshold preliminary determination, before proceeding further, because this initial determination affected the Board's jurisdiction to adjudicate this claim on its underlying merits, meaning on a de novo basis.",
"See Barnett v. Brown, 83 F.3d 1380, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1996). In a June 2013 decision, the Board determined that new and material evidence had been submitted and, therefore, that this claim for service connection for bilateral hearing loss disability could be reopened. However, the Board then proceeded to deny this claim on its underlying merits. The Veteran appealed the Board's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans' Claims (Court/CAVC).",
"In an April 2014 Order, the Court granted a Joint Motion - thereby vacating the Board's decision denying this claim and remanding it back to the Board for further development and readjudication consistent with the terms of the Joint Motion. And to comply with this Order, the Board in turn is remanding the claim to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). Please also note this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c) (2013). 38 U.S.C.A.",
"§ 7107(a) (2) (West 2002). REMAND In the Joint Motion, the parties indicated that in August 2010 a VA audiologist (who had earlier examined the Veteran in June 2010) opined that the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss was not related to his service because \"a hearing loss for VA purposes was not seen in the right ear until 1974 and in the left ear until 1984.\" The parties pointed out the Court previously has found that, when audiometric test results at a Veteran's separation from service do not meet the regulatory requirements for a ratable \"disability\" (see 38 C.F.R. § 3.385), the Veteran nevertheless may establish his entitlement to service connection for a hearing loss disability by submitting evidence that the current disability is causally related to his service.",
"See, e.g., Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 160 (1993). The parties found that the VA examiner who concluded unfavorably had failed to consider that the Veteran's non-disabling level of hearing loss shown as early as 1965 with gradual worsening thereafter could indicate that his current hearing loss disability is related to his service. Additionally, the parties indicated the examiner did not address treatise information submitted by the Veteran in December 2009 regarding the gradual nature of hearing loss and did not address an attached note from a private audiologist. Therefore, the parties found the examiner's opinion and rationale were inadequate, warranting remand of the Veteran's claim for a supplemental medical nexus opinion. An October 2013 medical nexus opinion provided by a private otolaryngologist (ear, nose & throat (ENT) specialist, submitted in July 2014) indicated it is more likely than not that the Veteran's current condition of noise-induced hearing loss and tinnitus was caused by noise exposure during the time of his military service.",
"This commenting otolaryngologist observed the Veteran had a history of noise exposure while on active duty in the military of sufficient intensity and duration to contribute to his current hearing loss. This otolaryngologist noted that he had reviewed the service treatment records and more contemporaneous medical history. He also noted that \"(the Veteran's) separation audiogram did not show significant hearing loss, but this is irrelevant given the current knowledge regarding noise-induced hearing loss.\" There is no separation audiogram of record, however, and no indication the Veteran was provided any actual audiometric testing at the time of his June 1946 separation examination. Instead, during that examination watch, coin click, whispered voice and spoken voice testing was administered with normal findings on all tests.",
"Thus, the non-audiometric hearing testing, which was performed at separation, did not include an indication of hearing loss, whether \"significant\" or otherwise. Consequently, given that the October 2013 otolaryngologist referred to a non-existent separation audiogram and did not discuss the normal findings, albeit from the non-audiometric (so less scientific) testing, it does not appear that he actually reviewed the Veteran's service treatment records. Accordingly, given the inadequacies of both the August 2010 VA audiological opinion and this October 2013 private otolaryngologist's opinion, still additional medical comment is needed concerning the etiology of the Veteran's current hearing loss disability. Accordingly, this claim is REMANDED for the following additional development and consideration: (Please note, this appeal has been advanced on the Board's docket pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.900(c). Expedited handling is requested.) 1.",
"Return the claims file to the VA examiner that performed the June 2010 VA audiological examination, who also provided the August 2010 audiological opinion, for an addendum opinion. The examiner should review the claims file, including the report of the Veteran's August 1944 military entrance examination; the June 1946 separation examination; the numerous reports of post-service hearing testing dating from 1965 to the present; the Veteran's August 2009 statement describing his noise exposure during his service; a document entitled \"Causes of Hearing Loss\" submitted in September 2009, which includes a description of noise-induced hearing loss; a November 2009 letter from a private audiologist, noting \"high frequency notch hearing loss\"; a June 2009 printout (submitted in December 2009) pertaining to the sound levels produced by blank firing cannons and some other noise sources; the Veteran's December 2009 Notice of Disagreement (NOD, describing noise exposure from the guns he fired in service; the June 2010 VA audiological examination report; the August 2010 VA audiological opinion; the Veteran's October 2010 Substantive Appeal (on VA Form 9); a May 2013 brief from the Veteran's initial representative, citing studies pertaining to the limitations of the whispered voice test and to delayed and progressive ear damage, describing some of the Veteran's post-service employment, and noting that he had a bilateral \"boilermakers notch\" in both ears by 1965; the October 2013 private medical opinion indicating that it is more likely than not that the Veteran's current noise-induced hearing loss was caused by noise exposure during his service; and any other information deemed pertinent - including, as an example, the contrary findings reported in the 2005 study of the Institute of Medicine (IOM) disputing any notion that there is such thing as \"delayed-onset\" hearing loss.",
"The examiner is then asked to provide an opinion as to the likelihood (very likely, as likely as not, or unlikely) that the Veteran's current bilateral hearing loss disability was caused by or is the result of his noise exposure during his military service. Because of the difference of opinion to date on whether the Veteran's current hearing loss is attributable to the noise exposure during his service, it is essential the examiner discuss the underlying rationale for his opinion, whether favorable or unfavorable to the claim, if necessary citing to specific evidence in the file (or elsewhere, such as in the way of medical treatise) supporting conclusions. In providing this explanation, the examiner must specifically address the significance of the Veteran having some hearing loss in 1965 (albeit not to a disabling level by VA standards, meaning according to the threshold minimum requirements of 38 C.F.R. § 3.385 to have actually constituted a ratable disability); the notation in \"Causes of Hearing Loss in Adults\" indicating that \"noise induced (hearing) loss usually develops gradually and painlessly\"; the finding by the November 2009 private audiologist and the October 2013 private otolaryngologist that the Veteran has a high frequency notched hearing loss consistent with noise exposure; the study regarding \"delayed and progressive ear damage\" referenced in the May 2013 brief by the Veteran's initial representative; the October 2013 private otolaryngologist's finding that studies of industrial hearing loss clearly document that the effects of noise are cumulative and may not be manifested until later in life; and any other pertinent information added to the record since July 2014.",
"The examiner should also consider the results of the contrary study performed in 2005 by the IOM disputing the notion there is such thing as \"delayed-onset\" hearing loss. If, for whatever reason, the June 2010 VA examining audiologist is unavailable to provide this further comment, then have someone else with the necessary qualifications do so. This may require having the Veteran re-examined, but whether re-examination is necessary is left to the designee's discretion. 2. Review this supplemental opinion to ensure it complies with the remand directives. If it does not, take appropriate corrective action.",
"38 C.F.R. § 4.2. 3. Then readjudicate this claim in light of this and all other additional evidence. If this claim continues to be denied, send the Veteran and his attorney a supplemental statement of the case (SSOC) and give them opportunity to respond to it before returning the file to the Board for further appellate consideration of this claim. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument concerning this claim the Board is remanding. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the Court for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West Supp. 2013). _________________________________________________ KEITH W. ALLEN Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the Board is appealable to the Court.",
"This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2013)."
]
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Citation Nr: 0334378
Decision Date: 12/10/03 Archive Date: 12/16/03
DOCKET NO. 02-06 627 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical and Regional
Office Center (RO) in Fargo, North Dakota
THE ISSUE
Entitlement to service connection for squamous cell carcinoma
of both ears.
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
Joseph Michael Horrigan
INTRODUCTION
The veteran served on active duty from November 1965 to
September 1967, including service in the Republic of Vietnam.
This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals
(Board) on appeal from a February 2000 rating action by the
RO in Roanoke, Virginia, that denied service connection for
squamous cell carcinoma of both ears, including a claim based
on exposure to Agent Orange. This rating action also denied
service connection for chloracne and for cysts on the face
and neck, also claimed as residuals of exposure to Agent
Orange. (The veteran subsequently moved to Minnesota and his
claim was thereafter transferred to the RO in Fargo, North
Dakota.)
The RO in Fargo, North Carolina thereafter sent the veteran a
statement of the case in regard to all the above claims, but
in his substantive appeal (VA Form 9) the veteran only
referenced the issue of entitlement to service connection for
squamous cell carcinoma of both ears, including a claim based
on exposure to Agent Orange. That is the only issue that has
been certified as being on appeal. Accordingly, only this
issue is currently before the Board for appellate
consideration at this time.
REMAND
The veteran has reported relevant treatment at the VA Medical
Center in Washington DC. Records of this treatment are not
part of the claims folder.
The veteran has not been afforded an examination to determine
whether the squamous cell carcinoma is related to in-service
sun or herbicide exposure. Under the VCAA, VA is obliged to
provide an examination when the record contains competent
evidence that the claimant has a current disability or signs
and symptoms of a current disability, the record indicates
that the disability or signs and symptoms of disability may
be associated with active service; and the record does not
contain sufficient information to make a decision on the
claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2002). The evidence of
a link between current disability and service must be
competent. Wells v. Principi, 326 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
The current record does not contain competent evidence
linking the veteran's squamous cell carcinoma to in-service
sun or herbicide exposure.
During the pendency of the veteran's claim, the Veterans
Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (hereinafter VCAA), Pub. L. No.
106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), was enacted. The VCAA
requires VA to specifically inform the claimant and the
claimant's representative, if any, of the evidence needed to
substantiate the claim, of which portion, if any, of the
evidence is to be provided by the claimant and which part, if
any, VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant.
38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)
(2002).
In a letter dated in December 2001, the RO in Fargo, North
Dakota informed the appellant of the Veterans Claims
Assistance Act (VCAA), 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103,
5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002), of the evidence needed to
substantiate his claims, and of what evidence he was
responsible for obtaining. However, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined that such
notice was inadequate because it limited the time period for
submitting necessary evidence to 60 days rather than the
statutorily mandated one year. Disabled American Veterans v.
Principi, 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
In a decision promulgated on September 22, 2003, Paralyzed
Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, No. 02-
7007, -7008, -7009, -7010 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 2003), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
invalidated the 30-day response period contained in 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.159(b)(1) as inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.§ 5103(b)(1).
The Court made a conclusion similar to the one reached in
Disabled Am. Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 327
F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing a related Board
regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.9). The court found that the 30-
day period provided in § 3.159(b)(1) to respond to a VCCA
duty to notify is misleading and detrimental to claimants
whose claims are prematurely denied short of the statutory
one-year period provided for response. Therefore, since this
case is being remanded for additional development or to cure
a procedural defect, the RO must take this opportunity to
inform the appellant that notwithstanding the information
previously provided, a full year is allowed to respond to a
VCAA notice.
In view of the foregoing, this case is REMANDED for the
following actions:
1. The RO must review the claims file
and ensure that all VCAA notice
obligations have been satisfied in
accordance with the recent decision in
Paralyzed Veterans of America v.
Secretary of Veterans Affairs, as well as
38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, and 5103A,
(West 2002), and any other applicable
legal precedent.
2. The RO should obtain copies of all
clinical records documenting the
veteran's treatment for squamous cell
carcinoma at the Ear Nose and Throat
clinic of the VA Medical Center in
Washington D.C. beginning in the 1990s.
3. If the RO receives competent evidence
that the squamous cell carcinoma may be
related to in-service exposure to sun or
herbicides, it should afford the veteran
an appropriate VA examination to
determine the etiology of his squamous
cell carcinoma affecting the ears. The
claims folder must be made available to
the examining physician and the physician
should state that he/she reviewed the
claims folder in the report of
examination or in an addendum to the
examination report. All pertinent
clinical findings should be reported in
detail. At the conclusion of the
examination the examiner should express
an opinion with full rationale as to
whether it is at least as likely as not
that the veteran's squamous cell
carcinoma affecting his ears was the
result of exposure to the sun during his
Vietnam service or is otherwise due to
service.
4. Then the RO should again adjudicate
the issue on appeal. If the benefit
sought on appeal is not granted, the
veteran should be provided a supplemental
statement of the case and afforded a
reasonable opportunity to respond. The
case should then be returned to the Board
for further appellate consideration if
otherwise appropriate.
No action is required of the veteran until he is so informed.
The purpose of this remand is to obtain additional clarifying
evidence and to insure that the veteran receives due process
of law. The appellant has the right to submit additional
evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has
remanded to the regional office. Kutscherousky v. West, 12
Vet. App. 369 (1999).
This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO.
The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the
Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or
other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious
manner. See The Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994),
38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West 2002) (Historical and Statutory
Notes). In addition, VBA's Adjudication Procedure Manual,
M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious
handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board
and the Court. See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.43 and 38.02.
_________________________________________________
Mark D. Hindin
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the
Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. This remand is in the
nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a
decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal.
38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2003). | 12-10-2003 | [
"Citation Nr: 0334378 Decision Date: 12/10/03 Archive Date: 12/16/03 DOCKET NO. 02-06 627 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Medical and Regional Office Center (RO) in Fargo, North Dakota THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for squamous cell carcinoma of both ears. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD Joseph Michael Horrigan INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from November 1965 to September 1967, including service in the Republic of Vietnam. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a February 2000 rating action by the RO in Roanoke, Virginia, that denied service connection for squamous cell carcinoma of both ears, including a claim based on exposure to Agent Orange.",
"This rating action also denied service connection for chloracne and for cysts on the face and neck, also claimed as residuals of exposure to Agent Orange. (The veteran subsequently moved to Minnesota and his claim was thereafter transferred to the RO in Fargo, North Dakota.) The RO in Fargo, North Carolina thereafter sent the veteran a statement of the case in regard to all the above claims, but in his substantive appeal (VA Form 9) the veteran only referenced the issue of entitlement to service connection for squamous cell carcinoma of both ears, including a claim based on exposure to Agent Orange. That is the only issue that has been certified as being on appeal. Accordingly, only this issue is currently before the Board for appellate consideration at this time. REMAND The veteran has reported relevant treatment at the VA Medical Center in Washington DC.",
"Records of this treatment are not part of the claims folder. The veteran has not been afforded an examination to determine whether the squamous cell carcinoma is related to in-service sun or herbicide exposure. Under the VCAA, VA is obliged to provide an examination when the record contains competent evidence that the claimant has a current disability or signs and symptoms of a current disability, the record indicates that the disability or signs and symptoms of disability may be associated with active service; and the record does not contain sufficient information to make a decision on the claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A(d) (West 2002). The evidence of a link between current disability and service must be competent.",
"Wells v. Principi, 326 F.3d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The current record does not contain competent evidence linking the veteran's squamous cell carcinoma to in-service sun or herbicide exposure. During the pendency of the veteran's claim, the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (hereinafter VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), was enacted. The VCAA requires VA to specifically inform the claimant and the claimant's representative, if any, of the evidence needed to substantiate the claim, of which portion, if any, of the evidence is to be provided by the claimant and which part, if any, VA will attempt to obtain on behalf of the claimant.",
"38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) (2002). In a letter dated in December 2001, the RO in Fargo, North Dakota informed the appellant of the Veterans Claims Assistance Act (VCAA), 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5107, 5126 (West 2002), of the evidence needed to substantiate his claims, and of what evidence he was responsible for obtaining. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has determined that such notice was inadequate because it limited the time period for submitting necessary evidence to 60 days rather than the statutorily mandated one year. Disabled American Veterans v. Principi, 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In a decision promulgated on September 22, 2003, Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, No. 02- 7007, -7008, -7009, -7010 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 22, 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit invalidated the 30-day response period contained in 38 C.F.R.",
"§ 3.159(b)(1) as inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.§ 5103(b)(1). The Court made a conclusion similar to the one reached in Disabled Am. Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 327 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing a related Board regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.9). The court found that the 30- day period provided in § 3.159(b)(1) to respond to a VCCA duty to notify is misleading and detrimental to claimants whose claims are prematurely denied short of the statutory one-year period provided for response. Therefore, since this case is being remanded for additional development or to cure a procedural defect, the RO must take this opportunity to inform the appellant that notwithstanding the information previously provided, a full year is allowed to respond to a VCAA notice. In view of the foregoing, this case is REMANDED for the following actions: 1. The RO must review the claims file and ensure that all VCAA notice obligations have been satisfied in accordance with the recent decision in Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, as well as 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103, and 5103A, (West 2002), and any other applicable legal precedent.",
"2. The RO should obtain copies of all clinical records documenting the veteran's treatment for squamous cell carcinoma at the Ear Nose and Throat clinic of the VA Medical Center in Washington D.C. beginning in the 1990s. 3. If the RO receives competent evidence that the squamous cell carcinoma may be related to in-service exposure to sun or herbicides, it should afford the veteran an appropriate VA examination to determine the etiology of his squamous cell carcinoma affecting the ears. The claims folder must be made available to the examining physician and the physician should state that he/she reviewed the claims folder in the report of examination or in an addendum to the examination report. All pertinent clinical findings should be reported in detail.",
"At the conclusion of the examination the examiner should express an opinion with full rationale as to whether it is at least as likely as not that the veteran's squamous cell carcinoma affecting his ears was the result of exposure to the sun during his Vietnam service or is otherwise due to service. 4. Then the RO should again adjudicate the issue on appeal. If the benefit sought on appeal is not granted, the veteran should be provided a supplemental statement of the case and afforded a reasonable opportunity to respond.",
"The case should then be returned to the Board for further appellate consideration if otherwise appropriate. No action is required of the veteran until he is so informed. The purpose of this remand is to obtain additional clarifying evidence and to insure that the veteran receives due process of law. The appellant has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded to the regional office. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment by the RO. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board of Veterans' Appeals or by the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner.",
"See The Veterans' Benefits Improvements Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-446, § 302, 108 Stat. 4645, 4658 (1994), 38 U.S.C.A. § 5101 (West 2002) (Historical and Statutory Notes). In addition, VBA's Adjudication Procedure Manual, M21-1, Part IV, directs the ROs to provide expeditious handling of all cases that have been remanded by the Board and the Court. See M21-1, Part IV, paras. 8.43 and 38.02. _________________________________________________ Mark D. Hindin Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2002), only a decision of the Board of Veterans' Appeals is appealable to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.",
"This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2003)."
]
| https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/12lAd8Os7VFeqbTKi4wcqJqODjHIn0-yQ?usp=sharing | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Election/Restrictions Applicant’s election without traverse of Group I (claim 2) in the reply filed on 03/16/2021 is acknowledged. Claim 2 depends from claim 1 which applicant essentially elects claims 1-2 and 6 for examination without traverse.
EXAMINER’S NOTE As claims 1-2 and 6 have been deemed allowable, claims 3-5, and 7-9 are allowed to be rejoined in the application and deemed allowable also.
Allowable Subject Matter Claims 1-9 are allowed. The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: Lu et al US9841411 (hereinafter “Lu 411”) discloses an ammonia gas sensor based on a squaric acid derivative includes an interdigital electrode and a coating material. The coating material is a squaric acid derivative of formula I, and said coating material is coated on said interdigital electrode through a vacuum coating process, and a thickness of said coating material is 100-200 nm. (Fig 1-6, Col 4 line 31 – Col 5 line 15) However, Lu 411’ fails to disclose a two component sensor, characterized in that said squaraine-polymer-based ammonium/nitrogen monoxide two-component sensor comprises an Lu et al US20170342201 (hereinafter “Lu 201”) discloses a humidity sensor based on squaraine polymer and the preparation method and use thereof. Specifically, the humidity sensor disclosed by the invention comprises a coating material and an interdigital electrode, wherein the coating material is a squaraine polymer as shown in formula I, n is an integer of 40-50, the coating material is brushed on the interdigital electrode, and the thickness is 100-400 microns. The humidity sensor disclosed by the invention has the advantages that the preparation is convenient, and the operation is simple; the response time is short, and the response for humidity change is higher than that of common metallic oxides; the recovery time is short, and the device performance is stable; the humidity hysteresis of the device is high under high humidity environment. However, Lu 201’ fails to disclose a two component sensor, characterized in that said squaraine-polymer-based ammonium/nitrogen monoxide two-component sensor comprises an interdigital electrode and a coating material coated on said interdigital electrode; said coating material is a squaraine polymer; the chemical structure of said squaraine polymer is: wherein n is 20 to 50.
Prior arts such as Lu 411’ and Lu 201’ made available do not teach, or fairly suggest, a two component sensor, characterized in that said squaraine-polymer-based ammonium/nitrogen monoxide two-component sensor comprises an interdigital electrode and a coating material Hence the best prior art of record fails to teach the invention as set forth in claims 1-9 and the examiner can find no teaching of the specific invention, nor reasons within the cited prior art or on her own to combine the elements of these references other than the applicant’s own reasoning to fully encompass the current pending claims. Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.” Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to NIGEL H PLUMB whose telephone number is (571)272-8886. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 7am-5pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Lisa Caputo can be reached on 571-272-2388. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished /NIGEL H PLUMB/Examiner, Art Unit 2855 /LISA M CAPUTO/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2855 | 2021-04-08T09:33:03 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Election/Restrictions Applicant’s election without traverse of Group I (claim 2) in the reply filed on 03/16/2021 is acknowledged. Claim 2 depends from claim 1 which applicant essentially elects claims 1-2 and 6 for examination without traverse. EXAMINER’S NOTE As claims 1-2 and 6 have been deemed allowable, claims 3-5, and 7-9 are allowed to be rejoined in the application and deemed allowable also. Allowable Subject Matter Claims 1-9 are allowed. The following is an examiner’s statement of reasons for allowance: Lu et al US9841411 (hereinafter “Lu 411”) discloses an ammonia gas sensor based on a squaric acid derivative includes an interdigital electrode and a coating material.",
"The coating material is a squaric acid derivative of formula I, and said coating material is coated on said interdigital electrode through a vacuum coating process, and a thickness of said coating material is 100-200 nm. (Fig 1-6, Col 4 line 31 – Col 5 line 15) However, Lu 411’ fails to disclose a two component sensor, characterized in that said squaraine-polymer-based ammonium/nitrogen monoxide two-component sensor comprises an Lu et al US20170342201 (hereinafter “Lu 201”) discloses a humidity sensor based on squaraine polymer and the preparation method and use thereof. Specifically, the humidity sensor disclosed by the invention comprises a coating material and an interdigital electrode, wherein the coating material is a squaraine polymer as shown in formula I, n is an integer of 40-50, the coating material is brushed on the interdigital electrode, and the thickness is 100-400 microns. The humidity sensor disclosed by the invention has the advantages that the preparation is convenient, and the operation is simple; the response time is short, and the response for humidity change is higher than that of common metallic oxides; the recovery time is short, and the device performance is stable; the humidity hysteresis of the device is high under high humidity environment. However, Lu 201’ fails to disclose a two component sensor, characterized in that said squaraine-polymer-based ammonium/nitrogen monoxide two-component sensor comprises an interdigital electrode and a coating material coated on said interdigital electrode; said coating material is a squaraine polymer; the chemical structure of said squaraine polymer is: wherein n is 20 to 50.",
"Prior arts such as Lu 411’ and Lu 201’ made available do not teach, or fairly suggest, a two component sensor, characterized in that said squaraine-polymer-based ammonium/nitrogen monoxide two-component sensor comprises an interdigital electrode and a coating material Hence the best prior art of record fails to teach the invention as set forth in claims 1-9 and the examiner can find no teaching of the specific invention, nor reasons within the cited prior art or on her own to combine the elements of these references other than the applicant’s own reasoning to fully encompass the current pending claims. Any comments considered necessary by applicant must be submitted no later than the payment of the issue fee and, to avoid processing delays, should preferably accompany the issue fee. Such submissions should be clearly labeled “Comments on Statement of Reasons for Allowance.” Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to NIGEL H PLUMB whose telephone number is (571)272-8886.",
"The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 7am-5pm. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Lisa Caputo can be reached on 571-272-2388. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished /NIGEL H PLUMB/Examiner, Art Unit 2855 /LISA M CAPUTO/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2855"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2021-04-11.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied. | 11-28-2022 | [
"Sup. Ct. Kan. Certiorari denied."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/9263679/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Title: $300 shoulder bag stolen I know the guy and he has a gun Question:Last night my fitness gf invited over a bunch of people while I was really drunk and some guy stole my $300 supreme shoulder bag. Last week he got beat up because he stole someone’s gun at the bar so he’s definitely very sketchy. I want to resolve this very peacefully but idk if I can even report this to the police. Answer #1: You are within your legal rights to report this theft to the police and when you do so, your can report the gun theft. | 02-09-2020 | [
"Title: $300 shoulder bag stolen I know the guy and he has a gun Question:Last night my fitness gf invited over a bunch of people while I was really drunk and some guy stole my $300 supreme shoulder bag. Last week he got beat up because he stole someone’s gun at the bar so he’s definitely very sketchy. I want to resolve this very peacefully but idk if I can even report this to the police.",
"Answer #1: You are within your legal rights to report this theft to the police and when you do so, your can report the gun theft."
]
| https://www.reddit.com/r/legaladvice/comments/f1l3m6/300_shoulder_bag_stolen_i_know_the_guy_and_he_has/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
JENKINS, Circuit Judge. A committee, of which Mr. Johnston Livingston is chairman,, claiming to represent holders of bonds secured by the general second mortgage of the defendant company, has petitioned the court that all or some one member of the committee be made parties or party defendant to this cause. Charles Van Nostrand, in his own behalf, and at the request and for the benefit of a committee of the holders and owners of upwards of $1,-000,000 of the general third mortgage bonds, and in behalf of all others who may join in protecting the interest of the third mortgage bondholders, also presents a petition that he may be made a party to the suit. These petitions are opposed by the trust company, complainant. There is also presented the petition of Edward D. Adams and others, a committee of bondholders representing $6,-036,000 of the second mortgage bonds, $6,593,000 of the third mortgage bonds, and $19,880,000 of the consolidated bonds, which in effect sustains the trustee in its objection to the allowance of the petitions of the other committees, and expresses contentment with the action of the trust company in the execution of its trust, but asks the court, if the prayers of the other petitions should be allowed, that they also may be made parties to the suit, as representatives of bondholders. That the situation may be accurately conceived, a general review of the condition of affairs should be stated. The bonded indebtedness of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, secured by mortgage or trust deed, is as follows: First. A mortgage dated May 1, 1879, to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, to secure bonds to the amount of $2,500,000, of which there are outstanding bonds to the aggregate amount of $1,904,000. This mortgage is upon the Missouri Division of the road, being that part of its main line extending from the Missouri river, in the state of North Dakota, to the Yellowstone river, in the state of Montana, and upon all the lands granted by congress appertaining thereto, with certain other property. Second. A mortgage to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, dated September 1, 1879, tp secure bonds to the amount of $4,500,000, of which there are outstanding $455,000 in amount. This mortgage is on the Pend d’Oreille Division, extending from the Snake river, in the state of Washington, to Lake Pend-d’Oreille, in the state of Idaho, and all the lands granted by congress appertaining thereto. Third. The general first mortgage to the Central Trust Company, dated January 1, 1881, to secure bonds now outstanding, to the amount of $43,393,000. This mortgage is upon the main line of the road and its Cascade Branch (being a branch over the Cascade Mountains to Puget Sound), and upon all lands granted by congress and upon the rolling stock of the company *171and other property acquired or to be acquired for use in connection with its railroad. Fourth. The general second mortgage issued to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, November 20,18,83, to secure an issue of bonds to an amount not to exceed in the aggregate $20,000,-000, and under which mortgage there are now outstanding bonds to the aggregate amount of $19,216,000. This mortgage is upon the main line, telegraph lines, and upon the land grant, except as to those lands lying east of the Missouri river; also upon the lease of the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and upon the one undivided half of that part of the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad which extends from its junction with the main line of the railroad of the Northern Pacific Railroad near Thompson to Duluth, Minn.; and also upon lauds then owned or thereafter acquired in the city of St. Paul or Duluth for use in connection with or for the purposes of the road, and upon all other property, of every kind and natui-e, then owned or thereafter to be acquired, wherever situated or however held, for use in connection with or for the purposes of the railroads or any of them, or the business of the Northern Pacific Company. Fifth. The general third mortgage to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, dated December 1, 1887, to secure bonds aggregating $12,000,000 principal, of which there are now7 outstanding $11,461,000. This mortgage covers the main line of the railroad, the Cascade Branch, the land grant, the lease of the St. Paul & Northern Pacific, the undivided half of that part of the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad between Thompson and Duluth, and also all the interest of the Northern Pacific Company in some 20 branch lines of railroads mentioned, and all other branch roads that might thereafter be acquired or constructed and operated as feeders of the main line or of the Cascade Branch. Sixth. The consolidated mortgage to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, dated December 2, 1889, to secure bonds in the aggregate not exceeding $160,000,000, under which there are outstanding bonds to the amount of $62,443,000. This mortgage in general covers all the property and rights included in the previous general mortgages. It recites also that some 2 L branch lines have been constructed, naming them, and that the capital stock of all the branch line companies owned by the Northern Pacific Company is of the par value of $37,781,057.50, of which $8,552,600 is owned absolutely by the company, and the remaining stock, amounting at par value to $29,228,457.50, is held in trust for the railroad company to become the absolute property of the company when the mortgage debt of the branch lines is paid. In addition to the indebtedness secured by mortgage upon the railway, there is also a certain collateral trust indenture, dated May 1, 1893, to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, to secure an issue of notes to the amount of $15,000,000, of which there were outstanding at the institution of the suit §10,050,000, secured by certain collateral bonds and stock of the branch lines and other roads controlled by the Northern Pacific Company. The Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company is also trustee under various mortgages *172made by some 17 of the branch lines connected with the Northern Pacific Railroad to secure bonds amounting in the aggregate to some $33,873,000, which bonds bear the guaranty of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. This suit was originally brought by the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee under all the trusts recited, and by certain stockholders and creditors of the railroad company, and in behalf of all other stockholders and creditors of the company who might choose to become parties to the suit and contribute to its expense; praying the court to fully administer the trust fund in which the complainants, were interested, constituting the entire railroad system, lands, and assets of the defendant corporation, to marshal all its assets, to ascertain the several respective liens and priorities existing upon each and every part of the system of railway and property, the amount due upon each and every part of the mortgages or other liens, and to enforce and decree the rights, liens, and equities of each and all of the preferred and common stockholders and bondholders and creditors of the company as the same may be finally ascertained and decreed upon the respective interventions or applications of each and every such stockholder or lienor in and to not only said lines of railroad, appurtenances, equipment, land, and property, but also to and upon each and every portion of the assets and property of each of the said corporations. Subsequently the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company filed its bill of complaint, setting forth the several mortgages upon the road executed to it as' trustee, reciting the proceedings in the suit which it had brought in connection with the stockholders co-complainants, and asking that all the rights and franchises, and all the property, real and personal, of the Northern Pacific Company, may be declared subject to the lien of the consolidated mortgage; that an accounting may be taken of the outstanding bonds under the general' second mortgage, and they declared a first lien on the property of the company described in the general second mortgage, subject only to the lien of the general first mortgage and the prior divisional mortgages; that an account be'taken of the outstanding bonds under the general third mortgage, and that the amount of them may be found to be the next lien following the lien of the general second mortgage on the property described in the general third mortgage; that an account be taken of the outstanding bonds under the consolidated mortgage, and that the amount thereof may be found to be a lien next following the lien of the general third mortgage on the property of the company, according to the terms of the consolidated mortgage; that, in default of payment of interest due under the general second mortgage, the property and franchises of the company may be sold to satisfy the entire amount of the general second bonds and coupons; and that out of the proceeds the amount due under the general second mortgage may be paid, and the surplus, if any, be applied as the court may direct. Upon the filing of the bill, an order was entered, upon the prayer of the complainant, extending the receivership created under the original bill to the *173bill of foreclosure filed by the trust company, and directing that the two' causes be consolidated, the consolidated caxise to proceed under the title of the bill of foreclosure. The petitions, in brief, proceed upon the following grounds: First. That the trustee occupies inconsistent positions; that, by its bill to foreclose the second mortgage, it seeks to cut off the equity of the third mortgage bondholders; that, as trustee of the general second mortgage, it becomes its duty to press a foreclosure and sale, while, as trustee of the general third mortgage, it is its duty to avoid or delay such a foreclosure. Second. That grave questions exist whether the general first and the general second mortgage cover the same property, and whether the general third mortgage does not cover property that is claimed to be covered exclusively by the consolidated mortgage; that it is in the interest of the holders of consols (hat the expense of the receivership and administration should be charged against the interest of third mortgage bondholders, and of the latter that such expense should be charged only against the classes of bonds the holders of which, are benefited by such expense; that the interest of the third mortgage bondholders is for a sale of the road so soon as it will realize enough to pay the interest and principal of the third mortgage bonds and of prior mortgages in full; and that the expense of administration, if such sale should be delayed, is in the interest of the consolidated mortgage bondholders, and counter to the interest of the bondholders under the general third mortgage; that it is in the interest of holders of consolidated bonds that all such hypothecated bonds should be redeemed, but that such redemption is counter to the interest of the third mortgage bondholders; that there is a coniiict of interest between third mortgage bondholders and the holders of bonds issued under the mortgages on branch lines of -which the complainant is trustee. It is also insisted that the complainant was guilty of improper conduct in assenting to the issue of receivers’ certificates imposed as a lien upon the railroad properly superior to the general second and third mortgages, and issued for the redemption of outstanding securities, and in failing to disclose to the court that it was itself the holder of some of the securities to be redeemed; and also that in the course of administration the trust company has acted with partiality towards the consol holders, and unfairly to the prior mortgage holders, in this: that it suffered provision to be made under which the proceeds of receivers’ certificates to the extent of $2,000,000 and upward were used by the receivers to redeem some $4,000,000 of consols, $700,000 of Chicago & Northern Pacific bonds, and $400,-000 collateral trust notes which could not benefit the second and third general mortgage bondholders. It is a cardinal principle in the administration of the law that no man shall be condemned without a hearing. Therefore, it is that no one shall be concluded by a judgment to which he is neither party nor privy. Therefox-e, it is that, as a general rule, all persons interested in a conixoversy must be made parties thereto, that their rights may be determined and concluded by the judgment. There *174has grown into the practice an exception, in some states recognized by positive enactment, that the trustee of an express tru'st may maintain suit without joining his cestui que trust. This is to avoid the expense and the delay attending the getting together and joining of numerous parties whose interests had been committed to the keeping of a trustee, and could be protected by him without their intervention. Under this exception, it has been wrell held that, in general, courts can deal with bondholders only through their trustee, and that it is not to be tolerated that each individual bondholder could, at his own suggestion, proceed to assert his rights, when they can as well be asserted through a trustee. The rule,, however, creates an exception to the general principle that all interested should join in the controversy. It is a rule of convenience, to facilitate the conduct of the suit. It proceeds upon the assumption that the cestui que trust can be fully and fairly represented and protected in his rights by the trustee or representative. A. rule of convenience must, however, give way when rights are involved. If it appears that the trustee refuses or neglects to act, or stands in a hostile position, or has assumed a position prejudicial to the interests of the cestui que trust, the rule of convenience is put aside, and the cestui que trust admitted to represent his rights, because in such case the trustee has not or cannot fully and faithfully represent them. Jones, Corp. Bonds, § 338. It is, however, insisted for the complainant that the court has not the power to permit these petitioners to intervene as parties to the suit, because so to do would be to permit them to violate their contract obligations. This contention is founded upon a provision of both the general second and general third mortgages to the effect that: “No holder or holders of a bond, or of any bonds secured hereby, shall have the right to institute any suit, action, or proceeding, in equity or at law, for' "the foreclosure of this indenture, or for the execution of the trusts thereof, or for the appointment of a receiver, or any other action, suit, or remedy hereunder, or under or upon any bond or coupon for interest hereby secured, without first giving notice in writing to the trustee of default having occurred and continued, as in this article aforesaid, and requesting the trustee, and affording it a reasonable opportunity, to institute such action, suit, or jjro-ceeding in its own name, or to proceed to- exercise the powers hereinbefore granted, and also offering to it adequate security and indemnity against the costs, expenses, and liabilities to be incurred therein or thereby; and such notification, request, and offer of indemnity are hereby declared to be conditions precedent to any suit or action, or right of suit or action, for the foreclosure or for the execution of the trust of this indenture, or for the appointment of a receiver, and to any other action, suit, or .remedy hereunder, or under or upon any bond or coupon for interest hereby secured.” It is asserted that by tbis provision the bondholders have expressly agreed that except under peculiar circumstances of request and neglect to sue, which do not exist, their rights shall be protected and enforced only by the trustee. I cannot assent to this contention. The provision is restricted to suit by the bondholders to foreclose the mortgage, or to enforce the bonds except through the instrumentality of the trustee, but cannot, I think, be applied to a case where suit has been brought by the trustee, if the conditions *175would justify a court in admitting tbe bondholders to intervene. They do not by this provision conclude themselves against the subsequent assumption by the trustee of hostile position or against: its violation of duty. The stipulation is a mere restraint upon suit by the bondholder unless and until the trustee, upon proper demand and indemnity, refuses to bring suit, but it cannot be that a trustee, by a mere formal institution of suit, could therein, by the assumption of: hostile position or in violation of his duty, sacrifice the interests of the bondholders, and they be without remedy because of this stipulation. It is claimed that the only remedy of the bondholders in case of dereliction of duty on the part of the trustee is to be found in article 15 of the mortgage, in which it is declared “that the trustee may be removed by the majority in interest of the bondholders of all of said bonds hereby secured and then outstanding, by instrument or instruments in writing, under their hands and seals, or by a vote of a meeting duly called and held as herein provided.” This provision puts it in the power of a majority of bondholders at any time, and for or without cause, to displace the trustee, but does not limit or control the powers of a court of equity to permit the intervention of bondholders for the protection of their rights when otherwise it would be just or proper to permit them so to do. The intervention does not displace the trastee, but admits the cestui que trust, that they may be heard in the protection of their claims. The question, I think, resolves itself to this: Are the circumstances disclosed such as to call upon the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to permit bondholders to intervene for the protection of their rights? I proceed now to the consideration of the grounds upon which intervention is sought, and to the consideration of the charges preferred against the trustee. I do not design to go over the ground with respect to the propriety of the issuance of receivers’ certificates. That question was long ago fully presented, considered, and determined. I am satisfied of the wisdom of the course then pursued, and that it has resulted in saving this great system of railway from disintegration. The facts presented to the court upon that application were undisputed and indisputable. Counsel for the present petitioning second mortgage bondholders was allowed, amicus curiae, to be heard at length. There was no contention upon the facts. It was a question of propriety of action upon ascertained conditions. Certainly no objection can be justly taken to the action of the trustee with regard to its submission to the court of the question of the propriety of the issuance of those certificates. It is said, however, that the complainant acted improperly in failing to disclose to the court the fact that it at the-time held a debt against the company, secured by collaterals which it was proposed to redeem with the proceeds of the receivers’ certificates lo be issued. It is true that that fact was not disclosed to the court, and therein I think the trust company failed in its duty to the court. It should have disclosed that it was actually or possibly interested in the issuance of. those certificates, and its omis*176sion to advise the court of its debt has given rise, I think, to just criticism. The action of the court, however, -would have been no different had the fact been disclosed. It appears that the loan made by the trust company to the railway company was to aid it in an emergency; that the loan -was made upon reasonable terms, no advantage being taken of the necessities of the company, and that it was a favorable loan for the company; that it has not as yet been paid, and has been carried by the trust company through a period of serious financial revulsion without charge to the estate other than the accruing interest; and that the trust company has not and does not desire with respect to this debt to avail itself of the provision of the order for the issuance of certificates. I cannot think that the omission to advise the court of this debt, while improper, was designed, and it certainly has resulted in no injury to the interests of the petitioners. The court is then confronted with the question whether the trustee stands in such relation to the different mortgages upon the road that it may be hindered in fully and impartially representing each independent interest in the foreclosure of the general second mortgage and in the conduct of the suit. And here it must be remembered that this consolidated suit is not one merely to foreclose the general second mortgage; it is also an administration suit to marshal the assets, to ascertain and determine the several respective liens and priorities existing upon this whole system of railway, and to enforce the rights, not only of the lienors, but of the general creditors and stockholders of the company. I do not deem it proper at this time to assert the respective rights under the different mortgages, but it is apparent that there may well arise conflicting claims under these mortgages with respect to the property covered by each, and the respective rights of the bondholders thereunder. It is not needful, nor would it be proper, now to say that, as matter of proper' construction of the various instruments, the contention cannot be sustained. It' is enough to say that it is debatable ground, and in a court of justice, in the determination of such a question, the contestants have a right to be heard. If such questions should arise, how can the trustee under one mortgage, with strict impartiality, represent the interests under another mortgage? It was well said in Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 332, 32 N. E. 1088, with respect to the duty of a trustee, that “the absolute and positive duty is imposed upon him to defend the life of the trust whenever it is assailed.” A trustee cannot be permitted to assume a position inconsistent with or in opposition to his trust. His duty is single, and he cannot serve two masters with antagonistic interests. The interest of the general second mortgage bondholders is to secure their money as speedily as possible. The interest of the third mortgage bondholders is to delay foreclosure until arrangements can be made that will insure their interest in the property, and therefore to insist upon postponement of the enforcement of the rights of the second mortgage bondholders. The interest of the holders of consolidated mortgage bonds is in this respect antagonistic to both the general second and *177general third mortgage bondholders. It would be improper to say what course should be pursued in the determination of the questions when they shall be confronted, but surely it would seem inconsistent with its trust under the consolidated mortgage for the trustee to insist upon immediate sale under the prior mortgages, and so Tice versa. Upon that question each interest should be heard in its own behalf. These observations will apply also to possible contention between the different mortgage interests with respect to the property covered by each, and possible contention between the third mortgage bondholders, and the consolidated mortgage bondholders and the holders of collateral trust notes, with respect to which interest has a prior lien upon the collateral notes and upon the bonds of the branch lines which may be held by the trust company (complainant) as trustee. It would be neither profitable nor wise to forecast the controversies that may arise with respect to conflicting interests in this case. It is sufficient to say that each conflicting interest has a right to its day in court, and to be heard; and, where there is the same trustee in each of the mortgages and under the collateral trust agreement, it seems just and proper that each interest should be represented in the suit, that the court may be properly advised upon a full hearing of all interests. I think it will not do to say that the controversies suggested have not as yet arisen. They could probably never arise if all the bondholders under the different mortgages were alone represented by the same trustee. In Such case their rights would most likely be determined without controversy. The presence of disputing parties is necessary that the conflict may be formulated and determined by judgment. It would, I think, be an anomaly if a trastee under one trust should sue himself as trustee under another trust to determine the conflict between the trusts. I think it proper, therefore, in view of the possible and probable conflicts that may arise, and in view of the position of the complainant as trustee under all these mortgages, that a representative of each interest should be admitted to protect the rights of each in any conflict that may arise between these interests. It is objected to the application of the Livingston committee that it only represents a million or a million and a half dollars of bonds out of the total amount of $19,216,000; and to Mr. Yan Nostrand that he or his committee only represent a million dollars of bonds out of $14,461,00.0; a,nd that the Adams committee, opposing the granting of the petitions, and content with the action of the trustee, represents nearly one-third of the bonds issued under the general second mortgage, and over one-half of the bonds issued under the general third mortgage. This objection might be of great force and availing were it not for the fact that the Adams committee also represents nearly one-third — :some $19,881,000 — of the consolidated mortgage bonds. The Adams committee, therefore, stands in the same plight with the complainant, trustee under all the mortgages. Its interest would be not only to protect the general second and general third mortgages, but also the consolidated mort*178gage, and possibly its interest under tbe general second and general third mortgages might be subordinated to its larger interest under the consolidated mortgage. It is also objected to the Livingston committee and to the Van Nostrand committee that they largely represent stockholders as well as bondholders. I am not impressed with the validity of this objection. The stockholders are now represented by the corporation defendant, actively asserting their rights in the suit. These committees could do no more. I am, however, impressed with the consideration that the Livingston and the Van Nostrand committees respectively represent but a small minority of the bonds issued under the general second and third mortgages; and if there were a representative of a majority of the bonds issued under these two mortgages respectively, having.no other interest to serve than that of the respective mortgages mentioned, I should not feel inclined to grant these petitions. But they are the only persons before the court representing distinctively the interests of the mortgages under which they respectively hold bonds. The stock which they hold is at the best of but trifling value. It is not reasonable to suppose that they would sacrifice or endanger their bonds in the protection of that which is of but trifling value. It is urged that these petitions should not be granted, because it is feared that they are not preferred in good faith, but merely to obtain vantage ground from which they can embarrass the trustee and the court in the management of this great railway, and impede and hinder the work and injure the credit of the receivership. The court has no right to assume that such is the purpose of the petitioners, nor can it perceive that such result can follow the granting of the petitions. If, however, such be the purpose, — which I have no right to assume, and which is disclaimed by counsel,— the court will be quite able to protect itself and the estate against improper intrusion into and attack upon the management of the property committed to its supervision. The petitioners are admitted for the protection of their rights, not for factional opposition to the management of this property by the receivers. The fear is also expressed by counsel for the trustee that the exercise, of the right to appeal may prevent a proper reorganization plan from being carried out. I am not forgetful of the considerations which influence the actions of courts with respect to properties of this kind in recognizing every fair plan of reorganization; nor am I unmindful of the consideration that the minority of bondholders are in large measure subject to the action of the majority; but such considerations ought not to avail to abridge the right to appeal in any case where a party deems his right infringed. It is more important that the right to appeal be preserved in its integrity than that any plan of reorganization should be carried into effect without the delay which may be incident to the assertion of legal rights. At the same time, however, care should be taken that, while the right should be granted, it should be protected from abuse. And to that end I have come to the conclusion to allow but *179one individual of each of these committees to be represented in tlie suit, to the end that each mortgage interest shall thus have representation. This will, as I think, enable the court to be informed of the claims and rights of each interest, prevent confusion in the orderly conduct of the litigation, and factional opposition in the management of the estate. The prayers of the several petitions will therefore be granted so far as to permit Mr. Johnston Livingston, Mr. Charles B. Van Nostrand, and Mr. Edward D. Adams to be made parties defendant to the suit for the purpose of protecting the interests of the bonds represented by them respectively in any conflict which may arise as to their respective interests in the estate. | 11-26-2022 | [
"JENKINS, Circuit Judge. A committee, of which Mr. Johnston Livingston is chairman,, claiming to represent holders of bonds secured by the general second mortgage of the defendant company, has petitioned the court that all or some one member of the committee be made parties or party defendant to this cause. Charles Van Nostrand, in his own behalf, and at the request and for the benefit of a committee of the holders and owners of upwards of $1,-000,000 of the general third mortgage bonds, and in behalf of all others who may join in protecting the interest of the third mortgage bondholders, also presents a petition that he may be made a party to the suit.",
"These petitions are opposed by the trust company, complainant. There is also presented the petition of Edward D. Adams and others, a committee of bondholders representing $6,-036,000 of the second mortgage bonds, $6,593,000 of the third mortgage bonds, and $19,880,000 of the consolidated bonds, which in effect sustains the trustee in its objection to the allowance of the petitions of the other committees, and expresses contentment with the action of the trust company in the execution of its trust, but asks the court, if the prayers of the other petitions should be allowed, that they also may be made parties to the suit, as representatives of bondholders.",
"That the situation may be accurately conceived, a general review of the condition of affairs should be stated. The bonded indebtedness of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company, secured by mortgage or trust deed, is as follows: First. A mortgage dated May 1, 1879, to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, to secure bonds to the amount of $2,500,000, of which there are outstanding bonds to the aggregate amount of $1,904,000. This mortgage is upon the Missouri Division of the road, being that part of its main line extending from the Missouri river, in the state of North Dakota, to the Yellowstone river, in the state of Montana, and upon all the lands granted by congress appertaining thereto, with certain other property. Second. A mortgage to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, dated September 1, 1879, tp secure bonds to the amount of $4,500,000, of which there are outstanding $455,000 in amount.",
"This mortgage is on the Pend d’Oreille Division, extending from the Snake river, in the state of Washington, to Lake Pend-d’Oreille, in the state of Idaho, and all the lands granted by congress appertaining thereto. Third. The general first mortgage to the Central Trust Company, dated January 1, 1881, to secure bonds now outstanding, to the amount of $43,393,000. This mortgage is upon the main line of the road and its Cascade Branch (being a branch over the Cascade Mountains to Puget Sound), and upon all lands granted by congress and upon the rolling stock of the company *171and other property acquired or to be acquired for use in connection with its railroad. Fourth.",
"The general second mortgage issued to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, November 20,18,83, to secure an issue of bonds to an amount not to exceed in the aggregate $20,000,-000, and under which mortgage there are now outstanding bonds to the aggregate amount of $19,216,000. This mortgage is upon the main line, telegraph lines, and upon the land grant, except as to those lands lying east of the Missouri river; also upon the lease of the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and upon the one undivided half of that part of the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad which extends from its junction with the main line of the railroad of the Northern Pacific Railroad near Thompson to Duluth, Minn.; and also upon lauds then owned or thereafter acquired in the city of St. Paul or Duluth for use in connection with or for the purposes of the road, and upon all other property, of every kind and natui-e, then owned or thereafter to be acquired, wherever situated or however held, for use in connection with or for the purposes of the railroads or any of them, or the business of the Northern Pacific Company. Fifth.",
"The general third mortgage to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, dated December 1, 1887, to secure bonds aggregating $12,000,000 principal, of which there are now7 outstanding $11,461,000. This mortgage covers the main line of the railroad, the Cascade Branch, the land grant, the lease of the St. Paul & Northern Pacific, the undivided half of that part of the St. Paul & Duluth Railroad between Thompson and Duluth, and also all the interest of the Northern Pacific Company in some 20 branch lines of railroads mentioned, and all other branch roads that might thereafter be acquired or constructed and operated as feeders of the main line or of the Cascade Branch. Sixth. The consolidated mortgage to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, dated December 2, 1889, to secure bonds in the aggregate not exceeding $160,000,000, under which there are outstanding bonds to the amount of $62,443,000.",
"This mortgage in general covers all the property and rights included in the previous general mortgages. It recites also that some 2 L branch lines have been constructed, naming them, and that the capital stock of all the branch line companies owned by the Northern Pacific Company is of the par value of $37,781,057.50, of which $8,552,600 is owned absolutely by the company, and the remaining stock, amounting at par value to $29,228,457.50, is held in trust for the railroad company to become the absolute property of the company when the mortgage debt of the branch lines is paid.",
"In addition to the indebtedness secured by mortgage upon the railway, there is also a certain collateral trust indenture, dated May 1, 1893, to the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee, to secure an issue of notes to the amount of $15,000,000, of which there were outstanding at the institution of the suit §10,050,000, secured by certain collateral bonds and stock of the branch lines and other roads controlled by the Northern Pacific Company. The Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company is also trustee under various mortgages *172made by some 17 of the branch lines connected with the Northern Pacific Railroad to secure bonds amounting in the aggregate to some $33,873,000, which bonds bear the guaranty of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company. This suit was originally brought by the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company as trustee under all the trusts recited, and by certain stockholders and creditors of the railroad company, and in behalf of all other stockholders and creditors of the company who might choose to become parties to the suit and contribute to its expense; praying the court to fully administer the trust fund in which the complainants, were interested, constituting the entire railroad system, lands, and assets of the defendant corporation, to marshal all its assets, to ascertain the several respective liens and priorities existing upon each and every part of the system of railway and property, the amount due upon each and every part of the mortgages or other liens, and to enforce and decree the rights, liens, and equities of each and all of the preferred and common stockholders and bondholders and creditors of the company as the same may be finally ascertained and decreed upon the respective interventions or applications of each and every such stockholder or lienor in and to not only said lines of railroad, appurtenances, equipment, land, and property, but also to and upon each and every portion of the assets and property of each of the said corporations.",
"Subsequently the Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company filed its bill of complaint, setting forth the several mortgages upon the road executed to it as' trustee, reciting the proceedings in the suit which it had brought in connection with the stockholders co-complainants, and asking that all the rights and franchises, and all the property, real and personal, of the Northern Pacific Company, may be declared subject to the lien of the consolidated mortgage; that an accounting may be taken of the outstanding bonds under the general' second mortgage, and they declared a first lien on the property of the company described in the general second mortgage, subject only to the lien of the general first mortgage and the prior divisional mortgages; that an account be'taken of the outstanding bonds under the general third mortgage, and that the amount of them may be found to be the next lien following the lien of the general second mortgage on the property described in the general third mortgage; that an account be taken of the outstanding bonds under the consolidated mortgage, and that the amount thereof may be found to be a lien next following the lien of the general third mortgage on the property of the company, according to the terms of the consolidated mortgage; that, in default of payment of interest due under the general second mortgage, the property and franchises of the company may be sold to satisfy the entire amount of the general second bonds and coupons; and that out of the proceeds the amount due under the general second mortgage may be paid, and the surplus, if any, be applied as the court may direct.",
"Upon the filing of the bill, an order was entered, upon the prayer of the complainant, extending the receivership created under the original bill to the *173bill of foreclosure filed by the trust company, and directing that the two' causes be consolidated, the consolidated caxise to proceed under the title of the bill of foreclosure. The petitions, in brief, proceed upon the following grounds: First. That the trustee occupies inconsistent positions; that, by its bill to foreclose the second mortgage, it seeks to cut off the equity of the third mortgage bondholders; that, as trustee of the general second mortgage, it becomes its duty to press a foreclosure and sale, while, as trustee of the general third mortgage, it is its duty to avoid or delay such a foreclosure. Second. That grave questions exist whether the general first and the general second mortgage cover the same property, and whether the general third mortgage does not cover property that is claimed to be covered exclusively by the consolidated mortgage; that it is in the interest of the holders of consols (hat the expense of the receivership and administration should be charged against the interest of third mortgage bondholders, and of the latter that such expense should be charged only against the classes of bonds the holders of which, are benefited by such expense; that the interest of the third mortgage bondholders is for a sale of the road so soon as it will realize enough to pay the interest and principal of the third mortgage bonds and of prior mortgages in full; and that the expense of administration, if such sale should be delayed, is in the interest of the consolidated mortgage bondholders, and counter to the interest of the bondholders under the general third mortgage; that it is in the interest of holders of consolidated bonds that all such hypothecated bonds should be redeemed, but that such redemption is counter to the interest of the third mortgage bondholders; that there is a coniiict of interest between third mortgage bondholders and the holders of bonds issued under the mortgages on branch lines of -which the complainant is trustee.",
"It is also insisted that the complainant was guilty of improper conduct in assenting to the issue of receivers’ certificates imposed as a lien upon the railroad properly superior to the general second and third mortgages, and issued for the redemption of outstanding securities, and in failing to disclose to the court that it was itself the holder of some of the securities to be redeemed; and also that in the course of administration the trust company has acted with partiality towards the consol holders, and unfairly to the prior mortgage holders, in this: that it suffered provision to be made under which the proceeds of receivers’ certificates to the extent of $2,000,000 and upward were used by the receivers to redeem some $4,000,000 of consols, $700,000 of Chicago & Northern Pacific bonds, and $400,-000 collateral trust notes which could not benefit the second and third general mortgage bondholders.",
"It is a cardinal principle in the administration of the law that no man shall be condemned without a hearing. Therefore, it is that no one shall be concluded by a judgment to which he is neither party nor privy. Therefox-e, it is that, as a general rule, all persons interested in a conixoversy must be made parties thereto, that their rights may be determined and concluded by the judgment. There *174has grown into the practice an exception, in some states recognized by positive enactment, that the trustee of an express tru'st may maintain suit without joining his cestui que trust. This is to avoid the expense and the delay attending the getting together and joining of numerous parties whose interests had been committed to the keeping of a trustee, and could be protected by him without their intervention. Under this exception, it has been wrell held that, in general, courts can deal with bondholders only through their trustee, and that it is not to be tolerated that each individual bondholder could, at his own suggestion, proceed to assert his rights, when they can as well be asserted through a trustee.",
"The rule,, however, creates an exception to the general principle that all interested should join in the controversy. It is a rule of convenience, to facilitate the conduct of the suit. It proceeds upon the assumption that the cestui que trust can be fully and fairly represented and protected in his rights by the trustee or representative. A. rule of convenience must, however, give way when rights are involved.",
"If it appears that the trustee refuses or neglects to act, or stands in a hostile position, or has assumed a position prejudicial to the interests of the cestui que trust, the rule of convenience is put aside, and the cestui que trust admitted to represent his rights, because in such case the trustee has not or cannot fully and faithfully represent them. Jones, Corp. Bonds, § 338. It is, however, insisted for the complainant that the court has not the power to permit these petitioners to intervene as parties to the suit, because so to do would be to permit them to violate their contract obligations. This contention is founded upon a provision of both the general second and general third mortgages to the effect that: “No holder or holders of a bond, or of any bonds secured hereby, shall have the right to institute any suit, action, or proceeding, in equity or at law, for' \"the foreclosure of this indenture, or for the execution of the trusts thereof, or for the appointment of a receiver, or any other action, suit, or remedy hereunder, or under or upon any bond or coupon for interest hereby secured, without first giving notice in writing to the trustee of default having occurred and continued, as in this article aforesaid, and requesting the trustee, and affording it a reasonable opportunity, to institute such action, suit, or jjro-ceeding in its own name, or to proceed to- exercise the powers hereinbefore granted, and also offering to it adequate security and indemnity against the costs, expenses, and liabilities to be incurred therein or thereby; and such notification, request, and offer of indemnity are hereby declared to be conditions precedent to any suit or action, or right of suit or action, for the foreclosure or for the execution of the trust of this indenture, or for the appointment of a receiver, and to any other action, suit, or .remedy hereunder, or under or upon any bond or coupon for interest hereby secured.” It is asserted that by tbis provision the bondholders have expressly agreed that except under peculiar circumstances of request and neglect to sue, which do not exist, their rights shall be protected and enforced only by the trustee.",
"I cannot assent to this contention. The provision is restricted to suit by the bondholders to foreclose the mortgage, or to enforce the bonds except through the instrumentality of the trustee, but cannot, I think, be applied to a case where suit has been brought by the trustee, if the conditions *175would justify a court in admitting tbe bondholders to intervene. They do not by this provision conclude themselves against the subsequent assumption by the trustee of hostile position or against: its violation of duty. The stipulation is a mere restraint upon suit by the bondholder unless and until the trustee, upon proper demand and indemnity, refuses to bring suit, but it cannot be that a trustee, by a mere formal institution of suit, could therein, by the assumption of: hostile position or in violation of his duty, sacrifice the interests of the bondholders, and they be without remedy because of this stipulation.",
"It is claimed that the only remedy of the bondholders in case of dereliction of duty on the part of the trustee is to be found in article 15 of the mortgage, in which it is declared “that the trustee may be removed by the majority in interest of the bondholders of all of said bonds hereby secured and then outstanding, by instrument or instruments in writing, under their hands and seals, or by a vote of a meeting duly called and held as herein provided.” This provision puts it in the power of a majority of bondholders at any time, and for or without cause, to displace the trustee, but does not limit or control the powers of a court of equity to permit the intervention of bondholders for the protection of their rights when otherwise it would be just or proper to permit them so to do. The intervention does not displace the trastee, but admits the cestui que trust, that they may be heard in the protection of their claims.",
"The question, I think, resolves itself to this: Are the circumstances disclosed such as to call upon the court, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to permit bondholders to intervene for the protection of their rights? I proceed now to the consideration of the grounds upon which intervention is sought, and to the consideration of the charges preferred against the trustee. I do not design to go over the ground with respect to the propriety of the issuance of receivers’ certificates. That question was long ago fully presented, considered, and determined.",
"I am satisfied of the wisdom of the course then pursued, and that it has resulted in saving this great system of railway from disintegration. The facts presented to the court upon that application were undisputed and indisputable. Counsel for the present petitioning second mortgage bondholders was allowed, amicus curiae, to be heard at length. There was no contention upon the facts. It was a question of propriety of action upon ascertained conditions. Certainly no objection can be justly taken to the action of the trustee with regard to its submission to the court of the question of the propriety of the issuance of those certificates. It is said, however, that the complainant acted improperly in failing to disclose to the court the fact that it at the-time held a debt against the company, secured by collaterals which it was proposed to redeem with the proceeds of the receivers’ certificates lo be issued. It is true that that fact was not disclosed to the court, and therein I think the trust company failed in its duty to the court. It should have disclosed that it was actually or possibly interested in the issuance of.",
"those certificates, and its omis*176sion to advise the court of its debt has given rise, I think, to just criticism. The action of the court, however, -would have been no different had the fact been disclosed. It appears that the loan made by the trust company to the railway company was to aid it in an emergency; that the loan -was made upon reasonable terms, no advantage being taken of the necessities of the company, and that it was a favorable loan for the company; that it has not as yet been paid, and has been carried by the trust company through a period of serious financial revulsion without charge to the estate other than the accruing interest; and that the trust company has not and does not desire with respect to this debt to avail itself of the provision of the order for the issuance of certificates. I cannot think that the omission to advise the court of this debt, while improper, was designed, and it certainly has resulted in no injury to the interests of the petitioners.",
"The court is then confronted with the question whether the trustee stands in such relation to the different mortgages upon the road that it may be hindered in fully and impartially representing each independent interest in the foreclosure of the general second mortgage and in the conduct of the suit. And here it must be remembered that this consolidated suit is not one merely to foreclose the general second mortgage; it is also an administration suit to marshal the assets, to ascertain and determine the several respective liens and priorities existing upon this whole system of railway, and to enforce the rights, not only of the lienors, but of the general creditors and stockholders of the company. I do not deem it proper at this time to assert the respective rights under the different mortgages, but it is apparent that there may well arise conflicting claims under these mortgages with respect to the property covered by each, and the respective rights of the bondholders thereunder.",
"It is not needful, nor would it be proper, now to say that, as matter of proper' construction of the various instruments, the contention cannot be sustained. It' is enough to say that it is debatable ground, and in a court of justice, in the determination of such a question, the contestants have a right to be heard. If such questions should arise, how can the trustee under one mortgage, with strict impartiality, represent the interests under another mortgage? It was well said in Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 332, 32 N. E. 1088, with respect to the duty of a trustee, that “the absolute and positive duty is imposed upon him to defend the life of the trust whenever it is assailed.” A trustee cannot be permitted to assume a position inconsistent with or in opposition to his trust.",
"His duty is single, and he cannot serve two masters with antagonistic interests. The interest of the general second mortgage bondholders is to secure their money as speedily as possible. The interest of the third mortgage bondholders is to delay foreclosure until arrangements can be made that will insure their interest in the property, and therefore to insist upon postponement of the enforcement of the rights of the second mortgage bondholders. The interest of the holders of consolidated mortgage bonds is in this respect antagonistic to both the general second and *177general third mortgage bondholders. It would be improper to say what course should be pursued in the determination of the questions when they shall be confronted, but surely it would seem inconsistent with its trust under the consolidated mortgage for the trustee to insist upon immediate sale under the prior mortgages, and so Tice versa.",
"Upon that question each interest should be heard in its own behalf. These observations will apply also to possible contention between the different mortgage interests with respect to the property covered by each, and possible contention between the third mortgage bondholders, and the consolidated mortgage bondholders and the holders of collateral trust notes, with respect to which interest has a prior lien upon the collateral notes and upon the bonds of the branch lines which may be held by the trust company (complainant) as trustee. It would be neither profitable nor wise to forecast the controversies that may arise with respect to conflicting interests in this case. It is sufficient to say that each conflicting interest has a right to its day in court, and to be heard; and, where there is the same trustee in each of the mortgages and under the collateral trust agreement, it seems just and proper that each interest should be represented in the suit, that the court may be properly advised upon a full hearing of all interests.",
"I think it will not do to say that the controversies suggested have not as yet arisen. They could probably never arise if all the bondholders under the different mortgages were alone represented by the same trustee. In Such case their rights would most likely be determined without controversy. The presence of disputing parties is necessary that the conflict may be formulated and determined by judgment. It would, I think, be an anomaly if a trastee under one trust should sue himself as trustee under another trust to determine the conflict between the trusts. I think it proper, therefore, in view of the possible and probable conflicts that may arise, and in view of the position of the complainant as trustee under all these mortgages, that a representative of each interest should be admitted to protect the rights of each in any conflict that may arise between these interests.",
"It is objected to the application of the Livingston committee that it only represents a million or a million and a half dollars of bonds out of the total amount of $19,216,000; and to Mr. Yan Nostrand that he or his committee only represent a million dollars of bonds out of $14,461,00.0; a,nd that the Adams committee, opposing the granting of the petitions, and content with the action of the trustee, represents nearly one-third of the bonds issued under the general second mortgage, and over one-half of the bonds issued under the general third mortgage. This objection might be of great force and availing were it not for the fact that the Adams committee also represents nearly one-third — :some $19,881,000 — of the consolidated mortgage bonds.",
"The Adams committee, therefore, stands in the same plight with the complainant, trustee under all the mortgages. Its interest would be not only to protect the general second and general third mortgages, but also the consolidated mort*178gage, and possibly its interest under tbe general second and general third mortgages might be subordinated to its larger interest under the consolidated mortgage. It is also objected to the Livingston committee and to the Van Nostrand committee that they largely represent stockholders as well as bondholders. I am not impressed with the validity of this objection. The stockholders are now represented by the corporation defendant, actively asserting their rights in the suit. These committees could do no more. I am, however, impressed with the consideration that the Livingston and the Van Nostrand committees respectively represent but a small minority of the bonds issued under the general second and third mortgages; and if there were a representative of a majority of the bonds issued under these two mortgages respectively, having.no other interest to serve than that of the respective mortgages mentioned, I should not feel inclined to grant these petitions. But they are the only persons before the court representing distinctively the interests of the mortgages under which they respectively hold bonds. The stock which they hold is at the best of but trifling value.",
"It is not reasonable to suppose that they would sacrifice or endanger their bonds in the protection of that which is of but trifling value. It is urged that these petitions should not be granted, because it is feared that they are not preferred in good faith, but merely to obtain vantage ground from which they can embarrass the trustee and the court in the management of this great railway, and impede and hinder the work and injure the credit of the receivership. The court has no right to assume that such is the purpose of the petitioners, nor can it perceive that such result can follow the granting of the petitions. If, however, such be the purpose, — which I have no right to assume, and which is disclaimed by counsel,— the court will be quite able to protect itself and the estate against improper intrusion into and attack upon the management of the property committed to its supervision. The petitioners are admitted for the protection of their rights, not for factional opposition to the management of this property by the receivers.",
"The fear is also expressed by counsel for the trustee that the exercise, of the right to appeal may prevent a proper reorganization plan from being carried out. I am not forgetful of the considerations which influence the actions of courts with respect to properties of this kind in recognizing every fair plan of reorganization; nor am I unmindful of the consideration that the minority of bondholders are in large measure subject to the action of the majority; but such considerations ought not to avail to abridge the right to appeal in any case where a party deems his right infringed.",
"It is more important that the right to appeal be preserved in its integrity than that any plan of reorganization should be carried into effect without the delay which may be incident to the assertion of legal rights. At the same time, however, care should be taken that, while the right should be granted, it should be protected from abuse. And to that end I have come to the conclusion to allow but *179one individual of each of these committees to be represented in tlie suit, to the end that each mortgage interest shall thus have representation. This will, as I think, enable the court to be informed of the claims and rights of each interest, prevent confusion in the orderly conduct of the litigation, and factional opposition in the management of the estate.",
"The prayers of the several petitions will therefore be granted so far as to permit Mr. Johnston Livingston, Mr. Charles B. Van Nostrand, and Mr. Edward D. Adams to be made parties defendant to the suit for the purpose of protecting the interests of the bonds represented by them respectively in any conflict which may arise as to their respective interests in the estate."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/8851865/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed June 30, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D21-887 Lower Tribunal No. F12-4353 ________________
Gilberto Alvarez, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alberto Milian, Judge.
Gilberto Alvarez, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before EMAS, C.J., and LINDSEY and HENDON, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed. | 06-30-2021 | [
"Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed June 30, 2021. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. ________________ No. 3D21-887 Lower Tribunal No. F12-4353 ________________ Gilberto Alvarez, Appellant, vs. The State of Florida, Appellee. An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Alberto Milian, Judge. Gilberto Alvarez, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee. Before EMAS, C.J., and LINDSEY and HENDON, JJ. PER CURIAM. Affirmed."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/4699881/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge. The defendant, Charles S. Stuart, appeals his conviction and sentence for second-degree murder. We have examined his arguments and find merit in only one. In addition to sentencing him to 12 years’ incarceration and 10 years’ probation, the trial court suspended his driver’s license for the probationary period. We agree that the trial court lacked authority to suspend or revoke the defendant’s license. As we have previously explained, the correct procedure is for the trial court to forward the record of the conviction and the factual basis showing the use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the felony to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. It is then the Department’s responsibility to revoke the driving license privilege of the convicted. See § 322.26(3), Fla.Stat. (1987); Hughes v. State, 578 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Mandile v. State, 547 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence but vacate that portion of his sentence suspending his driver’s license. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings in compliance with section 322.26(3). LEHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. | 07-29-2022 | [
"SCHEB, Acting Chief Judge. The defendant, Charles S. Stuart, appeals his conviction and sentence for second-degree murder. We have examined his arguments and find merit in only one. In addition to sentencing him to 12 years’ incarceration and 10 years’ probation, the trial court suspended his driver’s license for the probationary period. We agree that the trial court lacked authority to suspend or revoke the defendant’s license. As we have previously explained, the correct procedure is for the trial court to forward the record of the conviction and the factual basis showing the use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the felony to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. It is then the Department’s responsibility to revoke the driving license privilege of the convicted. See § 322.26(3), Fla.Stat. (1987); Hughes v. State, 578 So.2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Mandile v. State, 547 So.2d 1062 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).",
"Accordingly, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence but vacate that portion of his sentence suspending his driver’s license. We remand to the trial court for further proceedings in compliance with section 322.26(3). LEHAN and HALL, JJ., concur."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/7591605/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2019 ME 95 Docket: And-18-508 Submitted On Briefs: May 30, 2019 Decided: June 11, 2019
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
IN RE CHILD OF SHANNON S.
PER CURIAM
[¶1] Shannon S. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Lewiston,
Ham-Thompson, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child. 22 M.R.S.
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018). The mother challenges the court’s
determination that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of
her child. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
[¶2] On November 9, 2015, the Department of Health and Human
Services filed a child protection petition. See 22 M.R.S. § 4032 (2018). The
petition alleged that the mother struggled with substance abuse and exposed
the child to domestic violence between the parents in the home.1 On
February 5, 2016, the court (Dow, J.) entered a jeopardy order, with the parents’
1 Although both parents’ parental rights were terminated, the father has not appealed. 2
agreement, see 22 M.R.S. § 4035(1)-(2) (2018); however, custody remained
with the mother until May 22, 2017, when the court (Oram, J.) granted the
Department custody of the child after the mother was charged with two counts
of unlawful possession of scheduled drugs. The child was placed with a
relative.2
[¶3] The Department petitioned for termination of the mother’s parental
rights on May 18, 2018. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018). The court
(Ham-Thompson, J.) held a three-day hearing on the petition and, on
November 19, 2018, found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is
unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for
the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs,
and that termination of the mother’s rights is in the best interest of the child.
See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii).
[¶4] The court based its decision on the following factual findings, all of
which are supported by competent evidence in the record.
[The mother] has a significant history of substance abuse. By her own admissions, she has had multiple relapses during the pendency of this case. [The mother] has participated in two residential treatment programs, multiple [Intensive Outpatient
2On June 23, 2018, the child was moved to the home of another relative who previously had provided some respite care for the child. The child was in this relative’s care at the time of the termination hearing. 3
Programs], and individual counseling. Despite these services, [the mother] has and continues to actively abuse substances. [The mother] also has significant mental health issues and has been inconsistent in attending mental health treatment. During her testimony, [the mother] indicated that she did not see a correlation between her mental health issues and the impact on her child.
....
. . . [The mother] has failed to do the things required in order to eliminate jeopardy. She has failed to refrain from using illicit substances, failed to adequately address her substance abuse history, failed to address her mental health issues, failed to provide a safe and stable home environment for her [child], and failed to demonstrate that she can be an emotionally stable parent to her [child].
The court found further that the mother’s “substance abuse has resulted in her
having a fairly extensive criminal history from 2004 to present” including
“multiple OUIs, thefts by unauthorized taking, illegal possessions of controlled
substances and violations of conditions of release.”
II. DISCUSSION
[¶5] On appeal, the mother challenges the court’s finding that
termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. “We review the
trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion
regarding the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the
facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court’s lens.” In re
Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 3, 157 A.3d 244 (quotation marks omitted). Because 4
the trial court is “able to directly evaluate the testimony of the witnesses,” we
give substantial deference to the court’s judgment on the issue of best interest.
In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 33, 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted).
[¶6] The mother argues that the court abused its discretion because it
speculated about who might adopt the child after her parental rights were
terminated. The mother contends that the court improperly considered this
factor in its best interest analysis when it found that
termination of parental rights is in [the child’s] best interest. [The child] seems happy in [the] current placement, and if [the parents’] parental rights are terminated, [the foster parent] would happily adopt [the child]. . . . Given the strong public policy favoring permanency for children . . . the court has no difficulty in finding that the plan of adoption is clearly in [the child’s] best interest so that [the child] has permanency in the happy home where [the child] is presently living.
(Emphasis added.)
[¶7] It is well established that the court may, and often does, consolidate
permanency planning and termination proceedings; the two “cannot be
divorced from one another because a best interest decision necessarily
requires the court to consider the long-term living arrangement that will best
serve a child’s needs. The court’s permanency plan for the child is an
inextricable part of that decision.” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 15,
187 A.3d 1 (quoting In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 28, 889 A.2d 297). In 5
general, trial courts are permitted to consider in these consolidated
proceedings “evidence that the current foster placement is furthering the
child’s permanency plan, especially where that plan is to place the child for
adoption.” In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 6, 157 A.3d 244. However,
“permanency planning for a child in foster care, and the best interest
determination to be made in a termination proceeding, are distinct from the
question of who should adopt the child . . . .”3 Id. (citations omitted).
[¶8] Courts should “not opine on who should become the adoptive
parent(s) in a prospective adoption proceeding.” In re Children of Bethmarie R.,
2019 ME 59, ¶ 8, --- A.3d ---. “The question of who is the best person to adopt
the child . . . is beyond the scope of a termination proceeding because that
question must be addressed in a separate adoption action governed by
[title 18].” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1. In this case,
while the court determined that the permanency plan for the child would be
adoption, see In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 28, 889 A.2d 297, it did not
3 In title 22 proceedings for the termination of parental rights, “the court does not begin to consider post-termination placements until after termination of parental rights has been ordered.” Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 9, 175 A.3d 639. “[I]n a consolidated proceeding where the court addresses a termination petition and establishes a permanency plan, while the court may determine that as a general matter adoption is in the child’s best interest and will be the permanency plan, the court would overreach if it were to designate the adoptive party.” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1. 6
declare that “the inevitable result of its termination judgment” would be
adoption with the foster parent, In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2019 ME 59, ¶ 8,
--- A.3d ---. The court, therefore, stopped just short of determining who the
adoptive parent would be, but nonetheless determined that the child’s best
interest would be served through the permanency plan of adoption.
[¶9] Given the strength of the record, particularly the length of time the
child has been in kinship care and the mother’s consistent and demonstrated
inability to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is
in the child’s best interest. See In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 3, 157 A.3d 244.
Title 22 favors permanency; the child has been the subject of child protection
proceedings since November 2015, and termination of the mother’s parental
rights will finally allow the child to achieve that permanency. See 22 M.R.S.
§ 4050 (2018); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 23, 889 A.2d 297.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed. 7
Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant mother
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2015-70 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY | 06-13-2019 | [
"MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT Reporter of Decisions Decision: 2019 ME 95 Docket: And-18-508 Submitted On Briefs: May 30, 2019 Decided: June 11, 2019 Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. IN RE CHILD OF SHANNON S. PER CURIAM [¶1] Shannon S. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, Ham-Thompson, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child. 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) (2018). The mother challenges the court’s determination that termination of her parental rights is in the best interest of her child. We affirm the judgment. I. BACKGROUND [¶2] On November 9, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services filed a child protection petition. See 22 M.R.S.",
"§ 4032 (2018). The petition alleged that the mother struggled with substance abuse and exposed the child to domestic violence between the parents in the home.1 On February 5, 2016, the court (Dow, J.) entered a jeopardy order, with the parents’ 1 Although both parents’ parental rights were terminated, the father has not appealed. 2 agreement, see 22 M.R.S. § 4035(1)-(2) (2018); however, custody remained with the mother until May 22, 2017, when the court (Oram, J.) granted the Department custody of the child after the mother was charged with two counts of unlawful possession of scheduled drugs. The child was placed with a relative.2 [¶3] The Department petitioned for termination of the mother’s parental rights on May 18, 2018. See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018).",
"The court (Ham-Thompson, J.) held a three-day hearing on the petition and, on November 19, 2018, found by clear and convincing evidence that the mother is unwilling or unable to protect the child from jeopardy or take responsibility for the child within a time that is reasonably calculated to meet the child’s needs, and that termination of the mother’s rights is in the best interest of the child. See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii). [¶4] The court based its decision on the following factual findings, all of which are supported by competent evidence in the record.",
"[The mother] has a significant history of substance abuse. By her own admissions, she has had multiple relapses during the pendency of this case. [The mother] has participated in two residential treatment programs, multiple [Intensive Outpatient 2On June 23, 2018, the child was moved to the home of another relative who previously had provided some respite care for the child. The child was in this relative’s care at the time of the termination hearing. 3 Programs], and individual counseling. Despite these services, [the mother] has and continues to actively abuse substances. [The mother] also has significant mental health issues and has been inconsistent in attending mental health treatment. During her testimony, [the mother] indicated that she did not see a correlation between her mental health issues and the impact on her child.",
".... . . . [The mother] has failed to do the things required in order to eliminate jeopardy. She has failed to refrain from using illicit substances, failed to adequately address her substance abuse history, failed to address her mental health issues, failed to provide a safe and stable home environment for her [child], and failed to demonstrate that she can be an emotionally stable parent to her [child]. The court found further that the mother’s “substance abuse has resulted in her having a fairly extensive criminal history from 2004 to present” including “multiple OUIs, thefts by unauthorized taking, illegal possessions of controlled substances and violations of conditions of release.” II. DISCUSSION [¶5] On appeal, the mother challenges the court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. “We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its ultimate conclusion regarding the best interest of the child for an abuse of discretion, viewing the facts, and the weight to be given them, through the trial court’s lens.” In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 3, 157 A.3d 244 (quotation marks omitted). Because 4 the trial court is “able to directly evaluate the testimony of the witnesses,” we give substantial deference to the court’s judgment on the issue of best interest. In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 33, 159 A.3d 345 (quotation marks omitted).",
"[¶6] The mother argues that the court abused its discretion because it speculated about who might adopt the child after her parental rights were terminated. The mother contends that the court improperly considered this factor in its best interest analysis when it found that termination of parental rights is in [the child’s] best interest. [The child] seems happy in [the] current placement, and if [the parents’] parental rights are terminated, [the foster parent] would happily adopt [the child]. . . . Given the strong public policy favoring permanency for children . . . the court has no difficulty in finding that the plan of adoption is clearly in [the child’s] best interest so that [the child] has permanency in the happy home where [the child] is presently living.",
"(Emphasis added.) [¶7] It is well established that the court may, and often does, consolidate permanency planning and termination proceedings; the two “cannot be divorced from one another because a best interest decision necessarily requires the court to consider the long-term living arrangement that will best serve a child’s needs. The court’s permanency plan for the child is an inextricable part of that decision.” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 15, 187 A.3d 1 (quoting In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 28, 889 A.2d 297). In 5 general, trial courts are permitted to consider in these consolidated proceedings “evidence that the current foster placement is furthering the child’s permanency plan, especially where that plan is to place the child for adoption.” In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 6, 157 A.3d 244. However, “permanency planning for a child in foster care, and the best interest determination to be made in a termination proceeding, are distinct from the question of who should adopt the child . . . .”3 Id.",
"(citations omitted). [¶8] Courts should “not opine on who should become the adoptive parent(s) in a prospective adoption proceeding.” In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2019 ME 59, ¶ 8, --- A.3d ---. “The question of who is the best person to adopt the child . . . is beyond the scope of a termination proceeding because that question must be addressed in a separate adoption action governed by [title 18].” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1. In this case, while the court determined that the permanency plan for the child would be adoption, see In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 28, 889 A.2d 297, it did not 3 In title 22 proceedings for the termination of parental rights, “the court does not begin to consider post-termination placements until after termination of parental rights has been ordered.” Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 9, 175 A.3d 639. “[I]n a consolidated proceeding where the court addresses a termination petition and establishes a permanency plan, while the court may determine that as a general matter adoption is in the child’s best interest and will be the permanency plan, the court would overreach if it were to designate the adoptive party.” In re Children of Nicole M., 2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1.",
"6 declare that “the inevitable result of its termination judgment” would be adoption with the foster parent, In re Children of Bethmarie R., 2019 ME 59, ¶ 8, --- A.3d ---. The court, therefore, stopped just short of determining who the adoptive parent would be, but nonetheless determined that the child’s best interest would be served through the permanency plan of adoption. [¶9] Given the strength of the record, particularly the length of time the child has been in kinship care and the mother’s consistent and demonstrated inability to provide a safe and stable home for the child, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the child’s best interest. See In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 3, 157 A.3d 244.",
"Title 22 favors permanency; the child has been the subject of child protection proceedings since November 2015, and termination of the mother’s parental rights will finally allow the child to achieve that permanency. See 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2018); In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 23, 889 A.2d 297. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 7 Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant mother Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human Services Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2015-70 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY"
]
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Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 1 of 14
1 AMIEL L. WADE (No. 184312) BRANDON J. CHAIDEZ (No. 326189) 2 WADE LAW GROUP 3 A Professional Corporation 84 West Santa Clara Street, Ste. 750 4 San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 842-1688 5 Facsimile:(408) 852-0614 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff, 7 ERIK MISHIYEV
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ERIK MISHIYEV, ) Case No. 11 ) Plaintiff, ) PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S 12 ) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES vs. ) 13 ) ) COMPLAINT FOR: 14 YOUTUBE ENTERTAINMENT STUDIOS, INC. ) And DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive, ) 1. BREACH OF CONTRACT 15 ) 2. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH Defendants. ) PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS ADVANTAGE; 16 ) ) 3. INTERFERENCE WITH 17 ) CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS ) 4. NEGLIGENCE; 18 ) 5. NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH ) PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS; 19 ) ) 6. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF; 20 ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 21 ) ) 22 ) ) 23 ) ) 24 25 26 27 -1- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 2 of 14
INTRODUCTION 1 2 Plaintiff, ERIK MISHIYEV, (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) alleges:
3 1. Plaintiff was at all times herein mentioned, originally a resident of the State of New 4 York. Plaintiff goes by the name DJ Short-E, and operates Hot4ever LLC, established February 10, 5 2010, in what is now his residential location of Tampa, Florida. 6 2. On information and belief, Defendant YOUTUBE ENTERTAINMENT STUDIOS 7 8 INC., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Bruno, California.
9 3. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES 10 1-10, inclusive. Plaintiff therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend 11 this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and 12 believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is in some manner 13 14 responsible for the injuries and damage sustained by Plaintiff, as alleged herein.
15 4. At all times mentioned, each Defendant, including, but not limited to Defendants DOES 1 16 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, were, and each was, an agent, associate and/or employee, acting 17 with the permission, consent and/or in the aid or assistance of one or more of the other above-named 18 Defendants and each of them at all times herein mentioned, was acting within the course and scope of 19 20 his/her/their agency and/or employment of said Defendants.
21 5. Furthermore, because of the agency, employment and/or joint venture relationship
22 between Defendants, each Defendant had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the acts of each of the 23 other Cross-Defendants. Each Defendant ratified, approved, joined in, acquiesced and/or authorized the 24 wrongful acts of co-Defendants, and each of them, as set forth below, and/or retained the benefits of said 25 wrongful acts. 26 27 -2- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 3 of 14
6. In performing and failing to perform the acts alleged herein, Defendants aided and 1 2 abetted the others; as each Defendant is and/or was the employee, agent, joint venturer and/or
3 representative of the others, and was acting on their behalf, within the scope of that agency, employment 4 and/or joint venture and with their permission and consent; as each Defendant acted both directly and 5 indirectly through agents and employees. As such said Defendants shall hereinafter be collectively 6 referred to as “Defendant.” 7 8 JURISIDCTION
9 7. This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 USC § 1332(a) 10 because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the parties 11 hereto reside in different states. The Plaintiff resides in the state of Florida and the Defendant is 12 incorporated in the state of Delaware, and has its principal place of business in San Bruno California. 13 14 FACTS
15 8. Plaintiff, is a well-known Journalist and DJ, known as ‘Short-E’, who publishes original 16 music, DJ mixes, and celebrity interviews in videos on YOUTUBE. 17 9. YOUTUBE is a video-sharing site where hundreds of millions of internet users post 18 videos daily. 19 10. Such videos are made available to others for viewing on individualized platforms created by 20 the various content creators through use of the YOUTUBE website. The content creator’s videos 21 include, but are not limited to, videos of personal life events and experiences, music videos, news 22 reports, advertisements, commentary on differing television programs, and compilation videos of 23 various assortments and variety. 24 11. Since on or about 2007, Plaintiff has developed and maintained two (2) main YOUTUBE 25 channels, dubbed “djshortehot4eva” and “theshorteshow.” With over 250,000 total subscribers from 26 27 -3- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 4 of 14
1 around the world, Plaintiff managed to accumulate over 110 million views, earning him $310,000.00 2 over approximately a five (5) year time period. See Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s 3 earnings from YOUTUBE over the last five years and channel growth. 4 12. On or about 2007, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with YOUTUBE, through its 5 representative Matthew Villacarte, to begin the monetization of his videos and channels through use of a 6 monetized AdSense publisher account, to which the following videos were designated as monetized 7 (meaning that Plaintiff could begin earning income based on the amount of views each individual video 8 received): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5y-8-bU8p8; 9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXlc_6XA1VE; 10 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDJZZCXQPR0; 11 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nBmVV6U6DY; 12 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSKxm6Bk8FI; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onlRQn0zCW8; 13 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGgngkA2vHw; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5bxmI59DV4; 14 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Lb01gKxTzQ; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngLzAoSfdP4; 15 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFFCvWcK6Yw; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsl_d_EuRFE; 16 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCU2h3drj08 17 13. The written agreement was YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions which were in writing, 18 which YOUTUBE stated governed the terms of the Plaintiff’s use of YOUTUBE. See Exhibit B, a true 19 and correct copy of YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions that were in place and that were applicable to the 20 parties agreement during the period of times articulated in this complaint (the “Agreement”). 21 14. Although Plaintiff does earn and has earned supplemental income through the booking of DJ 22 events, Plaintiff’s main source of income since on or about 2012, has been his earnings generated from 23 the monetization of his YOUTUBE videos and channels through use of his AdSense publisher account. 24 15. On or about March 11, 2016, Plaintiff began receiving copyright claims on his highest 25 advertisement revenue videos, which if unresponded to would leave a strike on Plaintiff’s channel, with 26 three strikes resulting in the discontinuance of Plaintiff’s channel. Plaintiff ended up responding by 27 -4- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 5 of 14
1 following proper procedure and filing a ‘counter-notification’ challenging the claims, and ended up 2 winning all claims asserted against him, which resulted in all of his targeted channels and videos being 3 re-instated for monetization. See Exhibit C, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s counter notification 4 wins. 5 16. All parties, and most content creators on YOUTUBE, understand that it is customary for 6 false and erroneous copyright claims to made by other users, in order to intercept advertisement revenue 7 and/or to have legitimate content removed in an effort to stifle competition. In order to combat such 8 customary practices, YOUTUBE has a requirement that the claimant either provide proof of a lawsuit 9 for infringement or the alleged offending video will be re-instated, and strike(s) removed. These rules 10 and laws are in place to vet legitimate claims from meritless claims, as well as to thwart abuse of the 11 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”). See Exhibit B, a true and correct copy of YOUTUBE’s 12 terms and conditions (the “Agreement”). 13 17. On or about the start of 2017, YOUTUBE congratulated Plaintiff for his success on their 14 website and granted him a “Silver Creator Award,” for his accolade of reaching 100,000 subscribers. 15 See Exhibit D, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff receiving a Silver Creator Award. 16 18. Thereafter, although Plaintiff’s channels and videos were re-instated and his 17 subscribers were continuing to increase at a rate of about 4,000 a month, his views on each video posted 18 remained low when compared to smaller similar channels. Plaintiff was concerned about this suspicious 19 activity and sought confirmation numerous times from YOUTUBE that they were truly distributing his 20 new videos to his fans and subscribers, but YOUTUBE failed to provide such confirmation, stating 21 “They could not share this information” with him. See Exhibit E, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s 22 communications with YouTube customer service through their messaging chat. 23 19. As indicated above, when a person establishes a YOUTUBE channel, YOUTUBE has 24 each person agree to YOUTUBE’S terms and conditions, which are in writing. See Exhibit B, a true and 25 correct copy of YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions (the “Agreement”). YOUTUBE breached Section 26 6(F) of the Agreement when it failed to resolve its continual technical difficulties and distribute 27 -5- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 6 of 14
1 Plaintiff’s new content. See Exhibit F, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s communications with 2 YouTube users indicating that Plaintiff’s newly uploaded videos were not being distributed. YOUTUBE 3 breached Section 6(F) when it failed to process “audiovisual content uploaded by [Plaintiff] in 4 accordance with the YOUTUBE’s Data Processing Terms. Particularly, YOUTUBE’s continual 5 technical difficulties were the result of a breach in Google’s security which lead to the accidental or 6 unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, Customer’s Personal Data 7 on systems managed by or otherwise controlled by Google. 8 20. As a direct result of YOUTUBE’s breach of the Agreement, although Plaintiff was 9 growing subscribers at a rate of about 4,000 per month, when he uploaded a new video, he would only 10 receive a few hundred views directly causing a reduction in his revenue in the amount of $125,000.00 in 11 losses over a three (3) year period. 12 21. Thereafter, due to YOUTUBE’s ongoing breaches and negligence in handling 13 Plaintiff’s technical issues, Plaintiff lost trust with YOUTUBE’s support team and placed them on notice 14 several times via chat messages and emails, that he would be filing a lawsuit against YOUTUBE if such 15 conduct persisted. See Exhibit G, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s email communications with 16 YouTube customer service. 17 22. On December 14, 2018, YOUTUBE sent Plaintiff a notice that they were terminating his 18 accounts and removing all his videos due to his litigation threat, though he had not violated any rules or 19 terms of use nor the Community Guidelines. See Exhibit H, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s email 20 communications with YouTube customer service. 21 23. On December 15, 2018 through January 15, 2019, Plaintiff was abruptly bombarded with 22 copyright claims like he never had been before the entire time he had been managing and growing his 23 channels. See Exhibit I, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s email inbox associated with his YouTube 24 account. 25 24. Then on or about January 22, 2018, acting upon a takedown notice delivered by claimants 26 to YOUTUBE, pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), 27 -6- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 7 of 14
1 YOUTUBE blocked all public access to Plaintiff’s videos. YOUTUBE substituted the videos with a 2 notice stating that “This video is no longer available due to a copyright claim.” See Exhibit J, a true and 3 correct copy of Plaintiff’s screen shot of YOUTUBE’s notice. 4 25. Once Plaintiff’s videos were removed, he received strikes on his account. Although 5 YOUTUBE stated they removed his channels and videos for copyright claims, the removals appeared to 6 Plaintiff to be in retaliation for his placing them on notice that he would be filing a lawsuit. Such 7 removals violated Section 8(b) of YOUTUBE’s Agreement, which states, inter alia, “[u]nless the 8 copyright claim owner files an action seeking a court order against the Content provider, member or 9 user, the removed Content may be replaced, or access to it restored, in 10 to 14 business days or more 10 after receipt of the counter-notice, at Youtube’s sole discretion.” See Exhibit K, a true and correct copy 11 of communications between Plaintiff and YOUTUBE’s Google Support team. 12 26. YOUTUBE’s Agreement requires that any claimants who make copyright claims 13 demonstrate that they have filed a copyright infringement lawsuit. Should the claimant fail to provide 14 proof within fourteen (14) days from a ‘counter notification’, the offending video shall be re-loaded and 15 the strike removed. See Exhibit L, a true and correct copy of YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions (the 16 “Agreement”). 17 27. Plaintiff complied with YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions of use and submitted counter 18 notifications on the following dates: Wednesday, January 23, 2019; Thursday January 24, 2019; 19 Thursday, February 7, 2019; Friday February 8, 2019; and Friday February 22, 2019. See Exhibit M, 20 true and correct copies of the notifications submitted by Plaintiff. 21 28. Although Plaintiff had been compliant with YOUTUBE’s Agreement for counter 22 notifications and had previously succeeded in challenging all prior claims with no litigation ever 23 initiated against him, YOUTUBE failed to process Plaintiff’s counter notifications, at first stating that 24 such counter notifications were “ineligible,” without providing a description of why Plaintiff’s videos 25 were “ineligible.” See Exhibit N, a true and correct copy of email communications between Plaintiff and 26 YOUTUBE. 27 -7- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 8 of 14
1 29. After further inquiry by Plaintiff as to the root cause of Plaintiff’s ineligibility to exercise 2 his procedural rights to process counter notifications, YOUTUBE personnel retracted their statement 3 that such videos were ineligible and instead stated that the videos counter notifications would be 4 processed through, to which they never were processed through. See Exhibit O, a true and correct copy 5 of email communications between Plaintiff and YOUTUBE. 6 30. YOUTUBE also failed to comply with the Agreement, which states, inter alia, that 7 “…each strike expires in 90 days from the time it is issued.” Ninety (90) plus business days have passed 8 and YOUTUBE should have organically removed Plaintiff’s strikes and re-instated his videos and 9 channels according to YOUTUBE's ‘Community Guidelines strike basics.’ See Exhibit P, a true and 10 correct copy of YOUTUBE’s Community Guidelines strike basics. 11 31. To date, Plaintiff’s strikes have not been removed, his counter claims have 12 not been processed, and his videos and channels have been permanently removed, though no 13 claimants presented evidence that they filed any lawsuits. Thus, evidencing that YOUTUBE did not 14 simply remove his content because of copyright claims, but instead in retaliation for placing them on 15 notice that he was filing a lawsuit against them. 16 32. YOUTUBE breached their Agreement by removing public access to Plaintiff’s videos, 17 failing to re-instate all of Plaintiff’s Videos, failing to remove all strikes from his channels, and failing to 18 re-establish all of his channels. 19 33. Plaintiff’s YOUTUBE channels at issue herein were advertised with the AdSense 20 publisher, which had an id# associated with the channels, such advertisements were aired during his 21 pre-recorded tv shows in multiple cities. The AdSense id# is how Plaintiff’s monetization account is 22 identified (AdSense pub-10424255688085310), and this is no longer available as a result of his 23 channels being removed consequently preventing him from receiving any AdSense revenue. 24 34. Since January 2019, Plaintiff has not earned any money from YOUTUBE. The delay of 25 resolution that was allowed to proceed past the 14-day time limit caused him to suffer loss of earnings of 26 $90,000 from January 2019 to July 2019. The prolonged dead video links resulted in loss of new 27 -8- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 9 of 14
1 subscribers, views, future hits, performance bookings, and lost advertising and sponsorship revenue, all 2 of which has caused irreparable harm. YOUTUBE’s breach has directly caused Plaintiff to suffer over 3 $720,000 in damages for loss of earnings and lost future earnings. Defendants' breach is directly causing 4 Plaintiff to compete with a disadvantage because YOUTUBE has restricted him from creating any new 5 YOUTUBE channels. 6 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 7 (BREACH OF CONTRACT) 8 9 35. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 34, as though fully set forth herein.
10 36. As referenced above, the Plaintiff entered into a service contract with Defendant by
11 which he agreed to use Defendant’s YOUTUBE platform as a repository for his video content creation
12 with the expectation that he would be paid based on viewership of each individual posted video.
13 37. Plaintiff has performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on their part to
14 be performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of their agreement with Defendant as
15 described above.
16 38. Plaintiff has requested Defendant to perform his obligations under the contract and
17 Defendant has refused.
18 39. Defendant breached the contract by engaging the conduct herein alleged.
19 40. By engaging in the conduct outlined above and in breaching his contract with the
20 Plaintiff, Defendant has also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the
21 Plaintiff.
22 41. As a direct result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff was harmed and continues to be
23 harmed and the breach of contract was a substantial factor causing Plaintiff’s harm.
24 42. As a result, thereof, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such basis alleges that he is
25 owed an amount according to proof at trial, but at least $720,000.00.
26 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth.
27 -9- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 10 of 14
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS) 2 3 43. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 42, as though fully set forth herein. 4 44. Defendant knew that Plaintiff had many subscribers which as a result thereof, the 5 Plaintiff was making money from said subscribers. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual 6 relationships with said subscribers by doing all of the acts and omissions alleged above. 7 8 45. As a proximate result of the above described acts and omissions of the Defendant,
9 Plaintiff’s contractual relationships with customers have broken and/or been damaged. 10 46. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant as herein alleged, 11 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such basis alleges that he has lost profits and/or other 12 compensation in an amount not fully known by him, will continue to lose profits in the future, the full 13 14 extent to which is not currently known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff requests leave to amend when said amount
15 is ascertained. 16 47. The aforementioned conduct of Defendant was intentional on the part of Defendant, 17 thereby depriving Plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and was despicable 18 conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff rights, 19 20 so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages.
21 48. Defendant unless restrained, will disrupt other business relationships between Plaintiff
22 and other potential customers to Plaintiff great irreparable injury, for which damages would not afford 23 adequate relief, in that they would not completely compensate for the injury to Plaintiff’s business 24 reputation and goodwill. 25 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth 26 27 -10- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 11 of 14
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE) 2 3 49. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 48, as though fully set forth herein. 4 50. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective clients by engaging in the conduct 5 attributed to the defendant above and omissions alleged above. 6 51. As a proximate result of the Defendant’s conduct described above, Plaintiff’s contractual 7 8 relationships with potential customers have been broken and/or damaged.
9 52. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant as herein alleged, 10 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such basis alleges that he has lost profits and/or other 11 compensation in an amount not fully known by him, will continue to lose profits in the future, the full 12 extent to which is not currently known to Plaintiff, but is at least believed to be $720,000. Plaintiff 13 14 requests leave to amend when said amount is ascertained.
15 53. The aforementioned conduct of Defendant was intentional on the part of Defendant, 16 thereby depriving Plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and was despicable 17 conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff rights, 18 so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages. 19 20 54. Defendant unless restrained, will disrupt other business relationships between Plaintiff
21 and other potential customers to Plaintiff great irreparable injury, for which damages would not afford
22 adequate relief, in that they would not completely compensate for the injury to Plaintiff’s business 23 reputation and goodwill. 24 25 26 27 -11- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 12 of 14
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE) 2 3 55. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 54, as though fully set forth herein. 4 56. Defendant had a duty to refrain from conduct that would cause harm to Plaintiff. 5 Defendant breached that duty when negligently interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective clients by doing 6 all of the acts and omissions alleged above. 7 8 57. As a proximate result of the above described acts and omissions of the Defendant,
9 Plaintiff’s contractual relationships with potential customers have been broken and/or damaged. 10 58. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant as herein alleged, 11 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such basis alleges that he has lost profits 12 and/or other compensation in an amount not fully known by him, will continue to lose profits in the 13 14 future, the full extent to which is not currently known to Plaintiff, but the damaged is believed to be at
15 least $720,000. Plaintiff requests leave to amend when said amount is ascertained. 16 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth. 17 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 18 (NEGLIGENCE) 19 59. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 58, above, as if set forth fully 20 herein. 21 60. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to prevent causing harm to the 22 Plaintiff and knew or should have known with reasonable certainty that Plaintiff would suffer damages 23 24 if Defendant engaged in the conduct attributed to defendant herein.
25 61. Defendant breached it duty by engaging in the conduct described above. 26 27 -12- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 13 of 14
62. As a direct and legal result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff has, and will incur, damages 1 2 as described above.
3 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereafter set forth. 4 5 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
6 (INJUCTIVE RELIEF) 63. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 62, as though fully set forth herein. 7 8 64. Defendant is refusing to allow the plaintiff to create new channels and is engaging in other
9 conduct that is preventing the Plaintiff from earning profits 10 65. In order to stop the Defendant damaging the Plaintiff’s business relations, a restraining order 11 and preliminary injunction should issue, preventing the Defendants and their agents, servants, assigns 12 and all those in concert with them from banning Plaintiff from the full use of the internet and 13 14 YOUTUBE’s services.
15 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth 16 PRAYER 17 18 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants and each of them, as follows:
19 On the FIRST COUNT: 20 1. General damages according to proof, but in the amount of at least $720,000.00; 21 2. Special damages according to proof; 22 On the SECOND thru FIFTH COUNTS: 23 3. General damages according to proof, but in the amount of at least $$720,000.00; 24 25 4. Special damages according to proof;
26 27 -13- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 14 of 14
5. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish Defendant and deter defendant from 1 2 engaging in similar misconduct;
3 On the SIXTH COUNT: 4 6. For an order requiring Defendant to show cause, if any, why both a preliminary and 5 permanent injunction should not issue enjoining Defendant and its agents and all persons, 6 acting under, in concert with defendant, from restricting Plaintiff’s use of YOUTUBE in 7 8 any manner, AND
9 7. For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants agents and all persons, 10 acting under, in concert with defendant, from restricting Plaintiff’s use of YOUTUBE in 11 any manner. 12 On ALL COUNTS: 13 14 8. For the cost of suit incurred herein;
15 9. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper. 16 17 Dated: 8-28-2019 WADE LAW GROUP 18 19 20 By: AMIEL L. WADE_______ AMIEL L. WADE 21 Attorneys for Plaintiff, ERIK MISHIYEV 22 23 24 25 26 27 -14- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 | 2019-08-28 | [
"Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 1 of 14 1 AMIEL L. WADE (No. 184312) BRANDON J. CHAIDEZ (No. 326189) 2 WADE LAW GROUP 3 A Professional Corporation 84 West Santa Clara Street, Ste. 750 4 San Jose, CA 95113 Telephone: (408) 842-1688 5 Facsimile:(408) 852-0614 6 Attorneys for Plaintiff, 7 ERIK MISHIYEV 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 ERIK MISHIYEV, ) Case No. 11 ) Plaintiff, ) PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S 12 ) COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES vs. ) 13 ) ) COMPLAINT FOR: 14 YOUTUBE ENTERTAINMENT STUDIOS, INC. ) And DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive, ) 1. BREACH OF CONTRACT 15 ) 2. INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH Defendants. )",
"PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS ADVANTAGE; 16 ) ) 3. INTERFERENCE WITH 17 ) CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS ) 4. NEGLIGENCE; 18 ) 5. NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH ) PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS; 19 ) ) 6. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF; 20 ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 21 ) ) 22 ) ) 23 ) ) 24 25 26 27 -1- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 2 of 14 INTRODUCTION 1 2 Plaintiff, ERIK MISHIYEV, (hereinafter “Plaintiff”) alleges: 3 1. Plaintiff was at all times herein mentioned, originally a resident of the State of New 4 York.",
"Plaintiff goes by the name DJ Short-E, and operates Hot4ever LLC, established February 10, 5 2010, in what is now his residential location of Tampa, Florida. 6 2. On information and belief, Defendant YOUTUBE ENTERTAINMENT STUDIOS 7 8 INC., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in San Bruno, California. 9 3. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as DOES 10 1-10, inclusive. Plaintiff therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend 11 this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and 12 believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the fictitiously named Defendants is in some manner 13 14 responsible for the injuries and damage sustained by Plaintiff, as alleged herein.",
"15 4. At all times mentioned, each Defendant, including, but not limited to Defendants DOES 1 16 through 10, inclusive, and each of them, were, and each was, an agent, associate and/or employee, acting 17 with the permission, consent and/or in the aid or assistance of one or more of the other above-named 18 Defendants and each of them at all times herein mentioned, was acting within the course and scope of 19 20 his/her/their agency and/or employment of said Defendants. 21 5. Furthermore, because of the agency, employment and/or joint venture relationship 22 between Defendants, each Defendant had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the acts of each of the 23 other Cross-Defendants. Each Defendant ratified, approved, joined in, acquiesced and/or authorized the 24 wrongful acts of co-Defendants, and each of them, as set forth below, and/or retained the benefits of said 25 wrongful acts. 26 27 -2- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 3 of 14 6. In performing and failing to perform the acts alleged herein, Defendants aided and 1 2 abetted the others; as each Defendant is and/or was the employee, agent, joint venturer and/or 3 representative of the others, and was acting on their behalf, within the scope of that agency, employment 4 and/or joint venture and with their permission and consent; as each Defendant acted both directly and 5 indirectly through agents and employees.",
"As such said Defendants shall hereinafter be collectively 6 referred to as “Defendant.” 7 8 JURISIDCTION 9 7. This Court has diversity jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 USC § 1332(a) 10 because the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the parties 11 hereto reside in different states. The Plaintiff resides in the state of Florida and the Defendant is 12 incorporated in the state of Delaware, and has its principal place of business in San Bruno California. 13 14 FACTS 15 8. Plaintiff, is a well-known Journalist and DJ, known as ‘Short-E’, who publishes original 16 music, DJ mixes, and celebrity interviews in videos on YOUTUBE. 17 9.",
"YOUTUBE is a video-sharing site where hundreds of millions of internet users post 18 videos daily. 19 10. Such videos are made available to others for viewing on individualized platforms created by 20 the various content creators through use of the YOUTUBE website. The content creator’s videos 21 include, but are not limited to, videos of personal life events and experiences, music videos, news 22 reports, advertisements, commentary on differing television programs, and compilation videos of 23 various assortments and variety. 24 11.",
"Since on or about 2007, Plaintiff has developed and maintained two (2) main YOUTUBE 25 channels, dubbed “djshortehot4eva” and “theshorteshow.” With over 250,000 total subscribers from 26 27 -3- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 4 of 14 1 around the world, Plaintiff managed to accumulate over 110 million views, earning him $310,000.00 2 over approximately a five (5) year time period. See Exhibit A, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s 3 earnings from YOUTUBE over the last five years and channel growth.",
"4 12. On or about 2007, Plaintiff entered into a written agreement with YOUTUBE, through its 5 representative Matthew Villacarte, to begin the monetization of his videos and channels through use of a 6 monetized AdSense publisher account, to which the following videos were designated as monetized 7 (meaning that Plaintiff could begin earning income based on the amount of views each individual video 8 received): http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K5y-8-bU8p8; 9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXlc_6XA1VE; 10 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kDJZZCXQPR0; 11 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1nBmVV6U6DY; 12 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dSKxm6Bk8FI; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onlRQn0zCW8; 13 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGgngkA2vHw; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z5bxmI59DV4; 14 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Lb01gKxTzQ; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngLzAoSfdP4; 15 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFFCvWcK6Yw; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zsl_d_EuRFE; 16 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZCU2h3drj08 17 13. The written agreement was YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions which were in writing, 18 which YOUTUBE stated governed the terms of the Plaintiff’s use of YOUTUBE. See Exhibit B, a true 19 and correct copy of YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions that were in place and that were applicable to the 20 parties agreement during the period of times articulated in this complaint (the “Agreement”).",
"21 14. Although Plaintiff does earn and has earned supplemental income through the booking of DJ 22 events, Plaintiff’s main source of income since on or about 2012, has been his earnings generated from 23 the monetization of his YOUTUBE videos and channels through use of his AdSense publisher account. 24 15. On or about March 11, 2016, Plaintiff began receiving copyright claims on his highest 25 advertisement revenue videos, which if unresponded to would leave a strike on Plaintiff’s channel, with 26 three strikes resulting in the discontinuance of Plaintiff’s channel. Plaintiff ended up responding by 27 -4- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 5 of 14 1 following proper procedure and filing a ‘counter-notification’ challenging the claims, and ended up 2 winning all claims asserted against him, which resulted in all of his targeted channels and videos being 3 re-instated for monetization. See Exhibit C, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s counter notification 4 wins.",
"5 16. All parties, and most content creators on YOUTUBE, understand that it is customary for 6 false and erroneous copyright claims to made by other users, in order to intercept advertisement revenue 7 and/or to have legitimate content removed in an effort to stifle competition. In order to combat such 8 customary practices, YOUTUBE has a requirement that the claimant either provide proof of a lawsuit 9 for infringement or the alleged offending video will be re-instated, and strike(s) removed. These rules 10 and laws are in place to vet legitimate claims from meritless claims, as well as to thwart abuse of the 11 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).",
"See Exhibit B, a true and correct copy of YOUTUBE’s 12 terms and conditions (the “Agreement”). 13 17. On or about the start of 2017, YOUTUBE congratulated Plaintiff for his success on their 14 website and granted him a “Silver Creator Award,” for his accolade of reaching 100,000 subscribers. 15 See Exhibit D, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff receiving a Silver Creator Award. 16 18. Thereafter, although Plaintiff’s channels and videos were re-instated and his 17 subscribers were continuing to increase at a rate of about 4,000 a month, his views on each video posted 18 remained low when compared to smaller similar channels. Plaintiff was concerned about this suspicious 19 activity and sought confirmation numerous times from YOUTUBE that they were truly distributing his 20 new videos to his fans and subscribers, but YOUTUBE failed to provide such confirmation, stating 21 “They could not share this information” with him. See Exhibit E, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s 22 communications with YouTube customer service through their messaging chat. 23 19.",
"As indicated above, when a person establishes a YOUTUBE channel, YOUTUBE has 24 each person agree to YOUTUBE’S terms and conditions, which are in writing. See Exhibit B, a true and 25 correct copy of YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions (the “Agreement”). YOUTUBE breached Section 26 6(F) of the Agreement when it failed to resolve its continual technical difficulties and distribute 27 -5- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 6 of 14 1 Plaintiff’s new content.",
"See Exhibit F, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s communications with 2 YouTube users indicating that Plaintiff’s newly uploaded videos were not being distributed. YOUTUBE 3 breached Section 6(F) when it failed to process “audiovisual content uploaded by [Plaintiff] in 4 accordance with the YOUTUBE’s Data Processing Terms. Particularly, YOUTUBE’s continual 5 technical difficulties were the result of a breach in Google’s security which lead to the accidental or 6 unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, Customer’s Personal Data 7 on systems managed by or otherwise controlled by Google. 8 20. As a direct result of YOUTUBE’s breach of the Agreement, although Plaintiff was 9 growing subscribers at a rate of about 4,000 per month, when he uploaded a new video, he would only 10 receive a few hundred views directly causing a reduction in his revenue in the amount of $125,000.00 in 11 losses over a three (3) year period. 12 21. Thereafter, due to YOUTUBE’s ongoing breaches and negligence in handling 13 Plaintiff’s technical issues, Plaintiff lost trust with YOUTUBE’s support team and placed them on notice 14 several times via chat messages and emails, that he would be filing a lawsuit against YOUTUBE if such 15 conduct persisted. See Exhibit G, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s email communications with 16 YouTube customer service.",
"17 22. On December 14, 2018, YOUTUBE sent Plaintiff a notice that they were terminating his 18 accounts and removing all his videos due to his litigation threat, though he had not violated any rules or 19 terms of use nor the Community Guidelines. See Exhibit H, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s email 20 communications with YouTube customer service. 21 23. On December 15, 2018 through January 15, 2019, Plaintiff was abruptly bombarded with 22 copyright claims like he never had been before the entire time he had been managing and growing his 23 channels. See Exhibit I, a true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s email inbox associated with his YouTube 24 account. 25 24. Then on or about January 22, 2018, acting upon a takedown notice delivered by claimants 26 to YOUTUBE, pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C.",
"§ 512(c), 27 -6- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 7 of 14 1 YOUTUBE blocked all public access to Plaintiff’s videos. YOUTUBE substituted the videos with a 2 notice stating that “This video is no longer available due to a copyright claim.” See Exhibit J, a true and 3 correct copy of Plaintiff’s screen shot of YOUTUBE’s notice. 4 25. Once Plaintiff’s videos were removed, he received strikes on his account. Although 5 YOUTUBE stated they removed his channels and videos for copyright claims, the removals appeared to 6 Plaintiff to be in retaliation for his placing them on notice that he would be filing a lawsuit. Such 7 removals violated Section 8(b) of YOUTUBE’s Agreement, which states, inter alia, “[u]nless the 8 copyright claim owner files an action seeking a court order against the Content provider, member or 9 user, the removed Content may be replaced, or access to it restored, in 10 to 14 business days or more 10 after receipt of the counter-notice, at Youtube’s sole discretion.” See Exhibit K, a true and correct copy 11 of communications between Plaintiff and YOUTUBE’s Google Support team.",
"12 26. YOUTUBE’s Agreement requires that any claimants who make copyright claims 13 demonstrate that they have filed a copyright infringement lawsuit. Should the claimant fail to provide 14 proof within fourteen (14) days from a ‘counter notification’, the offending video shall be re-loaded and 15 the strike removed. See Exhibit L, a true and correct copy of YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions (the 16 “Agreement”). 17 27. Plaintiff complied with YOUTUBE’s terms and conditions of use and submitted counter 18 notifications on the following dates: Wednesday, January 23, 2019; Thursday January 24, 2019; 19 Thursday, February 7, 2019; Friday February 8, 2019; and Friday February 22, 2019.",
"See Exhibit M, 20 true and correct copies of the notifications submitted by Plaintiff. 21 28. Although Plaintiff had been compliant with YOUTUBE’s Agreement for counter 22 notifications and had previously succeeded in challenging all prior claims with no litigation ever 23 initiated against him, YOUTUBE failed to process Plaintiff’s counter notifications, at first stating that 24 such counter notifications were “ineligible,” without providing a description of why Plaintiff’s videos 25 were “ineligible.” See Exhibit N, a true and correct copy of email communications between Plaintiff and 26 YOUTUBE. 27 -7- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 8 of 14 1 29. After further inquiry by Plaintiff as to the root cause of Plaintiff’s ineligibility to exercise 2 his procedural rights to process counter notifications, YOUTUBE personnel retracted their statement 3 that such videos were ineligible and instead stated that the videos counter notifications would be 4 processed through, to which they never were processed through.",
"See Exhibit O, a true and correct copy 5 of email communications between Plaintiff and YOUTUBE. 6 30. YOUTUBE also failed to comply with the Agreement, which states, inter alia, that 7 “…each strike expires in 90 days from the time it is issued.” Ninety (90) plus business days have passed 8 and YOUTUBE should have organically removed Plaintiff’s strikes and re-instated his videos and 9 channels according to YOUTUBE's ‘Community Guidelines strike basics.’ See Exhibit P, a true and 10 correct copy of YOUTUBE’s Community Guidelines strike basics. 11 31. To date, Plaintiff’s strikes have not been removed, his counter claims have 12 not been processed, and his videos and channels have been permanently removed, though no 13 claimants presented evidence that they filed any lawsuits. Thus, evidencing that YOUTUBE did not 14 simply remove his content because of copyright claims, but instead in retaliation for placing them on 15 notice that he was filing a lawsuit against them. 16 32.",
"YOUTUBE breached their Agreement by removing public access to Plaintiff’s videos, 17 failing to re-instate all of Plaintiff’s Videos, failing to remove all strikes from his channels, and failing to 18 re-establish all of his channels. 19 33. Plaintiff’s YOUTUBE channels at issue herein were advertised with the AdSense 20 publisher, which had an id# associated with the channels, such advertisements were aired during his 21 pre-recorded tv shows in multiple cities. The AdSense id# is how Plaintiff’s monetization account is 22 identified (AdSense pub-10424255688085310), and this is no longer available as a result of his 23 channels being removed consequently preventing him from receiving any AdSense revenue. 24 34. Since January 2019, Plaintiff has not earned any money from YOUTUBE. The delay of 25 resolution that was allowed to proceed past the 14-day time limit caused him to suffer loss of earnings of 26 $90,000 from January 2019 to July 2019. The prolonged dead video links resulted in loss of new 27 -8- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 9 of 14 1 subscribers, views, future hits, performance bookings, and lost advertising and sponsorship revenue, all 2 of which has caused irreparable harm.",
"YOUTUBE’s breach has directly caused Plaintiff to suffer over 3 $720,000 in damages for loss of earnings and lost future earnings. Defendants' breach is directly causing 4 Plaintiff to compete with a disadvantage because YOUTUBE has restricted him from creating any new 5 YOUTUBE channels. 6 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 7 (BREACH OF CONTRACT) 8 9 35. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 34, as though fully set forth herein. 10 36. As referenced above, the Plaintiff entered into a service contract with Defendant by 11 which he agreed to use Defendant’s YOUTUBE platform as a repository for his video content creation 12 with the expectation that he would be paid based on viewership of each individual posted video. 13 37.",
"Plaintiff has performed all conditions, covenants, and promises required on their part to 14 be performed in accordance with the terms and conditions of their agreement with Defendant as 15 described above. 16 38. Plaintiff has requested Defendant to perform his obligations under the contract and 17 Defendant has refused. 18 39. Defendant breached the contract by engaging the conduct herein alleged. 19 40. By engaging in the conduct outlined above and in breaching his contract with the 20 Plaintiff, Defendant has also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing with the 21 Plaintiff. 22 41. As a direct result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff was harmed and continues to be 23 harmed and the breach of contract was a substantial factor causing Plaintiff’s harm.",
"24 42. As a result, thereof, Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on such basis alleges that he is 25 owed an amount according to proof at trial, but at least $720,000.00. 26 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth. 27 -9- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 10 of 14 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS) 2 3 43. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 42, as though fully set forth herein. 4 44. Defendant knew that Plaintiff had many subscribers which as a result thereof, the 5 Plaintiff was making money from said subscribers. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s contractual 6 relationships with said subscribers by doing all of the acts and omissions alleged above. 7 8 45.",
"As a proximate result of the above described acts and omissions of the Defendant, 9 Plaintiff’s contractual relationships with customers have broken and/or been damaged. 10 46. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant as herein alleged, 11 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such basis alleges that he has lost profits and/or other 12 compensation in an amount not fully known by him, will continue to lose profits in the future, the full 13 14 extent to which is not currently known to Plaintiff. Plaintiff requests leave to amend when said amount 15 is ascertained. 16 47. The aforementioned conduct of Defendant was intentional on the part of Defendant, 17 thereby depriving Plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and was despicable 18 conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff rights, 19 20 so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages.",
"21 48. Defendant unless restrained, will disrupt other business relationships between Plaintiff 22 and other potential customers to Plaintiff great irreparable injury, for which damages would not afford 23 adequate relief, in that they would not completely compensate for the injury to Plaintiff’s business 24 reputation and goodwill. 25 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth 26 27 -10- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 11 of 14 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE) 2 3 49. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 48, as though fully set forth herein.",
"4 50. Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective clients by engaging in the conduct 5 attributed to the defendant above and omissions alleged above. 6 51. As a proximate result of the Defendant’s conduct described above, Plaintiff’s contractual 7 8 relationships with potential customers have been broken and/or damaged. 9 52. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant as herein alleged, 10 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such basis alleges that he has lost profits and/or other 11 compensation in an amount not fully known by him, will continue to lose profits in the future, the full 12 extent to which is not currently known to Plaintiff, but is at least believed to be $720,000. Plaintiff 13 14 requests leave to amend when said amount is ascertained. 15 53. The aforementioned conduct of Defendant was intentional on the part of Defendant, 16 thereby depriving Plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury, and was despicable 17 conduct that subjected Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Plaintiff rights, 18 so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive damages. 19 20 54.",
"Defendant unless restrained, will disrupt other business relationships between Plaintiff 21 and other potential customers to Plaintiff great irreparable injury, for which damages would not afford 22 adequate relief, in that they would not completely compensate for the injury to Plaintiff’s business 23 reputation and goodwill. 24 25 26 27 -11- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 12 of 14 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 1 (NEGLIGENT INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC ADVANTAGE) 2 3 55.",
"Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 54, as though fully set forth herein. 4 56. Defendant had a duty to refrain from conduct that would cause harm to Plaintiff. 5 Defendant breached that duty when negligently interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective clients by doing 6 all of the acts and omissions alleged above. 7 8 57. As a proximate result of the above described acts and omissions of the Defendant, 9 Plaintiff’s contractual relationships with potential customers have been broken and/or damaged. 10 58. As a further proximate result of the acts and omissions of Defendant as herein alleged, 11 Plaintiff is informed and believes and on such basis alleges that he has lost profits 12 and/or other compensation in an amount not fully known by him, will continue to lose profits in the 13 14 future, the full extent to which is not currently known to Plaintiff, but the damaged is believed to be at 15 least $720,000.",
"Plaintiff requests leave to amend when said amount is ascertained. 16 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth. 17 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 18 (NEGLIGENCE) 19 59. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 58, above, as if set forth fully 20 herein. 21 60. Defendant owed a duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to prevent causing harm to the 22 Plaintiff and knew or should have known with reasonable certainty that Plaintiff would suffer damages 23 24 if Defendant engaged in the conduct attributed to defendant herein.",
"25 61. Defendant breached it duty by engaging in the conduct described above. 26 27 -12- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 13 of 14 62. As a direct and legal result of Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff has, and will incur, damages 1 2 as described above. 3 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as hereafter set forth. 4 5 SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION 6 (INJUCTIVE RELIEF) 63. Plaintiff adopts and restates paragraphs 1 through 62, as though fully set forth herein. 7 8 64. Defendant is refusing to allow the plaintiff to create new channels and is engaging in other 9 conduct that is preventing the Plaintiff from earning profits 10 65. In order to stop the Defendant damaging the Plaintiff’s business relations, a restraining order 11 and preliminary injunction should issue, preventing the Defendants and their agents, servants, assigns 12 and all those in concert with them from banning Plaintiff from the full use of the internet and 13 14 YOUTUBE’s services.",
"15 WHEREFORE Plaintiff prays for the relief hereinafter set forth 16 PRAYER 17 18 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants and each of them, as follows: 19 On the FIRST COUNT: 20 1. General damages according to proof, but in the amount of at least $720,000.00; 21 2. Special damages according to proof; 22 On the SECOND thru FIFTH COUNTS: 23 3. General damages according to proof, but in the amount of at least $$720,000.00; 24 25 4. Special damages according to proof; 26 27 -13- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31 Case 5:19-cv-05422 Document 1 Filed 08/28/19 Page 14 of 14 5. For punitive damages in an amount appropriate to punish Defendant and deter defendant from 1 2 engaging in similar misconduct; 3 On the SIXTH COUNT: 4 6.",
"For an order requiring Defendant to show cause, if any, why both a preliminary and 5 permanent injunction should not issue enjoining Defendant and its agents and all persons, 6 acting under, in concert with defendant, from restricting Plaintiff’s use of YOUTUBE in 7 8 any manner, AND 9 7. For a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining Defendants agents and all persons, 10 acting under, in concert with defendant, from restricting Plaintiff’s use of YOUTUBE in 11 any manner. 12 On ALL COUNTS: 13 14 8. For the cost of suit incurred herein; 15 9. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem proper. 16 17 Dated: 8-28-2019 WADE LAW GROUP 18 19 20 By: AMIEL L. WADE_______ AMIEL L. WADE 21 Attorneys for Plaintiff, ERIK MISHIYEV 22 23 24 25 26 27 -14- 28 _________________________________________________________________ PLAINTIFF ERIK MISHIYEV’S COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES 29 30 31"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/104626765/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Citation Nr: 1633975
Decision Date: 08/29/16 Archive Date: 08/31/16
DOCKET NO. 10-30 080 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Louis, Missouri
THE ISSUES
1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss.
2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus.
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
W.T. Snyder, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The Veteran had active duty service from September 1966 to September 1968.
This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2009 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Louis, Missouri, that denied the claims.
In December 2013, the Board remanded the case to the Appeals Management Center (AMC), Washington, DC, for additional development,
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The AMC completed the additional development directed in the December 2013 Board remand.
2. Bilateral hearing loss has not been shown to have had its onset in active service, nor is it not due to injury or disease incurred in active service.
3. Tinnitus has not been shown to have had its onset in active service, nor is not due to injury or disease incurred in active service.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The requirements for entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1154, 5107(b) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a) (2015).
2. The requirements for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1154, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA)
The requirements of the VCAA, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, and 5126, have been met. There is no issue as to providing an appropriate application form or completeness of the application. Prior to issuance of the December 2009 rating decision, via an October 2009 letter, the RO provided the Veteran with time- and content-compliant VCAA notice. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). Neither the Veteran nor his representative asserts any notice error or specific prejudice as a result. Hence, The Board finds that VA complied with the VCAA notice requirements.
VA has also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran in obtaining identified and available evidence needed to substantiate a claim, and as warranted by law, affording VA examinations. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The Veteran's Service treatment records (STRs), VA and non-VA records, including the examination report, are in the claims file. Further, the Board remanded for clarification of the VA examination findings to insure that all asserted bases for the claims were considered. Neither the Veteran nor his representative asserts that there are additional records to obtain. In sum, there is no evidence of any VA error in notifying or assisting the Veteran that affects the fairness of this adjudication. Hence, the Board may address the merits of the appeal without prejudice to the Veteran.
Applicable Legal Requirements
Generally, to establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: (1) a present disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service, the so-called "nexus" requirement. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303.
For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz (Hz) is 40 decibels (db) or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hz are 26 db or greater; or, when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R. § 3.385.
VA regulations do not preclude service connection for a hearing loss which first met VA's definition of disability after service. Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 159 (1993).
Organic diseases of the nervous system are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. This presumption applies to veterans who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(3), 3.309(a). VA deems sensorineural hearing loss and tinnitus as organic diseases of the nervous system. See VA Under Secretary for Health Memorandum (October 1995).
Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza elements in a claim involving a listed chronic disease is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. An award of service connection based solely on continuity of symptomatology is limited to chronic diseases under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Cf. Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d).
"Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology." Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997); (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994) (distinguishing between competency ("a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered") and credibility ("a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted").
In relevant part, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) requires that VA give "due consideration" to "all pertinent medical and lay evidence" in evaluating a claim for disability or death benefits. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
The Board must fully consider the lay evidence of record. Davidson, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A layperson is competent to report on the onset of disability and, when applicable, continuity of his or her current symptomatology. See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 470 (a Veteran is competent to report on that of which he or she has personal knowledge). Lay evidence can also be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis if (1) the layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau, 492 F. 3d at 1376-77.
When considering whether lay evidence is competent, the Board must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the Veteran's particular disability is the type of disability for which lay evidence may be competent. Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011); see also Jandreau, supra.
The Board is charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (2001). As a finder of fact, when considering whether lay evidence is satisfactory, the Board may also properly consider internal inconsistency of the statements, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the Veteran, and the Veteran's demeanor when testifying at a hearing. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 38 (2007); Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 511, aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990).
Discussion
In his written submissions, the Veteran asserted that, as a helicopter mechanic, he was exposed to Army flight line noise, to include having to ride the helicopters as a crew member, all without hearing protection. His DD Form 214 confirms that his MOS was helicopter repairman. The Veteran asserts further that his hearing loss and tinnitus had their onset during his active service.
The April 1966 Report of Medical Examination For Induction reflects that the Veteran's hearing manifested as follows (converted from American Standards Association (ASA) units to International Standard Organization (ISO) units): right ear: 500 Hertz (Hz), 20 decibels (db); 1000 Hz, 15 db; 2000 Hz, 25 db; 4000 Hz, 20 db. The left ear manifested as follows: 500 Hz, 20 db; 1000 Hz, 15 db; 2000 Hz, -10 db; 4000 Hz, 10 db. (01/10/1969 VBMS-STR-Medical, p. 4). The STRs do not reflect any entries related to complaints of hearing loss or tinnitus or ringing of the ears. On his May 1968 Report of Medical History for his examination at separation, the Veteran denied any prior history of hearing loss. Id., p. 9. The May 1968 Report of Medical Examination For Separation reflects that the Veteran's ears were assessed as normal. His hearing test reflects the following findings: right ear: 500 Hz, -5 db; 1000 Hz, -5 db; 2000 Hz, 10 db; 3000 Hz, 15 db; 4000 Hz, 5 db. The left ear manifested as follows: 500 Hz, -5 db: 1000 Hz, -5 db; 2000 Hz, -5 db; 3000 Hz, 5 db; 4000 Hz, 5 db. Id., pp. 7-8. He was deemed physically fit for separation from active service.
In a written statement submitted in support of his claim, the Veteran asserted that he did not report his tinnitus or hearing loss at his separation examination because the troops were told that if they reported any health problems they would be held back. (11/20/2009 VBMS-VA-21-4138).
The December 2009 VA examination report (20/09/2009/VBMS-VA Examination) reflects that the Veteran had a history of unprotected exposure to military noise, as well as civilian noise. The examiner noted that the Veteran reported mild bilateral constant tonal tinnitus of unknown onset and etiology, and that it did not cause him any current difficulty. The Veteran's right ear manifested as 500 Hz, 30 db; 1000 Hz, 35 db; 2000 Hz, 60 db; 3000 Hz, 70 db; 4000 Hz, 70 db. The left ear manifested as follows: 500 Hz, 30 db: 1000 Hz, 35 db; 2000 Hz, 60 db; 3000 Hz, 70 db; 4000 Hz, 70 db. The examiner diagnosed a mild to profound sensorineural hearing loss in the right ear, and a mild to severe loss in the left. The examiner opined that, in light of the fact that the Veteran had hearing within normal limits both at entry into and separation from active service, it was not at least as likely as not that his hearing loss was causally connected to his active service. Concerning the Veteran's tinnitus, the examiner noted that the Veteran did not associate his tinnitus with his active service, and that there were no documented complaints of tinnitus. Hence, the examiner rendered a negative nexus opinion on the tinnitus.
As noted earlier, the Board remanded for an addendum to the examination, as it was not clear from the examination report if the examiner had converted the hearing values from the examination for Induction, and because factored in the Veteran's lay reported history or his post-service exposure. Subsequent to the remand, the Veteran submitted two reports of private audiologic examinations which were conducted for his private railroad employer in May 1989 and December 1989.
May 1989
500
1000
2000
3000
4000
Right
-5
10
10
50
40
Left
5
10
20
55
50
Nov. 1989
500
1000
2000
3000
4000
Right
5
5
10
50
45
Left
10
10
20
60
55
The reports do not reflect any opinion as to the source of the hearing loss. Other documentation in the claims file, however, reflects that the Veteran's employer obtained copies of his military hearing examinations from VA in 1990. (02/02/1990 VBMS-Third Party Correspondence)
The January 2016 addendum to the December 2009 examination report (02/05/2014 VBMS-CAPRI) reflects that the examiner noted another review of the claims file, and she also noted that she converted the value units from ASO to ISO regarding the hearing examination at induction. Citing a study of acoustic trauma by the Institute of Medicine, the examiner noted that the latest research in the area did not support the idea of a delayed onset of hearing loss; and, that there was no scientific basis on which to conclude that a hearing loss that appeared many years after noise exposure could be causally related to that noise exposure if hearing was normal immediately after the exposure. In light of the findings and conclusions of that study and the fact that the Veteran exited active service with normal hearing, the examiner opined that it was not likely that the Veteran's current hearing loss is causally connected to his active service.
As concerns the Veteran's tinnitus, the examiner again noted the absence of any documented complaints of tinnitus in active service; that there was no acoustic damage from service; and, per the 2009 interview [December 2009 examination report], the Veteran did not specifically attribute his tinnitus to the military, the examiner opined that it was not at least as likely as not that the Veteran's tinnitus is related to military service.
On his substantive appeal (07/20/2010 VBMS-VA-9), the Veteran asserted that he wore hearing protection while he worked for the railroad. The Board acknowledges the Veteran's assertion. The fact of the matter, however, is that the Veteran's work-related hearing tests show that his hearing loss manifested as of May 1989. The Board also notes the fact that the Veteran indicated on his formal claim that a private doctor told him his hearing loss was due to his military service. (10/06/2009-VBMS-VA-21-526, p. 7). The Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to both identify a decrease in his hearing acuity and to report what a doctor told him. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). Competency aside, however, his lay reports still must be tested for veracity and against the other evidence of record.
There is no documentation of a private opinion of military causality, and the Veteran was afforded the opportunity to identify any records he desired for VA to obtain. See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). It is also relevant that the Veteran's employer did not seek copies of his military hearing examinations until 1990, 20+ years after his separation from active service. The Board infers that the employer sought the test results for comparative purposes. VA outpatient records note the Veteran's report of a long history or civilian noise exposure in addition to his in-service exposure. 04/05/2010 VBMS-Medical Treatment-Government Facility). The Board must also assess the Veteran's admitted motive of secondary gain-he is seeking hearing aids at government expense. (11/20/2009 VBMS-VA-21-4138) Hence, the Board finds that, at best, the Veteran's lay reports and assertions concerning his hearing loss are outweighed by the other evidence of record. The VA examiner reviewed the claims file and provided a clear rationale for the opinion reached. Hence, the Board finds it highly probative. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007). As for the Veteran's personal opinion to the contrary, while he is competent to identify a hearing loss, the Board finds that opining on the etiology for a hearing loss, especially where noise exposure was many years in the past, requires medical training. See Jandreau, 492 F. 3d 1372; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). There is no evidence that the Veteran has medical training. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim on both a presumptive and direct basis. 38 C.F.R. § 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a).
With respect to the Veteran's tinnitus, he also asserted on his VA Form 9 that at the December 2009 VA examination he did not want the examiner to think he was a "wimp," so when the examiner asked him if the tinnitus bothered him, he said it did not. As noted earlier, the Veteran asserted that he did not want to be retained in active service any longer than necessary, so he did not report the ringing in his ears; also, he thought it was just part of getting old. The Board first notes that being asked if the tinnitus bothered him is an entirely different question from when it first started. Thus, the Board attaches more weight to the Veteran's answer as noted in the examination report that the date of onset was uncertain, and that he did not associate it with his active service. As for the Veteran's assertion that he wanted to separate as soon as possible in 1968, the Board notes that the Veteran's physical examination was some four months prior to his separation. For the listed reasons, although tinnitus is generally established by the subjective reports of the patient, as there is no clinical test for it, the weight of the evidence persuades the Board to reject the Veteran's now-asserted date of onset. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim on both a presumptive and direct basis. 38 C.F.R. § 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a).
In reaching this decision the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims, however, the doctrine is not for application. Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1999).
ORDER
Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied.
Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is denied.
____________________________________________
ERIC S. LEBOFF
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Department of Veterans Affairs | 08-29-2016 | [
"Citation Nr: 1633975 Decision Date: 08/29/16 Archive Date: 08/31/16 DOCKET NO. 10-30 080 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Louis, Missouri THE ISSUES 1. Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss. 2. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus. REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Disabled American Veterans ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD W.T. Snyder, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty service from September 1966 to September 1968. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a December 2009 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Louis, Missouri, that denied the claims. In December 2013, the Board remanded the case to the Appeals Management Center (AMC), Washington, DC, for additional development, FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The AMC completed the additional development directed in the December 2013 Board remand. 2. Bilateral hearing loss has not been shown to have had its onset in active service, nor is it not due to injury or disease incurred in active service.",
"3. Tinnitus has not been shown to have had its onset in active service, nor is not due to injury or disease incurred in active service. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The requirements for entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1154, 5107(b) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a) (2015). 2. The requirements for entitlement to service connection for tinnitus have not been met. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1110, 1112, 1154, 5107(b); 38 C.F.R.",
"§§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) The requirements of the VCAA, Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) (codified at 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, and 5126, have been met. There is no issue as to providing an appropriate application form or completeness of the application. Prior to issuance of the December 2009 rating decision, via an October 2009 letter, the RO provided the Veteran with time- and content-compliant VCAA notice. See Dingess/Hartman v. Nicholson, 19 Vet. App. 473 (2006); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). Neither the Veteran nor his representative asserts any notice error or specific prejudice as a result. Hence, The Board finds that VA complied with the VCAA notice requirements. VA has also fulfilled its duty to assist the Veteran in obtaining identified and available evidence needed to substantiate a claim, and as warranted by law, affording VA examinations. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c).",
"The Veteran's Service treatment records (STRs), VA and non-VA records, including the examination report, are in the claims file. Further, the Board remanded for clarification of the VA examination findings to insure that all asserted bases for the claims were considered. Neither the Veteran nor his representative asserts that there are additional records to obtain. In sum, there is no evidence of any VA error in notifying or assisting the Veteran that affects the fairness of this adjudication.",
"Hence, the Board may address the merits of the appeal without prejudice to the Veteran. Applicable Legal Requirements Generally, to establish a right to compensation for a present disability, a veteran must show: (1) a present disability; (2) an in-service incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service, the so-called \"nexus\" requirement. Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2004). See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 1110; 38 C.F.R. § 3.303. For the purposes of applying the laws administered by VA, impaired hearing will be considered to be a disability when the auditory threshold in any of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, 4000 Hertz (Hz) is 40 decibels (db) or greater; or when the auditory thresholds for at least three of the frequencies 500, 1000, 2000, 3000, or 4000 Hz are 26 db or greater; or, when speech recognition scores using the Maryland CNC Test are less than 94 percent. 38 C.F.R.",
"§ 3.385. VA regulations do not preclude service connection for a hearing loss which first met VA's definition of disability after service. Hensley v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 155, 159 (1993). Organic diseases of the nervous system are presumed to have been incurred in service if manifested to a compensable degree within one year of separation from service. This presumption applies to veterans who have served 90 days or more of active service during a war period or after December 31, 1946. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 1101, 1112; 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.307(a)(3), 3.309(a). VA deems sensorineural hearing loss and tinnitus as organic diseases of the nervous system.",
"See VA Under Secretary for Health Memorandum (October 1995). Under 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(b), an alternative method of establishing the second and third Shedden/Caluza elements in a claim involving a listed chronic disease is through a demonstration of continuity of symptomatology. An award of service connection based solely on continuity of symptomatology is limited to chronic diseases under 38 C.F.R. § 3.309(a). Cf. Walker v. Shinseki, 708 F.3d 1331 (Fed.",
"Cir. 2013). Service connection may be granted for any disease diagnosed after discharge when all the evidence, including that pertinent to service, establishes that the disease was incurred in service. 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(d). \"Symptoms, not treatment, are the essence of any evidence of continuity of symptomatology.\" Savage v. Gober, 10 Vet. App. 488, 495-97 (1997); (citing Wilson v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 16, 19 (1991). Once evidence is determined to be competent, the Board must determine whether such evidence is also credible. See Layno v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 465, 469-70 (1994) (distinguishing between competency (\"a legal concept determining whether testimony may be heard and considered\") and credibility (\"a factual determination going to the probative value of the evidence to be made after the evidence has been admitted\"). In relevant part, 38 U.S.C.A. § 1154(a) requires that VA give \"due consideration\" to \"all pertinent medical and lay evidence\" in evaluating a claim for disability or death benefits. Davidson v. Shinseki, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009).",
"The Board must fully consider the lay evidence of record. Davidson, 581 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A layperson is competent to report on the onset of disability and, when applicable, continuity of his or her current symptomatology. See Layno, 6 Vet. App. at 470 (a Veteran is competent to report on that of which he or she has personal knowledge). Lay evidence can also be competent and sufficient to establish a diagnosis if (1) the layperson is competent to identify the medical condition, (2) the layperson is reporting a contemporaneous medical diagnosis, or (3) lay testimony describing symptoms at the time supports a later diagnosis by a medical professional. Jandreau, 492 F. 3d at 1376-77. When considering whether lay evidence is competent, the Board must determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the Veteran's particular disability is the type of disability for which lay evidence may be competent.",
"Kahana v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 428 (2011); see also Jandreau, supra. The Board is charged with the duty to assess the credibility and weight given to evidence. Wensch v. Principi, 15 Vet. App. 362, 367 (2001). As a finder of fact, when considering whether lay evidence is satisfactory, the Board may also properly consider internal inconsistency of the statements, facial plausibility, and consistency with other evidence submitted on behalf of the Veteran, and the Veteran's demeanor when testifying at a hearing. See Dalton v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 23, 38 (2007); Caluza, 7 Vet. App. at 511, aff'd per curiam, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed.",
"Cir. 1996). When there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107; see also Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). Discussion In his written submissions, the Veteran asserted that, as a helicopter mechanic, he was exposed to Army flight line noise, to include having to ride the helicopters as a crew member, all without hearing protection. His DD Form 214 confirms that his MOS was helicopter repairman. The Veteran asserts further that his hearing loss and tinnitus had their onset during his active service. The April 1966 Report of Medical Examination For Induction reflects that the Veteran's hearing manifested as follows (converted from American Standards Association (ASA) units to International Standard Organization (ISO) units): right ear: 500 Hertz (Hz), 20 decibels (db); 1000 Hz, 15 db; 2000 Hz, 25 db; 4000 Hz, 20 db. The left ear manifested as follows: 500 Hz, 20 db; 1000 Hz, 15 db; 2000 Hz, -10 db; 4000 Hz, 10 db.",
"(01/10/1969 VBMS-STR-Medical, p. 4). The STRs do not reflect any entries related to complaints of hearing loss or tinnitus or ringing of the ears. On his May 1968 Report of Medical History for his examination at separation, the Veteran denied any prior history of hearing loss. Id., p. 9. The May 1968 Report of Medical Examination For Separation reflects that the Veteran's ears were assessed as normal. His hearing test reflects the following findings: right ear: 500 Hz, -5 db; 1000 Hz, -5 db; 2000 Hz, 10 db; 3000 Hz, 15 db; 4000 Hz, 5 db. The left ear manifested as follows: 500 Hz, -5 db: 1000 Hz, -5 db; 2000 Hz, -5 db; 3000 Hz, 5 db; 4000 Hz, 5 db. Id., pp. 7-8. He was deemed physically fit for separation from active service. In a written statement submitted in support of his claim, the Veteran asserted that he did not report his tinnitus or hearing loss at his separation examination because the troops were told that if they reported any health problems they would be held back. (11/20/2009 VBMS-VA-21-4138). The December 2009 VA examination report (20/09/2009/VBMS-VA Examination) reflects that the Veteran had a history of unprotected exposure to military noise, as well as civilian noise.",
"The examiner noted that the Veteran reported mild bilateral constant tonal tinnitus of unknown onset and etiology, and that it did not cause him any current difficulty. The Veteran's right ear manifested as 500 Hz, 30 db; 1000 Hz, 35 db; 2000 Hz, 60 db; 3000 Hz, 70 db; 4000 Hz, 70 db. The left ear manifested as follows: 500 Hz, 30 db: 1000 Hz, 35 db; 2000 Hz, 60 db; 3000 Hz, 70 db; 4000 Hz, 70 db. The examiner diagnosed a mild to profound sensorineural hearing loss in the right ear, and a mild to severe loss in the left. The examiner opined that, in light of the fact that the Veteran had hearing within normal limits both at entry into and separation from active service, it was not at least as likely as not that his hearing loss was causally connected to his active service. Concerning the Veteran's tinnitus, the examiner noted that the Veteran did not associate his tinnitus with his active service, and that there were no documented complaints of tinnitus.",
"Hence, the examiner rendered a negative nexus opinion on the tinnitus. As noted earlier, the Board remanded for an addendum to the examination, as it was not clear from the examination report if the examiner had converted the hearing values from the examination for Induction, and because factored in the Veteran's lay reported history or his post-service exposure. Subsequent to the remand, the Veteran submitted two reports of private audiologic examinations which were conducted for his private railroad employer in May 1989 and December 1989. May 1989 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 Right -5 10 10 50 40 Left 5 10 20 55 50 Nov. 1989 500 1000 2000 3000 4000 Right 5 5 10 50 45 Left 10 10 20 60 55 The reports do not reflect any opinion as to the source of the hearing loss.",
"Other documentation in the claims file, however, reflects that the Veteran's employer obtained copies of his military hearing examinations from VA in 1990. (02/02/1990 VBMS-Third Party Correspondence) The January 2016 addendum to the December 2009 examination report (02/05/2014 VBMS-CAPRI) reflects that the examiner noted another review of the claims file, and she also noted that she converted the value units from ASO to ISO regarding the hearing examination at induction. Citing a study of acoustic trauma by the Institute of Medicine, the examiner noted that the latest research in the area did not support the idea of a delayed onset of hearing loss; and, that there was no scientific basis on which to conclude that a hearing loss that appeared many years after noise exposure could be causally related to that noise exposure if hearing was normal immediately after the exposure. In light of the findings and conclusions of that study and the fact that the Veteran exited active service with normal hearing, the examiner opined that it was not likely that the Veteran's current hearing loss is causally connected to his active service.",
"As concerns the Veteran's tinnitus, the examiner again noted the absence of any documented complaints of tinnitus in active service; that there was no acoustic damage from service; and, per the 2009 interview [December 2009 examination report], the Veteran did not specifically attribute his tinnitus to the military, the examiner opined that it was not at least as likely as not that the Veteran's tinnitus is related to military service. On his substantive appeal (07/20/2010 VBMS-VA-9), the Veteran asserted that he wore hearing protection while he worked for the railroad.",
"The Board acknowledges the Veteran's assertion. The fact of the matter, however, is that the Veteran's work-related hearing tests show that his hearing loss manifested as of May 1989. The Board also notes the fact that the Veteran indicated on his formal claim that a private doctor told him his hearing loss was due to his military service. (10/06/2009-VBMS-VA-21-526, p. 7). The Board acknowledges that the Veteran is competent to both identify a decrease in his hearing acuity and to report what a doctor told him. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(2). Competency aside, however, his lay reports still must be tested for veracity and against the other evidence of record. There is no documentation of a private opinion of military causality, and the Veteran was afforded the opportunity to identify any records he desired for VA to obtain.",
"See Wood v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 190, 193 (1991). It is also relevant that the Veteran's employer did not seek copies of his military hearing examinations until 1990, 20+ years after his separation from active service. The Board infers that the employer sought the test results for comparative purposes. VA outpatient records note the Veteran's report of a long history or civilian noise exposure in addition to his in-service exposure. 04/05/2010 VBMS-Medical Treatment-Government Facility). The Board must also assess the Veteran's admitted motive of secondary gain-he is seeking hearing aids at government expense. (11/20/2009 VBMS-VA-21-4138) Hence, the Board finds that, at best, the Veteran's lay reports and assertions concerning his hearing loss are outweighed by the other evidence of record.",
"The VA examiner reviewed the claims file and provided a clear rationale for the opinion reached. Hence, the Board finds it highly probative. See Nieves-Rodriguez v. Peake, 22 Vet. App. 295 (2008); Stefl v. Nicholson, 21 Vet. App. 120, 124 (2007). As for the Veteran's personal opinion to the contrary, while he is competent to identify a hearing loss, the Board finds that opining on the etiology for a hearing loss, especially where noise exposure was many years in the past, requires medical training. See Jandreau, 492 F. 3d 1372; 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(a)(1). There is no evidence that the Veteran has medical training. Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim on both a presumptive and direct basis. 38 C.F.R. § 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a). With respect to the Veteran's tinnitus, he also asserted on his VA Form 9 that at the December 2009 VA examination he did not want the examiner to think he was a \"wimp,\" so when the examiner asked him if the tinnitus bothered him, he said it did not.",
"As noted earlier, the Veteran asserted that he did not want to be retained in active service any longer than necessary, so he did not report the ringing in his ears; also, he thought it was just part of getting old. The Board first notes that being asked if the tinnitus bothered him is an entirely different question from when it first started. Thus, the Board attaches more weight to the Veteran's answer as noted in the examination report that the date of onset was uncertain, and that he did not associate it with his active service. As for the Veteran's assertion that he wanted to separate as soon as possible in 1968, the Board notes that the Veteran's physical examination was some four months prior to his separation. For the listed reasons, although tinnitus is generally established by the subjective reports of the patient, as there is no clinical test for it, the weight of the evidence persuades the Board to reject the Veteran's now-asserted date of onset.",
"Thus, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim on both a presumptive and direct basis. 38 C.F.R. § 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.303, 3.307(a), 3.309(a). In reaching this decision the Board considered the doctrine of reasonable doubt. As the preponderance of the evidence is against the Veteran's claims, however, the doctrine is not for application. Schoolman v. West, 12 Vet. App. 307, 311 (1999). ORDER Entitlement to service connection for bilateral hearing loss is denied. Entitlement to service connection for tinnitus is denied. ____________________________________________ ERIC S. LEBOFF Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs"
]
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DETAILED ACTION This FINAL action is in response to Application No. 16/768,885 originally filed 06/02/2020. The amendment presented on 06/13/2022 which provides amendments to claims 1, 3 and 10 - 12, claim 15 is cancelled is hereby acknowledged. Currently claims 1 - 5 and 10 - 14 are pending. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Amendments 1. This is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 13 June 2022, wherein: claims 1 - 5 and 10 - 14 are currently pending. Claims 1, 3 and 10 - 12 have been amended and claim 15 has been amended. Response to Arguments 2. Applicant’s arguments filed on June 13, 2022 with respect to the rejections of claims 1 - 5 and 10 - 14 have been fully considered but are moot in view of the new ground(s) of rejection. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 3. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. 4. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
5. Claims 1 - 2, 4, 10 - 11 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being patentable over Kim “2014/0299848” and Shimizu “US 2006/0109549”.
Re-claim 1, Kim teaches a light emitting panel, (fig. 1; 1001) comprising: a substrate, (fig. 1; 500 protection film) a flexible layer, (fig. 1; 100) [0062] (according to one embodiment of the present invention, the protection film 500 is attached to a bottom surface of the flexible substrate 100. The protection film 500 can be formed with polymers for reinforcing strength of the flexible substrate 100 and for protecting the flexible substrate 100 from external interference.) a light emitting device, (fig. 1; 300) and a cover plate (fig. 1; 400 encapsulation layer is equivalent to a cover plate) which are sequentially stacked up from bottom to top; (see fig. 1) wherein a rough structure (fig. 1; 100 flexible substrate including a rough structure) is formed on one surface of the flexible layer (fig. 1; 100) facing the substrate, (fig. 1; 500 protection film) and the rough structure comprises a plurality of concave portions which are arranged; (fig. 1; 130 a separation groove (square section) is equivalent to a concave portions) (see par. [0084]) and Kim does not explicitly teach wherein a density of the concave portions on the flexible layer is ranged from 104 to 108 per square centimeter. However, Shimizu teaches wherein a density of the concave portions on the flexible layer is ranged from 104 to 108 per square centimeter. (par. [0107] Furthermore, although the density of the first concave portions 61 in the first region 67 in which the first concave portions 61 are formed (that is, a region corresponding to the usable lens region of the microlens substrate 1) is not particularly limited, it is preferable that the density of the first concave portions 61 in the first region 67 is in the range of 100 to 4,000,000 pieces/cm.sup.2.) It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effecting filing date to modify the invention of Kim with the teachings of Shimizu to prevent defects such as crack in the member with concave portions and/or the microlenses from being generated more effectively. (par. [0107]) Re-claim 2, Kim teaches wherein an interval is formed between two adjacent ones of the concave portions. (see fig. 1; 100 there is an open area in between two adjacent square section.) (see par. [0084]) Re-claim 4, Kim teaches wherein a section shape of each of the concave portions is one of an arc, a circle, a square, and a trapezoid. (see fig. 1 a square and see par. [0084]) Re-claims 10 - 11 and 13, are rejected as applied to claims 1 - 2 and 4 above because the scope and contents of the recited limitations are substantially the same. 6. Claims 5 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being patentable over Kim “2014/0299848” and Shimizu “US 2006/0109549” in view of Kwon “US 2015/0382446” and further in view of Yoon “US 2017/0060329”. Re-claims 5 and 14, Kim teaches the light emitting panel of claim 1, Kim and Shimizu do not explicitly teach wherein a touch panel and a polarizer are disposed between the light emitting device and the cover plate, and the polarizer is disposed on the touch panel. However, Kwon teaches wherein a touch panel (fig. 1C; 112) and a polarizer (fig. 1C; 110) are disposed between the light emitting device (fig. 1C; 102) and the cover plate, (fig. 1C; 114) [0048] (As shown in FIG. 1C, the flexible display 100 may also include a polarizer layer 110 for controlling the display characteristics (e.g., external light reflection, color accuracy, luminance, etc.) of the flexible display 100. A cover layer 114 may be used to protect the flexible display 100. Electrodes for sensing touch input from a user may be formed on an interior surface of a cover layer 114 and/or at least one surface of the polarizer layer 110.) It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to further modify the invention of the combination with the teachings of Kwon so as to an organic-light-emitting material to provide rigidity and increase in the rigidity at selective parts of the flexible display may help in ensuring the accurate configuration and spacing of the components within the flexible display at a desired value. (Kwon, par. [0038]) Kim, Shimizu and Kwon as a whole do not explicitly teach the polarizer is disposed on the touch panel. However, Yoon teaches the polarizer (fig. 2b; 271) is disposed on the touch panel. (fig. 2b; 100) It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to further modify the invention of the combination with the teachings of Yoon to provide a touch sensor panel for detecting the touch position. (Yoon, par. [0065]) Allowable Subject Matter 7. Claims 3 and 12 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Conclusion 8. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action. Contact Information 9. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Sosina Abebe whose telephone number is (571) 270-7929. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Friday from 9:00-5:30 If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's Supervisor, Temesghen Ghebretinsae can be reached on (571) 272-3017. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). /S.A/Examiner, Art Unit 2626 /TEMESGHEN GHEBRETINSAE/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2626 8/19/202B | 2022-08-23T22:18:44 | [
"DETAILED ACTION This FINAL action is in response to Application No. 16/768,885 originally filed 06/02/2020. The amendment presented on 06/13/2022 which provides amendments to claims 1, 3 and 10 - 12, claim 15 is cancelled is hereby acknowledged. Currently claims 1 - 5 and 10 - 14 are pending. Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Amendments 1. This is in response to applicant’s communication filed on 13 June 2022, wherein: claims 1 - 5 and 10 - 14 are currently pending.",
"Claims 1, 3 and 10 - 12 have been amended and claim 15 has been amended. Response to Arguments 2. Applicant’s arguments filed on June 13, 2022 with respect to the rejections of claims 1 - 5 and 10 - 14 have been fully considered but are moot in view of the new ground(s) of rejection. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 3. In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. 4. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C.",
"103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. 5. Claims 1 - 2, 4, 10 - 11 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being patentable over Kim “2014/0299848” and Shimizu “US 2006/0109549”.",
"Re-claim 1, Kim teaches a light emitting panel, (fig. 1; 1001) comprising: a substrate, (fig. 1; 500 protection film) a flexible layer, (fig. 1; 100) [0062] (according to one embodiment of the present invention, the protection film 500 is attached to a bottom surface of the flexible substrate 100. The protection film 500 can be formed with polymers for reinforcing strength of the flexible substrate 100 and for protecting the flexible substrate 100 from external interference.) a light emitting device, (fig. 1; 300) and a cover plate (fig. 1; 400 encapsulation layer is equivalent to a cover plate) which are sequentially stacked up from bottom to top; (see fig. 1) wherein a rough structure (fig. 1; 100 flexible substrate including a rough structure) is formed on one surface of the flexible layer (fig. 1; 100) facing the substrate, (fig.",
"1; 500 protection film) and the rough structure comprises a plurality of concave portions which are arranged; (fig. 1; 130 a separation groove (square section) is equivalent to a concave portions) (see par. [0084]) and Kim does not explicitly teach wherein a density of the concave portions on the flexible layer is ranged from 104 to 108 per square centimeter. However, Shimizu teaches wherein a density of the concave portions on the flexible layer is ranged from 104 to 108 per square centimeter. (par. [0107] Furthermore, although the density of the first concave portions 61 in the first region 67 in which the first concave portions 61 are formed (that is, a region corresponding to the usable lens region of the microlens substrate 1) is not particularly limited, it is preferable that the density of the first concave portions 61 in the first region 67 is in the range of 100 to 4,000,000 pieces/cm.sup.2.)",
"It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effecting filing date to modify the invention of Kim with the teachings of Shimizu to prevent defects such as crack in the member with concave portions and/or the microlenses from being generated more effectively. (par. [0107]) Re-claim 2, Kim teaches wherein an interval is formed between two adjacent ones of the concave portions. (see fig. 1; 100 there is an open area in between two adjacent square section.) (see par. [0084]) Re-claim 4, Kim teaches wherein a section shape of each of the concave portions is one of an arc, a circle, a square, and a trapezoid. (see fig. 1 a square and see par. [0084]) Re-claims 10 - 11 and 13, are rejected as applied to claims 1 - 2 and 4 above because the scope and contents of the recited limitations are substantially the same. 6. Claims 5 and 14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being patentable over Kim “2014/0299848” and Shimizu “US 2006/0109549” in view of Kwon “US 2015/0382446” and further in view of Yoon “US 2017/0060329”. Re-claims 5 and 14, Kim teaches the light emitting panel of claim 1, Kim and Shimizu do not explicitly teach wherein a touch panel and a polarizer are disposed between the light emitting device and the cover plate, and the polarizer is disposed on the touch panel.",
"However, Kwon teaches wherein a touch panel (fig. 1C; 112) and a polarizer (fig. 1C; 110) are disposed between the light emitting device (fig. 1C; 102) and the cover plate, (fig. 1C; 114) [0048] (As shown in FIG. 1C, the flexible display 100 may also include a polarizer layer 110 for controlling the display characteristics (e.g., external light reflection, color accuracy, luminance, etc.) of the flexible display 100. A cover layer 114 may be used to protect the flexible display 100. Electrodes for sensing touch input from a user may be formed on an interior surface of a cover layer 114 and/or at least one surface of the polarizer layer 110.) It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to further modify the invention of the combination with the teachings of Kwon so as to an organic-light-emitting material to provide rigidity and increase in the rigidity at selective parts of the flexible display may help in ensuring the accurate configuration and spacing of the components within the flexible display at a desired value. (Kwon, par.",
"[0038]) Kim, Shimizu and Kwon as a whole do not explicitly teach the polarizer is disposed on the touch panel. However, Yoon teaches the polarizer (fig. 2b; 271) is disposed on the touch panel. (fig. 2b; 100) It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date to further modify the invention of the combination with the teachings of Yoon to provide a touch sensor panel for detecting the touch position. (Yoon, par. [0065]) Allowable Subject Matter 7.",
"Claims 3 and 12 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Conclusion 8. Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action.",
"In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action. Contact Information 9. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Sosina Abebe whose telephone number is (571) 270-7929. The examiner can normally be reached on Mon-Friday from 9:00-5:30 If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner's Supervisor, Temesghen Ghebretinsae can be reached on (571) 272-3017. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 703-872-9306. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). /S.A/Examiner, Art Unit 2626 /TEMESGHEN GHEBRETINSAE/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2626 8/19/202B"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-08-28.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Exhibit 10.35
Employment Agreement by and between Imperial Nurseries, Inc. and Gregory Schaan January 1, 2001
as amended
April 9, 2008
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ARTICLE 1. EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEE ARTICLE 2. DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE
Section 2.1 Positions and Duties................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Section 2.2 Time Devoted to Work............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Section 2.3 Term of Employment................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1
ARTICLE 3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT
Section 3.1 Place of Employment................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
ARTICLE 4. COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE
Section 4.1 Base Salary................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Section 4.2 Incentive Compensation............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Section 4.3 Stock Options............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Section 4.4 Retirement and Deferred Compensation.................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Section 4.5 Reimbursement for Business Expenses................................................................................................................................................................................... 2
ARTICLE 5. FRINGE BENEFITS
Section 5.1 Employer Employee Benefit Plans............................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 Section 5.2 Motor Vehicle.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Section 5.3 Life Insurance.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3
ARTICLE 6. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
Section 6.1 Term of Employment................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Section 6.2 Extension of Employment........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Section 6.3 Termination at Employee’s Death............................................................................................................................................................................................. 4
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Section 6.4 Termination by Employee.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Section 6.5 Termination by Employer........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Section 6.6 Notice of Termination................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 Section 6.7 Date Termination is Effective.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Section 6.8 Compensation Following Termination..................................................................................................................................................................................... 5
ARTICLE 7. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION; NON-SOLICITATION; NON-COMPETITION
Section 7.1 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Section 7.2 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Section 7.3 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Section 7.4 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7
ARTICLE 8. MISCELLANEOUS
Section 8.1 Notices.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Section 8.2 Binding Agreement – Employer’s Successors....................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Section 8.3 Binding Agreement – Employee’s Successors....................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Section 8.4 Waivers......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.5 Entire Agreement......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.6 Prior Agreements......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.7 Amendment of Agreement......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.8 Severability of Provisions.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.9 Assignment of Agreement......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.10 Governing Law............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9
ARTICLE 9. AGREEMENTS BY GRIFFIN LAND & NURSERIES, INC.
Section 9.1 Guaranty....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 9.2 Direct Agreement........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of January 1, 2001, by and between Gregory Schaan (“employee”) and Imperial Nurseries, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“employer”). WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, employee and employer deem it to be in their respective best interests to enter into an agreement providing for employer’s employment of employee pursuant to the terms herein stated; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual promises and agreements contained herein, it is hereby agreed as follows:
ARTICLE 1.
EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEE Effective as of the date hereof, employer agrees to employ employee, and employee agrees to provide services to the employer, upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement.
ARTICLE 2.
DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE Section 2.1 Position and Duties. Employer agrees to employ employee and employee agrees to serve as President of employer for the term of employment (as described in Section 2.3). In this capacity, employee shall devote his reasonable best efforts to the performance of the services customarily incident to such office and position and to such other services of an executive nature as may be reasonably requested by the board of directors of employer which may include services for one or more subsidiaries or affiliates of employer, including without limitation, Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. (“Griffin”). Employee shall in his capacity as an employee and officer of employer be responsible to and obey the reasonable and lawful directives of the board of directors of employer. Section 2.2 Time Devoted to Work. Employee shall devote substantially all his business time and attention, and shall use his reasonable best efforts, toward fulfillment of his duties under this Agreement and toward protecting, encouraging and promoting the interests of employer. Section 2.3 Term of Employment. Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, employer shall employ employee, and employee shall provide services to employer, upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement during the period beginning on the date hereof and ending on the date provided under Section 6 of this Agreement.
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ARTICLE 3.
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT Section 3.1 Place of Employment. Employee shall be based at employer’s principal office Granby, Connecticut. Employer agrees that during the term of this employment agreement it shall not assign employee to work at any location other than its principal office on a permanent basis without employee’s consent.
ARTICLE 4.
COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE Section 4.1 Base Salary. Except as otherwise set forth below, for all services rendered by employee under this employment agreement, employer agrees to pay employee an annual base salary of $195,000, which shall be payable to employee in such installments, but not less frequently than monthly, as are consistent with employer’s practice for its other employees. Employee’s annual base salary with respect to each fiscal year beginning on or about the applicable date set forth below shall be as follows:
December 1, 2001 $210,000 December 1, 2002 As determined by the Compensation Committee of Employer’s Board of Directors (the “Committee”), but not less than $210,000
Section 4.2 Incentive Compensation. In addition to the base salary, employee shall be entitled to receive not less than 30% of the employer’s senior management incentive pool as established by the Committee. Section 4.3 Stock Options. Employee shall be eligible to participate in the Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. 1997 Stock Option Plan (the “Option Plan”), at such level and in such amounts as may be determined by the employer’s board of directors in its sole discretion, subject to the terms and conditions of the Option Plan and any applicable award agreements. Section 4.4 Retirement and Deferred Compensation. Employee shall be eligible to participate in Griffin’s 401k plan and Griffin’s non-qualified deferred compensation plan to the extent provided by the terms of such plans. Section 4.5 Reimbursement for Business Expenses. Employer shall promptly pay or reimburse employee for all reasonable business expenses incurred by employee in performing employee’s duties and obligations under this employment agreement, but only if employee properly accounts for expenses in accordance with employer’s policies.
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ARTICLE 5.
FRINGE BENEFITS Section 5.1 Employer Employee Benefit Plans. Employee shall be entitled to participate in and receive benefits from all of employer’s employee benefit plans that currently are maintained by employer for senior employees of employer. Employee shall be entitled to participate in and receive benefits under any retirement plan, profit-sharing plan, or other employee benefit plan that employer establishes for the benefit of similarly situated employees of employer, after the effective date of this employment agreement. No amounts paid to employee from an employee benefit plan shall count as compensation due employee as base salary or incentive compensation. Nothing in this employment agreement shall prohibit employer from modifying or terminating any of its employee benefit plans in a manner that does not discriminate between employee and other employees of employer. Section 5.2 Motor Vehicle. Employer will provide employee with the use of a motor vehicle to be selected in the reasonable discretion of employer in keeping with employer’s present practice, and employer shall procure, maintain, and pay for appropriate insurance on the motor vehicle, including liability insurance of at least $300,000 per person and $1,000,000 per occurrence for personal injury and $100,000 for property damage. Section 5.3 Life Insurance. Employer shall maintain in effect during the term of employee’s employment a term life insurance policy in an amount equal to employee’s base salary. In addition, employee shall be able to purchase additional term life insurance in accordance with the group life insurance policy made available by employer. Any proceeds payable under the policy shall be paid to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated in writing from time to time by employee.
ARTICLE 6.
TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT Section 6.1 Term of Employment. Employee’s employment shall commence on the date of the execution of this agreement and shall terminate on November 30, 2003, unless extended or terminated sooner, as provided by this article of the employment agreement. For purposes of this employment agreement, the later of November 30, 2003 or the last day of any Extension Term (as defined in Section 6.2) shall be referred to as the “end-of-employment date.” Section 6.2 Extension of Employment. On November 30, 2003 and on each December 1 occurring in 2004 or thereafter, employee’s employment with employer automatically shall be extended for an additional year (each such additional year, an “Extension Term”) unless, at least sixty (60) days prior to the termination date or end-of-employment date, employer or employee delivers to the other a written notice that employee’s employment with employer is not to be extended. In the absence of an agreement, employee’s annual base compensation shall be determined by the Committee, but shall be not less than the employee’s previous year’s annual base compensation.” 3
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Section 6.3 Termination at Employee’s Death or Disability. Employee’s employment with employer shall terminate as of the date of employee’s death or as the effective date of his “Disability.” For purposes of this Agreement, “Disability” shall mean employee’s incapacity due to physical or mental illness (as determined in good faith by a physician acceptable to employer) which (a) results in employee being absent from the full-time performance of his duties with employer for 120 consecutive days during any 12 month period or (b) which (as determined in good faith by a physician acceptable to employer) will likely result in employee’s inability to return to the full-time performance of his duties with employer for 120 consecutive days during the succeeding 12 month period. Section 6.4 Termination by Employee . Employee may, but is not obligated to, terminate this employment agreement at any time under the following circumstances:
(a) There is a change in control of employer. There is a change in control of employer if someone other than a current owner of employer becomes the beneficial owner of more than 50% of the voting power of employer. No transaction or event will be deemed to have caused a change in control if employee gives prior consent to the transaction or event. (b) Employee is assigned duties that are significantly adversely different than those described in this employment agreement without his consent. (c) Employee is removed from any of the positions described in Section 2.1 of this employment agreement (other than by employer for cause). (d) Employee’s fringe benefits or other compensation are materially reduced. (e) Employer fails to have a successor assume this employment agreement. (f) Employer becomes insolvent or files a bankruptcy petition.
Section 6.5 Termination by Employer.
(a) Termination for Cause. Employer may terminate employee’s employment for cause. (b) “Cause” Defined. Employer shall have cause to terminate employee’s employment if employee willfully fails to substantially perform any duties required by this employment agreement (unless employee’s failure is due to a physical or mental incapacity), employee is grossly negligent in the performance of required duties, employee engages in conduct that demonstrably and substantially damages employer, employee is convicted of or pleads nolo contendere to a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, or employee discloses material confidential information. No act or failure to act by employee may be considered “willful” unless employee acted or failed to act without any reasonable belief that the act or omission was in employer’s best interests and without good faith.
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Section 6.6 Notice of Termination. Any termination of employee’s employment by employer or employee must be communicated to the other party by a written notice of termination. The notice must specify the provision of this employment agreement authorizing the termination and must set forth in reasonable detail the facts and circumstances providing the basis for termination of employee’s employment. Section 6.7 Date Termination Is Effective. If employee’s employment terminates because this employment agreement expires, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on that expiration date. If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s death, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date of employee’s death. If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s Disability, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date as of which employee is determined to be disabled in accordance with Section 6.3. If employee’s employment is terminated by employee, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date that notice of termination is given. If employee’s employment is terminated by employer for cause, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date specified by the notice of termination. Section 6.8 Compensation Following Termination.
(a) If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s death, employer shall pay a death benefit to the person or persons designated in a written notice filed with employer by employee or, if no person has been designated, to employee’s estate. The amount of the death benefit shall equal the sum of (i) the employee’s then current annual base salary plus (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s death occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year. Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Nurseries, Inc. Incentive Compensation Plan as in effect for such fiscal year (the “Imperial Incentive Plan”). This death benefit shall be in addition to any other amounts that the employee’s beneficiaries and estate may be entitled to receive under any employee benefit plan maintained by employer.” (b) If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s Disability, employer shall pay employee (i) in accordance with employer’s customary payroll practices, his then current annual base salary during the period commencing on the effective date of such termination and ending on the first anniversary of the date the employee’s employment was terminated and (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s Disability occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year. Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Incentive Plan. Amounts payable under this Section 6.8(b) shall be paid in addition to any other amounts that employee may be entitled to receive under any employee benefit plan or insurance arrangement maintained by employer.”
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(c) If employee’s employment is terminated by employer for cause, employer shall pay employee his then current base salary through the date employment is terminated, and employer shall have no further obligations to employee under this employment agreement. (d) If employer terminates the employee’s employment other than for cause, employer shall pay employee his then current base salary through the date employment is terminated. In addition, employer shall pay employee as liquidated damages an amount equal to the sum of (i) his then current annual base salary and (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s termination of employment occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year. Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Incentive Plan.” (e) If employee’s employment is terminated by employee in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.4 of this employment agreement, employer shall pay employee severance pay in an amount equal to the sum of (i) his then current annual base salary and (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s termination of employment occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year. Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Incentive Plan. If employee’s employment is terminated by employee for any reason other than those set forth in Section 6.4 of this employment agreement, employer shall pay to employee his then current base salary through the date of such termination of employment and employer shall have no further obligations to employee under this employment agreement.” (f) If employee’s employment is terminated by a successor in interest following a merger or sale, if there is a change in control, or if employee terminated employment with the successor employer for any reason during the term of this employment agreement, Griffin agrees to employ employee. Upon commencement of employment with Griffin, employee will receive compensation and benefits equal to or commensurate with the compensation and benefits provided in this employment agreement until the first anniversary of the date of commencement of employment with Griffin.”
ARTICLE 7.
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION; NON-SOLICITATION; NON-COMPETITION Section 7.1 During the term of employment hereunder and for one year thereafter (the “Non- Compete Period”), employee shall not, directly or indirectly in any manner or capacity (e.g., as an advisor, principal, agent, partner, officer, director, shareholder, employee, 6
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member of any association or otherwise) engage in, work for, consult, provide advice or assistance or otherwise participate in any activity which is competitive with the business of employer or Griffin in any geographic area in which employer is now or shall then be doing business. Employee further agrees that during the Non-Compete Period he will not assist or encourage any other person in carrying out any activity that would be prohibited by the provisions of this Section 7 if such activity were carried out by employee and, in particular, employee agrees that he will not induce any employee of employer or Griffin to carry out any such activity; provided, however, that the “beneficial ownership” by employee, either individually or as a member of a “group,” as such terms are used in Rule 13d of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, of not more than two percent (2%) of the voting stock of any publicly held corporation shall not be a violation of this employment agreement. It is further expressly agreed that employer will or would suffer irreparable injury if employee were to compete with employer or any subsidiary or affiliate of employer in violation of this employment agreement and that employer would by reason of such competition be entitled to injunctive relief in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, and employee further consents and stipulates to the entry of such injunctive relief in such a court prohibiting employee from competing with employer or any subsidiary or affiliate of employer in violation of this employment agreement. Section 7.2 During the term of employment and for one year thereafter, employee shall not, directly or indirectly, influence or attempt to influence customers or suppliers of employer or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, to divert their business to any competitor of employer. Section 7.3 Employee recognizes that he will possess confidential information about other employees of employer relating to their education, experience, skills, abilities, compensation and benefits, and interpersonal relationships with customers of employer. Employee recognizes that the information he will possess about these other employees is not generally known, is of substantial value to employee in developing its business and in securing and retaining customers, and will be acquired by him because of his business position with employer. Employee agrees that, during the term of employment, and for a period of one year thereafter, he will not, directly or indirectly, solicit or recruit any employee of employer for the purpose of being employed by him or by any competitor of employer on whose behalf he is acting as an agent, representative or employee and that he will not convey any such confidential information or trade secrets about other employees of employer to any other person. Section 7.4 If it is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in any state that any restriction in this Section 7 is excessive in duration or scope or is unreasonable or unenforceable under the laws of that state, it is the intention of the parties that such restriction may be modified or amended by the court to render it enforceable to the maximum extent permitted by the law of that state.
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ARTICLE 8.
MISCELLANEOUS Section 8.1 Notices. Any notice given under this employment agreement to either party shall be made in writing. Notices shall be deemed given when delivered by hand or when mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, and addressed to the party at the address set forth below.
Employee’s address: Gregory Schaan 17 Newbury Court Simsbury, CT 06070 Employer’s address: Imperial Nurseries, Inc. 90 Salmon Brook Street Granby, CT 06035 Guarantor’s address: Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. One Rockefeller Plaza, suite 2301 New York, NY 10020
Each party may designate a different address for receiving notices by giving written notice of the different address to the other party. The written notice of the different address will be deemed given when it is received by the other party. Section 8.2 Binding Agreement - Employer’s Successors.
(a) The rights and obligations of employer under this employment agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of employer. (b) Employer shall require any direct or indirect successor (by purchase, merger, consolidation, or otherwise) of all or substantially all of employer’s business and/or assets relating to the employer’s growing operations to expressly agree to assume employer’s obligations under this employment agreement and perform them in the same manner and to the same extent as employer would have been required to do if no succession had occurred. The agreement must be in a form and substance satisfactory to employee. (c) If employer fails to obtain such an agreement before the effective date of the succession, employer’s failure will be considered a breach of this employment agreement, and employee shall be entitled to the same amount of money that employee would have been entitled to if employee had terminated employee’s employment in accordance with the terms of this employment agreement, calculated as though employee’s employment had terminated on the end-of-employment date.
Section 8.3 Binding Agreement - Employee’s Successors. This employment agreement shall inure to the benefit and be enforceable by employee’s personal representatives, 8
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legatees, and heirs. If employee dies while amounts are still owed, such amounts shall be paid to employee’s legatees or, if no such person or persons have been designated, to employee’s estate. Section 8.4 Waivers. The waiver by either party of a breach of any provision of this employment agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach. Section 8.5 Entire Agreement. This instrument contains the entire agreement of the parties. The parties have not made any agreements or representations, oral or otherwise, express or implied, pertaining to the subject matter of this employment agreement other than those specifically included in this employment agreement. Section 8.6 Prior Agreements. This employment agreement supersedes any prior agreements pertaining to or connected with or arising in any manner out of the employment of employee by employer. All such agreements are terminated and are of no force or effect whatsoever. Section 8.7 Amendment of Agreement. No change or modification of this employment agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by the party against whom the change or modification is sought to be enforced. No change or modification by employer shall be effective unless it is approved by employer’s Board of Directors and signed by an officer specifically authorized to sign such documents. Section 8.8 Severability of Provisions. If any provision of this employment agreement is invalidated or held unenforceable, the invalidity or unenforceability of that provision or provisions shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision of this employment agreement. Section 8.9 Assignment of Agreement. Employer shall not assign this employment agreement without employee’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. Employee may not assign this employment agreement. Section 8.10 Governing Law. All questions regarding the validity and interpretation of this employment agreement shall be governed by and construed and enforced in all respects in accordance with the laws of the State of Connecticut.
ARTICLE 9.
AGREEMENTS BY GRIFFIN LAND & NURSERIES, INC. Section 9.1 Guaranty. As a material inducement to employee to enter into this agreement and in recognition to the contribution to be made by employee to its own business, Griffin hereby guaranties full performance of this employment agreement by employer. Section 9.2 Direct Agreement. As a material inducement to employee to enter into this employment agreement and in recognition to the contribution to be made by employee to its own business, Griffin hereby agrees to issue stock as provided in Article 5, to ratify and 9
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confirm the firm offer of employment contained in Article 7 and to allow continuing participation by employee in stock option plans identified in Article 4.
[signature page follows]
10
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IN WITNESS, the parties have executed this employment agreement in duplicate and effective as of January 1, 2001 and amended April 9, 2008.
Imperial Nurseries, Inc., employer By: /s/Frederick M. Danziger /s/Gregory Schaan Frederick M. Danziger, Director Gregory Schaan, employee Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. By: /s/Frederick M. Danziger Frederick M. Danziger, President And Chief Executive Officer
11
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"Exhibit 10.35 Employment Agreement by and between Imperial Nurseries, Inc. and Gregory Schaan January 1, 2001 as amended April 9, 2008 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ARTICLE 1. EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEE ARTICLE 2. DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE Section 2.1 Positions and Duties................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Section 2.2 Time Devoted to Work............................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Section 2.3 Term of Employment................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 1 ARTICLE 3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT Section 3.1 Place of Employment................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 ARTICLE 4. COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE Section 4.1 Base Salary................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Section 4.2 Incentive Compensation............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Section 4.3 Stock Options............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Section 4.4 Retirement and Deferred Compensation.................................................................................................................................................................................. 2 Section 4.5 Reimbursement for Business Expenses................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 ARTICLE 5. FRINGE BENEFITS Section 5.1 Employer Employee Benefit Plans............................................................................................................................................................................................ 3 Section 5.2 Motor Vehicle.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 Section 5.3 Life Insurance.............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 3 ARTICLE 6. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT Section 6.1 Term of Employment................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Section 6.2 Extension of Employment........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 3 Section 6.3 Termination at Employee’s Death............................................................................................................................................................................................. 4 i -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 6.4 Termination by Employee.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Section 6.5 Termination by Employer........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 4 Section 6.6 Notice of Termination................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 5 Section 6.7 Date Termination is Effective.................................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Section 6.8 Compensation Following Termination..................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 ARTICLE 7.",
"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION; NON-SOLICITATION; NON-COMPETITION Section 7.1 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6 Section 7.2 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Section 7.3 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 Section 7.4 ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7 ARTICLE 8. MISCELLANEOUS Section 8.1 Notices.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Section 8.2 Binding Agreement – Employer’s Successors....................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Section 8.3 Binding Agreement – Employee’s Successors....................................................................................................................................................................... 8 Section 8.4 Waivers......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.5 Entire Agreement......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.6 Prior Agreements......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.7 Amendment of Agreement......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.8 Severability of Provisions.......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.9 Assignment of Agreement......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 8.10 Governing Law............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 9 ARTICLE 9. AGREEMENTS BY GRIFFIN LAND & NURSERIES, INC.",
"Section 9.1 Guaranty....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 9 Section 9.2 Direct Agreement........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9 ii -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT THIS AGREEMENT is made and entered into as of January 1, 2001, by and between Gregory Schaan (“employee”) and Imperial Nurseries, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“employer”). WITNESSETH: WHEREAS, employee and employer deem it to be in their respective best interests to enter into an agreement providing for employer’s employment of employee pursuant to the terms herein stated; NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual promises and agreements contained herein, it is hereby agreed as follows: ARTICLE 1. EMPLOYMENT OF EMPLOYEE Effective as of the date hereof, employer agrees to employ employee, and employee agrees to provide services to the employer, upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement. ARTICLE 2. DUTIES OF EMPLOYEE Section 2.1 Position and Duties. Employer agrees to employ employee and employee agrees to serve as President of employer for the term of employment (as described in Section 2.3).",
"In this capacity, employee shall devote his reasonable best efforts to the performance of the services customarily incident to such office and position and to such other services of an executive nature as may be reasonably requested by the board of directors of employer which may include services for one or more subsidiaries or affiliates of employer, including without limitation, Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. (“Griffin”). Employee shall in his capacity as an employee and officer of employer be responsible to and obey the reasonable and lawful directives of the board of directors of employer. Section 2.2 Time Devoted to Work. Employee shall devote substantially all his business time and attention, and shall use his reasonable best efforts, toward fulfillment of his duties under this Agreement and toward protecting, encouraging and promoting the interests of employer. Section 2.3 Term of Employment.",
"Except as otherwise specifically provided herein, employer shall employ employee, and employee shall provide services to employer, upon the terms and conditions set forth in this Agreement during the period beginning on the date hereof and ending on the date provided under Section 6 of this Agreement. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ARTICLE 3. PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT Section 3.1 Place of Employment. Employee shall be based at employer’s principal office Granby, Connecticut. Employer agrees that during the term of this employment agreement it shall not assign employee to work at any location other than its principal office on a permanent basis without employee’s consent. ARTICLE 4. COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEE Section 4.1 Base Salary. Except as otherwise set forth below, for all services rendered by employee under this employment agreement, employer agrees to pay employee an annual base salary of $195,000, which shall be payable to employee in such installments, but not less frequently than monthly, as are consistent with employer’s practice for its other employees.",
"Employee’s annual base salary with respect to each fiscal year beginning on or about the applicable date set forth below shall be as follows: December 1, 2001 $210,000 December 1, 2002 As determined by the Compensation Committee of Employer’s Board of Directors (the “Committee”), but not less than $210,000 Section 4.2 Incentive Compensation. In addition to the base salary, employee shall be entitled to receive not less than 30% of the employer’s senior management incentive pool as established by the Committee. Section 4.3 Stock Options. Employee shall be eligible to participate in the Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. 1997 Stock Option Plan (the “Option Plan”), at such level and in such amounts as may be determined by the employer’s board of directors in its sole discretion, subject to the terms and conditions of the Option Plan and any applicable award agreements. Section 4.4 Retirement and Deferred Compensation. Employee shall be eligible to participate in Griffin’s 401k plan and Griffin’s non-qualified deferred compensation plan to the extent provided by the terms of such plans.",
"Section 4.5 Reimbursement for Business Expenses. Employer shall promptly pay or reimburse employee for all reasonable business expenses incurred by employee in performing employee’s duties and obligations under this employment agreement, but only if employee properly accounts for expenses in accordance with employer’s policies. 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ARTICLE 5. FRINGE BENEFITS Section 5.1 Employer Employee Benefit Plans. Employee shall be entitled to participate in and receive benefits from all of employer’s employee benefit plans that currently are maintained by employer for senior employees of employer. Employee shall be entitled to participate in and receive benefits under any retirement plan, profit-sharing plan, or other employee benefit plan that employer establishes for the benefit of similarly situated employees of employer, after the effective date of this employment agreement. No amounts paid to employee from an employee benefit plan shall count as compensation due employee as base salary or incentive compensation.",
"Nothing in this employment agreement shall prohibit employer from modifying or terminating any of its employee benefit plans in a manner that does not discriminate between employee and other employees of employer. Section 5.2 Motor Vehicle. Employer will provide employee with the use of a motor vehicle to be selected in the reasonable discretion of employer in keeping with employer’s present practice, and employer shall procure, maintain, and pay for appropriate insurance on the motor vehicle, including liability insurance of at least $300,000 per person and $1,000,000 per occurrence for personal injury and $100,000 for property damage. Section 5.3 Life Insurance. Employer shall maintain in effect during the term of employee’s employment a term life insurance policy in an amount equal to employee’s base salary. In addition, employee shall be able to purchase additional term life insurance in accordance with the group life insurance policy made available by employer. Any proceeds payable under the policy shall be paid to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated in writing from time to time by employee.",
"ARTICLE 6. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT Section 6.1 Term of Employment. Employee’s employment shall commence on the date of the execution of this agreement and shall terminate on November 30, 2003, unless extended or terminated sooner, as provided by this article of the employment agreement. For purposes of this employment agreement, the later of November 30, 2003 or the last day of any Extension Term (as defined in Section 6.2) shall be referred to as the “end-of-employment date.” Section 6.2 Extension of Employment. On November 30, 2003 and on each December 1 occurring in 2004 or thereafter, employee’s employment with employer automatically shall be extended for an additional year (each such additional year, an “Extension Term”) unless, at least sixty (60) days prior to the termination date or end-of-employment date, employer or employee delivers to the other a written notice that employee’s employment with employer is not to be extended. In the absence of an agreement, employee’s annual base compensation shall be determined by the Committee, but shall be not less than the employee’s previous year’s annual base compensation.” 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 6.3 Termination at Employee’s Death or Disability.",
"Employee’s employment with employer shall terminate as of the date of employee’s death or as the effective date of his “Disability.” For purposes of this Agreement, “Disability” shall mean employee’s incapacity due to physical or mental illness (as determined in good faith by a physician acceptable to employer) which (a) results in employee being absent from the full-time performance of his duties with employer for 120 consecutive days during any 12 month period or (b) which (as determined in good faith by a physician acceptable to employer) will likely result in employee’s inability to return to the full-time performance of his duties with employer for 120 consecutive days during the succeeding 12 month period. Section 6.4 Termination by Employee . Employee may, but is not obligated to, terminate this employment agreement at any time under the following circumstances: (a) There is a change in control of employer. There is a change in control of employer if someone other than a current owner of employer becomes the beneficial owner of more than 50% of the voting power of employer.",
"No transaction or event will be deemed to have caused a change in control if employee gives prior consent to the transaction or event. (b) Employee is assigned duties that are significantly adversely different than those described in this employment agreement without his consent. (c) Employee is removed from any of the positions described in Section 2.1 of this employment agreement (other than by employer for cause). (d) Employee’s fringe benefits or other compensation are materially reduced. (e) Employer fails to have a successor assume this employment agreement. (f) Employer becomes insolvent or files a bankruptcy petition. Section 6.5 Termination by Employer. (a) Termination for Cause. Employer may terminate employee’s employment for cause. (b) “Cause” Defined.",
"Employer shall have cause to terminate employee’s employment if employee willfully fails to substantially perform any duties required by this employment agreement (unless employee’s failure is due to a physical or mental incapacity), employee is grossly negligent in the performance of required duties, employee engages in conduct that demonstrably and substantially damages employer, employee is convicted of or pleads nolo contendere to a felony or a crime of moral turpitude, or employee discloses material confidential information. No act or failure to act by employee may be considered “willful” unless employee acted or failed to act without any reasonable belief that the act or omission was in employer’s best interests and without good faith. 4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 6.6 Notice of Termination. Any termination of employee’s employment by employer or employee must be communicated to the other party by a written notice of termination. The notice must specify the provision of this employment agreement authorizing the termination and must set forth in reasonable detail the facts and circumstances providing the basis for termination of employee’s employment.",
"Section 6.7 Date Termination Is Effective. If employee’s employment terminates because this employment agreement expires, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on that expiration date. If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s death, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date of employee’s death. If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s Disability, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date as of which employee is determined to be disabled in accordance with Section 6.3. If employee’s employment is terminated by employee, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date that notice of termination is given. If employee’s employment is terminated by employer for cause, then employee’s employment will be considered to have terminated on the date specified by the notice of termination. Section 6.8 Compensation Following Termination.",
"(a) If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s death, employer shall pay a death benefit to the person or persons designated in a written notice filed with employer by employee or, if no person has been designated, to employee’s estate. The amount of the death benefit shall equal the sum of (i) the employee’s then current annual base salary plus (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s death occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year. Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Nurseries, Inc. Incentive Compensation Plan as in effect for such fiscal year (the “Imperial Incentive Plan”). This death benefit shall be in addition to any other amounts that the employee’s beneficiaries and estate may be entitled to receive under any employee benefit plan maintained by employer.” (b) If employee’s employment terminates because of employee’s Disability, employer shall pay employee (i) in accordance with employer’s customary payroll practices, his then current annual base salary during the period commencing on the effective date of such termination and ending on the first anniversary of the date the employee’s employment was terminated and (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s Disability occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year.",
"Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Incentive Plan. Amounts payable under this Section 6.8(b) shall be paid in addition to any other amounts that employee may be entitled to receive under any employee benefit plan or insurance arrangement maintained by employer.” 5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (c) If employee’s employment is terminated by employer for cause, employer shall pay employee his then current base salary through the date employment is terminated, and employer shall have no further obligations to employee under this employment agreement.",
"(d) If employer terminates the employee’s employment other than for cause, employer shall pay employee his then current base salary through the date employment is terminated. In addition, employer shall pay employee as liquidated damages an amount equal to the sum of (i) his then current annual base salary and (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s termination of employment occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year. Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Incentive Plan.” (e) If employee’s employment is terminated by employee in accordance with the provisions of Section 6.4 of this employment agreement, employer shall pay employee severance pay in an amount equal to the sum of (i) his then current annual base salary and (ii) a pro-rated amount (based on number of days in the performance period for which he was employed during the applicable fiscal year) of the incentive compensation that the employee would have otherwise earned with respect to the fiscal year in which the employee’s termination of employment occurs based on actual results for the full fiscal year.",
"Such pro-rated amount of incentive compensation shall be paid at such time as the employee would have otherwise received any such incentive compensation pursuant to the Imperial Incentive Plan. If employee’s employment is terminated by employee for any reason other than those set forth in Section 6.4 of this employment agreement, employer shall pay to employee his then current base salary through the date of such termination of employment and employer shall have no further obligations to employee under this employment agreement.” (f) If employee’s employment is terminated by a successor in interest following a merger or sale, if there is a change in control, or if employee terminated employment with the successor employer for any reason during the term of this employment agreement, Griffin agrees to employ employee. Upon commencement of employment with Griffin, employee will receive compensation and benefits equal to or commensurate with the compensation and benefits provided in this employment agreement until the first anniversary of the date of commencement of employment with Griffin.” ARTICLE 7.",
"CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION; NON-SOLICITATION; NON-COMPETITION Section 7.1 During the term of employment hereunder and for one year thereafter (the “Non- Compete Period”), employee shall not, directly or indirectly in any manner or capacity (e.g., as an advisor, principal, agent, partner, officer, director, shareholder, employee, 6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- member of any association or otherwise) engage in, work for, consult, provide advice or assistance or otherwise participate in any activity which is competitive with the business of employer or Griffin in any geographic area in which employer is now or shall then be doing business. Employee further agrees that during the Non-Compete Period he will not assist or encourage any other person in carrying out any activity that would be prohibited by the provisions of this Section 7 if such activity were carried out by employee and, in particular, employee agrees that he will not induce any employee of employer or Griffin to carry out any such activity; provided, however, that the “beneficial ownership” by employee, either individually or as a member of a “group,” as such terms are used in Rule 13d of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, of not more than two percent (2%) of the voting stock of any publicly held corporation shall not be a violation of this employment agreement. It is further expressly agreed that employer will or would suffer irreparable injury if employee were to compete with employer or any subsidiary or affiliate of employer in violation of this employment agreement and that employer would by reason of such competition be entitled to injunctive relief in a court of appropriate jurisdiction, and employee further consents and stipulates to the entry of such injunctive relief in such a court prohibiting employee from competing with employer or any subsidiary or affiliate of employer in violation of this employment agreement.",
"Section 7.2 During the term of employment and for one year thereafter, employee shall not, directly or indirectly, influence or attempt to influence customers or suppliers of employer or any of its subsidiaries or affiliates, to divert their business to any competitor of employer. Section 7.3 Employee recognizes that he will possess confidential information about other employees of employer relating to their education, experience, skills, abilities, compensation and benefits, and interpersonal relationships with customers of employer. Employee recognizes that the information he will possess about these other employees is not generally known, is of substantial value to employee in developing its business and in securing and retaining customers, and will be acquired by him because of his business position with employer. Employee agrees that, during the term of employment, and for a period of one year thereafter, he will not, directly or indirectly, solicit or recruit any employee of employer for the purpose of being employed by him or by any competitor of employer on whose behalf he is acting as an agent, representative or employee and that he will not convey any such confidential information or trade secrets about other employees of employer to any other person. Section 7.4 If it is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in any state that any restriction in this Section 7 is excessive in duration or scope or is unreasonable or unenforceable under the laws of that state, it is the intention of the parties that such restriction may be modified or amended by the court to render it enforceable to the maximum extent permitted by the law of that state.",
"7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ARTICLE 8. MISCELLANEOUS Section 8.1 Notices. Any notice given under this employment agreement to either party shall be made in writing. Notices shall be deemed given when delivered by hand or when mailed by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, postage prepaid, and addressed to the party at the address set forth below. Employee’s address: Gregory Schaan 17 Newbury Court Simsbury, CT 06070 Employer’s address: Imperial Nurseries, Inc. 90 Salmon Brook Street Granby, CT 06035 Guarantor’s address: Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. One Rockefeller Plaza, suite 2301 New York, NY 10020 Each party may designate a different address for receiving notices by giving written notice of the different address to the other party. The written notice of the different address will be deemed given when it is received by the other party. Section 8.2 Binding Agreement - Employer’s Successors. (a) The rights and obligations of employer under this employment agreement shall inure to the benefit of and shall be binding upon the successors and assigns of employer. (b) Employer shall require any direct or indirect successor (by purchase, merger, consolidation, or otherwise) of all or substantially all of employer’s business and/or assets relating to the employer’s growing operations to expressly agree to assume employer’s obligations under this employment agreement and perform them in the same manner and to the same extent as employer would have been required to do if no succession had occurred.",
"The agreement must be in a form and substance satisfactory to employee. (c) If employer fails to obtain such an agreement before the effective date of the succession, employer’s failure will be considered a breach of this employment agreement, and employee shall be entitled to the same amount of money that employee would have been entitled to if employee had terminated employee’s employment in accordance with the terms of this employment agreement, calculated as though employee’s employment had terminated on the end-of-employment date. Section 8.3 Binding Agreement - Employee’s Successors. This employment agreement shall inure to the benefit and be enforceable by employee’s personal representatives, 8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- legatees, and heirs.",
"If employee dies while amounts are still owed, such amounts shall be paid to employee’s legatees or, if no such person or persons have been designated, to employee’s estate. Section 8.4 Waivers. The waiver by either party of a breach of any provision of this employment agreement shall not operate or be construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach. Section 8.5 Entire Agreement. This instrument contains the entire agreement of the parties. The parties have not made any agreements or representations, oral or otherwise, express or implied, pertaining to the subject matter of this employment agreement other than those specifically included in this employment agreement. Section 8.6 Prior Agreements. This employment agreement supersedes any prior agreements pertaining to or connected with or arising in any manner out of the employment of employee by employer. All such agreements are terminated and are of no force or effect whatsoever. Section 8.7 Amendment of Agreement. No change or modification of this employment agreement shall be valid unless it is in writing and signed by the party against whom the change or modification is sought to be enforced.",
"No change or modification by employer shall be effective unless it is approved by employer’s Board of Directors and signed by an officer specifically authorized to sign such documents. Section 8.8 Severability of Provisions. If any provision of this employment agreement is invalidated or held unenforceable, the invalidity or unenforceability of that provision or provisions shall not affect the validity or enforceability of any other provision of this employment agreement. Section 8.9 Assignment of Agreement. Employer shall not assign this employment agreement without employee’s prior written consent, which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld.",
"Employee may not assign this employment agreement. Section 8.10 Governing Law. All questions regarding the validity and interpretation of this employment agreement shall be governed by and construed and enforced in all respects in accordance with the laws of the State of Connecticut. ARTICLE 9. AGREEMENTS BY GRIFFIN LAND & NURSERIES, INC. Section 9.1 Guaranty. As a material inducement to employee to enter into this agreement and in recognition to the contribution to be made by employee to its own business, Griffin hereby guaranties full performance of this employment agreement by employer. Section 9.2 Direct Agreement. As a material inducement to employee to enter into this employment agreement and in recognition to the contribution to be made by employee to its own business, Griffin hereby agrees to issue stock as provided in Article 5, to ratify and 9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- confirm the firm offer of employment contained in Article 7 and to allow continuing participation by employee in stock option plans identified in Article 4. [signature page follows] 10 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- IN WITNESS, the parties have executed this employment agreement in duplicate and effective as of January 1, 2001 and amended April 9, 2008.",
"Imperial Nurseries, Inc., employer By: /s/Frederick M. Danziger /s/Gregory Schaan Frederick M. Danziger, Director Gregory Schaan, employee Griffin Land & Nurseries, Inc. By: /s/Frederick M. Danziger Frederick M. Danziger, President And Chief Executive Officer 11 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------"
]
| https://github.com/TheAtticusProject/cuad | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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Converted by SEC Publisher, created by BCL Technologies Inc., for SEC Filing (Check One): UNITED STATES ¨ Form 10-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ¨ Form 20-F Washington, D.C. 20549 ¨ Form 11-K x Form 10-Q FORM 12b-25 SEC File Number: 0-4465 ¨ Form N-SAR CUSIP Number: 384 ¨ Form N-CSR NOTIFICATION OF LATE FILING For Period Ended: August 31 , 2006 ¨ Transition Report on Form 10-K ¨ Transition Report on Form 20-F ¨ Transition Report on Form 11-K ¨ Transition Report on Form 10-Q ¨ Transition Report on Form N-SAR ¨ Transition Report on Form N-CSR For the Transition Period Ended: Nothing in this form shall be construed to imply that the Commission has verified any information contained herein. If the notification relates to a portion of the filing checked above, identify the Item(s) to which the notification relates: PART I - REGISTRANT INFORMATION eLEC Communications Corp. Full name of registrant Former name if applicable 75 South Broadway, Suite 302 Address of principal executive office (Street and number) White Plains, New York 10601 City, state and zip code PART II - RULES 12b-25(b) and (c) If the subject report could not be filed without unreasonable effort or expense and the registrant seeks relief pursuant to Rule 12b-25(b), the following should be completed. (Check box if appropriate.) x (a) The reasons described in reasonable detail in Part III of this form could not be eliminated without unreasonable effort or expense; (b) The subject annual report, semi-annual report, transition report on Form 10-K, Form 20-F, Form 11-K, Form N-SAR or Form N-CSR, or portion thereof, will be filed on or before the fifteenth calendar day following the prescribed due date; or the subject quarterly report or transition report on Form 10-Q, or portion thereof will be filed on or before the fifth calendar day following the prescribed due date; and (c) The accountants statement or other exhibit required by Rule 12b-25(c) has been attached if applicable. PART III NARRATIVE State below in reasonable detail why Forms 10-K, 20-F, 11-K, 10-Q, N-SAR, N-CSR, or the transition report or portion thereof, could not be filed within the prescribed time period. Certain financial and other information necessary for an accurate and full completion of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q could not be provided within the prescribed time period without unreasonable effort or expense. As a result of the foregoing, our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended August 31, 2006 will be filed on or before October 23, 2006, which is within the extension period provided under Rule 12b-25. PART IV - OTHER INFORMATION (1) Name and telephone number of person to contact in regard to this notification: Eric M. Hellige (212) 421-4100 (2) Have all other periodic reports required under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 30 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 during the preceding 12 months or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such report(s) been filed? If the answer is no, identify report(s). x Yes ¨ No (3) Is it anticipated that any significant change in results of operations from the corresponding period for the last fiscal year will be reflected by the earnings statements to be included in the subject report or portion thereof? x Yes ¨ No If so, attach an explanation of the anticipated change, both narratively and quantitatively, and, if appropriate, state the reasons why a reasonable estimate of the results cannot be made. As previously reported, we are no longer focusing on growing our wireline telephone business and we are using the cash generated by this mature customer base to help fund the growth of our newly-developed digital telephone service that routes telephone calls over the Internet. Although the number of digital telephone numbers we have in service continues to grow and exceeds 5,300 numbers, our revenue per line for digital phone services is less than our revenue per line for wireline service. The decrease in the number of wirelines and the overall decrease in our average revenue per line caused our revenue for the three- month period ended August 31, 2006 to decrease by approximately $2,198,000, or approximately 53%, to approximately $1,949,000 as compared to approximately $4,147,000 reported for the three-month period ended August 31, 2005. Our gross profit for the three-month period ended August 31, 2006 decreased by approximately $1,173,000 to approximately $734,000 from approximately $1,907,000 reported in the three-month period ended August 31, 2005. During the three-month period ended August 31, 2006, our gross profit percentage decreased to 37.7% from 46.0% during the comparable 2005 period. The decrease in our gross profit resulted primarily from the decrease in the size of our customer base in the third quarter of fiscal 2006 relative to the third quarter in fiscal 2005, and the higher cost of services we are now incurring under our wholesale services agreement with Verizon. Selling, general and administrative expenses decreased by approximately $137,000, or approximately 11%, to approximately $1,166,000 for the three-month period ended August 31, 2006 from approximately $1,303,000 reported in prior year fiscal period. Our bad debt expense, net of recoveries, decreased by approximately $940,000, or approximately 100%, to approximately $3,000 for the three months ended August 31, 2006 from approximately $943,000 reported in the prior fiscal period. This decrease was related to the reduction in the number of wireline customers we had during the 2006 period and the fact that the remaining wireline customers represent a mature base that has consistently paid their bills. Further, because we require credit card payment from our retail digital telephone service customers, our new customers have not been generating bad debt expense. The change in warrant valuation for the three-month period ended August 31, 2006 amounted to income of approximately $406,000 compared to income of approximately $35,000 for the same period in fiscal 2005. The increase was due to the change in the value of our common stock. For the three-month period ended August 31, 2005, we reported a gain on sales of investment securities of approximately $323,000. There were no security transactions in 2006. eLEC Communications Corp. (Name of Registrant as Specified in Charter) has caused this notification to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized. Date: October 17, 2006 By: /s/ Paul H. Riss Paul H Riss Chief Executive Officer INSTRUCTION: The form may be signed by an executive officer of the registrant or by any other duly authorized representative. The name and title of the person signing the form shall be typed or printed beneath the signature. If the statement is signed on behalf of the registrant by an authorized representative (other than an executive officer), evidence of the representatives authority to sign on behalf of the registrant shall be filed with the form. ATTENTION Intentional misstatements or omissions of fact constitute Federal criminal violations (See 18 U.S.C. | [
"Converted by SEC Publisher, created by BCL Technologies Inc., for SEC Filing (Check One): UNITED STATES ¨ Form 10-K SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ¨ Form 20-F Washington, D.C. 20549 ¨ Form 11-K x Form 10-Q FORM 12b-25 SEC File Number: 0-4465 ¨ Form N-SAR CUSIP Number: 384 ¨ Form N-CSR NOTIFICATION OF LATE FILING For Period Ended: August 31 , 2006 ¨ Transition Report on Form 10-K ¨ Transition Report on Form 20-F ¨ Transition Report on Form 11-K ¨ Transition Report on Form 10-Q ¨ Transition Report on Form N-SAR ¨ Transition Report on Form N-CSR For the Transition Period Ended: Nothing in this form shall be construed to imply that the Commission has verified any information contained herein. If the notification relates to a portion of the filing checked above, identify the Item(s) to which the notification relates: PART I - REGISTRANT INFORMATION eLEC Communications Corp. Full name of registrant Former name if applicable 75 South Broadway, Suite 302 Address of principal executive office (Street and number) White Plains, New York 10601 City, state and zip code PART II - RULES 12b-25(b) and (c) If the subject report could not be filed without unreasonable effort or expense and the registrant seeks relief pursuant to Rule 12b-25(b), the following should be completed.",
"(Check box if appropriate.) x (a) The reasons described in reasonable detail in Part III of this form could not be eliminated without unreasonable effort or expense; (b) The subject annual report, semi-annual report, transition report on Form 10-K, Form 20-F, Form 11-K, Form N-SAR or Form N-CSR, or portion thereof, will be filed on or before the fifteenth calendar day following the prescribed due date; or the subject quarterly report or transition report on Form 10-Q, or portion thereof will be filed on or before the fifth calendar day following the prescribed due date; and (c) The accountants statement or other exhibit required by Rule 12b-25(c) has been attached if applicable. PART III NARRATIVE State below in reasonable detail why Forms 10-K, 20-F, 11-K, 10-Q, N-SAR, N-CSR, or the transition report or portion thereof, could not be filed within the prescribed time period.",
"Certain financial and other information necessary for an accurate and full completion of the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q could not be provided within the prescribed time period without unreasonable effort or expense. As a result of the foregoing, our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended August 31, 2006 will be filed on or before October 23, 2006, which is within the extension period provided under Rule 12b-25. PART IV - OTHER INFORMATION (1) Name and telephone number of person to contact in regard to this notification: Eric M. Hellige (212) 421-4100 (2) Have all other periodic reports required under Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or Section 30 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 during the preceding 12 months or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such report(s) been filed? If the answer is no, identify report(s).",
"x Yes ¨ No (3) Is it anticipated that any significant change in results of operations from the corresponding period for the last fiscal year will be reflected by the earnings statements to be included in the subject report or portion thereof? x Yes ¨ No If so, attach an explanation of the anticipated change, both narratively and quantitatively, and, if appropriate, state the reasons why a reasonable estimate of the results cannot be made. As previously reported, we are no longer focusing on growing our wireline telephone business and we are using the cash generated by this mature customer base to help fund the growth of our newly-developed digital telephone service that routes telephone calls over the Internet. Although the number of digital telephone numbers we have in service continues to grow and exceeds 5,300 numbers, our revenue per line for digital phone services is less than our revenue per line for wireline service.",
"The decrease in the number of wirelines and the overall decrease in our average revenue per line caused our revenue for the three- month period ended August 31, 2006 to decrease by approximately $2,198,000, or approximately 53%, to approximately $1,949,000 as compared to approximately $4,147,000 reported for the three-month period ended August 31, 2005. Our gross profit for the three-month period ended August 31, 2006 decreased by approximately $1,173,000 to approximately $734,000 from approximately $1,907,000 reported in the three-month period ended August 31, 2005. During the three-month period ended August 31, 2006, our gross profit percentage decreased to 37.7% from 46.0% during the comparable 2005 period. The decrease in our gross profit resulted primarily from the decrease in the size of our customer base in the third quarter of fiscal 2006 relative to the third quarter in fiscal 2005, and the higher cost of services we are now incurring under our wholesale services agreement with Verizon. Selling, general and administrative expenses decreased by approximately $137,000, or approximately 11%, to approximately $1,166,000 for the three-month period ended August 31, 2006 from approximately $1,303,000 reported in prior year fiscal period.",
"Our bad debt expense, net of recoveries, decreased by approximately $940,000, or approximately 100%, to approximately $3,000 for the three months ended August 31, 2006 from approximately $943,000 reported in the prior fiscal period. This decrease was related to the reduction in the number of wireline customers we had during the 2006 period and the fact that the remaining wireline customers represent a mature base that has consistently paid their bills. Further, because we require credit card payment from our retail digital telephone service customers, our new customers have not been generating bad debt expense. The change in warrant valuation for the three-month period ended August 31, 2006 amounted to income of approximately $406,000 compared to income of approximately $35,000 for the same period in fiscal 2005. The increase was due to the change in the value of our common stock. For the three-month period ended August 31, 2005, we reported a gain on sales of investment securities of approximately $323,000.",
"There were no security transactions in 2006. eLEC Communications Corp. (Name of Registrant as Specified in Charter) has caused this notification to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized. Date: October 17, 2006 By: /s/ Paul H. Riss Paul H Riss Chief Executive Officer INSTRUCTION: The form may be signed by an executive officer of the registrant or by any other duly authorized representative. The name and title of the person signing the form shall be typed or printed beneath the signature.",
"If the statement is signed on behalf of the registrant by an authorized representative (other than an executive officer), evidence of the representatives authority to sign on behalf of the registrant shall be filed with the form. ATTENTION Intentional misstatements or omissions of fact constitute Federal criminal violations (See 18 U.S.C."
]
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EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION -OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Frederick E. Purches, certify that: 1.I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Parlux Fragrances, Inc.; 2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4.The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant andhave: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5.The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting. Dated: February 3, 2011 /s/ Frederick E. Purches Frederick E. Purches, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer | [
"EXHIBIT 31.1 CERTIFICATIONS PURSUANT TO RULE 13A-14 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION -OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Frederick E. Purches, certify that: 1.I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Parlux Fragrances, Inc.; 2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3.Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4.The registrant's other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant andhave: a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) Designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5.The registrant's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting.",
"Dated: February 3, 2011 /s/ Frederick E. Purches Frederick E. Purches, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer"
]
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839 F.2d 1085 1988 A.M.C. 2534, 24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1217,Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 11,708 Melanie SNYDER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.WHITTAKER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.Billie Fay ALLEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.WHITTAKER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. No. 86-6002. United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit. March 14, 1988.
Jack L. Allbritton, Houston, Tex., for Whittaker Corp. Timothy H. Pletcher, Houston, Tex., for Snyder. Anthony E. Pletcher, Yancey White, Corpus Christi, Tex., for Allen. Mary Ellen Blade, Beaumont, Tex., for Joseph Buckmaster, et al. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Before BROWN, JOHNSON, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges. JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
1 A boat manufacturer appeals a judgment for two crewmen in a Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) suit. The manufacturer raises issues of sufficiency of the evidence, admission of evidence, and damages. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
2 In 1978, Desco Marine, a division of Whittaker Corporation (Whittaker), built a seventy-five foot shrimp boat. The boat was bought by Jack Yardley, who sold it in 1979 to the partnership of Joe Buckmaster and Andrew Allen. Allen operated the boat, now named the TEXAS LADY, while Buckmaster handled financial and business matters. Allen was an experienced shrimp boat captain.
3 In late March, 1983, Captain Allen and a deckhand, Robert Cameron, set out from Freeport, Texas, on a shrimping trip. Because a crew member failed to show up, the boat was one short of its normal three-man crew. On April 6, 1983, at around 5:45 in the evening, Ron Banta, the supervisor on an ANR Pipeline drilling platform on the outer continental shelf, felt a jar to the platform. Banta later testified that the jar felt like the impact boats normally made when attempting to dock at the platform. Seeing no boat at the main platform, Banta walked to the other side to look at a smaller platform supporting a gas flare stack, about 500 feet away at the end of a cat walk. About twenty-five to thirty yards from the flare stack, Banta saw a shrimp boat. He saw two crew members, one of whom leaned over to examine the hull near the bow and then walked back to talk to the other. The crew showed no signs of distress and did not attempt to contact the rig. Banta went back to work.
4 About forty-five minutes or an hour later, a rig employee told Banta that a shrimp boat was sinking at about 300 feet away. Banta radioed the Coast Guard, which had already received a distress call at 5:47 p.m. In the dusk, Banta thought he could see a capsized boat and a figure clinging to the hull. The Coast Guard rescue team was unable to save Allen and Cameron; their bodies were never found.
5 Eighteen hours after the distress call, a team of Coast Guard divers headed by Howard Teves found the TEXAS LADY, keel up, with its bow imbedded in the bottom forty feet below the surface. The water around the bow was too murky for anything to be seen, but Teves was able to feel a sizeable hole in the hull about two feet from the keel near the port bow. Teves later testified that the hole had smooth edges and appeared to have burned through from a heat source within the vessel. Teves also testified that the boat's outriggers, normally held horizontally while a boat is a sea, were tied upright, making the boat unstable. The Coast Guard report attributed the sinking to collision with "an unknown submerged object." Record, Vol. 5 at 313. The TEXAS LADY later broke up and was never salvaged.
6 On April 9, Captain Allen's brother, Donald Allen, reached the spot with David Sullivan, a certified diver and nephew of Andrew Allen's widow. Donald Allen and Sullivan attempted, fruitlessly, to find the bodies. They also took photographs of the flare stack supports, showing white paint and scrape marks. Sullivan dived down to the bow of the wreck and, because visibility had improved, was able to see a hole in the port bow near the waterline. Sullivan testified that the hole was jagged.
7 Allen and Cameron's representatives (Snyder and the other plaintiffs) sued the ANR Pipeline Co. and Whittaker under DOHSA and the Texas Survival Statute. 46 U.S.C. Sec. 761 et seq.; Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Sec. 71.021. At trial, Snyder presented evidence that ANR had not sounded its foghorn as required by Coast Guard regulations. ANR settled on the last day of trial. In the suit against Whittaker, the boat manufacturer, Snyder attempted to prove that Whittaker had defectively designed and manufactured the TEXAS LADY, and had misrepresented the strength of its shrimp boats' hull in sales literature. The gist of Snyder's case was that Whittaker's decision to build its shrimp boat hulls of two materials--balsacore material above the waterline and fiberglass laminate below--created weak points or "stress spots" that allowed a small impact to cause a large hole. Both sides presented expert testimony. The jury rejected Snyder's misrepresentation and defective manufacture claims, but found that the TEXAS LADY had been defectively designed and that this design had caused the accident. The jury allocated 10 percent of the fault to ANR pipeline; 50 percent to Whittaker; 35 percent to Allen; and 5 percent to Cameron. The jury awarded $100,000 for the pain and suffering of each decedent. Allen's family was awarded $300,000 for lost inheritance; $736,000 for past and future loss of support and services; and $107,600 for the Allen children's loss of care and support. The district court granted prejudgment interest on past damages. After seeking in vain a judgment n.o.v., Whittaker appealed to this Court.
II. DISCUSSION A. Evidentiary Issues
8 Whittaker raises several evidentiary issues. First, Whittaker contends that the district court erred in handling the testimony of James C. Flanagan, an expert witness called by Snyder. Whittaker suggests that Flanagan should have been prevented from testifying because Flanagan is a "professional expert" who earns a substantial portion of his income from trials. Because Whittaker did not raise this objection in the district court, it is barred here unless it involved plain error. Fed.R.Evid. 103. This Court has held that a witness cannot be disqualified merely because he "spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and testifying...." In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La, Eymard, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1986). Moreover, Whittaker was able to bring before the jury Flanagan's experience as a professional witness. The district court had no reason to exclude Flanagan's testimony on this ground.
9 Whittaker also argues that Flanagan should not have been allowed to indulge in "speculation" about the speed at which the TEXAS LADY struck the platform. However, Flanagan's testimony on speed is more aptly characterized as an expert opinion, expressly allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The facts on which Flanagan based his opinion as to speed were laid out before the jury; Whittaker was free to argue--and did argue--that these facts were thin. Similarly, the district court did not err in allowing Flanagan to give his opinion on the TEXAS LADY's design. The Federal Rules envision that such opinions can be given in response to hypothetical questions or facts presented to the expert at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 703. Whittaker had the same latitude with its own experts.
10 Second, Whittaker argues that the district court erred in admitting certain documents. One document was a magazine article lauding balsa-core material, which Whittaker objected to as not properly authenticated. However, Fed.R.Evid. 902(6) dispenses with "[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity" for printed articles from periodicals.
11 Whittaker also contests the admission of notes written by Charles Underwood, former senior manager of the Desco engineering department. At trial, Whittaker objected to the notes on the ground that "the author of it is not here." Assuming that this objection went to authentication of the notes, it has no merit. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires only "evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." A district court's ruling on authentication can be reversed only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544, 556 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1987); Meadows and Walker Drilling Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 417 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir.1969). Whittaker's witnesses acknowledged that Underwood was a senior employee of the design department, and Whittaker produced the Underwood notes during discovery. The district court did not err in accepting these facts as adequate authentication, particularly since Whittaker has never claimed that the notes were not Underwood's.
12 Third, Whittaker objected to the admission of a memorandum between two officers in the sales division of Baltek, Norman Boyer and Ray Olson, dated December 3, 1974. This "Baltek memo" reported the results of a computer analysis that purportedly showed balsa-core material to be over four times stiffer than fiberglass laminate without balsa. The writer expressly observes that his calculations do not take into account the effect of a stringer system. The writer closes with a suggestion that the analysis be sent to Desco. In fact, the memorandum was unearthed from Desco files during discovery. We reject Whittaker's challenge to the authentication of this document, for the reasons given in our discussion of the Underwood notes.
13 However, Whittaker also objected that the memo was hearsay. Snyder counters that the memo qualified under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). The proponent of a document offered under the business record exception must show that the document was prepared in the regular course of its author's business. United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1528-29 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S.Ct. 252, 88 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985); United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 709-10 (2d Cir.1973); Hussein v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 946, 948-49 (5th Cir.1968). Snyder at most offered evidence that the Baltek memorandum was written by Baltek employees and received and kept by Desco. This showing does not suffice under Rule 803(6). Nor can the memo be admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 703, as data underlying an expert opinion. The Baltek memorandum was not shown to be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Fed.R.Evid. 703.
14 However, a statement does not fall under the hearsay rule if it was offered, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to prove that the statement was made. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Snyder used the Baltek memo chiefly to question Whittaker's expert, David Strickland. The questioning was directed at determining whether Desco Marine had notice that fiberglass laminate lacked stiffness and would require extra support. Record Vol. 7 at 761-69. The questions pursued a theory of liability--apparently misrepresentation--that went to the jury, although the jury rejected it. For the purpose of proving that certain statements were made to Desco by Baltek, the Baltek memorandum is not hearsay.
15 However, the district court did not instruct the jury to consider the Baltek memorandum only for its nonhearsay use. The jury may well have interpreted the memo as supporting Snyder's contention that fiberglass was not stiff enough. Mindful that we may not reverse on the basis of an evidentiary ruling unless that ruling affects "a substantial right of the party," we hold that any error as to the hearsay use of the memo was harmless. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a). The memo was cumulative in that the jury heard other testimony that fiberglass was less stiff than balsa-core material. Other statements in the memo--particularly Baltek's acknowledgment that a stringer system could compensate for loss of stiffness--were favorable to Whittaker; indeed, Whittaker's counsel had Strickland read part of the memo to the jury, and it was Whittaker, not Snyder, who referred to the memo extensively during closing argument. Under these circumstances, the district court's failure to warn the jury against hearsay use of the memo did not constitute reversible error.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Liability
16 Whittaker contends that the district court erred in denying Whittaker's motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v. In reviewing such motions, this court considers all the evidence and avoids second-guessing conflicts in the evidence or credibility determinations. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir.1969). This court will not disturb a jury verdict based on substantial evidence and reasonable inferences. Taylor v. Texaco, Inc., 814 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir.1987); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir.1985); Boeing, 411 F.2d at 374-75. Whittaker argues that Snyder did not present substantial evidence to prove either that the TEXAS LADY was defectively designed or that any design defects caused the accident.
17 Turning first to defective design, we observe that the jury faced a classic conflict of experts. Snyder's expert, Flanagan, testified that balsa-core material was much stiffer than fiberglass laminate and that the combination of the two materials could cause the impact of a blow above the waterline to be transmitted below the waterline, breaking a hole. Whittaker's experts, Strickland and Phillips, testified about structural safeguards at the connection between the materials and about the stringer and floor structures supporting the lower, fiberglass hull. Snyder elicited from Strickland the fact that, in the bow area around the fuel tank, there was a plywood stiffener at the forward end of the tank but that there were no other stiffeners for the length of the tank. Whittaker's witnesses also testified as to the advantages of the two-material hull. Snyder's expert argued that the TEXAS LADY design did not adequately compensate for forseeable stress spots arising out of the dual material construction; Whittaker's experts testified that the design did adequately compensate. The jury chose between these conflicting opinions, and the district court did not err in refusing to disturb that finding.
18 With regard to causation, Snyder reconstructed the accident in this way: the TEXAS LADY, due to negligence by the crew and the platform, collided at a relatively low rate of speed with the flare-stack supports. The TEXAS LADY then moved about twenty-five to thirty yards away. Allen and Cameron leaned over the bow side to look for damage, but showed no signs of panic because impact had been slight. The impact near the waterline, however, had been transmitted from the balsa-core hull to the fiberglass hull in such a way as to cause a hole in the fiberglass below the waterline. Allen and Cameron realized their danger and radioed to the Coast Guard at 5:47 p.m. By 6:35 p.m. the shrimp boat had capsized.
19 Whittaker argues that there was no evidence that the TEXAS LADY did collide with the platform or that the collision was at a low speed. However, Snyder did present Ron Banta's testimony that he felt a jar and that it was no greater than the impact of a docking boat. The jury saw photographs and heard testimony that there were paint smears on the side of one of the flare stack supports a few days later. When Banta saw the crew of the shrimp boat, they were examining the hull near the bow waterline, but showed no panic. This behavior, also, is consistent with the hypothesis that a collision occurred but was a slight one. In addition, the distance that the TEXAS LADY travelled between the impact and Banta's sighting was not great, supporting an inference that the boat's speed was low. In short, the jury did hear substantial evidence that a slight collision occurred between the TEXAS LADY and the platform.
20 As previously discussed, the jury chose to credit Snyder's expert and to believe that defective design of the TEXAS LADY allowed a relatively slight blow to the upper hull to cause a hole in the lower hull. Although both sides agreed that there was a hole in the hull, the two divers, Teves and Sullivan, presented somewhat inconsistent testimony on what kind of hole it was and where it was located. Teves found a smooth-edged hole near the keel in the bow area. He testified that the hole was of a type not caused by collision, but by the burning through of an internal heat source. Sullivan found a hole higher up, with rough edges. Such a hole would be more consistent with a collision. Each diver's testimony had weaknesses, which were brought out before the jury. Teves was an experienced salvage diver and came on the scene soon after the sinking; however, visibility was so limited at the time of Teves' dive that he could only feel the hole with his hands. Sullivan, on the other hand, was a less-experienced diver, but made his dive under better conditions and was able to see the hole. The jury was entitled to reject Teves' "internal heat source" theory and to credit Sullivan's testimony insofar as it conflicted with Teves'.
21 At each step in reconstructing the sinking of the TEXAS LADY on April 6, 1983, the jury heard conflicting testimony backed up by some physical evidence. The jury chose to resolve the conflicts in the testimony in such a way as to impose liability on Whittaker, and the jury's resolution is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence. We decline to disturb this resolution.
C. Allocation of Fault
22 The jury found that many causes contributed to the loss of the TEXAS LADY. Captain Allen chose to set sail with less than a full crew; the crew failed to keep an adequate lookout; the platform failed to use its foghorn; and the boat design allowed a minor collision to make a large hole. Whittaker argues that the jury erred in allocating fifty percent of the causation to boat design and fifty percent to the crew and platform owners. Allocation of fault is a question for the factfinder, and is reviewed under the Boeing "substantial evidence" standard. S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc., 608 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1852, 64 L.Ed.2d 272 (1980).
23 Under Snyder's reconstruction of the accident, which, as previously discussed, the jury was entitled to accept, the TEXAS LADY's collision with the platform legs was a minor impact, one that should not occur but which does occur with some frequency whenever boats maneuver near fixed objects. In the jury's mind, the TEXAS LADY showed an unexpected susceptibility to this minor collision. Because the collision was slight, the jury could believe that Allen and Cameron wasted time looking for damage, time which they could have employed in getting out safety equipment or attempting to reach the platform twenty-five to thirty yards away. Given this view of the sequence of events, we cannot say that the jury did not have substantial evidence for its allocation of fault.
D. Damages
24 Whittaker challenges three damage findings made by the jury: the amount for Allen and Cameron's pain and suffering, for the Allen family's lost inheritance, and for the Allens' loss of support. Although DOHSA does not provide damages for a decedent's pain and suffering, a DOHSA plaintiff may recover such damages under a state survival statute. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792 (5th Cir.1976), cert. dism'd, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28, 54 L.Ed.2d 59 (1977). Snyder and Cameron did plead a pendant cause of action under the Texas Survival Statute. Tex.Civ.Stat. art. 5525 (now Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Sec. 71.021). Texas law governs, but for purposes of the issues raised here, it is essentially the same as the general maritime and Jones Act law. A plaintiff seeking to recover for his decedent's pain and suffering must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent was conscious after realizing his danger. Deal v. A.P. Bell Fish Co., 728 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir.1984) (Jones Act drowning case); Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1156 (5th Cir.1981) (Texas diversity suit); Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir.1962) (Jones Act drowning case); Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F.Supp. 752, 761 (S.D.Tex.1977) (Jones Act and general maritime law); see also Haley v. Pan American World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1984) (same test under Louisiana law); Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792 (same test under Florida law). The issue is for the factfinder, which may consider direct, circumstantial, and expert evidence. Haley, 746 F.2d at 316; Deal, 728 F.2d at 718-19; Ballou, 656 F.2d at 1156; Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792-93.
25 In the instant case, the jury heard Banta's testimony that, after the TEXAS LADY capsized, he thought he saw a figure clinging to the hull of the boat. Whittaker's own expert testified that, under the weather conditions that night, a man could survive from eight to twenty hours in the water. This evidence distinguishes the instant case from Thompson, where the decedents fell twenty-five feet into the sea and there was no evidence that they survived impact. 440 F.Supp. at 762. Here, the jury could reasonably infer that Allen and Cameron struggled for several hours in the water.
26 This Court has declined to overturn a jury award of $15,000 for the four to six seconds of mental anguish experienced by a plane crash victim. Haley, 746 F.2d at 317; see also Solomon, 540 F.2d at 793 (affirming $10,000 award for pre-impact suffering in plane crash). In light of the evidence the jury heard in the instant case, it cannot be determined that the amount awarded--$100,000 for each decedent--constituted an abuse of discretion.
27 Second, Whittaker contends that the jury lacked substantial evidence to find that the Allens' loss of inheritance damages were $300,000. Loss of inheritance is a permissible element of DOHSA damages, and its determination is left to the trier of fact. Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d 1390, 1392 (5th Cir.1986); Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1287 (5th Cir.1985), reversed on other grounds 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Solomon, 540 F.2d at 790. In order to obtain loss of inheritance damages, a wrongful death plaintiff must prove "a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit." Tallentire, 800 F.2d at 1392; Solomon, 540 F.2d at 790. The factfinder will look at the likelihood that the decedent would have accumulated substantial property; how much consumption and taxes would eat into any accumulations; the decedent's past propensity to save or invest; and similar factors. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., Eymard, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234-35; Marks v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 785 F.2d 539, 542-43 (5th Cir.1986); Tallentire, 754 F.2d at 1287; Higgins v. Kinnebrew Motors, Inc., 547 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (5th Cir.1977); Solomon, 540 F.2d at 790-92.
28 Snyder's expert witness, an economist named Donald Huddle, testified that Allen's partnership in the boat would have been worth at least $286,316 by the time Allen reached age sixty-five. Allen's partner, Joe Buckmaster, testified that the boat made a higher profit than average, and estimated that a share would be worth $536,953. Dr. Huddle did not carry his calculations beyond age sixty-five, but he testified that, even after retiring as a boat captain, Allen would likely continue to work at the kind of shoreside boat investments engaged in by Buckmaster. Buckmaster, testifying on his own income from boat partnerships, estimated that he would have earned about $50,000 from the TEXAS LADY in 1986, if it had brought in an average catch. The jury could reasonably have inferred that Allen, had he lived, would have been able to make similar investments. The jury also heard evidence that the Allens lived conservatively and that Allen reinvested much of his earnings in the shrimp business. Evidently, the jury took all of this evidence--the $286,000 to $536,000 partnership stake, possibilities of substantial post-retirement earnings, saving propensity--and reached the conclusion that Allen's estate would contain $300,000 by the time he achieved his life expectancy. While this conclusion incorporates several inferences, those inferences are based on concrete figures and represent more than the speculation condemned in Eymard, and Marks. Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1235; Marks, 785 F.2d at 542. Hence, we decline to disturb the jury's loss of inheritance verdict.
29 Finally, Whittaker argues that the jury should not have awarded $630,000 to the Allens for loss of future support. Whittaker points to Dr. Huddle's admission, on cross examination, that the present value of Allen's future earnings, up to retirement as a boat captain and after taxes and personal consumption, would be $520,000. However, on redirect examination, Huddle clarified that the $520,000 figure did not include any depreciation allowances that Allen would have been able to take on his boat, or any amount for the services Allen would provide his family. The jury apparently believed Huddle's earlier, higher figure. We do not find the jury's reliance on Huddle's testimony unreasonable.
E. Prejudgment Interest
30 The district court awarded ten percent per annum prejudgment interest on the awards for losses occurring before the judgment. Whittaker argues that Snyder and Cameron's survivors cannot receive prejudgment interest because such interest is an admiralty remedy, and the case was tried on the "law side" of the court.
31 The complaint in the instant case asserted federal question, diversity, and admiralty jurisdiction. Record Vol. 1 at 131. Both parties asked for a jury, and the district court granted their request. This Court has held that a plaintiff who requests a jury trial and fails to elect to proceed in admiralty will be considered to have proceeded on the law side of the court. Martin v. Walk, Haydel & Associates, Inc., 794 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.1986). Thus, it appears that the district court in the instant case acquired jurisdiction in law rather than admiralty.
32 Whittaker urges us to apply a line of cases under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec. 688. The Jones Act allows a seaman plaintiff to sue for death or personal injury either in a federal court under admiralty jurisdiction or in a state or federal court under legal jurisdiction, if the seaman meets other jurisdictional requirements. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 340-43 (2d ed. 1975). However, the seaman must make a trade-off: if he elects to proceed at law, he can have a jury but must forego prejudgment interest; if he elects to proceed in admiralty, he can have prejudgment interest but no jury. Martin, 794 F.2d at 212; Williams v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 750 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir.1985); Theriot v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 742 F.2d 877, 883 (5th Cir.1984); Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951, 955 (5th Cir.1984); Barrios v. Louisiana Construction Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (5th Cir.1972); Sanford Brothers Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 972-73 (5th Cir.1969) (citing cases going back to 1930); National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885, 80 S.Ct. 157, 4 L.Ed.2d 121 (1959). This long-standing rule is generally cited without discussion, but some courts have justified it by pointing out that, in the typical personal injury suit under the Jones Act, the bulk of the damages will occur in the future, and that imposition of prejudgment interest would therefore be unjust. Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955 n. 3; Barrios, 465 F.2d at 1168. Other courts have stated that calculating prejudgment interest on ongoing damages would be difficult for a jury. Vidrine, 412 F.2d at 973 n. 13; Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406. This Court has observed that the task of calculating prejudgment interest is easier in wrongful death cases where the loss occurs at one time. Barrios, 465 F.2d at 1168; Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406 & n. 6.
33 Whittaker urges this Court to apply this Jones Act rule to DOHSA cases. We find no precedent directly on point, perhaps because, until a recent Supreme Court case, it was far from certain that DOHSA cases could be brought in law courts. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire , 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Tallentire made it clear that such cases could be brought at law but that the substantive provisions of DOHSA would apply. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2497.
34 This Court held, long ago, that DOHSA's provision of "fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained," mandated prejudgment interest in the absence of special circumstances. Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406; 46 U.S.C. Sec. 762. We do not believe that the rationale for disallowing prejudgment interest in Jones Act cases brought at law justifies disallowing that interest in DOHSA cases brought at law. Most of the damages in a wrongful death case occur in a moment. Calculation of prejudgment interest from that moment is a relatively easy task. In the instant case, the district court asked the jury to set each element of damages separately, and then the court itself performed the prejudgment interest calculation.
35 In a roughly analogous situation, a plaintiff may bring an action in a law court, seeking both legal and equitable relief, obtain a jury verdict on the legal relief, and receive a ruling from the court on the equitable remedy. The plaintiff need not elect between his legal and equitable remedies, so long as the forum has jurisdiction to hear both claims. The Jones Act rule originated before 1966 and the unification of law and admiralty, when admiralty and law courts operated in radically different ways. Today, no such gulf yawns between law and admiralty. The recent Tallentire case makes it clear that, however a court obtains jurisdiction over a DOHSA case, the substantive law to be applied remains the same. 106 S.Ct. at 2497. To make prejudgment interest depend on the route by which a plaintiff arrived in federal court is to confuse jurisdiction with remedy in a way no longer accepted in other areas of the law. Moreover, the specific rationales advanced for maintaining the artificial distinction in Jones Act cases do not apply to DOHSA cases. For all of these reasons, we decline to import the Jones Act election rule into the DOHSA jurisprudence. The district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest to Snyder and Cameron on their past damages.
III. CONCLUSION
36 This was a hard-fought, close case arising from tragic events whose best witnesses, Allen and Cameron, are dead. The jury weighed the conflicting evidence and decided that the design of the TEXAS LADY was defective, causing 50 percent of the tragedy. These findings were supported by substantial evidence, as were the jury's findings on damages. The district court did not err in admitting certain documents and expert testimony. Nor did the district court err in assessing prejudgment interest. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is
37 AFFIRMED. | 08-23-2011 | [
"839 F.2d 1085 1988 A.M.C. 2534, 24 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1217,Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH)P 11,708 Melanie SNYDER, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.WHITTAKER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.Billie Fay ALLEN, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees,v.WHITTAKER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant. No. 86-6002. United States Court of Appeals,Fifth Circuit. March 14, 1988. Jack L. Allbritton, Houston, Tex., for Whittaker Corp. Timothy H. Pletcher, Houston, Tex., for Snyder. Anthony E. Pletcher, Yancey White, Corpus Christi, Tex., for Allen. Mary Ellen Blade, Beaumont, Tex., for Joseph Buckmaster, et al. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas. Before BROWN, JOHNSON, and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges. JOHNSON, Circuit Judge: 1 A boat manufacturer appeals a judgment for two crewmen in a Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) suit.",
"The manufacturer raises issues of sufficiency of the evidence, admission of evidence, and damages. For the reasons outlined below, we affirm. I. BACKGROUND 2 In 1978, Desco Marine, a division of Whittaker Corporation (Whittaker), built a seventy-five foot shrimp boat. The boat was bought by Jack Yardley, who sold it in 1979 to the partnership of Joe Buckmaster and Andrew Allen. Allen operated the boat, now named the TEXAS LADY, while Buckmaster handled financial and business matters. Allen was an experienced shrimp boat captain.",
"3 In late March, 1983, Captain Allen and a deckhand, Robert Cameron, set out from Freeport, Texas, on a shrimping trip. Because a crew member failed to show up, the boat was one short of its normal three-man crew. On April 6, 1983, at around 5:45 in the evening, Ron Banta, the supervisor on an ANR Pipeline drilling platform on the outer continental shelf, felt a jar to the platform. Banta later testified that the jar felt like the impact boats normally made when attempting to dock at the platform. Seeing no boat at the main platform, Banta walked to the other side to look at a smaller platform supporting a gas flare stack, about 500 feet away at the end of a cat walk. About twenty-five to thirty yards from the flare stack, Banta saw a shrimp boat. He saw two crew members, one of whom leaned over to examine the hull near the bow and then walked back to talk to the other.",
"The crew showed no signs of distress and did not attempt to contact the rig. Banta went back to work. 4 About forty-five minutes or an hour later, a rig employee told Banta that a shrimp boat was sinking at about 300 feet away. Banta radioed the Coast Guard, which had already received a distress call at 5:47 p.m. In the dusk, Banta thought he could see a capsized boat and a figure clinging to the hull. The Coast Guard rescue team was unable to save Allen and Cameron; their bodies were never found. 5 Eighteen hours after the distress call, a team of Coast Guard divers headed by Howard Teves found the TEXAS LADY, keel up, with its bow imbedded in the bottom forty feet below the surface.",
"The water around the bow was too murky for anything to be seen, but Teves was able to feel a sizeable hole in the hull about two feet from the keel near the port bow. Teves later testified that the hole had smooth edges and appeared to have burned through from a heat source within the vessel. Teves also testified that the boat's outriggers, normally held horizontally while a boat is a sea, were tied upright, making the boat unstable. The Coast Guard report attributed the sinking to collision with \"an unknown submerged object.\" Record, Vol. 5 at 313. The TEXAS LADY later broke up and was never salvaged. 6 On April 9, Captain Allen's brother, Donald Allen, reached the spot with David Sullivan, a certified diver and nephew of Andrew Allen's widow.",
"Donald Allen and Sullivan attempted, fruitlessly, to find the bodies. They also took photographs of the flare stack supports, showing white paint and scrape marks. Sullivan dived down to the bow of the wreck and, because visibility had improved, was able to see a hole in the port bow near the waterline. Sullivan testified that the hole was jagged. 7 Allen and Cameron's representatives (Snyder and the other plaintiffs) sued the ANR Pipeline Co. and Whittaker under DOHSA and the Texas Survival Statute. 46 U.S.C. Sec.",
"761 et seq. ; Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Sec. 71.021. At trial, Snyder presented evidence that ANR had not sounded its foghorn as required by Coast Guard regulations. ANR settled on the last day of trial. In the suit against Whittaker, the boat manufacturer, Snyder attempted to prove that Whittaker had defectively designed and manufactured the TEXAS LADY, and had misrepresented the strength of its shrimp boats' hull in sales literature. The gist of Snyder's case was that Whittaker's decision to build its shrimp boat hulls of two materials--balsacore material above the waterline and fiberglass laminate below--created weak points or \"stress spots\" that allowed a small impact to cause a large hole. Both sides presented expert testimony.",
"The jury rejected Snyder's misrepresentation and defective manufacture claims, but found that the TEXAS LADY had been defectively designed and that this design had caused the accident. The jury allocated 10 percent of the fault to ANR pipeline; 50 percent to Whittaker; 35 percent to Allen; and 5 percent to Cameron. The jury awarded $100,000 for the pain and suffering of each decedent. Allen's family was awarded $300,000 for lost inheritance; $736,000 for past and future loss of support and services; and $107,600 for the Allen children's loss of care and support.",
"The district court granted prejudgment interest on past damages. After seeking in vain a judgment n.o.v., Whittaker appealed to this Court. II. DISCUSSION A. Evidentiary Issues 8 Whittaker raises several evidentiary issues. First, Whittaker contends that the district court erred in handling the testimony of James C. Flanagan, an expert witness called by Snyder. Whittaker suggests that Flanagan should have been prevented from testifying because Flanagan is a \"professional expert\" who earns a substantial portion of his income from trials. Because Whittaker did not raise this objection in the district court, it is barred here unless it involved plain error. Fed.R.Evid. 103. This Court has held that a witness cannot be disqualified merely because he \"spends substantially all of his time consulting with attorneys and testifying....\" In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La, Eymard, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir.1986). Moreover, Whittaker was able to bring before the jury Flanagan's experience as a professional witness.",
"The district court had no reason to exclude Flanagan's testimony on this ground. 9 Whittaker also argues that Flanagan should not have been allowed to indulge in \"speculation\" about the speed at which the TEXAS LADY struck the platform. However, Flanagan's testimony on speed is more aptly characterized as an expert opinion, expressly allowed by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 702. The facts on which Flanagan based his opinion as to speed were laid out before the jury; Whittaker was free to argue--and did argue--that these facts were thin. Similarly, the district court did not err in allowing Flanagan to give his opinion on the TEXAS LADY's design. The Federal Rules envision that such opinions can be given in response to hypothetical questions or facts presented to the expert at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 703. Whittaker had the same latitude with its own experts. 10 Second, Whittaker argues that the district court erred in admitting certain documents. One document was a magazine article lauding balsa-core material, which Whittaker objected to as not properly authenticated. However, Fed.R.Evid. 902(6) dispenses with \"[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity\" for printed articles from periodicals.",
"11 Whittaker also contests the admission of notes written by Charles Underwood, former senior manager of the Desco engineering department. At trial, Whittaker objected to the notes on the ground that \"the author of it is not here.\" Assuming that this objection went to authentication of the notes, it has no merit. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires only \"evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.\" A district court's ruling on authentication can be reversed only for abuse of discretion. United States v. Feldman, 788 F.2d 544, 556 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied , --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 955, 93 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1987); Meadows and Walker Drilling Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 417 F.2d 378, 382 (5th Cir.1969). Whittaker's witnesses acknowledged that Underwood was a senior employee of the design department, and Whittaker produced the Underwood notes during discovery. The district court did not err in accepting these facts as adequate authentication, particularly since Whittaker has never claimed that the notes were not Underwood's.",
"12 Third, Whittaker objected to the admission of a memorandum between two officers in the sales division of Baltek, Norman Boyer and Ray Olson, dated December 3, 1974. This \"Baltek memo\" reported the results of a computer analysis that purportedly showed balsa-core material to be over four times stiffer than fiberglass laminate without balsa. The writer expressly observes that his calculations do not take into account the effect of a stringer system. The writer closes with a suggestion that the analysis be sent to Desco. In fact, the memorandum was unearthed from Desco files during discovery. We reject Whittaker's challenge to the authentication of this document, for the reasons given in our discussion of the Underwood notes. 13 However, Whittaker also objected that the memo was hearsay.",
"Snyder counters that the memo qualified under the business record exception to the hearsay rule. Fed.R.Evid. 803(6). The proponent of a document offered under the business record exception must show that the document was prepared in the regular course of its author's business. United States v. Tafoya, 757 F.2d 1522, 1528-29 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 921, 106 S.Ct. 252, 88 L.Ed.2d 259 (1985); United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 709-10 (2d Cir.1973); Hussein v. Isthmian Lines, Inc., 405 F.2d 946, 948-49 (5th Cir.1968). Snyder at most offered evidence that the Baltek memorandum was written by Baltek employees and received and kept by Desco. This showing does not suffice under Rule 803(6). Nor can the memo be admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 703, as data underlying an expert opinion. The Baltek memorandum was not shown to be \"of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field.\" Fed.R.Evid.",
"703. 14 However, a statement does not fall under the hearsay rule if it was offered, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to prove that the statement was made. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). Snyder used the Baltek memo chiefly to question Whittaker's expert, David Strickland. The questioning was directed at determining whether Desco Marine had notice that fiberglass laminate lacked stiffness and would require extra support. Record Vol. 7 at 761-69. The questions pursued a theory of liability--apparently misrepresentation--that went to the jury, although the jury rejected it. For the purpose of proving that certain statements were made to Desco by Baltek, the Baltek memorandum is not hearsay. 15 However, the district court did not instruct the jury to consider the Baltek memorandum only for its nonhearsay use. The jury may well have interpreted the memo as supporting Snyder's contention that fiberglass was not stiff enough. Mindful that we may not reverse on the basis of an evidentiary ruling unless that ruling affects \"a substantial right of the party,\" we hold that any error as to the hearsay use of the memo was harmless. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a).",
"The memo was cumulative in that the jury heard other testimony that fiberglass was less stiff than balsa-core material. Other statements in the memo--particularly Baltek's acknowledgment that a stringer system could compensate for loss of stiffness--were favorable to Whittaker; indeed, Whittaker's counsel had Strickland read part of the memo to the jury, and it was Whittaker, not Snyder, who referred to the memo extensively during closing argument. Under these circumstances, the district court's failure to warn the jury against hearsay use of the memo did not constitute reversible error.",
"B. Sufficiency of the Evidence on Liability 16 Whittaker contends that the district court erred in denying Whittaker's motions for a directed verdict and for judgment n.o.v. In reviewing such motions, this court considers all the evidence and avoids second-guessing conflicts in the evidence or credibility determinations. Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir.1969). This court will not disturb a jury verdict based on substantial evidence and reasonable inferences. Taylor v. Texaco, Inc., 814 F.2d 231, 235 (5th Cir.1987); Shipp v. General Motors Corp., 750 F.2d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir.1985); Boeing, 411 F.2d at 374-75. Whittaker argues that Snyder did not present substantial evidence to prove either that the TEXAS LADY was defectively designed or that any design defects caused the accident. 17 Turning first to defective design, we observe that the jury faced a classic conflict of experts. Snyder's expert, Flanagan, testified that balsa-core material was much stiffer than fiberglass laminate and that the combination of the two materials could cause the impact of a blow above the waterline to be transmitted below the waterline, breaking a hole.",
"Whittaker's experts, Strickland and Phillips, testified about structural safeguards at the connection between the materials and about the stringer and floor structures supporting the lower, fiberglass hull. Snyder elicited from Strickland the fact that, in the bow area around the fuel tank, there was a plywood stiffener at the forward end of the tank but that there were no other stiffeners for the length of the tank. Whittaker's witnesses also testified as to the advantages of the two-material hull.",
"Snyder's expert argued that the TEXAS LADY design did not adequately compensate for forseeable stress spots arising out of the dual material construction; Whittaker's experts testified that the design did adequately compensate. The jury chose between these conflicting opinions, and the district court did not err in refusing to disturb that finding. 18 With regard to causation, Snyder reconstructed the accident in this way: the TEXAS LADY, due to negligence by the crew and the platform, collided at a relatively low rate of speed with the flare-stack supports. The TEXAS LADY then moved about twenty-five to thirty yards away.",
"Allen and Cameron leaned over the bow side to look for damage, but showed no signs of panic because impact had been slight. The impact near the waterline, however, had been transmitted from the balsa-core hull to the fiberglass hull in such a way as to cause a hole in the fiberglass below the waterline. Allen and Cameron realized their danger and radioed to the Coast Guard at 5:47 p.m. By 6:35 p.m. the shrimp boat had capsized. 19 Whittaker argues that there was no evidence that the TEXAS LADY did collide with the platform or that the collision was at a low speed.",
"However, Snyder did present Ron Banta's testimony that he felt a jar and that it was no greater than the impact of a docking boat. The jury saw photographs and heard testimony that there were paint smears on the side of one of the flare stack supports a few days later. When Banta saw the crew of the shrimp boat, they were examining the hull near the bow waterline, but showed no panic. This behavior, also, is consistent with the hypothesis that a collision occurred but was a slight one. In addition, the distance that the TEXAS LADY travelled between the impact and Banta's sighting was not great, supporting an inference that the boat's speed was low. In short, the jury did hear substantial evidence that a slight collision occurred between the TEXAS LADY and the platform. 20 As previously discussed, the jury chose to credit Snyder's expert and to believe that defective design of the TEXAS LADY allowed a relatively slight blow to the upper hull to cause a hole in the lower hull.",
"Although both sides agreed that there was a hole in the hull, the two divers, Teves and Sullivan, presented somewhat inconsistent testimony on what kind of hole it was and where it was located. Teves found a smooth-edged hole near the keel in the bow area. He testified that the hole was of a type not caused by collision, but by the burning through of an internal heat source. Sullivan found a hole higher up, with rough edges. Such a hole would be more consistent with a collision. Each diver's testimony had weaknesses, which were brought out before the jury. Teves was an experienced salvage diver and came on the scene soon after the sinking; however, visibility was so limited at the time of Teves' dive that he could only feel the hole with his hands. Sullivan, on the other hand, was a less-experienced diver, but made his dive under better conditions and was able to see the hole. The jury was entitled to reject Teves' \"internal heat source\" theory and to credit Sullivan's testimony insofar as it conflicted with Teves'.",
"21 At each step in reconstructing the sinking of the TEXAS LADY on April 6, 1983, the jury heard conflicting testimony backed up by some physical evidence. The jury chose to resolve the conflicts in the testimony in such a way as to impose liability on Whittaker, and the jury's resolution is supported by more than a scintilla of evidence. We decline to disturb this resolution. C. Allocation of Fault 22 The jury found that many causes contributed to the loss of the TEXAS LADY. Captain Allen chose to set sail with less than a full crew; the crew failed to keep an adequate lookout; the platform failed to use its foghorn; and the boat design allowed a minor collision to make a large hole. Whittaker argues that the jury erred in allocating fifty percent of the causation to boat design and fifty percent to the crew and platform owners.",
"Allocation of fault is a question for the factfinder, and is reviewed under the Boeing \"substantial evidence\" standard. S.C. Loveland, Inc. v. East West Towing, Inc., 608 F.2d 160, 166 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 918, 100 S.Ct. 1852, 64 L.Ed.2d 272 (1980). 23 Under Snyder's reconstruction of the accident, which, as previously discussed, the jury was entitled to accept, the TEXAS LADY's collision with the platform legs was a minor impact, one that should not occur but which does occur with some frequency whenever boats maneuver near fixed objects. In the jury's mind, the TEXAS LADY showed an unexpected susceptibility to this minor collision. Because the collision was slight, the jury could believe that Allen and Cameron wasted time looking for damage, time which they could have employed in getting out safety equipment or attempting to reach the platform twenty-five to thirty yards away.",
"Given this view of the sequence of events, we cannot say that the jury did not have substantial evidence for its allocation of fault. D. Damages 24 Whittaker challenges three damage findings made by the jury: the amount for Allen and Cameron's pain and suffering, for the Allen family's lost inheritance, and for the Allens' loss of support. Although DOHSA does not provide damages for a decedent's pain and suffering, a DOHSA plaintiff may recover such damages under a state survival statute. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792 (5th Cir.1976), cert. dism'd, 434 U.S. 801, 98 S.Ct. 28, 54 L.Ed.2d 59 (1977).",
"Snyder and Cameron did plead a pendant cause of action under the Texas Survival Statute. Tex.Civ.Stat. art. 5525 (now Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Sec. 71.021). Texas law governs, but for purposes of the issues raised here, it is essentially the same as the general maritime and Jones Act law. A plaintiff seeking to recover for his decedent's pain and suffering must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decedent was conscious after realizing his danger. Deal v. A.P. Bell Fish Co., 728 F.2d 717, 718 (5th Cir.1984) (Jones Act drowning case); Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1156 (5th Cir.1981) (Texas diversity suit); Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir.1962) (Jones Act drowning case); Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F.Supp. 752, 761 (S.D.Tex.1977) (Jones Act and general maritime law); see also Haley v. Pan American World Airways, 746 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir.1984) (same test under Louisiana law); Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792 (same test under Florida law).",
"The issue is for the factfinder, which may consider direct, circumstantial, and expert evidence. Haley, 746 F.2d at 316; Deal, 728 F.2d at 718-19; Ballou, 656 F.2d at 1156; Solomon, 540 F.2d at 792-93. 25 In the instant case, the jury heard Banta's testimony that, after the TEXAS LADY capsized, he thought he saw a figure clinging to the hull of the boat. Whittaker's own expert testified that, under the weather conditions that night, a man could survive from eight to twenty hours in the water. This evidence distinguishes the instant case from Thompson, where the decedents fell twenty-five feet into the sea and there was no evidence that they survived impact. 440 F.Supp. at 762.",
"Here, the jury could reasonably infer that Allen and Cameron struggled for several hours in the water. 26 This Court has declined to overturn a jury award of $15,000 for the four to six seconds of mental anguish experienced by a plane crash victim. Haley, 746 F.2d at 317; see also Solomon, 540 F.2d at 793 (affirming $10,000 award for pre-impact suffering in plane crash). In light of the evidence the jury heard in the instant case, it cannot be determined that the amount awarded--$100,000 for each decedent--constituted an abuse of discretion. 27 Second, Whittaker contends that the jury lacked substantial evidence to find that the Allens' loss of inheritance damages were $300,000. Loss of inheritance is a permissible element of DOHSA damages, and its determination is left to the trier of fact. Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 800 F.2d 1390, 1392 (5th Cir.1986); Tallentire v. Offshore Logistics, Inc., 754 F.2d 1274, 1287 (5th Cir.1985), reversed on other grounds 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct.",
"2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Solomon, 540 F.2d at 790. In order to obtain loss of inheritance damages, a wrongful death plaintiff must prove \"a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit.\" Tallentire, 800 F.2d at 1392; Solomon, 540 F.2d at 790. The factfinder will look at the likelihood that the decedent would have accumulated substantial property; how much consumption and taxes would eat into any accumulations; the decedent's past propensity to save or invest; and similar factors. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., Eymard, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234-35; Marks v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 785 F.2d 539, 542-43 (5th Cir.1986); Tallentire, 754 F.2d at 1287; Higgins v. Kinnebrew Motors, Inc., 547 F.2d 1223, 1225-26 (5th Cir.1977); Solomon, 540 F.2d at 790-92. 28 Snyder's expert witness, an economist named Donald Huddle, testified that Allen's partnership in the boat would have been worth at least $286,316 by the time Allen reached age sixty-five. Allen's partner, Joe Buckmaster, testified that the boat made a higher profit than average, and estimated that a share would be worth $536,953. Dr. Huddle did not carry his calculations beyond age sixty-five, but he testified that, even after retiring as a boat captain, Allen would likely continue to work at the kind of shoreside boat investments engaged in by Buckmaster. Buckmaster, testifying on his own income from boat partnerships, estimated that he would have earned about $50,000 from the TEXAS LADY in 1986, if it had brought in an average catch. The jury could reasonably have inferred that Allen, had he lived, would have been able to make similar investments.",
"The jury also heard evidence that the Allens lived conservatively and that Allen reinvested much of his earnings in the shrimp business. Evidently, the jury took all of this evidence--the $286,000 to $536,000 partnership stake, possibilities of substantial post-retirement earnings, saving propensity--and reached the conclusion that Allen's estate would contain $300,000 by the time he achieved his life expectancy. While this conclusion incorporates several inferences, those inferences are based on concrete figures and represent more than the speculation condemned in Eymard, and Marks. Eymard, 795 F.2d at 1235; Marks, 785 F.2d at 542. Hence, we decline to disturb the jury's loss of inheritance verdict. 29 Finally, Whittaker argues that the jury should not have awarded $630,000 to the Allens for loss of future support. Whittaker points to Dr. Huddle's admission, on cross examination, that the present value of Allen's future earnings, up to retirement as a boat captain and after taxes and personal consumption, would be $520,000. However, on redirect examination, Huddle clarified that the $520,000 figure did not include any depreciation allowances that Allen would have been able to take on his boat, or any amount for the services Allen would provide his family.",
"The jury apparently believed Huddle's earlier, higher figure. We do not find the jury's reliance on Huddle's testimony unreasonable. E. Prejudgment Interest 30 The district court awarded ten percent per annum prejudgment interest on the awards for losses occurring before the judgment. Whittaker argues that Snyder and Cameron's survivors cannot receive prejudgment interest because such interest is an admiralty remedy, and the case was tried on the \"law side\" of the court. 31 The complaint in the instant case asserted federal question, diversity, and admiralty jurisdiction. Record Vol. 1 at 131. Both parties asked for a jury, and the district court granted their request.",
"This Court has held that a plaintiff who requests a jury trial and fails to elect to proceed in admiralty will be considered to have proceeded on the law side of the court. Martin v. Walk, Haydel & Associates, Inc., 794 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir.1986). Thus, it appears that the district court in the instant case acquired jurisdiction in law rather than admiralty. 32 Whittaker urges us to apply a line of cases under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. Sec.",
"688. The Jones Act allows a seaman plaintiff to sue for death or personal injury either in a federal court under admiralty jurisdiction or in a state or federal court under legal jurisdiction, if the seaman meets other jurisdictional requirements. See generally G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 340-43 (2d ed. 1975). However, the seaman must make a trade-off: if he elects to proceed at law, he can have a jury but must forego prejudgment interest; if he elects to proceed in admiralty, he can have prejudgment interest but no jury. Martin, 794 F.2d at 212; Williams v. Reading & Bates Drilling Co., 750 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir.1985); Theriot v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 742 F.2d 877, 883 (5th Cir.1984); Wyatt v. Penrod Drilling Co., 735 F.2d 951, 955 (5th Cir.1984); Barrios v. Louisiana Construction Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1167-68 (5th Cir.1972); Sanford Brothers Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 972-73 (5th Cir.1969) (citing cases going back to 1930); National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir.",
"), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885, 80 S.Ct. 157, 4 L.Ed.2d 121 (1959). This long-standing rule is generally cited without discussion, but some courts have justified it by pointing out that, in the typical personal injury suit under the Jones Act, the bulk of the damages will occur in the future, and that imposition of prejudgment interest would therefore be unjust. Wyatt, 735 F.2d at 955 n. 3; Barrios, 465 F.2d at 1168. Other courts have stated that calculating prejudgment interest on ongoing damages would be difficult for a jury. Vidrine, 412 F.2d at 973 n. 13; Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406. This Court has observed that the task of calculating prejudgment interest is easier in wrongful death cases where the loss occurs at one time. Barrios, 465 F.2d at 1168; Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406 & n. 6.",
"33 Whittaker urges this Court to apply this Jones Act rule to DOHSA cases. We find no precedent directly on point, perhaps because, until a recent Supreme Court case, it was far from certain that DOHSA cases could be brought in law courts. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire , 477 U.S. 207, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Tallentire made it clear that such cases could be brought at law but that the substantive provisions of DOHSA would apply. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2497. 34 This Court held, long ago, that DOHSA's provision of \"fair and just compensation for the pecuniary loss sustained,\" mandated prejudgment interest in the absence of special circumstances.",
"Stiles, 268 F.2d at 406; 46 U.S.C. Sec. 762. We do not believe that the rationale for disallowing prejudgment interest in Jones Act cases brought at law justifies disallowing that interest in DOHSA cases brought at law. Most of the damages in a wrongful death case occur in a moment. Calculation of prejudgment interest from that moment is a relatively easy task. In the instant case, the district court asked the jury to set each element of damages separately, and then the court itself performed the prejudgment interest calculation. 35 In a roughly analogous situation, a plaintiff may bring an action in a law court, seeking both legal and equitable relief, obtain a jury verdict on the legal relief, and receive a ruling from the court on the equitable remedy. The plaintiff need not elect between his legal and equitable remedies, so long as the forum has jurisdiction to hear both claims.",
"The Jones Act rule originated before 1966 and the unification of law and admiralty, when admiralty and law courts operated in radically different ways. Today, no such gulf yawns between law and admiralty. The recent Tallentire case makes it clear that, however a court obtains jurisdiction over a DOHSA case, the substantive law to be applied remains the same. 106 S.Ct. at 2497. To make prejudgment interest depend on the route by which a plaintiff arrived in federal court is to confuse jurisdiction with remedy in a way no longer accepted in other areas of the law. Moreover, the specific rationales advanced for maintaining the artificial distinction in Jones Act cases do not apply to DOHSA cases. For all of these reasons, we decline to import the Jones Act election rule into the DOHSA jurisprudence. The district court did not err in awarding prejudgment interest to Snyder and Cameron on their past damages.",
"III. CONCLUSION 36 This was a hard-fought, close case arising from tragic events whose best witnesses, Allen and Cameron, are dead. The jury weighed the conflicting evidence and decided that the design of the TEXAS LADY was defective, causing 50 percent of the tragedy. These findings were supported by substantial evidence, as were the jury's findings on damages. The district court did not err in admitting certain documents and expert testimony. Nor did the district court err in assessing prejudgment interest. For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is 37 AFFIRMED."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/501836/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Case 3:17-cv-05806-RJB Document 316 Filed 10/04/19 Page 1 of 3
1 The Honorable Robert J. Bryan
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
9 STATE OF WASHINGTON, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-cv-05806-RJB 10 Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF MARSHA 11 v. CHIEN IN SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE TO 12 THE GEO GROUP, INC., THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 13 Defendant. JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) 14
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16 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746(2), I, Marsha Chien, hereby declare as follows:
17 1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify.
18 2. I am an Assistant Attorney General in the Wing Luke Civil Rights Division of the
19 Washington State Attorney General’s Office and I represent the State of Washington in this matter.
20 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the September 12,
21 2019 oral argument in the above captioned case.
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23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is
24 true and correct.
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26 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF MARSHA CHIEN IN 1 Civil Rights Division SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 TO THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) Case 3:17-cv-05806-RJB Document 316 Filed 10/04/19 Page 2 of 3
1 Dated this 4th day of October 2019 in Seattle, Washington.
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26 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF MARSHA CHIEN IN 2 Civil Rights Division SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 TO THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) Case 3:17-cv-05806-RJB Document 316 Filed 10/04/19 Page 3 of 3
1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2 I hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed with the United
3 States District Court using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are
4 registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF
5 system.
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7 Dated this 4th day of October 2019 in Seattle, Washington.
8 s/ Caitilin Hall 9 CAITILIN HALL Legal Assistant 10
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26 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF MARSHA CHIEN IN Civil Rights Division SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 TO THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) | 2019-10-04 | [
"Case 3:17-cv-05806-RJB Document 316 Filed 10/04/19 Page 1 of 3 1 The Honorable Robert J. Bryan 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 9 STATE OF WASHINGTON, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-cv-05806-RJB 10 Plaintiff, DECLARATION OF MARSHA 11 v. CHIEN IN SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE TO 12 THE GEO GROUP, INC., THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 13 Defendant. JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) 14 15 16 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.",
"§ 1746(2), I, Marsha Chien, hereby declare as follows: 17 1. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify. 18 2. I am an Assistant Attorney General in the Wing Luke Civil Rights Division of the 19 Washington State Attorney General’s Office and I represent the State of Washington in this matter. 20 3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the transcript of the September 12, 21 2019 oral argument in the above captioned case. 22 23 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States that the foregoing is 24 true and correct.",
"25 26 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF MARSHA CHIEN IN 1 Civil Rights Division SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 TO THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) Case 3:17-cv-05806-RJB Document 316 Filed 10/04/19 Page 2 of 3 1 Dated this 4th day of October 2019 in Seattle, Washington. 2 3 s/ Marsha Chien 4 MARSHA CHIEN, WSBA No.",
"47020 Assistant Attorney General 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF MARSHA CHIEN IN 2 Civil Rights Division SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 TO THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306) Case 3:17-cv-05806-RJB Document 316 Filed 10/04/19 Page 3 of 3 1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 2 I hereby certify that the foregoing document was electronically filed with the United 3 States District Court using the CM/ECF system.",
"I certify that all participants in the case are 4 registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF 5 system. 6 7 Dated this 4th day of October 2019 in Seattle, Washington. 8 s/ Caitilin Hall 9 CAITILIN HALL Legal Assistant 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WASHINGTON DECLARATION OF MARSHA CHIEN IN Civil Rights Division SUPPORT OF WASHINGTON’S RESPONSE 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000 TO THE COURT’S PROPOSED ORDER Seattle, WA 98104-3188 (206) 464-7744 GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL (ECF NO. 306)"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/109098668/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Pinney, J. 1. The principal question in this case is whether the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company has a me•chanic’s lien on the premises described in the complaint, and, if so, its date and amount. This point determined, all other questions are free from difficulty. The only interest 'the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company asserts is under the lien it filed April 27, 1896, more than six paonths after that company had performed its written contract with the John-sons and performance of it had been accepted. The amount that thus became due to it was $2,870. This was an entire transaction. The claim for lien is for this item, and the ■amount of an entirely separate and independent transaction, an item of $52.37, for pulleys, etc., furnished November 25, 1895. This made its entire claim, consisting of two items, $2,922.37, upon which $500 had been paid, leaving a balance •due of $2,4-22.37. The evidence is entirely clear on this point. Over four months elapsed between the performance of the written contract, under which the amount due on it accrued, ■and the contract for the $52.37, of November 25, 1895. The matter of this last sum was entirely outside of the written •contract. The statute (sec. 3318, S. & B. Ann. Stats.) provides that ■“no lien hereby given shall exist, and no action to enforce the same shall be maintained, unless within six months from the date of the last charge for performing such work or labor, or of the furnishing of such materials, a claim for lien ■shall be filed,” etc. The claim for lien was confessedly filed more than six months after the date of the charge under the written contract. No connection in fact or in law is shown between these two contracts. "Where there are several items of account for goods sold at different times, there must be either au express contract, or the circumstances must be such as to raise an implied contract embracing all the items, so .as to make them single or entire; Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 548. There was here no such express contract, and no *126implied contract embracing all the items. Zimmerman v. Erhard, 83 N. Y. 74. Where a party furnishes materials for a building at different times, in order to have a lien for the whole amount furnished, and that a lien might be filed one year after the date of the last charge, it rvas held such materials must have been furnished under one contract. Fowler v. Bailley, 14 Wis. 126. And where work is done in the erection of a building according to a contract, and where there is an acceptance of such work, a lien therefor must be filed within six months after such completion or acceptance. Berry v. Turner, 45 Wis. 105. This view is supported by the case of Fish Creek B. & L. D. Co. v. First Fat. Bank, 80 Wis. 630. No ground appears for tacking both items of the claim of the Edward P. Allis Company together for the purpose of filing a lien for their entire amount. It clearly appears that the Edward P. Allis Oompamy wholly failed to file its claim in time to secure a lien for the amount that accrued to it under its written contract, and that it had and has no lien on the premises except for the item of $52.37, furnished and dated November 25, 1895. 2. There was no error in the admission of evidence, nor in the findings thereon, to show that the Jolmsons did not intend, in the first instance, to put in a milling plant until after the macaroni mill had been completed, and did not determine to do so until after the making of the mortgage to the plaintiff. There was but one structure or mill, namely, the original macaroni factory, which, with additions of machinery, etc., was converted into a flouring mill. The contention of the Edward P. Allis Company depended wholly upon showing a valid lien. Whether it had such lien was fairly putin evidence, and tried, and it is plain that it has no lien thereon except for the $52.37, as stated. , 3. The order refusing to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was not appealable, and the *127appeal of the Edward P. Allis Company therefrom must be dismissed. Laws of 1895, oh. 212. It follows from these views that the part of the judgment appealed from by the plaintiff which adjudges that the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company has a valid claim for a mechanic’s lien upon the premises and real estate described in the judgment must be reversed, with costs against said' EdwcvrdP. Allis Company, in favor of the plaintiff, except as to the said sum of $52.37; and that that portion of the judgment which adjudges that the claim of the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company for a mechanic’s lien upon the premises and real estate in said judgment described is inferior, subsequent, and subordinate to the claim of the plaintiff, Hiland C. Brown, on account of the mechanic’s liens assigned to him and his mortgage, must be affirmed. The claims of the different parties are entitled to rank and precedence in the application of the proceeds of the sale of the premises as follows: (1) The claim of the plaintiff for the amount due on his mortgage and the several mechanics’ liens assigned to ffim; (2) the claim of the defendant Anna Glennon for the amount due on her mortgage of $500, which is prior to the lien adjudged to the Edxocurd P. AlUs Company; (3) the amount due to the Edward P. Allis Company on its said lien of November 25, 1895, for $52.37; and the residue of the proceeds, if any, is to be paid to the defendant Piarle L. Patterson, assignee of the defendant Johnsons. < By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in'accordance with the opinion of this court. | 09-09-2022 | [
"Pinney, J. 1. The principal question in this case is whether the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company has a me•chanic’s lien on the premises described in the complaint, and, if so, its date and amount. This point determined, all other questions are free from difficulty. The only interest 'the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company asserts is under the lien it filed April 27, 1896, more than six paonths after that company had performed its written contract with the John-sons and performance of it had been accepted. The amount that thus became due to it was $2,870. This was an entire transaction.",
"The claim for lien is for this item, and the ■amount of an entirely separate and independent transaction, an item of $52.37, for pulleys, etc., furnished November 25, 1895. This made its entire claim, consisting of two items, $2,922.37, upon which $500 had been paid, leaving a balance •due of $2,4-22.37. The evidence is entirely clear on this point. Over four months elapsed between the performance of the written contract, under which the amount due on it accrued, ■and the contract for the $52.37, of November 25, 1895. The matter of this last sum was entirely outside of the written •contract. The statute (sec. 3318, S. & B. Ann. Stats.) provides that ■“no lien hereby given shall exist, and no action to enforce the same shall be maintained, unless within six months from the date of the last charge for performing such work or labor, or of the furnishing of such materials, a claim for lien ■shall be filed,” etc.",
"The claim for lien was confessedly filed more than six months after the date of the charge under the written contract. No connection in fact or in law is shown between these two contracts. \"Where there are several items of account for goods sold at different times, there must be either au express contract, or the circumstances must be such as to raise an implied contract embracing all the items, so .as to make them single or entire; Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 548. There was here no such express contract, and no *126implied contract embracing all the items. Zimmerman v. Erhard, 83 N. Y. 74. Where a party furnishes materials for a building at different times, in order to have a lien for the whole amount furnished, and that a lien might be filed one year after the date of the last charge, it rvas held such materials must have been furnished under one contract. Fowler v. Bailley, 14 Wis. 126. And where work is done in the erection of a building according to a contract, and where there is an acceptance of such work, a lien therefor must be filed within six months after such completion or acceptance.",
"Berry v. Turner, 45 Wis. 105. This view is supported by the case of Fish Creek B. & L. D. Co. v. First Fat. Bank, 80 Wis. 630. No ground appears for tacking both items of the claim of the Edward P. Allis Company together for the purpose of filing a lien for their entire amount. It clearly appears that the Edward P. Allis Oompamy wholly failed to file its claim in time to secure a lien for the amount that accrued to it under its written contract, and that it had and has no lien on the premises except for the item of $52.37, furnished and dated November 25, 1895. 2.",
"There was no error in the admission of evidence, nor in the findings thereon, to show that the Jolmsons did not intend, in the first instance, to put in a milling plant until after the macaroni mill had been completed, and did not determine to do so until after the making of the mortgage to the plaintiff. There was but one structure or mill, namely, the original macaroni factory, which, with additions of machinery, etc., was converted into a flouring mill. The contention of the Edward P. Allis Company depended wholly upon showing a valid lien. Whether it had such lien was fairly putin evidence, and tried, and it is plain that it has no lien thereon except for the $52.37, as stated.",
", 3. The order refusing to grant a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence was not appealable, and the *127appeal of the Edward P. Allis Company therefrom must be dismissed. Laws of 1895, oh. 212. It follows from these views that the part of the judgment appealed from by the plaintiff which adjudges that the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company has a valid claim for a mechanic’s lien upon the premises and real estate described in the judgment must be reversed, with costs against said' EdwcvrdP. Allis Company, in favor of the plaintiff, except as to the said sum of $52.37; and that that portion of the judgment which adjudges that the claim of the defendant the Edward P. Allis Company for a mechanic’s lien upon the premises and real estate in said judgment described is inferior, subsequent, and subordinate to the claim of the plaintiff, Hiland C. Brown, on account of the mechanic’s liens assigned to him and his mortgage, must be affirmed. The claims of the different parties are entitled to rank and precedence in the application of the proceeds of the sale of the premises as follows: (1) The claim of the plaintiff for the amount due on his mortgage and the several mechanics’ liens assigned to ffim; (2) the claim of the defendant Anna Glennon for the amount due on her mortgage of $500, which is prior to the lien adjudged to the Edxocurd P. AlUs Company; (3) the amount due to the Edward P. Allis Company on its said lien of November 25, 1895, for $52.37; and the residue of the proceeds, if any, is to be paid to the defendant Piarle L. Patterson, assignee of the defendant Johnsons.",
"< By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded with directions to enter judgment in'accordance with the opinion of this court."
]
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LURTON, Circuit Judge. This is a bill asserting a statutory lien in behalf of a subcontractor against a railroad company. The question is quite simple. The Shutt Improvement Company made a contract in the state of Indiana for double-tracking a part of, the railwa)*- com*747pany’s line which lies in Indiana. It was convenient Cor the Shutt Company to operate a commissary in aid of their work, for the purpose of furnishing groceries and like supplies to their employes. They bought these goods from 1lic appellants, grocers doing business in Cincinnati, and they were delivered at the station of the railroad company in that city; the railroad company having contracted with the Shutt Company to convey all materials and supplies, needed in carrying out the contract, free of charge. After doing a great part of the job, the Shutt Company broke down, and the railroad company finished the contract work at a cost much in excess of the contract price. The contract price, remaining unpaid when the Shutt Company failed, was applied, as far as it would go, in finishing the work and in relieving the property of such claims as were regarded as liens under the Indiana law. The contract between the railroad company and the contractor expressly provided that the former might thus protect itself by the application of funds due, or to become due, under the contract, in discharge of liens in favor o.f labor or materials furnished to the contractor. This was a provision wholly for the benefit of the owner, and no contract obligation to pay off such liens was imposed or assumed. The Shutt Company owed the appellants a balance, on account, of some $12,000 when it abandoned the work. This claim the railroad company refused to pay or assume, because it was advised that it did not constitute a lien upon its road. After paying the expense of finishing the contract work and such claims against the Shutt Company which it was advised were liens, the Shutt Company was indebted to the railroad company in a large sum on account of payments in excess of the contract price. The appellants in no way attached or garnished the fund reserved out of the contract price, and not a dollar of the contract price remained unpaid when this bill was filed. Neither is it shown that the railroad company came under any contract, express or implied, to pay the debt due to appellants by the Shutt Company. Nor was the conduct of the railroad company in dealing with the Shutt Company, or the appellants, in respect to the contract price, such as to constitute it in any way a trustee for atiy part of the purchase price in respect to appellants. The liability of the railroad company on account of this claim must, therefore, arise out of some statute directly imposing a lien upon the appellee’s line of railway or fastening some charge upon the contract price. The primary claim is that a statutory lien did arise under the law of Ohio. For the appellee it has been urged that, aside from the question of the validity of the Ohio statute, under which complainant below asserted a lien, the statute, if valid, does not embrace groceries and provisions. It has also been urged that these supplies were furnished to be used upon that part of the line of the appellee’s railroad which is situated in the state of Indiana, and that, if any lien was created, it was against the property of the company in Indiana, and as a consequence of some'Indiana statute. We shall not consider either of these defenses, but for the purposes of the case will assume that groceries and provisions are “supplies,” within the meaning of the Ohio statute, and that the sale and delivery within Ohio created a lien *748under the Ohio mechanic’s lien statute, which is enforceable in Ohio against the railway as a unitary structure. The result must turn upon the-solution of the question of whether there was any valid statutory lien in favor of a subcontractor for supplies furnished a contractor for railroad construction? There are two acts under which appellants claim a direct or implied lien. One is the act of March 20, 1889 (86 Ohio Laws, p. 120), constituting sections 3231 — 1 to 3231 — 5, Bates’ Revised Statutes of Ohio. That act provides that for supplies and materials furnished to any contractor or subcontractor for the construction of any railroad, embankment, abutment, pier, side track, or excavation, or for the making of any canal, turnpike, street railway, or other public structure, there shall be an absolute lien on the whole of the property on which labor is done, or to which such materials- or supplies have contributed, whether same was done for or furnished at the instance of the owner, “or any contractor or subcontractor.” The other Ohio act is one of April 6, 1883 (80 Ohio Laws, p. 99), found now as sections 3207 to 3211, Bates’ Revised Statutes of Ohio. We shall first deal with the act of March 20, 1889, particularly that part which constitutes section 3231 — 1, Revised Statutes, being the section which declares a lien in favor of subcontractors in express terms. Was it competent for the Ohio Legislature, under the limitations of the organic law of the state, to so abridge the right of an owner in respect of his power of contracting as to impose upon his property, against his will, a lien in favor of third persons who should furnish labor, material, or supplies at the instance of a contractor for an improvement upon the land of such owner, and contrary to the arrangement between the owner and the contractor for the payment of the contract price? The precise question was answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313. The syllabus of that case, that being the authoritative decision of the Ohio court, reads as follows: “The inalienable right of enjoying liberty and acquiring property, guaranteed by the first section of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, embraces the right to be free in the'enjoyment of our faculties, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare. “Liberty to acquire property by contract can be restrained by the General Assembly only so far as such restraint is for the common welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people,- and such restraining statute must be of such a character that a court may see that it is for such general welfare, protection and benefit. The judgment of the General Assembly in such cases is not conclusive. “While a valid statute regulating contracts is by its own force read into and made a part of such contracts, it is otherwise as to invalid statutes. “The act of April 13, 1894 (91 Ohio Laws, p. 135), in so far as it gives a lien on the property of the owner to subcontractors, laborers, and those who furnish machinery, material, or tile to the contractor, is unconstitutional and void. All to whom the contractor becomes indebted in the performance of his contract are bound by the terms of the contract between him and the owner.” The Ohio act there held void was the act of April 13, 1894 (91 Ohio Laws, p. 135). The act referred to amended the former act, now section 3184, Bates’ Revised Statutes of Ohio, which gave the lien in fa*749vor of one who should do labor or furnish machinery or materials by-virtue of a contract “with the owner or his authorized agent,” by giving the lien to any one who should furnish labor or materials “by-virtue of a contract with or at the instance of the owner or his agent trustee, contractor, or subcontractor.” The difference between that act and the one now involved consists in the fact that the amendatory act of 1894 applied only to section. 3184, Revised Statutes, which did not, in express terms, refer to corporations, whilé section 3231 — 1 applies to railroads and certain other public service corporations. We shall later consider whether this fact takes the present case outside of the authority of Palmer v. Tingle. But it is said that this court, in Jones v. Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Company, 86 Fed. 370, 30 C. C. A. 108, held that section 3184, Revised Statutes of Ohio, as amended by the act of April 13, 1894, was not unconstitutional under the Constitution of Ohio, but was valid and enforceable, and that in that view we were affirmed by the Supreme Court in Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Company v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct. 576, 48 L. Ed. 778. The lien asserted in Jones v. Great Southern Hotel Company, and enforced by this court, arose before the Ohio court had decided Palmer v. Tingle, and before the Omo court had decided any case affecting the constitutionality of any act creating a lien in favor of persons having no direct contract with the owner. We were, therefore, not only at liberty, but under obligation, to exercise an independent judgment in respect to the validity of the statute in.question. The lien now asserted arose long after the decision in Palmer v. Tingle, and, if that decision is to be regarded as a construction and application of the organic law of Ohio, it is obviously our duty to- accept that construction and apply it to the case now under consideration, inasmuch as we are not now deaF iiig with rights which arose before that decision, but with rights unidor contracts made long since that construction. The obligatory character of Palmer v. Tingle does not rest upon the 'fact that it was a decision in respect to the very statute now involved, for that is not the case. Nor does its obligatory effect rest alone upon the similarity of the lien created under the act now involved with the lien under the later act of 1894. Neither does our obligation depend upon the application of any general rule of statutory or constitutional construction announced in that case, or in O’Brien v. Wheelock, 95 Fed. 883, 37 C. C. A. 309, affirmed in 184 U. S. 450, 22 Sup, Ct. 354, 46 L. Ed. 636. No question of statutory construction was involved in Palmer v. Tingle, and none is raised here. What the Supreme Court of Ohio decided in Palmer v. Tingle was that that part of the organic law of Oliio which declared that the “right of enjoying and defending life and liberty” and of “acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,” included and involved the right of any owner of property to make any contracts he pleased in respect of improvements to be erected thereon which did not injuriously affect the public welfare. Coming to the application of that constitutional declaration, thus interpreted, the Ohio court said: “It was not for the common public welfare that the liberty of contract should be taken away from the owner of a building to enable the seiler of materials *750to collect their value from a man who never purchased them, and has already fully paid the one with whom he contracted for all that he has received.” When considering- the weight to be given to Palmer v. Tingle, this court, in recognition of our duty to lean toward an agreement with the Ohio court, though not under obligation to follow it in a case when rights' had arisen- before that decision, referred to the identity, of this constitutional declaration with like provisions in the organic law of other states as raising- for our consideration a larger question of constitutional law than might otherwise be the case. In view, therefore, of the fact that the Ohio court had before it no provision of the Ohio Constitution which was peculiar to the Ohio Constitution, we were constrained to differ with that court' as to the force and meaning of the words in question as a limitation restraining the Ohio Legislature. In this we were affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. But the case is quite different now. The highest court of Ohio-, in the exercise of its undoubted authority, construed this declaration in the Ohio Bill of Rights as denying to the Ohio Legislature the power to create a lien upon an owner’s property through the unauthorized acts of a principal contractor. The distinction between our obligation in passing upon rights accrued before Palmer v. Tingle, and rights which have accrued since, was well stated by Justice Harlan in Great Southern Hotel Company v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct. 576, 48 L. Ed. 778, when that eminent jurist, for the court, said: “In our opinion, neither the decisions of Palmer v. Tingle, Young v. Lion Hardware Co., 55 Ohio St 423, 45 N. E. 313, nor any other case in the Supreme Court of Ohio, precluded the Circuit 'Court from exercising its independent judgment as to the constitutionality of the statute of Ohio here in question. If, prior to the making of the contracts between the plaintiff and McClain, the state court had adjudged that the statute in question was in violation of the state Constitution, it would have been the duts of the Circuit Court, and equally the duty of this court, whatever the opinion of either court as to the proper construction of that instrument, to accept such prior decision as determining the rights of the parties. But, the decision of the state court as to the constitutionality of the statute in question having been rendered after the rights of the parties to this suit had been fixed by their contracts, the Circuit Court would have been derelict in duty if it had not exercised-its independent judgment touching the validity of the statute here in question. In making this declaration we must not be understood as at all qualifying the principle that, in all cases, it is the duty of the federal court to lean to an agreement with the state court, where the issue relates to matters depending upon the construction of the Constitution or laws of the state.” But it is said that the Ohio court did not have before it in Palmer v. Tingle the particular act now in question, but another, a general mechanic’s lien act, and that the acts here involved apply to railroads and other corporate companies, and that the legislative limitation determined by Palmer v. Tingle was in respect to the contracts of persons and not of corporations. But it is difficult to see why, if the Ohio Legislature has no power to create a lien against the will of an individual owner of real property in favor of persons having no contractual relations with him, it should have -such power simply because the owner is -an aggregation of persons with corporate powers. Indeed, the Ohio court in Palmer v. Tingle supports its conclusion that the act of 1894 violated liberty of contract by referring to State v. *751Lake Eric Iron Company (an officially unreportcd Ohio case) 33 Ohio Law Bul. 6, by saying: “It was the infringement of the liberty of contract that induced this court: in State v. Hake Erie Iron Company (oilieially unreported) 33 Ohio Raw Bui. (>, to hold the statute unconstitutional which required corporations to pay their employes at least twice in each month.” In Cleveland v. Construction Company, 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am. St. Rep. 670, the Supreme Court held an act void, as an abridgment of liberty of contract, which dented to municipal corporations the right to agree with contractors and subcontractors as to the hours of labor which should constitute a day’s labor. In Stewart v. Gardner, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N. S.) 408, the circuit court of Lucas county had under consideration the validity of section 3231 — 1, Revised Statutes of Ohio. The point was made that Palmer v. Tingle was not controlling, because section 3231 — 1 applied to railroads. It was held in an elaborate opinion that the clause of the Ohio Bill of Rights applies not only to individuals, but to private corporations, and that the Legislature was without power to qualify the right of a railroad company to make contracts in respect to construction or improvements which it could not make with respect to individuals, it was held that Palmer v. Tingle was a controlling authority, and that so much of section 3231 — 1 as undertook to give to subcontractors for materials or supplies a lien, without the consent of the owner, was unconstitutional. This judgment directly involved the very act now under consideration, and was affirmed, without opinion, by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in 78 Ohio St. 451, 85 N. E. 1132. The affirmance could not have gone upon any other ground than that of the invalidity of the very act under which appellants now assert a lien. It is true that Stewart v. Gardner was decided after the rights of ajipellants arose, and is not, therefore, so obligatory as Palmer v. Tingle. The decision is, however, of weight sufficient to solve any doubt we might have as to the question now raised. Neither lias the appellant shown any right to equitable relief under his prayer for general relief. This contention is bottomed upon section 3207, Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: "Sec. 3207. (Wluit Contracts for Railroad Work shall Stipulate; Claims; Order of Priority.) Any person, association of persons, or corporation contracting Cor the construction of a railroad, depot buildings, water-tanks, or any part: thereof, shall be liable to and shall pay to each person performing labor or furnishing materials stipulated for in the contract with the owner of the road, under a contract express or implied with the original contractor, or with any subcontractor, for the whole or any part of the work stipulated in the original contract: with the owner of the railroad; and the railroad company shall provide, in its contract with any person, association of persons, or corporation for the construct ion of its road, or any part thereof, that payments under its said contract shall be made in the following order of priority: First, to the persons performing labor or furnishing materials, or furnishing boarding on the order of any contractor or subcontractor to persons employed by them, or either of them, in furnishing materials or labor for or in the construction of such railroad, without preference. Second, to any subcontractor, any balance due under his contract after payment of his or tlieir liability to persons performing labor or furnishing materials or boarding, under his or their contract. Third, to any contractor, or construction company intervening between a subcontractor and the railroad company, in the order of such in*752tervention frozp such subcontractor upward to the owner of the railroad, any balance due after payment by the company, of amounts found due in the order of priority above stipulated.” That section, by providing that the contracting railroad owner shall pay out of the contract price “each person” who shall labor or furnish materials or supplies stipulated for in the contract, in the order named in the section, regardless of any contract relation between the owner and such person, manifestly interferes quite as much with the owner’s liberty of contract as if an independent lien had been declared in favor of each person so to be paid. Indeed, the restraint upon the owner’s right of liberty of contract is even more effectual, for the owning railroad is required to stipulate in its contract that it will pay out the contract price to the persons and in the order named in the section. Aside from the obvious fact that, if section 3231 — 1 et seq. is obnoxious because the owner is subjected to liability to persons with whom he has no contract, this section is void for the same reason, there is the further difficulty in this case, namely, the contract made by the railroad company was made in the state of Indiana, to be wholly performed by the Shutt Company in that state. A contract made in Indiana, to be exclusively performed in that state, was not subject to the requirement of the Ohio statute that the owning railroad shall provide, in its contract, for the payment of the contract price to labor and supply claims in the order named in the statute. 'No such provision was inserted in the contract with the Shutt Company, and no-ground exists upon which we can hold that the term is to be read into the agreement for the benefit of persons having no contractual relations with the railroad company. Neither is there any principle of general equity upon which appellants can obtain any relief against the appellee. No facts are shown which raise any trust, or in any way constitute the relation of debtor or creditor, between appellants and appellee. No fraud was practiced upon which a liability can be raised, and the appellants must look alone to the Shutt Improvement Company for the balance of their account. Decree affirmed. | 11-26-2022 | [
"LURTON, Circuit Judge. This is a bill asserting a statutory lien in behalf of a subcontractor against a railroad company. The question is quite simple. The Shutt Improvement Company made a contract in the state of Indiana for double-tracking a part of, the railwa)*- com*747pany’s line which lies in Indiana. It was convenient Cor the Shutt Company to operate a commissary in aid of their work, for the purpose of furnishing groceries and like supplies to their employes.",
"They bought these goods from 1lic appellants, grocers doing business in Cincinnati, and they were delivered at the station of the railroad company in that city; the railroad company having contracted with the Shutt Company to convey all materials and supplies, needed in carrying out the contract, free of charge. After doing a great part of the job, the Shutt Company broke down, and the railroad company finished the contract work at a cost much in excess of the contract price.",
"The contract price, remaining unpaid when the Shutt Company failed, was applied, as far as it would go, in finishing the work and in relieving the property of such claims as were regarded as liens under the Indiana law. The contract between the railroad company and the contractor expressly provided that the former might thus protect itself by the application of funds due, or to become due, under the contract, in discharge of liens in favor o.f labor or materials furnished to the contractor. This was a provision wholly for the benefit of the owner, and no contract obligation to pay off such liens was imposed or assumed.",
"The Shutt Company owed the appellants a balance, on account, of some $12,000 when it abandoned the work. This claim the railroad company refused to pay or assume, because it was advised that it did not constitute a lien upon its road. After paying the expense of finishing the contract work and such claims against the Shutt Company which it was advised were liens, the Shutt Company was indebted to the railroad company in a large sum on account of payments in excess of the contract price. The appellants in no way attached or garnished the fund reserved out of the contract price, and not a dollar of the contract price remained unpaid when this bill was filed. Neither is it shown that the railroad company came under any contract, express or implied, to pay the debt due to appellants by the Shutt Company. Nor was the conduct of the railroad company in dealing with the Shutt Company, or the appellants, in respect to the contract price, such as to constitute it in any way a trustee for atiy part of the purchase price in respect to appellants. The liability of the railroad company on account of this claim must, therefore, arise out of some statute directly imposing a lien upon the appellee’s line of railway or fastening some charge upon the contract price.",
"The primary claim is that a statutory lien did arise under the law of Ohio. For the appellee it has been urged that, aside from the question of the validity of the Ohio statute, under which complainant below asserted a lien, the statute, if valid, does not embrace groceries and provisions. It has also been urged that these supplies were furnished to be used upon that part of the line of the appellee’s railroad which is situated in the state of Indiana, and that, if any lien was created, it was against the property of the company in Indiana, and as a consequence of some'Indiana statute. We shall not consider either of these defenses, but for the purposes of the case will assume that groceries and provisions are “supplies,” within the meaning of the Ohio statute, and that the sale and delivery within Ohio created a lien *748under the Ohio mechanic’s lien statute, which is enforceable in Ohio against the railway as a unitary structure.",
"The result must turn upon the-solution of the question of whether there was any valid statutory lien in favor of a subcontractor for supplies furnished a contractor for railroad construction? There are two acts under which appellants claim a direct or implied lien. One is the act of March 20, 1889 (86 Ohio Laws, p. 120), constituting sections 3231 — 1 to 3231 — 5, Bates’ Revised Statutes of Ohio. That act provides that for supplies and materials furnished to any contractor or subcontractor for the construction of any railroad, embankment, abutment, pier, side track, or excavation, or for the making of any canal, turnpike, street railway, or other public structure, there shall be an absolute lien on the whole of the property on which labor is done, or to which such materials- or supplies have contributed, whether same was done for or furnished at the instance of the owner, “or any contractor or subcontractor.” The other Ohio act is one of April 6, 1883 (80 Ohio Laws, p. 99), found now as sections 3207 to 3211, Bates’ Revised Statutes of Ohio.",
"We shall first deal with the act of March 20, 1889, particularly that part which constitutes section 3231 — 1, Revised Statutes, being the section which declares a lien in favor of subcontractors in express terms. Was it competent for the Ohio Legislature, under the limitations of the organic law of the state, to so abridge the right of an owner in respect of his power of contracting as to impose upon his property, against his will, a lien in favor of third persons who should furnish labor, material, or supplies at the instance of a contractor for an improvement upon the land of such owner, and contrary to the arrangement between the owner and the contractor for the payment of the contract price? The precise question was answered in the negative by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of Palmer v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St. 423, 45 N. E. 313. The syllabus of that case, that being the authoritative decision of the Ohio court, reads as follows: “The inalienable right of enjoying liberty and acquiring property, guaranteed by the first section of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, embraces the right to be free in the'enjoyment of our faculties, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the common welfare.",
"“Liberty to acquire property by contract can be restrained by the General Assembly only so far as such restraint is for the common welfare and equal protection and benefit of the people,- and such restraining statute must be of such a character that a court may see that it is for such general welfare, protection and benefit. The judgment of the General Assembly in such cases is not conclusive. “While a valid statute regulating contracts is by its own force read into and made a part of such contracts, it is otherwise as to invalid statutes. “The act of April 13, 1894 (91 Ohio Laws, p. 135), in so far as it gives a lien on the property of the owner to subcontractors, laborers, and those who furnish machinery, material, or tile to the contractor, is unconstitutional and void.",
"All to whom the contractor becomes indebted in the performance of his contract are bound by the terms of the contract between him and the owner.” The Ohio act there held void was the act of April 13, 1894 (91 Ohio Laws, p. 135). The act referred to amended the former act, now section 3184, Bates’ Revised Statutes of Ohio, which gave the lien in fa*749vor of one who should do labor or furnish machinery or materials by-virtue of a contract “with the owner or his authorized agent,” by giving the lien to any one who should furnish labor or materials “by-virtue of a contract with or at the instance of the owner or his agent trustee, contractor, or subcontractor.” The difference between that act and the one now involved consists in the fact that the amendatory act of 1894 applied only to section. 3184, Revised Statutes, which did not, in express terms, refer to corporations, whilé section 3231 — 1 applies to railroads and certain other public service corporations. We shall later consider whether this fact takes the present case outside of the authority of Palmer v. Tingle. But it is said that this court, in Jones v. Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Company, 86 Fed.",
"370, 30 C. C. A. 108, held that section 3184, Revised Statutes of Ohio, as amended by the act of April 13, 1894, was not unconstitutional under the Constitution of Ohio, but was valid and enforceable, and that in that view we were affirmed by the Supreme Court in Great Southern Fireproof Hotel Company v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct. 576, 48 L. Ed. 778. The lien asserted in Jones v. Great Southern Hotel Company, and enforced by this court, arose before the Ohio court had decided Palmer v. Tingle, and before the Omo court had decided any case affecting the constitutionality of any act creating a lien in favor of persons having no direct contract with the owner.",
"We were, therefore, not only at liberty, but under obligation, to exercise an independent judgment in respect to the validity of the statute in.question. The lien now asserted arose long after the decision in Palmer v. Tingle, and, if that decision is to be regarded as a construction and application of the organic law of Ohio, it is obviously our duty to- accept that construction and apply it to the case now under consideration, inasmuch as we are not now deaF iiig with rights which arose before that decision, but with rights unidor contracts made long since that construction. The obligatory character of Palmer v. Tingle does not rest upon the 'fact that it was a decision in respect to the very statute now involved, for that is not the case. Nor does its obligatory effect rest alone upon the similarity of the lien created under the act now involved with the lien under the later act of 1894. Neither does our obligation depend upon the application of any general rule of statutory or constitutional construction announced in that case, or in O’Brien v. Wheelock, 95 Fed. 883, 37 C. C. A. 309, affirmed in 184 U. S. 450, 22 Sup, Ct. 354, 46 L. Ed. 636.",
"No question of statutory construction was involved in Palmer v. Tingle, and none is raised here. What the Supreme Court of Ohio decided in Palmer v. Tingle was that that part of the organic law of Oliio which declared that the “right of enjoying and defending life and liberty” and of “acquiring, possessing, and protecting property,” included and involved the right of any owner of property to make any contracts he pleased in respect of improvements to be erected thereon which did not injuriously affect the public welfare. Coming to the application of that constitutional declaration, thus interpreted, the Ohio court said: “It was not for the common public welfare that the liberty of contract should be taken away from the owner of a building to enable the seiler of materials *750to collect their value from a man who never purchased them, and has already fully paid the one with whom he contracted for all that he has received.” When considering- the weight to be given to Palmer v. Tingle, this court, in recognition of our duty to lean toward an agreement with the Ohio court, though not under obligation to follow it in a case when rights' had arisen- before that decision, referred to the identity, of this constitutional declaration with like provisions in the organic law of other states as raising- for our consideration a larger question of constitutional law than might otherwise be the case.",
"In view, therefore, of the fact that the Ohio court had before it no provision of the Ohio Constitution which was peculiar to the Ohio Constitution, we were constrained to differ with that court' as to the force and meaning of the words in question as a limitation restraining the Ohio Legislature. In this we were affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. But the case is quite different now. The highest court of Ohio-, in the exercise of its undoubted authority, construed this declaration in the Ohio Bill of Rights as denying to the Ohio Legislature the power to create a lien upon an owner’s property through the unauthorized acts of a principal contractor. The distinction between our obligation in passing upon rights accrued before Palmer v. Tingle, and rights which have accrued since, was well stated by Justice Harlan in Great Southern Hotel Company v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 24 Sup. Ct. 576, 48 L. Ed. 778, when that eminent jurist, for the court, said: “In our opinion, neither the decisions of Palmer v. Tingle, Young v. Lion Hardware Co., 55 Ohio St 423, 45 N. E. 313, nor any other case in the Supreme Court of Ohio, precluded the Circuit 'Court from exercising its independent judgment as to the constitutionality of the statute of Ohio here in question.",
"If, prior to the making of the contracts between the plaintiff and McClain, the state court had adjudged that the statute in question was in violation of the state Constitution, it would have been the duts of the Circuit Court, and equally the duty of this court, whatever the opinion of either court as to the proper construction of that instrument, to accept such prior decision as determining the rights of the parties. But, the decision of the state court as to the constitutionality of the statute in question having been rendered after the rights of the parties to this suit had been fixed by their contracts, the Circuit Court would have been derelict in duty if it had not exercised-its independent judgment touching the validity of the statute here in question. In making this declaration we must not be understood as at all qualifying the principle that, in all cases, it is the duty of the federal court to lean to an agreement with the state court, where the issue relates to matters depending upon the construction of the Constitution or laws of the state.” But it is said that the Ohio court did not have before it in Palmer v. Tingle the particular act now in question, but another, a general mechanic’s lien act, and that the acts here involved apply to railroads and other corporate companies, and that the legislative limitation determined by Palmer v. Tingle was in respect to the contracts of persons and not of corporations.",
"But it is difficult to see why, if the Ohio Legislature has no power to create a lien against the will of an individual owner of real property in favor of persons having no contractual relations with him, it should have -such power simply because the owner is -an aggregation of persons with corporate powers. Indeed, the Ohio court in Palmer v. Tingle supports its conclusion that the act of 1894 violated liberty of contract by referring to State v. *751Lake Eric Iron Company (an officially unreportcd Ohio case) 33 Ohio Law Bul. 6, by saying: “It was the infringement of the liberty of contract that induced this court: in State v. Hake Erie Iron Company (oilieially unreported) 33 Ohio Raw Bui. (>, to hold the statute unconstitutional which required corporations to pay their employes at least twice in each month.” In Cleveland v. Construction Company, 67 Ohio St. 197, 65 N. E. 885, 59 L. R. A. 775, 93 Am.",
"St. Rep. 670, the Supreme Court held an act void, as an abridgment of liberty of contract, which dented to municipal corporations the right to agree with contractors and subcontractors as to the hours of labor which should constitute a day’s labor. In Stewart v. Gardner, 10 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. (N. S.) 408, the circuit court of Lucas county had under consideration the validity of section 3231 — 1, Revised Statutes of Ohio. The point was made that Palmer v. Tingle was not controlling, because section 3231 — 1 applied to railroads. It was held in an elaborate opinion that the clause of the Ohio Bill of Rights applies not only to individuals, but to private corporations, and that the Legislature was without power to qualify the right of a railroad company to make contracts in respect to construction or improvements which it could not make with respect to individuals, it was held that Palmer v. Tingle was a controlling authority, and that so much of section 3231 — 1 as undertook to give to subcontractors for materials or supplies a lien, without the consent of the owner, was unconstitutional. This judgment directly involved the very act now under consideration, and was affirmed, without opinion, by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in 78 Ohio St. 451, 85 N. E. 1132.",
"The affirmance could not have gone upon any other ground than that of the invalidity of the very act under which appellants now assert a lien. It is true that Stewart v. Gardner was decided after the rights of ajipellants arose, and is not, therefore, so obligatory as Palmer v. Tingle. The decision is, however, of weight sufficient to solve any doubt we might have as to the question now raised. Neither lias the appellant shown any right to equitable relief under his prayer for general relief. This contention is bottomed upon section 3207, Revised Statutes, which reads as follows: \"Sec. 3207. (Wluit Contracts for Railroad Work shall Stipulate; Claims; Order of Priority.)",
"Any person, association of persons, or corporation contracting Cor the construction of a railroad, depot buildings, water-tanks, or any part: thereof, shall be liable to and shall pay to each person performing labor or furnishing materials stipulated for in the contract with the owner of the road, under a contract express or implied with the original contractor, or with any subcontractor, for the whole or any part of the work stipulated in the original contract: with the owner of the railroad; and the railroad company shall provide, in its contract with any person, association of persons, or corporation for the construct ion of its road, or any part thereof, that payments under its said contract shall be made in the following order of priority: First, to the persons performing labor or furnishing materials, or furnishing boarding on the order of any contractor or subcontractor to persons employed by them, or either of them, in furnishing materials or labor for or in the construction of such railroad, without preference. Second, to any subcontractor, any balance due under his contract after payment of his or tlieir liability to persons performing labor or furnishing materials or boarding, under his or their contract.",
"Third, to any contractor, or construction company intervening between a subcontractor and the railroad company, in the order of such in*752tervention frozp such subcontractor upward to the owner of the railroad, any balance due after payment by the company, of amounts found due in the order of priority above stipulated.” That section, by providing that the contracting railroad owner shall pay out of the contract price “each person” who shall labor or furnish materials or supplies stipulated for in the contract, in the order named in the section, regardless of any contract relation between the owner and such person, manifestly interferes quite as much with the owner’s liberty of contract as if an independent lien had been declared in favor of each person so to be paid. Indeed, the restraint upon the owner’s right of liberty of contract is even more effectual, for the owning railroad is required to stipulate in its contract that it will pay out the contract price to the persons and in the order named in the section.",
"Aside from the obvious fact that, if section 3231 — 1 et seq. is obnoxious because the owner is subjected to liability to persons with whom he has no contract, this section is void for the same reason, there is the further difficulty in this case, namely, the contract made by the railroad company was made in the state of Indiana, to be wholly performed by the Shutt Company in that state. A contract made in Indiana, to be exclusively performed in that state, was not subject to the requirement of the Ohio statute that the owning railroad shall provide, in its contract, for the payment of the contract price to labor and supply claims in the order named in the statute. 'No such provision was inserted in the contract with the Shutt Company, and no-ground exists upon which we can hold that the term is to be read into the agreement for the benefit of persons having no contractual relations with the railroad company. Neither is there any principle of general equity upon which appellants can obtain any relief against the appellee. No facts are shown which raise any trust, or in any way constitute the relation of debtor or creditor, between appellants and appellee.",
"No fraud was practiced upon which a liability can be raised, and the appellants must look alone to the Shutt Improvement Company for the balance of their account. Decree affirmed."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/8772711/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
746 F.2d 1360 Kenneth L. CELESTINE, Appellant,v.VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL, Appellee. No. 83-2511. United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. Submitted Sept. 14, 1984.Decided Oct. 26, 1984.
Linda K. Davis, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant. Larry D. Coleman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee. Before LAY, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. Kenneth L. Celestine brought this action pro se against the Veterans Administration. His handwritten complaint alleged that he had been mistreated by employees of the Veterans Administration (VA), an agency of the United States. The District Court, interpreting the complaint as an attempt to allege a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2671 et seq., dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies by filing an administrative claim with the VA and then filing suit within six months after written denial of the claim. In fact, but unknown to the District Court, plaintiff had filed such a claim with the VA, and it had been denied in writing, before the Court ruled favorably on the government's motion to dismiss. We hold that the government should have notified the District Court of this crucial change in circumstances, which destroyed the basis for the motion to dismiss. We vacate the decision below and remand for further proceedings on Celestine's claim. When plaintiff initially filed his complaint, it was subject to the objection, made by the government in its motion to dismiss, that administrative remedies had not been exhausted. Exhaustion of these remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and absent such exhaustion the sovereign immunity of the United States from suit is not waived.1 Smith v. United States, 588 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir.1978). The government was therefore within its rights when, about two months after the complaint was filed, it moved to dismiss. If the District Court had acted on the motion at that time, there would have been no error. The Court did not act, however, until about eighteen months later, at which time the state of affairs had changed. By that time the plaintiff had filed an administrative claim with the VA, and it had been denied in writing. Neither the plaintiff nor the government informed the District Court of this fact. The Court, therefore, can hardly be faulted for the action it took. The government urges us to affirm, contending that it was plaintiff's duty to establish jurisdiction by informing the District Court of the fact that he had filed a claim and had received from the VA a denial of the claim in writing. No doubt the plaintiff should have conveyed this information to the Court, though, as a party acting without counsel, we can understand his failure to do so. But we cannot agree that the change in circumstances should now be ignored. It is the duty of the United States and its attorneys, when engaged in litigation or, indeed, in any dealings with citizens, not just to win a case, but to see that justice is done. The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, ... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
1 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935). The government had filed a motion to dismiss representing that administrative remedies had not been exhausted. When this state of affairs later changed, the government obviously knew it, because its own agency had denied Celestine's administrative claim. This information should have been conveyed by the VA to the United States Attorney, and by him, in turn, to the District Court.
2 The Assistant United States Attorney handling the case was himself unaware that an administrative claim had been filed and denied. That does not alter the legal fact that the United States is a collective entity, as well as a sovereign one, and that the knowledge of the employees of the Veterans Administration who denied Celestine's claim is, under the circumstances of this case, fairly imputable, as a matter of law, to government counsel representing the VA in court. It is fair to assume, in most contexts, that lawyers know what their clients know, and this is especially true when the client is the United States, which, as just noted, has a duty to deal fairly with opposing litigants.
3 The government's motion to dismiss was a continuing representation of facts to the Court; if these facts were no longer correct, the government, knowing of this change, had a duty to report the changed circumstances to the Court. The failure of the government to inform the District Court of the new information, the denial of the administrative claim, was, thus, a breach of duty.2
4 We take the case, therefore, as if the government had fulfilled its duty. Although administrative remedies had not been exhausted when suit was filed, they were exhausted before any substantial progress had been made on the case. Several courts have held that when the plaintiff files an administrative claim after filing in district court, and the claim is subsequently denied, refiling is not necessary and objections for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are moot. In Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979), the plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint several months after they had filed suit. The Third Circuit held that "[w]here the administrative claim is denied before any substantial progress has been made in the pending litigation, the suit need not be refiled to be effective .... To hold that refiling was necessary would involve duplicitous pleadings and wasted effort." 581 F.2d at 1098. See also Campbell v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D.Hawaii 1982); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y.1979), appeal dismissed as to other defendants, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.1980).
5 Although the District Court cannot be said to have committed any error, since it acted quite properly on the basis of the facts as it believed them to be, it is our duty to vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. We hold that the District Court does have jurisdiction of the complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Whether all of the theories that the complaint may be read to allege in fact state claims under that Act is of course another question, to be explored on remand.
6 The District Court also observed (correctly) that the "Veterans Administration" is not a suable entity. The case should have been brought against the United States as such, and on remand the District Court should grant leave to amend the complaint accordingly. The Court should also consider whether to appoint counsel for plaintiff.
7 Plaintiff has been represented on this appeal by counsel appointed by this Court. We thank her for her service to her client and to us.
8 Vacated and remanded.
1 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) (1982), provides: An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section.
2 Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2), which imposes an analogous duty on all parties in the context of discovery: A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains information upon the basis of which ... he knows that the response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. | 08-23-2011 | [
"746 F.2d 1360 Kenneth L. CELESTINE, Appellant,v.VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL, Appellee. No. 83-2511. United States Court of Appeals,Eighth Circuit. Submitted Sept. 14, 1984.Decided Oct. 26, 1984. Linda K. Davis, Kansas City, Mo., for appellant. Larry D. Coleman, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, Mo., for appellee. Before LAY, Chief Judge, McMILLIAN and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. Kenneth L. Celestine brought this action pro se against the Veterans Administration. His handwritten complaint alleged that he had been mistreated by employees of the Veterans Administration (VA), an agency of the United States.",
"The District Court, interpreting the complaint as an attempt to allege a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2671 et seq., dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, holding that plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies by filing an administrative claim with the VA and then filing suit within six months after written denial of the claim. In fact, but unknown to the District Court, plaintiff had filed such a claim with the VA, and it had been denied in writing, before the Court ruled favorably on the government's motion to dismiss. We hold that the government should have notified the District Court of this crucial change in circumstances, which destroyed the basis for the motion to dismiss. We vacate the decision below and remand for further proceedings on Celestine's claim. When plaintiff initially filed his complaint, it was subject to the objection, made by the government in its motion to dismiss, that administrative remedies had not been exhausted. Exhaustion of these remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of an action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and absent such exhaustion the sovereign immunity of the United States from suit is not waived.1 Smith v. United States, 588 F.2d 1209, 1211 (8th Cir.1978).",
"The government was therefore within its rights when, about two months after the complaint was filed, it moved to dismiss. If the District Court had acted on the motion at that time, there would have been no error. The Court did not act, however, until about eighteen months later, at which time the state of affairs had changed. By that time the plaintiff had filed an administrative claim with the VA, and it had been denied in writing. Neither the plaintiff nor the government informed the District Court of this fact. The Court, therefore, can hardly be faulted for the action it took. The government urges us to affirm, contending that it was plaintiff's duty to establish jurisdiction by informing the District Court of the fact that he had filed a claim and had received from the VA a denial of the claim in writing. No doubt the plaintiff should have conveyed this information to the Court, though, as a party acting without counsel, we can understand his failure to do so. But we cannot agree that the change in circumstances should now be ignored. It is the duty of the United States and its attorneys, when engaged in litigation or, indeed, in any dealings with citizens, not just to win a case, but to see that justice is done.",
"The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, ... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. 1 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935). The government had filed a motion to dismiss representing that administrative remedies had not been exhausted.",
"When this state of affairs later changed, the government obviously knew it, because its own agency had denied Celestine's administrative claim. This information should have been conveyed by the VA to the United States Attorney, and by him, in turn, to the District Court. 2 The Assistant United States Attorney handling the case was himself unaware that an administrative claim had been filed and denied. That does not alter the legal fact that the United States is a collective entity, as well as a sovereign one, and that the knowledge of the employees of the Veterans Administration who denied Celestine's claim is, under the circumstances of this case, fairly imputable, as a matter of law, to government counsel representing the VA in court. It is fair to assume, in most contexts, that lawyers know what their clients know, and this is especially true when the client is the United States, which, as just noted, has a duty to deal fairly with opposing litigants. 3 The government's motion to dismiss was a continuing representation of facts to the Court; if these facts were no longer correct, the government, knowing of this change, had a duty to report the changed circumstances to the Court.",
"The failure of the government to inform the District Court of the new information, the denial of the administrative claim, was, thus, a breach of duty.2 4 We take the case, therefore, as if the government had fulfilled its duty. Although administrative remedies had not been exhausted when suit was filed, they were exhausted before any substantial progress had been made on the case. Several courts have held that when the plaintiff files an administrative claim after filing in district court, and the claim is subsequently denied, refiling is not necessary and objections for failure to exhaust administrative remedies are moot. In Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979), the plaintiffs filed an administrative complaint several months after they had filed suit. The Third Circuit held that \"[w]here the administrative claim is denied before any substantial progress has been made in the pending litigation, the suit need not be refiled to be effective .... To hold that refiling was necessary would involve duplicitous pleadings and wasted effort.\"",
"581 F.2d at 1098. See also Campbell v. United States, 534 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D.Hawaii 1982); Clark v. United States, 481 F. Supp. 1086, 1098-99 (S.D.N.Y.1979), appeal dismissed as to other defendants, 624 F.2d 3 (2d Cir.1980). 5 Although the District Court cannot be said to have committed any error, since it acted quite properly on the basis of the facts as it believed them to be, it is our duty to vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.",
"We hold that the District Court does have jurisdiction of the complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Whether all of the theories that the complaint may be read to allege in fact state claims under that Act is of course another question, to be explored on remand. 6 The District Court also observed (correctly) that the \"Veterans Administration\" is not a suable entity. The case should have been brought against the United States as such, and on remand the District Court should grant leave to amend the complaint accordingly. The Court should also consider whether to appoint counsel for plaintiff. 7 Plaintiff has been represented on this appeal by counsel appointed by this Court. We thank her for her service to her client and to us. 8 Vacated and remanded.",
"1 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2675(a) (1982), provides: An action shall not be instituted upon a claim against the United States for money damages for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing and sent by certified or registered mail. The failure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of this section. 2 Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2), which imposes an analogous duty on all parties in the context of discovery: A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if he obtains information upon the basis of which ... he knows that the response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/443272/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
This case was twice before the territorial court prior to this appeal. The cases are reported in 9 Utah 49, and 12 Utah 209. Upon each occasion the record discloses Pac. 292. Upon each occasion the record discloses a somewhat dissimilar state of facts. The case now presents a somewhat different state of facts from those presented on the last appeal, so far as appears from the opinion rendered. The first question arises upon the charge of the court as given, and the refusal of *Page 206 the court to charge as requested. In some respects the testimony bearing upon the question involved is somewhat indefinite and unsatisfactory. The jury were the judges of its weight and conclusiveness, and found against the plaintiffs. There are sufficient facts and circumstances disclosed in the record from which the jury could infer or find that Jungk, Fabian, and Scott were partners for the purpose of purchasing sheep, and that Jungk and Fabian knew at the time, or were chargeable with notice, that Scott was a partner with Cropper and Reed, or at least interested with them in the contracts for the purchase and sale of sheep to them; that Cropper, Reed, and Scott were partners in the purchase and sale of sheep to Jungk and Fabian; that Cropper and Reed knew, or were chargeable with notice, that Scott was a partner or interested in the contract for the purchase of sheep with Jungk and Fabian; that defendants Holbrook and Duggins were wholly ignorant of the double relation existing between Scott and the two firms at the time they signed the guaranty contract and the notes given in pursuance of it, and would not have executed the contract or indorsed the notes had the true state of facts been made known to them by either firm; that the concealment of these facts and circumstances immediately affected the liability of the sureties; that Cropper and Reed and Jungk and Fabian fraudulently withheld from the sureties the true state of facts existing between them and Scott when the indorsements were made; that each of these firms knew that Scott was their partner in the transactions with the other firm, and that the sureties were making the indorsement in ignorance of the relation; that Jungk and Fabian sent Scott, as their agent and representative, to obtain the signatures of Holbrook and Duggins to *Page 207 the contract; that Scott was their partner at the time; that Jungk and Fabian knew, or were chargeable with notice, that Cropper, Reed, and Scott owned sheep together at Oasis, and had them there when Fabian was present; that Reed and Cropper and Jungk and Fabian, knowing the facts, induced the sureties to sign the notes, and fraudulently withheld from them the double relation of Scott, as affecting their interest and liability. If, in obtaining the signatures of these defendants to the contract of suretyship, or as indorsers of the notes made in continuation of their supposed liability, there was any fraudulent concealment on the part of Cropper and Reed and Jungk and Fabian, or either of said firms, of any fact or circumstance within their knowledge, or concerning which they were reasonably chargeable with notice, which materially affected and increased the liability and responsibility of Holbrook and Duggins as sureties or indorsers in those transactions in which they were sureties, and operated to their prejudice, then the sureties should be discharged. "It has been held that the mere non-communication by the creditor to the surety of material facts within the knowledge of the creditor which the surety should know, although not willful or intentional on the part of the creditor, or with a view to advantage to himself, will discharge the surety." The fraud upon the sureties consists in the situation in which they were placed by the conduct of the other parties, and not on what was passing in their minds, not expressed, but concealed. Upon this subject, Brandt on Suretyship (section 420) says: "It has been held that `one who becomes surety for another must ordinarily be presumed to do so upon the belief that the transaction between the principal parties is one occurring in the usual course of business of that description, subjecting *Page 208 him only to the ordinary risks attending it; and the party to whom he becomes a surety must be presumed to know that such will be his understanding, and that he will act upon it unless he is informed that there are extraordinary circumstances affecting the risk. To receive a surety known to be acting upon the belief that there are no unusual circumstances by which his risks will be materially increased, well knowing that there are such circumstances, and having an opportunity to make them known, and withholding them, must be regarded as a legal fraud, by which the surety will be relieved from his contract.'" It is also held that, in order to discharge the surety, the undisclosed information should relate to business which is the subject of suretyship. Story says: "The contract of surety imports entire good faith and confidence between the parties in regard to the whole transaction. Any concealment of material facts, or any express or implied misrepresentation of such facts, or any undue advantage taken of the surety by the creditor, either by surprise or by withholding proper information, will undoubtedly furnish a sufficient ground to invalidate the contract. Upon the same ground, the creditor is, in all subsequent transactions with the debtor, bound to equal good faith to the surety." Story Eq. Jur. § 324; Bank v. Cooper, 36 Me. 179; Brandt Sur. §§ 419-421;Comstock v. Gage, 91 Ill. 328; Bank v. Stevens, 39 Me. 532;Jungk v. Reed, 9 Utah 49; Peck v. Durrett, 9 Dana 486; Pidcock v.Bishop, 1 Law Lib. 87; Doughty v. Savage, 28 Conn. 146; Hamilton v.Mathews, 10 Clark F. 934; Warren v. Branch, 15 W. Va. 21. It is said that that "test as to whether the disclosure should be voluntarily made is whether there is a contract between the debtor and creditor to the effect that his position shall be a different one from that which *Page 209 the surety might expect." Hamilton v. Watson, 12 Clark F. 109. These sureties did not know that Scott was a partner of each firm on the contract concerning which they were sureties, and did not indorse with the knowledge that they were becoming liable for the acts of Scott in the manipulation of the business of the several firms. They signed as sureties for Cropper and Reed, relying upon their integrity, and not as sureties for Cropper, Reed, and Scott. When they signed, they were not informed that a member of both firms had laid plans with each, by which the sureties should be robbed, and Cropper and Reed ruined, for the benefit of one member of the several firms. Nor did the sureties know that Cropper and Reed and Jungk and Fabian were either passive or active agents in such resulting dishonesty. Neither did the sureties know that Jungk and Fabian knew that Scott was interested with Cropper and Reed in the sale of sheep, nor that Cropper and Reed knew that Scott was interested with Jungk and Fabian in the purchase of sheep. If a material fact connected with the contract of suretyship, and directly affecting the sureties' liability, which might influence the sureties in entering into the contract, is concealed from the sureties, or, if knowing the fact, such information is purposely concealed from the sureties, in the interest of the creditor, such concealment, though no inquiry is made by the sureties, amounts to a fraud upon the sureties, and would discharge them from liability. Under all the facts and circumstances shown for the consideration of the jury, they have found the facts against the appellants. We find no reversible error in the instructions of the court, nor is there any error in refusing to give the instructions asked by the plaintiffs. *Page 210 Prior to the trial, plaintiffs moved the district court for Utah county for an order transferring said cause for trial to Salt Lake county. The motion was based upon an affidavit showing that plaintiffs owned the notes, and had resided in Salt Lake county since they were given, and that they were payable at Salt Lake. The motion was overruled, and an exception taken. The motion is based on section 7 of article 24, and section 5 of article 8, of the constitution. Plaintiffs resided in Salt Lake City when they commenced this action in the First district court in Utah county, January 10, 1891. This case had been tried in that county three times prior to the last trial, which occurred October 9, 1896. The defendants resided in Provo, Utah county. Section 5 of article 8 of the constitution provides, among other things, that all civil and criminal business arising in any county must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue be taken, in such cases as may be provided by law. Section 7 of article 24 of the constitution provides, among other things, that all actions and cases pending in the district and supreme courts of the territory at the time the state is admitted into the Union shall, except as otherwise provided, be transferred to the supreme court and district courts of the state. Section 2 of article 24 of the constitution provides that all laws of the territory now in force, and not repugnant to the constitution, shall remain in force until they expire of their own limitation, or are altered or repealed by the legislature. Section 5 of article 8 of the constitution is only prospective in its operations, and therefore does not apply to actions which were commenced and pending in the territorial district courts when the constitution went into effect. A constitutional provision should not be construed with a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention *Page 211 of the words used. Black, Const. Law, p. 70; End. Interp. St. § 506;Watt v. Wright, 66 Cal. 202; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88;People v. County Com'rs of Grand Co., 6 Colo. 204; Lehigh Iron Co. v.Lower Macungie Tp., 81 Pa. St. 484. Section 2 of article 24 of the constitution continues in force, under the state, such territorial laws `as were not repugnant to it, and thereby makes them state laws. This court so held in Whipple v.Henderson, 13 Utah 374; Pleasant Val. Coal Co. v. Board of Com'rs,15 Utah 97. Among the laws of the territory then in force with reference to the place of trial were sections 3193 to 3201, Comp. Laws Utah 1888, which were amended (Sess. Laws 1896, p. 90) by making these sections conform to the new condition of things under the constitution. The territorial act was substantially re-enacted after striking out the words "judicial district," and substituting the word "county." The act was approved and took effect February 17, 1896, before this motion was made. This act provides where cases shall be commenced and tried, and when and where they may be removed for trial. Section 3196 provides that "in all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action." When this action was commenced, the plaintiffs resided in Salt Lake, and the defendants in Utah, county. The First district formerly comprised Utah and several other counties. Under the new constitution, Utah county is made distinct by itself. The action was brought in pursuance of law in the proper county under the statute as it then existed. This statute was continued in force until changed by the act of 1896. We are of the opinion that the district court of Utah county properly assumed jurisdiction in this case. We *Page 212 find no reversible error in the proceedings. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, with costs. ZANE, C. J., concurs. HART, District Judge, concurs in the result. *Page 196 | 07-06-2016 | [
"This case was twice before the territorial court prior to this appeal. The cases are reported in 9 Utah 49, and 12 Utah 209. Upon each occasion the record discloses Pac. 292. Upon each occasion the record discloses a somewhat dissimilar state of facts. The case now presents a somewhat different state of facts from those presented on the last appeal, so far as appears from the opinion rendered. The first question arises upon the charge of the court as given, and the refusal of *Page 206 the court to charge as requested. In some respects the testimony bearing upon the question involved is somewhat indefinite and unsatisfactory. The jury were the judges of its weight and conclusiveness, and found against the plaintiffs.",
"There are sufficient facts and circumstances disclosed in the record from which the jury could infer or find that Jungk, Fabian, and Scott were partners for the purpose of purchasing sheep, and that Jungk and Fabian knew at the time, or were chargeable with notice, that Scott was a partner with Cropper and Reed, or at least interested with them in the contracts for the purchase and sale of sheep to them; that Cropper, Reed, and Scott were partners in the purchase and sale of sheep to Jungk and Fabian; that Cropper and Reed knew, or were chargeable with notice, that Scott was a partner or interested in the contract for the purchase of sheep with Jungk and Fabian; that defendants Holbrook and Duggins were wholly ignorant of the double relation existing between Scott and the two firms at the time they signed the guaranty contract and the notes given in pursuance of it, and would not have executed the contract or indorsed the notes had the true state of facts been made known to them by either firm; that the concealment of these facts and circumstances immediately affected the liability of the sureties; that Cropper and Reed and Jungk and Fabian fraudulently withheld from the sureties the true state of facts existing between them and Scott when the indorsements were made; that each of these firms knew that Scott was their partner in the transactions with the other firm, and that the sureties were making the indorsement in ignorance of the relation; that Jungk and Fabian sent Scott, as their agent and representative, to obtain the signatures of Holbrook and Duggins to *Page 207 the contract; that Scott was their partner at the time; that Jungk and Fabian knew, or were chargeable with notice, that Cropper, Reed, and Scott owned sheep together at Oasis, and had them there when Fabian was present; that Reed and Cropper and Jungk and Fabian, knowing the facts, induced the sureties to sign the notes, and fraudulently withheld from them the double relation of Scott, as affecting their interest and liability.",
"If, in obtaining the signatures of these defendants to the contract of suretyship, or as indorsers of the notes made in continuation of their supposed liability, there was any fraudulent concealment on the part of Cropper and Reed and Jungk and Fabian, or either of said firms, of any fact or circumstance within their knowledge, or concerning which they were reasonably chargeable with notice, which materially affected and increased the liability and responsibility of Holbrook and Duggins as sureties or indorsers in those transactions in which they were sureties, and operated to their prejudice, then the sureties should be discharged. \"It has been held that the mere non-communication by the creditor to the surety of material facts within the knowledge of the creditor which the surety should know, although not willful or intentional on the part of the creditor, or with a view to advantage to himself, will discharge the surety.\" The fraud upon the sureties consists in the situation in which they were placed by the conduct of the other parties, and not on what was passing in their minds, not expressed, but concealed. Upon this subject, Brandt on Suretyship (section 420) says: \"It has been held that `one who becomes surety for another must ordinarily be presumed to do so upon the belief that the transaction between the principal parties is one occurring in the usual course of business of that description, subjecting *Page 208 him only to the ordinary risks attending it; and the party to whom he becomes a surety must be presumed to know that such will be his understanding, and that he will act upon it unless he is informed that there are extraordinary circumstances affecting the risk.",
"To receive a surety known to be acting upon the belief that there are no unusual circumstances by which his risks will be materially increased, well knowing that there are such circumstances, and having an opportunity to make them known, and withholding them, must be regarded as a legal fraud, by which the surety will be relieved from his contract.'\" It is also held that, in order to discharge the surety, the undisclosed information should relate to business which is the subject of suretyship. Story says: \"The contract of surety imports entire good faith and confidence between the parties in regard to the whole transaction. Any concealment of material facts, or any express or implied misrepresentation of such facts, or any undue advantage taken of the surety by the creditor, either by surprise or by withholding proper information, will undoubtedly furnish a sufficient ground to invalidate the contract. Upon the same ground, the creditor is, in all subsequent transactions with the debtor, bound to equal good faith to the surety.\"",
"Story Eq. Jur. § 324; Bank v. Cooper, 36 Me. 179; Brandt Sur. §§ 419-421;Comstock v. Gage, 91 Ill. 328; Bank v. Stevens, 39 Me. 532;Jungk v. Reed, 9 Utah 49; Peck v. Durrett, 9 Dana 486; Pidcock v.Bishop, 1 Law Lib. 87; Doughty v. Savage, 28 Conn. 146; Hamilton v.Mathews, 10 Clark F. 934; Warren v. Branch, 15 W. Va. 21. It is said that that \"test as to whether the disclosure should be voluntarily made is whether there is a contract between the debtor and creditor to the effect that his position shall be a different one from that which *Page 209 the surety might expect.\" Hamilton v. Watson, 12 Clark F. 109. These sureties did not know that Scott was a partner of each firm on the contract concerning which they were sureties, and did not indorse with the knowledge that they were becoming liable for the acts of Scott in the manipulation of the business of the several firms.",
"They signed as sureties for Cropper and Reed, relying upon their integrity, and not as sureties for Cropper, Reed, and Scott. When they signed, they were not informed that a member of both firms had laid plans with each, by which the sureties should be robbed, and Cropper and Reed ruined, for the benefit of one member of the several firms. Nor did the sureties know that Cropper and Reed and Jungk and Fabian were either passive or active agents in such resulting dishonesty. Neither did the sureties know that Jungk and Fabian knew that Scott was interested with Cropper and Reed in the sale of sheep, nor that Cropper and Reed knew that Scott was interested with Jungk and Fabian in the purchase of sheep. If a material fact connected with the contract of suretyship, and directly affecting the sureties' liability, which might influence the sureties in entering into the contract, is concealed from the sureties, or, if knowing the fact, such information is purposely concealed from the sureties, in the interest of the creditor, such concealment, though no inquiry is made by the sureties, amounts to a fraud upon the sureties, and would discharge them from liability.",
"Under all the facts and circumstances shown for the consideration of the jury, they have found the facts against the appellants. We find no reversible error in the instructions of the court, nor is there any error in refusing to give the instructions asked by the plaintiffs. *Page 210 Prior to the trial, plaintiffs moved the district court for Utah county for an order transferring said cause for trial to Salt Lake county.",
"The motion was based upon an affidavit showing that plaintiffs owned the notes, and had resided in Salt Lake county since they were given, and that they were payable at Salt Lake. The motion was overruled, and an exception taken. The motion is based on section 7 of article 24, and section 5 of article 8, of the constitution. Plaintiffs resided in Salt Lake City when they commenced this action in the First district court in Utah county, January 10, 1891. This case had been tried in that county three times prior to the last trial, which occurred October 9, 1896.",
"The defendants resided in Provo, Utah county. Section 5 of article 8 of the constitution provides, among other things, that all civil and criminal business arising in any county must be tried in such county, unless a change of venue be taken, in such cases as may be provided by law. Section 7 of article 24 of the constitution provides, among other things, that all actions and cases pending in the district and supreme courts of the territory at the time the state is admitted into the Union shall, except as otherwise provided, be transferred to the supreme court and district courts of the state. Section 2 of article 24 of the constitution provides that all laws of the territory now in force, and not repugnant to the constitution, shall remain in force until they expire of their own limitation, or are altered or repealed by the legislature. Section 5 of article 8 of the constitution is only prospective in its operations, and therefore does not apply to actions which were commenced and pending in the territorial district courts when the constitution went into effect.",
"A constitutional provision should not be construed with a retrospective operation, unless that is the unmistakable intention *Page 211 of the words used. Black, Const. Law, p. 70; End. Interp. St. § 506;Watt v. Wright, 66 Cal. 202; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88;People v. County Com'rs of Grand Co., 6 Colo. 204; Lehigh Iron Co. v.Lower Macungie Tp., 81 Pa. St. 484. Section 2 of article 24 of the constitution continues in force, under the state, such territorial laws `as were not repugnant to it, and thereby makes them state laws.",
"This court so held in Whipple v.Henderson, 13 Utah 374; Pleasant Val. Coal Co. v. Board of Com'rs,15 Utah 97. Among the laws of the territory then in force with reference to the place of trial were sections 3193 to 3201, Comp. Laws Utah 1888, which were amended (Sess. Laws 1896, p. 90) by making these sections conform to the new condition of things under the constitution. The territorial act was substantially re-enacted after striking out the words \"judicial district,\" and substituting the word \"county.\" The act was approved and took effect February 17, 1896, before this motion was made. This act provides where cases shall be commenced and tried, and when and where they may be removed for trial. Section 3196 provides that \"in all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the defendants, or some of them, reside at the commencement of the action.\" When this action was commenced, the plaintiffs resided in Salt Lake, and the defendants in Utah, county.",
"The First district formerly comprised Utah and several other counties. Under the new constitution, Utah county is made distinct by itself. The action was brought in pursuance of law in the proper county under the statute as it then existed. This statute was continued in force until changed by the act of 1896. We are of the opinion that the district court of Utah county properly assumed jurisdiction in this case. We *Page 212 find no reversible error in the proceedings. The judgment of the district court is affirmed, with costs. ZANE, C. J., concurs. HART, District Judge, concurs in the result.",
"*Page 196"
]
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Mr. Justice Trunkey delivered the opinion of the court March 21st, 1887. The language of the will must be interpreted according to its proper acceptation, or with as near approach to that acceptation, as the context and state of the circumstances existing at the time of its execution will admit. A mistake in the wilL cannot be corrected, unless it clearly appears by fair inference from the whole. In this court the appellant has not contended that parol evidence is admissible of the actual intention of the testator for the purpose of controlling or influencing the construction of his will. This will contains seven “items,” and only the fifth contains no bequest to the testator’s wife. He first bequeaths to her all his personal estate, except a specified portion. The second and fourth items contain devises of real estate, each “ subject to the payment of the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per annum unto my widow, Catharine, for and during the term ,of her natural life.” In the third item real estate is devised to William Hellerman, “ subject to the payment of the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars unto my widow, Catharine, for and during all the term of her natural life.” In the sixth item the testator provides that in case his daughter Caroline should die before his widow, that his widow shall have the rents and profits of certain land “during the term’of her natural life.” And in the seventh item the testator devises his homestead farm, subject to the right of his widow, Catharine, to reside on the same “ during the term of her natural life,” and to receive'one third of the rents and profits “ during her life.” After having made five annual payments of one hundred and twenty-five dollars to the widow, the appellant discovered that the words “per annum” had been omitted in the clause creating the charge on the land devised to him. Being interested, he naturally inferred that the words in said clause, “during all the term of her natural life,” were meaningless, though so often used in their proper sense in other parts of the will where money and rents are directed to be paid to her during said period. That he did not sooner discover the omission is not surprising. It seems plain that he took the land, subject to an annual payment during the life of the widow. The testator used apt words to express his intention, and the several devises, subject to annual payments to the widow, are in similar phrase as respects the duration of the charge. Had the testator intended to charge one devise with a single small *129payment, he would have simply directed its payment to his widow, and not have repeated that phrase, omitting a word, thereby rendering the phrase senseless. It is a fair inference from the whole will that the words “ per annum” were omitted from said clause by mistake. It is unnecessary to repeat the reference to the authorities, made by the Master and court below, which establish the principle that a word may be supplied when it is a clear inference from the whole will that it Avas omitted by mistake. Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at costs of the appellant. | 02-17-2022 | [
"Mr. Justice Trunkey delivered the opinion of the court March 21st, 1887. The language of the will must be interpreted according to its proper acceptation, or with as near approach to that acceptation, as the context and state of the circumstances existing at the time of its execution will admit. A mistake in the wilL cannot be corrected, unless it clearly appears by fair inference from the whole. In this court the appellant has not contended that parol evidence is admissible of the actual intention of the testator for the purpose of controlling or influencing the construction of his will.",
"This will contains seven “items,” and only the fifth contains no bequest to the testator’s wife. He first bequeaths to her all his personal estate, except a specified portion. The second and fourth items contain devises of real estate, each “ subject to the payment of the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per annum unto my widow, Catharine, for and during the term ,of her natural life.” In the third item real estate is devised to William Hellerman, “ subject to the payment of the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars unto my widow, Catharine, for and during all the term of her natural life.” In the sixth item the testator provides that in case his daughter Caroline should die before his widow, that his widow shall have the rents and profits of certain land “during the term’of her natural life.” And in the seventh item the testator devises his homestead farm, subject to the right of his widow, Catharine, to reside on the same “ during the term of her natural life,” and to receive'one third of the rents and profits “ during her life.” After having made five annual payments of one hundred and twenty-five dollars to the widow, the appellant discovered that the words “per annum” had been omitted in the clause creating the charge on the land devised to him. Being interested, he naturally inferred that the words in said clause, “during all the term of her natural life,” were meaningless, though so often used in their proper sense in other parts of the will where money and rents are directed to be paid to her during said period.",
"That he did not sooner discover the omission is not surprising. It seems plain that he took the land, subject to an annual payment during the life of the widow. The testator used apt words to express his intention, and the several devises, subject to annual payments to the widow, are in similar phrase as respects the duration of the charge. Had the testator intended to charge one devise with a single small *129payment, he would have simply directed its payment to his widow, and not have repeated that phrase, omitting a word, thereby rendering the phrase senseless. It is a fair inference from the whole will that the words “ per annum” were omitted from said clause by mistake. It is unnecessary to repeat the reference to the authorities, made by the Master and court below, which establish the principle that a word may be supplied when it is a clear inference from the whole will that it Avas omitted by mistake. Decree affirmed, and appeal dismissed at costs of the appellant."
]
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LAND, J. The accused was indicted for murder, and pleaded not guilty. On the day set for the trial of the ease the following entry was made on the minutes of the court, to wit: “On motion of the district attorney, the defendant was called for trial on the charge of manslaughter.” The trial proceeded, and the accused was found guilty as charged by the unanimous verdict of the jury. A motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and the accused was sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for 10 years. The accused has appealed. We find attached to the record a bill of exception, not signed by the trial judge, for the reason that “no such bill was taken.” The bill recites that the accused objected to going to trial on the charge of manslaughter “for the reason that the indictment for murder had never been nolle prossed.” As it appears on the record that the accused was indicted for murder and tried for manslaughter, we think the legality of the proceeding may be considered as on assignment of error. [1] The state had the right to abandon the charge of murder and to try the accused for manslaughter. Why should the accused complain of being relieved of all chance of conviction of the greater offense? See State v. Evans, 40 La. Ann. 216, 3 South. 838. [3] There is an unsigned, bill of exception to the alleged charge of the court that nine members of the jury could render a verdict. The trial judge certifies that “no such bill was taken.” The record shows that all of the jurors concurred in the verdict. Another bill, which the trial judge certifies was not reserved at the time, recites objections to rebuttal and surrebuttal evidence adduced on the part of the state. The bill shows that the same privilege was extended to the accused. [2] The last bill was signed by the judge, but is without merit. A defense witness may be cross-examined as to his relations with the accused, for the purpose of showing bias, though nothing was said on the point in the examination in chief. State v. Willingham, 33 La. Ann. 537; State v. Fletcher, 127 La. 602, 53 South. 877. The discrediting of a witness is always relevant to the issue. State v. Griggsby, 117 La. 1046, 42 South. 497. The bias of a witness may be proved by his own testimony upon cross-examination or by independent evidence. Underhill on Evidence, p. 305. After the cause was submitted, counsel for the accused filed briefs, in which, for the first time, objections were made based on alleged defects in the minutes of the court. Such objections come too late. Judgment affirmed. | 07-24-2022 | [
"LAND, J. The accused was indicted for murder, and pleaded not guilty. On the day set for the trial of the ease the following entry was made on the minutes of the court, to wit: “On motion of the district attorney, the defendant was called for trial on the charge of manslaughter.” The trial proceeded, and the accused was found guilty as charged by the unanimous verdict of the jury. A motion for a new trial was filed and overruled, and the accused was sentenced to imprisonment in the state penitentiary for 10 years. The accused has appealed.",
"We find attached to the record a bill of exception, not signed by the trial judge, for the reason that “no such bill was taken.” The bill recites that the accused objected to going to trial on the charge of manslaughter “for the reason that the indictment for murder had never been nolle prossed.” As it appears on the record that the accused was indicted for murder and tried for manslaughter, we think the legality of the proceeding may be considered as on assignment of error. [1] The state had the right to abandon the charge of murder and to try the accused for manslaughter.",
"Why should the accused complain of being relieved of all chance of conviction of the greater offense? See State v. Evans, 40 La. Ann. 216, 3 South. 838. [3] There is an unsigned, bill of exception to the alleged charge of the court that nine members of the jury could render a verdict. The trial judge certifies that “no such bill was taken.” The record shows that all of the jurors concurred in the verdict. Another bill, which the trial judge certifies was not reserved at the time, recites objections to rebuttal and surrebuttal evidence adduced on the part of the state. The bill shows that the same privilege was extended to the accused. [2] The last bill was signed by the judge, but is without merit.",
"A defense witness may be cross-examined as to his relations with the accused, for the purpose of showing bias, though nothing was said on the point in the examination in chief. State v. Willingham, 33 La. Ann. 537; State v. Fletcher, 127 La. 602, 53 South. 877. The discrediting of a witness is always relevant to the issue. State v. Griggsby, 117 La. 1046, 42 South. 497. The bias of a witness may be proved by his own testimony upon cross-examination or by independent evidence. Underhill on Evidence, p. 305. After the cause was submitted, counsel for the accused filed briefs, in which, for the first time, objections were made based on alleged defects in the minutes of the court. Such objections come too late. Judgment affirmed."
]
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[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE (#108) FACTS On January 17, 2001, the plaintiff, Jeffery Pines, filed a two count complaint against the defendant, Aaron Tomany. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile operated by the defendant when the automobile struck a tree causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries. Count one alleges that the defendant was negligent. Count two alleges that the defendant was reckless. The plaintiff alleges in both counts that the defendant was driving this automobile while he was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a.1 On April 20, 2001, the defendant filed an amended answer and two special defenses. The first special defense alleges that the plaintiff knew the defendant was operating the automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor and was negligent because he was a passenger in the automobile. The second special defense alleges that the plaintiff knew CT Page 11647 that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors and acted with reckless disregard of his own safety by being a passenger in an automobile with the defendant. On April 6, 2001, prior to the filing of the amended answer, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the first special defense and a memorandum of law in support of his motion. In his motion, the plaintiff moves to strike the first special defense on the ground it is legally insufficient. In his memorandum, the plaintiff argues the special defense is legally insufficient because it alleges a defense of assumption of the risk, which was statutorily abolished by General Statutes § 52-572 (h)(b).2 On April 20, 2001, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in objection to the defendant's motion. Oral argument was heard on the motion on April 30, 2001. DISCUSSION "Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike. . . ." Practice Book §10-39. "In . . . ruling on the . . . motion to strike, the trial court [has an] obligation to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v.Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded." (Citations omitted.) Parsons v. UnitedTechnologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 68, 700 A.2d 655 (1997). The defendant's first special defense provides "[i]f the defendant, Aaron Tomany, was operating his motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, which is hereby expressly denied, as is alleged by the plaintiff in his [c]omplaint, then the plaintiff, himself wasnegligent in that he was a passenger in the defendant's motor vehiclewhen he knew or should have known by reasonable use of faculties thatsaid defendant was operating his vehicle while so influenced." (Emphasis added.) The plaintiff moves to strike the first special defense on the ground that it is legally insufficient because it pleads a special defense of assumption of the risk that has been abolished by General Statutes §52-572h (b). The defendant argues that the motion should be denied, because he may plead the elements of the assumption of the risk doctrine as a special defense when the special defense itself alleges that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent. CT Page 11648 In support of his position, the defendant relies on Wendland v.Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 190 Conn. 791, 462 A.2d 1043 (1983). In Wendland our Supreme Court stated that "[t]he central purpose of 52-572h was to abolish the harsh common law rule that the doctrines of contributory negligence, last clear chance and assumption of risk operated as a complete bar to recovery. Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523,525-26, 409 A.2d 1006 (1979). In lieu of these doctrines, subsection (a) of 52-572h sets forth a single standard: comparative negligence. In determining the relative negligence of each party, however, the factors relevant to the assumption of risk doctrine may be considered by the trier. As long as the jury is properly instructed concerning the doctrine of comparative negligence; General Statutes 52-572h (b); elements involving the failure of the plaintiff to comprehend a risk may be specially pleaded and weighed by the trier in determining the propriety and totality of the plaintiffs conduct in relation to that of the defendant. `When a plaintiffs conduct in assuming a risk is unreasonable, then the [assumption of risk] doctrine overlaps contributory negligence and the principle of comparative negligence embodied in the statute should apply.' James, `Connecticut Comparative Negligence Statute: an Analysis of Some Problems,' 6 Conn.L.Rev. 207, 213 (1974)." (Brackets in original.) Wendland v. Ridgefield ConstructionServices, Inc., supra, 190 Conn. 797-98. In Anastasio v. Ladd, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 160470 (January 29, 2001, Doherty, J.), the court granted a plaintiffs motion to strike a special defense that alleged that "the plaintiff assumed the risk of riding in such vehicle by voluntarily and knowingly choosing to ride with an operator who was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs." (Emphasis in original.) In its decision the court reviewed numerous superior court decisions which have allowed defendants to assert special defenses that include elements of the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id. The court stated that it granted the plaintiffs motion to strike because "the defendant herein fails to allegea legally sufficient special defense of comparative negligence because hefails to allege any negligence on the part of the plaintiff." Id. (Emphasis added.) This court finds the legal analysis and rational of Anastasio persuasive. This court also agrees with the numerous other superior court decisions that have held that a defendant may assert a special defense that includes factors relevant to the assumption of the risk doctrine so long as the defendant alleges the plaintiff was negligent in entering the defendant's automobile. See Maulucci v. Canevari, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 368663 (February 26, 1993, Hennessey, J.) (8 Conn. L. Rptr. 438) (8 C.S.C.R. 293) (plaintiffs motion to for summary judgment denied where a special defense CT Page 11649 alleged that the plaintiff "knew or should have known of the condition of the driver, yet he voluntarily and willingly rode with him as a passenger in a motor vehicle."); Orr v. Maheux, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 438927 (December 10, 1990, Aronson, J.) (3 Conn. L. Rptr. 87) (motion to strike a special defense was denied where the special defense alleged that the plaintiff was negligent by voluntarily being a passenger when she believed the defendant was intoxicated); Wood v. Rich, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 398946 (December 15, 1997, Levin, J.) (motion to strike a special defense was denied where the special defense alleged that the plaintiff watched the defendant consume large quantities of alcohol and was negligent by being a passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant); Benoit v. Travelers Insurance Company, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 105293 (March 14, 1996, Hendel, J.) (court denied motion to strike a special defense which alleged that the plaintiffs decedent knew or should have known he was riding in a vehicle with a driver who was intoxicated); but see McCormack v. Sedlak, Superior court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 099914 (June 23, 1992, McDonald, J.) (6 Conn. L. Rptr. 594) (motion to strike special defense was granted where the special defense alleged that the plaintiff was negligent for being a passenger in a vehicle knowing that the defendant was intoxicated because assumption of the risk is not allowed as a defense to the violation of statutes designed to protect the public). In this instance, the defendant has specifically plead that the plaintiff "was negligent in that he was a passenger in the defendant's motor vehicle when he knew or should have known by reasonable use of his faculties that said defendant was operating his vehicle [while intoxicated]." This special defense alleges some of the elements of an assumption of the risk defense, but adequately pleads that the plaintiff's negligent acts lead to his injuries. As such, it states the special defense of comparative negligence. Therefore, the plaintiffs motion to strike the first special defense is denied. ___________________ Martin, J. | 07-05-2016 | [
"[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE (#108) FACTS On January 17, 2001, the plaintiff, Jeffery Pines, filed a two count complaint against the defendant, Aaron Tomany. The complaint alleges that the plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile operated by the defendant when the automobile struck a tree causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries. Count one alleges that the defendant was negligent. Count two alleges that the defendant was reckless. The plaintiff alleges in both counts that the defendant was driving this automobile while he was impaired by the consumption of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a.1 On April 20, 2001, the defendant filed an amended answer and two special defenses. The first special defense alleges that the plaintiff knew the defendant was operating the automobile under the influence of intoxicating liquor and was negligent because he was a passenger in the automobile. The second special defense alleges that the plaintiff knew CT Page 11647 that the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquors and acted with reckless disregard of his own safety by being a passenger in an automobile with the defendant.",
"On April 6, 2001, prior to the filing of the amended answer, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the first special defense and a memorandum of law in support of his motion. In his motion, the plaintiff moves to strike the first special defense on the ground it is legally insufficient. In his memorandum, the plaintiff argues the special defense is legally insufficient because it alleges a defense of assumption of the risk, which was statutorily abolished by General Statutes § 52-572 (h)(b).2 On April 20, 2001, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in objection to the defendant's motion. Oral argument was heard on the motion on April 30, 2001. DISCUSSION \"Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike. . .",
".\" Practice Book §10-39. \"In . . . ruling on the . . . motion to strike, the trial court [has an] obligation to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency.\" Connecticut National Bank v.Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992). \"A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded.\" (Citations omitted.) Parsons v. UnitedTechnologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 68, 700 A.2d 655 (1997). The defendant's first special defense provides \"[i]f the defendant, Aaron Tomany, was operating his motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor, which is hereby expressly denied, as is alleged by the plaintiff in his [c]omplaint, then the plaintiff, himself wasnegligent in that he was a passenger in the defendant's motor vehiclewhen he knew or should have known by reasonable use of faculties thatsaid defendant was operating his vehicle while so influenced.\" (Emphasis added.)",
"The plaintiff moves to strike the first special defense on the ground that it is legally insufficient because it pleads a special defense of assumption of the risk that has been abolished by General Statutes §52-572h (b). The defendant argues that the motion should be denied, because he may plead the elements of the assumption of the risk doctrine as a special defense when the special defense itself alleges that the plaintiff was comparatively negligent. CT Page 11648 In support of his position, the defendant relies on Wendland v.Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 190 Conn. 791, 462 A.2d 1043 (1983).",
"In Wendland our Supreme Court stated that \"[t]he central purpose of 52-572h was to abolish the harsh common law rule that the doctrines of contributory negligence, last clear chance and assumption of risk operated as a complete bar to recovery. Gomeau v. Forrest, 176 Conn. 523,525-26, 409 A.2d 1006 (1979). In lieu of these doctrines, subsection (a) of 52-572h sets forth a single standard: comparative negligence. In determining the relative negligence of each party, however, the factors relevant to the assumption of risk doctrine may be considered by the trier. As long as the jury is properly instructed concerning the doctrine of comparative negligence; General Statutes 52-572h (b); elements involving the failure of the plaintiff to comprehend a risk may be specially pleaded and weighed by the trier in determining the propriety and totality of the plaintiffs conduct in relation to that of the defendant.",
"`When a plaintiffs conduct in assuming a risk is unreasonable, then the [assumption of risk] doctrine overlaps contributory negligence and the principle of comparative negligence embodied in the statute should apply.' James, `Connecticut Comparative Negligence Statute: an Analysis of Some Problems,' 6 Conn.L.Rev. 207, 213 (1974).\" (Brackets in original.) Wendland v. Ridgefield ConstructionServices, Inc., supra, 190 Conn. 797-98. In Anastasio v. Ladd, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 160470 (January 29, 2001, Doherty, J. ), the court granted a plaintiffs motion to strike a special defense that alleged that \"the plaintiff assumed the risk of riding in such vehicle by voluntarily and knowingly choosing to ride with an operator who was under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs.\"",
"(Emphasis in original.) In its decision the court reviewed numerous superior court decisions which have allowed defendants to assert special defenses that include elements of the doctrine of assumption of risk. Id. The court stated that it granted the plaintiffs motion to strike because \"the defendant herein fails to allegea legally sufficient special defense of comparative negligence because hefails to allege any negligence on the part of the plaintiff.\" Id. (Emphasis added.) This court finds the legal analysis and rational of Anastasio persuasive. This court also agrees with the numerous other superior court decisions that have held that a defendant may assert a special defense that includes factors relevant to the assumption of the risk doctrine so long as the defendant alleges the plaintiff was negligent in entering the defendant's automobile. See Maulucci v. Canevari, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Docket No.",
"368663 (February 26, 1993, Hennessey, J.) (8 Conn. L. Rptr. 438) (8 C.S.C.R. 293) (plaintiffs motion to for summary judgment denied where a special defense CT Page 11649 alleged that the plaintiff \"knew or should have known of the condition of the driver, yet he voluntarily and willingly rode with him as a passenger in a motor vehicle. \"); Orr v. Maheux, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 438927 (December 10, 1990, Aronson, J.) (3 Conn. L. Rptr. 87) (motion to strike a special defense was denied where the special defense alleged that the plaintiff was negligent by voluntarily being a passenger when she believed the defendant was intoxicated); Wood v. Rich, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 398946 (December 15, 1997, Levin, J.)",
"(motion to strike a special defense was denied where the special defense alleged that the plaintiff watched the defendant consume large quantities of alcohol and was negligent by being a passenger in an automobile driven by the defendant); Benoit v. Travelers Insurance Company, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 105293 (March 14, 1996, Hendel, J.) (court denied motion to strike a special defense which alleged that the plaintiffs decedent knew or should have known he was riding in a vehicle with a driver who was intoxicated); but see McCormack v. Sedlak, Superior court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. 099914 (June 23, 1992, McDonald, J.) (6 Conn. L. Rptr. 594) (motion to strike special defense was granted where the special defense alleged that the plaintiff was negligent for being a passenger in a vehicle knowing that the defendant was intoxicated because assumption of the risk is not allowed as a defense to the violation of statutes designed to protect the public). In this instance, the defendant has specifically plead that the plaintiff \"was negligent in that he was a passenger in the defendant's motor vehicle when he knew or should have known by reasonable use of his faculties that said defendant was operating his vehicle [while intoxicated].\"",
"This special defense alleges some of the elements of an assumption of the risk defense, but adequately pleads that the plaintiff's negligent acts lead to his injuries. As such, it states the special defense of comparative negligence. Therefore, the plaintiffs motion to strike the first special defense is denied. ___________________ Martin, J."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/3350081/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1199-2 Filed 01/27/21 Page 1 of 3
United States District Court Southern District of New York Virginia L. Giuffre,
Plaintiff, Case No.: 15-cv-07433-RWS
v.
Ghislaine Maxwell,
Defendant.
____________________________/
DECLARATION OF SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION FOR THE COURT TO DIRECT DEFENDANT TO DISCLOSE ALL INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM DEFENDANT HAS DISSEMINATED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
I, Sigrid S. McCawley, declare that the below is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge as follows:
1. I am a partner with the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP and duly
licensed to practice in Florida and before this Court pursuant to this Court’s September 29, 2015
Order granting my Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice.
2. I respectfully submit this Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Protective Order and Motion for The Court to Direct Defendant To Disclose All Individuals To
Whom Defendant Has Disseminated Confidential Information.
3. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of May 18, 2016,
Correspondence from Jeff Pagliuca to Meredith Schultz.
4. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of May 20, 2016,
Correspondence from Meredith Schultz to Jeff Pagliuca.
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of July 29, 2016,
Correspondence from Ty Gee to Meredith Schultz.
1 Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1199-2 Filed 01/27/21 Page 2 of 3
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
_/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley________ Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq.
Dated: August 8, 2016.
Respectfully Submitted,
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP
By: ___/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley____________ Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice) Meredith Schultz (Pro Hac Vice) Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011
David Boies Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504
Bradley J. Edwards (Pro Hac Vice) FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. 425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 (954) 524-2820
Paul G. Cassell (Pro Hac Vice) S.J. Quinney College of Law University of Utah 383 University St. Salt Lake City, UT 84112 (801) 585-52021
1 This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private representation.
2 Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1199-2 Filed 01/27/21 Page 3 of 3
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of August, 2016, I electronically filed the
foregoing document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system. I also certify that the
foregoing document is being served to all parties of record via transmission of the Electronic
Court Filing System generated by CM/ECF.
Laura A. Menninger, Esq. Jeffrey Pagliuca, Esq. HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN, P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 Tel: (303) 831-7364 Fax: (303) 832-2628 Email: lmenninger@hmflaw.com jpagliuca@hmflaw.com
/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley Sigrid S. McCawley
3 | 2021-01-27 | [
"Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1199-2 Filed 01/27/21 Page 1 of 3 United States District Court Southern District of New York Virginia L. Giuffre, Plaintiff, Case No. : 15-cv-07433-RWS v. Ghislaine Maxwell, Defendant. ____________________________/ DECLARATION OF SIGRID S. MCCAWLEY IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND MOTION FOR THE COURT TO DIRECT DEFENDANT TO DISCLOSE ALL INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM DEFENDANT HAS DISSEMINATED CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION I, Sigrid S. McCawley, declare that the below is true and correct to the best of my knowledge as follows: 1. I am a partner with the law firm of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP and duly licensed to practice in Florida and before this Court pursuant to this Court’s September 29, 2015 Order granting my Application to Appear Pro Hac Vice. 2. I respectfully submit this Declaration in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Protective Order and Motion for The Court to Direct Defendant To Disclose All Individuals To Whom Defendant Has Disseminated Confidential Information.",
"3. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of May 18, 2016, Correspondence from Jeff Pagliuca to Meredith Schultz. 4. Attached hereto as Sealed Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of May 20, 2016, Correspondence from Meredith Schultz to Jeff Pagliuca. 5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of July 29, 2016, Correspondence from Ty Gee to Meredith Schultz. 1 Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1199-2 Filed 01/27/21 Page 2 of 3 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. _/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley________ Sigrid S. McCawley, Esq. Dated: August 8, 2016. Respectfully Submitted, BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP By: ___/s/ Sigrid S. McCawley____________ Sigrid McCawley (Pro Hac Vice) Meredith Schultz (Pro Hac Vice) Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP 401 E. Las Olas Blvd., Suite 1200 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 356-0011 David Boies Boies Schiller & Flexner LLP 333 Main Street Armonk, NY 10504 Bradley J. Edwards (Pro Hac Vice) FARMER, JAFFE, WEISSING, EDWARDS, FISTOS & LEHRMAN, P.L. 425 North Andrews Avenue, Suite 2 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 (954) 524-2820 Paul G. Cassell (Pro Hac Vice) S.J.",
"Quinney College of Law University of Utah 383 University St. Salt Lake City, UT 84112 (801) 585-52021 1 This daytime business address is provided for identification and correspondence purposes only and is not intended to imply institutional endorsement by the University of Utah for this private representation. 2 Case 1:15-cv-07433-LAP Document 1199-2 Filed 01/27/21 Page 3 of 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8th day of August, 2016, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of Court by using the CM/ECF system.",
"I also certify that the foregoing document is being served to all parties of record via transmission of the Electronic Court Filing System generated by CM/ECF. Laura A. Menninger, Esq. Jeffrey Pagliuca, Esq. HADDON, MORGAN & FOREMAN, P.C. 150 East 10th Avenue Denver, Colorado 80203 Tel: (303) 831-7364 Fax: (303) 832-2628 Email: lmenninger@hmflaw.com jpagliuca@hmflaw.com /s/ Sigrid S. McCawley Sigrid S. McCawley 3"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/159153426/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
*1212ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW, this 7th day of February, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED. Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter. | 09-25-2021 | [
"*1212ORDER PER CURIAM AND NOW, this 7th day of February, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is DENIED. Justice Mundy did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/4978151/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Exhibit 10.1 – Amended and Restated 1990 Long-Term Incentive Plan (effective October 1, 1999, as amended effective December 7, 2015)
AMENDED AND RESTATED LEE ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED 1990 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN (Effective October 1, 1999, As amended effective December 7, 2015)
Section 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
1.1Purposes
The purposes of the 1990 Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended, restated and extended (the “Plan”) of Lee Enterprises, Incorporated (the “Company”) are to promote the interests of the Company and its stockholders by (i) attracting and retaining executives and other key employees of outstanding ability; (ii) strengthening the Company’s capability to develop, maintain and direct a competent management team; (iii) motivating executives and other key employees, by means of performance-related incentives, to achieve longer-range performance goals; (iv) providing incentive compensation opportunities which are competitive with those of other major corporations; and (v) enabling such employees to participate in the long-term growth and financial success of the Company.
1.2Definitions
“Affiliate” - means any corporation or other entity (i) which is not a Subsidiary but as to which the Company possesses a direct or indirect ownership interest and has representation on the board of directors or any similar governing body; and (ii) which is designated by the Board of Directors as an “Affiliate” for purposes of this Plan.
“Award” - means a grant or award under Sections 2 through 3, inclusive, of the Plan.
“Board of Directors” - means the board of directors of the Company.
“Code” - means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended from time to time.
“Committee” - means the Executive Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors.
“Common Stock” - means the Common Stock, $0.01 par value, of the Company, which may be authorized and unissued shares or may be reacquired shares of such Common Stock, together with a Preferred Share Purchase Right.
“Corporation” - means the Company, its divisions, Subsidiaries and Affiliates.
“Disability Date” - means the date on which a Participant is deemed disabled under the employee benefit plans of the Corporation applicable to the Participant.
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“Employee” - means any key employee of the Corporation.
“Fair Market Value” - means, as the Committee shall determine, either (i) the average of the high and low prices of the Common Stock, or (ii) the closing price of the Common Stock, on the date on which it is to be valued hereunder as reported for New York Stock Exchange-Composite Transactions.
“Non-Employee Director” - has the meaning set forth in Rule 16b-3(3)(i) promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or any successor definition adopted by the Commission.
“Normal Retirement Date” - has the meaning set forth in the pension or retirement plan of the Corporation applicable to the Participant, or such other date as may be mutually agreed upon in writing by the Committee and the Participant.
“Participant” - means an Employee who is selected by the Committee to receive an Award under the Plan.
“Preferred Share Purchase Right” - means the right to the holders of “Common Stock” issued pursuant to the Plan to purchase from the Company one one-thousandth of a share of Series A Participating Convertible Preferred Stock, without par value, of the Company at a price of $150.00 per one one-thousandth of a Preferred Share, subject to adjustment in a “Change of Control”.
“Replacement Award” – means, in the context of a Change of Control under Section 1.6(d)(iii)(B), an award of stock options, stock appreciation rights, or restricted stock in any entity other than the Company resulting from, or the acquirer of assets in, a Business Combination, which (i) is no less favorable, in terms of value and vesting rights, than the original Award made under the Plan, and (ii) provides for immediate vesting in the case of the Participant’s termination of employment within one (1) year following the issuance of such Replacement Award.
“Restricted Period” - means a period of three (3) years, or such other period of years selected by the Committee, during which a grant of Restricted Stock may be forfeited to the Company.
“Restricted Stock” - means shares of Common Stock contingently granted to a Participant under Section 3 of the Plan.
“Stock Appreciation Rights” - shall have the meaning specified in Section 1.6(b).
“Subsidiary” - means any corporation in which the Company possesses directly or indirectly fifty percent (50%) or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of its stock having voting power; provided that with respect to incentive stock options granted hereunder, the term “subsidiary” shall be as defined in Section 425(f) or any successor provision of the Code.
1.3Administration
The Plan shall be administered by the Committee, which shall at all times consist of three (3) or more members, each of whom shall be a Non-Employee Director. The Committee shall have sole and complete authority to adopt, alter and repeal such administrative rules, guidelines and practices governing the operation of the Plan as it shall from time to time deem advisable, and to interpret the terms and provisions of the Plan. The Committee may delegate to one or more executive officers of the Company the power to make Awards to Participants who are not executive officers or directors of the Company, provided the Committee shall fix the maximum amount of such Awards for the group and a maximum amount for any one Participant. The Committee’s decisions are binding upon all parties. 2
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1.4Eligibility
All Employees who have demonstrated significant management potential or who have contributed, or are deemed likely to contribute, in a substantial measure to the successful performance of the Corporation, as determined by the Committee, are eligible to be Participants in the Plan.
1.5Shares Reserved
a. There shall be reserved for issuance pursuant to the Plan a total of 5,600,309 shares of Common Stock, together with sufficient shares to cover outstanding grants under the Plan as of December 26, 2014. In the event that (i) a stock option expires or is terminated unexercised as to any shares covered thereby, (ii) shares are forfeited for any reason under the Plan, or (iii) shares are tendered as consideration for the exercise of options under Section 2.3 or for withholding of taxes under Section 1.7, such shares shall thereafter be again available for issuance pursuant to the Plan. In the event that a stock option is surrendered for payment pursuant to Section 1.6(b) hereof, the shares covered by the stock option shall not thereafter be available for issuance pursuant to the Plan.
b. In the event of any change in the outstanding shares of Common Stock by reason of any stock dividend or split, recapitalization, merger, consolidation, spin-off, combination or exchange of shares or other corporate change, or any distributions to common shareholders other than cash dividends, the Committee shall make such substitution or adjustment, if any, as it deems to be equitable to accomplish fairly the purposes of the Plan and to preserve the intended benefits of the Plan to the Participants and the Corporation, as to the number (including the number specified in Section 1.5(a) above) or kind of shares of Common Stock or other securities issued or reserved for issuance pursuant to the Plan, including the number of outstanding stock options, the option prices thereof, and the number of outstanding Awards of other types.
1.6Change of Control
a. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary, in the event of a Change of Control: any stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights outstanding as of the date such Change of Control is determined to have occurred, and which are not then exercisable and vested, shall not immediately vest, and any Restricted Stock shall remain subject to any applicable restrictions, but shall remain in effect in accordance with their terms, unless the Participant is terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation within one (1) year following a Change of Control described in this subsection, in which case (i) such stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights shall become fully exercisable and vested to the full extent of the original grant; and (ii) the restrictions and deferral limitations applicable to any Restricted Stock shall lapse, and such Restricted Stock shall become free of all restrictions and become fully vested and transferable to the full extent of the original grant. For purposes of this subsection, a Participant shall be deemed to have been immediately terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation in the event of a Change of Control described in Sections 1.6(d)(iii) or (iv).
3
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b. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary, if, following a Change of Control an optionee is terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation within one (1) year following a Change of Control, then, during the 60-day period from and after such termination of employment (the “Exercise Period”), unless the Committee shall determine otherwise at the time of grant, the optionee shall have the right, whether or not the stock option is fully exercisable and in lieu of the payment of the exercise price for the shares of Common Stock being purchased under the stock option and by giving notice to the Company, to elect (within the Exercise Period) to surrender all or part of the stock option to the Company and to receive cash, within 30 days of such notice, in an amount equal to the amount by which the Change of Control Price per share of Common Stock on the date of such election shall exceed the exercise price per share of Common Stock under the stock option multiplied by the number of shares of Common Stock granted under the stock option as to which the right granted under this Section 1.6(b) shall have been exercised (“Stock Appreciation Rights”). For purposes of this subsection, a Participant shall be deemed to have been immediately terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation in the event of a Change of Control described in Sections 1.6(d)(iii) or (iv).
c. For purposes of the Plan, “Change of Control Price” means the higher of (i) the highest reported sales price, regular way, of a share of Common Stock in any transaction reported on the New York Stock Exchange - Composite Tape or other national exchange on which such shares are listed or on NASDAQ during the 60-day period prior to and including the date of a Change of Control or (ii) if the Change of Control is the result of a tender or exchange offer or a Business Combination, the highest price per share of Common Stock paid in such tender or exchange offer or Business Combination; provided, however, that in the case of incentive stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights relating to incentive stock options, the Change of Control Price shall be in all cases the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock on the date such incentive stock option or Stock Appreciation Right is exercised. To the extent that the consideration paid in any such transaction described above consists all or in part of securities or other noncash consideration, the value of such securities or other noncash consideration shall be determined in the sole discretion of the Board.
d. For purposes of this Plan, a “Change of Control” means:
i. the acquisition by any individual, entity or group (within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) or 14(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”)) (a “Person”) of beneficial ownership (within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 promulgated under the Exchange Act) (“Beneficial Ownership”) of 15% or more of the Common Stock; provided, however, that for purposes of this subsection (i), the following acquisitions do not constitute a Change of Control: (A) any acquisition directly from the Company, (B) any acquisition by the Company, (C) any acquisition by any employee benefit plan (or related trust) sponsored or maintained by the Company or any corporation controlled by the Company (D) any acquisition by a Person of Beneficial Ownership of less than 25% of the Common Stock if such Person reports, or is required to report such Beneficial Ownership on Schedule 13G under the Exchange Act or Schedule 13D of the Exchange Act (or any comparable or successor report), which Schedule 13D does not state any present intention to (or reserve the right to) hold such Common Stock with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the Company, nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, or (E) any acquisition pursuant to a transaction that complies with clauses (A) or (B) of subsection (iii) below; or
4
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ii. individuals who, as of the date hereof, constitute the Board (the “Incumbent Board”) cease for any reason to constitute at least a majority of the Board; provided, however, that any individual becoming a director subsequent to the date hereof whose election, or nomination for election by the Company’s shareholders, was approved by a vote of at least a majority of the directors then comprising the Incumbent Board shall be considered as though such individual were a member of the Incumbent Board, but excluding, for this purpose, any such individual whose initial assumption of office occurs as a result of an actual or threatened election contest with respect to the election or removal of directors or other actual or threatened solicitation of proxies or consents by or on behalf of a Person other than the Board; or
iii. consummation of a reorganization, merger, statutory share exchange or consolidation or similar transaction involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries, a sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company or the acquisition of assets or stock of another (entity by the Company or any of its subsidiaries (each, a “Business Combination”), in each case, unless, following such Business Combination, (A) (1) all or substantially all of the individuals and entities that were the beneficial owners, respectively, of the Common Stock immediately prior to such Business Combination beneficially own, directly or indirectly, more than 60% of the Common Stock or, with respect to an entity other than the Company, the then outstanding shares of common stock (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent securities) and the combined voting power of the then-outstanding voting securities entitled to vote generally in the election of directors (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent governing body) of the entity resulting from such Business Combination (including, without limitation, an entity which as a result of such transaction owns the Company or all or substantially all of the Company’s assets either directly or through one or more subsidiaries) in substantially the same proportions as their ownership, immediately prior to such Business Combination of the Common Stock, (2) no Person (excluding any corporation resulting from such Business Combination or any employee benefit plan (or related trust) of the Company or such corporation resulting from such Business Combination) beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, 20% or more of the Common Stock or, with respect to an entity other than the Company, the then outstanding shares of common stock of the corporation resulting from such Business Combination (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent securities) or the combined voting power of the then outstanding voting securities of such entity, except to the extent that such ownership existed prior to the Business Combination and (3) at least a majority of the members of the board of directors (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent governing body) of the entity resulting from such Business Combination were members of the Incumbent Board at the time of the execution of the initial agreement, or of the action of the Board, providing for such Business Combination; or (B) if the Business Combination is the result of a reorganization, merger, statutory share exchange or consolidation or similar transaction involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries in which the Company is not the resulting entity, or a sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company, then each Award then-outstanding shall have been cancelled and substituted with a Replacement Award of equity in the acquiring entity; or
5
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iv. approval by the shareholders of the Company of a complete liquidation or dissolution of the Company.
1.7 Withholding
The Corporation shall have the right to deduct from all amounts paid in cash (whether under this Plan or otherwise) any taxes required by law or other amounts authorized by a Participant to be withheld therefrom. In the case of payments of Awards in the form of Common Stock, at the Committee’s discretion the Participant may be required to pay to the Corporation the amount of any taxes required to be withheld with respect to such Common Stock, or, in lieu thereof, the Corporation shall have the right to retain (or the Participant may be offered the opportunity to elect to tender) the number of shares of Common Stock whose Fair Market Value on the date such taxes are required to be withheld equals the amount required to be withheld.
1.8 Nontransferability
No Award shall be assignable or transferable, and no right or interest of any Participant shall be subject to any lien, obligation or liability of the Participant, except by will or the laws of descent and distribution.
1.9 No Right to Employment
No person shall have any claim or right to be granted an Award, and the grant of an Award shall not be construed as giving a Participant the right to be retained in the employ of the Corporation. Further, the Corporation expressly reserves the right at any time to dismiss a Participant free from any liability, or from any claim under the Plan, except as provided herein or in any agreement entered into with respect to an Award. 1.10 Construction of the Plan
The validity, construction, interpretation, administration and effect of the Plan and of its rules and regulations, and rights relating to the Plan, shall be determined solely in accordance with the laws of Delaware, without regard to conflict of law principles. 6
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1.11 Amendment
a. The Board of Directors may amend, suspend or terminate the Plan or any portion thereof and any Award hereunder at any time, provided that no amendment shall be made without stockholder approval which shall (i) increase (except as provided in Section 1.5(b) hereof) the total number of shares reserved for issuance pursuant to the Plan; (ii) change the class of Employees eligible to be Participants; (iii) decrease the minimum option prices stated herein (other than to change the manner of determining Fair Market Value to conform to any then applicable provision of the Code or regulations thereunder); (iv) extend the expiration date of the Plan as it applies to incentive stock options; or (v) withdraw the administration of the Plan from a committee consisting of three or more members, each of whom is a Non-Employee Director. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Committee may amend the Plan in such manner as may be necessary so as to have the Plan conform with applicable law and rules and regulations thereunder. Notwithstanding anything in this Plan to the contrary, following a Change of Control the Board may not amend the Plan in a manner that would adversely affect any outstanding Award of a Participant without the written consent of such Participant.
b. Without limiting the power of the Board of Directors under Section 1.11(a), the Committee, with the Participant’s consent, may amend, modify or terminate any outstanding Award at any time prior to payment or exercise in any manner not inconsistent with the terms of the Plan, including without limitation, to change the date or dates as of which (i) a stock option becomes exercisable; (ii) or a Restricted Stock becomes nonforfeitable; or (iii) to cancel and reissue an Award under such different terms and conditions as it determines appropriate.
1.12Dividends, Equivalents and Voting Rights; Cash Payments
Awards may provide the Participant with (i) dividends or dividend equivalents and voting rights prior to either vesting or earnout; and (ii) to the extent determined by the Committee, cash payments in lieu of or in addition to an Award.
1.13Effective Date
The Plan shall be effective on October 1, 1999, subject to ratification by the stockholders of the Company. No incentive stock options may be granted under the Plan after December 4, 2024. 7
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Section 2: STOCK OPTIONS 2.1Authority of Committee
Subject to the provisions of the Plan, the Committee shall have sole and complete authority to determine the Employees to whom stock options shall be granted, the number of shares to be covered by each stock option and the conditions and limitations, if any, in addition to those set forth in Section 2.3 hereof, applicable to the exercise of the stock option. The number of shares of Common Stock with respect to which stock options may be granted to any Participant during any fiscal year shall not exceed 300,000 (subject to adjustment as provided in Section 1.5(b) hereof). The Committee shall have the authority to grant stock options that are intended to be, and qualify as, incentive stock options under Section 422A of the Code, or to grant non-qualified stock options, or to grant both types of stock options, except that incentive stock options can only be granted to Participants who are Employees of the Company or a Subsidiary. In the case of incentive stock options, the terms and conditions of such grants shall be subject to and comply with such grant and vesting limitations as may be prescribed by Section 422A(d) of the Code, as from time to time amended, and any implementing regulations. Unless the Committee provides otherwise at the time of grant, or at any time as provided in Section 1.6, an incentive stock option shall be issued in tandem with a Stock Appreciation Right and exercisable except as otherwise provided in the Plan.
2.2Option Price
The Committee shall establish the option price at the time each stock option is granted, which price shall not be less than 100% of the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock on the date of grant. The option price shall be subject to adjustment in accordance with the provisions of Section 1.5(b) hereof.
2.3Exercise of Options
a. The Committee may determine that any stock option shall become exercisable in installments and may determine that the right to exercise such stock option as to such installments shall expire on different dates or on the same date. Incentive stock options may not be exercisable later than ten years after their date of grant.
b. In the event a Participant ceases to be an Employee with the consent of the Committee, or upon the occurrence of his or her death, Normal Retirement Date (or, if approved in writing by the Committee, his or her actual retirement date) or Disability Date, his or her stock options shall be exercisable at any time prior to a date established by the Committee at the date of grant. Except as otherwise provided by the Committee, if a Participant ceases to be an Employee for any other reason, his or her rights under all stock options shall terminate no later than the thirtieth (30th) day after such cessation of employment.
c. Each stock option shall be confirmed by a stock option agreement executed by the Company and by the Participant. The option price of each share as to which an option is exercised shall be paid in full at the time of such exercise. Such payment shall be made in cash, by tender of shares of Common Stock owned by the Participant valued at Fair Market Value as of the date of exercise, subject to such limitations on the tender of Common Stock as the Committee may impose, or by a combination of cash and shares of Common Stock. In addition, the Committee may provide the Participant with assistance in financing the option price and applicable withholding taxes, on such terms and conditions as it determines appropriate.
8
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d. Stock options granted under the Plan may include the right to acquire an Accelerated Ownership Non-Qualified Stock Option (“AO”). If an option grant contains an AO, and if a Participant pays all or part of the purchase price of the option with shares of Common Stock held by the Participant for at least one (1) year, then upon exercise of the option the Participant shall be granted the additional option to purchase, at the Fair Market Value as of the date of the AO grant, the number of shares of Common Stock equal to the number of whole shares of Common Stock used by the Participant in payment of the purchase price and the number of whole shares of Common Stock, if any, withheld by the Company as payment for applicable withholding taxes. An AO may be exercised no earlier than one (1) year after its grant and no later than the date of expiration of the option to which the AO is related;
e. Stock options may be exercised during the option term (as specified in the option agreement), by giving written notice of exercise to the Company specifying the number of shares to be purchased. Such notice shall be accompanied by payment in full of the purchase price, either by check, note or such other type of instrument as may be determined from time to time to be acceptable by the Committee or in accordance with procedures established by the Committee. As determined by, or in accordance with procedures established by, the Committee, in its sole discretion, at or after grant, payment in full or in part may also be made in the case of the exercise of a non-qualified stock option in the form of Restricted Stock subject to an Award hereunder (based, in each case, on the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock on the date the option is exercised, as determined by the Committee). If payment of the option exercise price of a non-qualified stock option is made in whole or in part in the form of Restricted Stock, such Restricted Stock (and any replacement shares relating thereto) shall remain (or be) restricted, as the case may be, in accordance with the original terms of the Restricted Stock award in question, and any additional Common Stock received upon the exercise shall be subject to the same forfeiture restrictions, unless otherwise determined by, or in accordance with procedures established by, the Committee, in its sole discretion, at or after grant.
Section 3: RESTRICTED STOCK
3.1Authority of Committee
Subject to the provisions of the Plan, the Committee shall have sole and complete authority to determine the Employees to whom shares of Restricted Stock shall be granted, the number of shares of Restricted Stock to be granted to each Participant, the duration of the Restricted Period during and the conditions under which the Restricted Stock may be forfeited to the Company, the purchase price, if any, to be paid by a Participant for such Restricted Stock, and the terms and conditions of the Award in addition to those contained in Section 3.2. Such determinations shall be made by the Committee at the time of the grant.
3.2Terms and Conditions
Shares of Restricted Stock may not be sold, assigned, transferred, pledged or otherwise encumbered, except as provided in Section 2.3(e), during the Restricted Period. Certificates issued in respect of shares of Restricted Stock shall be registered in the name of the Participant and deposited by him or her, together with a stock power endorsed in blank, with the Company. At the expiration of the Restricted Period, the Company shall deliver such certificates to the Participant or his or her legal representative. 9
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3.3Termination of Employment
Unless otherwise provided by the Committee at the time of the grant of Restricted Stock, in the event a Participant voluntarily terminates his or her employment with the Corporation during the Restricted Period, or upon the occurrence of his or her death, during the Restricted Period, Normal Retirement Date (or, if approved in writing by the Committee, his or her actual retirement date) or Disability Date during the Restricted Period, the restrictions imposed hereunder shall lapse with respect to such shares of Restricted Stock. In the event a Participant ceases to be an Employee for any other reason during the Restricted Period, unless otherwise provided by the Committee, all shares of Restricted Stock shall thereupon be forfeited to the Company.
10 | [
"Exhibit 10.1 – Amended and Restated 1990 Long-Term Incentive Plan (effective October 1, 1999, as amended effective December 7, 2015) AMENDED AND RESTATED LEE ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED 1990 LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN (Effective October 1, 1999, As amended effective December 7, 2015) Section 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS 1.1Purposes The purposes of the 1990 Long-Term Incentive Plan, as amended, restated and extended (the “Plan”) of Lee Enterprises, Incorporated (the “Company”) are to promote the interests of the Company and its stockholders by (i) attracting and retaining executives and other key employees of outstanding ability; (ii) strengthening the Company’s capability to develop, maintain and direct a competent management team; (iii) motivating executives and other key employees, by means of performance-related incentives, to achieve longer-range performance goals; (iv) providing incentive compensation opportunities which are competitive with those of other major corporations; and (v) enabling such employees to participate in the long-term growth and financial success of the Company. 1.2Definitions “Affiliate” - means any corporation or other entity (i) which is not a Subsidiary but as to which the Company possesses a direct or indirect ownership interest and has representation on the board of directors or any similar governing body; and (ii) which is designated by the Board of Directors as an “Affiliate” for purposes of this Plan.",
"“Award” - means a grant or award under Sections 2 through 3, inclusive, of the Plan. “Board of Directors” - means the board of directors of the Company. “Code” - means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 as amended from time to time. “Committee” - means the Executive Compensation Committee of the Board of Directors. “Common Stock” - means the Common Stock, $0.01 par value, of the Company, which may be authorized and unissued shares or may be reacquired shares of such Common Stock, together with a Preferred Share Purchase Right. “Corporation” - means the Company, its divisions, Subsidiaries and Affiliates. “Disability Date” - means the date on which a Participant is deemed disabled under the employee benefit plans of the Corporation applicable to the Participant. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- “Employee” - means any key employee of the Corporation.",
"“Fair Market Value” - means, as the Committee shall determine, either (i) the average of the high and low prices of the Common Stock, or (ii) the closing price of the Common Stock, on the date on which it is to be valued hereunder as reported for New York Stock Exchange-Composite Transactions. “Non-Employee Director” - has the meaning set forth in Rule 16b-3(3)(i) promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or any successor definition adopted by the Commission.",
"“Normal Retirement Date” - has the meaning set forth in the pension or retirement plan of the Corporation applicable to the Participant, or such other date as may be mutually agreed upon in writing by the Committee and the Participant. “Participant” - means an Employee who is selected by the Committee to receive an Award under the Plan. “Preferred Share Purchase Right” - means the right to the holders of “Common Stock” issued pursuant to the Plan to purchase from the Company one one-thousandth of a share of Series A Participating Convertible Preferred Stock, without par value, of the Company at a price of $150.00 per one one-thousandth of a Preferred Share, subject to adjustment in a “Change of Control”. “Replacement Award” – means, in the context of a Change of Control under Section 1.6(d)(iii)(B), an award of stock options, stock appreciation rights, or restricted stock in any entity other than the Company resulting from, or the acquirer of assets in, a Business Combination, which (i) is no less favorable, in terms of value and vesting rights, than the original Award made under the Plan, and (ii) provides for immediate vesting in the case of the Participant’s termination of employment within one (1) year following the issuance of such Replacement Award.",
"“Restricted Period” - means a period of three (3) years, or such other period of years selected by the Committee, during which a grant of Restricted Stock may be forfeited to the Company. “Restricted Stock” - means shares of Common Stock contingently granted to a Participant under Section 3 of the Plan. “Stock Appreciation Rights” - shall have the meaning specified in Section 1.6(b). “Subsidiary” - means any corporation in which the Company possesses directly or indirectly fifty percent (50%) or more of the total combined voting power of all classes of its stock having voting power; provided that with respect to incentive stock options granted hereunder, the term “subsidiary” shall be as defined in Section 425(f) or any successor provision of the Code. 1.3Administration The Plan shall be administered by the Committee, which shall at all times consist of three (3) or more members, each of whom shall be a Non-Employee Director. The Committee shall have sole and complete authority to adopt, alter and repeal such administrative rules, guidelines and practices governing the operation of the Plan as it shall from time to time deem advisable, and to interpret the terms and provisions of the Plan.",
"The Committee may delegate to one or more executive officers of the Company the power to make Awards to Participants who are not executive officers or directors of the Company, provided the Committee shall fix the maximum amount of such Awards for the group and a maximum amount for any one Participant. The Committee’s decisions are binding upon all parties. 2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.4Eligibility All Employees who have demonstrated significant management potential or who have contributed, or are deemed likely to contribute, in a substantial measure to the successful performance of the Corporation, as determined by the Committee, are eligible to be Participants in the Plan. 1.5Shares Reserved a. There shall be reserved for issuance pursuant to the Plan a total of 5,600,309 shares of Common Stock, together with sufficient shares to cover outstanding grants under the Plan as of December 26, 2014.",
"In the event that (i) a stock option expires or is terminated unexercised as to any shares covered thereby, (ii) shares are forfeited for any reason under the Plan, or (iii) shares are tendered as consideration for the exercise of options under Section 2.3 or for withholding of taxes under Section 1.7, such shares shall thereafter be again available for issuance pursuant to the Plan. In the event that a stock option is surrendered for payment pursuant to Section 1.6(b) hereof, the shares covered by the stock option shall not thereafter be available for issuance pursuant to the Plan. b. In the event of any change in the outstanding shares of Common Stock by reason of any stock dividend or split, recapitalization, merger, consolidation, spin-off, combination or exchange of shares or other corporate change, or any distributions to common shareholders other than cash dividends, the Committee shall make such substitution or adjustment, if any, as it deems to be equitable to accomplish fairly the purposes of the Plan and to preserve the intended benefits of the Plan to the Participants and the Corporation, as to the number (including the number specified in Section 1.5(a) above) or kind of shares of Common Stock or other securities issued or reserved for issuance pursuant to the Plan, including the number of outstanding stock options, the option prices thereof, and the number of outstanding Awards of other types.",
"1.6Change of Control a. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary, in the event of a Change of Control: any stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights outstanding as of the date such Change of Control is determined to have occurred, and which are not then exercisable and vested, shall not immediately vest, and any Restricted Stock shall remain subject to any applicable restrictions, but shall remain in effect in accordance with their terms, unless the Participant is terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation within one (1) year following a Change of Control described in this subsection, in which case (i) such stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights shall become fully exercisable and vested to the full extent of the original grant; and (ii) the restrictions and deferral limitations applicable to any Restricted Stock shall lapse, and such Restricted Stock shall become free of all restrictions and become fully vested and transferable to the full extent of the original grant.",
"For purposes of this subsection, a Participant shall be deemed to have been immediately terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation in the event of a Change of Control described in Sections 1.6(d)(iii) or (iv). 3 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- b. Notwithstanding any other provision of the Plan to the contrary, if, following a Change of Control an optionee is terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation within one (1) year following a Change of Control, then, during the 60-day period from and after such termination of employment (the “Exercise Period”), unless the Committee shall determine otherwise at the time of grant, the optionee shall have the right, whether or not the stock option is fully exercisable and in lieu of the payment of the exercise price for the shares of Common Stock being purchased under the stock option and by giving notice to the Company, to elect (within the Exercise Period) to surrender all or part of the stock option to the Company and to receive cash, within 30 days of such notice, in an amount equal to the amount by which the Change of Control Price per share of Common Stock on the date of such election shall exceed the exercise price per share of Common Stock under the stock option multiplied by the number of shares of Common Stock granted under the stock option as to which the right granted under this Section 1.6(b) shall have been exercised (“Stock Appreciation Rights”). For purposes of this subsection, a Participant shall be deemed to have been immediately terminated from his or her employment with the Corporation in the event of a Change of Control described in Sections 1.6(d)(iii) or (iv).",
"c. For purposes of the Plan, “Change of Control Price” means the higher of (i) the highest reported sales price, regular way, of a share of Common Stock in any transaction reported on the New York Stock Exchange - Composite Tape or other national exchange on which such shares are listed or on NASDAQ during the 60-day period prior to and including the date of a Change of Control or (ii) if the Change of Control is the result of a tender or exchange offer or a Business Combination, the highest price per share of Common Stock paid in such tender or exchange offer or Business Combination; provided, however, that in the case of incentive stock options and Stock Appreciation Rights relating to incentive stock options, the Change of Control Price shall be in all cases the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock on the date such incentive stock option or Stock Appreciation Right is exercised. To the extent that the consideration paid in any such transaction described above consists all or in part of securities or other noncash consideration, the value of such securities or other noncash consideration shall be determined in the sole discretion of the Board.",
"d. For purposes of this Plan, a “Change of Control” means: i. the acquisition by any individual, entity or group (within the meaning of Section 13(d)(3) or 14(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”)) (a “Person”) of beneficial ownership (within the meaning of Rule 13d-3 promulgated under the Exchange Act) (“Beneficial Ownership”) of 15% or more of the Common Stock; provided, however, that for purposes of this subsection (i), the following acquisitions do not constitute a Change of Control: (A) any acquisition directly from the Company, (B) any acquisition by the Company, (C) any acquisition by any employee benefit plan (or related trust) sponsored or maintained by the Company or any corporation controlled by the Company (D) any acquisition by a Person of Beneficial Ownership of less than 25% of the Common Stock if such Person reports, or is required to report such Beneficial Ownership on Schedule 13G under the Exchange Act or Schedule 13D of the Exchange Act (or any comparable or successor report), which Schedule 13D does not state any present intention to (or reserve the right to) hold such Common Stock with the purpose or effect of changing or influencing the control of the Company, nor in connection with or as a participant in any transaction having such purpose or effect, or (E) any acquisition pursuant to a transaction that complies with clauses (A) or (B) of subsection (iii) below; or 4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ii.",
"individuals who, as of the date hereof, constitute the Board (the “Incumbent Board”) cease for any reason to constitute at least a majority of the Board; provided, however, that any individual becoming a director subsequent to the date hereof whose election, or nomination for election by the Company’s shareholders, was approved by a vote of at least a majority of the directors then comprising the Incumbent Board shall be considered as though such individual were a member of the Incumbent Board, but excluding, for this purpose, any such individual whose initial assumption of office occurs as a result of an actual or threatened election contest with respect to the election or removal of directors or other actual or threatened solicitation of proxies or consents by or on behalf of a Person other than the Board; or iii.",
"consummation of a reorganization, merger, statutory share exchange or consolidation or similar transaction involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries, a sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company or the acquisition of assets or stock of another (entity by the Company or any of its subsidiaries (each, a “Business Combination”), in each case, unless, following such Business Combination, (A) (1) all or substantially all of the individuals and entities that were the beneficial owners, respectively, of the Common Stock immediately prior to such Business Combination beneficially own, directly or indirectly, more than 60% of the Common Stock or, with respect to an entity other than the Company, the then outstanding shares of common stock (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent securities) and the combined voting power of the then-outstanding voting securities entitled to vote generally in the election of directors (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent governing body) of the entity resulting from such Business Combination (including, without limitation, an entity which as a result of such transaction owns the Company or all or substantially all of the Company’s assets either directly or through one or more subsidiaries) in substantially the same proportions as their ownership, immediately prior to such Business Combination of the Common Stock, (2) no Person (excluding any corporation resulting from such Business Combination or any employee benefit plan (or related trust) of the Company or such corporation resulting from such Business Combination) beneficially owns, directly or indirectly, 20% or more of the Common Stock or, with respect to an entity other than the Company, the then outstanding shares of common stock of the corporation resulting from such Business Combination (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent securities) or the combined voting power of the then outstanding voting securities of such entity, except to the extent that such ownership existed prior to the Business Combination and (3) at least a majority of the members of the board of directors (or, for a non-corporate entity, equivalent governing body) of the entity resulting from such Business Combination were members of the Incumbent Board at the time of the execution of the initial agreement, or of the action of the Board, providing for such Business Combination; or (B) if the Business Combination is the result of a reorganization, merger, statutory share exchange or consolidation or similar transaction involving the Company or any of its subsidiaries in which the Company is not the resulting entity, or a sale or other disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of the Company, then each Award then-outstanding shall have been cancelled and substituted with a Replacement Award of equity in the acquiring entity; or 5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iv.",
"approval by the shareholders of the Company of a complete liquidation or dissolution of the Company. 1.7 Withholding The Corporation shall have the right to deduct from all amounts paid in cash (whether under this Plan or otherwise) any taxes required by law or other amounts authorized by a Participant to be withheld therefrom. In the case of payments of Awards in the form of Common Stock, at the Committee’s discretion the Participant may be required to pay to the Corporation the amount of any taxes required to be withheld with respect to such Common Stock, or, in lieu thereof, the Corporation shall have the right to retain (or the Participant may be offered the opportunity to elect to tender) the number of shares of Common Stock whose Fair Market Value on the date such taxes are required to be withheld equals the amount required to be withheld. 1.8 Nontransferability No Award shall be assignable or transferable, and no right or interest of any Participant shall be subject to any lien, obligation or liability of the Participant, except by will or the laws of descent and distribution. 1.9 No Right to Employment No person shall have any claim or right to be granted an Award, and the grant of an Award shall not be construed as giving a Participant the right to be retained in the employ of the Corporation.",
"Further, the Corporation expressly reserves the right at any time to dismiss a Participant free from any liability, or from any claim under the Plan, except as provided herein or in any agreement entered into with respect to an Award. 1.10 Construction of the Plan The validity, construction, interpretation, administration and effect of the Plan and of its rules and regulations, and rights relating to the Plan, shall be determined solely in accordance with the laws of Delaware, without regard to conflict of law principles. 6 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1.11 Amendment a.",
"The Board of Directors may amend, suspend or terminate the Plan or any portion thereof and any Award hereunder at any time, provided that no amendment shall be made without stockholder approval which shall (i) increase (except as provided in Section 1.5(b) hereof) the total number of shares reserved for issuance pursuant to the Plan; (ii) change the class of Employees eligible to be Participants; (iii) decrease the minimum option prices stated herein (other than to change the manner of determining Fair Market Value to conform to any then applicable provision of the Code or regulations thereunder); (iv) extend the expiration date of the Plan as it applies to incentive stock options; or (v) withdraw the administration of the Plan from a committee consisting of three or more members, each of whom is a Non-Employee Director. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Committee may amend the Plan in such manner as may be necessary so as to have the Plan conform with applicable law and rules and regulations thereunder. Notwithstanding anything in this Plan to the contrary, following a Change of Control the Board may not amend the Plan in a manner that would adversely affect any outstanding Award of a Participant without the written consent of such Participant.",
"b. Without limiting the power of the Board of Directors under Section 1.11(a), the Committee, with the Participant’s consent, may amend, modify or terminate any outstanding Award at any time prior to payment or exercise in any manner not inconsistent with the terms of the Plan, including without limitation, to change the date or dates as of which (i) a stock option becomes exercisable; (ii) or a Restricted Stock becomes nonforfeitable; or (iii) to cancel and reissue an Award under such different terms and conditions as it determines appropriate. 1.12Dividends, Equivalents and Voting Rights; Cash Payments Awards may provide the Participant with (i) dividends or dividend equivalents and voting rights prior to either vesting or earnout; and (ii) to the extent determined by the Committee, cash payments in lieu of or in addition to an Award. 1.13Effective Date The Plan shall be effective on October 1, 1999, subject to ratification by the stockholders of the Company.",
"No incentive stock options may be granted under the Plan after December 4, 2024. 7 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Section 2: STOCK OPTIONS 2.1Authority of Committee Subject to the provisions of the Plan, the Committee shall have sole and complete authority to determine the Employees to whom stock options shall be granted, the number of shares to be covered by each stock option and the conditions and limitations, if any, in addition to those set forth in Section 2.3 hereof, applicable to the exercise of the stock option. The number of shares of Common Stock with respect to which stock options may be granted to any Participant during any fiscal year shall not exceed 300,000 (subject to adjustment as provided in Section 1.5(b) hereof). The Committee shall have the authority to grant stock options that are intended to be, and qualify as, incentive stock options under Section 422A of the Code, or to grant non-qualified stock options, or to grant both types of stock options, except that incentive stock options can only be granted to Participants who are Employees of the Company or a Subsidiary. In the case of incentive stock options, the terms and conditions of such grants shall be subject to and comply with such grant and vesting limitations as may be prescribed by Section 422A(d) of the Code, as from time to time amended, and any implementing regulations.",
"Unless the Committee provides otherwise at the time of grant, or at any time as provided in Section 1.6, an incentive stock option shall be issued in tandem with a Stock Appreciation Right and exercisable except as otherwise provided in the Plan. 2.2Option Price The Committee shall establish the option price at the time each stock option is granted, which price shall not be less than 100% of the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock on the date of grant. The option price shall be subject to adjustment in accordance with the provisions of Section 1.5(b) hereof. 2.3Exercise of Options a. The Committee may determine that any stock option shall become exercisable in installments and may determine that the right to exercise such stock option as to such installments shall expire on different dates or on the same date. Incentive stock options may not be exercisable later than ten years after their date of grant. b. In the event a Participant ceases to be an Employee with the consent of the Committee, or upon the occurrence of his or her death, Normal Retirement Date (or, if approved in writing by the Committee, his or her actual retirement date) or Disability Date, his or her stock options shall be exercisable at any time prior to a date established by the Committee at the date of grant.",
"Except as otherwise provided by the Committee, if a Participant ceases to be an Employee for any other reason, his or her rights under all stock options shall terminate no later than the thirtieth (30th) day after such cessation of employment. c. Each stock option shall be confirmed by a stock option agreement executed by the Company and by the Participant. The option price of each share as to which an option is exercised shall be paid in full at the time of such exercise. Such payment shall be made in cash, by tender of shares of Common Stock owned by the Participant valued at Fair Market Value as of the date of exercise, subject to such limitations on the tender of Common Stock as the Committee may impose, or by a combination of cash and shares of Common Stock. In addition, the Committee may provide the Participant with assistance in financing the option price and applicable withholding taxes, on such terms and conditions as it determines appropriate.",
"8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- d. Stock options granted under the Plan may include the right to acquire an Accelerated Ownership Non-Qualified Stock Option (“AO”). If an option grant contains an AO, and if a Participant pays all or part of the purchase price of the option with shares of Common Stock held by the Participant for at least one (1) year, then upon exercise of the option the Participant shall be granted the additional option to purchase, at the Fair Market Value as of the date of the AO grant, the number of shares of Common Stock equal to the number of whole shares of Common Stock used by the Participant in payment of the purchase price and the number of whole shares of Common Stock, if any, withheld by the Company as payment for applicable withholding taxes.",
"An AO may be exercised no earlier than one (1) year after its grant and no later than the date of expiration of the option to which the AO is related; e. Stock options may be exercised during the option term (as specified in the option agreement), by giving written notice of exercise to the Company specifying the number of shares to be purchased. Such notice shall be accompanied by payment in full of the purchase price, either by check, note or such other type of instrument as may be determined from time to time to be acceptable by the Committee or in accordance with procedures established by the Committee. As determined by, or in accordance with procedures established by, the Committee, in its sole discretion, at or after grant, payment in full or in part may also be made in the case of the exercise of a non-qualified stock option in the form of Restricted Stock subject to an Award hereunder (based, in each case, on the Fair Market Value of the Common Stock on the date the option is exercised, as determined by the Committee). If payment of the option exercise price of a non-qualified stock option is made in whole or in part in the form of Restricted Stock, such Restricted Stock (and any replacement shares relating thereto) shall remain (or be) restricted, as the case may be, in accordance with the original terms of the Restricted Stock award in question, and any additional Common Stock received upon the exercise shall be subject to the same forfeiture restrictions, unless otherwise determined by, or in accordance with procedures established by, the Committee, in its sole discretion, at or after grant.",
"Section 3: RESTRICTED STOCK 3.1Authority of Committee Subject to the provisions of the Plan, the Committee shall have sole and complete authority to determine the Employees to whom shares of Restricted Stock shall be granted, the number of shares of Restricted Stock to be granted to each Participant, the duration of the Restricted Period during and the conditions under which the Restricted Stock may be forfeited to the Company, the purchase price, if any, to be paid by a Participant for such Restricted Stock, and the terms and conditions of the Award in addition to those contained in Section 3.2. Such determinations shall be made by the Committee at the time of the grant. 3.2Terms and Conditions Shares of Restricted Stock may not be sold, assigned, transferred, pledged or otherwise encumbered, except as provided in Section 2.3(e), during the Restricted Period. Certificates issued in respect of shares of Restricted Stock shall be registered in the name of the Participant and deposited by him or her, together with a stock power endorsed in blank, with the Company.",
"At the expiration of the Restricted Period, the Company shall deliver such certificates to the Participant or his or her legal representative. 9 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3.3Termination of Employment Unless otherwise provided by the Committee at the time of the grant of Restricted Stock, in the event a Participant voluntarily terminates his or her employment with the Corporation during the Restricted Period, or upon the occurrence of his or her death, during the Restricted Period, Normal Retirement Date (or, if approved in writing by the Committee, his or her actual retirement date) or Disability Date during the Restricted Period, the restrictions imposed hereunder shall lapse with respect to such shares of Restricted Stock. In the event a Participant ceases to be an Employee for any other reason during the Restricted Period, unless otherwise provided by the Committee, all shares of Restricted Stock shall thereupon be forfeited to the Company. 10"
]
| https://github.com/TheAtticusProject/cuad | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Specification The application has not been checked to the extent necessary to determine the presence of all possible typographical and grammatical errors. Applicant’s cooperation is requested in correcting any errors of which he/she may become aware in the application. The Information Disclosure Statements filed 10/27/2020, 11/12/2020 and 01/31/2000 have been considered. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.
Claims 1 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Galpin (EP 3 562 162 A1). Regarding claim 1, Galpin teaches in figures (13) and (14) a method for neural network decoding in a decoder, comprising: decoding, by a processor (1330) and from a bitstream corresponding to a representation of a neural network, at least a syntax element (See claim 5, paragraphs [0011], [0041], [0125]) to be applied to multiple blocks in the neural network; and reconstructing, by the processor (See paragraph [0096]) and the from the bitstream, weight coefficients of the multiple blocks based on the syntax element. Regarding claim 11, Galpin teaches in figures (13) and (14) an apparatus for neural network decoding, comprising: processing circuitry configured to: decoding, using a decoder (1330), from a bitstream corresponding to a representation of a neural network (See title), at least a syntax element (See claim 5, paragraphs [0011], [0041], [0125]) to be applied to multiple blocks in the neural network; and reconstruct, the from the bitstream, weight coefficients (See paragraph [0096]) in the multiple blocks based on the syntax element. Allowable Subject Matter Claims 2-10 and 12-20 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOSEPH J LAUTURE whose telephone number is (571)272-1805. The examiner can normally be reached 9:30 AM-6:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Dameon Levi can be reached on 5712722105. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/JOSEPH J LAUTURE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2845 | 2022-09-08T11:02:59 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Specification The application has not been checked to the extent necessary to determine the presence of all possible typographical and grammatical errors. Applicant’s cooperation is requested in correcting any errors of which he/she may become aware in the application. The Information Disclosure Statements filed 10/27/2020, 11/12/2020 and 01/31/2000 have been considered. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 102 The following is a quotation of the appropriate paragraphs of 35 U.S.C. 102 that form the basis for the rejections under this section made in this Office action: A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – (a)(2) the claimed invention was described in a patent issued under section 151, or in an application for patent published or deemed published under section 122(b), in which the patent or application, as the case may be, names another inventor and was effectively filed before the effective filing date of the claimed invention.",
"Claims 1 and 11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Galpin (EP 3 562 162 A1). Regarding claim 1, Galpin teaches in figures (13) and (14) a method for neural network decoding in a decoder, comprising: decoding, by a processor (1330) and from a bitstream corresponding to a representation of a neural network, at least a syntax element (See claim 5, paragraphs [0011], [0041], [0125]) to be applied to multiple blocks in the neural network; and reconstructing, by the processor (See paragraph [0096]) and the from the bitstream, weight coefficients of the multiple blocks based on the syntax element. Regarding claim 11, Galpin teaches in figures (13) and (14) an apparatus for neural network decoding, comprising: processing circuitry configured to: decoding, using a decoder (1330), from a bitstream corresponding to a representation of a neural network (See title), at least a syntax element (See claim 5, paragraphs [0011], [0041], [0125]) to be applied to multiple blocks in the neural network; and reconstruct, the from the bitstream, weight coefficients (See paragraph [0096]) in the multiple blocks based on the syntax element. Allowable Subject Matter Claims 2-10 and 12-20 are objected to as being dependent upon a rejected base claim, but would be allowable if rewritten in independent form including all of the limitations of the base claim and any intervening claims. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to JOSEPH J LAUTURE whose telephone number is (571)272-1805.",
"The examiner can normally be reached 9:30 AM-6:00 PM. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Dameon Levi can be reached on 5712722105. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.",
"/JOSEPH J LAUTURE/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2845"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-09-11.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-Q (Mark One) x QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the quarterly period ended December 31, 2011 OR oTRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to Commission File Number: 333-59114 HEALTHIENT, INC. (Exact name of small business issuer as specified in charter) Nevada 33-0730042 (State or other jurisdiction of (I.R.S. Employer incorporation or organization) Identification No.) 15132 Park of Commerce Blvd., Jupiter, Fl (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code) (561) 935-6449 (Issuer's Telephone number, including area code) (Former name, former address, and former fiscal year, if changed since last report) Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports,), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days. YesþNoo Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule405 of RegulationS-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files).YesþNo¨ Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a larger accelerated filer, an accelerated filer , a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. See the definitions of "larger accelerated filer" and "smaller or a smaller reporting company" in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. Large accelerated Filero Accelerated filero Non-accelerated filero (Do not check if a smaller reporting company) Smaller reporting company þ Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act) Yeso No þ Indicate the number of shares of the registrant's common stock outstanding of each of the insurer's common stock, as of the latest practicable date. As of February 8, 2012 -66,354,771 shares. HEALTHIENT, INC. QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31,2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PART I. FINANCIAL INFORMATION 3 Item 1.Financial Statements 3 (a)Consolidated Balance Sheets 4 (b)Consolidated Statements of Operations 5 (c)Consolidated Statement of Shareholders' Equity (deficit) 6 (d)Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (e)Notes to Financial Statements 8 Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 14 Item 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk 22 Item 4. Controls and Procedures 22 PART II. OTHER INFORMATION 23 Item 1.Legal Proceedings 23 Item 1A. Risk Factors 23 Item 2.Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds 32 Item 3.Defaults On Senior Securities 32 Item 4.[Reserved] 32 Item 5.Other Information 32 Item 6. Exhibits 32 SIGNATURES 33 2 PART I FINANCIAL INFORMATION ITEM 1.FINANCIAL STATEMENTS The accompanying unaudited financial statements of Healthient, Inc. (the "Company"), have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles for interim financial information and with the instructions to Form 10-Q. Accordingly, these financial statements may not include all of the information and disclosures required by generally accepted accounting principles for complete financial statements. The interim financial statements should be read in conjunction with the annual financial statement for the year ended June 30, 2011 included in the an 10-K filed October 13, 2011.In the opinion of management, the accompanying unaudited financial statements contain all adjustments necessary to fairly present the Company's financial position as of December 31, 2011 and its results of operations and its cash flows for the six months ended December 31, 2011 and 2010. 3 Healthient, Inc. ConsolidatedBalance Sheets (Unaudited) December 31, June 30, ASSETS Current Assets Cash $ $ Inventory Deposits and prepaid expenses Total Current Assets Property and Equipment Website costs (net of accummulated amortization) License to produce drink (net of accumulated amortization) - Computers and furniture (net of accumulated depreciation) Total Fixed Assets Total Assets $ $ LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS'EQUITY(DEFICIT) Current Liabilities Accounts payable $ $ Payroll taxes Directors' fees - Stock subscription payable - Officer loans Total Current Liabilities Stockholders'Equity (Deficit) Preferred stock, $0.001 Par value, 25,000,000 authorized: No shares issued - - Common stock, $0.001 par value: 200,000,000 shares authorized, 66,284,771 and 52,425,681 shares issued andoutstanding at December 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011, respectively Additional paid-in capital Deficit accumulated in Development stage ) ) Deficit accumulated from operations ) - Total Stockholders' Equity ) Total Liabilities and Stockholder's Equity $ $ The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements 4 Healthient, Inc. Statement of Operations (Unaudited) For the six months ended December 31, 2011 For the six months ended December 31, 2010 For the three months ended December 31, 2011 For the three months ended December 31, 2010 Revenues $ $ | [
"UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 FORM 10-Q (Mark One) x QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the quarterly period ended December 31, 2011 OR oTRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to Commission File Number: 333-59114 HEALTHIENT, INC. (Exact name of small business issuer as specified in charter) Nevada 33-0730042 (State or other jurisdiction of (I.R.S.",
"Employer incorporation or organization) Identification No.) 15132 Park of Commerce Blvd., Jupiter, Fl (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code) (561) 935-6449 (Issuer's Telephone number, including area code) (Former name, former address, and former fiscal year, if changed since last report) Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports,), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.",
"YesþNoo Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule405 of RegulationS-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files).YesþNo¨ Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a larger accelerated filer, an accelerated filer , a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company.",
"See the definitions of \"larger accelerated filer\" and \"smaller or a smaller reporting company\" in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. Large accelerated Filero Accelerated filero Non-accelerated filero (Do not check if a smaller reporting company) Smaller reporting company þ Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act) Yeso No þ Indicate the number of shares of the registrant's common stock outstanding of each of the insurer's common stock, as of the latest practicable date. As of February 8, 2012 -66,354,771 shares. HEALTHIENT, INC. QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q FOR THE PERIOD ENDED DECEMBER 31,2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PART I.",
"FINANCIAL INFORMATION 3 Item 1.Financial Statements 3 (a)Consolidated Balance Sheets 4 (b)Consolidated Statements of Operations 5 (c)Consolidated Statement of Shareholders' Equity (deficit) 6 (d)Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (e)Notes to Financial Statements 8 Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 14 Item 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures about Market Risk 22 Item 4. Controls and Procedures 22 PART II. OTHER INFORMATION 23 Item 1.Legal Proceedings 23 Item 1A. Risk Factors 23 Item 2.Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities and Use of Proceeds 32 Item 3.Defaults On Senior Securities 32 Item 4. [Reserved] 32 Item 5.Other Information 32 Item 6. Exhibits 32 SIGNATURES 33 2 PART I FINANCIAL INFORMATION ITEM 1.FINANCIAL STATEMENTS The accompanying unaudited financial statements of Healthient, Inc. (the \"Company\"), have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles for interim financial information and with the instructions to Form 10-Q.",
"Accordingly, these financial statements may not include all of the information and disclosures required by generally accepted accounting principles for complete financial statements. The interim financial statements should be read in conjunction with the annual financial statement for the year ended June 30, 2011 included in the an 10-K filed October 13, 2011.In the opinion of management, the accompanying unaudited financial statements contain all adjustments necessary to fairly present the Company's financial position as of December 31, 2011 and its results of operations and its cash flows for the six months ended December 31, 2011 and 2010.",
"3 Healthient, Inc. ConsolidatedBalance Sheets (Unaudited) December 31, June 30, ASSETS Current Assets Cash $ $ Inventory Deposits and prepaid expenses Total Current Assets Property and Equipment Website costs (net of accummulated amortization) License to produce drink (net of accumulated amortization) - Computers and furniture (net of accumulated depreciation) Total Fixed Assets Total Assets $ $ LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS'EQUITY(DEFICIT) Current Liabilities Accounts payable $ $ Payroll taxes Directors' fees - Stock subscription payable - Officer loans Total Current Liabilities Stockholders'Equity (Deficit) Preferred stock, $0.001 Par value, 25,000,000 authorized: No shares issued - - Common stock, $0.001 par value: 200,000,000 shares authorized, 66,284,771 and 52,425,681 shares issued andoutstanding at December 31, 2011 and June 30, 2011, respectively Additional paid-in capital Deficit accumulated in Development stage ) ) Deficit accumulated from operations ) - Total Stockholders' Equity ) Total Liabilities and Stockholder's Equity $ $ The accompanying notes are an integral part of these financial statements 4 Healthient, Inc.",
"Statement of Operations (Unaudited) For the six months ended December 31, 2011 For the six months ended December 31, 2010 For the three months ended December 31, 2011 For the three months ended December 31, 2010 Revenues $ $"
]
| https://applica-public.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/contract-discovery/edgar.txt.xz | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
|
By Judge Thomas D. Horne Defendants, Carl Pearson and McGee’s Crane Rental, Inc., contend the exclusivity provisions of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act bar the plaintiffs instant common law negligence action. Plaintiff, an employee of a framing contractor retained in connection with the construction of a residence, was injured when he fell during the placement of roof trusses. Defendants are the owner and operator of a crane being used to position the trusses. At the time of his fall, plaintiff was assisting in the positioning of the roof trusses. The outcome of the instant plea is controlled by the holding in Rea, Administrator v. Ford, 198 Va. 712 (1957), and Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164 (1985). While the plaintiff suggests the holding in Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409 (1957), is apposite to the facts of this case, the Court disagrees. In the instant case, unlike the crane operator in Kramer, there were not two separate and distinct contracts between owner and the subcontractors performing carpentry and truss work. NV Homes contracted with DLW to frame the home, and DLW contracted with defendant, McGee’s Crane Rental, to assist in lifting the trusses and plywood necessary to completion of the framing contract. Mr. Pearson was not an “other party” or “stranger” to the employment and work of the plaintiff, such that the instant action may be maintained *560against him or his employer. As in Ford, 198 Va. at 717, in furnishing the crane and operator, McGee ’ s was engaged in an essential part of the work the framing contractor had agreed to do. Accordingly, Mrs. Bardot may draw a final order in this case, sustaining the Plea in Bar and dismissing the cause. | 11-24-2022 | [
"By Judge Thomas D. Horne Defendants, Carl Pearson and McGee’s Crane Rental, Inc., contend the exclusivity provisions of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act bar the plaintiffs instant common law negligence action. Plaintiff, an employee of a framing contractor retained in connection with the construction of a residence, was injured when he fell during the placement of roof trusses. Defendants are the owner and operator of a crane being used to position the trusses. At the time of his fall, plaintiff was assisting in the positioning of the roof trusses. The outcome of the instant plea is controlled by the holding in Rea, Administrator v. Ford, 198 Va. 712 (1957), and Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164 (1985). While the plaintiff suggests the holding in Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409 (1957), is apposite to the facts of this case, the Court disagrees. In the instant case, unlike the crane operator in Kramer, there were not two separate and distinct contracts between owner and the subcontractors performing carpentry and truss work.",
"NV Homes contracted with DLW to frame the home, and DLW contracted with defendant, McGee’s Crane Rental, to assist in lifting the trusses and plywood necessary to completion of the framing contract. Mr. Pearson was not an “other party” or “stranger” to the employment and work of the plaintiff, such that the instant action may be maintained *560against him or his employer. As in Ford, 198 Va. at 717, in furnishing the crane and operator, McGee ’ s was engaged in an essential part of the work the framing contractor had agreed to do. Accordingly, Mrs. Bardot may draw a final order in this case, sustaining the Plea in Bar and dismissing the cause."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/8668785/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Chemung County) to review a determination of respondent Superintendent of Elmira Correctional Facility which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule. Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with smuggling after a nurse observed him pretend to swallow his medication and begin to walk away with the medication in the bottom of his juice cup. When the nurse questioned petitioner as to what was in his cup, petitioner quickly brought the cup back up to his mouth and swallowed the medication. Following a tier II disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty as charged, and this determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued. We confirm. Initially, inasmuch as a substantial evidence question was raised in the petition and there were no “other objections as could terminate the proceeding . . . without reaching the substantial evidence issue” (CPLR 7804 [g]), this proceeding was properly transferred to this Court (see Matter of Abreu v Bezio, 78 AD3d 1341, 1341 [2010]). Turning to the merits, the misbehavior report and hearing testimony provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt (see Matter of Cruz v Walsh, 87 AD3d 1234, 1234-1235 [2011]; Matter of English v Fischer, 55 AD3d 1206, 1206 [2008]). Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Hearing Officer could reasonably infer from the evidence that petitioner intended to take the medication out of the area. Moreover, petitioner’s denial of the charge and identification of alleged inconsistencies in witness testimony presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see Matter of Bethune v Fischer, 108 AD3d 966, 967 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 855 [2013]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit. Peters, PJ., Lahtinen, Spain and Egan Jr., JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed. | 01-13-2022 | [
"Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Chemung County) to review a determination of respondent Superintendent of Elmira Correctional Facility which found petitioner guilty of violating a prison disciplinary rule. Petitioner was charged in a misbehavior report with smuggling after a nurse observed him pretend to swallow his medication and begin to walk away with the medication in the bottom of his juice cup. When the nurse questioned petitioner as to what was in his cup, petitioner quickly brought the cup back up to his mouth and swallowed the medication.",
"Following a tier II disciplinary hearing, petitioner was found guilty as charged, and this determination was affirmed upon administrative appeal. This CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued. We confirm. Initially, inasmuch as a substantial evidence question was raised in the petition and there were no “other objections as could terminate the proceeding . . . without reaching the substantial evidence issue” (CPLR 7804 [g]), this proceeding was properly transferred to this Court (see Matter of Abreu v Bezio, 78 AD3d 1341, 1341 [2010]). Turning to the merits, the misbehavior report and hearing testimony provide substantial evidence to support the determination of guilt (see Matter of Cruz v Walsh, 87 AD3d 1234, 1234-1235 [2011]; Matter of English v Fischer, 55 AD3d 1206, 1206 [2008]). Contrary to petitioner’s contention, the Hearing Officer could reasonably infer from the evidence that petitioner intended to take the medication out of the area. Moreover, petitioner’s denial of the charge and identification of alleged inconsistencies in witness testimony presented a credibility issue for the Hearing Officer to resolve (see Matter of Bethune v Fischer, 108 AD3d 966, 967 [2013], lv denied 22 NY3d 855 [2013]). Petitioner’s remaining contentions have been examined and found to be without merit. Peters, PJ., Lahtinen, Spain and Egan Jr., JJ., concur.",
"Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/5956248/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
It is ordered and adjudged that said petition in error be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause. Petition in error dismissed. MARSHALL, C.J., JONES, MATTHIAS, DAY, ALLEN, KINKADE and ROBINSON, JJ., concur. *Page 701 | 07-06-2016 | [
"It is ordered and adjudged that said petition in error be, and the same hereby is, dismissed for the reason no debatable constitutional question is involved in said cause. Petition in error dismissed. MARSHALL, C.J., JONES, MATTHIAS, DAY, ALLEN, KINKADE and ROBINSON, JJ., concur. *Page 701"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/3781245/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Election/Restrictions Applicant's election without traverse of Group 1 consisting of claims 1-4, and 6 in the reply filed on 1/5/2022 is acknowledged.
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Claims 1-4, and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. The claims recite a method for digital verification which is considered a judicial exception because it falls under Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity such as fundamental economic principles or practices, including mitigating risk. This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application as discussed below and the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception as discussed below. This rejection follows the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed Reg 4, January 7, 2019, pp. 50-57 (“2019 PEG”).
Analysis Step 1 (Statutory Categories) – 2019 PEG pg. 53 Claims 1-4, and 6 are directed to the statutory category of a process.
Step 2A, Prong 1 (Do the claims recite an abstract idea?) – 2019 PEG pg. 54 For independent claim 1, the claim recites an abstract idea of: generating a dynamic security code for a card transaction. The steps of: receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document for a user, the identity document comprising an image of the user; processing the identity document with at least one business-specific rule; extracting identity information from the identity document; determining a match rate of the image of the user on the identity document to a captured image; assigning a verification score to the user based on extracted identity information and the match rate; and publishing the verification score to at least one system, when considered collectively as an ordered combination, recites the abstract idea of digital verification. Independent claim 1 as drafted, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, is a process that covers Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity, since it recites fundamental economic principles or practices including mitigating risk. The steps of: receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document for a user, the identity document comprising an image of the user; processing the identity document with at least one business-specific rule; extracting identity information from the identity document; determining a match rate of the image of the user on the identity document to a captured image; assigning a verification score to the user based on extracted identity information and the match rate; and publishing the verification score to at least one system, considered collectively as an ordered combination, is a process that, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity such as fundamental economic principles or practices of mitigating risk. Hence all the steps of the claim, considered collectively as an ordered combination, fall under the abstract idea of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity. If the claim limitations, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers methods of organizing human activity but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas. Other than reciting the abstract idea, the independent claim recites generic computer components such as “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system”, and nothing in the claims precludes the steps from being performed as a method of organizing human activity. Accordingly, the claims recite an abstract idea. Dependent claims 2-4, and 6 recite similar limitations as independent claim 1; and when analyzed as a whole are held to be patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C 101 because the additional recited limitations only refine the abstract idea further. For instance in claims 2-4, and 6, the additional limitations of: wherein the identity document comprises one of a driver's license and a passport; wherein the identity information comprises at least one of a name, an address, a date of birth, and an expiration date; wherein the identity information is identified based on machine learning; and receiving, from a third party, a risk score based on activity involving a phone number associated with the user; wherein the verification score is further based on the risk score, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, are further refinements of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity such as such as fundamental economic principles or practices including mitigating risk because they describe different variations of the identity document information and an alternative method of determining the verification score. Other than reciting the abstract idea, the dependent claims recite similar generic computer components as the independent claims, such as “the identity document, a driver’s license, a passport, and machine learning”. If a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers fundamental economic principles or practices including mitigating risk, but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas.
Step 2A, Prong 2 (Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?) – 2019 PEG pg. 54 This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, independent claim 1 only recites the additional elements of “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system”. A plain reading of Figure 1 and associated descriptions in the specification in at least: para. 00101 stating “the processing machine used to implement the invention may be a general purpose computer”, para. 00112 of the specification stating “the invention may include a processing machine running the iOS operating system, the OS X operating system, the Android operating system, the TM operating systems…”, and para. 001151 of the specification stating “technologies used to provide such communication might include a network, the Internet, Intranet, Extranet, LAN, an Ethernet, wireless communication via cell tower or satellite, or any client server system” reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements of “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system” are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A. Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Dependent claims 2-4, and 6, recite similar generic computer components as the independent claims, such as “the identity document, a driver’s license, a passport, and machine learning”. The judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the additional elements in the dependent claims are also recited at a high-level of generality such that it amounts to more no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components. Therefore, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they also do not
Step 2B – 2019 PEG pg. 56 (Does the claim recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception?) – 2019 PEG pg. 56 Independent claim 1 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system” to perform the steps of: receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document for a user, the identity document comprising an image of the user; processing the identity document with at least one business-specific rule; extracting identity information from the identity document; determining a match rate of the image of the user on the identity document to a captured image; assigning a verification score to the user based on extracted identity information and the match rate; and publishing the verification score to at least one system, amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to the particular environment of Further, MPEP 2106.05(d)(ii) provides that receiving and transmitting data over a network (see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network)); are well-understood routine and conventional, similar to the instant application claims which recite: “receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document of a user”. Furthermore, MPEP 2106.05(d)(ii) provides that performing repetitive calculations (see Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, 198 USPQ2d at 199 (recomputing or readjusting alarm limit values), and Bancorp Services v. Sun Life, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278, 103 USPQ2d 1425, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims”)) are well-understood, routine, conventional activity, similar to the claimed limitations of the independent claims for: “processing…, determining…, and assigning…” MPEP 2106.05(d)(ii) provides that electronic recordkeeping (Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining "shadow accounts"); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log)), and storing and retrieving information in memory (see Versata Dev. Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, publishing the verification score to at least one system”. Therefore, independent claim 1 is not patent eligible. In addition, dependent claims 2-4, and 6, do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of dependent claims of: “the identity document, a driver’s license, a passport, and machine learning” to perform the claimed limitations, amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)). Similar to the independent claims, mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept. Also for the same reasoning as the independent claims, the additional elements of the limitations of the dependent claims, when considered individually and as an ordered combination, together do not offer significantly more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone and the dependent claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Further, the step of using machine learning to identify the identity information fails to transform dependent claim 4 into patent eligible material, as this is part of the field of use and technical environment in which the abstract idea is being implement and does not result in an improvement to additional elements (see MPEP 2106.05(h) Electric Power Group court decision). With respect to the use of machine learning, the Examiner interprets this to be akin to analyzing information, as the model is merely being used as a tool to analyze the 1. For these reasons, dependent claims 2-4, and 6 also are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. 101. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claims 1-4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over WO 2016/131083 to Spendlove et al. (hereinafter referred to as Spendlove), in view of US 9,342,741 to Amtrup et al. (hereinafter referred to as Amtrup).
In regards to claim 1, Spendlove discloses a method for digital identify verification (method and system to verify the identity of a user, para. 0004), Amtrup, in the related field of determining document validity, teaches processing (method includes normalizing data from the document using predefined business rules, col. 3, lines 4-14) with a business specific rule (predefined business rules may include business-oriented or criteria/conditions for processing data, col. 8, lines 36-50). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to provide the method of Spendlove with the ability to utilize business specific rules as taught by the method of Amtrup. The motivation for doing so would have been to check against applicable business rules to yield improved extraction accuracy (Amtrup, col. 12, lines 57-67).
In regards to claim 2, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, and further discloses wherein the identity document (the at least one independently issued identity verification document includes at least one Government issued verification document including a photographic image of
In regards to claim 3, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, and further discloses wherein the identity information comprises at least one of a name, an address, a date of birth, and an expiration date (The Optical Character Recognition (OCR) system recognizes characters such us name, date of birth, expiry date of license, license number and place of issue, para. 00120).
In regards to claim 4, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, and further discloses wherein the identity information is identified based on machine learning (second part includes constructing a classifier for selecting a small number of important features of the face using an Adaptive Boosting (or AdaBoost) learning algorithm, para. 0086)(Examiner interprets Adaptive Boosting or AdaBoost as machine learning).
Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Spendlove, in view of Amtrup, and further in view of US 2010/0070405 to Joa et al. (hereinafter referred to as Joa).
In regards to claim 6, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, but fails to disclose a method further comprising: receiving, from a third party, a risk score based on activity involving a phone number associated with the user; wherein the verification score is further based on the risk score. Joa, in the related field of evaluating risk and calculating risk scores, teaches receiving, from a third party (wireless number risk scores may be calculated by individual companies or by an industry consortium, para. 0006), a risk score based on activity involving a phone number associated with the user (customer information associated with a wireless phone number may be used to generate a wireless number risk score which can be used to gauge risk of nonpayment, para. 0006); wherein the verification score is further based on the risk score (at step 203 the identity of the customer may be authenticated and at step 204 the positive identification initiates the scoring process which generates the customer’s wireless number risk score which may be within acceptable limits (low risk) or may exceed acceptable limits (high risk), para. 0042). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to provide the method of Spendlove with the ability to utilize risk scores based on activity involving a user’s phone number as taught by the method of Joa. The motivation for doing so would have been to gauge a risk of nonpayment by generating a risk score based on information associated with a user’s wireless phone number (Joa, para. 0006).
Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Lacey (ES 2811249) teaches system and method for sharing verified identity documents. Malhotra et al. (US 10,176,542) teaches systems and methods for identity validation and verification. Nigram et al. (US 10,225,248) teaches methods and systems for providing online verification and security.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Paul Schwarzenberg whose telephone number is (313) 446-6611. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Thursday (7:30-6:30). Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Ryan Donlon, can be reached on (571) 270-3602. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (571) 273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR.
/PAUL S SCHWARZENBERG/Examiner, Art Unit 3695 2/10/2022
1 See NPL A Brief Review of Machine Learning, 2009, which discloses "Research shows that machine learning technology has been widely used in marketing, finance, telecommunications and network analysis.", see also Computation Finance, 2010, which discloses "Table 2 lists the statistical and artificial intelligence techniques that are widely used in computational finance." | 2022-02-17T10:27:58 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Election/Restrictions Applicant's election without traverse of Group 1 consisting of claims 1-4, and 6 in the reply filed on 1/5/2022 is acknowledged. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 101 35 U.S.C. 101 reads as follows: Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. Claims 1-4, and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 101 because the claimed invention is directed to an abstract idea without significantly more. The claims recite a method for digital verification which is considered a judicial exception because it falls under Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity such as fundamental economic principles or practices, including mitigating risk.",
"This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application as discussed below and the claims do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception as discussed below. This rejection follows the 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed Reg 4, January 7, 2019, pp. 50-57 (“2019 PEG”). Analysis Step 1 (Statutory Categories) – 2019 PEG pg. 53 Claims 1-4, and 6 are directed to the statutory category of a process. Step 2A, Prong 1 (Do the claims recite an abstract idea?) – 2019 PEG pg.",
"54 For independent claim 1, the claim recites an abstract idea of: generating a dynamic security code for a card transaction. The steps of: receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document for a user, the identity document comprising an image of the user; processing the identity document with at least one business-specific rule; extracting identity information from the identity document; determining a match rate of the image of the user on the identity document to a captured image; assigning a verification score to the user based on extracted identity information and the match rate; and publishing the verification score to at least one system, when considered collectively as an ordered combination, recites the abstract idea of digital verification.",
"Independent claim 1 as drafted, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, is a process that covers Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity, since it recites fundamental economic principles or practices including mitigating risk. The steps of: receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document for a user, the identity document comprising an image of the user; processing the identity document with at least one business-specific rule; extracting identity information from the identity document; determining a match rate of the image of the user on the identity document to a captured image; assigning a verification score to the user based on extracted identity information and the match rate; and publishing the verification score to at least one system, considered collectively as an ordered combination, is a process that, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity such as fundamental economic principles or practices of mitigating risk.",
"Hence all the steps of the claim, considered collectively as an ordered combination, fall under the abstract idea of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity. If the claim limitations, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, covers methods of organizing human activity but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas. Other than reciting the abstract idea, the independent claim recites generic computer components such as “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system”, and nothing in the claims precludes the steps from being performed as a method of organizing human activity. Accordingly, the claims recite an abstract idea.",
"Dependent claims 2-4, and 6 recite similar limitations as independent claim 1; and when analyzed as a whole are held to be patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C 101 because the additional recited limitations only refine the abstract idea further. For instance in claims 2-4, and 6, the additional limitations of: wherein the identity document comprises one of a driver's license and a passport; wherein the identity information comprises at least one of a name, an address, a date of birth, and an expiration date; wherein the identity information is identified based on machine learning; and receiving, from a third party, a risk score based on activity involving a phone number associated with the user; wherein the verification score is further based on the risk score, under the broadest reasonable interpretation, are further refinements of Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity such as such as fundamental economic principles or practices including mitigating risk because they describe different variations of the identity document information and an alternative method of determining the verification score.",
"Other than reciting the abstract idea, the dependent claims recite similar generic computer components as the independent claims, such as “the identity document, a driver’s license, a passport, and machine learning”. If a claim limitation, under its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers fundamental economic principles or practices including mitigating risk, but for the recitation of generic computer components, then it falls within the “Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity” grouping of abstract ideas. Step 2A, Prong 2 (Does the claim recite additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application?) – 2019 PEG pg. 54 This judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application. In particular, independent claim 1 only recites the additional elements of “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system”. A plain reading of Figure 1 and associated descriptions in the specification in at least: para. 00101 stating “the processing machine used to implement the invention may be a general purpose computer”, para. 00112 of the specification stating “the invention may include a processing machine running the iOS operating system, the OS X operating system, the Android operating system, the TM operating systems…”, and para.",
"001151 of the specification stating “technologies used to provide such communication might include a network, the Internet, Intranet, Extranet, LAN, an Ethernet, wireless communication via cell tower or satellite, or any client server system” reveals that generic processors may be used to execute the claimed steps. The additional elements of “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system” are recited at a high level of generality (i.e., as a generic processor performing generic computer functions) such that it amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to a particular environment (See MPEP 2106.05(h)). Mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component and limiting the judicial exception to a particular environment doesn’t integrate the abstract idea into a practical application in Step 2A.",
"Accordingly, these additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because it does not impose any meaningful limits on practicing the abstract idea. Hence, independent claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Dependent claims 2-4, and 6, recite similar generic computer components as the independent claims, such as “the identity document, a driver’s license, a passport, and machine learning”. The judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application because the additional elements in the dependent claims are also recited at a high-level of generality such that it amounts to more no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components. Therefore, the additional elements do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application because they also do not Step 2B – 2019 PEG pg. 56 (Does the claim recite additional elements that amount to significantly more than the judicial exception?)",
"– 2019 PEG pg. 56 Independent claim 1 does not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of “an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, an identity document, a user electronic device, a website, and a system” to perform the steps of: receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document for a user, the identity document comprising an image of the user; processing the identity document with at least one business-specific rule; extracting identity information from the identity document; determining a match rate of the image of the user on the identity document to a captured image; assigning a verification score to the user based on extracted identity information and the match rate; and publishing the verification score to at least one system, amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)) and limits the judicial exception to the particular environment of Further, MPEP 2106.05(d)(ii) provides that receiving and transmitting data over a network (see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355, 112 USPQ2d 1093, 1096 (Fed.",
"Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network)); are well-understood routine and conventional, similar to the instant application claims which recite: “receiving, from a user electronic device or at a website, an image of an identity document of a user”. Furthermore, MPEP 2106.05(d)(ii) provides that performing repetitive calculations (see Flook, 437 U.S. at 594, 198 USPQ2d at 199 (recomputing or readjusting alarm limit values), and Bancorp Services v. Sun Life, 687 F.3d 1266, 1278, 103 USPQ2d 1425, 1433 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The computer required by some of Bancorp’s claims is employed only for its most basic function, the performance of repetitive calculations, and as such does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims”)) are well-understood, routine, conventional activity, similar to the claimed limitations of the independent claims for: “processing…, determining…, and assigning…” MPEP 2106.05(d)(ii) provides that electronic recordkeeping (Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 573 U.S. 208, 225, 110 USPQ2d 1984 (2014) (creating and maintaining \"shadow accounts\"); Ultramercial, 772 F.3d at 716, 112 USPQ2d at 1755 (updating an activity log)), and storing and retrieving information in memory (see Versata Dev.",
"Group, Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1681, publishing the verification score to at least one system”. Therefore, independent claim 1 is not patent eligible. In addition, dependent claims 2-4, and 6, do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above with respect to integration of the abstract idea into a practical application, the additional elements of dependent claims of: “the identity document, a driver’s license, a passport, and machine learning” to perform the claimed limitations, amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using a generic computer component (See MPEP 2106.05(f)). Similar to the independent claims, mere instructions to apply an exception using a generic computer component cannot provide an inventive concept.",
"Also for the same reasoning as the independent claims, the additional elements of the limitations of the dependent claims, when considered individually and as an ordered combination, together do not offer significantly more than the sum of the functions of the elements when each is taken alone and the dependent claims as a whole, do not amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Further, the step of using machine learning to identify the identity information fails to transform dependent claim 4 into patent eligible material, as this is part of the field of use and technical environment in which the abstract idea is being implement and does not result in an improvement to additional elements (see MPEP 2106.05(h) Electric Power Group court decision). With respect to the use of machine learning, the Examiner interprets this to be akin to analyzing information, as the model is merely being used as a tool to analyze the 1. For these reasons, dependent claims 2-4, and 6 also are not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C.",
"101. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.",
"Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claims 1-4 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over WO 2016/131083 to Spendlove et al. (hereinafter referred to as Spendlove), in view of US 9,342,741 to Amtrup et al. (hereinafter referred to as Amtrup). In regards to claim 1, Spendlove discloses a method for digital identify verification (method and system to verify the identity of a user, para. 0004), Amtrup, in the related field of determining document validity, teaches processing (method includes normalizing data from the document using predefined business rules, col. 3, lines 4-14) with a business specific rule (predefined business rules may include business-oriented or criteria/conditions for processing data, col. 8, lines 36-50). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to provide the method of Spendlove with the ability to utilize business specific rules as taught by the method of Amtrup. The motivation for doing so would have been to check against applicable business rules to yield improved extraction accuracy (Amtrup, col. 12, lines 57-67).",
"In regards to claim 2, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, and further discloses wherein the identity document (the at least one independently issued identity verification document includes at least one Government issued verification document including a photographic image of In regards to claim 3, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, and further discloses wherein the identity information comprises at least one of a name, an address, a date of birth, and an expiration date (The Optical Character Recognition (OCR) system recognizes characters such us name, date of birth, expiry date of license, license number and place of issue, para. 00120). In regards to claim 4, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, and further discloses wherein the identity information is identified based on machine learning (second part includes constructing a classifier for selecting a small number of important features of the face using an Adaptive Boosting (or AdaBoost) learning algorithm, para.",
"0086)(Examiner interprets Adaptive Boosting or AdaBoost as machine learning). Claim 6 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Spendlove, in view of Amtrup, and further in view of US 2010/0070405 to Joa et al. (hereinafter referred to as Joa). In regards to claim 6, modified Spendlove discloses the method of claim 1, but fails to disclose a method further comprising: receiving, from a third party, a risk score based on activity involving a phone number associated with the user; wherein the verification score is further based on the risk score. Joa, in the related field of evaluating risk and calculating risk scores, teaches receiving, from a third party (wireless number risk scores may be calculated by individual companies or by an industry consortium, para.",
"0006), a risk score based on activity involving a phone number associated with the user (customer information associated with a wireless phone number may be used to generate a wireless number risk score which can be used to gauge risk of nonpayment, para. 0006); wherein the verification score is further based on the risk score (at step 203 the identity of the customer may be authenticated and at step 204 the positive identification initiates the scoring process which generates the customer’s wireless number risk score which may be within acceptable limits (low risk) or may exceed acceptable limits (high risk), para. 0042). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to provide the method of Spendlove with the ability to utilize risk scores based on activity involving a user’s phone number as taught by the method of Joa. The motivation for doing so would have been to gauge a risk of nonpayment by generating a risk score based on information associated with a user’s wireless phone number (Joa, para. 0006).",
"Conclusion The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Lacey (ES 2811249) teaches system and method for sharing verified identity documents. Malhotra et al. (US 10,176,542) teaches systems and methods for identity validation and verification. Nigram et al. (US 10,225,248) teaches methods and systems for providing online verification and security. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Paul Schwarzenberg whose telephone number is (313) 446-6611. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Thursday (7:30-6:30). Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice.",
"If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Ryan Donlon, can be reached on (571) 270-3602. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is (571) 273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. /PAUL S SCHWARZENBERG/Examiner, Art Unit 3695 2/10/2022 1 See NPL A Brief Review of Machine Learning, 2009, which discloses \"Research shows that machine learning technology has been widely used in marketing, finance, telecommunications and network analysis. \", see also Computation Finance, 2010, which discloses \"Table 2 lists the statistical and artificial intelligence techniques that are widely used in computational finance.\""
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-02-20.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied. | 11-28-2022 | [
"C. A. 11th Cir. Cer-tiorari denied."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/9254631/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, ) ) Case No. 3:21-CV-233 Plaintiff, ) ) Removal from the Circuit Court of vs. ) St. Clair County, Illinois ) Case No. 21-OV-0000277 MONSANTO CORPORATION, ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendant. )
NOTICE OF REMOVAL
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446, Defendant Monsanto Company 1
(“Defendant”) hereby removes the above-styled civil action to this Court from the Circuit Court
of St. Clair County, Illinois. Defendant removes this action on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction
because there is complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff, the City of East St. Louis
(“Plaintiff”), and Defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In support of this
removal, Defendant states as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
1. Plaintiff filed this civil action in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, Case
No. 21-OV-0000277, along with two other cases (21-OV-0000282 and 21-OV-0000276), which
Defendant is removing contemporaneously with this Notice. 2 These three actions allege that
Defendant violated various nuisance-related provisions of the East St. Louis City Code,
specifically Sections 50-78, 62-45, and 94-91 of the Code, and allegedly contaminated a number
of real estate parcels with polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). Plaintiff’s three separate actions,
1 Plaintiff improperly refers to Defendant as Monsanto Corporation. Defendant’s legal name is Monsanto Company. 2 Three citations were also issued to Pharmacia LLC, alleging identical ordinance violations occurring on identical properties during the exact same time frame (St. Clair County, IL Case Nos. 21-OV-0000275, 21-OV-0000278, 21- OV-0000280). Pharmacia LLC is removing those cases contemporaneously with this Notice by Defendant Monsanto. 1 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #2
including this action, seek a recovery for the same alleged contamination of the identical real estate
parcels. Plaintiff seeks the remedy of abatement and/or payment of monetary fines. Plaintiff
served Defendant with three citations, one for each action, on February 3, 2021.
2. A true and correct copy of the state court file, as of the date of this filing, is attached
hereto as Exhibit 1. Defendant is unaware of the existence of any process, pleadings, or orders
other than the documents included in the exhibits attached hereto.
3. Defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of
Delaware, and its principal place of business is in Missouri. Accordingly, Defendant is a citizen
of Delaware and Missouri for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
4. Plaintiff, the City of East St. Louis, is a municipality within the state of Illinois.
5. Accordingly, Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Illinois for diversity jurisdiction
purposes.
6. Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Sections 50-78, 62-45, and 94-91 of the East
St. Louis City Code by allegedly dumping, depositing, or otherwise discarding polychlorinated
biphenyls (PCBs) on hundreds of separately-identified parcels of real estate “located within the
City of East St. Louis, and described on the attached Exhibit A.” See Exhibit 1, Citations 0926751,
0926754, and 0926757 at pp. 2, 19, 36). Altogether, Plaintiff’s spreadsheet contains 373 separate
rows of property descriptions. Some of the property descriptions may be duplicates; however, no
fewer than 153 unique parcels and 22 right of way segments are identified on the Plaintiff’s
spreadsheet as affected properties. See Affidavit of Brian R. Hitchens, attached hereto as Exhibit
2.
7. Plaintiff has demanded a trial by jury. See Exhibit 1, Citations 0926751, 0926754,
and 0926757 at pp. 2, 19, 36).
2 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #3
8. Based upon Plaintiff’s allegations, and the relevant Sections of the East St. Louis
City Code, Plaintiff seeks for each unique parcel the remedy of abatement by Defendant and/or
monetary in the amount of $750 for each property (Plaintiff appears to be seeking either a one-
time payment for each property or a payment for each property each day of an alleged violation):
• Case No. 21-OV-0000277 alleges a violation of Section 50-78. Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages in the amount of $750 per day for each property and/or
abatement of each property.
• Case No. 21-OV-0000282 alleges a violation of Section 94-91. Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages in the amount of $750 for each property.
• Case No. 21-OV-0000276 alleges a violation of Section 62-45. Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages in the amount of $750 per day for each property and/or
abatement of each property.
9. Given the number of lots and blocks of properties at issue in this civil action (373
in all), as well as the amount of the monetary damages sought by the Plaintiff, upon information
and belief, the amount in controversy is no less than $279,750. Even if the actual number of
properties at issue were fewer than 373 (e.g., 153 unique parcels and 22 right of way segments),
the total payment amount sought by Plaintiff would still exceed $75,000. Finally, the remedy of
abatement would also – independently – eclipse the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000. See
Exhibit 2. Therefore, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
II. REMOVAL IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 AND 1441
10. Complete diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiff, a resident of the State of
Illinois, and Defendant, a resident of the States of Missouri and Delaware.
11. Furthermore, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 3 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #4
12. Therefore, removal is proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441.
13. Finally, the three actions described herein are properly considered one action. They
arise from identical allegations of contamination to identical parcels of real estate. Under Illinois
law, a plaintiff may not split its cause of action into separate pieces. Had the Plaintiff here not
improperly split its claims, these claims would exist in the same lawsuit. Thus, even though the
Court has original jurisdiction over this specific action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court is
also authorized, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, to retain supplemental jurisdiction over this action, where
the Court has original jurisdiction over the two additional claims brought by and against the same
parties that are part of the same case or controversy.
III. THE REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 AND 1446 ARE MET
14. This Notice of Removal is properly filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois because the Circuit Court of St. Clair County is located within the
Southern District of Illinois. Venue for removal is therefore proper because this is the “district
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
15. This Notice of Removal is signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).
16. This Notice of Removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), as it is filed within
thirty (30) days of service.
17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), attached hereto are copies of all process
documents, pleadings and orders filed with the court by Plaintiff with respect to this action. See
Exhibit 1.
4 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #5
18. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), a copy of this Notice of Removal is being served
upon counsel for Plaintiff and a copy, along with a Notice to Clerk of Removal, will be promptly
filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, State of Illinois.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendant Monsanto Company respectfully removes this action from the Circuit Court of
St. Clair County, Illinois to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
Dated: March 1, 2021 Respectfully submitted,
CAPES SOKOL
By: /s/ Adam E. Miller Adam E. Miller, #6206249 Katherine D. Landfried, #6328549 8182 Maryland Ave., 15th Floor St. Louis, MO 63105 (314) 721-7701 (telephone) (314) 754-4811 (facsimile) Email: miller@capessokol.com Email: landfried@capessokol.com
Attorneys for Defendant Monsanto Company
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 1st day of March, 2021 a true and correct copy of the foregoing were served via electronic mail and first class mail upon the following:
John Baricevic, Esq. 5 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #6
Chatham and Baricevic 107 West Main St. Belleville, IL 62220 john@chathamlaw.org
John J. Driscoll The Driscoll Firm, LLC 1311 Ave Ponce De León San Juan, Puerto Rico 00907
/s/ Adam E. Miller
6 | 2021-03-01 | [
"Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 1 of 6 Page ID #1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS CITY OF EAST ST. LOUIS, ) ) Case No. 3:21-CV-233 Plaintiff, ) ) Removal from the Circuit Court of vs. ) St. Clair County, Illinois ) Case No. 21-OV-0000277 MONSANTO CORPORATION, ) ) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED Defendant. ) NOTICE OF REMOVAL Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441 and 1446, Defendant Monsanto Company 1 (“Defendant”) hereby removes the above-styled civil action to this Court from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois. Defendant removes this action on the grounds of diversity jurisdiction because there is complete diversity of citizenship between Plaintiff, the City of East St. Louis (“Plaintiff”), and Defendant, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. In support of this removal, Defendant states as follows: I. BACKGROUND 1. Plaintiff filed this civil action in the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois, Case No.",
"21-OV-0000277, along with two other cases (21-OV-0000282 and 21-OV-0000276), which Defendant is removing contemporaneously with this Notice. 2 These three actions allege that Defendant violated various nuisance-related provisions of the East St. Louis City Code, specifically Sections 50-78, 62-45, and 94-91 of the Code, and allegedly contaminated a number of real estate parcels with polychlorinated biphenyls (“PCBs”). Plaintiff’s three separate actions, 1 Plaintiff improperly refers to Defendant as Monsanto Corporation. Defendant’s legal name is Monsanto Company. 2 Three citations were also issued to Pharmacia LLC, alleging identical ordinance violations occurring on identical properties during the exact same time frame (St. Clair County, IL Case Nos. 21-OV-0000275, 21-OV-0000278, 21- OV-0000280).",
"Pharmacia LLC is removing those cases contemporaneously with this Notice by Defendant Monsanto. 1 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 2 of 6 Page ID #2 including this action, seek a recovery for the same alleged contamination of the identical real estate parcels. Plaintiff seeks the remedy of abatement and/or payment of monetary fines. Plaintiff served Defendant with three citations, one for each action, on February 3, 2021. 2. A true and correct copy of the state court file, as of the date of this filing, is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Defendant is unaware of the existence of any process, pleadings, or orders other than the documents included in the exhibits attached hereto. 3.",
"Defendant is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of Delaware, and its principal place of business is in Missouri. Accordingly, Defendant is a citizen of Delaware and Missouri for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 4. Plaintiff, the City of East St. Louis, is a municipality within the state of Illinois. 5. Accordingly, Plaintiff is a citizen of the state of Illinois for diversity jurisdiction purposes. 6. Plaintiff alleges Defendant violated Sections 50-78, 62-45, and 94-91 of the East St. Louis City Code by allegedly dumping, depositing, or otherwise discarding polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) on hundreds of separately-identified parcels of real estate “located within the City of East St. Louis, and described on the attached Exhibit A.” See Exhibit 1, Citations 0926751, 0926754, and 0926757 at pp.",
"2, 19, 36). Altogether, Plaintiff’s spreadsheet contains 373 separate rows of property descriptions. Some of the property descriptions may be duplicates; however, no fewer than 153 unique parcels and 22 right of way segments are identified on the Plaintiff’s spreadsheet as affected properties. See Affidavit of Brian R. Hitchens, attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 7. Plaintiff has demanded a trial by jury. See Exhibit 1, Citations 0926751, 0926754, and 0926757 at pp. 2, 19, 36). 2 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 3 of 6 Page ID #3 8. Based upon Plaintiff’s allegations, and the relevant Sections of the East St. Louis City Code, Plaintiff seeks for each unique parcel the remedy of abatement by Defendant and/or monetary in the amount of $750 for each property (Plaintiff appears to be seeking either a one- time payment for each property or a payment for each property each day of an alleged violation): • Case No. 21-OV-0000277 alleges a violation of Section 50-78. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $750 per day for each property and/or abatement of each property. • Case No.",
"21-OV-0000282 alleges a violation of Section 94-91. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $750 for each property. • Case No. 21-OV-0000276 alleges a violation of Section 62-45. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in the amount of $750 per day for each property and/or abatement of each property. 9. Given the number of lots and blocks of properties at issue in this civil action (373 in all), as well as the amount of the monetary damages sought by the Plaintiff, upon information and belief, the amount in controversy is no less than $279,750. Even if the actual number of properties at issue were fewer than 373 (e.g., 153 unique parcels and 22 right of way segments), the total payment amount sought by Plaintiff would still exceed $75,000. Finally, the remedy of abatement would also – independently – eclipse the jurisdictional threshold of $75,000.",
"See Exhibit 2. Therefore, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. II. REMOVAL IS PROPER BECAUSE THIS COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 AND 1441 10. Complete diversity of citizenship exists between Plaintiff, a resident of the State of Illinois, and Defendant, a resident of the States of Missouri and Delaware. 11. Furthermore, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 3 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 4 of 6 Page ID #4 12. Therefore, removal is proper, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441. 13. Finally, the three actions described herein are properly considered one action.",
"They arise from identical allegations of contamination to identical parcels of real estate. Under Illinois law, a plaintiff may not split its cause of action into separate pieces. Had the Plaintiff here not improperly split its claims, these claims would exist in the same lawsuit. Thus, even though the Court has original jurisdiction over this specific action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, this Court is also authorized, under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, to retain supplemental jurisdiction over this action, where the Court has original jurisdiction over the two additional claims brought by and against the same parties that are part of the same case or controversy. III. THE REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS OF 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 AND 1446 ARE MET 14. This Notice of Removal is properly filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois because the Circuit Court of St. Clair County is located within the Southern District of Illinois.",
"Venue for removal is therefore proper because this is the “district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). 15. This Notice of Removal is signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). 16. This Notice of Removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), as it is filed within thirty (30) days of service. 17. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), attached hereto are copies of all process documents, pleadings and orders filed with the court by Plaintiff with respect to this action. See Exhibit 1. 4 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 5 of 6 Page ID #5 18. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d), a copy of this Notice of Removal is being served upon counsel for Plaintiff and a copy, along with a Notice to Clerk of Removal, will be promptly filed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, State of Illinois. IV.",
"CONCLUSION Defendant Monsanto Company respectfully removes this action from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. Dated: March 1, 2021 Respectfully submitted, CAPES SOKOL By: /s/ Adam E. Miller Adam E. Miller, #6206249 Katherine D. Landfried, #6328549 8182 Maryland Ave., 15th Floor St. Louis, MO 63105 (314) 721-7701 (telephone) (314) 754-4811 (facsimile) Email: miller@capessokol.com Email: landfried@capessokol.com Attorneys for Defendant Monsanto Company CERTIFICATE OF MAILING The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 1st day of March, 2021 a true and correct copy of the foregoing were served via electronic mail and first class mail upon the following: John Baricevic, Esq. 5 Case 3:21-cv-00233 Document 1 Filed 03/01/21 Page 6 of 6 Page ID #6 Chatham and Baricevic 107 West Main St. Belleville, IL 62220 john@chathamlaw.org John J. Driscoll The Driscoll Firm, LLC 1311 Ave Ponce De León San Juan, Puerto Rico 00907 /s/ Adam E. Miller 6"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/162125204/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114 A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on October 18, 2022 has been entered. Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yamazaki (JP 2001118134 A)1 in view of Kingham (US 4169356 A). As per claim 1, Yamazaki discloses a refrigerating unit (circuit inside 102) of a self-contained dispenser (100) of refrigerated products contained within a room (101) of the self-contained dispenser (see figure 1 and paragraph 5 of the translation), the refrigerating unit (circuit inside 102) comprising a primary circuit (108) for recovering and regenerating at least one refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A; see at least paragraph 22 of the translation) and a secondary circuit (112) for recovering and regenerating a heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B; see at least paragraph 23 of the translation), to allow a thermal exchange between the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A), the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) and the refrigerated products contained within the room (101) of the self-contained dispenser (100), the refrigerating unit (circuit inside 102) further comprising at least one primary evaporator (106 and 109) in common with respect to the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) and to the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) and is configured to receive both the refrigerating fluid (“A”) and the heat-transfer fluid (“B”, as shown in figure 1), and comprising at least one secondary heat exchanger (110) with respect to the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) and to the refrigerated products in the room (101; see at least paragraphs 5 and 23 of the translation), the primary circuit (108) for recovering and regenerating the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) being hermetically sealed (described as a “closed circuit” in paragraph 5 of the translation) and at least the primary evaporator (106 and 109) being placed in a suitable room (102, per se) open towards an outside environment (via vents and/or openings) to allow a suitable air circulation (described in paragraph 22 of the translation), forced through a fan (as described in paragraphs 6 and 27 of the translation), wherein the primary circuit (108) for recovering and regenerating the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) is composed of a compressor (103), a condenser (104), at least one fan of the condenser (see paragraph 6 of the translation), a lamination member (105) and the primary evaporator (106 and 109), while the secondary circuit (112) for recovering and regenerating the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) is composed of the primary evaporator (106 and 109), the secondary heat exchanger (110), at least one fan (see paragraph 27 of the translation) of the secondary heat exchanger (110) and a pump (111) for circulating the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B), the pump (111) for circulating the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) being placed in the room (102) of the primary circuit (108; as shown in figure 1), while the secondary heat exchanger (110) is placed inside the room (101) of the self-contained dispenser (100) for cooling and keeping the products at a controlled temperature (as described in at least paragraphs 4 and 5 of the translation), wherein the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) is composed of gas (i.e. ammonia) produced by the anaerobic decomposition (i.e. acidogenesis) of organic material (see at least paragraph 9 of the translation), and the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) is composed of water or of an antifreeze solution (e.g. brine; as described in at least paragraphs 16, 23, 25 and 34 of the translation), wherein the lamination member (105) is a throttling device adapted to generate a pressure drop comprising one of a capillary tube, or a thermostatic valve (see line 1 of paragraph 22 of the translation). However, Yamazaki may not explicitly disclose a dehydrating filter. On the other hand, Kingham, directed to a refrigeration system, discloses the use of a filter-drier (37). Furthermore, it has been held that some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention is a support for a conclusion of obviousness which is consistent with the proper "functional approach" to the determination of obviousness as laid down in Graham, if the following findings can be articulated: (1) a finding that there was some teaching, suggestion, or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings; (2) a finding that there was reasonable expectation of success; and (3) whatever additional findings based on the Graham factual inquiries may be necessary, in view of the facts of the case under consideration, to explain a conclusion of obviousness.2 As per (1), it should be noted Kingham teaches that the filter-drier is a conventional piece of equipment which removes any residual moisture from the refrigerant (see column 4, lines 18-26). One of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that said component allows for ensuring the optimal operation of the vapor-compression cycle. As per (2), one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that since the prior art of Kingham has successfully implemented its own teachings with regards to the dehydrating filter, there would also be a reasonable expectation of success if said teachings were to be incorporated into the teachings of Yamazaki. Said reasonable expectation of success is apparent from the fact that both Yamazaki and Kingham are analogous to each other, as well as are analogous to the claimed invention, by virtue of being within the same field of endeavor (i.e. refrigeration systems). Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the teachings of the prior art are compatible and combinable, without yielding unpredictable results. As per (3), one of ordinary skill in the art, when considering the aforementioned evidence, would comprehend that the prior art teachings of Yamazaki may be significantly improved by incorporating the prior art teachings of Kingham, since the teachings of Kingham serve to complement the teachings of Yamazaki by virtue of suggesting the removal of moisture from the vapor-compression cycle, thereby insuring an optimal performance thereof. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have taken the teachings of Yamazaki, and to have modified them with the teachings of Kingham, by having a dehydrating filter (i.e. a filter-drier), in order to remove any residual moisture from the refrigerant, and thereby ensuring the optimal operation of the system, as similarly suggested by Kingham, without yielding unpredictable results. Claim(s) 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yamazaki (JP 2001118134 A) in view of Kingham (US 4169356 A), as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Fink et al. (US 3153918 A), herein Fink. As per claim 4, Yamazaki discloses wherein the primary evaporator (106 and 109) comprises a housing for housing at least a portion of a fluid conduit (line of 108) associated with the primary circuit (108) and portion of a fluid conduit (line of 112) associated with the secondary circuit (108). Although Yamazaki teaches using a material having high thermal conductivity for the primary evaporator (106 and 109; see at least paragraph of the translation), Yamazaki appears to be silent as to whether the housing is made of metal, per se. On the other hand, Fink, directed to a refrigerator, discloses the use of an aluminum housing structure (34) for an evaporator (35). Fink explicitly discloses the use of aluminum due to its high thermal conductivity that provides an ideal heat absorption capacity (see column 3, lines 11-19). It has been held that the selection of a known material based on its suitability for its intended purpose supports a prima facie determination of obviousness. See MPEP § 2144.07. As outlined in Fink, aluminum is known to have a high thermal conductivity which benefits heat transfer within refrigeration systems. Hence, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have taken the teachings of Yamazaki and to have modified them with the teachings of Fink by having a metal (aluminum) housing for the primary evaporator in order to improve the heat transfer characteristics of the refrigerator, as similarly suggested by both Yamazaki and Fink, without yielding unpredictable results. Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments filed on October 18, 2022 (“the Remarks”) have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant first argues that Yamazaki does not teach a primary evaporator as claimed, because allegedly, “[t]he evaporator 106 is solely dedicated to the primary circuit and does not form part of the secondary fluid circuit. As such, the evaporator is not common with the secondary circuit”. Applicant states that Yamazaki does not teach the current claim language of the at least one primary evaporator being “in common with respect to the refrigerating fluid and to the heat-transfer fluid and [being] configured to receive both the refrigerating fluid and the heat-transfer fluid”. Lastly, Applicant appears to conclude that the current amendment distinguishes the claimed structures from the structures disclosed in Yamazaki.3 However, these arguments are considered unpersuasive as follows. First, it should be noted that the claim language states the following: “at least one primary evaporator in common with respect to the refrigerating fluid and to the heat-transfer fluid and is configured to receive both the refrigerating fluid and the heat-transfer fluid” (emphasis added). The current claim language can be infringed by having one or more primary evaporators. In Yamazaki, two heat exchangers (i.e. 106 and 109) are being relied upon to meet the limitation of “at least one primary evaporator”. The two evaporators (106 and 109) of Yamazaki respectively receive the refrigerating fluid (“A”) and the heat-transfer fluid (“B”). Also, the two evaporators (106 and 109) are formed as an integral unit by being encased with an insulator (113). The two evaporators of Yamazaki are common to both refrigerating fluids, by virtue of providing a thermal interface therebetween. Moreover, a review of the instant drawings shows what appears to be a plate heat exchanger (9) as the primary evaporator (see figure 3). The instant specification states that the evaporator can be “made through any building type, with welded-brazed plates, with coaxial tubes, with micro-channels, etc., suitable for a thermal exchanger of the gas-liquid or liquid-liquid type without mixing the fluids”4 (emphasis added). When comparing the original disclosure of the instant application with the new claim limitations, a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) of the claims would include any type of evaporator(s) that provide(s) heat exchange between two separate fluids of two separate circuits. In contrast, Applicant’s arguments appear to employ a narrow or limited interpretation of the claimed invention in light of the written description. The current claim language, under a BRI in light of the specification, is taught by any device with one or more evaporators (as in Yamazaki) that receive two separate fluid flows that to not mix. Absent additional structures related to the particularities of the claimed evaporator, the prior art of Yamazaki is still deemed to meet the claimed limitations. Therefore, the rejection is hereby maintained. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MIGUEL A DIAZ whose telephone number is (313)446-6587. The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Friday: 9:00 AM - 5:00 PM Eastern Time. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jianying C. Atkisson can be reached on (571) 270-7740. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/MIGUEL A DIAZ/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3763
1 Yamazaki and its translation were initially made of record by Applicant in the IDS filed on April 29, 2020. 2 See MPEP § 2143. 3 See page 4 of the Remarks. 4 See paragraph 58 of the printed publication (US 20200224937 A1). | 2022-11-07T03:23:59 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Continued Examination Under 37 CFR 1.114 A request for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, including the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e), was filed in this application after final rejection. Since this application is eligible for continued examination under 37 CFR 1.114, and the fee set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(e) has been timely paid, the finality of the previous Office action has been withdrawn pursuant to 37 CFR 1.114. Applicant's submission filed on October 18, 2022 has been entered.",
"Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.",
"Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yamazaki (JP 2001118134 A)1 in view of Kingham (US 4169356 A).",
"As per claim 1, Yamazaki discloses a refrigerating unit (circuit inside 102) of a self-contained dispenser (100) of refrigerated products contained within a room (101) of the self-contained dispenser (see figure 1 and paragraph 5 of the translation), the refrigerating unit (circuit inside 102) comprising a primary circuit (108) for recovering and regenerating at least one refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A; see at least paragraph 22 of the translation) and a secondary circuit (112) for recovering and regenerating a heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B; see at least paragraph 23 of the translation), to allow a thermal exchange between the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A), the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) and the refrigerated products contained within the room (101) of the self-contained dispenser (100), the refrigerating unit (circuit inside 102) further comprising at least one primary evaporator (106 and 109) in common with respect to the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) and to the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) and is configured to receive both the refrigerating fluid (“A”) and the heat-transfer fluid (“B”, as shown in figure 1), and comprising at least one secondary heat exchanger (110) with respect to the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) and to the refrigerated products in the room (101; see at least paragraphs 5 and 23 of the translation), the primary circuit (108) for recovering and regenerating the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) being hermetically sealed (described as a “closed circuit” in paragraph 5 of the translation) and at least the primary evaporator (106 and 109) being placed in a suitable room (102, per se) open towards an outside environment (via vents and/or openings) to allow a suitable air circulation (described in paragraph 22 of the translation), forced through a fan (as described in paragraphs 6 and 27 of the translation), wherein the primary circuit (108) for recovering and regenerating the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) is composed of a compressor (103), a condenser (104), at least one fan of the condenser (see paragraph 6 of the translation), a lamination member (105) and the primary evaporator (106 and 109), while the secondary circuit (112) for recovering and regenerating the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) is composed of the primary evaporator (106 and 109), the secondary heat exchanger (110), at least one fan (see paragraph 27 of the translation) of the secondary heat exchanger (110) and a pump (111) for circulating the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B), the pump (111) for circulating the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) being placed in the room (102) of the primary circuit (108; as shown in figure 1), while the secondary heat exchanger (110) is placed inside the room (101) of the self-contained dispenser (100) for cooling and keeping the products at a controlled temperature (as described in at least paragraphs 4 and 5 of the translation), wherein the refrigerating fluid (refrigerant A) is composed of gas (i.e.",
"ammonia) produced by the anaerobic decomposition (i.e. acidogenesis) of organic material (see at least paragraph 9 of the translation), and the heat-transfer fluid (refrigerant B) is composed of water or of an antifreeze solution (e.g. brine; as described in at least paragraphs 16, 23, 25 and 34 of the translation), wherein the lamination member (105) is a throttling device adapted to generate a pressure drop comprising one of a capillary tube, or a thermostatic valve (see line 1 of paragraph 22 of the translation). However, Yamazaki may not explicitly disclose a dehydrating filter. On the other hand, Kingham, directed to a refrigeration system, discloses the use of a filter-drier (37). Furthermore, it has been held that some teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art that would have led one of ordinary skill to modify the prior art reference or to combine prior art reference teachings to arrive at the claimed invention is a support for a conclusion of obviousness which is consistent with the proper \"functional approach\" to the determination of obviousness as laid down in Graham, if the following findings can be articulated: (1) a finding that there was some teaching, suggestion, or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings; (2) a finding that there was reasonable expectation of success; and (3) whatever additional findings based on the Graham factual inquiries may be necessary, in view of the facts of the case under consideration, to explain a conclusion of obviousness.2 As per (1), it should be noted Kingham teaches that the filter-drier is a conventional piece of equipment which removes any residual moisture from the refrigerant (see column 4, lines 18-26).",
"One of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that said component allows for ensuring the optimal operation of the vapor-compression cycle. As per (2), one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that since the prior art of Kingham has successfully implemented its own teachings with regards to the dehydrating filter, there would also be a reasonable expectation of success if said teachings were to be incorporated into the teachings of Yamazaki. Said reasonable expectation of success is apparent from the fact that both Yamazaki and Kingham are analogous to each other, as well as are analogous to the claimed invention, by virtue of being within the same field of endeavor (i.e. refrigeration systems). Thus, one of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the teachings of the prior art are compatible and combinable, without yielding unpredictable results.",
"As per (3), one of ordinary skill in the art, when considering the aforementioned evidence, would comprehend that the prior art teachings of Yamazaki may be significantly improved by incorporating the prior art teachings of Kingham, since the teachings of Kingham serve to complement the teachings of Yamazaki by virtue of suggesting the removal of moisture from the vapor-compression cycle, thereby insuring an optimal performance thereof. Therefore, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have taken the teachings of Yamazaki, and to have modified them with the teachings of Kingham, by having a dehydrating filter (i.e.",
"a filter-drier), in order to remove any residual moisture from the refrigerant, and thereby ensuring the optimal operation of the system, as similarly suggested by Kingham, without yielding unpredictable results. Claim(s) 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Yamazaki (JP 2001118134 A) in view of Kingham (US 4169356 A), as applied to claim 1 above, and further in view of Fink et al. (US 3153918 A), herein Fink. As per claim 4, Yamazaki discloses wherein the primary evaporator (106 and 109) comprises a housing for housing at least a portion of a fluid conduit (line of 108) associated with the primary circuit (108) and portion of a fluid conduit (line of 112) associated with the secondary circuit (108). Although Yamazaki teaches using a material having high thermal conductivity for the primary evaporator (106 and 109; see at least paragraph of the translation), Yamazaki appears to be silent as to whether the housing is made of metal, per se.",
"On the other hand, Fink, directed to a refrigerator, discloses the use of an aluminum housing structure (34) for an evaporator (35). Fink explicitly discloses the use of aluminum due to its high thermal conductivity that provides an ideal heat absorption capacity (see column 3, lines 11-19). It has been held that the selection of a known material based on its suitability for its intended purpose supports a prima facie determination of obviousness. See MPEP § 2144.07. As outlined in Fink, aluminum is known to have a high thermal conductivity which benefits heat transfer within refrigeration systems. Hence, it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to have taken the teachings of Yamazaki and to have modified them with the teachings of Fink by having a metal (aluminum) housing for the primary evaporator in order to improve the heat transfer characteristics of the refrigerator, as similarly suggested by both Yamazaki and Fink, without yielding unpredictable results. Response to Arguments Applicant's arguments filed on October 18, 2022 (“the Remarks”) have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant first argues that Yamazaki does not teach a primary evaporator as claimed, because allegedly, “[t]he evaporator 106 is solely dedicated to the primary circuit and does not form part of the secondary fluid circuit. As such, the evaporator is not common with the secondary circuit”.",
"Applicant states that Yamazaki does not teach the current claim language of the at least one primary evaporator being “in common with respect to the refrigerating fluid and to the heat-transfer fluid and [being] configured to receive both the refrigerating fluid and the heat-transfer fluid”. Lastly, Applicant appears to conclude that the current amendment distinguishes the claimed structures from the structures disclosed in Yamazaki.3 However, these arguments are considered unpersuasive as follows. First, it should be noted that the claim language states the following: “at least one primary evaporator in common with respect to the refrigerating fluid and to the heat-transfer fluid and is configured to receive both the refrigerating fluid and the heat-transfer fluid” (emphasis added).",
"The current claim language can be infringed by having one or more primary evaporators. In Yamazaki, two heat exchangers (i.e. 106 and 109) are being relied upon to meet the limitation of “at least one primary evaporator”. The two evaporators (106 and 109) of Yamazaki respectively receive the refrigerating fluid (“A”) and the heat-transfer fluid (“B”). Also, the two evaporators (106 and 109) are formed as an integral unit by being encased with an insulator (113). The two evaporators of Yamazaki are common to both refrigerating fluids, by virtue of providing a thermal interface therebetween. Moreover, a review of the instant drawings shows what appears to be a plate heat exchanger (9) as the primary evaporator (see figure 3). The instant specification states that the evaporator can be “made through any building type, with welded-brazed plates, with coaxial tubes, with micro-channels, etc., suitable for a thermal exchanger of the gas-liquid or liquid-liquid type without mixing the fluids”4 (emphasis added). When comparing the original disclosure of the instant application with the new claim limitations, a broadest reasonable interpretation (BRI) of the claims would include any type of evaporator(s) that provide(s) heat exchange between two separate fluids of two separate circuits.",
"In contrast, Applicant’s arguments appear to employ a narrow or limited interpretation of the claimed invention in light of the written description. The current claim language, under a BRI in light of the specification, is taught by any device with one or more evaporators (as in Yamazaki) that receive two separate fluid flows that to not mix. Absent additional structures related to the particularities of the claimed evaporator, the prior art of Yamazaki is still deemed to meet the claimed limitations. Therefore, the rejection is hereby maintained. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to MIGUEL A DIAZ whose telephone number is (313)446-6587.",
"The examiner can normally be reached Monday - Friday: 9:00 AM - 5:00 PM Eastern Time. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Jianying C. Atkisson can be reached on (571) 270-7740. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users.",
"To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional questions, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /MIGUEL A DIAZ/ Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3763 1 Yamazaki and its translation were initially made of record by Applicant in the IDS filed on April 29, 2020. 2 See MPEP § 2143. 3 See page 4 of the Remarks. 4 See paragraph 58 of the printed publication (US 20200224937 A1)."
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-11-13.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Case 2:98-cv-05182-TJS Document 39 Filed 04/24/20 Page 1 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIE STOKES : CIVIL ACTION Petitioner, : : : : v. : : DA OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., : NO. 98-5182 Respondents.
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
I hereby enter my appearance on behalf of the respondents in the above-captioned matter.
/s/ Max C. Kaufman
Max C. Kaufman Supervisor, Federal Litigation Unit
!1 Case 2:98-cv-05182-TJS Document 39 Filed 04/24/20 Page 2 of 2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
WILLIE STOKES : CIVIL ACTION Petitioner, : : : : v. : : DA OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., : NO. 98-5182 Respondents.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Max C. Kaufman, hereby certify that on April 24, 2020, a copy of the foregoing notice was served via ECF to counsel for Petitioner.
/s/ Max C. Kaufman
Max C. Kaufman Supervisor, Federal Litigation Unit Philadelphia District Attorney's Office Three South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499 (215) 686-5747
!2 | 2020-04-24 | [
"Case 2:98-cv-05182-TJS Document 39 Filed 04/24/20 Page 1 of 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA WILLIE STOKES : CIVIL ACTION Petitioner, : : : : v. : : DA OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., : NO. 98-5182 Respondents. NOTICE OF APPEARANCE I hereby enter my appearance on behalf of the respondents in the above-captioned matter. /s/ Max C. Kaufman Max C. Kaufman Supervisor, Federal Litigation Unit !1 Case 2:98-cv-05182-TJS Document 39 Filed 04/24/20 Page 2 of 2 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA WILLIE STOKES : CIVIL ACTION Petitioner, : : : : v. : : DA OF PHILADELPHIA, et al., : NO. 98-5182 Respondents. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Max C. Kaufman, hereby certify that on April 24, 2020, a copy of the foregoing notice was served via ECF to counsel for Petitioner. /s/ Max C. Kaufman Max C. Kaufman Supervisor, Federal Litigation Unit Philadelphia District Attorney's Office Three South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499 (215) 686-5747 !2"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/131613831/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
131 So.2d 129 (1961) STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Naomi Burleson CROCKETT et al., Defendants-Appellants. No. 9513. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit. June 1, 1961. Rehearing Denied June 22, 1961. Love & Rigby, Shreveport, for appellants. D. Ross Banister, Brunswig Sholars, Baton Rouge, for appellee. *130 Before HARDY, GLADNEY and AYRES, JJ. AYRES, Judge. This is an expropriation suit wherein the plaintiff, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, expropriated, for right-of-way purposes, defendants' property consisting of the premises bearing Municipal No. 972 Louisiana Avenue in the City of Shreveport. Plaintiff alleged that the just compensation for said property and the improvements thereon was $22,000. The defendants contended that the property had a value of $47,000 and, in reconvention, sought judgment in that sum. From a judgment approving the appraisal and evaluation as made on behalf of the State, and casting defendants for costs, the defendants prosecute this appeal. On this appeal, defendants specify as error the action of the court in holding (1) that, as a matter of law, the income approach to the appraisal of property is not admissible in the trial of expropriation suits and in excluding such evidence in this case; (2) that the sales relied upon by the State's appraisers were comparable sales; and (3) that the income approach for evaluation purposes was not, in this particular case, the best or appropriate method of appraising the property herein involved. The subject property has a frontage of 85.64 feet on Louisiana Avenue and a depth of 166.5 feet to an alley. The improvement consists of the old Crockett home acquired in 1937 by William Stuart Crockett, Jr., through inheritance. The 2-story frame residence consisted originally of 10 or 12 rooms which had been extensively remodeled and renovated for commercial purposes. The residence was approximately 42 feet wide with a length of 88 feet. To the rear was a 2-story, 4-room frame garage apartment, 42 feet wide, with a length of 47 feet, built on a concrete-slab foundation with asbestos siding. Mr. and Mrs. Crockett, after his acquisition of this property, and on completion of the remodeling done by them, conducted, in this former residence, over a number of years, an exclusive ladies' ready-to-wear apparel shop. This business, however, was closed at this location in 1952, due to the ill health of Mrs. Crockett, and re-established downtown on Milam Street where it was anticipated the operation of the business would be less strenuous. The location not proving as advantageous as contemplated, plans were made for the removal of the business to its former location. In the meantime, in 1953, announcements were made as to the contemplated location of an expressway through the City of Shreveport which would occupy and encroach upon defendants' property, as a result of which the plans for the re-establishment of the business at its former location were abandoned. Except for the aforesaid announcements, the record establishes that the business would have been re-established at its former location. After it became known that the right of way for said expressway would either take or encroach upon defendants' property, it was obvious, as conceded by plaintiff's appraisers, that no prudent person would have then attempted the establishment of a business at that location. The appraisals relied upon by the State for this expropriation were made during August, 1958, and the expropriation was effected May 22, 1959. It clearly appears from the record that the best and most profitable use to which the property was suited and to which it could be put was the re-establishment of the business which had been there so successfully operated for many years. The record reveals that the gross sales of the business had ranged from $180,000 to over $300,000 annually. The valuation placed upon the property by plaintiff's appraisers in the sum of $22,000 only took into account and was predicated upon an appraisal of the lot as if it were vacant. The appraisal *131 was based upon the lineal front footage evaluation of $257. Defendants' appraisers were in general accord with this evaluation of the lot. However, no value was placed upon or assigned for the improvements. The failure to properly evaluate the improvements constitutes the primary basis for the present controversy between the State and the defendants. The question presented for determination on this appeal relates to the "just and adequate compensation" to be paid upon the taking of defendants' private property for public purposes. Louisiana Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 2, LSA. The term "just and adequate compensation" generally denotes market value, that is, a price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy. State Through Department of Highways v. Barrow, 238 La. 887, 116 So.2d 703; City of New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36; Housing Authority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La. 463, 8 So.2d 295. To determine the market value of the property taken in an expropriation proceeding, or the "just and adequate compensation" to be paid the owner, various approaches are recognized and utilized. Among these are prior sales of comparable property. It has been held that "* * * the best guide is evidence of sales of similar or comparable properties in the vicinity * * *" (State v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97, 101) and that such sales are the best criteria of value in expropriation proceedings. Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Curry, 232 La. 140, 94 So.2d 9, 11. Another approach is the reproduction-cost approach, sometimes resorted to where the subject property contains immovable improvements, in which event, if the improvements are aged, an adjustment must be made for depreciation. Rapides Parish School Board v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So.2d 40; Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal R. of New Orleans v. Rouprich, 166 La. 344, 117 So. 273. The third of these approaches relates to the income or rental of the property as a factor in determining the market value of the property. State v. Sauls, supra; Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, 203 La. 255, 13 So.2d 853. While the preferable rule in the determination of property expropriated is evidence of sales of similar or comparable properties in the vicinity, where, however, the record contains no satisfactory evidence of sales comparable to that involved, ascertainment of the true value must be sought by a consideration of other factors and circumstances. State Through Department of Highways v. Stoer, 238 La. 718, 116 So.2d 498; State v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493; Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541. Among such other factors is the rule, well recognized, that rental income and value of the business, which is or had been located on the premises, while not the sole criteria, are material to the extent that they assist in determining the fair market value. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, supra; Louisiana Highway Commission v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193. The record discloses there were no comparable sales of property in the vicinity of the subject property. In fact, from the date of the announcements of the location of the expressway in 1953, there was no market for property in the area to be taken for right-of-way purposes. Whatever sales were made were restricted and limited to, or influenced by, the expropriations made for right-of-way purposes. Therefore, there was no free, unfettered, open market whereby the market value of property in the area could be determined as between one desiring to sell and one wishing to buy under ordinary and usual circumstances. It may be appropriate to also point out that the rule is well established in the *132 jurisprudence of this State that, in suits of this character, the most profitable use to which the land can be put, by reason of its location, topography, and adaptability, will be considered as bearing upon its market value. Koerber v. City of New Orleans, 234 La. 433, 100 So.2d 461; Parish of Lafayette, Etc., v. Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So.2d 672; Louisiana Power & Light Company v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d 251; City of Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. R. E. E. De Montluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Morehouse Realty Co., La.App.2d Cir., 1961, 126 So.2d 830. In keeping with these considerations, any evidence that relevantly bears on value should be admissible. The nearer the situation which produces the admissible evidence approaches the situation of the hypothetically perfect market, the greater should be its probative weight. In this connection, it may be pointed out that LSA-C.C. Art. 2633 provides the basis for determining the value of property expropriated as follows: "In estimating the value of the property to be expropriated, the basis of assessment shall be the true value which the land possessed before the contemplated improvement was proposed, and without deducting therefrom any amount for the benefit derived by the owner from the contemplated improvement or work." Under the aforesaid provisions, it was recognized, in State Through Department of Highways v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 99 So. 2d 20, that the criterion to be applied in arriving at the basis for assessments of true value in expropriation proceedings is the market value or the price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between a willing seller and a willing purchaser, taking into consideration all the available uses to which the property might be put, as well as all factors which lead to a replacement of the loss caused by the taking. It was pointed out this means substantially that the owner is placed in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been had his property not been taken. This criterion was also recognized in City of Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445, 447-448, wherein the court said: "But this does not mean that the evidence elicited in an expropriation case is to be restricted to testimony showing market value for all purposes. On the contrary, the inquiry extends to any and all evidence which might be of aid to the court in determining the true value provided for in Article 2633. For example, it has been held that evidence of the rental value of property, while not regarded as a measure of compensation, is material insofar as it throws light upon the market value. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, supra, and Louisiana Highway Commission v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) The rule was further emphasized in City of Alexandria v. Jones, 236 La. 612, 108 So.2d 528, 532, wherein the court, in quoting from the opinion of the trial judge, stated: "`Recent sales of comparable properties are the best criteria of values in expropriation proceedings, and if there are no comparable sales, ascertainment of true value is sought by consideration of other factors under the circumstances, such as rental income and value of the business being conducted upon the expropriated property, although these factors are not the absolute measures thereof. * * *" (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, where there is no market value for the property sought to be expropriated, the intrinsic value or its value to the owner must be taken into consideration (Housing Authority of Shreveport v. *133 Green, supra), for, as heretofore stated, the rental of, or income from, property expropriated is material insofar as it has some bearing on the establishment of the market value of the property. State v. Sauls, supra. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the testimony contended by defendants and excluded by the court from its consideration, as pertains to the income or rental of the property, according to the best and most profitable use to which it could be placed and used except for the pending expropriation, was material and relevant to a determination of the value of the property expropriated. The refusal of the trial judge to hear the testimony submitted by the defendants, as hereinabove stated, was prejudicial to them, as the assessment was reached without consideration of this evidence which might have been of material assistance in arriving at the true worth of the property. In these circumstances, the judgment must be set aside, as the ends of justice require that the case be remanded, with instructions that the trial of the case be reopened for the reception of any and all additional evidence, available to either party, bearing upon the market value of the property expropriated, in accordance with the rule as to the best or most profitable use to which it might have been placed, except for the expropriation, whether predicated upon an approach from the methods recognized as to prior sales, replacement costs, with adjustment for depreciation, or from income or rental of the property. Accordingly, the judgment appealed is reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the Honorable, the First Judicial District Court in and for Caddo Parish, Louisiana, for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistant with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded. | 10-30-2013 | [
"131 So.2d 129 (1961) STATE of Louisiana, Through the DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Naomi Burleson CROCKETT et al., Defendants-Appellants. No. 9513. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit. June 1, 1961. Rehearing Denied June 22, 1961. Love & Rigby, Shreveport, for appellants. D. Ross Banister, Brunswig Sholars, Baton Rouge, for appellee. *130 Before HARDY, GLADNEY and AYRES, JJ. AYRES, Judge. This is an expropriation suit wherein the plaintiff, State of Louisiana, through the Department of Highways, expropriated, for right-of-way purposes, defendants' property consisting of the premises bearing Municipal No. 972 Louisiana Avenue in the City of Shreveport. Plaintiff alleged that the just compensation for said property and the improvements thereon was $22,000. The defendants contended that the property had a value of $47,000 and, in reconvention, sought judgment in that sum. From a judgment approving the appraisal and evaluation as made on behalf of the State, and casting defendants for costs, the defendants prosecute this appeal. On this appeal, defendants specify as error the action of the court in holding (1) that, as a matter of law, the income approach to the appraisal of property is not admissible in the trial of expropriation suits and in excluding such evidence in this case; (2) that the sales relied upon by the State's appraisers were comparable sales; and (3) that the income approach for evaluation purposes was not, in this particular case, the best or appropriate method of appraising the property herein involved. The subject property has a frontage of 85.64 feet on Louisiana Avenue and a depth of 166.5 feet to an alley.",
"The improvement consists of the old Crockett home acquired in 1937 by William Stuart Crockett, Jr., through inheritance. The 2-story frame residence consisted originally of 10 or 12 rooms which had been extensively remodeled and renovated for commercial purposes. The residence was approximately 42 feet wide with a length of 88 feet. To the rear was a 2-story, 4-room frame garage apartment, 42 feet wide, with a length of 47 feet, built on a concrete-slab foundation with asbestos siding.",
"Mr. and Mrs. Crockett, after his acquisition of this property, and on completion of the remodeling done by them, conducted, in this former residence, over a number of years, an exclusive ladies' ready-to-wear apparel shop. This business, however, was closed at this location in 1952, due to the ill health of Mrs. Crockett, and re-established downtown on Milam Street where it was anticipated the operation of the business would be less strenuous. The location not proving as advantageous as contemplated, plans were made for the removal of the business to its former location. In the meantime, in 1953, announcements were made as to the contemplated location of an expressway through the City of Shreveport which would occupy and encroach upon defendants' property, as a result of which the plans for the re-establishment of the business at its former location were abandoned. Except for the aforesaid announcements, the record establishes that the business would have been re-established at its former location. After it became known that the right of way for said expressway would either take or encroach upon defendants' property, it was obvious, as conceded by plaintiff's appraisers, that no prudent person would have then attempted the establishment of a business at that location.",
"The appraisals relied upon by the State for this expropriation were made during August, 1958, and the expropriation was effected May 22, 1959. It clearly appears from the record that the best and most profitable use to which the property was suited and to which it could be put was the re-establishment of the business which had been there so successfully operated for many years. The record reveals that the gross sales of the business had ranged from $180,000 to over $300,000 annually. The valuation placed upon the property by plaintiff's appraisers in the sum of $22,000 only took into account and was predicated upon an appraisal of the lot as if it were vacant. The appraisal *131 was based upon the lineal front footage evaluation of $257. Defendants' appraisers were in general accord with this evaluation of the lot. However, no value was placed upon or assigned for the improvements.",
"The failure to properly evaluate the improvements constitutes the primary basis for the present controversy between the State and the defendants. The question presented for determination on this appeal relates to the \"just and adequate compensation\" to be paid upon the taking of defendants' private property for public purposes. Louisiana Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 2, LSA. The term \"just and adequate compensation\" generally denotes market value, that is, a price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and a purchaser willing to buy. State Through Department of Highways v. Barrow, 238 La. 887, 116 So.2d 703; City of New Orleans v. Noto, 217 La. 657, 47 So.2d 36; Housing Authority of Shreveport v. Green, 200 La.",
"463, 8 So.2d 295. To determine the market value of the property taken in an expropriation proceeding, or the \"just and adequate compensation\" to be paid the owner, various approaches are recognized and utilized. Among these are prior sales of comparable property. It has been held that \"* * * the best guide is evidence of sales of similar or comparable properties in the vicinity * * *\" (State v. Sauls, 234 La. 241, 99 So.2d 97, 101) and that such sales are the best criteria of value in expropriation proceedings. Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Curry, 232 La. 140, 94 So.2d 9, 11.",
"Another approach is the reproduction-cost approach, sometimes resorted to where the subject property contains immovable improvements, in which event, if the improvements are aged, an adjustment must be made for depreciation. Rapides Parish School Board v. Nassif, 232 La. 218, 94 So.2d 40; Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal R. of New Orleans v. Rouprich, 166 La. 344, 117 So. 273. The third of these approaches relates to the income or rental of the property as a factor in determining the market value of the property. State v. Sauls, supra; Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, 203 La.",
"255, 13 So.2d 853. While the preferable rule in the determination of property expropriated is evidence of sales of similar or comparable properties in the vicinity, where, however, the record contains no satisfactory evidence of sales comparable to that involved, ascertainment of the true value must be sought by a consideration of other factors and circumstances. State Through Department of Highways v. Stoer, 238 La. 718, 116 So.2d 498; State v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493; Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Boudwine, 224 La. 988, 71 So.2d 541. Among such other factors is the rule, well recognized, that rental income and value of the business, which is or had been located on the premises, while not the sole criteria, are material to the extent that they assist in determining the fair market value. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, supra; Louisiana Highway Commission v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193. The record discloses there were no comparable sales of property in the vicinity of the subject property. In fact, from the date of the announcements of the location of the expressway in 1953, there was no market for property in the area to be taken for right-of-way purposes.",
"Whatever sales were made were restricted and limited to, or influenced by, the expropriations made for right-of-way purposes. Therefore, there was no free, unfettered, open market whereby the market value of property in the area could be determined as between one desiring to sell and one wishing to buy under ordinary and usual circumstances. It may be appropriate to also point out that the rule is well established in the *132 jurisprudence of this State that, in suits of this character, the most profitable use to which the land can be put, by reason of its location, topography, and adaptability, will be considered as bearing upon its market value. Koerber v. City of New Orleans, 234 La.",
"433, 100 So.2d 461; Parish of Lafayette, Etc., v. Hernandez, 232 La. 1, 93 So.2d 672; Louisiana Power & Light Company v. Simmons, 229 La. 165, 85 So.2d 251; City of Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. R. E. E. De Montluzin Co., 166 La. 211, 116 So. 854; Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Morehouse Realty Co., La.App.2d Cir., 1961, 126 So.2d 830. In keeping with these considerations, any evidence that relevantly bears on value should be admissible. The nearer the situation which produces the admissible evidence approaches the situation of the hypothetically perfect market, the greater should be its probative weight. In this connection, it may be pointed out that LSA-C.C. Art.",
"2633 provides the basis for determining the value of property expropriated as follows: \"In estimating the value of the property to be expropriated, the basis of assessment shall be the true value which the land possessed before the contemplated improvement was proposed, and without deducting therefrom any amount for the benefit derived by the owner from the contemplated improvement or work.\" Under the aforesaid provisions, it was recognized, in State Through Department of Highways v. Ragusa, 234 La. 51, 99 So. 2d 20, that the criterion to be applied in arriving at the basis for assessments of true value in expropriation proceedings is the market value or the price which would be agreed upon at a voluntary sale between a willing seller and a willing purchaser, taking into consideration all the available uses to which the property might be put, as well as all factors which lead to a replacement of the loss caused by the taking. It was pointed out this means substantially that the owner is placed in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been had his property not been taken.",
"This criterion was also recognized in City of Shreveport v. Abe Meyer Corp., 219 La. 128, 52 So.2d 445, 447-448, wherein the court said: \"But this does not mean that the evidence elicited in an expropriation case is to be restricted to testimony showing market value for all purposes. On the contrary, the inquiry extends to any and all evidence which might be of aid to the court in determining the true value provided for in Article 2633.",
"For example, it has been held that evidence of the rental value of property, while not regarded as a measure of compensation, is material insofar as it throws light upon the market value. Housing Authority of New Orleans v. Persson, supra, and Louisiana Highway Commission v. Paciera, 205 La. 784, 18 So.2d 193. * * *\" (Emphasis supplied.) The rule was further emphasized in City of Alexandria v. Jones, 236 La. 612, 108 So.2d 528, 532, wherein the court, in quoting from the opinion of the trial judge, stated: \"`Recent sales of comparable properties are the best criteria of values in expropriation proceedings, and if there are no comparable sales, ascertainment of true value is sought by consideration of other factors under the circumstances, such as rental income and value of the business being conducted upon the expropriated property, although these factors are not the absolute measures thereof. * * *\" (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, where there is no market value for the property sought to be expropriated, the intrinsic value or its value to the owner must be taken into consideration (Housing Authority of Shreveport v. *133 Green, supra), for, as heretofore stated, the rental of, or income from, property expropriated is material insofar as it has some bearing on the establishment of the market value of the property.",
"State v. Sauls, supra. Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the testimony contended by defendants and excluded by the court from its consideration, as pertains to the income or rental of the property, according to the best and most profitable use to which it could be placed and used except for the pending expropriation, was material and relevant to a determination of the value of the property expropriated.",
"The refusal of the trial judge to hear the testimony submitted by the defendants, as hereinabove stated, was prejudicial to them, as the assessment was reached without consideration of this evidence which might have been of material assistance in arriving at the true worth of the property. In these circumstances, the judgment must be set aside, as the ends of justice require that the case be remanded, with instructions that the trial of the case be reopened for the reception of any and all additional evidence, available to either party, bearing upon the market value of the property expropriated, in accordance with the rule as to the best or most profitable use to which it might have been placed, except for the expropriation, whether predicated upon an approach from the methods recognized as to prior sales, replacement costs, with adjustment for depreciation, or from income or rental of the property. Accordingly, the judgment appealed is reversed and set aside, and the case is remanded to the Honorable, the First Judicial District Court in and for Caddo Parish, Louisiana, for further proceedings in accordance with law and consistant with the views herein expressed.",
"Reversed and remanded."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/1901867/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Long, J. The information in this cause charges the respondent with being a disorderly person, within the meaning of Act No. 264, Pub. Acts 1889 (being section 1997a, 3 How. Stat.). The information charges a third offense, the respondent having been theretofore convicted of the same offense on, to wit, October 12, 1896, and Juno 29, 1897. It appeared on the trial that the respondent was married to one Rosa La Rue, in Detroit, on June -27, 1893; that they lived together there as husband and wife for nearly 3 years, and that 22 months after the marriage a child was born to them; and that in October, 1895, the respondent left his wife, and refused to support her or the child. The defense is that the said Rosa La Rue was not the lawful wife of respondent. It is conceded that, if it be found that she is the lawful wife of respondent, there is testimony sustaining the conviction. It was shown that Rosa La Rue had been married before to one James P. La Rue; that a decree of divorce was granted by the court on June 24, 1893, but the decree was not formally filed until July 1,1893, and her marriage to respondent took place four days before, or on June 27th. The mere fact that the decree was not formally filed until July .1, 1893, cannot aid the respondent. The marriage ceremony was performed between himself and Rosa La Rue, and they continued to live and cohabit together as husband and wife from that time forward. These facts establish a valid marriage, within the ruling *133of this court in Williams v. Kilburn, 88 Mich. 279. The respondent was sworn on the trial, and admitted that the child was his; that he lived with Rosa La Rue as his wife, —so recognized her. It is also contended that the court had no jurisdiction to enter a decree of divorce, because the affidavit of the complainant for the order of publication was sworn to on the 5th day of August, 1892, and the order of -publication was not made until August 8th, two days having intervened. It appears, however, that a subpoena was duly issued in the case, and a return indorsed thereon by the sheriff that he was unable, after diligent search and inquiry, to find the defendant named therein. The affidavit for the order of publication was made after the return of such subpoena. The affidavit for the order states thát the “ defendant is concealed within the State, so that process cannot be served upon him, and that the subpoena issued in the case has been returned unserved upon the said defendant, though diligent search has been made for him by the sheriff of this county, as will appear by the return made by the sheriff, now on file.” This affidavit' conferred jurisdiction upon the court, within the terms of section 6670, 3 How. Stat., though the order was not made until three days after the affidavit was sworn to. The statutory provision is that, “when the defendant is a resident of this State, upon proof by affidavit that the process for his appearance has been duly issued, and that the same could not be served by reason of his absence from or concealment within this State, or by reason of his continued absence from his place of residence,” the order may be made. It is also contended that the complaints and warrants ' under which the former convictions were had were not in compliance with the statute, in that they did not recite that it was for the “first offense” and “second offense,” as required by Act No. 190, Pub. Acts 1895. Section 1 of that act provides: “Any person who shall be convicted a second time of being a disorderly person, the offense being charged as a *134second offense, shall be punished * * *. And for a third and all subsequent convictions, the offense being charged as a third or subsequent conviction, the punishment shall be by imprisonment in the Detroit house of correction,” etc. The information charges that said ‘ ‘ Frank Booth was heretofore duly convicted of the same offense, to wit, October 12, 1896, and June 29, 1897, before Frederick W. A. Kurth, and this is charged against said Frank Booth as a third offense,” étc. It was held in People v. Buck, 109 Mich. 687, that: “ An information for a third offense under the act in relation to disorderly persons (section 1997a et seq., 3 How. Stat.) must allege that convictions were had for such previous offenses, and, properly, it should also state the date and the occasion of such convictions.” . The information in that case had no averments of previous convictions, and it was said, “A sentence could not lawfully be imposed for a longer term than 30 days.” In the present case the information charges two previous convictions for the same offense, and gives the dates of those convictions, and before whom they were had. We think the information sufficiently stated the former convictions to warrant the conviction here, and, so far as this case is concerned, it does not matter whether the former complaints and warrants averred that they were for first and second offenses. The statute does not require, in the prosecution for a third offense, that the complaints and warrants in the former convictions shall have stated that they were for first and second offenses, but simply that the offense shall be “charged as a third or subsequent conviction,” etc. The objection has no force. The conviction must be affirmed. The other Justices concurred. | 09-08-2022 | [
"Long, J. The information in this cause charges the respondent with being a disorderly person, within the meaning of Act No. 264, Pub. Acts 1889 (being section 1997a, 3 How. Stat.). The information charges a third offense, the respondent having been theretofore convicted of the same offense on, to wit, October 12, 1896, and Juno 29, 1897. It appeared on the trial that the respondent was married to one Rosa La Rue, in Detroit, on June -27, 1893; that they lived together there as husband and wife for nearly 3 years, and that 22 months after the marriage a child was born to them; and that in October, 1895, the respondent left his wife, and refused to support her or the child. The defense is that the said Rosa La Rue was not the lawful wife of respondent.",
"It is conceded that, if it be found that she is the lawful wife of respondent, there is testimony sustaining the conviction. It was shown that Rosa La Rue had been married before to one James P. La Rue; that a decree of divorce was granted by the court on June 24, 1893, but the decree was not formally filed until July 1,1893, and her marriage to respondent took place four days before, or on June 27th. The mere fact that the decree was not formally filed until July .1, 1893, cannot aid the respondent. The marriage ceremony was performed between himself and Rosa La Rue, and they continued to live and cohabit together as husband and wife from that time forward. These facts establish a valid marriage, within the ruling *133of this court in Williams v. Kilburn, 88 Mich. 279.",
"The respondent was sworn on the trial, and admitted that the child was his; that he lived with Rosa La Rue as his wife, —so recognized her. It is also contended that the court had no jurisdiction to enter a decree of divorce, because the affidavit of the complainant for the order of publication was sworn to on the 5th day of August, 1892, and the order of -publication was not made until August 8th, two days having intervened. It appears, however, that a subpoena was duly issued in the case, and a return indorsed thereon by the sheriff that he was unable, after diligent search and inquiry, to find the defendant named therein.",
"The affidavit for the order of publication was made after the return of such subpoena. The affidavit for the order states thát the “ defendant is concealed within the State, so that process cannot be served upon him, and that the subpoena issued in the case has been returned unserved upon the said defendant, though diligent search has been made for him by the sheriff of this county, as will appear by the return made by the sheriff, now on file.” This affidavit' conferred jurisdiction upon the court, within the terms of section 6670, 3 How. Stat., though the order was not made until three days after the affidavit was sworn to. The statutory provision is that, “when the defendant is a resident of this State, upon proof by affidavit that the process for his appearance has been duly issued, and that the same could not be served by reason of his absence from or concealment within this State, or by reason of his continued absence from his place of residence,” the order may be made. It is also contended that the complaints and warrants ' under which the former convictions were had were not in compliance with the statute, in that they did not recite that it was for the “first offense” and “second offense,” as required by Act No. 190, Pub.",
"Acts 1895. Section 1 of that act provides: “Any person who shall be convicted a second time of being a disorderly person, the offense being charged as a *134second offense, shall be punished * * *. And for a third and all subsequent convictions, the offense being charged as a third or subsequent conviction, the punishment shall be by imprisonment in the Detroit house of correction,” etc. The information charges that said ‘ ‘ Frank Booth was heretofore duly convicted of the same offense, to wit, October 12, 1896, and June 29, 1897, before Frederick W. A. Kurth, and this is charged against said Frank Booth as a third offense,” étc. It was held in People v. Buck, 109 Mich. 687, that: “ An information for a third offense under the act in relation to disorderly persons (section 1997a et seq., 3 How. Stat.) must allege that convictions were had for such previous offenses, and, properly, it should also state the date and the occasion of such convictions.” . The information in that case had no averments of previous convictions, and it was said, “A sentence could not lawfully be imposed for a longer term than 30 days.” In the present case the information charges two previous convictions for the same offense, and gives the dates of those convictions, and before whom they were had.",
"We think the information sufficiently stated the former convictions to warrant the conviction here, and, so far as this case is concerned, it does not matter whether the former complaints and warrants averred that they were for first and second offenses. The statute does not require, in the prosecution for a third offense, that the complaints and warrants in the former convictions shall have stated that they were for first and second offenses, but simply that the offense shall be “charged as a third or subsequent conviction,” etc. The objection has no force. The conviction must be affirmed. The other Justices concurred."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/7940191/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Island County, No. 12-1-00012-4, Alan R. Hancock, J., entered July 5, 2012. Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, J., concurred in by Spearman, A.C.J., and Becker, J. | 08-12-2021 | [
"Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Island County, No. 12-1-00012-4, Alan R. Hancock, J., entered July 5, 2012. Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Dwyer, J., concurred in by Spearman, A.C.J., and Becker, J."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/4762029/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice MoIver. The plaintiff brings this action, as administrator of Margaret W. Petrie, to recover damages in behalf of her children, for injury sustained by them by reason of her death, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant company. The testimony on behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that the deceased was a widow lady about the age of seventy-nine years, living with her son-in-law very near the track of the railroad, and that she was killed by a passenger train while attempting to cross the track of the railroad at or near a point where it was intersected by a highway. At the time of her death she left several children, none of whom were minors, but they had all been settled off to themselves several years before the death of their mother. The old lady had a small income, sufficient for her own support, derived from the rent of her land, but at the time of her death she was living with her daughter, who had been in bad health for several years, and whose husband was also disabled, and was attending upon them. The testimony tended to show that the deceased was quite active and vigorous for a person of her years, and was in the habit of rendering valuable services to her children and grandchildren, especially in cases of sickness, as she claimed to have read and to have some knowledge of medicine. There was, however, no distinct evidence of the value, in *314dollars and cents, of her services, the testimony being in general terms, that her services were of value to her children, in saving them physicians’ bills, and in many ways being of material assistance to them, and there was also evidence that she was in the habit of assisting one of her sons, who had been disabled in the war, by giving him money and other things. The evidence tended to show that the country was open at the place where the disaster occurred, and that an approaching train could be seen and heard fora considerable distance; though there was also evidence that, on the side of the track from which the deceased was probably returning at the time she met her death, the view at one point was obstructed by a depression in the ground and by a sort of embankment or mound, as the witnesses called it, upon which wood was piled for the train, and also that there were some trees or bushes near the track which, it was claimed, obstructed the view. The day on which the disaster occurred — March 15, 1884 — it was cold and windy, the wind blowing down the road in a direction opposite to that from which the train approached, and when the body of deceased was found, her head was tied up with a veil and shawl, and she had on a large bonnet. The testimony was, that when the train reached the whistle post, some distance below the highway crossing, but how far was not shown, there were three or four short blows of the whistle on the engine, but there was no ringing of the bell, and the whistle was not kept blowing until the engine had crossed the highway. At the close of plaintiff’s testimony, counsel for defendant moved for a non-suit upon the grounds hereinafter more particularly stated, which motion was refused. The defence then went into their testimony, and first offered the testimony of Mrs. Neighbors taken before the coroner’s inquest, which, at a previous trial of this case, had been offered by the defence and received then without objection. Plaintiff’s counsel objected and ihe testimony was ruled out. Counsel for defendant then offered the testimony of B. P. Faker, the engineer of the train which caused the death of plaintiff’s intestate, which had been offered in evidence by the plaintiff on a former trial of this case and received then without objection. This testimony was objected to by coun*315sel for plaintiff and was likewise excluded. After other testimony had been offered in behalf of the defence for the purpose of showing that the death of deceased was not caused by any negligence on the part of the defendant company, but was due to her own gross negligence, the case was submitted to the jury, under the charge of the court, who rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for eight hundred and fifty dollars. Defendant’s counsel then submitted a motion for a new trial upon grounds which are mostly embraced in defendant’s ninth, tenth, and eleventh grounds of appeal. This motion was also refused, and judgment having been entered in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals and moves for a reversal of said judgment for the following alleged errors therein: I. In overruling defendant’s motion for a non-suit. II. In not admitting in evidence the testimony of Mrs. Neighbors. III. In not admitting in evidence the testimony of B. F. Faker. IV. In charging, “Was Mrs. Petrie guilty of gross or wilful negligence * * when the killing occurred ? * * * Did she go upon that track wilfully ? Did she put herself wilfully there with that intention ? Wilful negligence, gentlemen, is where one wilfully places himself in a place of known danger, as was illustrated to you in the case of one going upon a track for the purpose of committing suicide.” V. In charging, “It is not necessary that any witness should have testified to the value in dollars and cents of these services.” VI. In charging, “In this action, if the defendant is liable, funeral expenses of deceased may properly be considered as among the elements of damage, if it is satisfactorily proven that the plaintiff has paid the same.” VII. In charging, “The failure to blow the whistle or ring the bell as required by statute, if such failure existed, would be negligence in the defendant, whether that failure occurred by reason of the employment of one of its officers in arranging some other parts about the machinery or not.” VIII. In charging, “If a person should voluntarily put himself or herself upon the track and the engineer sees that person, *316it is his duty to endeavor to stop the train. To make no such effort when he saw such person would be gross negligence.” IX. In refusing to charge, “If the deceased saw and heard the train approach the crossing, and notwithstanding this undertook to cross the track of defendant in front of tins train, and, but for this act of hers, she would not have been killed, then the plaintiff cannot recover.” X. In refusing to charge, “It is the duty of a person approaching a railroad crossing, in order to avoid danger, to stop and look and listen, and if the deceased failed to use her sense of sight and hearing and walked upon the track of an approaching train in plain sight and hearing, and but for this act of hers would not have been killed, then she was guilty of such negligence as will defeat the plaintiff’s right to recover.” XI. In refusing to charge, “If Mrs. Petrie saw or heard the train approaching, or if she, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have seen or heard it, then the defendant is not liable, even though it failed to blow the whistle or ring the bell as required by the statute.” XII. In refusing to charge, “Even if the jury are satisfied in this case that the engineer was guilty of great negligence and want of care, yet the plaintiff cannot recover if the deceased w7as also guilty of contributory negligence; that is to say, that she did not observe proper care under the circumstances.” XIII. In refusing to charge, “If the deceased failed to observe proper care under the circumstances, the plaintiff cannot recover.” XIY. In refusing to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial. The second and third grounds of appeal, relating to the admissibility of testimony, will be considered together, as they are really governed by the same principle. There can be no doubt that the testimony of these two witnesses, taken before the coroner’s inquest, was originally incompetent evidence in this case. Even on the trial of the partj7 charged with the murder of the person over whose dead body the inquest was held, the testimony of a witness taken at such inquest, and w7ho has since died, has been held incompetent (State v. Campbell, 1 Rich., 124); and certainly such testimony is not admissible on a trial between per*317sons who were not parties to the inquest and had no legal connection therewith. Indeed, as we understand it, this proposition is conceded, but it is contended that inasmuch as this confessedly incompetent testimony was received without objection on the former trial of this case, it has thereby been made competent to introduce it in this trial, upon the well settled principle that where incompetent testimony has been received without objection, at the time it is offered, it thereby becomes competent. Burris v. Whitner, 3 S. C., 510, and many other cases to the same effect. But whether that principle can be applied to this case is what we are now called upon to determine. To so apply it would, it seems to us, ignore the nature and effect of a new trial, which is a trial de novo, and is conducted just as if there had been no previous trial. Neither party can rely upon the testimony as taken at the previous trial, nor is he bound thereby. On the contrary, each party must offer his evidence anew just as if there had been no previous trial, and when it is so offered it necessarily becomes subject to any legal objection which may be taken to it. Hence, while the testimony in question became competent in the former trial, because it was not objected to when offered, yet having been objected to when offered at the last trial it was properly excluded as incompetent on such trial. See 1 Greenl. Evid., § 163, and cases cited in note 1. The first ground of appeal imputes error to the Circuit Judge in refusing the motion for a non-suit. That motion was based upon the following grounds: “First. Because plaintiff has failed to show affirmatively any negligence on the part of defendant, causing the death of Mrs. Petrie. Second. Because plaintiff has failed to show that the failure to ring the bell or blow the whistle continuously caused or contributed to the death of Mrs. Petrie. Third. Because the facts show that the accident was caused by the gross negligence of the deceased. Fourth. That the plaintiff has failed to show any beneficial interest or pecuniary loss to her children.” It will be observed that the phraseology used in all these grounds is open to objection, when the question is as to a motion for a non-suit, for in such a case the inquiry never is whether the evidence shows the existence of *318a fact material to the plaintiff’s case, as the question whether such a fact has been shoivn is a question exclusively for the jury. The true inquiry is, whether there is any evidence tending to show the existence of such facts as are material to the case of the plaintiff; and this inquiry is not presented by any one of these grounds. But waiving this, and assuming that the questions were presented in proper form, we will proceed to consider them. The first two grounds are doubtless based upon the theory that while the failure to ring the bell or blow the whistle continuously until the engine had crossed the highway might be- evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, yet there was no testimony tending to show that such negligence caused the death of Mrs. Petrie, or in any way contributed thereto; for in the face of the express terms of the statute [Ger. Stat., § 1483), requiring that the bell should be rung or the whistle sounded at a distance of at least five hundred yards from the point where a railroad crosses a public highway, and kept ringing or sounding until the engine has crossed such highway, and in view of the undisputed testimony that this positive requirement of the statute was not complied with, it could scarcely be denied that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. But it being true, as contended for by appellant, that it is not sufficient to make out plaintiff’s case, that there should be simply evidence of defendant’s negligence, but that there must also be some evidence that the injury complained of was the result of such negligence [Glenn v. C. & G. R. R. Co., 21 S. C., 466), we will proceed to inquire whether there was any evidence tending to show that the failure on the part of the defendant to give the signals required by' statute in any way contributed to the injury complained of. We think there was some evidence tending to show that fact, and whether it was sufficient or not, was not for the Circuit Judge to determine on a motion for non-suit, but was exclusively for the jury, to whom it was properly left. The testimony is all set out in the Case, and we cannot go over it with a view of vindicating our conclusion. It is sufficient to say that the circumstances indicated by the Circuit Judge in refusing the motion for a non-suit, afforded some evidence that if *319the requirements of the statute had been complied with, the disaster might not have occurred. The high wind blowing at the time from a direction opposite to that from which the train was approaching, together with the manner in which the old lady’s head was wrapped up, probably to protect her from the cold wind, may have been sufficient to prevent her from hearing the signal which was given, and may not have been sufficient to have prevented her from hearing the signal which ought to have been given. We cannot say, therefore, that there was absolutely no evidence tending to show that the injury complained was the result of the negligence in failing to give the signal as required by thé statute. The third ground clearly cannot be sustained, for it has been frequently held that contributory negligence is a matter of defence which must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury, and cannot therefore constitute a ground for a non-suit. Carter v. Railroad Company, 19 S. C., 20; Darwin v. Railroad Company, 23 Id., 531, and many other cases. We come next to the fourth ground of the motion for a non-suit, and construing it in the same liberal spirit, it presents the inquiry whether there was any evidence tending to show that the parties for whose benefit this action is brought — the adult children of the deceased — had any beneficial interest in her life or suffered any pecuniary loss by her death. It would be sufficient for the present inquiry to say that there was some evidence that the deceased was in the habit of rendering services to her children which were of value to them, and that would be enough to carry the caseto the jury. It is contended, however, that unless the children had some legal claim on the deceased for their support, no damages can be recovered for their benefit, and as the children of deceased were all adults, living to themselves, they could not possibly have any such claim. This view is based upon the idea that the “injury” spoken of in the statute means only the deprivation of a legal right. This, it seems to us, is a narrow view of the statute, and, on the contrary, its language repels any such view. There is not only no language in the statute which requires such a restricted signification to be placed upon the word *320“injury,” but some of its terms indicate that such was not the sense in which the word was used. The language of section 2184 of the General Statutes is as follows : “Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and children of the person whose death shall have been caused, * * * and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom, and for whose benefit, such action shall be brought, and the amount so recovered shall be divided among the before mentioned parties in such shares as they would have been entitled to if the deceased had. died intestate, and the amount recovered had been personal assets of his or her estate.” Now, it will be observed that the provision is that the damages recovered, in case there are only children left, shall be divided equally amongst all of the children, whether some of them be minors or not; and this negatives the idea that the claim for damages rests upon the theory that the beneficiaries have been deprived of some legal right, for in the case supposed, while minor children would have a legal claim on their father for support, the adults would have no such claim, and yet by the terms of the statute no distinction is made. Again, it will be noticed that our statute, unlike many others of a similar character, does not speak of pecuniary loss or injury which might possibly tend to show the injury for which damages are allowed, was confined to the deprivation of some legal claim susceptible of measurement by a pecuniary standard, but its language is broader, and gives the jury the right to award “such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death;” and as it is quite certain that the beneficiaries of the action may sustain injury by the death of a relative, over and above the loss of any legal claim which they may have upon such relative, it follows that the view contended for cannot be sustained. The conclusion which we have reached is sustained by high authority. In the case of Railroad Company v. Barron (5 Wall., 90), the view contended for by the appellant was pressed by counsel in an elaborate argument, but the court held that it was not necessary that the beneficiaries should have had a legal claim on the deceased, if he had survived, for their sup*321port. Our view is also supported by many other authorities cited in respondent’s argument.1 Indeed, in the case we have cited from Wallace, supra, Nelson, J., in speaking of the view contended for by appellant, says: “This construction, we believe, has been rejected by every court before which the question has been presented.” It is quite clear, therefore, that there was no error in refusing the motion for a non-suit. The language of the charge excepted to in the fourth ground of appeal is only partially quoted, and fhe purpose of it seems to be to convey the idea that the Circuit Judge intended the jury to understand, or left them to infer, that there could be no gross negligence on the part of the deceased, unless she went upon the track for the purpose of committing suicide. But when the entire paragraph, from which these extracts are taken, is read (and for the purpose of a full understanding of the several exceptions, the entire charge should be embraced in the report of the case], it is plain that no such inference was open to the jury. For the judge, after defining gross negligence in terms to which no exception has been taken, proceeded to submit the question of fact to the jury — whether Mrs. Petrie was guilty of gross negligence. What he said about suicide ivas only as an illustration, and was properly qualified by the following remark: “That would be an extreme case of wilfulness.” That portion of the charge excepted to in the seventh ground of appeal, taken in the connection in which it was used, was clearly not erroneous. Where the statute requires a certain duty from a railroad company, the failure to perform such duty cannot be excused where the company has failed to provide a sufficient number of officers or agents to perform that and other necessary services in running the train. Hence the fact that the engineer was engaged in arranging the air-pump while approaching the *322crossing, and for this reason failed to give the signal required by statute, would be no excuse for such failure, unless it was shown, as the judge suggested, that the necessity for working on the pump arose from a sudden and unexpected emergency ; and there was not only no evidence of this, but, on the contrary, the testimony shows that this work might just as well have been done before approaching or after leaving the highway crossing. That portion of the charge which forms the basis of the eighth ground had no application whatever to the case as made by the testimony and was purely speculative. Hence, conceding that there was error in telling the jury that a supposed state of facts would constitute gross negligence, it is quite certain that such error could not possibly have affected the result in this case, for there was not only no evidence whatever that the engineer saw the deceased on the track in front of his train, but, on the contrary, the uncontradicted evidence is that neither the engineer nor any other officer connected with the train knew' that she had been run over or knocked off the track. The requests to charge in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh grounds of appeal, which also constitute the principal grounds for the motion for a new trial, were properly refused. The fundamental vice in all of these requests, is, that they called upon the judge to pass upon questions of fact. The rule, as we understand it, is that the province of the judge is to give the jury a definition of the term negligence, or gross negligence, and then it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the facts pwoved in a given case constitute negligence or gross negligence. Bridger v. Railroad Company, 25 S. C., 30, 31. As is well said by the Chief Justice, in that case, in speaking of this matter of negligence: “All agree as to the general definition — the absence of ordinary care. But who is to say whether the facts alleged and proved show this absence — the judge or the jury? The judge is required to charge the law, and the jury to find the facts. The law, however, does not state what facts proved will show the absence of ordinary care. It could not do so as applicable to every case which arises. The cases involving this question are so different in their facts, so various, so complicated, and arising under so many different circumstances, that it would be *323utterly impossible to lay down any general principle of law by which every special case could be measured and tested as to the fact of negligence, and which would enable a judge to say to the jury, as matter of law, such and such facts show the absence or presence of ordinary care;” and then he lays down the rule substantially as we have stated it. Of course, the same rule applies where the question is as to gross negligence, as in cases of ordinary negligence. This being the rule, it follows that the Circuit Judge committed no error in refusing to charge that the existence of certain facts precluded the plaintiff’s right to recover; for that would, in effect, have been a charge that a given state of facts constituted gross negligence, whereas that was a question for the jury. It will be observed that the question is not whether the judge erred in simply refusing to instruct the jury that it was the duty of a. person approaching a railroad crossing to use his senses of sight and hearing in order to protect himself from the danger of a collision, but the question is, whether he erred'in refusing to go further and instruct the jury that such failure was gross negligence, and would, in this case, defeat the plaintiff’s right to recover. The requests to charge wdiich constitute the basis of the twelfth and thirteenth grounds of appeal were not really refused. The statute (General Statutes, section 1529) provides that where a person is injured by a collision with a railroad train at a highway crossing, by reason of the negligence of the company to give the required signals, the company shall be liable for the damages thereby sustained, “unless it is shown that, in addition to a mere want of ordinary care, the person injured * * was, at the time of the collision, guilty of gross or wilful negligence, or was acting in violation of the law; and that such gross or wilful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury.” Nothing is said in the act about observing proper care, and hence the Circuit Judge, in dealing with these requests, declined to adopt the word “proper,” but following the language of the statute, instructed the jury, as he had done before, that if the deceased was guilty of gross negligence which contributed to the injury, then she could not recover, and that, taking the words, if she did not observe proper care, to mean that she was guilty of gross negligence, *324then the request was good law. In this there certainly was no error, for he simply translated the incorrect language of the request into the more accurate terms employed in the statute. The fourteenth ground of appeal has already been considered, except in so far as the motion for a new trial was based upon the ground that the damages given were excessive. It is so well settled that the decision of the Circuit Judge upon this point is final, that it is only necessary to refer to some of the cases. Steele v. C., C. & A. R. R. Co., 11 S. C., 589, and the cases therein cited. It only remains to consider the questions raised by the fifth ground of appeal, as to the mode of proving the amount of the damages, and by the sixth ground as to the elements which may enter into the estimate. As to the former question, it is yery obvious that in many cases, slander, &c., it is impossible to show by evidence the amount, in dollars and cents, of the damages sustained, and yet we have never heard it suggested even that the inability to do this precludes the jury, when the facts and circumstances are laid before them, from making their own estimate of the amount of the damages recoverable in such cases, and we see no reason why the same cannot be done in a case like this. Even if witnesses had undertaken to testify as to the amount of damages, in dollars and cents, which the beneficiaries in this action had sustained by the loss of their mother, such testimony could only have been the opinions or estimates of such witnesses, based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and it seems to us that the jury was quite as competent to make such estimate as the witnesses would have been. See what is said upon this subject by Nelson, J., in Railroad Company, v. Barron, supra. As to the other question — whether the funeral expenses could properly constitute an element in estimating the amount of the damages — it seems to us that the authorities cited by respondent’s counsel1 in his argument, fully sustain the ruling of the Circuit Judge. The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed.
Fait. Ry. Acc. L., $$ 405, 413; Deer. Neg., § 422; 3 Wood Rail. L., 1539, 1540; Lett v. Railway Co., 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 189; Railroad Company v. Maryland, Ibid., 203; 3 Sulk. Dam., 282, 283; Cregin v. Railroad Company, 19 Hun, 341; Railroad Company v. Noell, 32 Gratt., 394; Tilley v. Railroad Company, 29 N. Y., 252; Railroad Company v. Barron, 5 Wall., 453; Railroad Company v. Brown, Ibid., 90; Pierce R. R., 388; Carey v. Railroad Company, 48 Am. Dec.
3 Wood Rail., 1539; Pierce Rail., 397; Patt. Acc. Rail. L., § 412; Murphy v. R. R. Co., 88 N. Y., 445; Deer. Negl., § 420. | 07-20-2022 | [
"The opinion of the court was delivered by Mr. Justice MoIver. The plaintiff brings this action, as administrator of Margaret W. Petrie, to recover damages in behalf of her children, for injury sustained by them by reason of her death, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant company. The testimony on behalf of the plaintiff tended to show that the deceased was a widow lady about the age of seventy-nine years, living with her son-in-law very near the track of the railroad, and that she was killed by a passenger train while attempting to cross the track of the railroad at or near a point where it was intersected by a highway. At the time of her death she left several children, none of whom were minors, but they had all been settled off to themselves several years before the death of their mother. The old lady had a small income, sufficient for her own support, derived from the rent of her land, but at the time of her death she was living with her daughter, who had been in bad health for several years, and whose husband was also disabled, and was attending upon them.",
"The testimony tended to show that the deceased was quite active and vigorous for a person of her years, and was in the habit of rendering valuable services to her children and grandchildren, especially in cases of sickness, as she claimed to have read and to have some knowledge of medicine. There was, however, no distinct evidence of the value, in *314dollars and cents, of her services, the testimony being in general terms, that her services were of value to her children, in saving them physicians’ bills, and in many ways being of material assistance to them, and there was also evidence that she was in the habit of assisting one of her sons, who had been disabled in the war, by giving him money and other things.",
"The evidence tended to show that the country was open at the place where the disaster occurred, and that an approaching train could be seen and heard fora considerable distance; though there was also evidence that, on the side of the track from which the deceased was probably returning at the time she met her death, the view at one point was obstructed by a depression in the ground and by a sort of embankment or mound, as the witnesses called it, upon which wood was piled for the train, and also that there were some trees or bushes near the track which, it was claimed, obstructed the view. The day on which the disaster occurred — March 15, 1884 — it was cold and windy, the wind blowing down the road in a direction opposite to that from which the train approached, and when the body of deceased was found, her head was tied up with a veil and shawl, and she had on a large bonnet.",
"The testimony was, that when the train reached the whistle post, some distance below the highway crossing, but how far was not shown, there were three or four short blows of the whistle on the engine, but there was no ringing of the bell, and the whistle was not kept blowing until the engine had crossed the highway. At the close of plaintiff’s testimony, counsel for defendant moved for a non-suit upon the grounds hereinafter more particularly stated, which motion was refused. The defence then went into their testimony, and first offered the testimony of Mrs. Neighbors taken before the coroner’s inquest, which, at a previous trial of this case, had been offered by the defence and received then without objection. Plaintiff’s counsel objected and ihe testimony was ruled out. Counsel for defendant then offered the testimony of B. P. Faker, the engineer of the train which caused the death of plaintiff’s intestate, which had been offered in evidence by the plaintiff on a former trial of this case and received then without objection. This testimony was objected to by coun*315sel for plaintiff and was likewise excluded.",
"After other testimony had been offered in behalf of the defence for the purpose of showing that the death of deceased was not caused by any negligence on the part of the defendant company, but was due to her own gross negligence, the case was submitted to the jury, under the charge of the court, who rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for eight hundred and fifty dollars. Defendant’s counsel then submitted a motion for a new trial upon grounds which are mostly embraced in defendant’s ninth, tenth, and eleventh grounds of appeal. This motion was also refused, and judgment having been entered in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals and moves for a reversal of said judgment for the following alleged errors therein: I. In overruling defendant’s motion for a non-suit. II.",
"In not admitting in evidence the testimony of Mrs. Neighbors. III. In not admitting in evidence the testimony of B. F. Faker. IV. In charging, “Was Mrs. Petrie guilty of gross or wilful negligence * * when the killing occurred ? * * * Did she go upon that track wilfully ? Did she put herself wilfully there with that intention ? Wilful negligence, gentlemen, is where one wilfully places himself in a place of known danger, as was illustrated to you in the case of one going upon a track for the purpose of committing suicide.” V. In charging, “It is not necessary that any witness should have testified to the value in dollars and cents of these services.” VI. In charging, “In this action, if the defendant is liable, funeral expenses of deceased may properly be considered as among the elements of damage, if it is satisfactorily proven that the plaintiff has paid the same.” VII. In charging, “The failure to blow the whistle or ring the bell as required by statute, if such failure existed, would be negligence in the defendant, whether that failure occurred by reason of the employment of one of its officers in arranging some other parts about the machinery or not.” VIII.",
"In charging, “If a person should voluntarily put himself or herself upon the track and the engineer sees that person, *316it is his duty to endeavor to stop the train. To make no such effort when he saw such person would be gross negligence.” IX. In refusing to charge, “If the deceased saw and heard the train approach the crossing, and notwithstanding this undertook to cross the track of defendant in front of tins train, and, but for this act of hers, she would not have been killed, then the plaintiff cannot recover.” X. In refusing to charge, “It is the duty of a person approaching a railroad crossing, in order to avoid danger, to stop and look and listen, and if the deceased failed to use her sense of sight and hearing and walked upon the track of an approaching train in plain sight and hearing, and but for this act of hers would not have been killed, then she was guilty of such negligence as will defeat the plaintiff’s right to recover.” XI. In refusing to charge, “If Mrs. Petrie saw or heard the train approaching, or if she, by the exercise of reasonable care, could have seen or heard it, then the defendant is not liable, even though it failed to blow the whistle or ring the bell as required by the statute.” XII.",
"In refusing to charge, “Even if the jury are satisfied in this case that the engineer was guilty of great negligence and want of care, yet the plaintiff cannot recover if the deceased w7as also guilty of contributory negligence; that is to say, that she did not observe proper care under the circumstances.” XIII. In refusing to charge, “If the deceased failed to observe proper care under the circumstances, the plaintiff cannot recover.” XIY. In refusing to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial. The second and third grounds of appeal, relating to the admissibility of testimony, will be considered together, as they are really governed by the same principle. There can be no doubt that the testimony of these two witnesses, taken before the coroner’s inquest, was originally incompetent evidence in this case. Even on the trial of the partj7 charged with the murder of the person over whose dead body the inquest was held, the testimony of a witness taken at such inquest, and w7ho has since died, has been held incompetent (State v. Campbell, 1 Rich., 124); and certainly such testimony is not admissible on a trial between per*317sons who were not parties to the inquest and had no legal connection therewith. Indeed, as we understand it, this proposition is conceded, but it is contended that inasmuch as this confessedly incompetent testimony was received without objection on the former trial of this case, it has thereby been made competent to introduce it in this trial, upon the well settled principle that where incompetent testimony has been received without objection, at the time it is offered, it thereby becomes competent.",
"Burris v. Whitner, 3 S. C., 510, and many other cases to the same effect. But whether that principle can be applied to this case is what we are now called upon to determine. To so apply it would, it seems to us, ignore the nature and effect of a new trial, which is a trial de novo, and is conducted just as if there had been no previous trial. Neither party can rely upon the testimony as taken at the previous trial, nor is he bound thereby. On the contrary, each party must offer his evidence anew just as if there had been no previous trial, and when it is so offered it necessarily becomes subject to any legal objection which may be taken to it. Hence, while the testimony in question became competent in the former trial, because it was not objected to when offered, yet having been objected to when offered at the last trial it was properly excluded as incompetent on such trial.",
"See 1 Greenl. Evid., § 163, and cases cited in note 1. The first ground of appeal imputes error to the Circuit Judge in refusing the motion for a non-suit. That motion was based upon the following grounds: “First. Because plaintiff has failed to show affirmatively any negligence on the part of defendant, causing the death of Mrs. Petrie. Second. Because plaintiff has failed to show that the failure to ring the bell or blow the whistle continuously caused or contributed to the death of Mrs. Petrie. Third. Because the facts show that the accident was caused by the gross negligence of the deceased. Fourth. That the plaintiff has failed to show any beneficial interest or pecuniary loss to her children.” It will be observed that the phraseology used in all these grounds is open to objection, when the question is as to a motion for a non-suit, for in such a case the inquiry never is whether the evidence shows the existence of *318a fact material to the plaintiff’s case, as the question whether such a fact has been shoivn is a question exclusively for the jury. The true inquiry is, whether there is any evidence tending to show the existence of such facts as are material to the case of the plaintiff; and this inquiry is not presented by any one of these grounds. But waiving this, and assuming that the questions were presented in proper form, we will proceed to consider them.",
"The first two grounds are doubtless based upon the theory that while the failure to ring the bell or blow the whistle continuously until the engine had crossed the highway might be- evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, yet there was no testimony tending to show that such negligence caused the death of Mrs. Petrie, or in any way contributed thereto; for in the face of the express terms of the statute [Ger. Stat., § 1483), requiring that the bell should be rung or the whistle sounded at a distance of at least five hundred yards from the point where a railroad crosses a public highway, and kept ringing or sounding until the engine has crossed such highway, and in view of the undisputed testimony that this positive requirement of the statute was not complied with, it could scarcely be denied that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant. But it being true, as contended for by appellant, that it is not sufficient to make out plaintiff’s case, that there should be simply evidence of defendant’s negligence, but that there must also be some evidence that the injury complained of was the result of such negligence [Glenn v. C. & G. R. R. Co., 21 S. C., 466), we will proceed to inquire whether there was any evidence tending to show that the failure on the part of the defendant to give the signals required by' statute in any way contributed to the injury complained of.",
"We think there was some evidence tending to show that fact, and whether it was sufficient or not, was not for the Circuit Judge to determine on a motion for non-suit, but was exclusively for the jury, to whom it was properly left. The testimony is all set out in the Case, and we cannot go over it with a view of vindicating our conclusion. It is sufficient to say that the circumstances indicated by the Circuit Judge in refusing the motion for a non-suit, afforded some evidence that if *319the requirements of the statute had been complied with, the disaster might not have occurred. The high wind blowing at the time from a direction opposite to that from which the train was approaching, together with the manner in which the old lady’s head was wrapped up, probably to protect her from the cold wind, may have been sufficient to prevent her from hearing the signal which was given, and may not have been sufficient to have prevented her from hearing the signal which ought to have been given.",
"We cannot say, therefore, that there was absolutely no evidence tending to show that the injury complained was the result of the negligence in failing to give the signal as required by thé statute. The third ground clearly cannot be sustained, for it has been frequently held that contributory negligence is a matter of defence which must be proved to the satisfaction of the jury, and cannot therefore constitute a ground for a non-suit. Carter v. Railroad Company, 19 S. C., 20; Darwin v. Railroad Company, 23 Id., 531, and many other cases. We come next to the fourth ground of the motion for a non-suit, and construing it in the same liberal spirit, it presents the inquiry whether there was any evidence tending to show that the parties for whose benefit this action is brought — the adult children of the deceased — had any beneficial interest in her life or suffered any pecuniary loss by her death. It would be sufficient for the present inquiry to say that there was some evidence that the deceased was in the habit of rendering services to her children which were of value to them, and that would be enough to carry the caseto the jury.",
"It is contended, however, that unless the children had some legal claim on the deceased for their support, no damages can be recovered for their benefit, and as the children of deceased were all adults, living to themselves, they could not possibly have any such claim. This view is based upon the idea that the “injury” spoken of in the statute means only the deprivation of a legal right. This, it seems to us, is a narrow view of the statute, and, on the contrary, its language repels any such view. There is not only no language in the statute which requires such a restricted signification to be placed upon the word *320“injury,” but some of its terms indicate that such was not the sense in which the word was used.",
"The language of section 2184 of the General Statutes is as follows : “Every such action shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent, and children of the person whose death shall have been caused, * * * and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death to the parties respectively for whom, and for whose benefit, such action shall be brought, and the amount so recovered shall be divided among the before mentioned parties in such shares as they would have been entitled to if the deceased had. died intestate, and the amount recovered had been personal assets of his or her estate.” Now, it will be observed that the provision is that the damages recovered, in case there are only children left, shall be divided equally amongst all of the children, whether some of them be minors or not; and this negatives the idea that the claim for damages rests upon the theory that the beneficiaries have been deprived of some legal right, for in the case supposed, while minor children would have a legal claim on their father for support, the adults would have no such claim, and yet by the terms of the statute no distinction is made. Again, it will be noticed that our statute, unlike many others of a similar character, does not speak of pecuniary loss or injury which might possibly tend to show the injury for which damages are allowed, was confined to the deprivation of some legal claim susceptible of measurement by a pecuniary standard, but its language is broader, and gives the jury the right to award “such damages as they may think proportioned to the injury resulting from such death;” and as it is quite certain that the beneficiaries of the action may sustain injury by the death of a relative, over and above the loss of any legal claim which they may have upon such relative, it follows that the view contended for cannot be sustained.",
"The conclusion which we have reached is sustained by high authority. In the case of Railroad Company v. Barron (5 Wall., 90), the view contended for by the appellant was pressed by counsel in an elaborate argument, but the court held that it was not necessary that the beneficiaries should have had a legal claim on the deceased, if he had survived, for their sup*321port. Our view is also supported by many other authorities cited in respondent’s argument.1 Indeed, in the case we have cited from Wallace, supra, Nelson, J., in speaking of the view contended for by appellant, says: “This construction, we believe, has been rejected by every court before which the question has been presented.” It is quite clear, therefore, that there was no error in refusing the motion for a non-suit.",
"The language of the charge excepted to in the fourth ground of appeal is only partially quoted, and fhe purpose of it seems to be to convey the idea that the Circuit Judge intended the jury to understand, or left them to infer, that there could be no gross negligence on the part of the deceased, unless she went upon the track for the purpose of committing suicide. But when the entire paragraph, from which these extracts are taken, is read (and for the purpose of a full understanding of the several exceptions, the entire charge should be embraced in the report of the case], it is plain that no such inference was open to the jury. For the judge, after defining gross negligence in terms to which no exception has been taken, proceeded to submit the question of fact to the jury — whether Mrs. Petrie was guilty of gross negligence.",
"What he said about suicide ivas only as an illustration, and was properly qualified by the following remark: “That would be an extreme case of wilfulness.” That portion of the charge excepted to in the seventh ground of appeal, taken in the connection in which it was used, was clearly not erroneous. Where the statute requires a certain duty from a railroad company, the failure to perform such duty cannot be excused where the company has failed to provide a sufficient number of officers or agents to perform that and other necessary services in running the train. Hence the fact that the engineer was engaged in arranging the air-pump while approaching the *322crossing, and for this reason failed to give the signal required by statute, would be no excuse for such failure, unless it was shown, as the judge suggested, that the necessity for working on the pump arose from a sudden and unexpected emergency ; and there was not only no evidence of this, but, on the contrary, the testimony shows that this work might just as well have been done before approaching or after leaving the highway crossing.",
"That portion of the charge which forms the basis of the eighth ground had no application whatever to the case as made by the testimony and was purely speculative. Hence, conceding that there was error in telling the jury that a supposed state of facts would constitute gross negligence, it is quite certain that such error could not possibly have affected the result in this case, for there was not only no evidence whatever that the engineer saw the deceased on the track in front of his train, but, on the contrary, the uncontradicted evidence is that neither the engineer nor any other officer connected with the train knew' that she had been run over or knocked off the track. The requests to charge in the ninth, tenth, and eleventh grounds of appeal, which also constitute the principal grounds for the motion for a new trial, were properly refused.",
"The fundamental vice in all of these requests, is, that they called upon the judge to pass upon questions of fact. The rule, as we understand it, is that the province of the judge is to give the jury a definition of the term negligence, or gross negligence, and then it is the exclusive province of the jury to determine whether the facts pwoved in a given case constitute negligence or gross negligence. Bridger v. Railroad Company, 25 S. C., 30, 31. As is well said by the Chief Justice, in that case, in speaking of this matter of negligence: “All agree as to the general definition — the absence of ordinary care. But who is to say whether the facts alleged and proved show this absence — the judge or the jury? The judge is required to charge the law, and the jury to find the facts. The law, however, does not state what facts proved will show the absence of ordinary care.",
"It could not do so as applicable to every case which arises. The cases involving this question are so different in their facts, so various, so complicated, and arising under so many different circumstances, that it would be *323utterly impossible to lay down any general principle of law by which every special case could be measured and tested as to the fact of negligence, and which would enable a judge to say to the jury, as matter of law, such and such facts show the absence or presence of ordinary care;” and then he lays down the rule substantially as we have stated it. Of course, the same rule applies where the question is as to gross negligence, as in cases of ordinary negligence. This being the rule, it follows that the Circuit Judge committed no error in refusing to charge that the existence of certain facts precluded the plaintiff’s right to recover; for that would, in effect, have been a charge that a given state of facts constituted gross negligence, whereas that was a question for the jury. It will be observed that the question is not whether the judge erred in simply refusing to instruct the jury that it was the duty of a. person approaching a railroad crossing to use his senses of sight and hearing in order to protect himself from the danger of a collision, but the question is, whether he erred'in refusing to go further and instruct the jury that such failure was gross negligence, and would, in this case, defeat the plaintiff’s right to recover.",
"The requests to charge wdiich constitute the basis of the twelfth and thirteenth grounds of appeal were not really refused. The statute (General Statutes, section 1529) provides that where a person is injured by a collision with a railroad train at a highway crossing, by reason of the negligence of the company to give the required signals, the company shall be liable for the damages thereby sustained, “unless it is shown that, in addition to a mere want of ordinary care, the person injured * * was, at the time of the collision, guilty of gross or wilful negligence, or was acting in violation of the law; and that such gross or wilful negligence or unlawful act contributed to the injury.” Nothing is said in the act about observing proper care, and hence the Circuit Judge, in dealing with these requests, declined to adopt the word “proper,” but following the language of the statute, instructed the jury, as he had done before, that if the deceased was guilty of gross negligence which contributed to the injury, then she could not recover, and that, taking the words, if she did not observe proper care, to mean that she was guilty of gross negligence, *324then the request was good law.",
"In this there certainly was no error, for he simply translated the incorrect language of the request into the more accurate terms employed in the statute. The fourteenth ground of appeal has already been considered, except in so far as the motion for a new trial was based upon the ground that the damages given were excessive. It is so well settled that the decision of the Circuit Judge upon this point is final, that it is only necessary to refer to some of the cases. Steele v. C., C. & A. R. R. Co., 11 S. C., 589, and the cases therein cited.",
"It only remains to consider the questions raised by the fifth ground of appeal, as to the mode of proving the amount of the damages, and by the sixth ground as to the elements which may enter into the estimate. As to the former question, it is yery obvious that in many cases, slander, &c., it is impossible to show by evidence the amount, in dollars and cents, of the damages sustained, and yet we have never heard it suggested even that the inability to do this precludes the jury, when the facts and circumstances are laid before them, from making their own estimate of the amount of the damages recoverable in such cases, and we see no reason why the same cannot be done in a case like this.",
"Even if witnesses had undertaken to testify as to the amount of damages, in dollars and cents, which the beneficiaries in this action had sustained by the loss of their mother, such testimony could only have been the opinions or estimates of such witnesses, based upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and it seems to us that the jury was quite as competent to make such estimate as the witnesses would have been. See what is said upon this subject by Nelson, J., in Railroad Company, v. Barron, supra. As to the other question — whether the funeral expenses could properly constitute an element in estimating the amount of the damages — it seems to us that the authorities cited by respondent’s counsel1 in his argument, fully sustain the ruling of the Circuit Judge.",
"The judgment of this court is, that the judgment of the Circuit Court be affirmed. Fait. Ry. Acc. L., $$ 405, 413; Deer. Neg., § 422; 3 Wood Rail. L., 1539, 1540; Lett v. Railway Co., 21 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas., 189; Railroad Company v. Maryland, Ibid., 203; 3 Sulk. Dam., 282, 283; Cregin v. Railroad Company, 19 Hun, 341; Railroad Company v. Noell, 32 Gratt., 394; Tilley v. Railroad Company, 29 N. Y., 252; Railroad Company v. Barron, 5 Wall., 453; Railroad Company v. Brown, Ibid., 90; Pierce R. R., 388; Carey v. Railroad Company, 48 Am. Dec. 3 Wood Rail., 1539; Pierce Rail., 397; Patt. Acc. Rail.",
"L., § 412; Murphy v. R. R. Co., 88 N. Y., 445; Deer. Negl., § 420."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/6676671/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION Civil Case No. 5:20-cv-411-BO HELEN JO TALIAFERRO, KENNETH ) DURDEN, KENDALL GIBBS, RICKY ) SCOTT, NORTH CAROLINA COUNCIL ) OF THE BLIND, INC., GOVERNOR ) MOREHEAD SCHOOL ALUMNI ) ASSOCIATION, INC., and DISABILITY ) RIGHTS NORTH CAROLINA, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) MOTION FOR ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ) ELECTIONS, KAREN BRINSON BELL, in ) her official capacity as Executive Director of ) the NCSBOE, DAMON CIRCOSTA, in his ) official capacity as Chair of the NCSBOE, ) STELLA ANDERSON, in her official ) capacity as Secretary of the NCSBOE, KEN ) RAYMOND, in his official capacity as ) Member of the NCSBOE, JEFF CARMON ) III, in his official capacity as Member of the ) NCSBOE, and DAVID C. BLACK, in his ) official capacity as Member of the NCSBOE, ) ) Defendants. )
NOW COME PLAINTIFFS, by and through counsel, and respectfully move the Court to
enter a Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ordering Defendants to provide
accessible absentee ballots and processes for requesting, receiving, signing, and returning
absentee ballots for the November 2020 general election. Plaintiffs simultaneously file
declarations and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction.
In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs state:
Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 1 of 4 1. Individual Plaintiffs Taliaferro, Durden, Gibbs, Scott, and members of the
Organizational Plaintiffs North Carolina Council of the Blind, Inc., and Governor Morehead
School Alumni Association, Inc., are blind and are registered voters who desire to cast a private
and independent vote through Defendants’ Absentee Voting Program in the November 2020
general election. (See Declarations of Taliaferro, Durden, Gibbs, Scott, McEachern, and Bell.)
2. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act that Defendants discriminate against them and
other blind voters based on disability in conducting the Absentee Voting Program via
inaccessible, standard print hard copy absentee ballots and communications, and that
Defendants’ discriminatory actions require Plaintiffs and other blind voters to rely on sighted
assistants and forfeit their right to a private and independent vote.
3. Absent a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs and other voters with disabilities will
suffer irreparable harm. Specifically, Plaintiffs will be forced to forgo their privacy and
independence to cast an absentee ballot from home. Additionally, unlike in prior years, the
absence of a preliminary injunction forces Plaintiffs to risk exposure to COVID-19 at their
polling place in order to exercise their right to cast a private and independent ballot.
4. The balance of equities supporting the grant of preliminary injunctive relief tips in
favor of Plaintiffs. In the absence of a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs and other voters with
disabilities will suffer injury to their right to equal access to the Absentee Voting Program and a
secret ballot when Defendants have rapidly deployable, free or limited cost accessible voting
systems available to them.
5. The public interest is in upholding the right of Plaintiffs and other voters with
disabilities to have equal access to the Absentee Voting Program, especially in light of the
Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 2 of 4 ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.
6. On August 7, 2020, Plaintiffs, through counsel, conferred with counsel for
Defendants regarding their intent to pursue a Preliminary Injunction. Defendants have not agreed
to Plaintiffs’ request to provide an accessible absentee ballot for the November 2020 election and
object to this Motion.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs ask that the Court:
A. Issue a Preliminary Injunction requiring Defendants to:
(1) provide accessible absentee ballots, which includes accessible electronic
ballots and alternative print format ballots (Braille and large print);
(2) utilize and make accessible formats available for requesting, receiving,
marking, signing, and returning the accessible ballots; and
(3) ensure accessible absentee ballots are received and processed in a manner that
does not reveal that the ballot was cast by a voter with a disability
for the November 2020 general election;
B. Waive the requirement of a bond; and
C. If desired by the Court, set a hearing for the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction.
Dated: August 12, 2020 Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Holly Stiles Holly Stiles holly.stiles@disabilityrightsnc.org N.C. State Bar No. 38930 Lisa Grafstein lisa.grafstein@disabilityrightsnc.org N.C. State Bar No. 22076 DISABILITY RIGHTS NC 3724 National Drive, Suite 100 Raleigh, NC 27612 Phone: (919) 856-2195
Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 3 of 4 Fax: (919) 856-2244
/s/ Stuart Seaborn Stuart Seaborn* sseaborn@dralegal.org C.A. State Bar No. 198590 Rosa Lee Bichell* rbichell@dralegal.org C.A. State Bar No. 331530 DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES 2001 Center St #4 Berkeley, CA 94704 Phone: (510) 665-8644 Fax: (510) 665-8511
Christina Brandt-Young* cbrandt-young@dralegal.org N.Y. State Bar No. 4165189 DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES 655 Third Avenue, 14th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 644-8644 Fax: (212) 644-8636 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
*Appearing by Special Appearance
Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 4 of 4 | 2020-08-12 | [
"IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION Civil Case No. 5:20-cv-411-BO HELEN JO TALIAFERRO, KENNETH ) DURDEN, KENDALL GIBBS, RICKY ) SCOTT, NORTH CAROLINA COUNCIL ) OF THE BLIND, INC., GOVERNOR ) MOREHEAD SCHOOL ALUMNI ) ASSOCIATION, INC., and DISABILITY ) RIGHTS NORTH CAROLINA, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) MOTION FOR ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ) ELECTIONS, KAREN BRINSON BELL, in ) her official capacity as Executive Director of ) the NCSBOE, DAMON CIRCOSTA, in his ) official capacity as Chair of the NCSBOE, ) STELLA ANDERSON, in her official ) capacity as Secretary of the NCSBOE, KEN ) RAYMOND, in his official capacity as ) Member of the NCSBOE, JEFF CARMON ) III, in his official capacity as Member of the ) NCSBOE, and DAVID C. BLACK, in his ) official capacity as Member of the NCSBOE, ) ) Defendants. )",
"NOW COME PLAINTIFFS, by and through counsel, and respectfully move the Court to enter a Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 ordering Defendants to provide accessible absentee ballots and processes for requesting, receiving, signing, and returning absentee ballots for the November 2020 general election. Plaintiffs simultaneously file declarations and a Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction. In support of their Motion, Plaintiffs state: Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 1 of 4 1. Individual Plaintiffs Taliaferro, Durden, Gibbs, Scott, and members of the Organizational Plaintiffs North Carolina Council of the Blind, Inc., and Governor Morehead School Alumni Association, Inc., are blind and are registered voters who desire to cast a private and independent vote through Defendants’ Absentee Voting Program in the November 2020 general election.",
"(See Declarations of Taliaferro, Durden, Gibbs, Scott, McEachern, and Bell.) 2. Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act that Defendants discriminate against them and other blind voters based on disability in conducting the Absentee Voting Program via inaccessible, standard print hard copy absentee ballots and communications, and that Defendants’ discriminatory actions require Plaintiffs and other blind voters to rely on sighted assistants and forfeit their right to a private and independent vote. 3. Absent a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs and other voters with disabilities will suffer irreparable harm. Specifically, Plaintiffs will be forced to forgo their privacy and independence to cast an absentee ballot from home. Additionally, unlike in prior years, the absence of a preliminary injunction forces Plaintiffs to risk exposure to COVID-19 at their polling place in order to exercise their right to cast a private and independent ballot. 4.",
"The balance of equities supporting the grant of preliminary injunctive relief tips in favor of Plaintiffs. In the absence of a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs and other voters with disabilities will suffer injury to their right to equal access to the Absentee Voting Program and a secret ballot when Defendants have rapidly deployable, free or limited cost accessible voting systems available to them. 5. The public interest is in upholding the right of Plaintiffs and other voters with disabilities to have equal access to the Absentee Voting Program, especially in light of the Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 2 of 4 ongoing COVID-19 pandemic.",
"6. On August 7, 2020, Plaintiffs, through counsel, conferred with counsel for Defendants regarding their intent to pursue a Preliminary Injunction. Defendants have not agreed to Plaintiffs’ request to provide an accessible absentee ballot for the November 2020 election and object to this Motion. WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs ask that the Court: A. Issue a Preliminary Injunction requiring Defendants to: (1) provide accessible absentee ballots, which includes accessible electronic ballots and alternative print format ballots (Braille and large print); (2) utilize and make accessible formats available for requesting, receiving, marking, signing, and returning the accessible ballots; and (3) ensure accessible absentee ballots are received and processed in a manner that does not reveal that the ballot was cast by a voter with a disability for the November 2020 general election; B. Waive the requirement of a bond; and C. If desired by the Court, set a hearing for the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Dated: August 12, 2020 Respectfully submitted, /s/ Holly Stiles Holly Stiles holly.stiles@disabilityrightsnc.org N.C. State Bar No. 38930 Lisa Grafstein lisa.grafstein@disabilityrightsnc.org N.C. State Bar No.",
"22076 DISABILITY RIGHTS NC 3724 National Drive, Suite 100 Raleigh, NC 27612 Phone: (919) 856-2195 Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 3 of 4 Fax: (919) 856-2244 /s/ Stuart Seaborn Stuart Seaborn* sseaborn@dralegal.org C.A. State Bar No. 198590 Rosa Lee Bichell* rbichell@dralegal.org C.A. State Bar No. 331530 DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES 2001 Center St #4 Berkeley, CA 94704 Phone: (510) 665-8644 Fax: (510) 665-8511 Christina Brandt-Young* cbrandt-young@dralegal.org N.Y. State Bar No. 4165189 DISABILITY RIGHTS ADVOCATES 655 Third Avenue, 14th Floor New York, NY 10017 Tel: (212) 644-8644 Fax: (212) 644-8636 ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS *Appearing by Special Appearance Case 5:20-cv-00411-BO Document 24 Filed 08/12/20 Page 4 of 4"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/142218785/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION
Applicant’s election without traverse of Invention A in the reply filed on 4/6/22 is acknowledged. Applicant canceled claims 9-12 and 14-16 and added claims 26-32. The new claims require a different restriction requirement. The restriction requirement between Inventions A and B, as set forth on 4/6/22, is hereby withdrawn. In view of the above noted withdrawal of the restriction requirement, applicant is advised that if any claim presented in a continuation or divisional application is anticipated by, or includes all the limitations of, a claim that is allowable in the present application, such claim may be subject to provisional statutory and/or nonstatutory double patenting rejections over the claims of the instant application. Once a restriction requirement is withdrawn, the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 121 are no longer applicable. See In re Ziegler, 443 F.2d 1211, 1215, 170 USPQ 129, 131-32 (CCPA 1971). See also MPEP § 804.01.
Election/Restrictions This application contains claims directed to the following patentably distinct species: Species I A device having: an elongated gate structure… having a first end portion, a second end portion, and a third portion between the first end portion and the second end portion; the first conductive contact being disposed adjacent to the third portion; the second conductive contact being disposed adjacent to the first end portion; and wherein the second conductive contact overlaps with a greater number of the fin structures than the first conductive contact;
Species II A device having: a Vcc contact, a Vss contact, a bit-line (BL) contact, and a node contact that each extend in the first direction wherein a dimension of the node contact is smaller than the dimension of the Vcc contact and the dimension of the BL contact in the second direction
Species III A device having: a first gate and a second gate each extending in a first direction, wherein a first gap separates the first gate from the second gate in the first direction; wherein a second gap separates the Vcc contact and the first gate in a second direction perpendicular to the first direction, and wherein no segment of the Vcc contact overlaps with the first gap in the first direction; a Vss contact extending in the first direction and having a greater dimension than the first gap in the first direction; wherein a third gap separates the Vss contact from the first gate in the second direction, wherein the Vss contact is disposed closer to the first gap than the Vcc contact is disposed to the first gap.
Currently, claims 1-8 and 25 read on species I; claims 21-24 read on species II; and claims 25-32 read on species III.
The species are independent or distinct because at least the underlined elements described above exist only in their respective species and not in the other species. In addition, these species are not obvious variants of each other based on the current record.
Applicant is required under 35 U.S.C. 121 to elect a single disclosed species, or a single grouping of patentably indistinct species, for prosecution on the merits to which the claims shall be restricted if no generic claim is finally held to be allowable. Currently, no claim appears generic to all species.
There is a search and/or examination burden for the patentably distinct species as set forth above because at least the following reason(s) apply: The claims to the different groups require a different field of search, e.g. searching different class/subclass combinations and employing different search strategies and search queries, specifically to find the different features listed two numbered sections above.
Applicant is advised that the reply to this requirement to be complete must include (i) an election of a species or a grouping of patentably indistinct species to be examined even though the requirement may be traversed (37 CFR 1.143) and (ii) identification of the claims encompassing the elected species or grouping of patentably indistinct species, including any claims subsequently added. An argument that a claim is allowable or that all claims are generic is considered nonresponsive unless accompanied by an election.
The election may be made with or without traverse. To preserve a right to petition, the election must be made with traverse. If the reply does not distinctly and specifically point out supposed errors in the election of species requirement, the election shall be treated as an election without traverse. Traversal must be presented at the time of election in order to be considered timely. Failure to timely traverse the requirement will result in the loss of right to petition under 37 CFR 1.144. If claims are added after the election, applicant must indicate which of these claims are readable on the elected species or grouping of patentably indistinct species.
Should applicant traverse on the ground that the species, or groupings of patentably indistinct species from which election is required, are not patentably distinct, applicant should submit evidence or identify such evidence now of record showing them to be obvious variants or clearly admit on the record that this is the case. In either instance, if the examiner finds one of the species unpatentable over the prior art, the evidence or admission may be used in a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) of the other species.
Upon the allowance of a generic claim, applicant will be entitled to consideration of claims to additional species which depend from or otherwise require all the limitations of an allowable generic claim as provided by 37 CFR 1.141.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Kevin Parendo, whose can be contacted by phone at (571) 270-5030 or directly by fax at (571) 270-6030. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday from 9 am - 5 pm ET. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Allen Parker, can be reached at (303) 297-4722. The fax number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000.
/Kevin Parendo/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2819 | 2022-05-12T23:35:59 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Applicant’s election without traverse of Invention A in the reply filed on 4/6/22 is acknowledged. Applicant canceled claims 9-12 and 14-16 and added claims 26-32. The new claims require a different restriction requirement. The restriction requirement between Inventions A and B, as set forth on 4/6/22, is hereby withdrawn. In view of the above noted withdrawal of the restriction requirement, applicant is advised that if any claim presented in a continuation or divisional application is anticipated by, or includes all the limitations of, a claim that is allowable in the present application, such claim may be subject to provisional statutory and/or nonstatutory double patenting rejections over the claims of the instant application.",
"Once a restriction requirement is withdrawn, the provisions of 35 U.S.C. 121 are no longer applicable. See In re Ziegler, 443 F.2d 1211, 1215, 170 USPQ 129, 131-32 (CCPA 1971). See also MPEP § 804.01. Election/Restrictions This application contains claims directed to the following patentably distinct species: Species I A device having: an elongated gate structure… having a first end portion, a second end portion, and a third portion between the first end portion and the second end portion; the first conductive contact being disposed adjacent to the third portion; the second conductive contact being disposed adjacent to the first end portion; and wherein the second conductive contact overlaps with a greater number of the fin structures than the first conductive contact; Species II A device having: a Vcc contact, a Vss contact, a bit-line (BL) contact, and a node contact that each extend in the first direction wherein a dimension of the node contact is smaller than the dimension of the Vcc contact and the dimension of the BL contact in the second direction Species III A device having: a first gate and a second gate each extending in a first direction, wherein a first gap separates the first gate from the second gate in the first direction; wherein a second gap separates the Vcc contact and the first gate in a second direction perpendicular to the first direction, and wherein no segment of the Vcc contact overlaps with the first gap in the first direction; a Vss contact extending in the first direction and having a greater dimension than the first gap in the first direction; wherein a third gap separates the Vss contact from the first gate in the second direction, wherein the Vss contact is disposed closer to the first gap than the Vcc contact is disposed to the first gap.",
"Currently, claims 1-8 and 25 read on species I; claims 21-24 read on species II; and claims 25-32 read on species III. The species are independent or distinct because at least the underlined elements described above exist only in their respective species and not in the other species. In addition, these species are not obvious variants of each other based on the current record. Applicant is required under 35 U.S.C. 121 to elect a single disclosed species, or a single grouping of patentably indistinct species, for prosecution on the merits to which the claims shall be restricted if no generic claim is finally held to be allowable.",
"Currently, no claim appears generic to all species. There is a search and/or examination burden for the patentably distinct species as set forth above because at least the following reason(s) apply: The claims to the different groups require a different field of search, e.g. searching different class/subclass combinations and employing different search strategies and search queries, specifically to find the different features listed two numbered sections above. Applicant is advised that the reply to this requirement to be complete must include (i) an election of a species or a grouping of patentably indistinct species to be examined even though the requirement may be traversed (37 CFR 1.143) and (ii) identification of the claims encompassing the elected species or grouping of patentably indistinct species, including any claims subsequently added. An argument that a claim is allowable or that all claims are generic is considered nonresponsive unless accompanied by an election.",
"The election may be made with or without traverse. To preserve a right to petition, the election must be made with traverse. If the reply does not distinctly and specifically point out supposed errors in the election of species requirement, the election shall be treated as an election without traverse. Traversal must be presented at the time of election in order to be considered timely. Failure to timely traverse the requirement will result in the loss of right to petition under 37 CFR 1.144. If claims are added after the election, applicant must indicate which of these claims are readable on the elected species or grouping of patentably indistinct species. Should applicant traverse on the ground that the species, or groupings of patentably indistinct species from which election is required, are not patentably distinct, applicant should submit evidence or identify such evidence now of record showing them to be obvious variants or clearly admit on the record that this is the case. In either instance, if the examiner finds one of the species unpatentable over the prior art, the evidence or admission may be used in a rejection under 35 U.S.C.",
"103(a) of the other species. Upon the allowance of a generic claim, applicant will be entitled to consideration of claims to additional species which depend from or otherwise require all the limitations of an allowable generic claim as provided by 37 CFR 1.141. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to Kevin Parendo, whose can be contacted by phone at (571) 270-5030 or directly by fax at (571) 270-6030. The examiner can normally be reached Monday through Friday from 9 am - 5 pm ET. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Allen Parker, can be reached at (303) 297-4722.",
"The fax number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /Kevin Parendo/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 2819"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-05-15.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
D)E(CISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDSoldier Creek Coal Company, a Division of CaliforniaPortland Cement Co. and Elven Ray Stokes. Case27-CA 5689-2July 13, 1979DECISION AND ORDERBY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINSANI) MUIRPHIYOn April 10, 1979, Administrative Law Judge JoanWieder issued the attached Decision in this proceed-ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptionsand a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed ananswering brief.Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of theNational Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-thority in this proceeding to a three-meimber panel.The Board has considered the record and the at-tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefsand has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' andconclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and toadopt her recommended Order.ORDERPursuant to Section 10(c) of' the National LaborRelations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-der of the Administrative l.aw Judge and hereby or-ders that the complaint be, and it hereby is. dismissedin its entirety.I The Administrative Law Judge held that eidence of disparate treatmentregarding Stokes' attendance and discharge did not result in a prima faci'case. We agree with the General (Counsel's exception Iowever. we find thatthe Respondent rebutted the prima rru e case the Respondent warnedStokes when he was hired that it was aware of his poolr attendance recordwith his previous employer and that similar conduct would nt he tolerated.Consequently, we find that the Respondent's apparently disparate treatmentof Stokes was justified and that it rebutted the General (Counsel's prima faciecase. Pepsi (ola Bottling (nmpan. 242 NLRB No. 48 (1979)The General Counsel also excepts to the Administrative I.aw Judge's lail-ure to draw an adverse inference because the Respondent did not call twoforemen as witnesses. We agree with the General Counsel's contention thatthe Administrative Law Judge's reliance on lx.al 25%v United Automoble,Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers o' America Atherton ('addl-lac, Inc.] v N L RB.. 608 F.2d 1369 (2d. (ir. 1977), enid as modified 225NLRB 421 (1976). is misplaced. That case dealt with the failure to call aneutral nonparty. However, the General C'ounsel was attempting to provethat Ross had direct knowledge of Stokes' absence. Stokes' testimony. whenviewed most favorably to the General (Counsel's case. is only that he told theforemen that he was not getting on the bus The Respondent did not disputethis conversation; however, there is no evidence that this was communicatedto Ross. who made the discharge decision and unequivocally denied that heknew of Stokes' absence. We therefore conclude that the Administrative LawJudge correctly did not draw an adverse inference from the Respondent'sfailure to call the foremen. Trinity ('oncrete Produ tIv Crompanv, Rac/le Divi-sion, 162 NLRB 1237 (1967,DECISIONS1AfIEMF N1 OF IHE CASEJOAN WIIF)lR. Administrative Law Judge: This case washeard at Price. Utah, on November 14 and 15. 1978. Thecharge was filed on December 29. 1977.' by Elven RayStokes (Stokes). A complaint2was issued September 1 alleg-ing that Soldier ('reek Coal Company, a Division of' Cali-fornia Portland Cement Co., herein called the Company orRespondent. violated Section 8(a)( I) of the National LaborRelations Act. as amended (Act), by discharging Stokes forengaging in protected concerted activity and by refusing, ingood faith, to perform labor under abnormally dangerousconditions at work. The Respondent admits that it dis-charged Stokes, but denies that the discharge was unlawfulor that it in any way violated the Act.All parties were given full opportunity to participate, tointroduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examinewitnesses, to argue orally, and to file briet's. Briefs. whichwere filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the ('Com-pany. have been carefully considered.Upon the entire record, including especially my observa-tion of the wttnesses and their demeanor. I make the follow-ing:IINI)IN(;S ti FA( I1. i111 Al I (il) INI AIR I.AB()R PRA( Ill ESBackgroundRespondent is engaged in the underground mining of'coal at a site approximately 22 miles from the city of' Price.Utah.' The (Company acquired this property in September1974 and it started prodtiucing coatl in June 1976. ('urrently.approximately 115 people are employed at the mine. of'which 85 are hourly workers and 30 are supervisors andmanagers. I he mine is a nonunion operation.' During nor-mal operations the ( onipany uses three shifts.5The , ice president arnd general manager of' Respondent isMarion Donaldl Ross Ross), who is responsible for the op-era.tions of the C('ompanv. Ross is assisted by Reed W. Olsen(Olsen) among others. Olsen is the mine manager and hasserved in that capacity for approximately 1-1/2 years." It isadmitted that Ross and Olsen are supervisors.I Unless otherwise indicated all dates herein reler to the year 1977.The complaint was amended pursuant to stipulation at the hearingJurisdiction is not in issue. The Respondent admits, and I find, that itmeets the Board's $50,000 direct outflow standard or the assertion of'juris-diction.' The other nonunion mines in the Price area are Swisher (coal Company,Plateau Mining Company, and Southern Utah Fuel Company. 'here areseven or eight union mines in the area, whose employees are represented bythe United Mine Workers (UMW)I'wo of the shifts are engaged in production and the third, the graveyardshil:, is engaged in maintenance. The graveyard shift is designated shift No.I and employs approximately 15 to 16 men working from II p.m. to 7 a.m.The day shift is designated shift No. 2 and employs approximately 40 to 45men, working from 7 a m. to 3 p.m The third shift, referred to as the swingshift, employs approximately 20 miners working rom 3:15 p.m. to 11:15p.m. For every six to eight miners there is one supervisor, Prior to being employed by Respondent. Olsen worked at Braztah ('or-poration for approximately I year as general mine foreman. Employees atBraztah Corporation were represented by the United Mine Workers.243 NLRB No. 75456 SOLDIER ('REEK COAL CO.The Charging Party was hired by Respondent on Octo-ber II. New employees hired by Respondent in October1977 were subject to a 60-calendar-day probationary pe-riod.' Stokes had been previously employed by BraztahCorporation.At the time he was employed by Respondent. Stokes re-ceived orientation which included the receipt of a firm let-ter stating that he was hired effective October 11. 1977. fora 60-day probationary period; at the expiration of 60 days.the Company would either terminate his employment ordecide to retain him. The letter further stated that in theevent he was terminated during the 60-day probationaryperiod, the reasons for the termination were not subject tothe Company's grievance procedure. Additionally. awoman, whom Stokes described as the person in charge ofpersonnel, explained the probationary period, and furthersaid that if Stokes were discharged during his probation.there was no recourse.In early December 1977. the nationwide UMW contractexpired. On December 6, UMW members started picketingSoldier Creek Mine.' Prior to the expiration of the UMWcontract. Ross had heard rumors" that LUMW memberswould picket, and if nonunion miners attempted to workduring the forthcoming strike, violence was threatened.Ross also heard reports of several incidents involving com-pany employees."' Around December 5. 1977. the wholecommunity, according to Ross. was buzzing with reports'that there would be sabotage to stop production at the non-union mines.In response to the anticipated mass picketing. the non-union operators contacted the county sheriff and state offi-cials, including the governor, the director of the highwaypatrol, and the safety director. Three meetings were heldwith the state officials, and Governor Matheson assured thenonunion mine operators that they would have whateversecurity was necessary to insure the continued operations ofthe nonunion mines. The Company took other precautions.including supplementing the "antiquated" telephone systemwith two-way radios and hiring a private security firce toprotect the physical plant.On November 29, 1977, Ross held a meeting with Re-spondent's employees' to discuss the general situation re-garding the impending strike. Specifically, Ross discussedthe plans of law enforcement officials to assure the workersI In May 1978 the probationary period was increased to 90 days.'There are several UMW locals. for each union mine has its own alThere was no reference to picketing by particular LJMW union locals.'The source of the rumors was the news media, including newspapers.0m On or about November 3. Ross heard a report that an employee had thelug nuts on his truck wheels loosened; on or about November 25 the Com-pany's safety engineer had some problems. but Ross did not hear that hismailbox had been run over or that a black cat had been shot in the head andwas thrown on the cement in his backyard. Initially. Ross stated he hadheard that the Company's safety director had a small tree in his yard uproot-ed, but changed his testimony to indicate that he did not hear such a report.On or about November 29. Ross' wife received an anonymous phone callwarning her that Ross had better not go to work during the forthcomingstrike. Ross did not recall whether any of the other supervisors receivedsimilar calls at the same time.i" The source of the reports was characterized by Ross as hearsay" All employees of Soldier Creek Coal Company plus the employees ofCoal Service. a trucking company that transported the coal produced byRespondent to the railroad. The facilities ,ffCoal Service were located on theaccess road to the mine.of adequate security when they traveled to and from work.Ross informed the employees that he had met with the gov-ernor and state highway officials and had been promisedtwo 15-man riot squads to assist with security. Ross alsoindicated that management would at no time risk the work-ers' lives or well-being. Ross further stated that each em-ployee, as well as the Company, had the right to work andthat the normal work schedule would be followed undernormal rules, regulations. and policies. A system for trans-porting employees to and from work using vans and a busin lieu of personal vehicles was also discussed. Finally. Rossmentioned the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief toprotect the employees. After the November 29 meeting.Ross had a sign posted to remind all employees that theCompany would keep the present work schedule under thecurrent rules and policies. Stokes attended the meeting.A. Ev Cnl.s of Decembe'hrr 6The anticipated mass picketing commenced on Decem-ber 6. The picket site was established near the Coal Servicemaintenance yard. According to Ross. there were approxi-mately 75 to 80 picketers who completely blocked the roadby standing several ranks deep across the two-lane road.'Ross stopped his vehicle and conversed with several picket-ers. Picketers he personally knew requested that Ross closethe mine in support f' their action. Ross stated that therewere the "usual obscenities that go with this type of thing."The car was spat upon, a cup of coffee was spilled on theback of the vehicle, and the car was struck with picketsigns. There was no damage to Ross' car. Similar actionswere taken against other cars that were attempting to passthrough the picket line to take the employees to work. Thepicketers also tried to stop the C(oal Service trucks as well asother delivers trucks. Ross did not see any weapons eitherin any of the picketers' vehicles that were parked near thepicket line or carried b the picketers. Ross testified thatthere were no reports of rocks being thrown on the first dayof picketing.Ross crossed the picket line on several occasions on De-cember 6. 1977. to ascertain whether the mines' employeeshad adequate security going to and from work. During oneof the safety checks. Ross observed a car stopped by themass picketers who were blocking the highway. Ross con-versed with a picket who reiterated the request to supportthe Union and close the mine. One picketer. Diporto,crawled onto the hood of Ross' car, trying to block his view.Ross inched his car through the picket line and proceededto the Coal Service garage area with the picketer on the carhood. Diporto and his brother were on Coal Service prop-erty. Ross informed the brothers they were on private prop-erty, and he escorted them one at a time off the property. ACoal Service security guard reported to Ross after the Di-porto incident that one of the brothers had threatened andmanhandled him and that possibly the picketer had a knifein his pocket. The Diporto brothers were described as beinghighly intoxicated.Stokes was working the swing shift on December 6. 1977.13 The road was described as a normal secondary highway, rto lanes wideand having a blacktop surface.457 DE('ISIONS OF NATIONAI. .ABOR RELATIONS BOARDStokes carpooled with a coworker and it was Stokes' turn todrive. Stokes prepared to go to work, though he testifiedthat he was feeling ill, and picked up his rider. During thedrive to the mine. Stokes felt sufficiently incapacitated as toconstitute a threat to his coworkers and to his personalsafety, so he decided not to report for work. Stokes took hiscoworker to an unspecified meeting point, which appears tobe the Coal Service facility, where the workers were togather for transport to the mine in vans or buses. Stokeswaited until he was sure his coworker had a ride home, thenreturned to his residence. When Stokes arrived home hetelephoned Respondent to report that he was feeling ill andwould not be working that day. Stokes also advised theCompany that he did not know if he would be working thefollowing day, December 7.Stokes testified that when he drove through the picketline he observed the picketers' private vehicles and esti-mated that a large number of' vehicles had gun racks con-taining firearms. It is uncontroverted that many residents ofthe Price area own pickup trucks with guns placed in gun-racks in the truck cab and that this manner of equippingthe trucks was considered a status symbol among the min-ers.B. Events ofJ Dclcmher 7The mass picketing continued. In the morning, at about2:30 a.m.. Ross received a telephone call from the localsheriff who asked him to meet with some Unitcd MineWorkers' representatives. The meeting was held at the sher-iffs office at 6:30 a.m., and three UMW local presidentsattended. The union representatives asked Ross to close themine. Ross asserted that he had a right to work and statedthat mining operations would continue. One tIMW repre-sentative said that if the mine were not closed, violencewould continue and could become worse.Ross then met with Colonel Reed of the highway patrolat a place designated as the assembly area.' When Rossreached the picket site, he noted that there were between150 to 175 picketers who completely blocked the road. Thepicketers shouted obscenities and banged signs on the sidesof the buses, rocks were thrown at one bus at least, and onesecretary was struck a glancing blow on the forehead by arock. No other injuries were reported. A windshield andtwo other windows were broken. Later in the day Ross re-ceived reports that a supervisor had his company carstopped, and some picketers started rocking the car, somestating the intent to roll the car over. During this incident a"pop can" had been thrown against the windshield.'5Subse-quently, Ross received reports that, on or about December7, law enforcement officials had also been subjected toabuses such as rock throwing and obscenities. Patrol carsoperated by state troopers had windows broken. Also, on orabout December 7, Respondent used a helicopter to supply4 The assembly area was located in the center of Price and was the pointwhere all Respondent's employees met to he transported to the mine in vansor buses leased by the ('ompany.15 Similar incidents were occurring a tlhe same time at the iother nonunionmines which were also the subjects of mass picketing.the security guards at the mine.? The helicopter was usedjust once.Ross did pass through the picket line on December 7 byslowly inching his vehicle through the several rows of pick-eters lined up across the road. At the time of these incidentsthe sheriffs office, which had approximately seven employ-ees, was experiencing great difficulty meeting the exigenciesarising at the three nonunion mines, which were geographi-cally separated. Ross admitted that the local law enforce-ment agencies were inadequate to protect the employeesand control the picketers on December 7. The state high-way patrol troopers had not yet been assigned to the Com-pany's mine.Stokes went to work on December 7. After picking up hiscoworker he drove toward the Coal Service facility, whichhad previously been the meeting site, to load onto buses'7for the trip to the mine, when he noticed the mine foremanand another employee driving back toward Price. T'he mineforeman signaled Stokes to follow him. Stokes turnedaround and followed the foreman to a municipal parkinglot. Stokes stated he was told "that things were pretty heavyon the picket line and for them not to take their privatevehicles there." Stokes also stated he was told that the em-ployees were driven out to the mine in vans with everyintention of working, but that conditions would he evalu-ated once they reached the site of the mass picketing.When the vans reached the picket line, Stokes found thepicketers to be in a violent mood, and heavy objects struckthe bus (van). No rocks were thrown at the bus Stokes occu-pied and he did not know what objects were striking thevehicles. Stokes testified that the employees passed throughthe picket line with the assistance of' troops who formed awedge and bodily forced back the picketers.About halfway through Stokes' shift, work was termi-nated at the (iGovernor's request. According to Ross. therequest was prompted by the (;ovcrnor's inability at thattime to provide security forces consistent with the assur-ances previously given the nonunion mine operators. Ac-cording to Stokes, this decision to close the mine halfwaythrough the shilt was not explained to employees at thetime. 'Ihey were told to leave the mine face and head for apoint called the kitchen area. which was an undergroundarea where the employees ate their lunches. There wassome undescribed speculation among the employees regard-ing the order to leave. but they did not know what exactlyled to the order. When the employees reached the kitchenarea, they were telephonically informed that they wouldimmediately exit the mine. When they reached the surface,the employees showered, got dressed, and waited for trans-portation to the municipal parking lot in Price.' AccordingI The use of the helicopter was pursuant to an offer made by anothermine The security officers at Soldier ('reek needed liftd to stock a trailer atthe mine site. Ross stated that management thought it would be easier totake the offered privilege of using the helicopter to fly the food in rather thanto go through the picket line one more time.17 The witnesses described the vehicles used to transport employees to themine site as vans and buses. At limes these vehicles were described as vansand at other times as buses. The terms were used interchangeably and therecord ails to accurately differentiate when a certain type of' vehicle wasused. Accordingly. the terms are used interchangeably herein.i Stokes initially testified that they waited a short time for the vans toarrive, then modified his testimony by stating that nl vans arrived, but policevehicles came to transport the employees.458 SOLDIER ('RIEK COA ( to Stokes. no reason was given for the work stoppage: anunspecified "theY" merely expressed the need for "expedi-ency and quickness." Stokes described the ride in the policecar as being extremely fast. in excess of the speed limit.'?Darkness had fallen and, as the police vehicles passedthrough the picket line. Stokes observed many fires and anabundance of picketers, possibly twice as many picketers ashe had observed when passing the picket line at the start ofthe shift. Stokes admitted that the fires could have been litto keep the picketers warm since it was a very cold eve-ning.20Ross stated that, with the exception of the rock-throwingincident which occurred on December 7. there were noother occasions when rocks were thrown during the masspicketing at Soldier Creek. The picketing lasted from De-cember 6 through December 16. During the picketing, andsubsequent to December 7. the picketers did make threatsand hold rocks in their hands, but no violence of any kindoccurred at the Company. There was a rock-throwing inci-dent at Plateau Mining and a bridge on the access road toPlateau Mining was burned. To Ross' knowledge that wasthe extent of the violence.C. Events of December 8The mine did not operate on December 8 at the Gover-nor's request, although the other nonunion mines did con-tinue operations. Ross met with state and local officials andwas satisfied that the authorities had made arrangementsadequate to insure the safety of the Respondent's employ-ees going to and from work. Ross also caused steel mesh tobe placed over the windows of the rented vans or buseswhich conveyed the employees to the mine. Additionally.since Ross was aware of one incident where tires had beenslashed or punctured on the picket line, extra rubber beltingwas placed on the vans or buses to protect the tires.The Company called a meeting for the evening of De-cember 8 to inform the employees why the mine was notoperated that day and to announce the security measuresassured by the Governor for the following day. December9. The meeting was conducted by Ross, Olsen. and an un-named representative of California Portland Cement, theparent company. The witnesses generally agreed that man-agement discussed the increased protective features addedto the vans or buses and said that all employees would workone shift, the day shift, so that no one would have to travelat night; that they would meet at the municipal parking lotagain for transportation to the mine: and that two 15-manriot police units were promised.2'Ross also discussed the efforts to get a restraining orderagainst the picketers and indicated the possibility that therestraining order could be granted the next morning, whichcould greatly limit the number of picketers. ArrangementsI' The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. and Stokes estimated that thevehicles went through the picket line at more than 60 miles per hour.10 Ross stated that he heard an employee's statement of concern over has-ing to go through the picket line on December 7 at great speed for the firsttime during Stokes' testimony in this proceeding. Ross was not present atthat time and has no knowledge of how the miners proceeded through thepicket line that evening:1 It is not clearly stated whether the riot police were to provide securityfor all nonunion mines or solely for Respondent's facility.were made for Ross and two employees to drive out to thepicket site to scout the area. If the area was unsafe, the,would not work, but the employees at the parking lot wouldbe paid one half day's wages for showing up. The meetingthen became a question-and-answer session.What transpired during the question-and-answer periodis the subject of controversy. Ross admits that the mood ofthe employees was "concerned." but he asserted the con-cern regarded the cause for calling the meeting and whenthey would next work. Ross further admits that some ques-tions were asked regarding safety traveling to and fromwork as well as safety at home. However. Ross denied tell-ing anybody to use guns.Stokes and Richard L. Statler: (Statler) testified that thecarrying of guns was discussed during the meeting. BothStokes and Statler admitted that the meeting was noisy andthat they had difficulty hearing the questions and answersat limes. Nevertheless. both testified that security wasdeemed insufficient to protect either the employees or theirfamilies at home, and personal safety during nonworkinghours was a matter of individual discretion: that if an em-ployee shot someone outside his home, management stated"just bring that individual inside": when asked if the em-ployees should carry firearms to work, management did notsay that would be grounds for termination. so Statler con-strued the lack of a discouraging response as permission tocarry guns.2' and ire was expressed by several employeestoward the picketers.Statler also testified that he saw quite a few employeescarrying handguns. including the bus driver. Statler alsocarried a gun24and apparently publicized the fact to pre-vent harassment or any threats to his person.I credit the testimony of Stokes and Statler regarding thequestion-and-answer portion of the meeting, based on thesimilarity of their renditions, though the witnesses were se-questered. and on the facts that Ross admitted that theemployees asked questions regarding their personal safetyand the safety of their families: Ross did not deny thatquestions regarding firearms were asked; and it is undisput-ed that some employees did carry handguns to and fromwork subsequent to the meeting. as discussed more fullyhereinafter.D. Events of December 9When Ross and two other employees scouted the picketline on Friday morning, they saw mass picketing was stilloccurring on the road leading to Respondent's mine. Ross2 Statler was employed by Respondent as a miner about November I.1977. He left the Company's employ around July 18. 1978. At the time of thehearing Statler was undergoing rehabilitation for alcoholism in Florida. Headmitted having an alcohol problem while employed by the Company andbeing reprimanded for coming to work while under the influence of alcohol1i Stokes testified that Ross specifically replied. "Well. whatever you guysdo. it is up to you. but just don't come up and tell me about it" Staller wasnot sure who responded for management24 Statler's testimony was unclear at times, he appeared to have difficultyconcentrating and at times became hostile and vas ery nervous. Statler'sdemeanor does not warrant the discrediting of his testimony. however. forhis rendition of what occurred at the meeting was ery similar to Stokes'testimony. even though the witnesses were sequestered and Stokes and Stat-ler did not converse prior to the hearing459 DEI) CISIONS OF NAI'IONAL LABOR REILATIONS BOARD)then returned to the municipal parking lot which was thebus staging area and saw Stokes. Stokes drove to the stag-ing area "somewhere after 7 a.m." The bus was not sched-uled to leave until 8 a.m. Eventually, the "scouts" reportedthe continuation of mass picketing. Stokes claims that hethen confronted Ross with the fact that there were manypickets." Ross allegedly looked at him with "disdain" butdid not respond. Stokes was instructed to remain at theparking lot until management decided if they would oper-ate the mine. He wandered around for a few minutes, thenreturned to his vehicle to get warm. Stokes stated that threecoworkers noticed that he was running the engine of hisvehicle to warm up and asked to join him. The four minerswere having a general discussion when, Stokes stated. onecoworker pulled out of his belt a loaded semiautomatichandgun. The other coworkers then exited the vehicle.Stokes then went to speak to a supervisor and found twoforemen. Stokes claims to have informed the foremen.,2"[T]hese guys have guns and someone is calling for war:someone is looking for some kind of war, and I don't be-lieve that I'm going to show up for it." According to Stokes,two other employees were talking with the foremen andthey both said, "This is crazy. I'm not going." The two menthen made a hasty exit. At this time the buses were startingto depart but Stokes did not board.Stokes then telephoned an unnamed friend and informedthe friend that some employees were carrying handguns.The friend suggested that they meet at the United MineWorkers office. Stokes went to the UMW office and re-ported the situation to the union president. The union pres-ident telephoned the county attorney who replied that hewould contact the local sheriff to stop the buses and removeall firearms."The buses were escorted by law enforcement personnel tothe mine, crossing the picket line without incident. FromDecember 9 to the date picketing ceased no further violenceor harassment was reported.E. Stokes' TerminationStokes reported to work the following workday. Monday.December 12, 1977. Before he could change into his workclothes he was asked to come to Olsen's office. Stokes wasinformed by Olsen that he could not go to work that day,that he had been terminated for absenteeism. The actualcontent of the conversation is in dispute, as hereinafter de-tailed.Ross and Olsen testified that the decision to terminateStokes was unrelated to his activities on December 9, 1977:rather the determination was based on Stokes' record ofabsences prior to that day. Ross said he knew of Stokes'atrocious absentee record at Braztah Corporation, whichwas a factor considered in the decision to terminate. The72 Stokes testified that Ross had indicated during the meeting the previousevening that if there were more than 15 picketers the mine would not oper-ate. This testimony was not confirmed by Statler and was not mentioned inthe testimony of the other witness.26 Neither or the two foremen was called as a witness." There was no evidence indicating that the buses were in fact stopped bythe authorities for removal of firearms. The "friend." the union president,and the county attorney did not testify.policy for terminating probationary employees has no fixedstandards and, hence, has no fixed pattern. The determina-tion is made after considering the employee's reliability,whether he is a good. safe worker, as well as other similarmanagement considerations. The decision is strictly Ross'and once he makes an adverse decision, he terminates theemployee. Ross stated that he decided to terminate Stokeson December 7, the day he received the daily report ofabsences for December 6.2sHe did not discuss his decisionwith anyone else and, due to the mass picketing, did nothave time to effect the termination prior to December 9,1977.Ross and Olsen further testified that at the time the ter-mination was made. December 9, 1977. they did not knowStokes was absent." This lack of knowledge is due to themanner of recordkeeping used at the mine. The lampmanprepares the attendance sheet, covering a 24-hour period orcovering each of the three shifts. After the report is finished,the lampman places the attendance sheet on Olsen's desk atapproximately 5:30 a.m. the following morning. After Ol-sen reviews the records. they are given to the data process-ing manager so that the data may be recorded on the em-ployees' records. The attendance reports are then passed onto Ross. Under their procedures, Olsen and Ross did notreceive information regarding Stokes' absence on Decem-ber 9 until the next workday, December 12, 1977.Olsen further testified that during the morning on De-cember 9. he telephoned Ross to inform him that it was thelast day of Stokes' probation. At that time, Olsen did notknow whether Stokes was present at the mine, for he didnot receive the attandance report for the day and he doesnot believe anyone informed him that Stokes did not boardthe bus at the municipal parking lot." Ross asked Olsen forhis recommendation. Olsen recommended that Stokes' em-ployment not be continued based on his absenteeism at Sol-dier Creek. Ross agreed and told Olsen to terminate Stokes.Stokes was absent on October 25 and 28. November 15,and December 6. as well as December 9. In late October1977, after Stokes began having unexcused absences, Olseninformed Stokes that he was a probationary employee whowas beginning to miss work. Olsen may have been sensitiveto Stokes' absenteeism since Olsen, while employed at Braz-tah mine, knew of Stokes' absentee record there. In fact,Olsen stated that the day Stokes applied for a job at SoldierCreek, he informed Stokes that he was aware of the absen-teeism problem at Braztah, and Soldier Creek could notallow that type of activity. Olsen hired Stokes because if theabsenteeism could be overcome, Stokes had a chance ofbeing a good employee. On October 31, Olsen prepared a2 Absences are reported in two ways: one method is through a call-inprocedure. where the employee telephones to report he will be absent, andthe other is the check-in and checkout procedure. Federal law requires thekeeping of these attendance records. Check-in and checkout are recorded ona sheet by an individual called the lampman, who is present at the changehouse at all times.9, The separation notice filed by Respondent with the Utah Department ofEmployment Security, filed December 9. 1977. stated that the last day Stokesworked was December 9, 1977.I There was no evidence introduced indicating that either Ross or Olsenknew Stokes did not board the bus. nor was there an indication that a specialreport was prepared on December 9 showing which employees ailed toboard the bus or report for work.460 SOIDIFR (RIEEK COAl (CO.written reprimand. stating "Stokes was also told at this timethat his absenteeism should improve." The reprimand wasplaced in Stokes' personnel file.Stokes denied he was excessively absent while employedat Braztah Corporation and stated that he never receivedany discipline. Stokes said he had an average amount ofunexcused absences while employed by Braztah Corpora-tion. Respondent placed in evidence a certified letter writ-ten by a Braztah Corporation superintendent to Stokes. anda return receipt signed by Stokes dated December 18. 1976.The letter states in part:A review of your absentee record indicates that youreceived a verbal warning for excessive absenteeism on9-24-76. Since that time you have continued to log anexcessive number of absences from scheduled work.This letter will serve as final written warning to youthat you must correct your pattern of excessive absen-teeism.In closing, I want to make it perfectly clear that wecannot tolerate your record of excessive absenteeism.Your record must improve or you will no longer beworking for this company.Stokes did admit that he had a bet with a coworker atBraztah Corporation regarding whether he could make itthrough a 2- or 3-week period on the graveyard shift with-out missing work.On December 19, 1977. Stokes filed a "Statement of Rea-son for Discharge" with the Utah Department of Employ-ment Security. The statement gave as the reason for hisdischarge, "Not fulfilling a 60 day probationary set of re-quirements." Stokes admitted that he had been warned pre-viously about the conditions which led to his discharge, buthe asserted that he did not miss another day without callingin. He claimed to have received only one verbal warningand no written reprimands. In addition to Olsen's repri-mand for his absence on October 28. 1977. the mine fore-man, on November 16, gave Stokes a verbal warning on hisabsenteeism, and the foreman, Wilson, also told Stokes thatif he continued to miss work the Company would take dis-ciplinary action. That the reprimand was given was notedin Stokes' personnel file.On December 23, the Company was informed by a "No-tice of Claim Filed" with the Utah Department of Employ-ment Security that Stokes claimed he was fired unjustlybecause he was "friendly with a union organizer." TheCompany replied to the claim, stating that the terminationwas "because of numerous unauthorized absences."Stokes testified in the instant matter that he believed thereason for his discharged was because he asked questions atthe December 8, 1977, meeting "which rubbed Ross thewrong way," but he was not absolutely sure why he wasfired.According to Olsen, after Ross stated Stokes was to beterminated, Olsen was unable to inform Stokes of the deci-sion because Stokes was absent. Olsen went to the bath-house on December 12 to inform Stokes that he was not toget changed but was to come over to his office. At his officeOlsen informed Stokes that he was terminated because ofhis absenteeism. Olsen also stated that Stokes could discussthe matter with Ross. On the other hand. Stokes claims thatOlsen said at the December 12. 1977. discharge interviewthat "This isn't anything personal between you and I ...but Ross told me not to allow anyone to come back up andgo in the mine." The actual import of this version is un-clear. inasmuch as there is no evidence that other employ-ees who failed to board the bus on November 9 were alsoprecluded from working on December 12. Olsen's allegedreticence, interred by Stokes' version, is also unexplained,particularly in light of Olsen's previous warning to Stokesbecause of Stokes' first unexcused absence in October.These factors. cojoined with Stokes' demeanor and his fail-ure to acknowledge all the warnings he received for absen-teeism lead me to not credit his testimony in this regard."On December 19, Stokes met with Ross. The meetingtook place in Ross' office. Two other individuals were pre-sent.": Ross informed Stokes that in reviewing his attend-ance record he decided that Stokes was not the type ofindividual Soldier Creek wanted as an employee. Stokesreplied that he did not think that he missed an outrageousamount of work. Ross stated the dates Stokes had unex-cused absences. Stokes then stated that he wished to followthe mediation program. Ross replied that he was not enti-tled to a mediator since he was terminated as a probation-ary employee. Stokes then said that if that was his onlyrecourse, then "possibly we'll see you in court."11. ANA,.YSIS ANI) ()N('It'SNS()Section 8(a(I) of the Act prohibits an employer frominterfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in theexercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Ifthe employer punishes an employee for engaging in con-certed activity, it is a violation of the Act, even though theemployer may not have enmity against such collective ac-tivity. N.L.R.B. v. Was.vhinglon A/uminum (Company , Inc.,370 U.S. 9(1962).To hold an employer in breach of Section 8(a)( 1) of theAct, however, "[I]t is necessary to establish that at the timeof the discharge the employer had knowledge of the con-certed nature of the activity fobr which the employee wasdischarged." Diagnostic Hospital Center Corp. of Texa.l., 228NLRB 1215. 1216 (1977). Respondent argues that at thetime Stokes was discharged, it was not known that he failedto board the bus. Furthermore, Respondent asserts thatsuch failure was not concerted activity protected by theAct.General Counsel contends that Stokes' discharge was, atleast in part, based on his unexcused absence of December9. To support this contention, reference is made to employ-ment records of Respondent selected by counsel for theGeneral Counsel. The records cited 12 instances where em-ployees of Soldier Creek had four or more absences butI The crediting of only portions of Stokes' testimony is required under thecircumstances of this case. and does not require rejection of his entire testi-mony. Carolina Canners. Inc., 213 NLRB 37 (1974). Accordingly. the dis-crediting of this portion does not require discounting all of his testimony."Nothing is more common than to believe some and not all of what a witnesssays." Edwards Transportation Companv. 187 NI RB 3-4 (1970). enfd. percuriam 437 F.2d 502 5th Cir. 1971).12 Jack Coprer was one of the individuals present. Copfer was terminatedabout the same time as Stokes. The reasons for Copfer's discharge were notplaced in evidence.461 I) ('ISIO)NS () N IONAI I ABOIR R A'IO()NS BOARDI)were not termioin ted during the prob;tiMn;lar period. heemployee records also show, it is argued, thal Respondentwas ery tolerant of absenleeism, terminlaltiig one employeeafter 9 consecutive working days of' unauthorized ab-sences This same employee during his probationary pe-riod had nine additional absences. Counsel for GeneralCounsel fails to state how mans of these nine absences wereunexcused. Another employee had four unexcused absencesduring his prohationar? period and was not terminated un-til thereafter, accumulating many more unexcused absencesand a total of 19 absences, excused and unexcused. The lastemployee singled out by (ieneral Counsel for comment hada total of ive unexculsed absences during his probationaryperiod, and he was not discharged. The reason why someemployees were retained though they had more unexcLusedabsences than Stokes was not explained by either party.The analssis of the records does not include informationindicating whether or not the selected employees receivedverbal or written reprimands relating to their unexcusedabsences. Furthermore, as Respondent argues, the em-ployee records introduced by General Counsel did not con-tain all the relevant facts surrounding the retention or ter-mination of the employees whose records were selected byGeneral Counsel, such as: whether the employee(s) wereretained because they possessed unusual skills, whether theemployee(s) left voluntarily because the) knew their attend-ance record(s) warrant(ed) termination: and the conditionof the labor market at the various times to indicate theavailability of potential replacement employees.Prior to drawing an adverse inference because of dispa-rate treatment, a basis for comparing attendance recordsmust be established. Best Products (Companv, In(c.. 236NLRB 1024. 1025, fn. 5 (1978). It is not disputed thatStokes received two reprimands for unexcused absences.The absences of October 28 and November 15. 1977, whichwere the subject of the reprimands. occurred well beforeany alleged protected activity. Furthermore, it was undis-puted that both Ross and Olsen were aware of Stokes' ex-cessive absenteeism while employed at Braztah Corpora-tion. Although Stokes denied he had excessive unexcusedabsences at Braztah Corporation, the reprimand letter, dis-cussed in/ra, more than adequately refutes Stokes' claim ofa reasonable attendance record at his former employment.Ross admitted that Stokes' attendance record at BraztahCorporation was considered in deciding to dischargeStokes. As noted previously, Olsen's actions were also ap-parently influenced by these same fiactors. Olsen gaveStokes a written reprimand the second time Stokes had anunexcused absence. In the absence of evidence that the em-ployees allegedly treated more leniently than Stokes hadsimilar employment histories and similar skills during simi-lar labor and other market conditions, there is no basis forcomparing their attendance records. Best Products Coim-panvy Inc.. supra.General Counsel also asserts that the testimony of Rossand Olsen to the effect that Stokes was discharged on De-cember 9 1977, should not be credited. In support of this1] It is noted that General ('Counsel listed the coinsecutive days of unek-cused absences as numbering 8, not 9 he difference is found not to besignificantlassertion. it is argued that Ross. though claiming to havemade the decision to terminate Stokes on December 7 afterrecei ing the report of Stokes' unexcused absence of De-cember 6, took no action on December 7 a day Stokesworked: called Stokes to the meeting of [)ecember 8, forwhich he was paid: and, in fact, terminated an employeewho was admittedly a good worker4for unexcused ab-sences, three of which were due to illness.General ounsel does not address the explanation forRoss' failure to implement his decision to discharge Stokesprior to D)ecember 9, that he was extremely occupied by theproblems caused by the nationwide IJMW strike resultingin mass picketing at Soldier (reek. I find the exigenciescreated by the mass picketing a credible explanation obrIailure to discharge Stokes on December 7 as well as theiaiulure to relay that decision to other supervisor personnelwho telephoned Respondent's employees on I)ecember 8 toinfoirm them of the meeting. Inasmuch as Ross did not im-plement his decision by discharging Stokes on December 7or 8, it is not inconsistent, as General Counsel alleges, thatStokes was paid for those days.General Counsel further avers that Stokes' testimonysupports the conclusion that he was actually discharged onDecember 12 after Ross and Olsen were informed he failedto report for work following the concealed weapons inci-dent of December 9."In addition to the reasons given previously for not credit-ing Stokes' testimony indicating that Olsen did not fire himon December 9 I further find that, based on Olsen's demea-nor, his testimony is to be credited. Additionally, Stokesfiled a statement with the Utah Department of Employ-ment Security admitting that he was told he was dischargedfor unexcused absences, which failed to "fulfill a 60 dayprobationary set of requirements." Stokes never claimed hewas not informed or did not know his last day of probationwas December 9. Yet the form filed December 19 claims hewas discharged for being "friendly with union organizers..and personal prejudice." The "personal prejudice" ap-parently retfers to Stokes' belief that he angered Ross whenhe asked questions at the December 8 meeting. Stokes ap-parently dropped the allegation that his discharge wascaused by his friendship with a union organizer. The differ-ing and somewhat contradictor clainms of causative factorsin his discharge further discredit Stokes' testimony. On theother hand, Respondent has consistently contended in allits filings with the Utah Department of Employment Secu-rity that Stokes was terminated during his probationary pe-riod for unexcused absences. The Respondent's stated mo-tive has not been shown to be implausible, inconsistent, orinadequate.To support an inference of inadequate or implausiblemotive, General Counsel asserts that Stokes' employee rec-ord lists December 9 as an unexcused absence, which wascrossed out at some unknown point, and the C(hargingParty was marked terminated at some unknown point. Therecord fails to clearly state which employee marks the at-Olsen tesitied that Stokes was a good worker with the exception If hisabsenteeism problem." As discussed in detail injra, Olsen's rendilmln o the December 12 discus-sion, wherein Stokes was told not to dress and not to reporlt or work in themine, is credited462 SOLDIlR CREEK (OAL CO.tendance record, when that employee marks the specificrecord when that employee is informed of management'sdecision to discharge a worker, or whether the same em-ployee records absences and terminations. These factors.cojoined with the absence of any indication that the mall-ner of marking Stokes' record is different from normal prac-tices, or that the termination was recorded on a date proha-tive of the allegation that termination was effectuated afterStokes' absence on December 9 was known to Ross andOlsen, fail to support the requested inference.General Counsel argues that Ross and Olsen knew Stokeswas absent on December 9 prior to the decision to dis-charge. In support of its argument. Stokes' conversationwith Ross referring to the fact that mass picketing contin-ued, when Ross looked at Stokes with "disdain" and re-fused to answer. is cited. Stokes' inquiry of concern. it isalleged, when added to the above arguments. presents suffi-cient evidence that Stokes was terminated. at least In part,for his failure to report to work on l)ecember 9. In furthersupport of this argument. the following testimony of Rosswas quoted. as pertinent, as follows:Q. In considering Mr. Stokes' attendance record.did you take into consideration part of' his absences inmaking the determination to discharge him'?A. In fairness, we took his whole record during histemporary employ ment.This testimony, it is asserted, includes a reference to De-cember 9. This assertion is not persuasive. Ross testified.without direct contradiction, that he had ()lsen discussedStokes' termination on I)ecember 9 prior to receiving theattendance records Ifr that date. Stokes' "w hole record" onthat date did not contain the I)ecember 9 unexcused aib-sence. Though General Counsel fails to argue the point.Stokes did testify that he informed two foremen about thegun situation."?The fact that Stokes maN have told two foremen that hewanted no part of traveling to work with employees carry-ing concealed weapons, under these circumstances, is insuf-ficient to establish a riniafl'ie case of unlawful motivationor even that the official who decided to discharge Stokeshad knowledge of his absence on December 9. both Rossand Olsen testified, without refutation by any witness, thatthey did not know Stokes was absent on December 9, theday Olsen recommended the discharge to Ross, and Rossinstructed Olsen to terminate Stokes. It is agreed by allparties that mass picketing continued to occur that day. afact which kept management very occupied. It is not con-tended that the method of recordkeeping, which informsmanagement of employees' attendance the ifollowing work-day, was altered on December 9 although all employeesworked a single shift.Stokes did not testify that the two foremen saw him leavethe area or knew that he did not board the bus. There was" General Counsel argues that Respondent's ailure call these forenlenrequires crediling Stokes' estimon). No adverse inference ill e drawn forfailure to call witnesses which were equall, available to both parties GeneralCounsel did not allege the foremen were unavailable as witnesses lor hiscase. Local 259. Unted .4Autmobhile. A4eropae., and A4grilrlaurl Inpl/ernntWorkers of.America Atherton ('adila. In 1, 225 NI.RB 421. 422, at n (1976).no clear showing that Stokes' statement to the foremen that"he wasn't going to be part of this" was clearly understoodas a declaration that Stokes was not going to work eitherbecause of his concern for his saf'elt or tor other reasons.Stokes admitted that the foremen "went about their husi-ness. got in the ans and left." Exactl ahat "their busi-ness" was or how long it took was not explained. Accord-ingly. it canlit be found that Ross or Olsen had knowledgethat Stokes was absent on December 9. nor can such knowl-edge be inferred from Stokes' statement to the foremen.T'he General Counsel has the burden of establishing e-cry element of' a iolation under the Act. Il .'stern T ranBargt' ('or/lorilton. 207 NlRB 13. tfootnote 1 (1973). 1 findthat (eirneral ('ounsel has failed t mIeet lis blurden. A-\though. or the purpoises of' this )cclslon. I assunc rgu-undl that Stokes' failure to board hl- e ani: ,n I)cccbll e r 9was acti\itx, protected b the Act.' the record does notestablish ui ful1 termi;natiton. or it tliils to dea;l\l ctab-lish that the prortected actiit i was cnisidered ior impellledthe discharge. Otn the particular fcts of this case. the Re-spondent. in ulnicon t rotverted testi mon'. stated Stokes w:asemnplh) ed because he had the potential ot' beto ning of g odemplioee it' he culd overcome the problem ol excessiveabsenteeism. At the time he was elplo? edl at Soldier ('reekhe was w'a rned that excessie ulnexcuscd abhsenlteeisl , Iouldnot be tolerated. l'his ; arning a;is repeated. lihcn Stokeshad an tllexcused absence.' ill tle forml ot' a xerbl rlelri-nanlld hich as reduced to a Ienlortnd. Ill placd i hispersonnel ile. Stokes' personnel file ilsIo contains I mtIello-randuni recording the fact that Stokes receltctd a erbalwarnling t'ron hi ls reiman. Rn krlsiit. t n1 Nolembehr (regardiig Stokes' iuiccusedi ahsncte ot" Nx enllhc 15 .Wil-son also intirnted Stokes tihat i hlie contilued to minss worklie w:ouldl be subiectied I tlisciplitar ictilt. I hese eeilts;re uncotlllrltlecl ted.()n the last dai of' Stokes' prhbatlionar preriod. inage-mnent assessed his suitabilit\ 'ir cnitiinued epltrLrent. alactivit li nlt shitnli to ei ate tIr'tt its nrilal slanlarlds.T'hle fact that the phatiolnar pcrli)L. discharge. and a;s-sunied protteteed ictivit\! ccurred oin the sale cdla is loundto be coincidlental, p-articullarly in light o' the finding thatthe engaging in plrrrteted cticit .as not kno n to Rossand Olsen at the time of the discharge. I he assessmenlt wasconducted at tie whee hen lte attendance records failed toindicate Stokes' absence for \ hat has been assulied cir/it-u,'ndo to be a protected activit. (ieneral ('ounsel failed todemonstrate through the presentation of prohatie persua-sie evidence that the !)ecember 9 absence was consideredin the determination to discharge. he absence of indepen-dent evidence on which to rest ia reasonable interence thatthe Respondent acted either out ot' hstilit tovard r inreprisal for the protected actisity Stlokes is assunle t have' General ('Cunsel contends hat Stokes had a prolected right under Sec-lion 502 ,I the Act rto refuse I) work n D)ecembniher lr the abhnornmilldangerous w .orklng co lill on, Uhich els te.d .it the ilille B.lsed n the con-clusion reached herein, i 1i Lllnnllc sars l dleternlen¢ I Stikcs ' i.t 11,is 1 iI)ecemhei 9 was in lfact prtectecl rghtl ilnler Sei 2 oi the -\lI"q Stokes .aIhbSTlll in ()ctoher 25 inll 28. No,eillhcl 1i .aldl I)ccmber6 and 9 t he reprillani d relerred I hi e sc A i, r the illneclc sed .hbence lIOctobher 28463 464DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDengaged in requires the conclusion that the Respondent didnot violate Section 8(a)(l) as alleged.Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be dis-missed in it entirety.CON(LTUSIONS OF LAW1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commercewithin the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.2. Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor prac-tices alleged in the complaint in Case 27-CA-5689-2.Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of theAct, I hereby issue the following recommended:ORDER19The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.1' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of theRules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48of the Rules and Regulations. he adopted by the Board and become itsfindings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemedwaived for all purposes. | [
"D)E(CISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDSoldier Creek Coal Company, a Division of CaliforniaPortland Cement Co. and Elven Ray Stokes. Case27-CA 5689-2July 13, 1979DECISION AND ORDERBY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS JENKINSANI) MUIRPHIYOn April 10, 1979, Administrative Law Judge JoanWieder issued the attached Decision in this proceed-ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptionsand a supporting brief, and the Respondent filed ananswering brief.Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of theNational Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-thority in this proceeding to a three-meimber panel.The Board has considered the record and the at-tached Decision in light of the exceptions and briefsand has decided to affirm the rulings, findings.' andconclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and toadopt her recommended Order.ORDERPursuant to Section 10(c) of' the National LaborRelations Act, as amended, the National Labor Rela-tions Board adopts as its Order the recommended Or-der of the Administrative l.aw Judge and hereby or-ders that the complaint be, and it hereby is. dismissedin its entirety.I The Administrative Law Judge held that eidence of disparate treatmentregarding Stokes' attendance and discharge did not result in a prima faci'case.",
"We agree with the General (Counsel's exception Iowever. we find thatthe Respondent rebutted the prima rru e case the Respondent warnedStokes when he was hired that it was aware of his poolr attendance recordwith his previous employer and that similar conduct would nt he tolerated.Consequently, we find that the Respondent's apparently disparate treatmentof Stokes was justified and that it rebutted the General (Counsel's prima faciecase. Pepsi (ola Bottling (nmpan. 242 NLRB No. 48 (1979)The General Counsel also excepts to the Administrative I.aw Judge's lail-ure to draw an adverse inference because the Respondent did not call twoforemen as witnesses. We agree with the General Counsel's contention thatthe Administrative Law Judge's reliance on lx.al 25%v United Automoble,Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers o' America Atherton ('addl-lac, Inc.] v N L RB.. 608 F.2d 1369 (2d.",
"(ir. 1977), enid as modified 225NLRB 421 (1976). is misplaced. That case dealt with the failure to call aneutral nonparty. However, the General C'ounsel was attempting to provethat Ross had direct knowledge of Stokes' absence. Stokes' testimony. whenviewed most favorably to the General (Counsel's case. is only that he told theforemen that he was not getting on the bus The Respondent did not disputethis conversation; however, there is no evidence that this was communicatedto Ross. who made the discharge decision and unequivocally denied that heknew of Stokes' absence. We therefore conclude that the Administrative LawJudge correctly did not draw an adverse inference from the Respondent'sfailure to call the foremen.",
"Trinity ('oncrete Produ tIv Crompanv, Rac/le Divi-sion, 162 NLRB 1237 (1967,DECISIONS1AfIEMF N1 OF IHE CASEJOAN WIIF)lR. Administrative Law Judge: This case washeard at Price. Utah, on November 14 and 15. 1978. Thecharge was filed on December 29. 1977.' by Elven RayStokes (Stokes). A complaint2was issued September 1 alleg-ing that Soldier ('reek Coal Company, a Division of' Cali-fornia Portland Cement Co., herein called the Company orRespondent. violated Section 8(a)( I) of the National LaborRelations Act.",
"as amended (Act), by discharging Stokes forengaging in protected concerted activity and by refusing, ingood faith, to perform labor under abnormally dangerousconditions at work. The Respondent admits that it dis-charged Stokes, but denies that the discharge was unlawfulor that it in any way violated the Act.All parties were given full opportunity to participate, tointroduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examinewitnesses, to argue orally, and to file briet's. Briefs. whichwere filed on behalf of the General Counsel and the ('Com-pany. have been carefully considered.Upon the entire record, including especially my observa-tion of the wttnesses and their demeanor. I make the follow-ing:IINI)IN(;S ti FA( I1. i111 Al I (il) INI AIR I.AB()R PRA( Ill ESBackgroundRespondent is engaged in the underground mining of'coal at a site approximately 22 miles from the city of' Price.Utah.' The (Company acquired this property in September1974 and it started prodtiucing coatl in June 1976.",
"('urrently.approximately 115 people are employed at the mine. of'which 85 are hourly workers and 30 are supervisors andmanagers. I he mine is a nonunion operation.' During nor-mal operations the ( onipany uses three shifts.5The , ice president arnd general manager of' Respondent isMarion Donaldl Ross Ross), who is responsible for the op-era.tions of the C('ompanv. Ross is assisted by Reed W. Olsen(Olsen) among others. Olsen is the mine manager and hasserved in that capacity for approximately 1-1/2 years.\" It isadmitted that Ross and Olsen are supervisors.I Unless otherwise indicated all dates herein reler to the year 1977.The complaint was amended pursuant to stipulation at the hearingJurisdiction is not in issue. The Respondent admits, and I find, that itmeets the Board's $50,000 direct outflow standard or the assertion of'juris-diction.'",
"The other nonunion mines in the Price area are Swisher (coal Company,Plateau Mining Company, and Southern Utah Fuel Company. 'here areseven or eight union mines in the area, whose employees are represented bythe United Mine Workers (UMW)I'wo of the shifts are engaged in production and the third, the graveyardshil:, is engaged in maintenance. The graveyard shift is designated shift No.I and employs approximately 15 to 16 men working from II p.m. to 7 a.m.The day shift is designated shift No. 2 and employs approximately 40 to 45men, working from 7 a m. to 3 p.m The third shift, referred to as the swingshift, employs approximately 20 miners working rom 3:15 p.m. to 11:15p.m. For every six to eight miners there is one supervisor, Prior to being employed by Respondent.",
"Olsen worked at Braztah ('or-poration for approximately I year as general mine foreman. Employees atBraztah Corporation were represented by the United Mine Workers.243 NLRB No. 75456 SOLDIER ('REEK COAL CO.The Charging Party was hired by Respondent on Octo-ber II. New employees hired by Respondent in October1977 were subject to a 60-calendar-day probationary pe-riod.' Stokes had been previously employed by BraztahCorporation.At the time he was employed by Respondent. Stokes re-ceived orientation which included the receipt of a firm let-ter stating that he was hired effective October 11.",
"1977. fora 60-day probationary period; at the expiration of 60 days.the Company would either terminate his employment ordecide to retain him. The letter further stated that in theevent he was terminated during the 60-day probationaryperiod, the reasons for the termination were not subject tothe Company's grievance procedure. Additionally. awoman, whom Stokes described as the person in charge ofpersonnel, explained the probationary period, and furthersaid that if Stokes were discharged during his probation.there was no recourse.In early December 1977. the nationwide UMW contractexpired. On December 6, UMW members started picketingSoldier Creek Mine.' Prior to the expiration of the UMWcontract. Ross had heard rumors\" that LUMW memberswould picket, and if nonunion miners attempted to workduring the forthcoming strike, violence was threatened.Ross also heard reports of several incidents involving com-pany employees.\"' Around December 5.",
"1977. the wholecommunity, according to Ross. was buzzing with reports'that there would be sabotage to stop production at the non-union mines.In response to the anticipated mass picketing. the non-union operators contacted the county sheriff and state offi-cials, including the governor, the director of the highwaypatrol, and the safety director. Three meetings were heldwith the state officials, and Governor Matheson assured thenonunion mine operators that they would have whateversecurity was necessary to insure the continued operations ofthe nonunion mines. The Company took other precautions.including supplementing the \"antiquated\" telephone systemwith two-way radios and hiring a private security firce toprotect the physical plant.On November 29, 1977, Ross held a meeting with Re-spondent's employees' to discuss the general situation re-garding the impending strike. Specifically, Ross discussedthe plans of law enforcement officials to assure the workersI In May 1978 the probationary period was increased to 90 days. 'There are several UMW locals. for each union mine has its own alThere was no reference to picketing by particular LJMW union locals.",
"'The source of the rumors was the news media, including newspapers.0m On or about November 3. Ross heard a report that an employee had thelug nuts on his truck wheels loosened; on or about November 25 the Com-pany's safety engineer had some problems. but Ross did not hear that hismailbox had been run over or that a black cat had been shot in the head andwas thrown on the cement in his backyard. Initially. Ross stated he hadheard that the Company's safety director had a small tree in his yard uproot-ed, but changed his testimony to indicate that he did not hear such a report.On or about November 29. Ross' wife received an anonymous phone callwarning her that Ross had better not go to work during the forthcomingstrike. Ross did not recall whether any of the other supervisors receivedsimilar calls at the same time.i\" The source of the reports was characterized by Ross as hearsay\" All employees of Soldier Creek Coal Company plus the employees ofCoal Service. a trucking company that transported the coal produced byRespondent to the railroad.",
"The facilities ,ffCoal Service were located on theaccess road to the mine.of adequate security when they traveled to and from work.Ross informed the employees that he had met with the gov-ernor and state highway officials and had been promisedtwo 15-man riot squads to assist with security. Ross alsoindicated that management would at no time risk the work-ers' lives or well-being. Ross further stated that each em-ployee, as well as the Company, had the right to work andthat the normal work schedule would be followed undernormal rules, regulations. and policies. A system for trans-porting employees to and from work using vans and a busin lieu of personal vehicles was also discussed. Finally. Rossmentioned the possibility of obtaining injunctive relief toprotect the employees. After the November 29 meeting.Ross had a sign posted to remind all employees that theCompany would keep the present work schedule under thecurrent rules and policies. Stokes attended the meeting.A. Ev Cnl.s of Decembe'hrr 6The anticipated mass picketing commenced on Decem-ber 6. The picket site was established near the Coal Servicemaintenance yard.",
"According to Ross. there were approxi-mately 75 to 80 picketers who completely blocked the roadby standing several ranks deep across the two-lane road. 'Ross stopped his vehicle and conversed with several picket-ers. Picketers he personally knew requested that Ross closethe mine in support f' their action. Ross stated that therewere the \"usual obscenities that go with this type of thing. \"The car was spat upon, a cup of coffee was spilled on theback of the vehicle, and the car was struck with picketsigns. There was no damage to Ross' car. Similar actionswere taken against other cars that were attempting to passthrough the picket line to take the employees to work. Thepicketers also tried to stop the C(oal Service trucks as well asother delivers trucks. Ross did not see any weapons eitherin any of the picketers' vehicles that were parked near thepicket line or carried b the picketers. Ross testified thatthere were no reports of rocks being thrown on the first dayof picketing.Ross crossed the picket line on several occasions on De-cember 6. 1977. to ascertain whether the mines' employeeshad adequate security going to and from work.",
"During oneof the safety checks. Ross observed a car stopped by themass picketers who were blocking the highway. Ross con-versed with a picket who reiterated the request to supportthe Union and close the mine. One picketer. Diporto,crawled onto the hood of Ross' car, trying to block his view.Ross inched his car through the picket line and proceededto the Coal Service garage area with the picketer on the carhood. Diporto and his brother were on Coal Service prop-erty. Ross informed the brothers they were on private prop-erty, and he escorted them one at a time off the property. ACoal Service security guard reported to Ross after the Di-porto incident that one of the brothers had threatened andmanhandled him and that possibly the picketer had a knifein his pocket.",
"The Diporto brothers were described as beinghighly intoxicated.Stokes was working the swing shift on December 6. 1977.13 The road was described as a normal secondary highway, rto lanes wideand having a blacktop surface.457 DE('ISIONS OF NATIONAI. .ABOR RELATIONS BOARDStokes carpooled with a coworker and it was Stokes' turn todrive. Stokes prepared to go to work, though he testifiedthat he was feeling ill, and picked up his rider.",
"During thedrive to the mine. Stokes felt sufficiently incapacitated as toconstitute a threat to his coworkers and to his personalsafety, so he decided not to report for work. Stokes took hiscoworker to an unspecified meeting point, which appears tobe the Coal Service facility, where the workers were togather for transport to the mine in vans or buses. Stokeswaited until he was sure his coworker had a ride home, thenreturned to his residence. When Stokes arrived home hetelephoned Respondent to report that he was feeling ill andwould not be working that day. Stokes also advised theCompany that he did not know if he would be working thefollowing day, December 7.Stokes testified that when he drove through the picketline he observed the picketers' private vehicles and esti-mated that a large number of' vehicles had gun racks con-taining firearms. It is uncontroverted that many residents ofthe Price area own pickup trucks with guns placed in gun-racks in the truck cab and that this manner of equippingthe trucks was considered a status symbol among the min-ers.B. Events ofJ Dclcmher 7The mass picketing continued. In the morning, at about2:30 a.m.. Ross received a telephone call from the localsheriff who asked him to meet with some Unitcd MineWorkers' representatives.",
"The meeting was held at the sher-iffs office at 6:30 a.m., and three UMW local presidentsattended. The union representatives asked Ross to close themine. Ross asserted that he had a right to work and statedthat mining operations would continue. One tIMW repre-sentative said that if the mine were not closed, violencewould continue and could become worse.Ross then met with Colonel Reed of the highway patrolat a place designated as the assembly area.' When Rossreached the picket site, he noted that there were between150 to 175 picketers who completely blocked the road. Thepicketers shouted obscenities and banged signs on the sidesof the buses, rocks were thrown at one bus at least, and onesecretary was struck a glancing blow on the forehead by arock. No other injuries were reported. A windshield andtwo other windows were broken. Later in the day Ross re-ceived reports that a supervisor had his company carstopped, and some picketers started rocking the car, somestating the intent to roll the car over. During this incident a\"pop can\" had been thrown against the windshield. '5Subse-quently, Ross received reports that, on or about December7, law enforcement officials had also been subjected toabuses such as rock throwing and obscenities.",
"Patrol carsoperated by state troopers had windows broken. Also, on orabout December 7, Respondent used a helicopter to supply4 The assembly area was located in the center of Price and was the pointwhere all Respondent's employees met to he transported to the mine in vansor buses leased by the ('ompany.15 Similar incidents were occurring a tlhe same time at the iother nonunionmines which were also the subjects of mass picketing.the security guards at the mine.? The helicopter was usedjust once.Ross did pass through the picket line on December 7 byslowly inching his vehicle through the several rows of pick-eters lined up across the road. At the time of these incidentsthe sheriffs office, which had approximately seven employ-ees, was experiencing great difficulty meeting the exigenciesarising at the three nonunion mines, which were geographi-cally separated.",
"Ross admitted that the local law enforce-ment agencies were inadequate to protect the employeesand control the picketers on December 7. The state high-way patrol troopers had not yet been assigned to the Com-pany's mine.Stokes went to work on December 7. After picking up hiscoworker he drove toward the Coal Service facility, whichhad previously been the meeting site, to load onto buses'7for the trip to the mine, when he noticed the mine foremanand another employee driving back toward Price. T'he mineforeman signaled Stokes to follow him. Stokes turnedaround and followed the foreman to a municipal parkinglot. Stokes stated he was told \"that things were pretty heavyon the picket line and for them not to take their privatevehicles there.\"",
"Stokes also stated he was told that the em-ployees were driven out to the mine in vans with everyintention of working, but that conditions would he evalu-ated once they reached the site of the mass picketing.When the vans reached the picket line, Stokes found thepicketers to be in a violent mood, and heavy objects struckthe bus (van). No rocks were thrown at the bus Stokes occu-pied and he did not know what objects were striking thevehicles. Stokes testified that the employees passed throughthe picket line with the assistance of' troops who formed awedge and bodily forced back the picketers.About halfway through Stokes' shift, work was termi-nated at the (iGovernor's request.",
"According to Ross. therequest was prompted by the (;ovcrnor's inability at thattime to provide security forces consistent with the assur-ances previously given the nonunion mine operators. Ac-cording to Stokes, this decision to close the mine halfwaythrough the shilt was not explained to employees at thetime. 'Ihey were told to leave the mine face and head for apoint called the kitchen area. which was an undergroundarea where the employees ate their lunches. There wassome undescribed speculation among the employees regard-ing the order to leave. but they did not know what exactlyled to the order. When the employees reached the kitchenarea, they were telephonically informed that they wouldimmediately exit the mine. When they reached the surface,the employees showered, got dressed, and waited for trans-portation to the municipal parking lot in Price.' AccordingI The use of the helicopter was pursuant to an offer made by anothermine The security officers at Soldier ('reek needed liftd to stock a trailer atthe mine site. Ross stated that management thought it would be easier totake the offered privilege of using the helicopter to fly the food in rather thanto go through the picket line one more time.17 The witnesses described the vehicles used to transport employees to themine site as vans and buses. At limes these vehicles were described as vansand at other times as buses.",
"The terms were used interchangeably and therecord ails to accurately differentiate when a certain type of' vehicle wasused. Accordingly. the terms are used interchangeably herein.i Stokes initially testified that they waited a short time for the vans toarrive, then modified his testimony by stating that nl vans arrived, but policevehicles came to transport the employees.458 SOLDIER ('RIEK COA ( to Stokes. no reason was given for the work stoppage: anunspecified \"theY\" merely expressed the need for \"expedi-ency and quickness.\" Stokes described the ride in the policecar as being extremely fast. in excess of the speed limit. '?Darkness had fallen and, as the police vehicles passedthrough the picket line. Stokes observed many fires and anabundance of picketers, possibly twice as many picketers ashe had observed when passing the picket line at the start ofthe shift.",
"Stokes admitted that the fires could have been litto keep the picketers warm since it was a very cold eve-ning.20Ross stated that, with the exception of the rock-throwingincident which occurred on December 7. there were noother occasions when rocks were thrown during the masspicketing at Soldier Creek. The picketing lasted from De-cember 6 through December 16. During the picketing, andsubsequent to December 7. the picketers did make threatsand hold rocks in their hands, but no violence of any kindoccurred at the Company. There was a rock-throwing inci-dent at Plateau Mining and a bridge on the access road toPlateau Mining was burned.",
"To Ross' knowledge that wasthe extent of the violence.C. Events of December 8The mine did not operate on December 8 at the Gover-nor's request, although the other nonunion mines did con-tinue operations. Ross met with state and local officials andwas satisfied that the authorities had made arrangementsadequate to insure the safety of the Respondent's employ-ees going to and from work. Ross also caused steel mesh tobe placed over the windows of the rented vans or buseswhich conveyed the employees to the mine. Additionally.since Ross was aware of one incident where tires had beenslashed or punctured on the picket line, extra rubber beltingwas placed on the vans or buses to protect the tires.The Company called a meeting for the evening of De-cember 8 to inform the employees why the mine was notoperated that day and to announce the security measuresassured by the Governor for the following day.",
"December9. The meeting was conducted by Ross, Olsen. and an un-named representative of California Portland Cement, theparent company. The witnesses generally agreed that man-agement discussed the increased protective features addedto the vans or buses and said that all employees would workone shift, the day shift, so that no one would have to travelat night; that they would meet at the municipal parking lotagain for transportation to the mine: and that two 15-manriot police units were promised.2'Ross also discussed the efforts to get a restraining orderagainst the picketers and indicated the possibility that therestraining order could be granted the next morning, whichcould greatly limit the number of picketers. ArrangementsI' The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. and Stokes estimated that thevehicles went through the picket line at more than 60 miles per hour.10 Ross stated that he heard an employee's statement of concern over has-ing to go through the picket line on December 7 at great speed for the firsttime during Stokes' testimony in this proceeding.",
"Ross was not present atthat time and has no knowledge of how the miners proceeded through thepicket line that evening:1 It is not clearly stated whether the riot police were to provide securityfor all nonunion mines or solely for Respondent's facility.were made for Ross and two employees to drive out to thepicket site to scout the area. If the area was unsafe, the,would not work, but the employees at the parking lot wouldbe paid one half day's wages for showing up. The meetingthen became a question-and-answer session.What transpired during the question-and-answer periodis the subject of controversy. Ross admits that the mood ofthe employees was \"concerned.\" but he asserted the con-cern regarded the cause for calling the meeting and whenthey would next work. Ross further admits that some ques-tions were asked regarding safety traveling to and fromwork as well as safety at home. However. Ross denied tell-ing anybody to use guns.Stokes and Richard L. Statler: (Statler) testified that thecarrying of guns was discussed during the meeting. BothStokes and Statler admitted that the meeting was noisy andthat they had difficulty hearing the questions and answersat limes. Nevertheless. both testified that security wasdeemed insufficient to protect either the employees or theirfamilies at home, and personal safety during nonworkinghours was a matter of individual discretion: that if an em-ployee shot someone outside his home, management stated\"just bring that individual inside\": when asked if the em-ployees should carry firearms to work, management did notsay that would be grounds for termination. so Statler con-strued the lack of a discouraging response as permission tocarry guns.2' and ire was expressed by several employeestoward the picketers.Statler also testified that he saw quite a few employeescarrying handguns.",
"including the bus driver. Statler alsocarried a gun24and apparently publicized the fact to pre-vent harassment or any threats to his person.I credit the testimony of Stokes and Statler regarding thequestion-and-answer portion of the meeting, based on thesimilarity of their renditions, though the witnesses were se-questered. and on the facts that Ross admitted that theemployees asked questions regarding their personal safetyand the safety of their families: Ross did not deny thatquestions regarding firearms were asked; and it is undisput-ed that some employees did carry handguns to and fromwork subsequent to the meeting.",
"as discussed more fullyhereinafter.D. Events of December 9When Ross and two other employees scouted the picketline on Friday morning, they saw mass picketing was stilloccurring on the road leading to Respondent's mine. Ross2 Statler was employed by Respondent as a miner about November I.1977. He left the Company's employ around July 18. 1978. At the time of thehearing Statler was undergoing rehabilitation for alcoholism in Florida. Headmitted having an alcohol problem while employed by the Company andbeing reprimanded for coming to work while under the influence of alcohol1i Stokes testified that Ross specifically replied. \"Well. whatever you guysdo. it is up to you. but just don't come up and tell me about it\" Staller wasnot sure who responded for management24 Statler's testimony was unclear at times, he appeared to have difficultyconcentrating and at times became hostile and vas ery nervous. Statler'sdemeanor does not warrant the discrediting of his testimony. however.",
"forhis rendition of what occurred at the meeting was ery similar to Stokes'testimony. even though the witnesses were sequestered and Stokes and Stat-ler did not converse prior to the hearing459 DEI) CISIONS OF NAI'IONAL LABOR REILATIONS BOARD)then returned to the municipal parking lot which was thebus staging area and saw Stokes. Stokes drove to the stag-ing area \"somewhere after 7 a.m.\" The bus was not sched-uled to leave until 8 a.m. Eventually, the \"scouts\" reportedthe continuation of mass picketing. Stokes claims that hethen confronted Ross with the fact that there were manypickets.\" Ross allegedly looked at him with \"disdain\" butdid not respond. Stokes was instructed to remain at theparking lot until management decided if they would oper-ate the mine. He wandered around for a few minutes, thenreturned to his vehicle to get warm.",
"Stokes stated that threecoworkers noticed that he was running the engine of hisvehicle to warm up and asked to join him. The four minerswere having a general discussion when, Stokes stated. onecoworker pulled out of his belt a loaded semiautomatichandgun. The other coworkers then exited the vehicle.Stokes then went to speak to a supervisor and found twoforemen. Stokes claims to have informed the foremen.,2\"[T]hese guys have guns and someone is calling for war:someone is looking for some kind of war, and I don't be-lieve that I'm going to show up for it.\" According to Stokes,two other employees were talking with the foremen andthey both said, \"This is crazy. I'm not going.\"",
"The two menthen made a hasty exit. At this time the buses were startingto depart but Stokes did not board.Stokes then telephoned an unnamed friend and informedthe friend that some employees were carrying handguns.The friend suggested that they meet at the United MineWorkers office. Stokes went to the UMW office and re-ported the situation to the union president. The union pres-ident telephoned the county attorney who replied that hewould contact the local sheriff to stop the buses and removeall firearms. \"The buses were escorted by law enforcement personnel tothe mine, crossing the picket line without incident. FromDecember 9 to the date picketing ceased no further violenceor harassment was reported.E.",
"Stokes' TerminationStokes reported to work the following workday. Monday.December 12, 1977. Before he could change into his workclothes he was asked to come to Olsen's office. Stokes wasinformed by Olsen that he could not go to work that day,that he had been terminated for absenteeism. The actualcontent of the conversation is in dispute, as hereinafter de-tailed.Ross and Olsen testified that the decision to terminateStokes was unrelated to his activities on December 9, 1977:rather the determination was based on Stokes' record ofabsences prior to that day. Ross said he knew of Stokes'atrocious absentee record at Braztah Corporation, whichwas a factor considered in the decision to terminate. The72 Stokes testified that Ross had indicated during the meeting the previousevening that if there were more than 15 picketers the mine would not oper-ate. This testimony was not confirmed by Statler and was not mentioned inthe testimony of the other witness.26 Neither or the two foremen was called as a witness.\" There was no evidence indicating that the buses were in fact stopped bythe authorities for removal of firearms.",
"The \"friend.\" the union president,and the county attorney did not testify.policy for terminating probationary employees has no fixedstandards and, hence, has no fixed pattern. The determina-tion is made after considering the employee's reliability,whether he is a good. safe worker, as well as other similarmanagement considerations. The decision is strictly Ross'and once he makes an adverse decision, he terminates theemployee. Ross stated that he decided to terminate Stokeson December 7, the day he received the daily report ofabsences for December 6.2sHe did not discuss his decisionwith anyone else and, due to the mass picketing, did nothave time to effect the termination prior to December 9,1977.Ross and Olsen further testified that at the time the ter-mination was made. December 9, 1977. they did not knowStokes was absent.\" This lack of knowledge is due to themanner of recordkeeping used at the mine. The lampmanprepares the attendance sheet, covering a 24-hour period orcovering each of the three shifts. After the report is finished,the lampman places the attendance sheet on Olsen's desk atapproximately 5:30 a.m. the following morning. After Ol-sen reviews the records. they are given to the data process-ing manager so that the data may be recorded on the em-ployees' records.",
"The attendance reports are then passed onto Ross. Under their procedures, Olsen and Ross did notreceive information regarding Stokes' absence on Decem-ber 9 until the next workday, December 12, 1977.Olsen further testified that during the morning on De-cember 9. he telephoned Ross to inform him that it was thelast day of Stokes' probation. At that time, Olsen did notknow whether Stokes was present at the mine, for he didnot receive the attandance report for the day and he doesnot believe anyone informed him that Stokes did not boardthe bus at the municipal parking lot.\" Ross asked Olsen forhis recommendation.",
"Olsen recommended that Stokes' em-ployment not be continued based on his absenteeism at Sol-dier Creek. Ross agreed and told Olsen to terminate Stokes.Stokes was absent on October 25 and 28. November 15,and December 6. as well as December 9. In late October1977, after Stokes began having unexcused absences, Olseninformed Stokes that he was a probationary employee whowas beginning to miss work. Olsen may have been sensitiveto Stokes' absenteeism since Olsen, while employed at Braz-tah mine, knew of Stokes' absentee record there. In fact,Olsen stated that the day Stokes applied for a job at SoldierCreek, he informed Stokes that he was aware of the absen-teeism problem at Braztah, and Soldier Creek could notallow that type of activity. Olsen hired Stokes because if theabsenteeism could be overcome, Stokes had a chance ofbeing a good employee. On October 31, Olsen prepared a2 Absences are reported in two ways: one method is through a call-inprocedure.",
"where the employee telephones to report he will be absent, andthe other is the check-in and checkout procedure. Federal law requires thekeeping of these attendance records. Check-in and checkout are recorded ona sheet by an individual called the lampman, who is present at the changehouse at all times.9, The separation notice filed by Respondent with the Utah Department ofEmployment Security, filed December 9. 1977. stated that the last day Stokesworked was December 9, 1977.I There was no evidence introduced indicating that either Ross or Olsenknew Stokes did not board the bus. nor was there an indication that a specialreport was prepared on December 9 showing which employees ailed toboard the bus or report for work.460 SOIDIFR (RIEEK COAl (CO.written reprimand. stating \"Stokes was also told at this timethat his absenteeism should improve.\" The reprimand wasplaced in Stokes' personnel file.Stokes denied he was excessively absent while employedat Braztah Corporation and stated that he never receivedany discipline. Stokes said he had an average amount ofunexcused absences while employed by Braztah Corpora-tion. Respondent placed in evidence a certified letter writ-ten by a Braztah Corporation superintendent to Stokes. anda return receipt signed by Stokes dated December 18. 1976.The letter states in part:A review of your absentee record indicates that youreceived a verbal warning for excessive absenteeism on9-24-76. Since that time you have continued to log anexcessive number of absences from scheduled work.This letter will serve as final written warning to youthat you must correct your pattern of excessive absen-teeism.In closing, I want to make it perfectly clear that wecannot tolerate your record of excessive absenteeism.Your record must improve or you will no longer beworking for this company.Stokes did admit that he had a bet with a coworker atBraztah Corporation regarding whether he could make itthrough a 2- or 3-week period on the graveyard shift with-out missing work.On December 19, 1977.",
"Stokes filed a \"Statement of Rea-son for Discharge\" with the Utah Department of Employ-ment Security. The statement gave as the reason for hisdischarge, \"Not fulfilling a 60 day probationary set of re-quirements.\" Stokes admitted that he had been warned pre-viously about the conditions which led to his discharge, buthe asserted that he did not miss another day without callingin. He claimed to have received only one verbal warningand no written reprimands. In addition to Olsen's repri-mand for his absence on October 28. 1977. the mine fore-man, on November 16, gave Stokes a verbal warning on hisabsenteeism, and the foreman, Wilson, also told Stokes thatif he continued to miss work the Company would take dis-ciplinary action. That the reprimand was given was notedin Stokes' personnel file.On December 23, the Company was informed by a \"No-tice of Claim Filed\" with the Utah Department of Employ-ment Security that Stokes claimed he was fired unjustlybecause he was \"friendly with a union organizer.\"",
"TheCompany replied to the claim, stating that the terminationwas \"because of numerous unauthorized absences. \"Stokes testified in the instant matter that he believed thereason for his discharged was because he asked questions atthe December 8, 1977, meeting \"which rubbed Ross thewrong way,\" but he was not absolutely sure why he wasfired.According to Olsen, after Ross stated Stokes was to beterminated, Olsen was unable to inform Stokes of the deci-sion because Stokes was absent. Olsen went to the bath-house on December 12 to inform Stokes that he was not toget changed but was to come over to his office.",
"At his officeOlsen informed Stokes that he was terminated because ofhis absenteeism. Olsen also stated that Stokes could discussthe matter with Ross. On the other hand. Stokes claims thatOlsen said at the December 12. 1977. discharge interviewthat \"This isn't anything personal between you and I ...but Ross told me not to allow anyone to come back up andgo in the mine.\" The actual import of this version is un-clear. inasmuch as there is no evidence that other employ-ees who failed to board the bus on November 9 were alsoprecluded from working on December 12. Olsen's allegedreticence, interred by Stokes' version, is also unexplained,particularly in light of Olsen's previous warning to Stokesbecause of Stokes' first unexcused absence in October.These factors.",
"cojoined with Stokes' demeanor and his fail-ure to acknowledge all the warnings he received for absen-teeism lead me to not credit his testimony in this regard. \"On December 19, Stokes met with Ross. The meetingtook place in Ross' office. Two other individuals were pre-sent. \": Ross informed Stokes that in reviewing his attend-ance record he decided that Stokes was not the type ofindividual Soldier Creek wanted as an employee. Stokesreplied that he did not think that he missed an outrageousamount of work. Ross stated the dates Stokes had unex-cused absences. Stokes then stated that he wished to followthe mediation program. Ross replied that he was not enti-tled to a mediator since he was terminated as a probation-ary employee. Stokes then said that if that was his onlyrecourse, then \"possibly we'll see you in court.\"11. ANA,.YSIS ANI) ()N('It'SNS()Section 8(a(I) of the Act prohibits an employer frominterfering with, restraining or coercing its employees in theexercise of their rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act. Ifthe employer punishes an employee for engaging in con-certed activity, it is a violation of the Act, even though theemployer may not have enmity against such collective ac-tivity.",
"N.L.R.B. v. Was.vhinglon A/uminum (Company , Inc.,370 U.S. 9(1962).To hold an employer in breach of Section 8(a)( 1) of theAct, however, \"[I]t is necessary to establish that at the timeof the discharge the employer had knowledge of the con-certed nature of the activity fobr which the employee wasdischarged.\" Diagnostic Hospital Center Corp. of Texa.l., 228NLRB 1215. 1216 (1977). Respondent argues that at thetime Stokes was discharged, it was not known that he failedto board the bus. Furthermore, Respondent asserts thatsuch failure was not concerted activity protected by theAct.General Counsel contends that Stokes' discharge was, atleast in part, based on his unexcused absence of December9. To support this contention, reference is made to employ-ment records of Respondent selected by counsel for theGeneral Counsel. The records cited 12 instances where em-ployees of Soldier Creek had four or more absences butI The crediting of only portions of Stokes' testimony is required under thecircumstances of this case. and does not require rejection of his entire testi-mony.",
"Carolina Canners. Inc., 213 NLRB 37 (1974). Accordingly. the dis-crediting of this portion does not require discounting all of his testimony. \"Nothing is more common than to believe some and not all of what a witnesssays.\" Edwards Transportation Companv. 187 NI RB 3-4 (1970). enfd. percuriam 437 F.2d 502 5th Cir. 1971).12 Jack Coprer was one of the individuals present. Copfer was terminatedabout the same time as Stokes. The reasons for Copfer's discharge were notplaced in evidence.461 I) ('ISIO)NS () N IONAI I ABOIR R A'IO()NS BOARDI)were not termioin ted during the prob;tiMn;lar period. heemployee records also show, it is argued, thal Respondentwas ery tolerant of absenleeism, terminlaltiig one employeeafter 9 consecutive working days of' unauthorized ab-sences This same employee during his probationary pe-riod had nine additional absences. Counsel for GeneralCounsel fails to state how mans of these nine absences wereunexcused.",
"Another employee had four unexcused absencesduring his prohationar? period and was not terminated un-til thereafter, accumulating many more unexcused absencesand a total of 19 absences, excused and unexcused. The lastemployee singled out by (ieneral Counsel for comment hada total of ive unexculsed absences during his probationaryperiod, and he was not discharged. The reason why someemployees were retained though they had more unexcLusedabsences than Stokes was not explained by either party.The analssis of the records does not include informationindicating whether or not the selected employees receivedverbal or written reprimands relating to their unexcusedabsences. Furthermore, as Respondent argues, the em-ployee records introduced by General Counsel did not con-tain all the relevant facts surrounding the retention or ter-mination of the employees whose records were selected byGeneral Counsel, such as: whether the employee(s) wereretained because they possessed unusual skills, whether theemployee(s) left voluntarily because the) knew their attend-ance record(s) warrant(ed) termination: and the conditionof the labor market at the various times to indicate theavailability of potential replacement employees.Prior to drawing an adverse inference because of dispa-rate treatment, a basis for comparing attendance recordsmust be established.",
"Best Products (Companv, In(c.. 236NLRB 1024. 1025, fn. 5 (1978). It is not disputed thatStokes received two reprimands for unexcused absences.The absences of October 28 and November 15. 1977, whichwere the subject of the reprimands. occurred well beforeany alleged protected activity. Furthermore, it was undis-puted that both Ross and Olsen were aware of Stokes' ex-cessive absenteeism while employed at Braztah Corpora-tion. Although Stokes denied he had excessive unexcusedabsences at Braztah Corporation, the reprimand letter, dis-cussed in/ra, more than adequately refutes Stokes' claim ofa reasonable attendance record at his former employment.Ross admitted that Stokes' attendance record at BraztahCorporation was considered in deciding to dischargeStokes. As noted previously, Olsen's actions were also ap-parently influenced by these same fiactors. Olsen gaveStokes a written reprimand the second time Stokes had anunexcused absence. In the absence of evidence that the em-ployees allegedly treated more leniently than Stokes hadsimilar employment histories and similar skills during simi-lar labor and other market conditions, there is no basis forcomparing their attendance records. Best Products Coim-panvy Inc.. supra.General Counsel also asserts that the testimony of Rossand Olsen to the effect that Stokes was discharged on De-cember 9 1977, should not be credited.",
"In support of this1] It is noted that General ('Counsel listed the coinsecutive days of unek-cused absences as numbering 8, not 9 he difference is found not to besignificantlassertion. it is argued that Ross. though claiming to havemade the decision to terminate Stokes on December 7 afterrecei ing the report of Stokes' unexcused absence of De-cember 6, took no action on December 7 a day Stokesworked: called Stokes to the meeting of [)ecember 8, forwhich he was paid: and, in fact, terminated an employeewho was admittedly a good worker4for unexcused ab-sences, three of which were due to illness.General ounsel does not address the explanation forRoss' failure to implement his decision to discharge Stokesprior to D)ecember 9, that he was extremely occupied by theproblems caused by the nationwide IJMW strike resultingin mass picketing at Soldier (reek. I find the exigenciescreated by the mass picketing a credible explanation obrIailure to discharge Stokes on December 7 as well as theiaiulure to relay that decision to other supervisor personnelwho telephoned Respondent's employees on I)ecember 8 toinfoirm them of the meeting.",
"Inasmuch as Ross did not im-plement his decision by discharging Stokes on December 7or 8, it is not inconsistent, as General Counsel alleges, thatStokes was paid for those days.General Counsel further avers that Stokes' testimonysupports the conclusion that he was actually discharged onDecember 12 after Ross and Olsen were informed he failedto report for work following the concealed weapons inci-dent of December 9. \"In addition to the reasons given previously for not credit-ing Stokes' testimony indicating that Olsen did not fire himon December 9 I further find that, based on Olsen's demea-nor, his testimony is to be credited. Additionally, Stokesfiled a statement with the Utah Department of Employ-ment Security admitting that he was told he was dischargedfor unexcused absences, which failed to \"fulfill a 60 dayprobationary set of requirements.\" Stokes never claimed hewas not informed or did not know his last day of probationwas December 9.",
"Yet the form filed December 19 claims hewas discharged for being \"friendly with union organizers..and personal prejudice.\" The \"personal prejudice\" ap-parently retfers to Stokes' belief that he angered Ross whenhe asked questions at the December 8 meeting. Stokes ap-parently dropped the allegation that his discharge wascaused by his friendship with a union organizer. The differ-ing and somewhat contradictor clainms of causative factorsin his discharge further discredit Stokes' testimony. On theother hand, Respondent has consistently contended in allits filings with the Utah Department of Employment Secu-rity that Stokes was terminated during his probationary pe-riod for unexcused absences. The Respondent's stated mo-tive has not been shown to be implausible, inconsistent, orinadequate.To support an inference of inadequate or implausiblemotive, General Counsel asserts that Stokes' employee rec-ord lists December 9 as an unexcused absence, which wascrossed out at some unknown point, and the C(hargingParty was marked terminated at some unknown point. Therecord fails to clearly state which employee marks the at-Olsen tesitied that Stokes was a good worker with the exception If hisabsenteeism problem.\"",
"As discussed in detail injra, Olsen's rendilmln o the December 12 discus-sion, wherein Stokes was told not to dress and not to reporlt or work in themine, is credited462 SOLDIlR CREEK (OAL CO.tendance record, when that employee marks the specificrecord when that employee is informed of management'sdecision to discharge a worker, or whether the same em-ployee records absences and terminations. These factors.cojoined with the absence of any indication that the mall-ner of marking Stokes' record is different from normal prac-tices, or that the termination was recorded on a date proha-tive of the allegation that termination was effectuated afterStokes' absence on December 9 was known to Ross andOlsen, fail to support the requested inference.General Counsel argues that Ross and Olsen knew Stokeswas absent on December 9 prior to the decision to dis-charge. In support of its argument.",
"Stokes' conversationwith Ross referring to the fact that mass picketing contin-ued, when Ross looked at Stokes with \"disdain\" and re-fused to answer. is cited. Stokes' inquiry of concern. it isalleged, when added to the above arguments. presents suffi-cient evidence that Stokes was terminated. at least In part,for his failure to report to work on l)ecember 9. In furthersupport of this argument. the following testimony of Rosswas quoted. as pertinent, as follows:Q. In considering Mr. Stokes' attendance record.did you take into consideration part of' his absences inmaking the determination to discharge him'?A. In fairness, we took his whole record during histemporary employ ment.This testimony, it is asserted, includes a reference to De-cember 9. This assertion is not persuasive. Ross testified.without direct contradiction, that he had ()lsen discussedStokes' termination on I)ecember 9 prior to receiving theattendance records Ifr that date.",
"Stokes' \"w hole record\" onthat date did not contain the I)ecember 9 unexcused aib-sence. Though General Counsel fails to argue the point.Stokes did testify that he informed two foremen about thegun situation. \"?The fact that Stokes maN have told two foremen that hewanted no part of traveling to work with employees carry-ing concealed weapons, under these circumstances, is insuf-ficient to establish a riniafl'ie case of unlawful motivationor even that the official who decided to discharge Stokeshad knowledge of his absence on December 9. both Rossand Olsen testified, without refutation by any witness, thatthey did not know Stokes was absent on December 9, theday Olsen recommended the discharge to Ross, and Rossinstructed Olsen to terminate Stokes. It is agreed by allparties that mass picketing continued to occur that day. afact which kept management very occupied.",
"It is not con-tended that the method of recordkeeping, which informsmanagement of employees' attendance the ifollowing work-day, was altered on December 9 although all employeesworked a single shift.Stokes did not testify that the two foremen saw him leavethe area or knew that he did not board the bus. There was\" General Counsel argues that Respondent's ailure call these forenlenrequires crediling Stokes' estimon). No adverse inference ill e drawn forfailure to call witnesses which were equall, available to both parties GeneralCounsel did not allege the foremen were unavailable as witnesses lor hiscase. Local 259. Unted .4Autmobhile. A4eropae., and A4grilrlaurl Inpl/ernntWorkers of.America Atherton ('adila.",
"In 1, 225 NI.RB 421. 422, at n (1976).no clear showing that Stokes' statement to the foremen that\"he wasn't going to be part of this\" was clearly understoodas a declaration that Stokes was not going to work eitherbecause of his concern for his saf'elt or tor other reasons.Stokes admitted that the foremen \"went about their husi-ness. got in the ans and left.\" Exactl ahat \"their busi-ness\" was or how long it took was not explained. Accord-ingly. it canlit be found that Ross or Olsen had knowledgethat Stokes was absent on December 9. nor can such knowl-edge be inferred from Stokes' statement to the foremen.T'he General Counsel has the burden of establishing e-cry element of' a iolation under the Act. Il . 'stern T ranBargt' ('or/lorilton. 207 NlRB 13. tfootnote 1 (1973). 1 findthat (eirneral ('ounsel has failed t mIeet lis blurden.",
"A-\\though. or the purpoises of' this )cclslon. I assunc rgu-undl that Stokes' failure to board hl- e ani: ,n I)cccbll e r 9was acti\\itx, protected b the Act.' the record does notestablish ui ful1 termi;natiton. or it tliils to dea;l\\l ctab-lish that the prortected actiit i was cnisidered ior impellledthe discharge. Otn the particular fcts of this case. the Re-spondent. in ulnicon t rotverted testi mon'. stated Stokes w:asemnplh) ed because he had the potential ot' beto ning of g odemplioee it' he culd overcome the problem ol excessiveabsenteeism. At the time he was elplo? edl at Soldier ('reekhe was w'a rned that excessie ulnexcuscd abhsenlteeisl , Iouldnot be tolerated.",
"l'his ; arning a;is repeated. lihcn Stokeshad an tllexcused absence.' ill tle forml ot' a xerbl rlelri-nanlld hich as reduced to a Ienlortnd. Ill placd i hispersonnel ile. Stokes' personnel file ilsIo contains I mtIello-randuni recording the fact that Stokes receltctd a erbalwarnling t'ron hi ls reiman. Rn krlsiit. t n1 Nolembehr (regardiig Stokes' iuiccusedi ahsncte ot\" Nx enllhc 15 .Wil-son also intirnted Stokes tihat i hlie contilued to minss worklie w:ouldl be subiectied I tlisciplitar ictilt. I hese eeilts;re uncotlllrltlecl ted. ()n the last dai of' Stokes' prhbatlionar preriod.",
"inage-mnent assessed his suitabilit\\ 'ir cnitiinued epltrLrent. alactivit li nlt shitnli to ei ate tIr'tt its nrilal slanlarlds.T'hle fact that the phatiolnar pcrli)L. discharge. and a;s-sunied protteteed ictivit\\! ccurred oin the sale cdla is loundto be coincidlental, p-articullarly in light o' the finding thatthe engaging in plrrrteted cticit .as not kno n to Rossand Olsen at the time of the discharge. I he assessmenlt wasconducted at tie whee hen lte attendance records failed toindicate Stokes' absence for \\ hat has been assulied cir/it-u,'ndo to be a protected activit. (ieneral ('ounsel failed todemonstrate through the presentation of prohatie persua-sie evidence that the ! )ecember 9 absence was consideredin the determination to discharge. he absence of indepen-dent evidence on which to rest ia reasonable interence thatthe Respondent acted either out ot' hstilit tovard r inreprisal for the protected actisity Stlokes is assunle t have' General ('Cunsel contends hat Stokes had a prolected right under Sec-lion 502 ,I the Act rto refuse I) work n D)ecembniher lr the abhnornmilldangerous w .orklng co lill on, Uhich els te.d .it the ilille B.lsed n the con-clusion reached herein, i 1i Lllnnllc sars l dleternlen¢ I Stikcs ' i.t 11,is 1 iI)ecemhei 9 was in lfact prtectecl rghtl ilnler Sei 2 oi the -\\lI\"q Stokes .aIhbSTlll in ()ctoher 25 inll 28.",
"No,eillhcl 1i .aldl I)ccmber6 and 9 t he reprillani d relerred I hi e sc A i, r the illneclc sed .hbence lIOctobher 28463 464DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARDengaged in requires the conclusion that the Respondent didnot violate Section 8(a)(l) as alleged.Accordingly, I recommend that the complaint be dis-missed in it entirety.CON(LTUSIONS OF LAW1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commercewithin the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.2. Respondent has not engaged in the unfair labor prac-tices alleged in the complaint in Case 27-CA-5689-2.Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of theAct, I hereby issue the following recommended:ORDER19The complaint is dismissed in its entirety.1' In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of theRules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,conclusions and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.",
"102.48of the Rules and Regulations. he adopted by the Board and become itsfindings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be deemedwaived for all purposes."
]
| https://www.nlrb.gov/cases-decisions/decisions/board-decisions | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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Hr. Justice Ball delivered the opinion of the court. The contentions of appellants are: First, the court erred' 'in refusing the peremptory instruction requested by the defendants; second, the court erred in giving plaintiff’s first and second instructions; and third, the damages are excessive. The peremptory instruction is based upon the pleadings and the evidence. The declaration charged that the plaintiff was a passenger on said car, or was in the act of stepping on said car for the purpose of becoming a passenger. It is contended that the evidence showed he did not intend to become a passenger, but, at the time of the accident, had gone to the corner in question simply to put his daughter on the car, and was injured while handing her baby to her. It is settled law that the plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon his declaration, and that he cannot charge one species of negligence and recover upon proof of negligence of a different character. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Bell, 209 Ill., 25. If the plaintiff was not a passenger, or did not intend to become a passenger, defendants did not owe him that high degree of care required from the common carrier for the protection of its passengers, but owed him the duty of ordinary care only; namely, to use ordinary care that the plaintiff was not injured by reason of the sudden starting of the car, or by reason of an omission to give the customary signals for the starting of the car. The claim that the plaintiff was not a passenger is based upon a statement made by him in cross-examination. In his examination in chief he had testified that he was going to attend a meeting of the Western Star Order, of which he was recording secretary, at Binder’s Hall. The following occurred in his cross-examination: “Q. Isn’t it a fact that you just simply went down there to help your daughter get on the car and get started home that night? A. Yes. Mr. Lipsox : What is the answer ? The Court : Yes. Mr. Lipsoh : I ask that the court put that question to the witness. Me. Baily : Ho, I object to it. Judge Heely : I object to it. The witness answered. The Court : You can get him on the re-direct.” At the close of the cross-examination the court asked the plaintiff: “When you put your baby, your grandchild, into your daughter’s arms, did you intend to take that car ?” A. “Yes, I was ready to go on the car. I was going to the meeting on that car, and my daughter was going to get off when she got to her home.” There is ample evidence in this record to justify the jury in finding that the plaintiff was a passenger in this car or was in the act of stepping on the car for the purpose of becoming a passenger at the time of the injury. The conductor testified that after the car had run about a block he went to the daughter and collected her fare, and then looked around for the plaintiff, when she said, “The gentleman jumped off,” or “He jumped off.” This evidence is not res gestee, nor was the statement made in the presence of the plaintiff. Its effect is to discredit the daughter, but it cannot be extended farther. The plaintiff testifies: “When .Mrs. Brooks got on the car was standing still. She took the baby from me. I held the baby on that hand, -and I held with that hand to the car, and I was ready to- go on the car from the first step and the car push and I fall down.” Mrs. Brooks says: “The car jerked and he fell back. He fell backwards and his head was west. I had the baby wheij, he fell. The car jerked and I was on the car screaming.” Harry B. Gimlin testified: “He also had a little child and he was putting his foot on the place for him to get into the car, and as he was there the grip started all of a sudden, the lever opened, and threw him.” Opposed to this is the testimony of the two conductors and the motorman of this train, each of whom testifies that when they left Hamlin avenue the train started up in the usual way. It is to be noted that each of these witnesses declares he knew nothing of this accident until he reached the car barns upon the return trip. It is not strange that in this regard the jury believed the evidence of the plaintiff and disbelieved that of the defendants. The first instruction given at the request of the plaintiff reads as follows: “1. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff got on the car in question for the purpose of riding on the said car and was ready, willing and able to pay his fare, then it was the duty of the defendant, Chicago Union Traction Company, to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight could reasonably do consistent with the character and mode of conveyance adopted and the practical prosecution of their business to prevent an accident to the plaintiff while he was riding upon the said car or going upon the same, and if you further believe from the evidence that the defendant, Chicago Union Traction Company, failed to use such care and diligence and that by reason thereof the plaintiff was injured as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration while the plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care for his own safety, then you should find the defendant, Chicago Union Traction Company, guilty.” In objecting to this instruction the defendants say it assumes that the plaintiff was a passenger or intended to become a passenger upon the car. As we have seen, there was ample evidence to justify the jury in so finding. Again, they say it does not limit the right of recovery to the negligence charged in the declaration. We do not so read the instruction. It says, if the “defendant the Chicago Union Traction Company failed to use such care and diligence, and that by reason thereof- the plaintiff was injured as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration,” etc. The phrase “as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration” relates back to the use of diligence by that defendant as well as to the injury to the plaintiff. Any other interpretation is too technical impractical use. Further, by given instruction No. 11 the jury were instructed that unless the plaintiff was a passenger on the car, or svas in the act of boarding or of stepping on the car for the purpose of becoming a passenger, he could not recover. But admitting that this instruction is not clearly drawn, the propositions of law it contains are correct when applied to the facts of , the case as found by the jury, and they were not misled thereby. From a careful examination of the record, we are convinced that in this case substantial justice has been done, and that a retrial would probably résult in another verdict for the plaintiff. So believing, we cannot set aside the judgment fpr errors of a technical character which do not go to the substantial merits of the case. This common sense position is sustained by Wilson v. The People, 94 Ill., 299; C. & E. I. Ry. Co. v. Rung, 104 Ill., 641; Zimm v. The People, 111 Ill., 52; Beard v. Maxwell, 113 Ill., 442; Gore v. The People, 162 Ill., 259; and W. C. St. Ry. Co. v. Maday, 188 Ill., 310. We find no reversible error in the second instruction given at the request of the plaintiff. The question of the amount of damages in an injury case is primarily for the jury under the guidance of proper instructions. The evidence in this case justifies the statement that the - plaintiff was thrown from the car to the' ground with such violence that he was rendered unconscious, and blood flowed from his ears and mouth, and that he was transformed thereby from a strong, well man in the prime of life, of good hearing and unruptured, to a sick man, prematurely old, incapacitated for pleasure, wholly deaf in one ear and partially deaf in the other, with an inguinal hernia so large that it necessarily interferes with his movements, and cannot be reduced by manipulation. It is true that there is evidence given by distinguished experts to the effect that this hernia could not come from the accident. There is also abundant evidence to the contrary. Two witnesses testify that while the plaintiff lay upon the ground at the scene-of the accident, partially unconscious, he drew up his legs and placed his hands upon his groin. Doctor Levitón, who-examined the plaintiff within three days of the injury, found this hernia by digital examination, and advised the immediate use of a truss. Doctors Weber, Stettauer and Campbell, men of high rank in their profession, in answer to a-hypothetical question based upon the evidence, each stated that the fall from the car could have produced the hernia. The objection that the damages are excessive is not well taken. ' Finding no reversible error in this record, we affirm the-judgment of the Circuit Court. Affirmed. | 07-24-2022 | [
"Hr. Justice Ball delivered the opinion of the court. The contentions of appellants are: First, the court erred' 'in refusing the peremptory instruction requested by the defendants; second, the court erred in giving plaintiff’s first and second instructions; and third, the damages are excessive. The peremptory instruction is based upon the pleadings and the evidence. The declaration charged that the plaintiff was a passenger on said car, or was in the act of stepping on said car for the purpose of becoming a passenger. It is contended that the evidence showed he did not intend to become a passenger, but, at the time of the accident, had gone to the corner in question simply to put his daughter on the car, and was injured while handing her baby to her. It is settled law that the plaintiff must recover, if at all, upon his declaration, and that he cannot charge one species of negligence and recover upon proof of negligence of a different character. C. & A. Ry. Co. v. Bell, 209 Ill., 25.",
"If the plaintiff was not a passenger, or did not intend to become a passenger, defendants did not owe him that high degree of care required from the common carrier for the protection of its passengers, but owed him the duty of ordinary care only; namely, to use ordinary care that the plaintiff was not injured by reason of the sudden starting of the car, or by reason of an omission to give the customary signals for the starting of the car. The claim that the plaintiff was not a passenger is based upon a statement made by him in cross-examination. In his examination in chief he had testified that he was going to attend a meeting of the Western Star Order, of which he was recording secretary, at Binder’s Hall.",
"The following occurred in his cross-examination: “Q. Isn’t it a fact that you just simply went down there to help your daughter get on the car and get started home that night? A. Yes. Mr. Lipsox : What is the answer ? The Court : Yes. Mr. Lipsoh : I ask that the court put that question to the witness. Me. Baily : Ho, I object to it. Judge Heely : I object to it. The witness answered. The Court : You can get him on the re-direct.” At the close of the cross-examination the court asked the plaintiff: “When you put your baby, your grandchild, into your daughter’s arms, did you intend to take that car ?” A. “Yes, I was ready to go on the car. I was going to the meeting on that car, and my daughter was going to get off when she got to her home.” There is ample evidence in this record to justify the jury in finding that the plaintiff was a passenger in this car or was in the act of stepping on the car for the purpose of becoming a passenger at the time of the injury.",
"The conductor testified that after the car had run about a block he went to the daughter and collected her fare, and then looked around for the plaintiff, when she said, “The gentleman jumped off,” or “He jumped off.” This evidence is not res gestee, nor was the statement made in the presence of the plaintiff. Its effect is to discredit the daughter, but it cannot be extended farther. The plaintiff testifies: “When .Mrs. Brooks got on the car was standing still. She took the baby from me. I held the baby on that hand, -and I held with that hand to the car, and I was ready to- go on the car from the first step and the car push and I fall down.” Mrs. Brooks says: “The car jerked and he fell back.",
"He fell backwards and his head was west. I had the baby wheij, he fell. The car jerked and I was on the car screaming.” Harry B. Gimlin testified: “He also had a little child and he was putting his foot on the place for him to get into the car, and as he was there the grip started all of a sudden, the lever opened, and threw him.” Opposed to this is the testimony of the two conductors and the motorman of this train, each of whom testifies that when they left Hamlin avenue the train started up in the usual way. It is to be noted that each of these witnesses declares he knew nothing of this accident until he reached the car barns upon the return trip. It is not strange that in this regard the jury believed the evidence of the plaintiff and disbelieved that of the defendants. The first instruction given at the request of the plaintiff reads as follows: “1. If you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff got on the car in question for the purpose of riding on the said car and was ready, willing and able to pay his fare, then it was the duty of the defendant, Chicago Union Traction Company, to do all that human care, vigilance and foresight could reasonably do consistent with the character and mode of conveyance adopted and the practical prosecution of their business to prevent an accident to the plaintiff while he was riding upon the said car or going upon the same, and if you further believe from the evidence that the defendant, Chicago Union Traction Company, failed to use such care and diligence and that by reason thereof the plaintiff was injured as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration while the plaintiff was in the exercise of reasonable care for his own safety, then you should find the defendant, Chicago Union Traction Company, guilty.” In objecting to this instruction the defendants say it assumes that the plaintiff was a passenger or intended to become a passenger upon the car.",
"As we have seen, there was ample evidence to justify the jury in so finding. Again, they say it does not limit the right of recovery to the negligence charged in the declaration. We do not so read the instruction. It says, if the “defendant the Chicago Union Traction Company failed to use such care and diligence, and that by reason thereof- the plaintiff was injured as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration,” etc. The phrase “as alleged in the plaintiff’s declaration” relates back to the use of diligence by that defendant as well as to the injury to the plaintiff.",
"Any other interpretation is too technical impractical use. Further, by given instruction No. 11 the jury were instructed that unless the plaintiff was a passenger on the car, or svas in the act of boarding or of stepping on the car for the purpose of becoming a passenger, he could not recover. But admitting that this instruction is not clearly drawn, the propositions of law it contains are correct when applied to the facts of , the case as found by the jury, and they were not misled thereby. From a careful examination of the record, we are convinced that in this case substantial justice has been done, and that a retrial would probably résult in another verdict for the plaintiff. So believing, we cannot set aside the judgment fpr errors of a technical character which do not go to the substantial merits of the case. This common sense position is sustained by Wilson v. The People, 94 Ill., 299; C. & E. I. Ry. Co. v. Rung, 104 Ill., 641; Zimm v. The People, 111 Ill., 52; Beard v. Maxwell, 113 Ill., 442; Gore v. The People, 162 Ill., 259; and W. C. St. Ry. Co. v. Maday, 188 Ill., 310.",
"We find no reversible error in the second instruction given at the request of the plaintiff. The question of the amount of damages in an injury case is primarily for the jury under the guidance of proper instructions. The evidence in this case justifies the statement that the - plaintiff was thrown from the car to the' ground with such violence that he was rendered unconscious, and blood flowed from his ears and mouth, and that he was transformed thereby from a strong, well man in the prime of life, of good hearing and unruptured, to a sick man, prematurely old, incapacitated for pleasure, wholly deaf in one ear and partially deaf in the other, with an inguinal hernia so large that it necessarily interferes with his movements, and cannot be reduced by manipulation. It is true that there is evidence given by distinguished experts to the effect that this hernia could not come from the accident. There is also abundant evidence to the contrary.",
"Two witnesses testify that while the plaintiff lay upon the ground at the scene-of the accident, partially unconscious, he drew up his legs and placed his hands upon his groin. Doctor Levitón, who-examined the plaintiff within three days of the injury, found this hernia by digital examination, and advised the immediate use of a truss. Doctors Weber, Stettauer and Campbell, men of high rank in their profession, in answer to a-hypothetical question based upon the evidence, each stated that the fall from the car could have produced the hernia. The objection that the damages are excessive is not well taken. ' Finding no reversible error in this record, we affirm the-judgment of the Circuit Court. Affirmed."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/7006350/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Exhibit CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 In connection with this Quarterly Report of Expedite 5, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod endingMarch 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sheila Hunter, President, Chief Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1. Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for theperiod endingMarch 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2. The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for theperiod endingMarch 31, 2009, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Expedite 5, Inc. Date: May 18, 2009 /s/ Sheila Hunter Sheila Hunter President, CEO, Principal Financial Officer and Secretary | [
"Exhibit CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 In connection with this Quarterly Report of Expedite 5, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for theperiod endingMarch 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sheila Hunter, President, Chief Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer and Secretary of the Company, certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: 1. Such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for theperiod endingMarch 31, 2009, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and 2.",
"The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for theperiod endingMarch 31, 2009, fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Expedite 5, Inc. Date: May 18, 2009 /s/ Sheila Hunter Sheila Hunter President, CEO, Principal Financial Officer and Secretary"
]
| https://applica-public.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/contract-discovery/edgar.txt.xz | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
|
Both plaintiff's and defendant's automobiles were injured in a collision between them. Plaintiff's claim for damages was met by the counterclaim of defendant. Defendant reviews a judgment entered on a verdict for plaintiff for $250 by writ of error. 1. On cross-examination defendant was asked: "Do you represent anybody besides yourself in the part of this action which involves your claim against the Northern Auto Company?" In the discussion following an objection to this question (the jury being absent during the greater part of it), it appeared that defendant was carrying liability insurance and had been paid the amount of his loss less $100. His counsel asked the jury to find a verdict in his favor for but that amount. Prior to the asking of the question above quoted, defendant had shown that the damage to his car was $350, and there had been no intimation that he was willing to limit his recovery to $100. On the record as made, defendant was in no way prejudiced by his forced admission that he had received $250 from an insurance company, as he asked to recover only his damage over and above that amount. We therefore need not further consider his right to recover for the entire damage done to his car or the right of plaintiff's counsel to ask the question objected to. 2. The claims of the parties as to how the collision occurred, as to which the testimony was very conflicting, were submitted to the jury in instructions in which we discover no error. *Page 150 3. The trial judge concluded that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, and with this conclusion we agree. The judgment is affirmed. CLARK, C.J., and McDONALD, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ., concurred. | 07-05-2016 | [
"Both plaintiff's and defendant's automobiles were injured in a collision between them. Plaintiff's claim for damages was met by the counterclaim of defendant. Defendant reviews a judgment entered on a verdict for plaintiff for $250 by writ of error. 1. On cross-examination defendant was asked: \"Do you represent anybody besides yourself in the part of this action which involves your claim against the Northern Auto Company?\" In the discussion following an objection to this question (the jury being absent during the greater part of it), it appeared that defendant was carrying liability insurance and had been paid the amount of his loss less $100.",
"His counsel asked the jury to find a verdict in his favor for but that amount. Prior to the asking of the question above quoted, defendant had shown that the damage to his car was $350, and there had been no intimation that he was willing to limit his recovery to $100. On the record as made, defendant was in no way prejudiced by his forced admission that he had received $250 from an insurance company, as he asked to recover only his damage over and above that amount. We therefore need not further consider his right to recover for the entire damage done to his car or the right of plaintiff's counsel to ask the question objected to. 2. The claims of the parties as to how the collision occurred, as to which the testimony was very conflicting, were submitted to the jury in instructions in which we discover no error. *Page 150 3. The trial judge concluded that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, and with this conclusion we agree. The judgment is affirmed.",
"CLARK, C.J., and McDONALD, BIRD, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ., concurred."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/3495188/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 DUSTIN ROBERT GRAN, Case No. 1:18-cv-01745-DAD-SAB-HC
12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO SEAL DOCUMENTS 13 v. ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 14 JOSIE GASTELO,1 TO SUBSTITUTE RESPONDENT
15 Respondent.
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17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ
18 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
19 Before the Court is Petitioner’s notice of request and request to file under the following
20 documents: (1) Request to Seal Documents; (2) Proposed Order re: Request to Seal Documents;
21 (3) Application for Limited Appointment of Co-Counsel; and (4) Proposed Order re: Application
22 for Limited Appointment of Co-Counsel.
23 Respondent has not opposed Petitioner’s request to seal and the time for doing so has
24 passed. See Local Rule 141(c).
25 ///
26 /// 27 1 Josie Gastelo is the current Warden of the California Men’s Colony, where Petitioner is currently housed. (ECF No. 33 at 1). Accordingly, Josie Gastelo is substituted as Respondent in this matter. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 28 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996).
1 1 Accordingly, for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Petitioner’s request to seal is GRANTED;
3 2. The following documents shall be maintained under seal and in camera: (1) Request to
4 Seal Documents; (2) Proposed Order re: Request to Seal Documents; (3) Application for
5 Limited Appointment of Co-Counsel; and (4) Proposed Order re: Application for Limited
6 Appointment of Co-Counsel; and
7 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute Josie Gastelo as Respondent in this
8 matter.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED. 10
11 Dated: June 26, 2019 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12
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"1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DUSTIN ROBERT GRAN, Case No. 1:18-cv-01745-DAD-SAB-HC 12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S REQUEST TO SEAL DOCUMENTS 13 v. ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 14 JOSIE GASTELO,1 TO SUBSTITUTE RESPONDENT 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is a state prisoner proceeding with a petition for writ 18 of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 19 Before the Court is Petitioner’s notice of request and request to file under the following 20 documents: (1) Request to Seal Documents; (2) Proposed Order re: Request to Seal Documents; 21 (3) Application for Limited Appointment of Co-Counsel; and (4) Proposed Order re: Application 22 for Limited Appointment of Co-Counsel. 23 Respondent has not opposed Petitioner’s request to seal and the time for doing so has 24 passed. See Local Rule 141(c).",
"25 /// 26 /// 27 1 Josie Gastelo is the current Warden of the California Men’s Colony, where Petitioner is currently housed. (ECF No. 33 at 1). Accordingly, Josie Gastelo is substituted as Respondent in this matter. See Ortiz-Sandoval v. Gomez, 28 81 F.3d 891, 894 (9th Cir. 1996). 1 1 Accordingly, for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Petitioner’s request to seal is GRANTED; 3 2. The following documents shall be maintained under seal and in camera: (1) Request to 4 Seal Documents; (2) Proposed Order re: Request to Seal Documents; (3) Application for 5 Limited Appointment of Co-Counsel; and (4) Proposed Order re: Application for Limited 6 Appointment of Co-Counsel; and 7 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to substitute Josie Gastelo as Respondent in this 8 matter. 9 IT IS SO ORDERED.",
"10 11 Dated: June 26, 2019 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/97433981/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Mr. Justice Fitch delivered the opinion of the court. Appellant issued to one Hamell a certificate for fifteen shares of its capital stock, stating on its face that it was “fully paid and non-assessable.” On November 8, 1904, Hamell endorsed the stock certificate to the appellee upon payment by the latter of $1,200. Appellee at once requested appellant’s secretary to transfer the shares on the company’s books. The secretary refused to do so, claiming that the shares of stock had been attached and sold prior to the purchase of the same by appellee. Litigation followed and continued for several years, until November 28, 1908, when the Hamell certificate was surrendered by appellee and a new certificate issued to him by the appellant. He thereupon made a formal demand upon the company for dividends which had accrued after the time of his purchase of the stock in 1904. This demand being refused, appellee brought suit in the Municipal Court as a first-class case, declaring on the common counts in assumpsit. A plea of the general issue was filed by appellant, and later an additional plea of set-off, alleging that Hamell was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $1,500 which had never been paid to the corporation for said shares of stock. To this plea the plaintiff replied double, first, that Hamell was not so indebted, and second, that when Hamell assigned said stock certificate to the plaintiff, the latter was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. To this replication the defendant filed a rejoinder to the effect that the issue of said stock certificate by the company was ultra vires, because the stock was not paid for. A demurrer to this rejoinder was sustained. Upon the trial, appellee proved his purchase of the stock, the endorsement to him of the stock certificate, the demand made for the transfer thereof, the surrender and cancellation of the old certificate and the issue of the new Certificate four years later, and that during said four years, four dividends of $300 each had been declared and paid to other stockholders but not paid to appellee. Appellant offered no evidence and'JEeWourtNlirected a verdict for $1,200. Judgment was entered on the verdict on November 8,1909, and the company appeals. Three reasons are suggested for the reversal of this judgment; first, that no recovery can be had on the common counts; second, that all the resolutions, declaring dividends, directed that such dividends be paid out of the profits and there was no proof there were any profits; and third, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the rejoinder above mentioned. First. The law is well settled that when a dividend has been duly declared by a corporation, it becomes a debt due from the corporation to each stockholder in proportion to the number of his shares, and he may sue and recover the same at law. (10 Cyc. 566). The declaration of a dividend “is a written admission on the part of the corporation of an indebtedness to each particular stockholder.” (Id. 566). When such a dividend has been declared nothing remains to be done except to pay over the money on demand, and where such is the case indebitatus assumpsit is a proper form of action. Lane v. Adams, 19 Ill. 167. Or upon another theory, when a defendant has obtained money belonging to the plaintiff which, in equity and good conscience, the defendant has no right to retain, the plaintiff may recover the same on the common count for money had and received. First National Bank v. Gatton, 172 Ill 625; Wilson v. Turner, 164 Ill. 398. Second. All the resolutions offered in evidence direct the payment of dividends ‘‘ out of the profits of the business for ’ ’ the year stated. The resolutions in themselves imply that profits had been earned sufficient, at least, to pay the dividends declared in the resolutions. Moreover, there was evidence that such dividends were paid to all other stockholders but appellee. We think this proof made a prima facie case in favor of appellee, so far as this contention is concerned. Third. It is a matter of no consequence how the court below ruled on a demurrer to a rejoinder to a replication to a plea of set-off, in view of the fact that the defendant offered no evidence of any kind in support of its plea of set-off. After examining this record and the briefs filed, we 0 cannot escape the conclusion that this appeal was prosecuted for delay. The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed with $60 damages (this being 5% of the damages assessed below), in addition to the costs. Judgment affirmed with damages. | 11-26-2022 | [
"Mr. Justice Fitch delivered the opinion of the court. Appellant issued to one Hamell a certificate for fifteen shares of its capital stock, stating on its face that it was “fully paid and non-assessable.” On November 8, 1904, Hamell endorsed the stock certificate to the appellee upon payment by the latter of $1,200. Appellee at once requested appellant’s secretary to transfer the shares on the company’s books. The secretary refused to do so, claiming that the shares of stock had been attached and sold prior to the purchase of the same by appellee. Litigation followed and continued for several years, until November 28, 1908, when the Hamell certificate was surrendered by appellee and a new certificate issued to him by the appellant. He thereupon made a formal demand upon the company for dividends which had accrued after the time of his purchase of the stock in 1904. This demand being refused, appellee brought suit in the Municipal Court as a first-class case, declaring on the common counts in assumpsit.",
"A plea of the general issue was filed by appellant, and later an additional plea of set-off, alleging that Hamell was indebted to the defendant in the sum of $1,500 which had never been paid to the corporation for said shares of stock. To this plea the plaintiff replied double, first, that Hamell was not so indebted, and second, that when Hamell assigned said stock certificate to the plaintiff, the latter was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. To this replication the defendant filed a rejoinder to the effect that the issue of said stock certificate by the company was ultra vires, because the stock was not paid for. A demurrer to this rejoinder was sustained. Upon the trial, appellee proved his purchase of the stock, the endorsement to him of the stock certificate, the demand made for the transfer thereof, the surrender and cancellation of the old certificate and the issue of the new Certificate four years later, and that during said four years, four dividends of $300 each had been declared and paid to other stockholders but not paid to appellee. Appellant offered no evidence and'JEeWourtNlirected a verdict for $1,200.",
"Judgment was entered on the verdict on November 8,1909, and the company appeals. Three reasons are suggested for the reversal of this judgment; first, that no recovery can be had on the common counts; second, that all the resolutions, declaring dividends, directed that such dividends be paid out of the profits and there was no proof there were any profits; and third, that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the rejoinder above mentioned. First. The law is well settled that when a dividend has been duly declared by a corporation, it becomes a debt due from the corporation to each stockholder in proportion to the number of his shares, and he may sue and recover the same at law. (10 Cyc. 566). The declaration of a dividend “is a written admission on the part of the corporation of an indebtedness to each particular stockholder.” (Id. 566). When such a dividend has been declared nothing remains to be done except to pay over the money on demand, and where such is the case indebitatus assumpsit is a proper form of action. Lane v. Adams, 19 Ill. 167.",
"Or upon another theory, when a defendant has obtained money belonging to the plaintiff which, in equity and good conscience, the defendant has no right to retain, the plaintiff may recover the same on the common count for money had and received. First National Bank v. Gatton, 172 Ill 625; Wilson v. Turner, 164 Ill. 398. Second. All the resolutions offered in evidence direct the payment of dividends ‘‘ out of the profits of the business for ’ ’ the year stated. The resolutions in themselves imply that profits had been earned sufficient, at least, to pay the dividends declared in the resolutions. Moreover, there was evidence that such dividends were paid to all other stockholders but appellee. We think this proof made a prima facie case in favor of appellee, so far as this contention is concerned.",
"Third. It is a matter of no consequence how the court below ruled on a demurrer to a rejoinder to a replication to a plea of set-off, in view of the fact that the defendant offered no evidence of any kind in support of its plea of set-off. After examining this record and the briefs filed, we 0 cannot escape the conclusion that this appeal was prosecuted for delay. The judgment will, therefore, be affirmed with $60 damages (this being 5% of the damages assessed below), in addition to the costs. Judgment affirmed with damages."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/8814111/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
867 F.2d 974 48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 386,48 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,399, 51 Ed. Law Rep. 1140 Susan SCHERR, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.WOODLAND SCHOOL COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED DISTRICT NO. 50,Defendant-Appellee.Rebecca MAGANUCO, on behalf of herself and numerous otherswho are similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.LEYDEN COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 212, Defendant-Appellee. Nos. 87-1275, 87-1682 and 87-1705. United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit. Argued Nov. 30, 1987.Decided Nov. 1, 1988.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 8, 1989.
Stephen A. Yokich, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant. Jennifer A. Keller, Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., J. Todd Faulkner, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee. Before CUMMINGS, WOOD, Jr., and MANION, Circuit Judges. CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge.
1 In March 1983, Rebecca Maganuco filed suit against Leyden Community High School District 212 alleging that the school district's maternity leave policy violated Sections 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("the Act"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k). In November 1984, Susan Scherr filed suit against Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50 similarly alleging that her school district's maternity leave policy violated Title VII. The district courts granted summary judgments in favor of the defendant school districts under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of liability. We reverse in part and remand.
2 * Rebecca Maganuco, a tenured teacher at Leyden Community High School ("Leyden"), became pregnant in 1981 and in June of that year informed the defendant school district that she planned to use accumulated paid sick leave to cover the period she expected to be disabled due to her pregnancy, and that as soon as she was no longer disabled, she planned to take an unpaid maternity leave for the remainder of the 1981-1982 school year. Despite her request to combine paid sick leave and an unpaid leave of absence to accommodate the period in which she was disabled as well as the period she chose to remain at home to care for her child, the school district's policy forced her to choose between taking either paid sick leave for the period in which she was disabled due to her pregnancy and delivery of her child, with an immediate return to work at the termination of her disability, or unpaid leave for both the period she was disabled and the period she remained at home to provide childcare.
3 Susan Scherr, a tenured teacher at Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50 ("Woodland"), became pregnant and requested paid sick leave from April 18, 1983 through the end of the 1982-1983 school year and a maternity leave for the 1983-1984 school year. Although Scherr was disabled from April 18 through the end of the 1982-1983 school year, Woodland did not allow her to take paid sick leave for this time. Instead, it required her to take an unpaid maternity leave for the entire period beginning April 18, 1983 through the 1983-1984 school year.
4 Each woman filed a suit alleging that her school district's leave policies discriminated against pregnant women. In both suits, the plaintiffs argued for liability under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories and asked for monetary damages for the days they were disabled but did not receive paid sick leave as well as permanent injunctive relief against the allegedly discriminatory maternity leave policies.
5 In Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On October 24, 1984, Judge Paul E. Plunkett denied Maganuco's motion for summary judgment, granted Leyden's motion for summary judgment on Maganuco's disparate treatment theory and denied Leyden's motion for summary judgment on Maganuco's disparate impact theory. The parties filed cross-motions for reconsideration and on June 7, 1985, Judge Plunkett reaffirmed his decision. The case was transferred to Judge Ann Williams and the parties proceeded with their preparations for trial on the disparate impact theory.
6 Meanwhile, the parties in Scherr v. Woodland Community Consolidated School District No. 50, which was also before Judge Williams, filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 15, 1986, Judge Williams denied Scherr's motion for summary judgment and granted Woodland's motion for summary judgment under both the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. Seeking a different result on the disparate impact theory in a factually similar case also before Judge Williams, the parties in Maganuco renewed their cross-motions for summary judgment. Stating that it would be anomalous for the court to allow Maganuco to go to trial on the disparate impact claim when it had already held in Scherr that such a claim could not succeed, Judge Williams disagreed with Judge Plunkett and granted defendant Leyden's motion for summary judgment. Both plaintiffs appealed and this Court consolidated the cases.
7 Both school districts provide teachers three types of leave: (1) paid sick leave--with continuing unpaid sick leave for extended illness, (2) unpaid maternity leave, and (3) an unpaid general leave of absence. In both school districts, a pregnant teacher can choose only one of the three forms of leave.
8 The school districts have similar paid sick leave policies. Teachers employed by Leyden accumulate 17 paid days of sick leave per year and unused days accumulate from year to year up to a maximum of 180 days. Teachers who exhaust their accumulated sick leave may be granted an extended, unpaid, personal illness leave to cover the period during which they remain disabled. Pregnant teachers may elect to use their accumulated sick leave to cover the period during which they are disabled; those who do are paid for the days they are disabled and must return to work as soon as they are no longer disabled.
9 Teachers employed by Woodland accumulate 11 days of paid sick leave per year and may accumulate up to 180 days. Teachers who exhaust their paid sick leave may be eligible, after a one-day waiting period, for up to 10 additional days of paid sick leave from the sick-leave "bank." Teachers who remain disabled after exhausting the sick-leave bank are eligible for unpaid "continuing illness" leave for the longer of 90 days or the remainder of the school year, although the Board of Education may at its discretion extend the leave for the duration of the disability. A teacher may elect to use disability leave (i.e., sick days, sick-bank days or continuing illness leave) during any period of disability related to her pregnancy and/or to the delivery of the child. Any teacher who elects disability leave must return to work immediately following the termination of the disability.
10 Both school districts also provide unpaid maternity leave as of right. At Leyden, any tenured teacher who becomes pregnant will be granted a maternity leave of up to three semesters, commencing on the date her doctor considers her unable to carry on her teaching duties. The teacher must give the administration no less than 60 days notice prior to the leave and at least 90 days notice prior to the end of the preceding semester of the date when she wants to start work. The administration may delay her return until the beginning of the school year following her request to return. Any teacher who opts for maternity/child-rearing leave must forgo the benefit of receiving paid sick leave for the period she is actually disabled due to the child's birth. However, paid sick leave is available prior to the commencement of a scheduled maternity/child-rearing leave if the teacher becomes ill, whether or not the illness is related to her pregnancy.
11 The terms of Woodland's unpaid maternity leave plan are provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the teachers' union and Woodland. Under the plan, teachers must schedule the leave in consultation with the Superintendent. The agreed-upon leave plan must be scheduled to take into consideration maintenance of continuity of instruction and medical factors to the maximum degree possible and must commence upon the earliest of (1) fifteen days prior to the anticipated delivery date, (2) the actual delivery date, or (3) the date on which the teacher becomes unable to perform her duties. The leave cannot exceed the balance of the school term in which it commences and one additional term, and every effort must be made to have the leave terminate prior to the start of a new school term. A teacher who elects to take a maternity leave and then becomes ill prior to the scheduled commencement of the leave, may use her sick days even if the illness is due to her pregnancy. However, the collective bargaining agreement expressly states that sick leave is not applicable during the period of the maternity leave; as a result, since maternity leave must begin at the latest date prior to the actual delivery date, a pregnant teacher who chooses maternity leave cannot take paid sick days for the period during which she is disabled. Woodland's maternity leave policy also expressly states that nothing in the policy shall be construed as requiring any teacher to apply for a maternity leave and reasserts the independent option of using accumulated sick leave during any period of disability related to her pregnancy or the delivery of the child and returning to work immediately following the termination of the disability.
12 Finally, both school districts provide for an unpaid general leave of absence. Under the Leyden policy, any tenured teacher may request a leave of absence and at least one-half of those applying each year must be granted this leave. In practice, all ten requests for general leave during the time period relevant to this case were granted. General leaves of absence at Leyden must begin and end in conformance with the school year. Woodland offers, at the Board's discretion, an unpaid leave of absence of up to one year. Such requests are normally granted and may begin at any agreed-upon time. Nothing in either of the school district's leave policies precludes a pregnant teacher from using this leave instead of maternity leave.
II
13 The defendant school districts, aided by the United States as amicus curiae, raise an argument that questions the theoretical foundations of the PDA. They contend that the PDA is a sweeping mandate of equal treatment, but does not contemplate disparate impact claims.1 They find support for this contention in both the plain language and legislative history of the PDA. From the language of the statute they emphasize the portion that states, "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k) (emphasis added). From the legislative history they argue that "[t]he primary purpose of the PDA was to eliminate the need for employees to rely on disparate impact analysis to support their Title VII claims based on pregnancy classifications '[b]y making clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII.' " (H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 4749, 4751). By the same token, Congress intended that disparate impact analysis would play no role in the pregnancy context after passage of the PDA. (Br. of the United States at 19.)
14 In their arguments, the defendants err by neglecting the context of the PDA and treating it as an independent statutory enactment. It is not. The PDA is an amendment to a highly developed statutory scheme added in response to the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976).
15 In Gilbert, the Court held that General Electric's exclusion of pregnancy coverage from its otherwise comprehensive disability plan did not constitute discrimination based on sex. While acknowledging that pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, the Court nevertheless reasoned that the pregnancy classification was not sex-based because it divided potential beneficiaries into two groups--"pregnant women and non-pregnant persons." Id. at 135-36, 97 S.Ct. at 407-08.
16 Congress " 'unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision' " by amending Title VII. California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 691, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 2628, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983)). The amendment contained in the PDA provides in relevant part that:
17 (k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work....
18 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k). Congress inserted the PDA as a new subsection to the definitions section which is applicable "[f]or the purposes of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e. Placed where it is within the Act as section 701(k), the PDA supplements the meaning of "because of sex" and "on the basis of sex" within Title VII as a whole. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678, 103 S.Ct. at 2628.
19 As a definitional amendment, the PDA provides no substantive rule to govern pregnancy discrimination. Instead, as part of Title VII, the PDA finds force through the substantive sections of the Act, sections 703(a)(1) and (2).2 Title VII prohibits two types of employment discrimination. First, it prohibits disparate treatment-intentional discriminatory treatment of employees based on impermissible criteria. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Second, it prohibits disparate impact--facially neutral practices that nevertheless have a discriminatory impact and are not justified by business necessity. Id. Because the PDA is part of Title VII and derives its substance and procedures from the Act as a whole, a claim of pregnancy discrimination, like any other claim of discrimination under Title VII, may be based either on a theory of disparate treatment or a theory of disparate impact.3 See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 700-01 (8th Cir.1987); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258-59 n. 2 (8th Cir.1984); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1984); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir.1982); Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C.Cir.1981) (all using disparate impact under the PDA).
20 The context in which the PDA was enacted indicates that, contrary to defendants' argument, Congress did not intend the same treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities to mean identical treatment. As discussed infra, Congress passed the PDA in reaction to Supreme Court decisions that permitted employers to exclude pregnancy from insurance coverage because of its unique status. When it considered the PDA, Congress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insurance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977), and opposition to the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of including pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans, not from those who favored special accommodation of pregnancy. Cal.Fed., 107 S.Ct. at 692. In this context, it is clear that the statutory requirement that pregnancy receive the "same" treatment as other disabilities was not intended as an ultimate end, but as a means of assuring that pregnancy would not be excluded, as it was in Gilbert, from any list of compensable disabilities. See Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 690, 719.4 Moreover, interpreting "same" to mean "identical" would go against "[t]he entire thrust ... behind this legislation [which] is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life." 123 Cong.Rec. 29658 (1977) (quoted with approval in Cal.Fed., 107 S.Ct. at 693-94).
21 In their argument that Congress intended the PDA to preclude a disparate impact approach, the defendants ignore not only the broad context in which the PDA was passed, but also the remainder of the sentence they quote for support. See infra p. 980. As to the broad context, under Gilbert, pregnancy classifications were gender neutral. Therefore when the Supreme Court considered a pregnancy discrimination claim in Satty, it used the theory applicable to facially neutral practices--disparate impact--and subsequently found that the employer's policy of denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from pregnancy leave violated Title VII. Congress recognized that the result of Gilbert and Satty was to leave employers and employees in the untenable position of guessing whether their policies violated Title VII. H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977). Through the PDA, Congress eliminated a great deal of this confusion by reversing the premise that pregnancy-based classifications were gender neutral and expressly recognizing pregnancy-based classifications as sex-based. As proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized, the "amending legislation was necessary to re-establish the principles of Title VII law as they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision." Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679, 103 S.Ct. at 2628. Accordingly, the PDA did not abolish "the impact approach." It restored it to its original purpose under Title VII as a means of challenging facially neutral employment practices that nevertheless discriminate. See Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L.J. 929, 936 (1985).
22 As to the narrow context, the remainder of the quotation relied on by the defendants makes clear the error in their conclusion that Congress intended disparate impact analysis to play no role in pregnancy discrimination cases. The full quotation reads as follows: "By making it clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate the need in most instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Satty." Id. As the full quotation reveals, Congress anticipated that the PDA would eliminate the need for a disparate impact theory "in most instances," thereby recognizing that in some instances plaintiffs would still need to rely on Title VII's disparate impact approach to rectify discrimination against them.
23 Finally, defendants argue that even if plaintiffs generally can use the disparate impact theory under the PDA, the plaintiffs in these cases cannot because their claims are under section 703(a)(1) for discrimination "with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment" and the disparate impact theory is inapplicable to violations of this section of Title VII. The disparate impact theory developed in cases alleging violations of section 703(a)(2) (e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977)), and the Supreme Court has not yet expressly decided whether subsection (a)(1), like (a)(2), allows a suit based on disparate impact. Other courts, including this one, have followed the Supreme Court's lead by not addressing the issue directly and have applied a disparate impact analysis to section 703(a)(1) claims without considering whether the claims were being brought under section 703(a)(1) or (a)(2). See, e.g., Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1130 (7th Cir.1983); EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 540 (6th Cir.1981). However, since oral argument in this case, we addressed the issue directly and held that disparate impact theory applies under section 703(a)(1) as well. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1127 (7th Cir.1987). Two other Circuits have addressed the issue directly and both have held that disparate impact claims can be brought under section 703(a)(1). EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir.1988) (expressly agreeing with our reasoning in Colby ); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir.1983).
24 Having resolved the more general legal question of whether plaintiffs Scherr and Maganuco can attempt to establish pregnancy discrimination on a disparate impact theory, we turn to the specific inquiries of whether issues of material fact exist that preclude the grants of summary judgment in favor of the defendant school districts in both cases on both theories.
III Disparate Treatment A. Scherr v. Woodland
25 In October 1984, Judge Plunkett granted the defendant school district Leyden's motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment theory because he found that the school district's "policies, at least on their face, 'discriminate' between forseeable and unforseeable disabilities, not between pregnancy-related disabilities and other disabilities." Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, No. 83 C 1975, slip op. at 8 (N.D.Ill.1984). Thus, in a manner reminiscent of the since rejected theory of Gilbert, he held that the policies were not facially discriminatory on the basis of sex.
26 One month later, Susan Scherr filed her virtually identical suit against Woodland and Woodland defended on the theory that its leave policies differentiated between forseeable and unforseeable disabilities. Judge Williams correctly recognized this argument for what it was--"a post-hoc attempt to fit its [Woodland's] leave policies within Judge Plunkett's scheme." Scherr v. Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50, No. 84 C 10185, slip op. at 8 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.1986) . Judge Williams nevertheless granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor on the disparate treatment theory because she found that no group was treated more favorably than pregnant teachers in the application of defendant's sick leave and non-disability leave policies.
27 Judge Williams' rejection of the forseeability-unforseeability distinction left Woodland without an explanation for differences in its policies. Rather than formulate another explanation for the differences, on appeal Woodland argues that no differences exist. It asserts that under its leave policies, no teacher, man or woman, pregnant or not pregnant, may combine paid and unpaid leaves to run consecutively. Both Woodland and Scherr agree that such a "no combination" policy exists for maternity leave; this policy is stated in Article VI(D)(4) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. However, the parties dispute the existence of a "no combination" policy for non-pregnant teachers. Both agree that no such restriction is expressly stated in defendant's written nondisability leave of absence policy, Section 4152.8 of the Policy Manual, but Woodland asserts the existence of an informal, unwritten policy.5 Woodland supports this assertion with the following statement in the affidavit of Superintendent Arden Luce: "8. Paid Sick leave or any other disability related leave is not available during the term of any nondisability related leave of absence identified in paragraphs 6 [maternity leave]--7 [general leave of absence] above."
28 In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the district court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 394 (7th Cir.1988). Upon review, we must consider the entire record and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record in the same light. Id.; Jakubiec v. Cities Services Co., 844 F.2d 470, 471 (7th Cir.1988). There is substantial evidence to support Scherr's contention that Woodland did not have a legitimate "no combination" policy applicable to non-pregnant teachers prior to her lawsuit. The purported policy was never formally adopted, never made the subject of collective bargaining, never communicated to those to whom it applied, and never actually applied. Whether Woodland has a no combination policy applicable to non-pregnant teachers is a genuine issue of material fact that goes to the heart of Scherr's ability to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment.6
29 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Manion contends that the disability leave plans of the school districts, in isolation, do not result in a disparate impact on pregnant teachers since the pregnant teachers are not forced into forgoing their paid sick days, but instead presumably choose to forgo them in favor of the longer maternity leave. Indeed, the dissent regards the availability of unpaid maternity leave as a gratuitous "extra option," since maternity leave is not available to non-pregnant teachers. This fails to recognize that although maternity leave is not available to non-pregnant teachers, a similar general leave of absence is available to all teachers.
30 Plaintiffs simply seek to be allowed to combine paid sick leave with unpaid maternity leave if the school districts allow or have failed to establish a legitimate policy against combination of paid sick leave and a general leave of absence. The dissent must then assume that no material question of fact exists regarding the existence of a policy prohibiting the combination of paid sick leave with any unpaid leave. We, on the other hand, hold that there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether Woodland had a legitimate "no-combination" policy in place prior to this lawsuit for both pregnant and non-pregnant teachers since no such policy was ever formally adopted or communicated to the teachers prior to this suit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for such a determination.
B. Maganuco v. Leyden
31 As discussed above, in Maganuco Judge Plunkett granted the defendant Leyden's motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment theory because he found that the policies discriminated on the basis of the forseeability of the disability, not on the basis of sex. Although rejecting this rationale, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.
32 Like Woodland, Leyden asserts that it treats all teachers alike, that no Leyden teacher may take disability leave days during the period of a non-disability leave or schedule disability and non-disability leave to run consecutively, so that there is no facial discrimination to support Maganuco's disparate treatment theory. Also like Woodland, Leyden has a written policy prohibiting a teacher from combining paid sick leave for the period of disability due to pregnancy and childbirth with unpaid maternity leave for the following period in which she is not disabled (Board/Union Contract, Article X, Section 4), but no written policy prohibiting the combination of paid sick leave with a general leave of absence.7 And like Woodland, Leyden has never granted a request to combine sick leave with a general leave of absence (no teacher has ever made such a request) and there is no evidence that it ever articulated such a policy prior to this litigation.
33 However, Leyden prevails where Woodland lost because of a critical factual difference in the leave policies of the two school districts--general leaves of absence at Leyden must begin and end in conformance with the school year. Because a general leave of absence must begin at the beginning of the school year, no teacher could ever take paid sick leave immediately prior to the beginning of his or her general unpaid leave of absence. Prior to that time, school would be in summer recess and the teacher would not be working, and thus not entitled to paid sick leave. From the terms of its leave of absence policy, it is clear that Leyden would not allow any teacher to use paid sick leave immediately prior to taking a leave of absence. Because no teacher may combine the two types of leave, there is no disparate treatment. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Leyden on the disparate treatment theory.
IV Disparate Impact
34 In both Scherr and Maganuco, Judge Williams granted the defendant school districts' motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' disparate impact claims. We reverse and remand both cases.
A. Scherr v. Woodland
35 In Scherr, the court stated that it "believe[d] that neither plaintiff's nor defendant's evidence sheds any light on the impact of defendant's leave policies on pregnant teachers." The court nevertheless granted summary judgment for the defendants because it found that Scherr "has pointed to no teacher or group of teachers upon whom defendant's leave policies had an impact different from the impact of those policies on pregnant teachers." The district court erred in two ways. First, finding neither party's evidence dispositive, it construed the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party making the motion. The facts must be construed to favor the party opposing the motion. See Jakubiec, 844 F.2d at 471.
36 Second, the district court required Scherr to present evidence of hypothetical non-pregnant teachers who would want to combine paid and unpaid leave. This is the type of evidence that would be appropriate to require in a disparate treatment case, but is inappropriate to require in a disparate impact case. "The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment analysis is used," Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2785, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), but the "factual issues and the character of the evidence are inevitably somewhat different when the plaintiff is exempted from the need to prove intentional discrimination.... The evidence in these 'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities." Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2784. Therefore rather than insisting on proof of the hypothetical non-pregnant teacher who would combine paid sick leave with unpaid general leave, the district court should look to the proof of the needs of pregnant teachers and compare that to the actual coverage. See California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir.1985), affirmed, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (equality in the disability context compares coverage to actual need, not coverage to hypothetical identical needs). Consequently we reverse and remand.
B. Maganuco v. Leyden
37 In Maganuco, Judge Williams disagreed with Judge Plunkett's prior ruling and granted Leyden's motion for summary judgment. Her rationale was that "it would be anomalous for this court to allow plaintiff to go to trial on the disparate impact claim when the court has already held in Scherr that such a claim cannot succeed." In Scherr, the court held that Scherr's disparate impact claim could not succeed; it did not hold that no disparate impact claim could succeed under the PDA. Therefore, it would not have been anomalous for Maganuco to proceed to trial on her claim if issues of material fact in her case remained unresolved, even though Scherr was precluded from proceeding to trial in her case. We agree with Judge Plunkett's original determination that whether Leyden's leave policies have a disparate impact on pregnant teachers is an issue that, on the basis of the current record, cannot be resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment.
38 Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, costs to be borne by the respective parties.
39 MANION, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
40 I concur in the majority's analysis of Scherr's and Maganuco's disparate treatment claims. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's decision to remand the disparate impact claims.
41 The United States presents a valid amicus argument that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not authorize disparate impact claims, at least where a facially neutral disability leave policy is at issue. Certainly, the PDA's language seems to support this result: "women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work...." (Emphasis added.) This plain language would seem to foreclose disparate impact claims, without resort to legislative history. But there is also much in the legislative history that supports the government's view. For example, the Senate Report states that
42 the [PDA] does not require employers to treat pregnant women in any particular manner with respect to hiring, permitting them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing medical and hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. The [PDA] would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.
43 S.Rep. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977), reprinted in Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1977 for the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 41 (1979) ("Leg.Hist."); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1977), Leg.Hist. at 150. Other statements in the legislative history echo the theme that the PDA does not require employers to provide disability leave or other disability benefits to pregnant employees if the employer does not provide the same benefits to other employees. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 95-331 at 4, 6, Leg.Hist. at 41, 43; H.R.Rep. No. 95-948 at 5, Leg.Hist. at 151; 123 Cong.Rec. 29,663 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias) ("[the PDA] does not, however, require that an employer do anything more for his pregnant employees than he does for any other employees."). The statutory language and legislative history strongly suggest that if a court finds that an employer has not intentionally discriminated against pregnant women by its disability leave plan (that is, if the plan treats all employees alike), the Title VII inquiry ends.
44 The majority has provided a reasonable answer to the government's argument, however, and the question of whether the PDA authorizes disparate impact claims is a close one. But that broad question is one we need not decide because Scherr and Maganuco have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on their disparate impact claims.
45 To succeed on a disparate impact claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show "that a facially neutral employment practice has a significant adverse impact on members of a protected ... group." Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 834 F.2d 697, 700 (8th Cir.1987) (emphasis added). In reversing on the disparate impact claims, the majority does not even identify the adverse impact the school districts' leave plans have on pregnant teachers (or women teachers as a whole, for that matter). This is not surprising; Scherr and Maganuco have not shown that the school districts' leave policies adversely affect women. Since Scherr and Maganuco have failed to make a sufficient showing to establish that an adverse impact exists, an essential element of their claim, summary judgment was proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
46 The only evidence that Scherr produced in opposing Woodland's summary judgment motions were statistics showing that since 1978, thirty Woodland teachers have taken leave because of pregnancy, and twenty-eight of those teachers have taken unpaid maternity leave instead of paid sick days. Maganuco produced similar statistics in opposing Leyden's motion: since 1978, fifteen Leyden teachers have taken leave because of pregnancy, and twelve of those teachers used unpaid maternity leave instead of paid sick days. According to Scherr and Maganuco, these statistics show that the school districts' leave plans deprive women of the use of paid sick leave because the leave plans "force" pregnant teachers to use unpaid leave rather than paid sick days.
47 These statistics, however, do not demonstrate any disparate impact. The reason why becomes apparent if one assumes that only disability leave is available to pregnant teachers. Scherr and Maganuco have not alleged or attempted to prove that the school districts' disability leave plans are insufficient to allow a pregnant teacher to fully recover from her pregnancy-related disability and resume teaching, or that the disability leave policies adversely affect women's employment opportunities in any other way. Cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977) (leave plan that forced pregnant employees to take a formal leave after which they were denied accumulated seniority upon returning to work had a disparate impact on women); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1984) (pregnant x-ray technician fired because of facially-neutral offspring protection policy); Abraham v. Graphic Arts Intern. Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir.1981) (limiting leave to ten days had disparate impact on women because it made pregnancy "virtually tantamount to dismissal"); see also 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.10(c) (EEOC regulations) ("Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates [Title VII] if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity."). (Emphasis added.) It is also obvious that if only disability leave were available, Scherr and Maganuco could make no argument that pregnant teachers are "forced" to forego using sick days. In short, the school districts' disability leave plans, standing alone, work no disparate impact on women. That being so, I fail to see how adding extra options for pregnant teachers (one of which, maternity leave, is not even available to other teachers) works a disparate impact on women. If anything, the extra option not available to other teachers is a benefit to pregnant teachers.
48 As Judge Williams noted, Scherr's and Maganuco's statistics "show only that pregnant teachers would rather take the longer maternity leave than the shorter paid sick leave when they become disabled due to pregnancy." Scherr v. Woodland Community Consolidated School Dist. No. 50, No. 84 C 10185, slip op. at 10. The school districts' leave policies do not "force" the teachers to give up sick days; instead, the teachers presumably choose to forego paid sick days because they want to spend more time at home after their pregnancy rather than immediately return to work when their pregnancy-related disabilities end.*
49 What Scherr and Maganuco want is a maternity leave plan that provides the best of both the disability leave plan (paid sick days for childbirth and its related disabilities) and the present maternity leave plan (extended time at home for child care), even if a comparable plan is not available to other teachers who need sick leave. In essence, they contend that Title VII mandates time off for child care, over and above a sufficient period of time to recover from pregnancy-related disability and return to work. While this may be desirable policy, it is a policy that Scherr and Maganuco must pursue in Congress, in the state legislature, or through the collective bargaining process, not in the federal courts.
1 This argument was made by the amicus curiae and adopted by the defendant school districts
2 Section 703 of Title VII provides that: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities.
3 The Supreme Court explained the difference between the two theories as follows: 'Disparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.... Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity.... Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory.... Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55 n. 15.
4 For additional discussion of whether the "same" treatment requires identical treatment and the choice between equal treatment and special treatment, see Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, LIV Fordham L.Rev. 699 (1986); Minnow, Justice Engendered, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 10 (1987); Note, The Conflict Between State Guaranteed Pregnancy Benefits and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Statutory Analysis, 74 Geo.L.J. 1743 (1986); Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L.J. 929 (1985)
5 Consideration of an unwritten, informal plan is appropriate. The EEOC regulations promulgated pursuant to the PDA expressly apply to both written and unwritten employment policies and practices as well as formal and informal sick leave plans. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.10(a) and (b)
6 The elements of a prima facie case of sex discrimination when the plaintiff alleges that employees of one sex are discriminately denied a benefit that is extended to employees of the opposite sex is an unsettled issue in this Circuit. In Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 2246 n. 8, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981), the Supreme Court did not expressly state the necessary elements. Resolution of the cases before us have not required resolution of the issue and in the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court we have not squarely addressed it. Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 411 (7th Cir.1988); Jennings v. Tinley Park Community Consolidated School District No. 146, 796 F.2d 962, 965 n. 2 (7th Cir.1986). Instead, in both cases we assumed, without so holding, "that to establish a prima facie case plaintiffs need only show a difference in treatment between two major groups of employees of different sex." Beard, 840 F.2d at 411; Jennings, 796 F.2d at 965 n. 2; see also Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Insurance Co., 653 F.2d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir.1981), certiorari denied, 454 U.S. 1146, 102 S.Ct. 1008, 71 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982) (affirming district court's determination that prima facie case existed without formulating a standard). Resolution of the Woodland case does not demand resolution of the issue, so that again we make the same legal assumption and remand to the district court for the predicate factual detemination
7 Article X, Section 4 of the Leyden Board/Union Contract provides in part that a pregnant teacher will be "granted a maternity leave to commence on the date her doctor considers her unable to carry on her teaching duties." As a result, a pregnant teacher is foreclosed from using her paid sick leave at the beginning of her pregnancy-related disability followed by a maternity leave, since the maternity leave must begin on the date the teacher becomes disabled due to her pregnancy, rather than on the later date when her paid sick leave is exhausted
* It was not improper, as the majority implies, Majority Opinion at 983, for Judge Williams to apply the reasoning from her decision in Scherr's case to enter summary judgment against Maganuco on her disparate impact claim. Since Scherr and Maganuco presented almost identical evidence to support their disparate impact claims, and since they made identical arguments, it would have been "anomalous" for Judge Williams to treat the two claims differently | 08-23-2011 | [
"867 F.2d 974 48 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 386,48 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 38,399, 51 Ed. Law Rep. 1140 Susan SCHERR, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.WOODLAND SCHOOL COMMUNITY CONSOLIDATED DISTRICT NO. 50,Defendant-Appellee.Rebecca MAGANUCO, on behalf of herself and numerous otherswho are similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants,v.LEYDEN COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 212, Defendant-Appellee. Nos. 87-1275, 87-1682 and 87-1705. United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit. Argued Nov. 30, 1987.Decided Nov. 1, 1988.Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Feb. 8, 1989. Stephen A. Yokich, Cornfield & Feldman, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant. Jennifer A. Keller, Robbins, Schwartz, Nicholas, Lifton & Taylor, Ltd., J. Todd Faulkner, Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee. Before CUMMINGS, WOOD, Jr., and MANION, Circuit Judges.",
"CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge. 1 In March 1983, Rebecca Maganuco filed suit against Leyden Community High School District 212 alleging that the school district's maternity leave policy violated Sections 703(a)(1) and (a)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (\"the Act\"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2), as amended by the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (\"PDA\"), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k). In November 1984, Susan Scherr filed suit against Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50 similarly alleging that her school district's maternity leave policy violated Title VII. The district courts granted summary judgments in favor of the defendant school districts under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of liability. We reverse in part and remand. 2 * Rebecca Maganuco, a tenured teacher at Leyden Community High School (\"Leyden\"), became pregnant in 1981 and in June of that year informed the defendant school district that she planned to use accumulated paid sick leave to cover the period she expected to be disabled due to her pregnancy, and that as soon as she was no longer disabled, she planned to take an unpaid maternity leave for the remainder of the 1981-1982 school year. Despite her request to combine paid sick leave and an unpaid leave of absence to accommodate the period in which she was disabled as well as the period she chose to remain at home to care for her child, the school district's policy forced her to choose between taking either paid sick leave for the period in which she was disabled due to her pregnancy and delivery of her child, with an immediate return to work at the termination of her disability, or unpaid leave for both the period she was disabled and the period she remained at home to provide childcare.",
"3 Susan Scherr, a tenured teacher at Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50 (\"Woodland\"), became pregnant and requested paid sick leave from April 18, 1983 through the end of the 1982-1983 school year and a maternity leave for the 1983-1984 school year. Although Scherr was disabled from April 18 through the end of the 1982-1983 school year, Woodland did not allow her to take paid sick leave for this time. Instead, it required her to take an unpaid maternity leave for the entire period beginning April 18, 1983 through the 1983-1984 school year. 4 Each woman filed a suit alleging that her school district's leave policies discriminated against pregnant women. In both suits, the plaintiffs argued for liability under both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories and asked for monetary damages for the days they were disabled but did not receive paid sick leave as well as permanent injunctive relief against the allegedly discriminatory maternity leave policies. 5 In Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On October 24, 1984, Judge Paul E. Plunkett denied Maganuco's motion for summary judgment, granted Leyden's motion for summary judgment on Maganuco's disparate treatment theory and denied Leyden's motion for summary judgment on Maganuco's disparate impact theory. The parties filed cross-motions for reconsideration and on June 7, 1985, Judge Plunkett reaffirmed his decision.",
"The case was transferred to Judge Ann Williams and the parties proceeded with their preparations for trial on the disparate impact theory. 6 Meanwhile, the parties in Scherr v. Woodland Community Consolidated School District No. 50, which was also before Judge Williams, filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On December 15, 1986, Judge Williams denied Scherr's motion for summary judgment and granted Woodland's motion for summary judgment under both the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories. Seeking a different result on the disparate impact theory in a factually similar case also before Judge Williams, the parties in Maganuco renewed their cross-motions for summary judgment. Stating that it would be anomalous for the court to allow Maganuco to go to trial on the disparate impact claim when it had already held in Scherr that such a claim could not succeed, Judge Williams disagreed with Judge Plunkett and granted defendant Leyden's motion for summary judgment.",
"Both plaintiffs appealed and this Court consolidated the cases. 7 Both school districts provide teachers three types of leave: (1) paid sick leave--with continuing unpaid sick leave for extended illness, (2) unpaid maternity leave, and (3) an unpaid general leave of absence. In both school districts, a pregnant teacher can choose only one of the three forms of leave. 8 The school districts have similar paid sick leave policies. Teachers employed by Leyden accumulate 17 paid days of sick leave per year and unused days accumulate from year to year up to a maximum of 180 days. Teachers who exhaust their accumulated sick leave may be granted an extended, unpaid, personal illness leave to cover the period during which they remain disabled. Pregnant teachers may elect to use their accumulated sick leave to cover the period during which they are disabled; those who do are paid for the days they are disabled and must return to work as soon as they are no longer disabled. 9 Teachers employed by Woodland accumulate 11 days of paid sick leave per year and may accumulate up to 180 days. Teachers who exhaust their paid sick leave may be eligible, after a one-day waiting period, for up to 10 additional days of paid sick leave from the sick-leave \"bank.\" Teachers who remain disabled after exhausting the sick-leave bank are eligible for unpaid \"continuing illness\" leave for the longer of 90 days or the remainder of the school year, although the Board of Education may at its discretion extend the leave for the duration of the disability.",
"A teacher may elect to use disability leave (i.e., sick days, sick-bank days or continuing illness leave) during any period of disability related to her pregnancy and/or to the delivery of the child. Any teacher who elects disability leave must return to work immediately following the termination of the disability. 10 Both school districts also provide unpaid maternity leave as of right. At Leyden, any tenured teacher who becomes pregnant will be granted a maternity leave of up to three semesters, commencing on the date her doctor considers her unable to carry on her teaching duties. The teacher must give the administration no less than 60 days notice prior to the leave and at least 90 days notice prior to the end of the preceding semester of the date when she wants to start work. The administration may delay her return until the beginning of the school year following her request to return.",
"Any teacher who opts for maternity/child-rearing leave must forgo the benefit of receiving paid sick leave for the period she is actually disabled due to the child's birth. However, paid sick leave is available prior to the commencement of a scheduled maternity/child-rearing leave if the teacher becomes ill, whether or not the illness is related to her pregnancy. 11 The terms of Woodland's unpaid maternity leave plan are provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the teachers' union and Woodland.",
"Under the plan, teachers must schedule the leave in consultation with the Superintendent. The agreed-upon leave plan must be scheduled to take into consideration maintenance of continuity of instruction and medical factors to the maximum degree possible and must commence upon the earliest of (1) fifteen days prior to the anticipated delivery date, (2) the actual delivery date, or (3) the date on which the teacher becomes unable to perform her duties. The leave cannot exceed the balance of the school term in which it commences and one additional term, and every effort must be made to have the leave terminate prior to the start of a new school term. A teacher who elects to take a maternity leave and then becomes ill prior to the scheduled commencement of the leave, may use her sick days even if the illness is due to her pregnancy.",
"However, the collective bargaining agreement expressly states that sick leave is not applicable during the period of the maternity leave; as a result, since maternity leave must begin at the latest date prior to the actual delivery date, a pregnant teacher who chooses maternity leave cannot take paid sick days for the period during which she is disabled. Woodland's maternity leave policy also expressly states that nothing in the policy shall be construed as requiring any teacher to apply for a maternity leave and reasserts the independent option of using accumulated sick leave during any period of disability related to her pregnancy or the delivery of the child and returning to work immediately following the termination of the disability. 12 Finally, both school districts provide for an unpaid general leave of absence. Under the Leyden policy, any tenured teacher may request a leave of absence and at least one-half of those applying each year must be granted this leave. In practice, all ten requests for general leave during the time period relevant to this case were granted.",
"General leaves of absence at Leyden must begin and end in conformance with the school year. Woodland offers, at the Board's discretion, an unpaid leave of absence of up to one year. Such requests are normally granted and may begin at any agreed-upon time. Nothing in either of the school district's leave policies precludes a pregnant teacher from using this leave instead of maternity leave. II 13 The defendant school districts, aided by the United States as amicus curiae, raise an argument that questions the theoretical foundations of the PDA. They contend that the PDA is a sweeping mandate of equal treatment, but does not contemplate disparate impact claims.1 They find support for this contention in both the plain language and legislative history of the PDA.",
"From the language of the statute they emphasize the portion that states, \"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes.\" 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(k) (emphasis added). From the legislative history they argue that \"[t]he primary purpose of the PDA was to eliminate the need for employees to rely on disparate impact analysis to support their Title VII claims based on pregnancy classifications '[b]y making clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII.' \" (H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) U.S.Code Cong.",
"& Admin.News 1978, pp. 4749, 4751). By the same token, Congress intended that disparate impact analysis would play no role in the pregnancy context after passage of the PDA. (Br. of the United States at 19.) 14 In their arguments, the defendants err by neglecting the context of the PDA and treating it as an independent statutory enactment. It is not.",
"The PDA is an amendment to a highly developed statutory scheme added in response to the Supreme Court's decision in General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976). 15 In Gilbert, the Court held that General Electric's exclusion of pregnancy coverage from its otherwise comprehensive disability plan did not constitute discrimination based on sex. While acknowledging that pregnancy is, of course, confined to women, the Court nevertheless reasoned that the pregnancy classification was not sex-based because it divided potential beneficiaries into two groups--\"pregnant women and non-pregnant persons.\" Id. at 135-36, 97 S.Ct.",
"at 407-08. 16 Congress \" 'unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning of the Court in the Gilbert decision' \" by amending Title VII. California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct. 683, 691, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 2628, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983)). The amendment contained in the PDA provides in relevant part that: 17 (k) The terms \"because of sex\" or \"on the basis of sex\" include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.... 18 42 U.S.C. Sec.",
"2000e(k). Congress inserted the PDA as a new subsection to the definitions section which is applicable \"[f]or the purposes of this subchapter.\" 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e. Placed where it is within the Act as section 701(k), the PDA supplements the meaning of \"because of sex\" and \"on the basis of sex\" within Title VII as a whole. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678, 103 S.Ct. at 2628. 19 As a definitional amendment, the PDA provides no substantive rule to govern pregnancy discrimination. Instead, as part of Title VII, the PDA finds force through the substantive sections of the Act, sections 703(a)(1) and (2).2 Title VII prohibits two types of employment discrimination. First, it prohibits disparate treatment-intentional discriminatory treatment of employees based on impermissible criteria.",
"International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Second, it prohibits disparate impact--facially neutral practices that nevertheless have a discriminatory impact and are not justified by business necessity. Id. Because the PDA is part of Title VII and derives its substance and procedures from the Act as a whole, a claim of pregnancy discrimination, like any other claim of discrimination under Title VII, may be based either on a theory of disparate treatment or a theory of disparate impact.3 See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 700-01 (8th Cir.1987); King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 258-59 n. 2 (8th Cir.1984); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1984); Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986, 989 (5th Cir.1982); Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union, 660 F.2d 811, 819 (D.C.Cir.1981) (all using disparate impact under the PDA). 20 The context in which the PDA was enacted indicates that, contrary to defendants' argument, Congress did not intend the same treatment of pregnancy and other disabilities to mean identical treatment.",
"As discussed infra, Congress passed the PDA in reaction to Supreme Court decisions that permitted employers to exclude pregnancy from insurance coverage because of its unique status. When it considered the PDA, Congress had before it extensive evidence of discrimination against pregnancy, particularly in disability and health insurance programs like those challenged in Gilbert and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977), and opposition to the PDA came from those concerned with the cost of including pregnancy in health and disability benefit plans, not from those who favored special accommodation of pregnancy. Cal.Fed., 107 S.Ct. at 692.",
"In this context, it is clear that the statutory requirement that pregnancy receive the \"same\" treatment as other disabilities was not intended as an ultimate end, but as a means of assuring that pregnancy would not be excluded, as it was in Gilbert, from any list of compensable disabilities. See Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83 Colum.L.Rev. 690, 719.4 Moreover, interpreting \"same\" to mean \"identical\" would go against \"[t]he entire thrust ... behind this legislation [which] is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental right to full participation in family life.\"",
"123 Cong.Rec. 29658 (1977) (quoted with approval in Cal.Fed., 107 S.Ct. at 693-94). 21 In their argument that Congress intended the PDA to preclude a disparate impact approach, the defendants ignore not only the broad context in which the PDA was passed, but also the remainder of the sentence they quote for support. See infra p. 980. As to the broad context, under Gilbert, pregnancy classifications were gender neutral. Therefore when the Supreme Court considered a pregnancy discrimination claim in Satty, it used the theory applicable to facially neutral practices--disparate impact--and subsequently found that the employer's policy of denying accumulated seniority to female employees returning from pregnancy leave violated Title VII. Congress recognized that the result of Gilbert and Satty was to leave employers and employees in the untenable position of guessing whether their policies violated Title VII. H.R.Rep.",
"No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1977). Through the PDA, Congress eliminated a great deal of this confusion by reversing the premise that pregnancy-based classifications were gender neutral and expressly recognizing pregnancy-based classifications as sex-based. As proponents of the bill repeatedly emphasized, the \"amending legislation was necessary to re-establish the principles of Title VII law as they had been understood prior to the Gilbert decision.\" Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679, 103 S.Ct. at 2628. Accordingly, the PDA did not abolish \"the impact approach.\" It restored it to its original purpose under Title VII as a means of challenging facially neutral employment practices that nevertheless discriminate. See Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L.J.",
"929, 936 (1985). 22 As to the narrow context, the remainder of the quotation relied on by the defendants makes clear the error in their conclusion that Congress intended disparate impact analysis to play no role in pregnancy discrimination cases. The full quotation reads as follows: \"By making it clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are per se violations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate the need in most instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Satty.\" Id. As the full quotation reveals, Congress anticipated that the PDA would eliminate the need for a disparate impact theory \"in most instances,\" thereby recognizing that in some instances plaintiffs would still need to rely on Title VII's disparate impact approach to rectify discrimination against them.",
"23 Finally, defendants argue that even if plaintiffs generally can use the disparate impact theory under the PDA, the plaintiffs in these cases cannot because their claims are under section 703(a)(1) for discrimination \"with respect to ... compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment\" and the disparate impact theory is inapplicable to violations of this section of Title VII. The disparate impact theory developed in cases alleging violations of section 703(a)(2) (e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct.",
"2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977)), and the Supreme Court has not yet expressly decided whether subsection (a)(1), like (a)(2), allows a suit based on disparate impact. Other courts, including this one, have followed the Supreme Court's lead by not addressing the issue directly and have applied a disparate impact analysis to section 703(a)(1) claims without considering whether the claims were being brought under section 703(a)(1) or (a)(2). See, e.g., Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1130 (7th Cir.1983); EEOC v. Ball Corp., 661 F.2d 531, 540 (6th Cir.1981). However, since oral argument in this case, we addressed the issue directly and held that disparate impact theory applies under section 703(a)(1) as well. Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1127 (7th Cir.1987). Two other Circuits have addressed the issue directly and both have held that disparate impact claims can be brought under section 703(a)(1). EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 843 F.2d 249, 252 (6th Cir.1988) (expressly agreeing with our reasoning in Colby ); Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 705 F.2d 1492, 1494 (9th Cir.1983). 24 Having resolved the more general legal question of whether plaintiffs Scherr and Maganuco can attempt to establish pregnancy discrimination on a disparate impact theory, we turn to the specific inquiries of whether issues of material fact exist that preclude the grants of summary judgment in favor of the defendant school districts in both cases on both theories. III Disparate Treatment A. Scherr v. Woodland 25 In October 1984, Judge Plunkett granted the defendant school district Leyden's motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment theory because he found that the school district's \"policies, at least on their face, 'discriminate' between forseeable and unforseeable disabilities, not between pregnancy-related disabilities and other disabilities.\"",
"Maganuco v. Leyden Community High School District 212, No. 83 C 1975, slip op. at 8 (N.D.Ill.1984). Thus, in a manner reminiscent of the since rejected theory of Gilbert, he held that the policies were not facially discriminatory on the basis of sex. 26 One month later, Susan Scherr filed her virtually identical suit against Woodland and Woodland defended on the theory that its leave policies differentiated between forseeable and unforseeable disabilities. Judge Williams correctly recognized this argument for what it was--\"a post-hoc attempt to fit its [Woodland's] leave policies within Judge Plunkett's scheme.\"",
"Scherr v. Woodland School Community Consolidated District No. 50, No. 84 C 10185, slip op. at 8 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.1986) . Judge Williams nevertheless granted summary judgment in the defendant's favor on the disparate treatment theory because she found that no group was treated more favorably than pregnant teachers in the application of defendant's sick leave and non-disability leave policies. 27 Judge Williams' rejection of the forseeability-unforseeability distinction left Woodland without an explanation for differences in its policies. Rather than formulate another explanation for the differences, on appeal Woodland argues that no differences exist. It asserts that under its leave policies, no teacher, man or woman, pregnant or not pregnant, may combine paid and unpaid leaves to run consecutively.",
"Both Woodland and Scherr agree that such a \"no combination\" policy exists for maternity leave; this policy is stated in Article VI(D)(4) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. However, the parties dispute the existence of a \"no combination\" policy for non-pregnant teachers. Both agree that no such restriction is expressly stated in defendant's written nondisability leave of absence policy, Section 4152.8 of the Policy Manual, but Woodland asserts the existence of an informal, unwritten policy.5 Woodland supports this assertion with the following statement in the affidavit of Superintendent Arden Luce: \"8. Paid Sick leave or any other disability related leave is not available during the term of any nondisability related leave of absence identified in paragraphs 6 [maternity leave]--7 [general leave of absence] above.\" 28 In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the district court must construe the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Richardson v. Penfold, 839 F.2d 392, 394 (7th Cir.1988).",
"Upon review, we must consider the entire record and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record in the same light. Id. ; Jakubiec v. Cities Services Co., 844 F.2d 470, 471 (7th Cir.1988). There is substantial evidence to support Scherr's contention that Woodland did not have a legitimate \"no combination\" policy applicable to non-pregnant teachers prior to her lawsuit. The purported policy was never formally adopted, never made the subject of collective bargaining, never communicated to those to whom it applied, and never actually applied.",
"Whether Woodland has a no combination policy applicable to non-pregnant teachers is a genuine issue of material fact that goes to the heart of Scherr's ability to make a prima facie case of disparate treatment.6 29 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Manion contends that the disability leave plans of the school districts, in isolation, do not result in a disparate impact on pregnant teachers since the pregnant teachers are not forced into forgoing their paid sick days, but instead presumably choose to forgo them in favor of the longer maternity leave. Indeed, the dissent regards the availability of unpaid maternity leave as a gratuitous \"extra option,\" since maternity leave is not available to non-pregnant teachers.",
"This fails to recognize that although maternity leave is not available to non-pregnant teachers, a similar general leave of absence is available to all teachers. 30 Plaintiffs simply seek to be allowed to combine paid sick leave with unpaid maternity leave if the school districts allow or have failed to establish a legitimate policy against combination of paid sick leave and a general leave of absence. The dissent must then assume that no material question of fact exists regarding the existence of a policy prohibiting the combination of paid sick leave with any unpaid leave. We, on the other hand, hold that there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether Woodland had a legitimate \"no-combination\" policy in place prior to this lawsuit for both pregnant and non-pregnant teachers since no such policy was ever formally adopted or communicated to the teachers prior to this suit. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for such a determination.",
"B. Maganuco v. Leyden 31 As discussed above, in Maganuco Judge Plunkett granted the defendant Leyden's motion for summary judgment on the disparate treatment theory because he found that the policies discriminated on the basis of the forseeability of the disability, not on the basis of sex. Although rejecting this rationale, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. 32 Like Woodland, Leyden asserts that it treats all teachers alike, that no Leyden teacher may take disability leave days during the period of a non-disability leave or schedule disability and non-disability leave to run consecutively, so that there is no facial discrimination to support Maganuco's disparate treatment theory. Also like Woodland, Leyden has a written policy prohibiting a teacher from combining paid sick leave for the period of disability due to pregnancy and childbirth with unpaid maternity leave for the following period in which she is not disabled (Board/Union Contract, Article X, Section 4), but no written policy prohibiting the combination of paid sick leave with a general leave of absence.7 And like Woodland, Leyden has never granted a request to combine sick leave with a general leave of absence (no teacher has ever made such a request) and there is no evidence that it ever articulated such a policy prior to this litigation. 33 However, Leyden prevails where Woodland lost because of a critical factual difference in the leave policies of the two school districts--general leaves of absence at Leyden must begin and end in conformance with the school year.",
"Because a general leave of absence must begin at the beginning of the school year, no teacher could ever take paid sick leave immediately prior to the beginning of his or her general unpaid leave of absence. Prior to that time, school would be in summer recess and the teacher would not be working, and thus not entitled to paid sick leave. From the terms of its leave of absence policy, it is clear that Leyden would not allow any teacher to use paid sick leave immediately prior to taking a leave of absence. Because no teacher may combine the two types of leave, there is no disparate treatment. We affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Leyden on the disparate treatment theory. IV Disparate Impact 34 In both Scherr and Maganuco, Judge Williams granted the defendant school districts' motions for summary judgment on the plaintiffs' disparate impact claims.",
"We reverse and remand both cases. A. Scherr v. Woodland 35 In Scherr, the court stated that it \"believe[d] that neither plaintiff's nor defendant's evidence sheds any light on the impact of defendant's leave policies on pregnant teachers.\" The court nevertheless granted summary judgment for the defendants because it found that Scherr \"has pointed to no teacher or group of teachers upon whom defendant's leave policies had an impact different from the impact of those policies on pregnant teachers.\"",
"The district court erred in two ways. First, finding neither party's evidence dispositive, it construed the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the party making the motion. The facts must be construed to favor the party opposing the motion. See Jakubiec, 844 F.2d at 471. 36 Second, the district court required Scherr to present evidence of hypothetical non-pregnant teachers who would want to combine paid and unpaid leave. This is the type of evidence that would be appropriate to require in a disparate treatment case, but is inappropriate to require in a disparate impact case. \"The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate in disparate impact cases do not imply that the legal issue is different than in cases where disparate treatment analysis is used,\" Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct.",
"2777, 2785, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion), but the \"factual issues and the character of the evidence are inevitably somewhat different when the plaintiff is exempted from the need to prove intentional discrimination.... The evidence in these 'disparate impact' cases usually focuses on statistical disparities, rather than specific incidents, and on competing explanations for those disparities.\" Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2784. Therefore rather than insisting on proof of the hypothetical non-pregnant teacher who would combine paid sick leave with unpaid general leave, the district court should look to the proof of the needs of pregnant teachers and compare that to the actual coverage. See California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir.1985), affirmed, 479 U.S. 272, 107 S.Ct.",
"683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987) (equality in the disability context compares coverage to actual need, not coverage to hypothetical identical needs). Consequently we reverse and remand. B. Maganuco v. Leyden 37 In Maganuco, Judge Williams disagreed with Judge Plunkett's prior ruling and granted Leyden's motion for summary judgment. Her rationale was that \"it would be anomalous for this court to allow plaintiff to go to trial on the disparate impact claim when the court has already held in Scherr that such a claim cannot succeed.\" In Scherr, the court held that Scherr's disparate impact claim could not succeed; it did not hold that no disparate impact claim could succeed under the PDA. Therefore, it would not have been anomalous for Maganuco to proceed to trial on her claim if issues of material fact in her case remained unresolved, even though Scherr was precluded from proceeding to trial in her case. We agree with Judge Plunkett's original determination that whether Leyden's leave policies have a disparate impact on pregnant teachers is an issue that, on the basis of the current record, cannot be resolved on cross-motions for summary judgment.",
"38 Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded, costs to be borne by the respective parties. 39 MANION, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. 40 I concur in the majority's analysis of Scherr's and Maganuco's disparate treatment claims. I respectfully dissent, however, from the majority's decision to remand the disparate impact claims. 41 The United States presents a valid amicus argument that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not authorize disparate impact claims, at least where a facially neutral disability leave policy is at issue. Certainly, the PDA's language seems to support this result: \"women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ... as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work....\" (Emphasis added.)",
"This plain language would seem to foreclose disparate impact claims, without resort to legislative history. But there is also much in the legislative history that supports the government's view. For example, the Senate Report states that 42 the [PDA] does not require employers to treat pregnant women in any particular manner with respect to hiring, permitting them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing medical and hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any other matter. The [PDA] would simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work. 43 S.Rep. No. 95-331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.",
"4 (1977), reprinted in Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1977 for the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources 41 (1979) (\"Leg.Hist. \"); see also H.R.Rep. No. 95-948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1977), Leg.Hist. at 150. Other statements in the legislative history echo the theme that the PDA does not require employers to provide disability leave or other disability benefits to pregnant employees if the employer does not provide the same benefits to other employees. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 95-331 at 4, 6, Leg.Hist. at 41, 43; H.R.Rep. No.",
"95-948 at 5, Leg.Hist. at 151; 123 Cong.Rec. 29,663 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Mathias) (\"[the PDA] does not, however, require that an employer do anything more for his pregnant employees than he does for any other employees.\"). The statutory language and legislative history strongly suggest that if a court finds that an employer has not intentionally discriminated against pregnant women by its disability leave plan (that is, if the plan treats all employees alike), the Title VII inquiry ends. 44 The majority has provided a reasonable answer to the government's argument, however, and the question of whether the PDA authorizes disparate impact claims is a close one. But that broad question is one we need not decide because Scherr and Maganuco have failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on their disparate impact claims.",
"45 To succeed on a disparate impact claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show \"that a facially neutral employment practice has a significant adverse impact on members of a protected ... group.\" Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 834 F.2d 697, 700 (8th Cir.1987) (emphasis added). In reversing on the disparate impact claims, the majority does not even identify the adverse impact the school districts' leave plans have on pregnant teachers (or women teachers as a whole, for that matter).",
"This is not surprising; Scherr and Maganuco have not shown that the school districts' leave policies adversely affect women. Since Scherr and Maganuco have failed to make a sufficient showing to establish that an adverse impact exists, an essential element of their claim, summary judgment was proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 46 The only evidence that Scherr produced in opposing Woodland's summary judgment motions were statistics showing that since 1978, thirty Woodland teachers have taken leave because of pregnancy, and twenty-eight of those teachers have taken unpaid maternity leave instead of paid sick days. Maganuco produced similar statistics in opposing Leyden's motion: since 1978, fifteen Leyden teachers have taken leave because of pregnancy, and twelve of those teachers used unpaid maternity leave instead of paid sick days. According to Scherr and Maganuco, these statistics show that the school districts' leave plans deprive women of the use of paid sick leave because the leave plans \"force\" pregnant teachers to use unpaid leave rather than paid sick days.",
"47 These statistics, however, do not demonstrate any disparate impact. The reason why becomes apparent if one assumes that only disability leave is available to pregnant teachers. Scherr and Maganuco have not alleged or attempted to prove that the school districts' disability leave plans are insufficient to allow a pregnant teacher to fully recover from her pregnancy-related disability and resume teaching, or that the disability leave policies adversely affect women's employment opportunities in any other way. Cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 98 S.Ct. 347, 54 L.Ed.2d 356 (1977) (leave plan that forced pregnant employees to take a formal leave after which they were denied accumulated seniority upon returning to work had a disparate impact on women); Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.1984) (pregnant x-ray technician fired because of facially-neutral offspring protection policy); Abraham v. Graphic Arts Intern.",
"Union, 660 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir.1981) (limiting leave to ten days had disparate impact on women because it made pregnancy \"virtually tantamount to dismissal\"); see also 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.10(c) (EEOC regulations) (\"Where the termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a termination violates [Title VII] if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.\"). (Emphasis added.) It is also obvious that if only disability leave were available, Scherr and Maganuco could make no argument that pregnant teachers are \"forced\" to forego using sick days.",
"In short, the school districts' disability leave plans, standing alone, work no disparate impact on women. That being so, I fail to see how adding extra options for pregnant teachers (one of which, maternity leave, is not even available to other teachers) works a disparate impact on women. If anything, the extra option not available to other teachers is a benefit to pregnant teachers. 48 As Judge Williams noted, Scherr's and Maganuco's statistics \"show only that pregnant teachers would rather take the longer maternity leave than the shorter paid sick leave when they become disabled due to pregnancy.\" Scherr v. Woodland Community Consolidated School Dist.",
"No. 50, No. 84 C 10185, slip op. at 10. The school districts' leave policies do not \"force\" the teachers to give up sick days; instead, the teachers presumably choose to forego paid sick days because they want to spend more time at home after their pregnancy rather than immediately return to work when their pregnancy-related disabilities end. * 49 What Scherr and Maganuco want is a maternity leave plan that provides the best of both the disability leave plan (paid sick days for childbirth and its related disabilities) and the present maternity leave plan (extended time at home for child care), even if a comparable plan is not available to other teachers who need sick leave. In essence, they contend that Title VII mandates time off for child care, over and above a sufficient period of time to recover from pregnancy-related disability and return to work. While this may be desirable policy, it is a policy that Scherr and Maganuco must pursue in Congress, in the state legislature, or through the collective bargaining process, not in the federal courts.",
"1 This argument was made by the amicus curiae and adopted by the defendant school districts 2 Section 703 of Title VII provides that: (a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-- (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities. 3 The Supreme Court explained the difference between the two theories as follows: 'Disparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination.",
"The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment.... Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate impact.' The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity....",
"Proof of discriminatory motive, we have held, is not required under a disparate-impact theory.... Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-55 n. 15. 4 For additional discussion of whether the \"same\" treatment requires identical treatment and the choice between equal treatment and special treatment, see Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences into Account, LIV Fordham L.Rev. 699 (1986); Minnow, Justice Engendered, 101 Harv.L.Rev. 10 (1987); Note, The Conflict Between State Guaranteed Pregnancy Benefits and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Statutory Analysis, 74 Geo.L.J.",
"1743 (1986); Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 94 Yale L.J. 929 (1985) 5 Consideration of an unwritten, informal plan is appropriate. The EEOC regulations promulgated pursuant to the PDA expressly apply to both written and unwritten employment policies and practices as well as formal and informal sick leave plans. 29 C.F.R. Sec. 1604.10(a) and (b) 6 The elements of a prima facie case of sex discrimination when the plaintiff alleges that employees of one sex are discriminately denied a benefit that is extended to employees of the opposite sex is an unsettled issue in this Circuit. In Washington County v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 2242, 2246 n. 8, 68 L.Ed.2d 751 (1981), the Supreme Court did not expressly state the necessary elements. Resolution of the cases before us have not required resolution of the issue and in the absence of further guidance from the Supreme Court we have not squarely addressed it. Beard v. Whitley County REMC, 840 F.2d 405, 411 (7th Cir.1988); Jennings v. Tinley Park Community Consolidated School District No.",
"146, 796 F.2d 962, 965 n. 2 (7th Cir.1986). Instead, in both cases we assumed, without so holding, \"that to establish a prima facie case plaintiffs need only show a difference in treatment between two major groups of employees of different sex.\" Beard, 840 F.2d at 411; Jennings, 796 F.2d at 965 n. 2; see also Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Insurance Co., 653 F.2d 1173, 1178 (7th Cir.1981), certiorari denied, 454 U.S. 1146, 102 S.Ct. 1008, 71 L.Ed.2d 299 (1982) (affirming district court's determination that prima facie case existed without formulating a standard). Resolution of the Woodland case does not demand resolution of the issue, so that again we make the same legal assumption and remand to the district court for the predicate factual detemination 7 Article X, Section 4 of the Leyden Board/Union Contract provides in part that a pregnant teacher will be \"granted a maternity leave to commence on the date her doctor considers her unable to carry on her teaching duties.\" As a result, a pregnant teacher is foreclosed from using her paid sick leave at the beginning of her pregnancy-related disability followed by a maternity leave, since the maternity leave must begin on the date the teacher becomes disabled due to her pregnancy, rather than on the later date when her paid sick leave is exhausted * It was not improper, as the majority implies, Majority Opinion at 983, for Judge Williams to apply the reasoning from her decision in Scherr's case to enter summary judgment against Maganuco on her disparate impact claim.",
"Since Scherr and Maganuco presented almost identical evidence to support their disparate impact claims, and since they made identical arguments, it would have been \"anomalous\" for Judge Williams to treat the two claims differently"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/518436/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
. ,- fr!LE§ IN RECEIVED IN The^^m - l^iSStS&r1* CAUSE NO. 06-15-00074-CV *D,strict OCT 2 3 2015 OCT 2 3 2015 DON A. WADE T Texarkana, Texas • • Debra Autreys Clerk Appellant FF nJ™k*na' Texas ^ebra K. Autrey, Clerk v.
HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL CORPORATION III Appellee
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE APPELLANT'S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Don A. Wade, Appellant, moves this Court to grant an extension of time to file
Appellant's Brife, and respectfully states:
1. Appellant's Brief is due on October 21, 2015, however, Appellant has
not had adequate time to research the records.
2. Appellant seeks a thirty day extension of time to file Appellant's Brief
from the due date, which would make Appellant's Brief due on or before
November 21, 2015.
3. This extension of time is necessary because Appellant requires time to
examine the records and transcript and study the defenses.
4. This is the first extension of time Appellant has sought for the filing
of his brief. For this reason, Don A. Wade requests that this court render an order
extending the time for filing Appellant's Brief to and including November 21,
2015.
^X^£^ Don A. Wade
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE
On October 20, 2015, an attempt was made to confer with Sarah S. Robbins
attorney for Appellee, in order to confer as to the extension, but was unable to
reach Ms. Robbins.
*f£^2zJ?
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On October 20, 2015, a copy of the attached motion for extension of time was sent by U. S. Postal Service to:
Sarah S. Robbins Hughes Watters & Askanase, LLP 333 Clay Street Houston, Texas 77002 | 09-29-2016 | [
". ,- fr!LE§ IN RECEIVED IN The^^m - l^iSStS&r1* CAUSE NO. 06-15-00074-CV *D,strict OCT 2 3 2015 OCT 2 3 2015 DON A. WADE T Texarkana, Texas • • Debra Autreys Clerk Appellant FF nJ™k*na' Texas ^ebra K. Autrey, Clerk v. HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL CORPORATION III Appellee APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE APPELLANT'S BRIEF TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS: Don A.",
"Wade, Appellant, moves this Court to grant an extension of time to file Appellant's Brife, and respectfully states: 1. Appellant's Brief is due on October 21, 2015, however, Appellant has not had adequate time to research the records. 2. Appellant seeks a thirty day extension of time to file Appellant's Brief from the due date, which would make Appellant's Brief due on or before November 21, 2015. 3. This extension of time is necessary because Appellant requires time to examine the records and transcript and study the defenses. 4. This is the first extension of time Appellant has sought for the filing of his brief. For this reason, Don A. Wade requests that this court render an order extending the time for filing Appellant's Brief to and including November 21, 2015. ^X^£^ Don A.",
"Wade CERTIFICATE OF CONFERENCE On October 20, 2015, an attempt was made to confer with Sarah S. Robbins attorney for Appellee, in order to confer as to the extension, but was unable to reach Ms. Robbins. *f£^2zJ? CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE On October 20, 2015, a copy of the attached motion for extension of time was sent by U. S. Postal Service to: Sarah S. Robbins Hughes Watters & Askanase, LLP 333 Clay Street Houston, Texas 77002"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/4067656/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Manner of Making Amendments to Patent Applications The status identifier for claim 2 should be “(Previously Presented)” and not “(Preciously Presented)”. See 37 C.F.R. 1.121(c) and MPEP 714(II)(C)(A). Appropriate correction is required.
Claim Interpretation Claims 1, 12, and 17 contain the limitation “annularly closed duct”, which is interpreted as an annularly closed groove on the base of the container, supported by Figs. 1-3. Regarding claims 1 and 13, the “variable” cross section of the bypass line could describe many different embodiments of a bypass line with obstructions or constrictions that could make the cross section of the bypass line variable. However, since the instant specification states that this variation means may be configured as a slider 36 (specification as filed, paragraph [0014]), it will be interpreted as the slider 36 (specification as filed, paragraph [0014]) and for example, a control valve (specification as filed, [0042]).
Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made.
The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
Claims 1-3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation). Regarding claim 1, Kassen discloses a container for generating biogas (paragraph [0002]) comprising: a cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]); a base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) arranged below the cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]), characterized in that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has an annularly closed circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), having an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having a cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section), a medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct having an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), having an outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) so as to discharge medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) from the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), and the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). Arguably, Kassen may disclose: an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having an inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) so as to admit medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) into the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) tangentially (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) to a vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), an annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is generated; and, when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is discharged through the outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), the annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is reinforced. Kassen does not disclose: so as to discharge medium from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container; a bypass line for connecting the outlet opening to the inlet opening, wherein the bypass line comprises a cross section that is variable. Regarding 1) of claim 1, Boer discloses an inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle 5”) having an inlet cross section (inherent that an opening has a cross-sectional area), so as to admit medium (middle of pg. 4 “feeding inoculum”) into the circulation duct tangentially to a vertical axis (beginning of pg. 5 “tangential direction” or Fig. 2) of the container (Fig. 2, element 1 “tank”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 2) of claim 1, Boer discloses when the medium (top of pg. 5, “water-rich waste masses containing fermentable organic substances”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle”), an annular flow in the circulation duct is generated (Fig. 2, element “R” and bottom of pg. 5, “mix its contents by means of the supply flow”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 3) of claim 1, Noonan discloses when the medium (paragraphs [0016]-[0017]) is discharged through the outlet opening (paragraphs [0016]-[0017] “effluent channel”), the annular flow in the circulation duct is reinforced (Figs. 1-4 and 6-7; paragraph [0052] “flow at least 360 degrees around the chamber”). In the analogous art of ring grit removers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the location and orientation of the outlet opening of modified Kassen with the outlet opening to reinforce the annular flow as in Noonan in order to lessen the footprint of the device, lower costs and reduce energy consumption (Noonan, paragraph [0011]). Regarding 4) of claim 1, Kirmair discloses discharging medium (paragraph [0086], “biomass” and Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”). Regarding the phrase “from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container”, the discharge pipe of Kirmair (Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”) could be placed offset to the vertical axis of the container, resulting in a tangential discharge relative to the vertical axis of the container. This placement or position would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container from an area of high fluid pressure to an area of low fluid pressure. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the discharge line of modified Kassen with the discharge line of Kirmair in order to orient the discharge of the medium to be tangentially oriented relative to the vertical axis of the container; this would be advantageous if further piping in the container were needed instead of laying piping underground and underneath the container. The tangential discharge of medium would also be helpful if circulation were needed in the container, depending on the inlet placement. Examples of circulating medium can be shown in Kirmair (Figs. 1 and 4-5). Regarding 5) of claim 1, Frick discloses a bypass line (Figs. 1-5, element 20, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) for connecting the outlet opening (Figs. 1-5, pipe vertical from element 21, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) to the inlet opening (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump” would have an opening, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13), wherein the bypass line comprises a cross section that is variable (Figs. 1-5, element 21 “multi-way valve”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the valve and piping schematic of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13). Regarding claim 2, Kassen discloses that the base (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has a planar central region (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) which is horizontally delimited by the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]). Regarding claim 3, Kassen discloses the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), and an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]). Kassen also describes pumping fluid into the container (paragraph [0032]). Kassen does not disclose an inlet pump or an outlet pump. Frick discloses an outlet pump (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the outlet pump of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13). Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump”, absent unexpected results, duplication of parts would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B). Also, regarding Kassen’s description of pumping into the container (Kassen, paragraph [0032]), it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date that this pumping action be done by an inlet pump. This inlet pump would allow pumping action to occur to the bottom of the tank against hydrostatic forces. Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump for admitting medium into the circulation duct via the inlet opening and/or an outlet pump for discharging medium from the circulation duct via the outlet opening”, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the pump to pump medium into the circulation duct or to discharge medium from the circulation duct in order to move the medium into and out of the fermenter.
Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of Wanjihia (US 2016/0088788). Regarding claim 4, arguably, Kassen discloses that the outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) is configured larger than the inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section). Assuming that Kassen does not fulfill the limitation above, Wanjihia discloses that the outlet cross section (paragraph [0012]) is configured larger (paragraph [0012]) than the inlet cross section (paragraph [0012]). In the analogous art of biogas-producing containers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the sizes of the inlet and outlet of modified Kassen with the larger outlet and smaller inlet sizes of Wanjihia in order to not have the apparatus blocked by solids at the slurry outlet (Wanjihia, paragraph [0071]).
Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of Gong (CN 105925465) (machine translation) and Yan (CN 103289185) (machine translation). Regarding claim 5, Kassen discloses the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) and a central region (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]). Kassen does not disclose a plastic material with a central region. Gong discloses a biogas slurry tank (abstract) made from a plastics material (paragraph [0009]) and a central region (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”).
PNG media_image1.png 655 727 media_image1.png Greyscale
Annotated Fig. 1 (Gong)
In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0016]). Modified Kassen does not disclose plastics material cast together. However, the limitation that the plastics material is cast together is a product-by-process limitation. “[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.” MPEP § 2113. Assuming, arguendo, that the patentability of the container does depend on its method of production, Yan discloses casting together plastics material for creating a biogas digester (paragraphs [0002] and [0032]). In the analogous art of creating plastic biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the process of creating the plastic component of modified Kassen with the process of casting the plastic material together as in Yan in order to obtain a high-strength plastic reactor (Yan, paragraphs [0010] and [0050] to [0052]).
Claims 6-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of Gong (CN 105925465) (machine translation). Regarding claim 6, Kassen discloses the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) and the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). Kassen does not disclose that a tapered portion, which is shaped conically, towards the base portion, is connected to the base portion in a direction of the vertical axis of the container. Gong discloses that a tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]), which is shaped conically (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]), towards the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”), is connected to the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”) in a direction of the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 1, inherent that there would be a vertical axis through the container). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]). Regarding claim 7, Kassen does not disclose that the tapered portion has plastics material walls. Gong discloses that the tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]) has plastics material walls (paragraph [0009]). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]).
Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), and Gong (CN 105925465) (machine translation), as applied to claim 6, above, further in view of Legratiet (EP 0270459) (machine translation). Regarding claim 8, Kassen does not disclose the tapered portion is introduced inground in a film-lined earth basin. Gong discloses the tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]). Legratiet discloses that the installation is introduced inground (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0033]) in a film-lined earth basin (paragraph [0040]). In the analogous art of installations that produce biogas, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the film-lined earth basin of Legratiet in order to be able to form the support for the base of the container via the ground.
Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation) as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of De Baere (US 2012/0064619). Regarding claim 9, Kassen discloses a stirring system (paragraph [0026], “agitator”) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) located in the container (paragraph [0002]). Assuming, arguendo, that the stirring system of Kassen does not meet the limitations of the instant claims, De Baere also discloses a stirring system (paragraph [0047]) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003]) located in the container (paragraph [0047]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]). Regarding claim 10, Kassen does not disclose that the stirring system comprises a lower opening, an upper opening and a pipeline. De Baere discloses that the stirring system (paragraph [0047]) comprises a lower opening (Fig. 1, element 9; paragraph [0045]), an upper opening (Fig. 1, element 6; paragraph [0047]) and a pipeline (Fig. 1, element 5; paragraph [0044]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]).
Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1, above, further in view of Legratiet (EP 0270459) (machine translation). Regarding claim 11, Kassen discloses the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]). Kassen does not disclose that the base portion is introduced inground on top of a gravel bed. Legratiet discloses that the installation is introduced inground (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0033]) on top of a gravel bed (paragraph [0037]). In the analogous art of installations that produce biogas, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the film-lined earth basin of Legratiet in order to be able to form the support for the base of the container via the ground.
Claims 12, 14, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), and Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation) in view of De Baere (US 2012/0064619). Regarding claim 12, Kassen discloses a container for generating biogas (paragraph [0002]) comprising: a cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]); a base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) arranged below the cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]), characterized in that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has an annularly closed circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), having an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having a cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section), a medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct having an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), having an outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) so as to discharge medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) from the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container); and a stirring system (paragraph [0026], “agitator”) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) located in the container (paragraph [0002]). Arguably, Kassen may disclose: an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having an inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) so as to admit medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) into the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) tangentially (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) to a vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), an annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is generated; and, when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is discharged through the outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), the annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is reinforced. Kassen does not disclose: so as to discharge medium from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container. Regarding 1) of claim 12, Boer discloses an inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle 5”) having an inlet cross section (inherent that an opening has a cross-sectional area), so as to admit medium (middle of pg. 4 “feeding inoculum”) into the circulation duct tangentially to a vertical axis (beginning of pg. 5 “tangential direction” or Fig. 2) of the container (Fig. 2, element 1 “tank”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 2) of claim 12, Boer discloses when the medium (top of pg. 5, “water-rich waste masses containing fermentable organic substances”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle”), an annular flow in the circulation duct is generated (Fig. 2, element “R” and bottom of pg. 5, “mix its contents by means of the supply flow”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 3) of claim 1, Noonan discloses when the medium (paragraphs [0016]-[0017]) is discharged through the outlet opening (paragraphs [0016]-[0017] “effluent channel”), the annular flow in the circulation duct is reinforced (Figs. 1-4 and 6-7; paragraph [0052] “flow at least 360 degrees around the chamber”). In the analogous art of ring grit removers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the location and orientation of the outlet opening of modified Kassen with the outlet opening to reinforce the annular flow as in Noonan in order to lessen the footprint of the device, lower costs and reduce energy consumption (Noonan, paragraph [0011]). Regarding 4) of claim 12, Kirmair discloses discharging medium (paragraph [0086], “biomass” and Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”). Regarding the phrase “from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container”, the discharge pipe of Kirmair (Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”) could be placed offset to the vertical axis of the container, resulting in a tangential discharge relative to the vertical axis of the container. This placement or position would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container from an area of high fluid pressure to an area of low fluid pressure. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the discharge line of modified Kassen with the discharge line of Kirmair in order to orient the discharge of the medium to be tangentially oriented relative to the vertical axis of the container; this would be advantageous if further piping in the container were needed instead of laying piping underground and underneath the container. The tangential discharge of medium would also be helpful if circulation were needed in the container, depending on the inlet placement. Examples of circulating medium can be shown in Kirmair (Figs. 1 and 4-5). Assuming, arguendo, that the stirring system of Kassen does not meet the limitations of the instant claims, De Baere also discloses a stirring system (paragraph [0047]) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003]) located in the container (paragraph [0047]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]). Regarding claim 14, Kassen discloses that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has a planar central region (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) which is horizontally delimited by the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]). Regarding claim 16, Kassen does not disclose that the stirring system comprises a lower opening, an upper opening and a pipeline. De Baere discloses that the stirring system (paragraph [0047]) comprises a lower opening (Fig. 1, element 9; paragraph [0045]), an upper opening (Fig. 1, element 6; paragraph [0047]) and a pipeline (Fig. 1, element 5; paragraph [0044]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]).
Claims 13 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), and Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and De Baere (US 2012/0064619) as applied to claim 12 above, further in view of Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation). Regarding claim 13, Kassen discloses the outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) and the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]). Kassen does not disclose a bypass line comprising a cross section that is variable. Frick discloses a bypass line (Figs. 1-5, element 20, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) for connecting the outlet opening (Figs. 1-5, pipe vertical from element 21, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) to the inlet opening (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump” would have an opening, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13), wherein the bypass line comprises a cross section that is variable (Figs. 1-5, element 21 “multi-way valve”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the valve and piping schematic of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13). Regarding claim 15, Kassen discloses the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), and an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]). Kassen also describes pumping fluid into the container (paragraph [0032]). Kassen does not disclose an inlet pump or an outlet pump. Frick discloses an outlet pump (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the outlet pump of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13). Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump”, absent unexpected results, duplication of parts would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B). Also, regarding Kassen’s description of pumping into the container (Kassen, paragraph [0032]), it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date that this pumping action be done by an inlet pump. This inlet pump would allow pumping action to occur to the bottom of the tank against hydrostatic forces. Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump for admitting medium into the circulation duct via the inlet opening and/or an outlet pump for discharging medium from the circulation duct via the outlet opening”, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the pump to pump medium into the circulation duct or to discharge medium from the circulation duct in order to move the medium into and out of the fermenter.
Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation). Regarding claim 17, Kassen discloses a container for generating biogas (paragraph [0002]) comprising: a cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]); a base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) arranged below the cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]), characterized in that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has an annularly closed circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), having an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having a cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section), a medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct having an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), having an outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) so as to discharge medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) from the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container); and the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), and an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]). Kassen also describes pumping fluid into the container (paragraph [0032]). Arguably, Kassen may disclose: an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having an inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) so as to admit medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) into the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) tangentially (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) to a vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), an annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is generated; and, when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is discharged through the outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), the annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is reinforced. Kassen does not disclose: so as to discharge medium from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container; and, an inlet pump or an outlet pump. Regarding 1) of claim 17, Boer discloses an inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle 5”) having an inlet cross section (inherent that an opening has a cross-sectional area), so as to admit medium (middle of pg. 4 “feeding inoculum”) into the circulation duct tangentially to a vertical axis (beginning of pg. 5 “tangential direction” or Fig. 2) of the container (Fig. 2, element 1 “tank”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 2) of claim 17, Boer discloses when the medium (top of pg. 5, “water-rich waste masses containing fermentable organic substances”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle”), an annular flow in the circulation duct is generated (Fig. 2, element “R” and bottom of pg. 5, “mix its contents by means of the supply flow”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 3) of claim 1, Noonan discloses when the medium (paragraphs [0016]-[0017]) is discharged through the outlet opening (paragraphs [0016]-[0017] “effluent channel”), the annular flow in the circulation duct is reinforced (Figs. 1-4 and 6-7; paragraph [0052] “flow at least 360 degrees around the chamber”). In the analogous art of ring grit removers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the location and orientation of the outlet opening of modified Kassen with the outlet opening to reinforce the annular flow as in Noonan in order to lessen the footprint of the device, lower costs and reduce energy consumption (Noonan, paragraph [0011]). Regarding 4) of claim 17, Kirmair discloses discharging medium (paragraph [0086], “biomass” and Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”). Regarding the phrase “from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container”, the discharge pipe of Kirmair (Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”) could be placed offset to the vertical axis of the container, resulting in a tangential discharge relative to the vertical axis of the container. This placement or position would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container from an area of high fluid pressure to an area of low fluid pressure. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the discharge line of modified Kassen with the discharge line of Kirmair in order to orient the discharge of the medium to be tangentially oriented relative to the vertical axis of the container; this would be advantageous if further piping in the container were needed instead of laying piping underground and underneath the container. The tangential discharge of medium would also be helpful if circulation were needed in the container, depending on the inlet placement. Examples of circulating medium can be shown in Kirmair (Figs. 1 and 4-5). As to 5) of claim 17, Frick discloses an outlet pump (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the outlet pump of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13). Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump”, absent unexpected results, duplication of parts would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B). Also, regarding Kassen’s description of pumping into the container (Kassen, paragraph [0032]), it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date that this pumping action be done by an inlet pump. This inlet pump would allow pumping action to occur to the bottom of the tank against hydrostatic forces. Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump for admitting medium into the circulation duct via the inlet opening and/or an outlet pump for discharging medium from the circulation duct via the outlet opening”, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the pump to pump medium into the circulation duct or to discharge medium from the circulation duct in order to move the medium into and out of the fermenter.
Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 17 above, further in view of De Baere (US 2012/0064619). Regarding claim 18, Kassen discloses the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) and the container (paragraph [0002]); and a stirring system (paragraph [0026], “agitator”) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) located in the container (paragraph [0002]). Kassen does not disclose that the stirring system comprises a lower opening, an upper opening and a pipeline. De Baere discloses that the stirring system (paragraph [0047]) comprises a lower opening (Fig. 1, element 9; paragraph [0045]), an upper opening (Fig. 1, element 6; paragraph [0047]) and a pipeline (Fig. 1, element 5; paragraph [0044]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]).
Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation) as applied to claim 17 above, further in view of Gong (CN 105925465). Regarding claim 19, Kassen does not disclose that a tapered portion, which is shaped conically towards the base portion, is connected to the base portion in a direction of the vertical axis of the container. Gong discloses that a tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]), which is shaped conically (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]) towards the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”), is connected to the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”) in a direction of the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 1, inherent that there would be a vertical axis through the container). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]).
Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation) as applied to claim 17 above, further in view of Wanjihia (US 2016/0088788). Regarding claim 20, arguably, Kassen discloses that the outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) is configured larger than the inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section). Assuming that Kassen does not fulfill the limitation above, Wanjihia discloses that the outlet cross section (paragraph [0012]) is configured larger (paragraph [0012]) than the inlet cross section (paragraph [0012]). In the analogous art of biogas-producing containers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the sizes of the inlet and outlet of modified Kassen with the larger outlet and smaller inlet sizes of Wanjihia in order to not have the apparatus blocked by solids at the slurry outlet (Wanjihia, paragraph [0071]).
Additional Prior Art References The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Csepregi (HU 196344) (machine translation) – This invention is a two-phase sludge reactor with tangential feeds. Jianguang (CN 102139955) (machine translation) – This invention is a multistage recirculation reactor for anaerobic sludge. Gantefort (US 2009/0305376) – This invention is an annular fermenter for producing biogas. Vellinga (US 5,565,098) – This invention is a water treatment reactor with tangential feeds and a tangential outlet line (Fig. 2), but does not have a similar structure to the base portion with an annularly closed circulation duct. Morandini (DE 10201916) (machine translation) – This invention is a separation device for effluent with an inlet and outlet pipe, at least the inlet pipe feeding tangentially into the tank. “Recycle Reactors” – This is a reference that describes the equations governing recycle reactors. Beliveau (US 8,715,511) – This invention is a method and apparatus for sewage grit removal. Noonan (US 2016/0263587) – This invention is a grit removal chamber for wastewater. Weis (US 2008/0105604) – This invention is a grit trap for wastewater. Davis (US 6,811,697) – This invention is a grit extractor with tangential inlets and outlets. Messick (US 8,906,233) – This invention is a ring grit remover with vanes. Wilson (US 6,881,350) – This invention is a chamber that collects wastewater solids and grit.
Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments filed on June 21, 2022 with respect to the claims have been fully considered but are either not persuasive or moot in view of the new grounds of rejection.
Regarding the arguments about: 1. Kassen teaches the amended section regarding an outlet opening that allows for annular flow in the circulation duct. The duct of Kassen is annular and discharging the medium through the outlet opening would naturally allow for flow from the duct to occur. Kassen dictates that “the sediments are conveyed in the direction of the discharge opening 9 solely by the flow of liquid and the incline and the rotary movement by the agitator” (Kassen, paragraph [0034]). Of these three factors: the flow of the liquid, the incline, and the rotary movement by the agitator, the instant application only discloses the flow of the liquid, as there is no incline or agitator. However, this flow of liquid is produced by a pump, which is obvious in the art to produce fluid flow. Modifying Kassen to have a pump on the outlet would be an obvious modification in order to promote quicker fluid movement and turnover through the fermentation tank. Assuming that the instant invention is enabled, this obvious pump modification would then enable Kassen to work as intended, similarly to the instant invention due to the similar structural arrangements. 2. The combination of Kassen and Kirmair teaches the element 4). Modified Kassen would be able to be structurally oriented so that a sloped pipe of Kirmair would be able to be placed in a tangential orientation on the circular base of modified Kassen. This placement would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container. Extra work is already present in both Kirmair and the instant invention in the form of a pump, which pumps against the flow of gravity. A sidewall opening would occur at some point in Kirmair, but also in the instant invention. The instant invention would have the openings near the base, while the pipes of Kirmair would be able to located on the base to go through the sidewall there as well. Given the amended section of the outlet above, now given in newly cited Noonan (US 2016/0038952), there is also a tangential setup to the outlet, causing the discharge from the circulation duct to also be tangential to the vertical axis of the container. 3. Regarding arguments about Kassen and Frick not teaching element 5), bypass lines are well known in the art. A multi-way valve disclosed in Frick shows a pipe leading to element 19, another pipe leading to the housing, and a third line to the outside. Since the multi-way valve can be used to bypass the outside line and recirculate the medium back into the housing, it is considered a bypass line. Regarding dependent claims 4-11, the independent claim 1 is still obvious in relation to the prior art. Since no other arguments were given for these dependent claims, they are still considered rejected. Regarding independent claims 12 and 17, the arguments rebutting Applicant arguments about similar and corresponding portions of claim 1’s parts 3) and 4) have already been explained. Additionally, Noonan describes the amended portion concerning the outlet. Regarding dependent claims 13-16, the independent claim 12 is still obvious in relation to the prior art. Since no other arguments were given for these dependent claims, they are still considered rejected. Regarding dependent claims 18-20, the independent claim 17 is still obvious in relation to the prior art. Since no other arguments were given for these dependent claims, they are still considered rejected. Conclusion Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a). Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action.
Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to NATHAN G ESPERON whose telephone number is 571-272-9807, and whose fax number is 571-273-8464. The examiner can normally be reached 9 am - 6 pm Monday through Thursday, and 9 am - 6 pm every other Friday. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Michael Marcheschi can be reached at 571-272-1374. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /N.G.E./Examiner, Art Unit 1799
/DONALD R SPAMER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1799 | 2022-08-27T10:54:03 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Manner of Making Amendments to Patent Applications The status identifier for claim 2 should be “(Previously Presented)” and not “(Preciously Presented)”. See 37 C.F.R. 1.121(c) and MPEP 714(II)(C)(A). Appropriate correction is required. Claim Interpretation Claims 1, 12, and 17 contain the limitation “annularly closed duct”, which is interpreted as an annularly closed groove on the base of the container, supported by Figs. 1-3. Regarding claims 1 and 13, the “variable” cross section of the bypass line could describe many different embodiments of a bypass line with obstructions or constrictions that could make the cross section of the bypass line variable. However, since the instant specification states that this variation means may be configured as a slider 36 (specification as filed, paragraph [0014]), it will be interpreted as the slider 36 (specification as filed, paragraph [0014]) and for example, a control valve (specification as filed, [0042]).",
"Claim Rejections - 35 USC § 103 In the event the determination of the status of the application as subject to AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103 (or as subject to pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. 102 and 103) is incorrect, any correction of the statutory basis for the rejection will not be considered a new ground of rejection if the prior art relied upon, and the rationale supporting the rejection, would be the same under either status. The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C.",
"103 which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: A patent for a claimed invention may not be obtained, notwithstanding that the claimed invention is not identically disclosed as set forth in section 102, if the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention pertains. Patentability shall not be negated by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103 are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.",
"4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. Claims 1-3 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation). Regarding claim 1, Kassen discloses a container for generating biogas (paragraph [0002]) comprising: a cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]); a base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) arranged below the cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]), characterized in that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has an annularly closed circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the circulation duct (Figs.",
"2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), having an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having a cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section), a medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct having an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), having an outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) so as to discharge medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) from the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), and the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). Arguably, Kassen may disclose: an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having an inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) so as to admit medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) into the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) tangentially (Figs.",
"4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) to a vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), an annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is generated; and, when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is discharged through the outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), the annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is reinforced. Kassen does not disclose: so as to discharge medium from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container; a bypass line for connecting the outlet opening to the inlet opening, wherein the bypass line comprises a cross section that is variable. Regarding 1) of claim 1, Boer discloses an inlet opening (Figs.",
"1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle 5”) having an inlet cross section (inherent that an opening has a cross-sectional area), so as to admit medium (middle of pg. 4 “feeding inoculum”) into the circulation duct tangentially to a vertical axis (beginning of pg. 5 “tangential direction” or Fig. 2) of the container (Fig. 2, element 1 “tank”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 2) of claim 1, Boer discloses when the medium (top of pg. 5, “water-rich waste masses containing fermentable organic substances”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle”), an annular flow in the circulation duct is generated (Fig.",
"2, element “R” and bottom of pg. 5, “mix its contents by means of the supply flow”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 3) of claim 1, Noonan discloses when the medium (paragraphs [0016]-[0017]) is discharged through the outlet opening (paragraphs [0016]-[0017] “effluent channel”), the annular flow in the circulation duct is reinforced (Figs. 1-4 and 6-7; paragraph [0052] “flow at least 360 degrees around the chamber”). In the analogous art of ring grit removers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the location and orientation of the outlet opening of modified Kassen with the outlet opening to reinforce the annular flow as in Noonan in order to lessen the footprint of the device, lower costs and reduce energy consumption (Noonan, paragraph [0011]). Regarding 4) of claim 1, Kirmair discloses discharging medium (paragraph [0086], “biomass” and Fig.",
"3, element 64 “discharge pipe”). Regarding the phrase “from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container”, the discharge pipe of Kirmair (Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”) could be placed offset to the vertical axis of the container, resulting in a tangential discharge relative to the vertical axis of the container. This placement or position would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container from an area of high fluid pressure to an area of low fluid pressure. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the discharge line of modified Kassen with the discharge line of Kirmair in order to orient the discharge of the medium to be tangentially oriented relative to the vertical axis of the container; this would be advantageous if further piping in the container were needed instead of laying piping underground and underneath the container. The tangential discharge of medium would also be helpful if circulation were needed in the container, depending on the inlet placement. Examples of circulating medium can be shown in Kirmair (Figs. 1 and 4-5).",
"Regarding 5) of claim 1, Frick discloses a bypass line (Figs. 1-5, element 20, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) for connecting the outlet opening (Figs. 1-5, pipe vertical from element 21, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) to the inlet opening (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump” would have an opening, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13), wherein the bypass line comprises a cross section that is variable (Figs. 1-5, element 21 “multi-way valve”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the valve and piping schematic of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13).",
"Regarding claim 2, Kassen discloses that the base (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has a planar central region (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) which is horizontally delimited by the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]). Regarding claim 3, Kassen discloses the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), and an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]). Kassen also describes pumping fluid into the container (paragraph [0032]). Kassen does not disclose an inlet pump or an outlet pump. Frick discloses an outlet pump (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13).",
"In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the outlet pump of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13). Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump”, absent unexpected results, duplication of parts would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B). Also, regarding Kassen’s description of pumping into the container (Kassen, paragraph [0032]), it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date that this pumping action be done by an inlet pump.",
"This inlet pump would allow pumping action to occur to the bottom of the tank against hydrostatic forces. Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump for admitting medium into the circulation duct via the inlet opening and/or an outlet pump for discharging medium from the circulation duct via the outlet opening”, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the pump to pump medium into the circulation duct or to discharge medium from the circulation duct in order to move the medium into and out of the fermenter. Claim 4 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of Wanjihia (US 2016/0088788). Regarding claim 4, arguably, Kassen discloses that the outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) is configured larger than the inlet cross section (Figs.",
"4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section). Assuming that Kassen does not fulfill the limitation above, Wanjihia discloses that the outlet cross section (paragraph [0012]) is configured larger (paragraph [0012]) than the inlet cross section (paragraph [0012]). In the analogous art of biogas-producing containers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the sizes of the inlet and outlet of modified Kassen with the larger outlet and smaller inlet sizes of Wanjihia in order to not have the apparatus blocked by solids at the slurry outlet (Wanjihia, paragraph [0071]). Claim 5 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of Gong (CN 105925465) (machine translation) and Yan (CN 103289185) (machine translation). Regarding claim 5, Kassen discloses the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) and a central region (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]).",
"Kassen does not disclose a plastic material with a central region. Gong discloses a biogas slurry tank (abstract) made from a plastics material (paragraph [0009]) and a central region (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”). PNG media_image1.png 655 727 media_image1.png Greyscale Annotated Fig. 1 (Gong) In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0016]). Modified Kassen does not disclose plastics material cast together. However, the limitation that the plastics material is cast together is a product-by-process limitation.",
"“[E]ven though product-by-process claims are limited by and defined by the process, determination of patentability is based on the product itself. The patentability of a product does not depend on its method of production. If the product in the product-by-process claim is the same as or obvious from a product of the prior art, the claim is unpatentable even though the prior product was made by a different process.” MPEP § 2113. Assuming, arguendo, that the patentability of the container does depend on its method of production, Yan discloses casting together plastics material for creating a biogas digester (paragraphs [0002] and [0032]). In the analogous art of creating plastic biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the process of creating the plastic component of modified Kassen with the process of casting the plastic material together as in Yan in order to obtain a high-strength plastic reactor (Yan, paragraphs [0010] and [0050] to [0052]). Claims 6-7 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of Gong (CN 105925465) (machine translation). Regarding claim 6, Kassen discloses the base portion (Fig.",
"3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) and the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). Kassen does not disclose that a tapered portion, which is shaped conically, towards the base portion, is connected to the base portion in a direction of the vertical axis of the container. Gong discloses that a tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]), which is shaped conically (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]), towards the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”), is connected to the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”) in a direction of the vertical axis of the container (Fig.",
"1, inherent that there would be a vertical axis through the container). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]). Regarding claim 7, Kassen does not disclose that the tapered portion has plastics material walls. Gong discloses that the tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]) has plastics material walls (paragraph [0009]).",
"In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]). Claim 8 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), and Gong (CN 105925465) (machine translation), as applied to claim 6, above, further in view of Legratiet (EP 0270459) (machine translation).",
"Regarding claim 8, Kassen does not disclose the tapered portion is introduced inground in a film-lined earth basin. Gong discloses the tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]). Legratiet discloses that the installation is introduced inground (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0033]) in a film-lined earth basin (paragraph [0040]). In the analogous art of installations that produce biogas, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the film-lined earth basin of Legratiet in order to be able to form the support for the base of the container via the ground. Claims 9 and 10 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.",
"103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation) as applied to claim 1 above, further in view of De Baere (US 2012/0064619). Regarding claim 9, Kassen discloses a stirring system (paragraph [0026], “agitator”) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) located in the container (paragraph [0002]). Assuming, arguendo, that the stirring system of Kassen does not meet the limitations of the instant claims, De Baere also discloses a stirring system (paragraph [0047]) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003]) located in the container (paragraph [0047]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]). Regarding claim 10, Kassen does not disclose that the stirring system comprises a lower opening, an upper opening and a pipeline.",
"De Baere discloses that the stirring system (paragraph [0047]) comprises a lower opening (Fig. 1, element 9; paragraph [0045]), an upper opening (Fig. 1, element 6; paragraph [0047]) and a pipeline (Fig. 1, element 5; paragraph [0044]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]). Claim 11 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 1, above, further in view of Legratiet (EP 0270459) (machine translation).",
"Regarding claim 11, Kassen discloses the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]). Kassen does not disclose that the base portion is introduced inground on top of a gravel bed. Legratiet discloses that the installation is introduced inground (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0033]) on top of a gravel bed (paragraph [0037]). In the analogous art of installations that produce biogas, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the film-lined earth basin of Legratiet in order to be able to form the support for the base of the container via the ground. Claims 12, 14, and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), and Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation) in view of De Baere (US 2012/0064619).",
"Regarding claim 12, Kassen discloses a container for generating biogas (paragraph [0002]) comprising: a cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]); a base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) arranged below the cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]), characterized in that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has an annularly closed circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), having an inlet opening (Figs.",
"4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having a cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section), a medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct having an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), having an outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) so as to discharge medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) from the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container); and a stirring system (paragraph [0026], “agitator”) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) located in the container (paragraph [0002]). Arguably, Kassen may disclose: an inlet opening (Figs.",
"4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having an inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) so as to admit medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) into the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) tangentially (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) to a vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), an annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is generated; and, when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is discharged through the outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), the annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs.",
"2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is reinforced. Kassen does not disclose: so as to discharge medium from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container. Regarding 1) of claim 12, Boer discloses an inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle 5”) having an inlet cross section (inherent that an opening has a cross-sectional area), so as to admit medium (middle of pg. 4 “feeding inoculum”) into the circulation duct tangentially to a vertical axis (beginning of pg. 5 “tangential direction” or Fig. 2) of the container (Fig.",
"2, element 1 “tank”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 2) of claim 12, Boer discloses when the medium (top of pg. 5, “water-rich waste masses containing fermentable organic substances”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs.",
"1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle”), an annular flow in the circulation duct is generated (Fig. 2, element “R” and bottom of pg. 5, “mix its contents by means of the supply flow”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 3) of claim 1, Noonan discloses when the medium (paragraphs [0016]-[0017]) is discharged through the outlet opening (paragraphs [0016]-[0017] “effluent channel”), the annular flow in the circulation duct is reinforced (Figs. 1-4 and 6-7; paragraph [0052] “flow at least 360 degrees around the chamber”). In the analogous art of ring grit removers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the location and orientation of the outlet opening of modified Kassen with the outlet opening to reinforce the annular flow as in Noonan in order to lessen the footprint of the device, lower costs and reduce energy consumption (Noonan, paragraph [0011]).",
"Regarding 4) of claim 12, Kirmair discloses discharging medium (paragraph [0086], “biomass” and Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”). Regarding the phrase “from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container”, the discharge pipe of Kirmair (Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”) could be placed offset to the vertical axis of the container, resulting in a tangential discharge relative to the vertical axis of the container. This placement or position would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container from an area of high fluid pressure to an area of low fluid pressure. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the discharge line of modified Kassen with the discharge line of Kirmair in order to orient the discharge of the medium to be tangentially oriented relative to the vertical axis of the container; this would be advantageous if further piping in the container were needed instead of laying piping underground and underneath the container.",
"The tangential discharge of medium would also be helpful if circulation were needed in the container, depending on the inlet placement. Examples of circulating medium can be shown in Kirmair (Figs. 1 and 4-5). Assuming, arguendo, that the stirring system of Kassen does not meet the limitations of the instant claims, De Baere also discloses a stirring system (paragraph [0047]) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003]) located in the container (paragraph [0047]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]). Regarding claim 14, Kassen discloses that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has a planar central region (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) which is horizontally delimited by the circulation duct (Figs.",
"2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]). Regarding claim 16, Kassen does not disclose that the stirring system comprises a lower opening, an upper opening and a pipeline. De Baere discloses that the stirring system (paragraph [0047]) comprises a lower opening (Fig. 1, element 9; paragraph [0045]), an upper opening (Fig. 1, element 6; paragraph [0047]) and a pipeline (Fig. 1, element 5; paragraph [0044]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]). Claims 13 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), and Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and De Baere (US 2012/0064619) as applied to claim 12 above, further in view of Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation). Regarding claim 13, Kassen discloses the outlet opening (Fig.",
"2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) and the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]). Kassen does not disclose a bypass line comprising a cross section that is variable. Frick discloses a bypass line (Figs. 1-5, element 20, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) for connecting the outlet opening (Figs. 1-5, pipe vertical from element 21, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13) to the inlet opening (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump” would have an opening, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13), wherein the bypass line comprises a cross section that is variable (Figs. 1-5, element 21 “multi-way valve”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the valve and piping schematic of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13).",
"Regarding claim 15, Kassen discloses the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), and an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]). Kassen also describes pumping fluid into the container (paragraph [0032]). Kassen does not disclose an inlet pump or an outlet pump. Frick discloses an outlet pump (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the outlet pump of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13).",
"Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump”, absent unexpected results, duplication of parts would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B). Also, regarding Kassen’s description of pumping into the container (Kassen, paragraph [0032]), it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date that this pumping action be done by an inlet pump. This inlet pump would allow pumping action to occur to the bottom of the tank against hydrostatic forces. Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump for admitting medium into the circulation duct via the inlet opening and/or an outlet pump for discharging medium from the circulation duct via the outlet opening”, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the pump to pump medium into the circulation duct or to discharge medium from the circulation duct in order to move the medium into and out of the fermenter.",
"Claim 17 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation). Regarding claim 17, Kassen discloses a container for generating biogas (paragraph [0002]) comprising: a cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]); a base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) arranged below the cylindrical main portion (paragraph [0025]), characterized in that the base portion (Fig. 3, element 4; paragraphs [0011] and [0036]) has an annularly closed circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), having an inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having a cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section), a medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct having an outlet opening (Fig.",
"2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), having an outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) so as to discharge medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) from the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]); the vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container); and the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”), the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]), the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), and an outlet opening (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]). Kassen also describes pumping fluid into the container (paragraph [0032]). Arguably, Kassen may disclose: an inlet opening (Figs.",
"4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) having an inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) so as to admit medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) into the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) tangentially (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]) to a vertical axis of the container (Fig. 3, vertical line through center of container). when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]), an annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is generated; and, when the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) is discharged through the outlet opening (Fig.",
"2, 4, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]), the annular flow (inherent in an annular circulation duct of Kassen; and paragraph [0034]) in the circulation duct (Figs. 2-3 and 5, element 18; paragraphs [0032] and [0035]-[0036]) is reinforced. Kassen does not disclose: so as to discharge medium from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container; and, an inlet pump or an outlet pump. Regarding 1) of claim 17, Boer discloses an inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle 5”) having an inlet cross section (inherent that an opening has a cross-sectional area), so as to admit medium (middle of pg. 4 “feeding inoculum”) into the circulation duct tangentially to a vertical axis (beginning of pg.",
"5 “tangential direction” or Fig. 2) of the container (Fig. 2, element 1 “tank”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 2) of claim 17, Boer discloses when the medium (top of pg. 5, “water-rich waste masses containing fermentable organic substances”) is supplied through the inlet opening (Figs. 1-2, element 5; or beginning of pg. 5 “nozzle”), an annular flow in the circulation duct is generated (Fig. 2, element “R” and bottom of pg. 5, “mix its contents by means of the supply flow”). In the analogous art of fermentation reactors, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the inlet opening of Kassen with the inlet opening of Boer in order to promote tangential flow within the circulation duct and cause mixing to occur. Regarding 3) of claim 1, Noonan discloses when the medium (paragraphs [0016]-[0017]) is discharged through the outlet opening (paragraphs [0016]-[0017] “effluent channel”), the annular flow in the circulation duct is reinforced (Figs. 1-4 and 6-7; paragraph [0052] “flow at least 360 degrees around the chamber”).",
"In the analogous art of ring grit removers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the location and orientation of the outlet opening of modified Kassen with the outlet opening to reinforce the annular flow as in Noonan in order to lessen the footprint of the device, lower costs and reduce energy consumption (Noonan, paragraph [0011]). Regarding 4) of claim 17, Kirmair discloses discharging medium (paragraph [0086], “biomass” and Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”). Regarding the phrase “from the circulation duct tangentially to the vertical axis of the container”, the discharge pipe of Kirmair (Fig. 3, element 64 “discharge pipe”) could be placed offset to the vertical axis of the container, resulting in a tangential discharge relative to the vertical axis of the container. This placement or position would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container from an area of high fluid pressure to an area of low fluid pressure.",
"MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(C). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the discharge line of modified Kassen with the discharge line of Kirmair in order to orient the discharge of the medium to be tangentially oriented relative to the vertical axis of the container; this would be advantageous if further piping in the container were needed instead of laying piping underground and underneath the container. The tangential discharge of medium would also be helpful if circulation were needed in the container, depending on the inlet placement. Examples of circulating medium can be shown in Kirmair (Figs. 1 and 4-5). As to 5) of claim 17, Frick discloses an outlet pump (paragraph [0012], Figs. 1-5, element 19 “pump”, paragraph [0012], or claims 12-13). In the analogous art of fermentation chambers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the piping of modified Kassen with the outlet pump of Frick in order to be able to either circulate medium within the container or be routed to the outside (Frick, claims 12-13).",
"Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump”, absent unexpected results, duplication of parts would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. MPEP § 2144.04(VI)(B). Also, regarding Kassen’s description of pumping into the container (Kassen, paragraph [0032]), it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date that this pumping action be done by an inlet pump. This inlet pump would allow pumping action to occur to the bottom of the tank against hydrostatic forces. Regarding the limitation “an inlet pump for admitting medium into the circulation duct via the inlet opening and/or an outlet pump for discharging medium from the circulation duct via the outlet opening”, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the pump to pump medium into the circulation duct or to discharge medium from the circulation duct in order to move the medium into and out of the fermenter. Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation), as applied to claim 17 above, further in view of De Baere (US 2012/0064619).",
"Regarding claim 18, Kassen discloses the medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) and the container (paragraph [0002]); and a stirring system (paragraph [0026], “agitator”) for stirring medium (paragraph [0003] “sludge, other biodegradable products”) located in the container (paragraph [0002]). Kassen does not disclose that the stirring system comprises a lower opening, an upper opening and a pipeline. De Baere discloses that the stirring system (paragraph [0047]) comprises a lower opening (Fig. 1, element 9; paragraph [0045]), an upper opening (Fig. 1, element 6; paragraph [0047]) and a pipeline (Fig. 1, element 5; paragraph [0044]). In the analogous art of fermentation tanks, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the container of modified Kassen with the stirring mechanism of De Baere in order to mix freshly supplied organic material with discharged, partly fermented material (De Baere, paragraph [0047]).",
"Claim 19 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation) as applied to claim 17 above, further in view of Gong (CN 105925465). Regarding claim 19, Kassen does not disclose that a tapered portion, which is shaped conically towards the base portion, is connected to the base portion in a direction of the vertical axis of the container. Gong discloses that a tapered portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]), which is shaped conically (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016]) towards the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”), is connected to the base portion (Fig. 1 and paragraph [0016] “bottom of the pool”) in a direction of the vertical axis of the container (Fig.",
"1, inherent that there would be a vertical axis through the container). In the analogous art of biogas digesters, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the circulation duct and central region of modified Kassen with the plastic material of Gong in order to have the sediment slide down to settle in the middle for storage (Gong, paragraph [0009]). Claim 20 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 as being unpatentable over Kassen (DE 10223866) (machine translation) in view of Boer (NL 8001072) (machine translation), Noonan (US 2016/0038952), Kirmair (EP 0158213) (machine translation), and Frick (EP 0046442) (machine translation) as applied to claim 17 above, further in view of Wanjihia (US 2016/0088788). Regarding claim 20, arguably, Kassen discloses that the outlet cross section (Fig. 2, 4, and 6, element 9; paragraphs [0034]-[0035]) is configured larger than the inlet cross section (Figs. 4-5, elements 21-22 or paragraphs [0032]-[0034]; also, inherent that the inlet opening would have a cross section). Assuming that Kassen does not fulfill the limitation above, Wanjihia discloses that the outlet cross section (paragraph [0012]) is configured larger (paragraph [0012]) than the inlet cross section (paragraph [0012]).",
"In the analogous art of biogas-producing containers, it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art before the effective filing date to modify the sizes of the inlet and outlet of modified Kassen with the larger outlet and smaller inlet sizes of Wanjihia in order to not have the apparatus blocked by solids at the slurry outlet (Wanjihia, paragraph [0071]). Additional Prior Art References The prior art made of record and not relied upon is considered pertinent to applicant's disclosure. Csepregi (HU 196344) (machine translation) – This invention is a two-phase sludge reactor with tangential feeds. Jianguang (CN 102139955) (machine translation) – This invention is a multistage recirculation reactor for anaerobic sludge.",
"Gantefort (US 2009/0305376) – This invention is an annular fermenter for producing biogas. Vellinga (US 5,565,098) – This invention is a water treatment reactor with tangential feeds and a tangential outlet line (Fig. 2), but does not have a similar structure to the base portion with an annularly closed circulation duct. Morandini (DE 10201916) (machine translation) – This invention is a separation device for effluent with an inlet and outlet pipe, at least the inlet pipe feeding tangentially into the tank. “Recycle Reactors” – This is a reference that describes the equations governing recycle reactors. Beliveau (US 8,715,511) – This invention is a method and apparatus for sewage grit removal. Noonan (US 2016/0263587) – This invention is a grit removal chamber for wastewater.",
"Weis (US 2008/0105604) – This invention is a grit trap for wastewater. Davis (US 6,811,697) – This invention is a grit extractor with tangential inlets and outlets. Messick (US 8,906,233) – This invention is a ring grit remover with vanes. Wilson (US 6,881,350) – This invention is a chamber that collects wastewater solids and grit. Response to Arguments Applicant’s arguments filed on June 21, 2022 with respect to the claims have been fully considered but are either not persuasive or moot in view of the new grounds of rejection. Regarding the arguments about: 1. Kassen teaches the amended section regarding an outlet opening that allows for annular flow in the circulation duct. The duct of Kassen is annular and discharging the medium through the outlet opening would naturally allow for flow from the duct to occur. Kassen dictates that “the sediments are conveyed in the direction of the discharge opening 9 solely by the flow of liquid and the incline and the rotary movement by the agitator” (Kassen, paragraph [0034]).",
"Of these three factors: the flow of the liquid, the incline, and the rotary movement by the agitator, the instant application only discloses the flow of the liquid, as there is no incline or agitator. However, this flow of liquid is produced by a pump, which is obvious in the art to produce fluid flow. Modifying Kassen to have a pump on the outlet would be an obvious modification in order to promote quicker fluid movement and turnover through the fermentation tank. Assuming that the instant invention is enabled, this obvious pump modification would then enable Kassen to work as intended, similarly to the instant invention due to the similar structural arrangements. 2. The combination of Kassen and Kirmair teaches the element 4). Modified Kassen would be able to be structurally oriented so that a sloped pipe of Kirmair would be able to be placed in a tangential orientation on the circular base of modified Kassen. This placement would be obvious, depending on how the circulating medium were intended to move within the container. Extra work is already present in both Kirmair and the instant invention in the form of a pump, which pumps against the flow of gravity. A sidewall opening would occur at some point in Kirmair, but also in the instant invention. The instant invention would have the openings near the base, while the pipes of Kirmair would be able to located on the base to go through the sidewall there as well.",
"Given the amended section of the outlet above, now given in newly cited Noonan (US 2016/0038952), there is also a tangential setup to the outlet, causing the discharge from the circulation duct to also be tangential to the vertical axis of the container. 3. Regarding arguments about Kassen and Frick not teaching element 5), bypass lines are well known in the art. A multi-way valve disclosed in Frick shows a pipe leading to element 19, another pipe leading to the housing, and a third line to the outside. Since the multi-way valve can be used to bypass the outside line and recirculate the medium back into the housing, it is considered a bypass line. Regarding dependent claims 4-11, the independent claim 1 is still obvious in relation to the prior art. Since no other arguments were given for these dependent claims, they are still considered rejected.",
"Regarding independent claims 12 and 17, the arguments rebutting Applicant arguments about similar and corresponding portions of claim 1’s parts 3) and 4) have already been explained. Additionally, Noonan describes the amended portion concerning the outlet. Regarding dependent claims 13-16, the independent claim 12 is still obvious in relation to the prior art. Since no other arguments were given for these dependent claims, they are still considered rejected. Regarding dependent claims 18-20, the independent claim 17 is still obvious in relation to the prior art. Since no other arguments were given for these dependent claims, they are still considered rejected. Conclusion Applicant's amendment necessitated the new ground(s) of rejection presented in this Office action. Accordingly, THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. See MPEP § 706.07(a).",
"Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the date of this final action. Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to NATHAN G ESPERON whose telephone number is 571-272-9807, and whose fax number is 571-273-8464.",
"The examiner can normally be reached 9 am - 6 pm Monday through Thursday, and 9 am - 6 pm every other Friday. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Michael Marcheschi can be reached at 571-272-1374. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system.",
"Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see https://ppair-my.uspto.gov/pair/PrivatePair. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. /N.G.E./Examiner, Art Unit 1799 /DONALD R SPAMER/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1799"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-09-04.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 1 of 6
EXHIBIT K
Bank of Utah’s December 16 Lease Default and Termination Notice Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 2 of 6
Honda Aircraft Company, LLC
6430 Ballinger Road
Greensboro, NC 27410 USA Attention: contracts@haci-honda.com
Re: Lease Agreement dated January 31, 2026 . December 16, 2020
Ladies and Gentlemen:
Reference is made to {i) that certain Lease Agreement, dated as of January 31, 2020, as amended by that certain Rent Deferral Agreement dated as of April 15, 2020 and that certain Second Amendment to Aircraft Lease Agreement dated as of November 19, 2020 {and as at any time further amended, modified, restated, or supplemented, the “Lease Agreement’), by and between Bank of Utah, not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee (in such capacity, the “Owner Trustee”) and the Lessee and (ii) each of the other Operative Documents. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Lease Agreement (and, if not defined therein, the meanings ascribed to such terms in the other Operative Documents, as applicable). ,
1. Events of Default
- (a). In respect of the Aircraft with manufacturers serial numbers 42000155, 42000156, 42000073, 42000111, 42000118, 42000160 and 42000161 {the “Currently Leased Airera i), we refer to Section 5(a) of the Lease Agreement, which provides that the Lessee is under an obligation to pay to the Owner Trustee a payment with respect-to each Aircraft, on the First Basic Payment Date if applicable and on each applicable Basic Payment Date thereafter, to and including the Base Term Expiry Date, in an amount equal to the Basic Payment for such Aireraft.
(b) Lessee has failed to comply with Section 5{a) of the Lease Agreement in respect of payments which are currently past due, in the amounts of $394,3261.10, $394,582.17, $485,294.60, $485,550.68, $485,806.75, and $486, 062.83, which inclide Basic Payments which were due on July 15, 2020, August 15, 2020, September 15, 2020, October 15, 2020, November 15, 2020, and December 15, 2020 respectively, with respect to the Currently Leased Aircraft (the “Lease Basic Payments”) as well as past due instalment payments of
the Deferred Rent Amount (the “Deferred Rent Instalment Payments”, together with the Lease Basic Payments, the “Past Due Lease Payments”).
{c) As a result of the Past Due Lease Payments not being paid when due, an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing under Section 24(a) of the Lease Agreernent.
{d) Asa result of Lessee’s failure to perform its obligations pursuant to the Purchase Agreement to cause to be delivered to the Lessor the Aircraft other than the Currently Leased Aircraft and pursuant to Section | of the Lease Agreement to lease such Aircraft from the Lessor pursuant thereto and its purported repudiation of the Lease in respect of any additional Aireraft required to be delivered by Lessee thereunder, which has been stated by Lessee in
FIGIGHIT? A TISTV TAG? Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 3 of 6
(a)
{b)
recent phone calls and emails from Lessee’s Chief Financial Officer, Jason Marrone, as well as internal legal counsel at Lessee (the “Lease Repudiation”), an Event of Default has occurred and is Continuing under Sections 24(d), 24(f) and 24(k) of the Lease Agreement.
Demand for Payment of Default Payment Amount
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 25(a) of the Lease Agreement, due to the occurrence and continuation of the aforementioned Events of Default, Lessor hereby declares the
payment in full of the Default Payment Amount (as calculated pursuant fo Section 25{a) of the Lease Agreement) by 5: oa EST on Friday, December 18, 2020. Such Default Payment Amount is equal to $111,439,607.55. Such amount excludes additional fees and expenses, including legal fees due from Lessee to counsel to Trustor and Lender and fees owed to Seraph Aviation Management Limited in relation to the termination of the Lease Agreement (such amount, $1,400,000) but includes the amount of principal and interest due to Lender from Lessee under the Lease Agreement, equal to $30,121,966.33 (including a prepayment penalty amount of $2,985,059.75).
We remind you that your payment obligations under the Lease, as expressly set forth in Section 11 of the Lease (The Lessee’s Payment Obligations), are absolute and unconditional under all circumstances and not subject to any abatements whatsoever. We also call your attention to Section 23 of the Lease Agreement (Lessee Acknowledgement and Agreement), ° whereby Lessee has agreed to pay directly to Lender all amounts owed by Lessee under the Lease Agreement.
We are, under separate cover, demanding that American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (as Guarantor and Parent. Guarantor) immediately satisfy all of its obligations to Lessor under the Guaranty and the Honda Parent Guarantees, including, but not limited to, the obligation to pay the Lessor the Default Payment Amount referenced above.
Cancellation of Lease Agreement
J
Additionally, due to the occurrence and continuation of such Events of Default and pursuant to Section 25(b)(ii) of the Lease Agreement, Owner Trustee, on behalf of Lessor, hereby cancels the Lease Agreement and terminates Lessor’s obligations thereunder, effectively immediately, Pursuant to Section 25(b)i0) of the Lease Agreement, Lessee’s tight to use the Aircraft or any part thereof is hereby terminated and Lessee remains liable under the Lease Agreement in accordance with its terms.
Reservation of Rights
The Owner Trustee is entitled to exercise all of its respective rights and remedies under the © Lease Agreement, the Operative Documents and/or under Applicable Law including, without limitation, the right to take legal action to enforce the obligations of the Lessee to pay all sums due under the Lease Agreement and/or to claim damages for breach of the Lease Agreement, to take possession of each Currently Leased Aircraft, of to require the redelivery of each Currently Leased Aircraft.
This letter is served without prejudice to any of the Owner Trustee’s rights and remedies under the Lease Agreement, the Operative Documents and/or under Applicable Law,
' including, but not limited to, all remedies as a lessor and/or secured creditor in default under
PEN29G2TT AIRS T7897 Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE | Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 4 of 6
(c)
(dl)
fe}
(6)
(g)
Articles 2A and 9, as applicable, of the New York UCC, all of which rights and remedies are specifically reserved without prejudice to the Owner Trustee’s continuing obligations under the Lease Agreement and the Operative Documents, including, without limitation, their obligations to insure, repair and maintain each Aircraft, all of which remain in full force and effect.
The rights of the Owner Trustee:
(i) are cumulative and not exclusive of any rights or remedies provided by law; (ii) — may be exercised as often as necessary;
(iii) may be waived only in writing and specifically; and
{iv} shall not be impaired, waived or precluded by delay or omission in exercising any ‘right, power or privilege available under the Operative Documents or otherwise available to the Owner Trustee under law.
For the avoidance of doubt, this letter is not intended to provide a comprehensive list or description of the Events of Default that may currently be continuing under the Lease Agreement, including, but not limited to, in relation to the Lease Repudiation, and all of the Owner Trustee’s rights and remedies under the Operative Documents in respect of any failure to pay any additional amounts due under the Lease Agreement, are fully reserved.
Neither this letter, nor any other discussions or correspondence that any person may engage in with any party concerning this letter or any defaults, shall be in any way construed as a waiver of any rights, a course of dealing or an extension of any grace period that may be available.
Please note that the Events of Default under the Lease Agreement as described in this letter are not meant to be exhaustive of all defaults and Events of Default that may have occurred under the Lease Agreement, the Guaranty, the Parent Guarantee, the Purchase Agreements or any other Operative Documents as of the date of this letter or may occur with the passage of time, giving of notice, or both, and there may be additional defaults and Events of Default urider the Operative Documents as of the date of this letter. Owner Trustee docs not waive or agree to forbear in the exercise of any rights or remedies against HAC or the Guarantor in connection with the Events of Default or any other default or Events of Default under the Operative Documents.
Lessor further reserves and preserves all rights and remedies available to it in connection with the Lease Agreement and the other Operative Documents and at law or in equity, including, without limitation, the right to charge interest at the default rate set forth in the Lease. Nothing contained herein is intended to constitute a release, waiver, Hmitation, or modification of the foregoing. The acceptance by Lessor of any partial payment of the
- obligations due and owing to Lessor under the Operative Documents shall not be deemed a
waiver of any default or Event of Default under the Operative Documents {including the Events of Default identified herein), a cure of any existing default under the Operative Documents or a limitation of any of Lessor's rights reserved herein as to the fill amount of any unpaid balance. Any delay or forbearance by Lessor in the enforcement or pursuit of any of its rights and remedies under the Lease Agreement, Guaranty, Parent Guarantees or any other Operative Document ar applicable law shall not constitute a waiver thereof, nor
"TAGQIS2FTL F3BR F897 Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 5 of 6
shall it be a bar to the exercise of Lessor’s rights or remedies at a later date. Owner Trustee will continue to strictly construc and enforce the express terms of the Lease Agreement, the Guaranty, the Parent Guarantees and all other Operative Documents.
(h) ‘This letter is designated an Operative Document.
(i) THIS LETTER SHALL IN ALL RESPECTS BE GOVERNED BY, AND CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, INCLUDING SECTION 5-1401 AND SECTION 5-1402 OF THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW, BUT EXCLUDING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, ALL OTHER CONFLICTS OF LAWS PRINCIPLES AND CHOICE OF LAW RULES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.
{Signature page to follow]
F30294 277 YT NGS £7897 Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 6 of 6
Regards,
BANK § f UYAH, not in its individual capacity, but sol¢ly as Qwner Trustee of Matterhorn HondaJet Trust | (as Lessor)
APPLE BANK FOR SAVINGS, as Lender
By: Dana Wlac/hmnen Naine: Dana Mackinnon Title: Senior Vice President
lee:
Honda Aircraft Company, LLC, as Residual Value Guarantor 6430 Ballinger Road
Greensboro, NC 27410 USA
Attention: contractstd@thaci handa.com
American Honda Motor Ce., Inc., as Guarantor 1919 Torrance Blvd
Torrance, CA 90501 USA
Attention: Mike Ryan
Email: mike rvani@iahm. honda.com
Mayer Brown LLP, Counsel to Trustor and Lender {221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10070-1001
Attention: George Miller
Email: gmillen@maverbrown.com
MAS One USA LLC
3420 South Ocean Blvd, #10T Highland Beach, FL 32487 Attention: Douglas Brennan
Email: douglas. brennan@igmail.com
FEOZOAITI A FIRSN F897 | 2021-03-11 | [
"Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 1 of 6 EXHIBIT K Bank of Utah’s December 16 Lease Default and Termination Notice Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 2 of 6 Honda Aircraft Company, LLC 6430 Ballinger Road Greensboro, NC 27410 USA Attention: contracts@haci-honda.com Re: Lease Agreement dated January 31, 2026 . December 16, 2020 Ladies and Gentlemen: Reference is made to {i) that certain Lease Agreement, dated as of January 31, 2020, as amended by that certain Rent Deferral Agreement dated as of April 15, 2020 and that certain Second Amendment to Aircraft Lease Agreement dated as of November 19, 2020 {and as at any time further amended, modified, restated, or supplemented, the “Lease Agreement’), by and between Bank of Utah, not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee (in such capacity, the “Owner Trustee”) and the Lessee and (ii) each of the other Operative Documents. Capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the Lease Agreement (and, if not defined therein, the meanings ascribed to such terms in the other Operative Documents, as applicable). , 1. Events of Default - (a). In respect of the Aircraft with manufacturers serial numbers 42000155, 42000156, 42000073, 42000111, 42000118, 42000160 and 42000161 {the “Currently Leased Airera i), we refer to Section 5(a) of the Lease Agreement, which provides that the Lessee is under an obligation to pay to the Owner Trustee a payment with respect-to each Aircraft, on the First Basic Payment Date if applicable and on each applicable Basic Payment Date thereafter, to and including the Base Term Expiry Date, in an amount equal to the Basic Payment for such Aireraft. (b) Lessee has failed to comply with Section 5{a) of the Lease Agreement in respect of payments which are currently past due, in the amounts of $394,3261.10, $394,582.17, $485,294.60, $485,550.68, $485,806.75, and $486, 062.83, which inclide Basic Payments which were due on July 15, 2020, August 15, 2020, September 15, 2020, October 15, 2020, November 15, 2020, and December 15, 2020 respectively, with respect to the Currently Leased Aircraft (the “Lease Basic Payments”) as well as past due instalment payments of the Deferred Rent Amount (the “Deferred Rent Instalment Payments”, together with the Lease Basic Payments, the “Past Due Lease Payments”).",
"{c) As a result of the Past Due Lease Payments not being paid when due, an Event of Default has occurred and is continuing under Section 24(a) of the Lease Agreernent. {d) Asa result of Lessee’s failure to perform its obligations pursuant to the Purchase Agreement to cause to be delivered to the Lessor the Aircraft other than the Currently Leased Aircraft and pursuant to Section | of the Lease Agreement to lease such Aircraft from the Lessor pursuant thereto and its purported repudiation of the Lease in respect of any additional Aireraft required to be delivered by Lessee thereunder, which has been stated by Lessee in FIGIGHIT? A TISTV TAG? Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 3 of 6 (a) {b) recent phone calls and emails from Lessee’s Chief Financial Officer, Jason Marrone, as well as internal legal counsel at Lessee (the “Lease Repudiation”), an Event of Default has occurred and is Continuing under Sections 24(d), 24(f) and 24(k) of the Lease Agreement. Demand for Payment of Default Payment Amount Accordingly, pursuant to Section 25(a) of the Lease Agreement, due to the occurrence and continuation of the aforementioned Events of Default, Lessor hereby declares the payment in full of the Default Payment Amount (as calculated pursuant fo Section 25{a) of the Lease Agreement) by 5: oa EST on Friday, December 18, 2020.",
"Such Default Payment Amount is equal to $111,439,607.55. Such amount excludes additional fees and expenses, including legal fees due from Lessee to counsel to Trustor and Lender and fees owed to Seraph Aviation Management Limited in relation to the termination of the Lease Agreement (such amount, $1,400,000) but includes the amount of principal and interest due to Lender from Lessee under the Lease Agreement, equal to $30,121,966.33 (including a prepayment penalty amount of $2,985,059.75). We remind you that your payment obligations under the Lease, as expressly set forth in Section 11 of the Lease (The Lessee’s Payment Obligations), are absolute and unconditional under all circumstances and not subject to any abatements whatsoever. We also call your attention to Section 23 of the Lease Agreement (Lessee Acknowledgement and Agreement), ° whereby Lessee has agreed to pay directly to Lender all amounts owed by Lessee under the Lease Agreement.",
"We are, under separate cover, demanding that American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (as Guarantor and Parent. Guarantor) immediately satisfy all of its obligations to Lessor under the Guaranty and the Honda Parent Guarantees, including, but not limited to, the obligation to pay the Lessor the Default Payment Amount referenced above. Cancellation of Lease Agreement J Additionally, due to the occurrence and continuation of such Events of Default and pursuant to Section 25(b)(ii) of the Lease Agreement, Owner Trustee, on behalf of Lessor, hereby cancels the Lease Agreement and terminates Lessor’s obligations thereunder, effectively immediately, Pursuant to Section 25(b)i0) of the Lease Agreement, Lessee’s tight to use the Aircraft or any part thereof is hereby terminated and Lessee remains liable under the Lease Agreement in accordance with its terms.",
"Reservation of Rights The Owner Trustee is entitled to exercise all of its respective rights and remedies under the © Lease Agreement, the Operative Documents and/or under Applicable Law including, without limitation, the right to take legal action to enforce the obligations of the Lessee to pay all sums due under the Lease Agreement and/or to claim damages for breach of the Lease Agreement, to take possession of each Currently Leased Aircraft, of to require the redelivery of each Currently Leased Aircraft. This letter is served without prejudice to any of the Owner Trustee’s rights and remedies under the Lease Agreement, the Operative Documents and/or under Applicable Law, ' including, but not limited to, all remedies as a lessor and/or secured creditor in default under PEN29G2TT AIRS T7897 Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE | Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 4 of 6 (c) (dl) fe} (6) (g) Articles 2A and 9, as applicable, of the New York UCC, all of which rights and remedies are specifically reserved without prejudice to the Owner Trustee’s continuing obligations under the Lease Agreement and the Operative Documents, including, without limitation, their obligations to insure, repair and maintain each Aircraft, all of which remain in full force and effect.",
"The rights of the Owner Trustee: (i) are cumulative and not exclusive of any rights or remedies provided by law; (ii) — may be exercised as often as necessary; (iii) may be waived only in writing and specifically; and {iv} shall not be impaired, waived or precluded by delay or omission in exercising any ‘right, power or privilege available under the Operative Documents or otherwise available to the Owner Trustee under law. For the avoidance of doubt, this letter is not intended to provide a comprehensive list or description of the Events of Default that may currently be continuing under the Lease Agreement, including, but not limited to, in relation to the Lease Repudiation, and all of the Owner Trustee’s rights and remedies under the Operative Documents in respect of any failure to pay any additional amounts due under the Lease Agreement, are fully reserved. Neither this letter, nor any other discussions or correspondence that any person may engage in with any party concerning this letter or any defaults, shall be in any way construed as a waiver of any rights, a course of dealing or an extension of any grace period that may be available.",
"Please note that the Events of Default under the Lease Agreement as described in this letter are not meant to be exhaustive of all defaults and Events of Default that may have occurred under the Lease Agreement, the Guaranty, the Parent Guarantee, the Purchase Agreements or any other Operative Documents as of the date of this letter or may occur with the passage of time, giving of notice, or both, and there may be additional defaults and Events of Default urider the Operative Documents as of the date of this letter. Owner Trustee docs not waive or agree to forbear in the exercise of any rights or remedies against HAC or the Guarantor in connection with the Events of Default or any other default or Events of Default under the Operative Documents.",
"Lessor further reserves and preserves all rights and remedies available to it in connection with the Lease Agreement and the other Operative Documents and at law or in equity, including, without limitation, the right to charge interest at the default rate set forth in the Lease. Nothing contained herein is intended to constitute a release, waiver, Hmitation, or modification of the foregoing. The acceptance by Lessor of any partial payment of the - obligations due and owing to Lessor under the Operative Documents shall not be deemed a waiver of any default or Event of Default under the Operative Documents {including the Events of Default identified herein), a cure of any existing default under the Operative Documents or a limitation of any of Lessor's rights reserved herein as to the fill amount of any unpaid balance.",
"Any delay or forbearance by Lessor in the enforcement or pursuit of any of its rights and remedies under the Lease Agreement, Guaranty, Parent Guarantees or any other Operative Document ar applicable law shall not constitute a waiver thereof, nor \"TAGQIS2FTL F3BR F897 Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 5 of 6 shall it be a bar to the exercise of Lessor’s rights or remedies at a later date. Owner Trustee will continue to strictly construc and enforce the express terms of the Lease Agreement, the Guaranty, the Parent Guarantees and all other Operative Documents. (h) ‘This letter is designated an Operative Document. (i) THIS LETTER SHALL IN ALL RESPECTS BE GOVERNED BY, AND CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, INCLUDING SECTION 5-1401 AND SECTION 5-1402 OF THE NEW YORK GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW, BUT EXCLUDING TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW, ALL OTHER CONFLICTS OF LAWS PRINCIPLES AND CHOICE OF LAW RULES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.",
"{Signature page to follow] F30294 277 YT NGS £7897 Case 1:21-cv-02092-PAE Document 6-11 Filed 03/11/21 Page 6 of 6 Regards, BANK § f UYAH, not in its individual capacity, but sol¢ly as Qwner Trustee of Matterhorn HondaJet Trust | (as Lessor) APPLE BANK FOR SAVINGS, as Lender By: Dana Wlac/hmnen Naine: Dana Mackinnon Title: Senior Vice President lee: Honda Aircraft Company, LLC, as Residual Value Guarantor 6430 Ballinger Road Greensboro, NC 27410 USA Attention: contractstd@thaci handa.com American Honda Motor Ce., Inc., as Guarantor 1919 Torrance Blvd Torrance, CA 90501 USA Attention: Mike Ryan Email: mike rvani@iahm. honda.com Mayer Brown LLP, Counsel to Trustor and Lender {221 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10070-1001 Attention: George Miller Email: gmillen@maverbrown.com MAS One USA LLC 3420 South Ocean Blvd, #10T Highland Beach, FL 32487 Attention: Douglas Brennan Email: douglas. brennan@igmail.com FEOZOAITI A FIRSN F897"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/164070143/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Citation Nr: 1743228
Decision Date: 09/28/17 Archive Date: 10/10/17
DOCKET NO. 16-15 160 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida
THE ISSUES
1. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for a dental disability (claimed as loss of teeth and infected gums), for the purpose of obtaining VA compensation.
2. Entitlement to service connection for a heart disorder.
3. Entitlement to service connection for hypertension.
4. Entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine / neck disorder.
REPRESENTATION
Veteran represented by: The American Legion
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
P.S. Rubin, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The Veteran had active duty service from November 1988 to December 1991 in the United States Army.
This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a March 2014 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida.
The Veteran requested a Board videoconference hearing before a Veterans Law Judge in his April 2016 Substantive Appeal (VA Form 9). Unfortunately, the Veteran passed away in February 2017 before the hearing could be scheduled.
FINDING OF FACT
On September 20, 2017, the Board was notified that the Veteran died in February 2017.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Due to the death of the appellant, the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this appeal at this time. 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302 (2016).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, on September 20, 2017 (by way of Social Security Administration (SSA) inquiry)), the Board was notified that the Veteran died in February 2017.
This was during the pendency of the appeal. As a matter of law, appellants' claims do not survive their deaths. Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Smith v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 330, 333-34 (1997); Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42, 47 (1994). This appeal on the merits has become moot by virtue of the death of the appellant and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302 (2016). In reaching this determination, the Board intimates no opinion as to the merits of this appeal or to any derivative claim brought by a survivor of the Veteran. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1106 (2016).
The Board's dismissal of this appeal does not affect the right of an eligible person to file a request to be substituted as the appellant for purposes of processing the claim to completion. Such request must be filed not later than one year after the date of the appellant's death. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121A (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(b) (2016). A person eligible for substitution includes "a living person who would be eligible to receive accrued benefits due to the claimant under section 5121(a) of this title ...." 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121A (West 2014); see 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(a) (2016). An eligible party seeking substitution in an appeal that has been dismissed by the Board due to the death of the claimant should file a request for substitution with the VA office from which the claim originated (listed on the first page of this decision). 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(b) (2016).
ORDER
The appeal is dismissed.
DAVID L. WIGHT
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Department of Veterans Affairs | 09-28-2017 | [
"Citation Nr: 1743228 Decision Date: 09/28/17 Archive Date: 10/10/17 DOCKET NO. 16-15 160 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Petersburg, Florida THE ISSUES 1. Whether new and material evidence has been submitted to reopen the claim of entitlement to service connection for a dental disability (claimed as loss of teeth and infected gums), for the purpose of obtaining VA compensation. 2. Entitlement to service connection for a heart disorder. 3. Entitlement to service connection for hypertension. 4. Entitlement to service connection for a cervical spine / neck disorder.",
"REPRESENTATION Veteran represented by: The American Legion ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD P.S. Rubin, Counsel INTRODUCTION The Veteran had active duty service from November 1988 to December 1991 in the United States Army. This matter comes to the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from a March 2014 rating decision issued by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in St. Petersburg, Florida. The Veteran requested a Board videoconference hearing before a Veterans Law Judge in his April 2016 Substantive Appeal (VA Form 9). Unfortunately, the Veteran passed away in February 2017 before the hearing could be scheduled. FINDING OF FACT On September 20, 2017, the Board was notified that the Veteran died in February 2017. CONCLUSION OF LAW Due to the death of the appellant, the Board has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of this appeal at this time.",
"38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302 (2016). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION Unfortunately, on September 20, 2017 (by way of Social Security Administration (SSA) inquiry)), the Board was notified that the Veteran died in February 2017. This was during the pendency of the appeal. As a matter of law, appellants' claims do not survive their deaths. Zevalkink v. Brown, 102 F.3d 1236, 1243-44 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Smith v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 330, 333-34 (1997); Landicho v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 42, 47 (1994). This appeal on the merits has become moot by virtue of the death of the appellant and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.",
"See 38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. § 20.1302 (2016). In reaching this determination, the Board intimates no opinion as to the merits of this appeal or to any derivative claim brought by a survivor of the Veteran. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1106 (2016). The Board's dismissal of this appeal does not affect the right of an eligible person to file a request to be substituted as the appellant for purposes of processing the claim to completion.",
"Such request must be filed not later than one year after the date of the appellant's death. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121A (West 2014); 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(b) (2016). A person eligible for substitution includes \"a living person who would be eligible to receive accrued benefits due to the claimant under section 5121(a) of this title ....\" 38 U.S.C.A. § 5121A (West 2014); see 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(a) (2016). An eligible party seeking substitution in an appeal that has been dismissed by the Board due to the death of the claimant should file a request for substitution with the VA office from which the claim originated (listed on the first page of this decision). 38 C.F.R. § 3.1010(b) (2016). ORDER The appeal is dismissed.",
"DAVID L. WIGHT Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs"
]
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EXHIBIT 31.1 I, William G. Watson, President, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of Texas Vanguard Oil Company, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Texas Vanguard Oil Company; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting. Date: August 6, 2013 /s/ William G. Watson William G. Watson, President, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer | [
"EXHIBIT 31.1 I, William G. Watson, President, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer of Texas Vanguard Oil Company, certify that: 1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Texas Vanguard Oil Company; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f)) for the registrant and have: a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; b) designed such internal control over financial reporting, or caused such internal control over financial reporting to be designed under our supervision, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles; c) evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and d) disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5.",
"The registrant's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant's auditors and the audit committee of the registrant's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal control over financial reporting. Date: August 6, 2013 /s/ William G. Watson William G. Watson, President, Chief Executive Officer and Principal Financial Officer"
]
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Appellant alleged in substance that in January, 1898, he was arrested, and on February 1, 1898, convicted and fined $100 upon the charge of "suspicious character," the ordinance of the city defining such offense being as follows: "An Ordinance Defining and Punishing Suspicious Characters: Be it ordained by the council of the city of San Antonio: *Page 141 "Section 1. All persons who entice any other person or persons to commit any irreputable act or deed; all persons found loitering about the city under suspicious circumstances or places and who are unable to give a proper account of themselves; all persons in the act of committing theft not amounting to a felony or misdemeanor, and all persons following any business by soliciting orders whereby the person or persons giving such orders are defrauded, that all such persons shall be considered suspicious characters. "Sec. 2. Any person found guilty of being a suspicious character as above defined shall, upon conviction, be fined in any sum not less than five nor more than two hundred dollars." That he was committed to jail and there remained two days before he could secure the sum necessary to satisfy the fine, when, being credited with $2 for two days spent in jail, he paid the balance of the fine ($98), which went into the city treasury, and he was liberated. That appellant soon afterward petitioned the mayor and council to remit said fine, which petition was never acted upon, and the city holds said sum, refusing to restore it to appellant. That he was put to the necessary expense of $95 in his efforts to secure release from said imprisonment and the remission of said fine; that by reason of the said arrest, fine, and imprisonment, which he alleges was malicious, etc., he has been damaged in the above sums, and in his good name, fame, and reputation the sum of $25,000, for all of which he prays judgment. Demurrers to the petition were filed, stating the following grounds: "1. That said amended original petition states no cause of action against this defendant. "2. Because the allegations of said petition are too uncertain, in this, that it is not shown what officers of said city arrested the plaintiff. "3. Because it appears from the plaintiff's said petition that his cause of action accrued more than one year before the filing of this suit, on the 20th day of March, 1898, and is therefore barred by the statute of limitation of one year. "4. Because the facts alleged with reference to exemplary damages are too uncertain, and no facts are alleged entitling plaintiff to recover such exemplary damages." The demurrers were sustained, and plaintiff declining to amend, judgment was rendered dismissing the action. Upon the facts shown by the petition, it is clear that the city is not liable in damages for the action of its officers in arresting, convicting, and imprisoning appellant, even though the ordinance under which said acts were done, be void. The nature of the act or acts complained of establishes that the city was acting in a governmental capacity, and attempting to exercise police powers. In such matters the city is the representative of the State, and is not liable to individuals. That the ordinance in question is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, would not affect this rule. We content ourselves with citing authorities upon this *Page 142 question. Easterly v. Town of Irwin, 68 N.W. Rep., 919; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Rep., 592; New Orleans v. Kerr, 23 So. Rep., 386; Bartlett v. Columbus, 28 S.E. Rep., 599; Fox v. City of Richmond, 40 S.W. Rep., 251; Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382; Harrison v. Columbus, 44 Tex. 418; Galveston v. Posnainsky,62 Tex. 130; Givens v. Paris, 24 S.W. Rep., 974. We think the motives of the mayor and city council in enacting or enforcing the ordinance in question have no effect upon the rule. This being so, the ruling of the court sustaining exceptions was correct, at least as to the item of $25,000 damages to appellant's reputation, occurring as alleged, by reason of the "malicious, unlawful, and wrongful and mercenary arrest, extortion, fine, and imprisonment." With that item out of the case, the petition did not claim enough to give the District Court jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the action of the court in dismissing the suit was not error. Haddock v. Taylor,74 Tex. 216. This is not a case where the plaintiff states a case entitling him to damages, and alleges excessive damages. As the court did not have jurisdiction to try the question of the city's liability to appellant for the fine paid and received by the city, or for the expenses incurred in the effort to have the money so paid restored, or both added, neither have we. We therefore do not feel called upon to pass on the validity of this ordinance, nor upon defendant's liability for appellant's money received by it, nor for the expenses in reference to efforts to secure a restoration of the money. The judgment of the District Court, however, should be qualified to show that the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, so that appellant may not be barred from proceeding in the proper court. As thus modified, the judgment will be affirmed. Modified and affirmed. Writ of error refused. | 07-06-2016 | [
"Appellant alleged in substance that in January, 1898, he was arrested, and on February 1, 1898, convicted and fined $100 upon the charge of \"suspicious character,\" the ordinance of the city defining such offense being as follows: \"An Ordinance Defining and Punishing Suspicious Characters: Be it ordained by the council of the city of San Antonio: *Page 141 \"Section 1. All persons who entice any other person or persons to commit any irreputable act or deed; all persons found loitering about the city under suspicious circumstances or places and who are unable to give a proper account of themselves; all persons in the act of committing theft not amounting to a felony or misdemeanor, and all persons following any business by soliciting orders whereby the person or persons giving such orders are defrauded, that all such persons shall be considered suspicious characters. \"Sec. 2. Any person found guilty of being a suspicious character as above defined shall, upon conviction, be fined in any sum not less than five nor more than two hundred dollars.\"",
"That he was committed to jail and there remained two days before he could secure the sum necessary to satisfy the fine, when, being credited with $2 for two days spent in jail, he paid the balance of the fine ($98), which went into the city treasury, and he was liberated. That appellant soon afterward petitioned the mayor and council to remit said fine, which petition was never acted upon, and the city holds said sum, refusing to restore it to appellant. That he was put to the necessary expense of $95 in his efforts to secure release from said imprisonment and the remission of said fine; that by reason of the said arrest, fine, and imprisonment, which he alleges was malicious, etc., he has been damaged in the above sums, and in his good name, fame, and reputation the sum of $25,000, for all of which he prays judgment. Demurrers to the petition were filed, stating the following grounds: \"1. That said amended original petition states no cause of action against this defendant. \"2.",
"Because the allegations of said petition are too uncertain, in this, that it is not shown what officers of said city arrested the plaintiff. \"3. Because it appears from the plaintiff's said petition that his cause of action accrued more than one year before the filing of this suit, on the 20th day of March, 1898, and is therefore barred by the statute of limitation of one year. \"4. Because the facts alleged with reference to exemplary damages are too uncertain, and no facts are alleged entitling plaintiff to recover such exemplary damages.\" The demurrers were sustained, and plaintiff declining to amend, judgment was rendered dismissing the action. Upon the facts shown by the petition, it is clear that the city is not liable in damages for the action of its officers in arresting, convicting, and imprisoning appellant, even though the ordinance under which said acts were done, be void.",
"The nature of the act or acts complained of establishes that the city was acting in a governmental capacity, and attempting to exercise police powers. In such matters the city is the representative of the State, and is not liable to individuals. That the ordinance in question is unconstitutional or otherwise invalid, would not affect this rule. We content ourselves with citing authorities upon this *Page 142 question. Easterly v. Town of Irwin, 68 N.W. Rep., 919; Trescott v. Waterloo, 26 Fed. Rep., 592; New Orleans v. Kerr, 23 So.",
"Rep., 386; Bartlett v. Columbus, 28 S.E. Rep., 599; Fox v. City of Richmond, 40 S.W. Rep., 251; Corsicana v. White, 57 Tex. 382; Harrison v. Columbus, 44 Tex. 418; Galveston v. Posnainsky,62 Tex. 130; Givens v. Paris, 24 S.W. Rep., 974. We think the motives of the mayor and city council in enacting or enforcing the ordinance in question have no effect upon the rule. This being so, the ruling of the court sustaining exceptions was correct, at least as to the item of $25,000 damages to appellant's reputation, occurring as alleged, by reason of the \"malicious, unlawful, and wrongful and mercenary arrest, extortion, fine, and imprisonment.\" With that item out of the case, the petition did not claim enough to give the District Court jurisdiction. Under these circumstances the action of the court in dismissing the suit was not error.",
"Haddock v. Taylor,74 Tex. 216. This is not a case where the plaintiff states a case entitling him to damages, and alleges excessive damages. As the court did not have jurisdiction to try the question of the city's liability to appellant for the fine paid and received by the city, or for the expenses incurred in the effort to have the money so paid restored, or both added, neither have we. We therefore do not feel called upon to pass on the validity of this ordinance, nor upon defendant's liability for appellant's money received by it, nor for the expenses in reference to efforts to secure a restoration of the money. The judgment of the District Court, however, should be qualified to show that the case was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, so that appellant may not be barred from proceeding in the proper court.",
"As thus modified, the judgment will be affirmed. Modified and affirmed. Writ of error refused."
]
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August 16, 2017 Via Edgar and Federal Express Mr. H. Roger Schwall Assistant Director U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporation Finance treet, NE Washington, DC 20549 Re:Range Resources Corporation | [
"August 16, 2017 Via Edgar and Federal Express Mr. H. Roger Schwall Assistant Director U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Division of Corporation Finance treet, NE Washington, DC 20549 Re:Range Resources Corporation"
]
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Citation Nr: 0417859
Decision Date: 07/02/04 Archive Date: 07/14/04
DOCKET NO. 03-27 451 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Cleveland,
Ohio
THE ISSUE
Entitlement to an effective date, prior to August 3, 2001,
for the award of a 100 percent evaluation for post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD).
REPRESENTATION
Appellant represented by: Richard A. LaPointe, Attorney
at Law
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
L. M. Barnard, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
The veteran served on active duty from November 1969 to
January 1971.
This appeal arose from an April 2002 rating action of the
Cleveland, Ohio, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA),
Regional Office (RO). The RO granted entitlement to a 100
percent evaluation for PTSD, effective August 3, 2001.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The veteran's claim for an increased evaluation for PTSD
was received on August 3, 2001.
2. The evidence of record indicates that entitlement to an
increased evaluation for PTSD was not ascertainable prior to
August 3, 2001.
CONCLUSION OF LAW
Under governing law, the effective date of the award of the
100 percent disability evaluation for the service-connected
PTSD is August 3, 2001. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a), 5103A,
5107(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.157(b)(1), 3.159(b)(1),
3.400, 3.400(o)(2).
REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
Preliminary Matter: Duties to Notify & to Assist
On November 9, 2000, the President signed into law the
Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No.
106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (codified as amended at 38
U.S.C.A. §§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West
2002)).
The VCAA revises VA's obligations in two significant ways.
First, VA has a duty to notify the appellant of any
information and evidence necessary to substantiate and
complete a claim for VA benefits. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102,
5103 (West 2002). Second, VA has a duty to assist the
appellant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the
claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002).
VA issued regulations to implement the VCAA in August 2001.
See 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2003).
The amendments became effective November 9, 2000, except for
the amendment to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which became effective
August 29, 2001.
VA specified that except for the amendment to 38 C.F.R. §
3.156(a), the second sentence of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c), and 38
C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(iii), the amended regulations otherwise
apply to any claim for benefits received by VA on or after
November 9, 2000, as well as to any claim filed before that
date but not decided by VA as of that date. 66 Fed. Reg.
45,620.
In its discussion of the scope and applicability of the
regulations, VA stated that except for the amendment to
38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), the second sentence of 38 C.F.R. §
3.159(c), and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(iii), "the provisions
of this rule merely implement the VCAA and do not provide any
rights other than those provided in the VCAA." 66 Fed. Reg.
45,629. VA went on to state that it would apply the new
regulations to any claim pending but not decided by VA as of
November 9, 2000. Id.
The Board has given consideration to the provisions of the
VCAA as they it apply to this case, and has determined that
they do apply. See Holliday v. Principi, 14 Vet. App. 280,
282-83 (2001) [the Board must make a determination as to the
applicability of the various provisions of the VCAA to a
particular claim].
The Board has considered whether the requirements of the VCAA
have been fulfilled.
First, there is no issue as to the substantial completeness
of the application. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (West 2002). The
August 3, 2001 claim appeared substantially complete on its
face. The veteran has clearly identified the disability in
question and the benefit sought.
Second, VA has a duty to notify the veteran and his
representative of any information and evidence needed to
substantiate and complete a claim. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 (West
2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). The veteran has been advised of
the type of evidence lacking to demonstrate entitlement to
the benefit sought with the April 2002 rating decision,
August 2003 statement of the case, and January 2004 letter
from the RO explaining the provisions of the VCAA.
The January 2004 letter specifically provided the veteran
with notice of the VCAA and explained the respective rights
and responsibilities under the VCAA. VA has no outstanding
duty to inform the veteran that any additional information or
evidence is needed.
Third, VA has a duty to assist the veteran in obtaining
evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The RO obtained
the VA medical records as indicated by the veteran. The
veteran never responded to the RO's inquiry as to private
treatment reports.
There is no indication that there is any other probative
evidence available that has not been obtained concerning the
issue on appeal. By the January 2004 letter from the RO and
the August 2003 statement of the case, the veteran was
clearly advised as to which portion of evidence is to be
provided by him and which portion is to be provided by VA.
That requirement of VA has been satisfied, and there is no
additional evidence that needs to be provided. Quartuccio v.
Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002).
The requirements of the VCAA have been substantially met by
the RO. Every possible avenue of assistance has been
explored, and the veteran has had ample notice of what might
be required or helpful to his case.
VA has satisfied its duties to inform and assist the
appellant in this case. Further development and further
expending of VA's resources is not warranted.
Additionally, it is noted that in a recent decision,
Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans
Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) invalidated
the 30-day response period contained in 38 C.F.R. §
3.159(b)(1) as inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.§ 5103(b)(1). The
CAFC made a conclusion similar to the one reached in Disabled
American Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 327 F.3d
1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing a related Board
regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.9).
The CAFC found that the 30-day period provided in §
3.159(b)(1) to respond to a VCAA duty to notify is misleading
and detrimental to claimants whose claims are prematurely
denied short of the statutory one-year period provided for
response. In the instant case, the veteran was provided with
initial notice of the provisions of the VCAA and its effect
on the development of his claim in the January 2004 letter
from the RO.
That letter did indicate that the veteran should respond up
to one year of the date of the letter. Additional argument
was submitted by the veteran's representative shortly
thereafter.
Given that the veteran has been fully advised of his rights
and responsibilities under the VCAA, and that he has given no
indication of additional evidence that has not been obtained,
the Board has concluded that VA has no outstanding duty to
inform the veteran that any additional information or
evidence is needed.
In any event, revisions to 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 contained in
the recently-enacted Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, which
was made effective retroactively to November 9, 2000, the
effective date of the VCAA, specify that VA is not
prohibited from making a decision on a claim before the
expiration of the one-year period after a notice to the
veteran and his representative of the information needed to
complete an application for benefits.
See the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, P.L. 108-183, § ___,
117 Stat. 2651, ___ (Dec. 16, 2003) [to be codified at 38
U.S.C. § 5103(b)]. As noted above, there is no deficiency
in the veteran's case at hand, nor would there be otherwise
by operation of the new law.
It is noted that the veteran was afforded a VA examination
and medical review. Accordingly, additional examination of
the veteran or another medical opinion is not warranted. The
requirements of the VCAA have been substantially met by the
RO. Every possible avenue of assistance has been explored,
and the veteran has had ample notice of what might be
required or helpful to his case.
VA has satisfied its duties to inform and assist the veteran
in this case. Further development and further expending of
VA's resources is not warranted. The Board finds that there
will be no prejudice to the appellant if the Board decides
his appeal at this time and the Board will, therefore,
proceed to consider the appellant's claim on the merits. See
Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993).
Finally, it is noted that the United States Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims (CAVC) decision in Pelegrini v. Principi,
No. 01-944 (U.S. Vet. App. June 24, 2004) (Pelegrini II)
(withdrawing and replacing Pelegrini v. Principi, 17 Vet.
App. 412 (2004)) held, in part, that a VCAA notice, as
required by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), must be provided to a
claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original
jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim for VA benefits. In
this case, the initial AOJ decision was made prior to January
2004, when the veteran was notified of the VCAA.
However, assuming solely for the sake of argument and without
conceding the correctness of Pelegrini II that essentially
adopted the same rationale as its withdrawn predecessor, the
Board finds that any defect with respect to the VCAA notice
requirement in this case was harmless error for the reasons
specified above.
In the present case, a substantially complete application was
received in August 2001. Thereafter, in the April 2002
rating decision, the RO rendered the determination at issue.
Only after that rating action was promulgated did the AOJ
provide notice to the claimant regarding what information and
evidence is needed to substantiate the claim, as well as what
information and evidence must be submitted by the claimant,
what information and evidence will be obtained by VA, and the
need for the claimant to submit any evidence in his
possession that pertains to the claim. See the references to
the documents issued to the veteran set out above.
Because the VCAA notice in this case was not provided to the
appellant prior to the initial AOJ adjudication denying the
claim, the timing of the notice does not comply with the
express requirements of the law as found by the CAVC in
Pelegrini II. The CAVC did leave open the possibility that a
notice error of this kind may be non-prejudicial to a
claimant.
The CAVC in Pelegrini II incorporated essentially the same
reasoning from its pervious decision, that is that the
failure to provide the notice until after a claimant has
already received an initial unfavorable AOJ determination,
i.e., a denial of the claim, would largely nullify the
purpose of the notice and, as such, prejudice the claimant by
forcing him or her to overcome an adverse decision, as well
as substantially impair the orderly sequence of claims
development and adjudication.
On the other hand, the CAVC acknowledged that the Secretary
could show that the lack of a pre-AOJ decision notice was not
prejudicial to the appellant. In light of the CAVC's
adoption of essentially the same principle in Pelegrini II,
the Board finds that the CAVC in Pelegrini II has left open
the possibility of a notice error being found to be non-
prejudicial to a claimant. To find otherwise would require
the Board to remand every case for the purpose of having the
AOJ provide a pre-initial adjudication notice.
The only way the AOJ could provide such a notice, however,
would be to vacate all prior adjudications, as well as to
nullify the notice of disagreement and substantive appeal
that were filed by the appellant to perfect the appeal to the
Board.
This would be an absurd result, and as such it is not a
reasonable construction of section 5103(a). There is no
basis for concluding that harmful error occurs simply because
a claimant receives VCAA notice after an initial adverse
adjudication.
Moreover, while strictly following the express holding in
Pelegrini would require the entire rating process to be
reinitiated when notice was not provided prior to the first
agency adjudication, this could not have been the intention
of the CAVC, otherwise it would not have taken "due account
of the rule of prejudicial error" in reviewing the Board's
decision. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2); see also Conway v.
Principi, 353 F. 3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (There is no
implicit exemption for the notice requirements contained in
38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) from the general statutory command set
forth in section 7261(b)(2) that the Veterans Claims Court
shall "take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.")
In reviewing AOJ determinations on appeal, the Board is
required to review the evidence of record on a de novo basis
and without providing any deference to the AOJ's decision.
As provided by 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), all questions in a matter
which under 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) are subject to decision by the
Secretary shall be subject to one review on appeal to the
Secretary, and such final decisions are made by the Board.
Because the Board makes the final decision on behalf of the
Secretary with respect to claims for veterans' benefits, it
is entirely appropriate for the Board to consider whether the
failure to provide a pre-AOJ initial adjudication constitutes
harmless error, especially since an AOJ determination that is
"affirmed" by the Board is subsumed by the appellate
decision and becomes the single and sole decision of the
Secretary in the matter under consideration. See 38 C.F.R.
§ 20.1104. There simply is no "adverse determination," as
discussed by the CAVC in Pelegrini, for the appellant to
overcome. Similarly, a claimant is not compelled under
38 U.S.C. § 5108 to proffer new and material evidence simply
because an AOJ decision is appealed to the Board. Rather, it
is only after a decision of either the AOJ or the Board
becomes final that a claimant has to surmount the reopening
hurdle.
All the VCAA requires is that the duty to notify is
satisfied, and that claimants be given the opportunity to
submit information and evidence in support of their claims.
Once this has been accomplished, all due process concerns
have been satisfied. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384
(1993); Sutton v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 553 (1996); see also
38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (harmless error).
Here, the Board finds that any defect with respect to the
timing of the VCAA notice requirement was harmless error.
While the notice provided to the appellant was not given
prior to the AOJ adjudication of the claim, the notice was
provided by the AOJ prior to the transfer and certification
of the appellant's case to the Board, and the content of the
notice fully complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b).
The claimant has been provided with every opportunity to
submit evidence and argument in support of his claim, and to
respond to VA notices. Therefore, notwithstanding Pelegrini,
to decide the appeal would not be prejudicial error to the
claimant.
The current decision in Pelegrini noted that a VCAA
notice consistent with 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.159(b) must: (1) inform the claimant about the
information and evidence not of record that is necessary
to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about
the information and evidence that VA will seek to
provide; (3) inform the claimant about the information
and evidence the claimant is expected to provide; and
(4) request or tell the claimant to provide any evidence
in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim,
or something to the effect that the claimant should
"give us everything you've got pertaining to your
claim(s)."
This new "fourth element" of the notice requirement
comes from the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). As
the Board has already noted on several occasions, the
veteran has already been afforded numerous opportunities
to submit additional evidence.
It appears to the Board that the claimant has indeed
been notified that he should provide or identify any and
all evidence relevant to the claim.
In this case, because each of the four content requirements
of a VCAA notice has been fully satisfied, the Board
concludes that any error in not providing a single notice to
the appellant covering all content requirements is harmless
error. The January 2004 notice in essence invited the
veteran to submit any evidence he had regarding the matter at
issue.
The Board finds that VA has done everything reasonably
possible to assist the claimant. Adjudication of the claim
may proceed, consistent with the VCAA. The record
demonstrates that remand for further action in accordance
with the VCAA would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 541 (1991).
Having determined that the duty to notify and the duty to
assist have been satisfied, the Board turns to an evaluation
of the veteran's claim on the merits.
Criteria
The rating criteria for evaluating psychoneurotic disorders
are as follows:
100 percent: total occupational and social
impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross
impairment in thought processes or communication;
persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly
inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of
hurting self or others; intermittent inability to
perform activities of daily living (including
maintenance of minimal personal hygiene);
disorientation to time and place; memory loss for
names of close relatives, own occupation, or own
name;
70 percent: Occupational and social impairment,
with deficiencies in most areas, such as work,
school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or
mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation;
obsessional rituals which interfere with routine
activities; speech intermittently illogical,
obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or
depression affecting the ability to function
independently, appropriately and effectively;
impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked
irritability with periods of violence); spatial
disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and
hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful
circumstances (including work or a worklike
setting); inability to establish and maintain
effective relationships;
50 percent: occupational and social impairment
with reduced reliability and productivity due to
such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial,
circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic
attacks more than once a week; difficulty in
understanding complex commands; impairment of
short-and long-term memory (e.g., retention of only
highly learned material, forgetting to complete
tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract
thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood;
difficulty in establishing and maintaining
effective work and social relationships;
30 percent: occupational and social impairment
with occasional decrease in work efficiency and
intermittent periods of inability to perform
occupational tasks (although generally functioning
satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care,
and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as:
depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic
attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep
impairment, mild memory loss (such as forgetting
names, directions, recent events)
10 percent: occupational and social impairment due
to mild or transient symptoms which decrease work
efficiency and ability to perform occupational
tasks only during periods of significant stress,
or; symptoms controlled by continuous medication;
0 percent: a mental condition has been formerly
diagnosed, but symptoms are not severe enough
either to interfere with occupational and social
functioning or to require continuous medication.
38 C.F.R. Part 4, Code 9411 (2003).
In general, the effective date of a claim for increase will
be the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement
arose, whichever is later. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2003).
According to 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) (2003), the effective
date of an increase in compensation is the earliest date as
of which it is factually ascertainable that an increase in
disability occurred if the claim is received within one year
from such date; otherwise, the date of receipt of the claim.
The CAVC has held, in Servello v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 196
(1992), that the Board must look at all communications that
can be interpreted as a claim for an increased rating, as
well as the evidence of record, and determine the earliest
date as of which, within the year prior to the claim, the
increase in disability was ascertainable.
According to the applicable criteria, the date of VA
outpatient or hospital examination or the date of admission
to a VA hospital will be accepted as the date of receipt of
claim; this provision applies only when a claim specifying
the benefit sought is received within one year from the date
of such examination, treatment or hospitalization. 38 C.F.R.
§ 3.157(b)(1) (2003).
Standard of Review
After the evidence has been assembled, it is the Board's
responsibility to evaluate the entire record. See
38 U.S.C.A. § 7104(a) (West 2002). When there is an
approximate balance of evidence regarding the merits of an
issue material to the determination of the matter, the
benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be
given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002);
38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3 (2001). In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1
Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990), the CAVC stated that "a veteran
need only demonstrate that there is 'an approximate balance
of positive and negative evidence' in order to prevail." To
deny a claim on its merits, the preponderance of the evidence
must be against the claim. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App.
518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54.
Factual Background
The veteran submitted private treatment records developed
between April 2000 and May 2001. On April 7, 2000, the
examiner noted the veteran had had a work-related incident
that had created more anxiety and depression, which had
caused an exacerbation of his PTSD. In August 2000, his PTSD
was improving. He had been to Vocational Rehabilitation and
wanted to start college, although it was noted that his
anxiety and depression had increased after his father's
death. In September 2000, his symptoms had increased and he
stated that he wanted a temporary increase in his
compensation so that he could finish his degree.
On September 18, 2000, his treating psychologist noted that
he had been treating the veteran for one year. He had had
increasing flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive daydreams,
hypervigilance and isolation. He stated that Worker's
Compensation had taken away his money and that this had
caused increased anxiety and depression. He had had recent
suicidal thoughts but no plan. The examiner commented that
the veteran's PTSD symptoms seemed to have increased over the
past few months.
Additional private treatment records were developed between
October 2000 and August 2001. On April 3, 2001, his
flashbacks were improved, although he still had occasional
war-related memories. His financial situation had improved
and that had aided his recovery. In May 2001, he was doing
better. On June 15, 2001, he was calmer and stated that he
was taking life more easily. On August 2, 2001, his PTSD
symptoms had lessened.
Analysis
After carefully reviewing the evidence of record, it is found
that an effective date earlier than August 3, 2001 for the
award of a 100 percent disability evaluation for PTSD is not
warranted. Initially, there is no indication in the record
that the veteran filed a claim before August 3, 2001. There
was no formal claim filed prior to this date, nor was there
any indication that the veteran had filed an informal claim
pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(1) seeking an increased
evaluation for his PTSD. The treatment records developed
between August 2000 and the date of the claim, August 3,
2001, while showing treatment for PTSD, did not evince an
intent to file a claim for an increased evaluation. In fact,
these records indicated that his PTSD had improved.
The evidence that was of record that pertained to the
veteran's PTSD developed during the one year period prior to
the August 3, 2001 claim does not demonstrate that the
assignment of a 100 percent evaluation was warranted. As
noted above, these records had indicated that his condition
had undergone improvement. While he still had occasional
nightmares, his flashbacks had improved. There was no
indication that his symptoms were manifested by more than an
occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent
periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although
generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior,
self-care, and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as:
depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks
(weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, mild memory
loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events).
In fact, the majority of his anxiety and depression were
attributed to his loss of work following an on-the-job
injury.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is found that the
preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim
for an effective date earlier than August 3, 2001 for the
award of a 100 percent disability evaluation for PTSD.
Although the veteran is entitled to the benefit of the doubt
where the evidence is in approximate balance, the benefit of
the doubt doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, the
preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. See
Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990).
ORDER
Entitlement to an effective date, prior to August 3, 2001,
for the award of a 100 percent evaluation for PTSD is denied.
____________________________________________
RONALD R. BOSCH
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Department of Veterans Affairs
YOUR RIGHTS TO APPEAL OUR DECISION
The attached decision by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) is
the final decision for all issues addressed in the "Order" section of the
decision. The Board may also choose to remand an issue or issues to the
local VA office for additional development. If the Board did this in your
case, then a "Remand" section follows the "Order." However, you cannot
appeal an issue remanded to the local VA office because a remand is not a
final decision. The advice below on how to appeal a claim applies only to
issues that were allowed, denied, or dismissed in the "Order."
If you are satisfied with the outcome of your appeal, you do not need to do
anything. We will return your file to your local VA office to implement
the BVA's decision. However, if you are not satisfied with the Board's
decision on any or all of the issues allowed, denied, or dismissed, you
have the following options, which are listed in no particular order of
importance:
? Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(Court)
? File with the Board a motion for reconsideration of this decision
? File with the Board a motion to vacate this decision
? File with the Board a motion for revision of this decision based on
clear and unmistakable error.
Although it would not affect this BVA decision, you may choose to also:
? Reopen your claim at the local VA office by submitting new and
material evidence.
There is no time limit for filing a motion for reconsideration, a motion to
vacate, or a motion for revision based on clear and unmistakable error with
the Board, or a claim to reopen at the local VA office. None of these
things is mutually exclusive - you can do all five things at the same time
if you wish. However, if you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court and a
motion with the Board at the same time, this may delay your case because of
jurisdictional conflicts. If you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court
before you file a motion with the BVA, the BVA will not be able to consider
your motion without the Court's permission.
How long do I have to start my appeal to the Court? You have 120 days from
the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of
this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims. If you also want to file a motion for
reconsideration or a motion to vacate, you will still have time to appeal
to the Court. As long as you file your motion(s) with the Board within 120
days of the date this decision was mailed to you, you will then have
another 120 days from the date the BVA decides the motion for
reconsideration or the motion to vacate to appeal to the Court. You should
know that even if you have a representative, as discussed below, it is your
responsibility to make sure that your appeal to Court is filed on time.
How do I appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims?
Send your Notice of Appeal to the Court at:
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20004-2950
You can get information about the Notice of Appeal, the procedure for
filing a Notice of Appeal, the filing fee (or a motion to waive the filing
fee if payment would cause financial hardship), and other matters covered
by the Court's rules directly from the Court. You can also get this
information from the Court's web site on the Internet at
www.vetapp.uscourts.gov, and you can download forms directly from that
website. The Court's facsimile number is (202) 501-5848.
To ensure full protection of your right of appeal to the Court, you must
file your Notice of Appeal with the Court, not with the Board, or any other
VA office.
How do I file a motion for reconsideration? You can file a motion asking
the BVA to reconsider any part of this decision by writing a letter to the
BVA stating why you believe that the BVA committed an obvious error of fact
or law in this decision, or stating that new and material military service
records have been discovered that apply to your appeal. If the BVA has
decided more than one issue, be sure to tell us which issue(s) you want
reconsidered. Send your letter to:
Director, Management and Administration (014)
Board of Veterans' Appeals
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420
VA
FORM
JUN
2003
(RS)
4597
Page
1
CONTINUED
Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a motion for
reconsideration, and you can do this at any time. However, if you also plan
to appeal this decision to the Court, you must file your motion within 120
days from the date of this decision.
How do I file a motion to vacate? You can file a motion asking the BVA to
vacate any part of this decision by writing a letter to the BVA stating why
you believe you were denied due process of law during your appeal. For
example, you were denied your right to representation through action or
inaction by VA personnel, you were not provided a Statement of the Case or
Supplemental Statement of the Case, or you did not get a personal hearing
that you requested. You can also file a motion to vacate any part of this
decision on the basis that the Board allowed benefits based on false or
fraudulent evidence. Send this motion to the address above for the
Director, Management and Administration, at the Board. Remember, the Board
places no time limit on filing a motion to vacate, and you can do this at
any time. However, if you also plan to appeal this decision to the Court,
you must file your motion within 120 days from the date of this decision.
How do I file a motion to revise the Board's decision on the basis of clear
and unmistakable error? You can file a motion asking that the Board revise
this decision if you believe that the decision is based on "clear and
unmistakable error" (CUE). Send this motion to the address above for the
Director, Management and Administration, at the Board. You should be
careful when preparing such a motion because it must meet specific
requirements, and the Board will not review a final decision on this basis
more than once. You should carefully review the Board's Rules of Practice
on CUE, 38 C.F.R. 20.1400 -- 20.1411, and seek help from a qualified
representative before filing such a motion. See discussion on
representation below. Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a
CUE review motion, and you can do this at any time.
How do I reopen my claim? You can ask your local VA office to reopen your
claim by simply sending them a statement indicating that you want to reopen
your claim. However, to be successful in reopening your claim, you must
submit new and material evidence to that office. See 38 C.F.R. 3.156(a).
Can someone represent me in my appeal? Yes. You can always represent
yourself in any claim before VA, including the BVA, but you can also
appoint someone to represent you. An accredited representative of a
recognized service organization may represent you free of charge. VA
approves these organizations to help veterans, service members, and
dependents prepare their claims and present them to VA. An accredited
representative works for the service organization and knows how to prepare
and present claims. You can find a listing of these organizations on the
Internet at: www.va.gov/vso. You can also choose to be represented by a
private attorney or by an "agent." (An agent is a person who is not a
lawyer, but is specially accredited by VA.)
If you want someone to represent you before the Court, rather than before
VA, then you can get information on how to do so by writing directly to the
Court. Upon request, the Court will provide you with a state-by-state
listing of persons admitted to practice before the Court who have indicated
their availability to represent appellants. This information is also
provided on the Court's website at www.vetapp.uscourts.gov.
Do I have to pay an attorney or agent to represent me? Except for a claim
involving a home or small business VA loan under Chapter 37 of title 38,
United States Code, attorneys or agents cannot charge you a fee or accept
payment for services they provide before the date BVA makes a final
decision on your appeal. If you hire an attorney or accredited agent within
1 year of a final BVA decision, then the attorney or agent is allowed to
charge you a fee for representing you before VA in most situations. An
attorney can also charge you for representing you before the Court. VA
cannot pay fees of attorneys or agents.
Fee for VA home and small business loan cases: An attorney or agent may
charge you a reasonable fee for services involving a VA home loan or small
business loan. For more information, read section 5904, title 38, United
States Code.
In all cases, a copy of any fee agreement between you and an attorney or
accredited agent must be sent to:
Office of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman (012)
Board of Veterans' Appeals
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420
The Board may decide, on its own, to review a fee agreement for
reasonableness, or you or your attorney or agent can file a motion asking
the Board to do so. Send such a motion to the address above for the Office
of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman at the Board.
VA
FORM
JUN
2003
(RS)
4597
Page
2 | 07-02-2004 | [
"Citation Nr: 0417859 Decision Date: 07/02/04 Archive Date: 07/14/04 DOCKET NO. 03-27 451 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Cleveland, Ohio THE ISSUE Entitlement to an effective date, prior to August 3, 2001, for the award of a 100 percent evaluation for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). REPRESENTATION Appellant represented by: Richard A. LaPointe, Attorney at Law ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD L. M. Barnard, Counsel INTRODUCTION The veteran served on active duty from November 1969 to January 1971. This appeal arose from an April 2002 rating action of the Cleveland, Ohio, Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), Regional Office (RO). The RO granted entitlement to a 100 percent evaluation for PTSD, effective August 3, 2001.",
"FINDINGS OF FACT 1. The veteran's claim for an increased evaluation for PTSD was received on August 3, 2001. 2. The evidence of record indicates that entitlement to an increased evaluation for PTSD was not ascertainable prior to August 3, 2001. CONCLUSION OF LAW Under governing law, the effective date of the award of the 100 percent disability evaluation for the service-connected PTSD is August 3, 2001. 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5103(a), 5103A, 5107(a) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.157(b)(1), 3.159(b)(1), 3.400, 3.400(o)(2). REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION Preliminary Matter: Duties to Notify & to Assist On November 9, 2000, the President signed into law the Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000) (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.A.",
"§§ 5100, 5102, 5103, 5103A, 5106, 5107, 5126 (West 2002)). The VCAA revises VA's obligations in two significant ways. First, VA has a duty to notify the appellant of any information and evidence necessary to substantiate and complete a claim for VA benefits. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5102, 5103 (West 2002). Second, VA has a duty to assist the appellant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. See 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103A (West 2002). VA issued regulations to implement the VCAA in August 2001. See 38 C.F.R.",
"§§ 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159, 3.326(a) (2003). The amendments became effective November 9, 2000, except for the amendment to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), which became effective August 29, 2001. VA specified that except for the amendment to 38 C.F.R. § 3.156(a), the second sentence of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c), and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(iii), the amended regulations otherwise apply to any claim for benefits received by VA on or after November 9, 2000, as well as to any claim filed before that date but not decided by VA as of that date. 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620. In its discussion of the scope and applicability of the regulations, VA stated that except for the amendment to 38 C.F.R.",
"§ 3.156(a), the second sentence of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c), and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c)(4)(iii), \"the provisions of this rule merely implement the VCAA and do not provide any rights other than those provided in the VCAA.\" 66 Fed. Reg. 45,629. VA went on to state that it would apply the new regulations to any claim pending but not decided by VA as of November 9, 2000. Id. The Board has given consideration to the provisions of the VCAA as they it apply to this case, and has determined that they do apply.",
"See Holliday v. Principi, 14 Vet. App. 280, 282-83 (2001) [the Board must make a determination as to the applicability of the various provisions of the VCAA to a particular claim]. The Board has considered whether the requirements of the VCAA have been fulfilled. First, there is no issue as to the substantial completeness of the application. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5102 (West 2002). The August 3, 2001 claim appeared substantially complete on its face. The veteran has clearly identified the disability in question and the benefit sought. Second, VA has a duty to notify the veteran and his representative of any information and evidence needed to substantiate and complete a claim. 38 U.S.C.A.",
"§ 5103 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). The veteran has been advised of the type of evidence lacking to demonstrate entitlement to the benefit sought with the April 2002 rating decision, August 2003 statement of the case, and January 2004 letter from the RO explaining the provisions of the VCAA. The January 2004 letter specifically provided the veteran with notice of the VCAA and explained the respective rights and responsibilities under the VCAA. VA has no outstanding duty to inform the veteran that any additional information or evidence is needed. Third, VA has a duty to assist the veteran in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate the claim. 38 U.S.C.A.",
"§ 5103A (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(c). The RO obtained the VA medical records as indicated by the veteran. The veteran never responded to the RO's inquiry as to private treatment reports. There is no indication that there is any other probative evidence available that has not been obtained concerning the issue on appeal. By the January 2004 letter from the RO and the August 2003 statement of the case, the veteran was clearly advised as to which portion of evidence is to be provided by him and which portion is to be provided by VA. That requirement of VA has been satisfied, and there is no additional evidence that needs to be provided.",
"Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002). The requirements of the VCAA have been substantially met by the RO. Every possible avenue of assistance has been explored, and the veteran has had ample notice of what might be required or helpful to his case. VA has satisfied its duties to inform and assist the appellant in this case. Further development and further expending of VA's resources is not warranted. Additionally, it is noted that in a recent decision, Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) invalidated the 30-day response period contained in 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1) as inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.§ 5103(b)(1). The CAFC made a conclusion similar to the one reached in Disabled American Veterans v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 327 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing a related Board regulation, 38 C.F.R. § 19.9). The CAFC found that the 30-day period provided in § 3.159(b)(1) to respond to a VCAA duty to notify is misleading and detrimental to claimants whose claims are prematurely denied short of the statutory one-year period provided for response.",
"In the instant case, the veteran was provided with initial notice of the provisions of the VCAA and its effect on the development of his claim in the January 2004 letter from the RO. That letter did indicate that the veteran should respond up to one year of the date of the letter. Additional argument was submitted by the veteran's representative shortly thereafter. Given that the veteran has been fully advised of his rights and responsibilities under the VCAA, and that he has given no indication of additional evidence that has not been obtained, the Board has concluded that VA has no outstanding duty to inform the veteran that any additional information or evidence is needed. In any event, revisions to 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103 contained in the recently-enacted Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, which was made effective retroactively to November 9, 2000, the effective date of the VCAA, specify that VA is not prohibited from making a decision on a claim before the expiration of the one-year period after a notice to the veteran and his representative of the information needed to complete an application for benefits.",
"See the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, P.L. 108-183, § ___, 117 Stat. 2651, ___ (Dec. 16, 2003) [to be codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5103(b)]. As noted above, there is no deficiency in the veteran's case at hand, nor would there be otherwise by operation of the new law. It is noted that the veteran was afforded a VA examination and medical review. Accordingly, additional examination of the veteran or another medical opinion is not warranted. The requirements of the VCAA have been substantially met by the RO.",
"Every possible avenue of assistance has been explored, and the veteran has had ample notice of what might be required or helpful to his case. VA has satisfied its duties to inform and assist the veteran in this case. Further development and further expending of VA's resources is not warranted. The Board finds that there will be no prejudice to the appellant if the Board decides his appeal at this time and the Board will, therefore, proceed to consider the appellant's claim on the merits. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet.",
"App. 384, 394 (1993). Finally, it is noted that the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) decision in Pelegrini v. Principi, No. 01-944 (U.S. Vet. App. June 24, 2004) (Pelegrini II) (withdrawing and replacing Pelegrini v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 412 (2004)) held, in part, that a VCAA notice, as required by 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a), must be provided to a claimant before the initial unfavorable agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ) decision on a claim for VA benefits. In this case, the initial AOJ decision was made prior to January 2004, when the veteran was notified of the VCAA. However, assuming solely for the sake of argument and without conceding the correctness of Pelegrini II that essentially adopted the same rationale as its withdrawn predecessor, the Board finds that any defect with respect to the VCAA notice requirement in this case was harmless error for the reasons specified above. In the present case, a substantially complete application was received in August 2001. Thereafter, in the April 2002 rating decision, the RO rendered the determination at issue.",
"Only after that rating action was promulgated did the AOJ provide notice to the claimant regarding what information and evidence is needed to substantiate the claim, as well as what information and evidence must be submitted by the claimant, what information and evidence will be obtained by VA, and the need for the claimant to submit any evidence in his possession that pertains to the claim. See the references to the documents issued to the veteran set out above. Because the VCAA notice in this case was not provided to the appellant prior to the initial AOJ adjudication denying the claim, the timing of the notice does not comply with the express requirements of the law as found by the CAVC in Pelegrini II. The CAVC did leave open the possibility that a notice error of this kind may be non-prejudicial to a claimant. The CAVC in Pelegrini II incorporated essentially the same reasoning from its pervious decision, that is that the failure to provide the notice until after a claimant has already received an initial unfavorable AOJ determination, i.e., a denial of the claim, would largely nullify the purpose of the notice and, as such, prejudice the claimant by forcing him or her to overcome an adverse decision, as well as substantially impair the orderly sequence of claims development and adjudication. On the other hand, the CAVC acknowledged that the Secretary could show that the lack of a pre-AOJ decision notice was not prejudicial to the appellant.",
"In light of the CAVC's adoption of essentially the same principle in Pelegrini II, the Board finds that the CAVC in Pelegrini II has left open the possibility of a notice error being found to be non- prejudicial to a claimant. To find otherwise would require the Board to remand every case for the purpose of having the AOJ provide a pre-initial adjudication notice. The only way the AOJ could provide such a notice, however, would be to vacate all prior adjudications, as well as to nullify the notice of disagreement and substantive appeal that were filed by the appellant to perfect the appeal to the Board. This would be an absurd result, and as such it is not a reasonable construction of section 5103(a). There is no basis for concluding that harmful error occurs simply because a claimant receives VCAA notice after an initial adverse adjudication.",
"Moreover, while strictly following the express holding in Pelegrini would require the entire rating process to be reinitiated when notice was not provided prior to the first agency adjudication, this could not have been the intention of the CAVC, otherwise it would not have taken \"due account of the rule of prejudicial error\" in reviewing the Board's decision. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2); see also Conway v. Principi, 353 F. 3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (There is no implicit exemption for the notice requirements contained in 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) from the general statutory command set forth in section 7261(b)(2) that the Veterans Claims Court shall \"take due account of the rule of prejudicial error.\") In reviewing AOJ determinations on appeal, the Board is required to review the evidence of record on a de novo basis and without providing any deference to the AOJ's decision. As provided by 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a), all questions in a matter which under 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) are subject to decision by the Secretary shall be subject to one review on appeal to the Secretary, and such final decisions are made by the Board.",
"Because the Board makes the final decision on behalf of the Secretary with respect to claims for veterans' benefits, it is entirely appropriate for the Board to consider whether the failure to provide a pre-AOJ initial adjudication constitutes harmless error, especially since an AOJ determination that is \"affirmed\" by the Board is subsumed by the appellate decision and becomes the single and sole decision of the Secretary in the matter under consideration. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1104. There simply is no \"adverse determination,\" as discussed by the CAVC in Pelegrini, for the appellant to overcome. Similarly, a claimant is not compelled under 38 U.S.C. § 5108 to proffer new and material evidence simply because an AOJ decision is appealed to the Board. Rather, it is only after a decision of either the AOJ or the Board becomes final that a claimant has to surmount the reopening hurdle.",
"All the VCAA requires is that the duty to notify is satisfied, and that claimants be given the opportunity to submit information and evidence in support of their claims. Once this has been accomplished, all due process concerns have been satisfied. See Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384 (1993); Sutton v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 553 (1996); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.1102 (harmless error). Here, the Board finds that any defect with respect to the timing of the VCAA notice requirement was harmless error. While the notice provided to the appellant was not given prior to the AOJ adjudication of the claim, the notice was provided by the AOJ prior to the transfer and certification of the appellant's case to the Board, and the content of the notice fully complied with the requirements of 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b). The claimant has been provided with every opportunity to submit evidence and argument in support of his claim, and to respond to VA notices. Therefore, notwithstanding Pelegrini, to decide the appeal would not be prejudicial error to the claimant.",
"The current decision in Pelegrini noted that a VCAA notice consistent with 38 U.S.C. § 5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b) must: (1) inform the claimant about the information and evidence not of record that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek to provide; (3) inform the claimant about the information and evidence the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) request or tell the claimant to provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that pertains to the claim, or something to the effect that the claimant should \"give us everything you've got pertaining to your claim(s).\" This new \"fourth element\" of the notice requirement comes from the language of 38 C.F.R. § 3.159(b)(1). As the Board has already noted on several occasions, the veteran has already been afforded numerous opportunities to submit additional evidence. It appears to the Board that the claimant has indeed been notified that he should provide or identify any and all evidence relevant to the claim. In this case, because each of the four content requirements of a VCAA notice has been fully satisfied, the Board concludes that any error in not providing a single notice to the appellant covering all content requirements is harmless error.",
"The January 2004 notice in essence invited the veteran to submit any evidence he had regarding the matter at issue. The Board finds that VA has done everything reasonably possible to assist the claimant. Adjudication of the claim may proceed, consistent with the VCAA. The record demonstrates that remand for further action in accordance with the VCAA would serve no useful purpose. See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 541 (1991). Having determined that the duty to notify and the duty to assist have been satisfied, the Board turns to an evaluation of the veteran's claim on the merits.",
"Criteria The rating criteria for evaluating psychoneurotic disorders are as follows: 100 percent: total occupational and social impairment, due to such symptoms as: gross impairment in thought processes or communication; persistent delusions or hallucinations; grossly inappropriate behavior; persistent danger of hurting self or others; intermittent inability to perform activities of daily living (including maintenance of minimal personal hygiene); disorientation to time and place; memory loss for names of close relatives, own occupation, or own name; 70 percent: Occupational and social impairment, with deficiencies in most areas, such as work, school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood, due to such symptoms as: suicidal ideation; obsessional rituals which interfere with routine activities; speech intermittently illogical, obscure, or irrelevant; near-continuous panic or depression affecting the ability to function independently, appropriately and effectively; impaired impulse control (such as unprovoked irritability with periods of violence); spatial disorientation; neglect of personal appearance and hygiene; difficulty in adapting to stressful circumstances (including work or a worklike setting); inability to establish and maintain effective relationships; 50 percent: occupational and social impairment with reduced reliability and productivity due to such symptoms as: flattened affect; circumstantial, circumlocutory, or stereotyped speech; panic attacks more than once a week; difficulty in understanding complex commands; impairment of short-and long-term memory (e.g., retention of only highly learned material, forgetting to complete tasks); impaired judgment; impaired abstract thinking; disturbances of motivation and mood; difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective work and social relationships; 30 percent: occupational and social impairment with occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events) 10 percent: occupational and social impairment due to mild or transient symptoms which decrease work efficiency and ability to perform occupational tasks only during periods of significant stress, or; symptoms controlled by continuous medication; 0 percent: a mental condition has been formerly diagnosed, but symptoms are not severe enough either to interfere with occupational and social functioning or to require continuous medication. 38 C.F.R.",
"Part 4, Code 9411 (2003). In general, the effective date of a claim for increase will be the date of receipt of the claim or the date entitlement arose, whichever is later. 38 C.F.R. § 3.400 (2003). According to 38 C.F.R. § 3.400(o)(2) (2003), the effective date of an increase in compensation is the earliest date as of which it is factually ascertainable that an increase in disability occurred if the claim is received within one year from such date; otherwise, the date of receipt of the claim. The CAVC has held, in Servello v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App.",
"196 (1992), that the Board must look at all communications that can be interpreted as a claim for an increased rating, as well as the evidence of record, and determine the earliest date as of which, within the year prior to the claim, the increase in disability was ascertainable. According to the applicable criteria, the date of VA outpatient or hospital examination or the date of admission to a VA hospital will be accepted as the date of receipt of claim; this provision applies only when a claim specifying the benefit sought is received within one year from the date of such examination, treatment or hospitalization. 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(1) (2003). Standard of Review After the evidence has been assembled, it is the Board's responsibility to evaluate the entire record. See 38 U.S.C.A.",
"§ 7104(a) (West 2002). When there is an approximate balance of evidence regarding the merits of an issue material to the determination of the matter, the benefit of the doubt in resolving each such issue shall be given to the claimant. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.102, 4.3 (2001). In Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990), the CAVC stated that \"a veteran need only demonstrate that there is 'an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence' in order to prevail.\" To deny a claim on its merits, the preponderance of the evidence must be against the claim. See Alemany v. Brown, 9 Vet. App.",
"518, 519 (1996), citing Gilbert, 1 Vet. App. at 54. Factual Background The veteran submitted private treatment records developed between April 2000 and May 2001. On April 7, 2000, the examiner noted the veteran had had a work-related incident that had created more anxiety and depression, which had caused an exacerbation of his PTSD. In August 2000, his PTSD was improving. He had been to Vocational Rehabilitation and wanted to start college, although it was noted that his anxiety and depression had increased after his father's death. In September 2000, his symptoms had increased and he stated that he wanted a temporary increase in his compensation so that he could finish his degree. On September 18, 2000, his treating psychologist noted that he had been treating the veteran for one year. He had had increasing flashbacks, nightmares, intrusive daydreams, hypervigilance and isolation.",
"He stated that Worker's Compensation had taken away his money and that this had caused increased anxiety and depression. He had had recent suicidal thoughts but no plan. The examiner commented that the veteran's PTSD symptoms seemed to have increased over the past few months. Additional private treatment records were developed between October 2000 and August 2001. On April 3, 2001, his flashbacks were improved, although he still had occasional war-related memories. His financial situation had improved and that had aided his recovery. In May 2001, he was doing better. On June 15, 2001, he was calmer and stated that he was taking life more easily.",
"On August 2, 2001, his PTSD symptoms had lessened. Analysis After carefully reviewing the evidence of record, it is found that an effective date earlier than August 3, 2001 for the award of a 100 percent disability evaluation for PTSD is not warranted. Initially, there is no indication in the record that the veteran filed a claim before August 3, 2001. There was no formal claim filed prior to this date, nor was there any indication that the veteran had filed an informal claim pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 3.157(b)(1) seeking an increased evaluation for his PTSD. The treatment records developed between August 2000 and the date of the claim, August 3, 2001, while showing treatment for PTSD, did not evince an intent to file a claim for an increased evaluation. In fact, these records indicated that his PTSD had improved.",
"The evidence that was of record that pertained to the veteran's PTSD developed during the one year period prior to the August 3, 2001 claim does not demonstrate that the assignment of a 100 percent evaluation was warranted. As noted above, these records had indicated that his condition had undergone improvement. While he still had occasional nightmares, his flashbacks had improved. There was no indication that his symptoms were manifested by more than an occasional decrease in work efficiency and intermittent periods of inability to perform occupational tasks (although generally functioning satisfactorily, with routine behavior, self-care, and conversation normal), due to such symptoms as: depressed mood, anxiety, suspiciousness, panic attacks (weekly or less often), chronic sleep impairment, mild memory loss (such as forgetting names, directions, recent events). In fact, the majority of his anxiety and depression were attributed to his loss of work following an on-the-job injury. Under the circumstances of this case, it is found that the preponderance of the evidence is against the veteran's claim for an effective date earlier than August 3, 2001 for the award of a 100 percent disability evaluation for PTSD.",
"Although the veteran is entitled to the benefit of the doubt where the evidence is in approximate balance, the benefit of the doubt doctrine is inapplicable where, as here, the preponderance of the evidence is against the claim. See Gilbert v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 49, 53 (1990). ORDER Entitlement to an effective date, prior to August 3, 2001, for the award of a 100 percent evaluation for PTSD is denied. ____________________________________________ RONALD R. BOSCH Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Department of Veterans Affairs YOUR RIGHTS TO APPEAL OUR DECISION The attached decision by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) is the final decision for all issues addressed in the \"Order\" section of the decision.",
"The Board may also choose to remand an issue or issues to the local VA office for additional development. If the Board did this in your case, then a \"Remand\" section follows the \"Order.\" However, you cannot appeal an issue remanded to the local VA office because a remand is not a final decision. The advice below on how to appeal a claim applies only to issues that were allowed, denied, or dismissed in the \"Order.\" If you are satisfied with the outcome of your appeal, you do not need to do anything. We will return your file to your local VA office to implement the BVA's decision.",
"However, if you are not satisfied with the Board's decision on any or all of the issues allowed, denied, or dismissed, you have the following options, which are listed in no particular order of importance: ? Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) ? File with the Board a motion for reconsideration of this decision ? File with the Board a motion to vacate this decision ? File with the Board a motion for revision of this decision based on clear and unmistakable error. Although it would not affect this BVA decision, you may choose to also: ? Reopen your claim at the local VA office by submitting new and material evidence. There is no time limit for filing a motion for reconsideration, a motion to vacate, or a motion for revision based on clear and unmistakable error with the Board, or a claim to reopen at the local VA office.",
"None of these things is mutually exclusive - you can do all five things at the same time if you wish. However, if you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court and a motion with the Board at the same time, this may delay your case because of jurisdictional conflicts. If you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court before you file a motion with the BVA, the BVA will not be able to consider your motion without the Court's permission. How long do I have to start my appeal to the Court?",
"You have 120 days from the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. If you also want to file a motion for reconsideration or a motion to vacate, you will still have time to appeal to the Court.",
"As long as you file your motion(s) with the Board within 120 days of the date this decision was mailed to you, you will then have another 120 days from the date the BVA decides the motion for reconsideration or the motion to vacate to appeal to the Court. You should know that even if you have a representative, as discussed below, it is your responsibility to make sure that your appeal to Court is filed on time. How do I appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims? Send your Notice of Appeal to the Court at: Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20004-2950 You can get information about the Notice of Appeal, the procedure for filing a Notice of Appeal, the filing fee (or a motion to waive the filing fee if payment would cause financial hardship), and other matters covered by the Court's rules directly from the Court. You can also get this information from the Court's web site on the Internet at www.vetapp.uscourts.gov, and you can download forms directly from that website. The Court's facsimile number is (202) 501-5848. To ensure full protection of your right of appeal to the Court, you must file your Notice of Appeal with the Court, not with the Board, or any other VA office.",
"How do I file a motion for reconsideration? You can file a motion asking the BVA to reconsider any part of this decision by writing a letter to the BVA stating why you believe that the BVA committed an obvious error of fact or law in this decision, or stating that new and material military service records have been discovered that apply to your appeal. If the BVA has decided more than one issue, be sure to tell us which issue(s) you want reconsidered. Send your letter to: Director, Management and Administration (014) Board of Veterans' Appeals 810 Vermont Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20420 VA FORM JUN 2003 (RS) 4597 Page 1 CONTINUED Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a motion for reconsideration, and you can do this at any time.",
"However, if you also plan to appeal this decision to the Court, you must file your motion within 120 days from the date of this decision. How do I file a motion to vacate? You can file a motion asking the BVA to vacate any part of this decision by writing a letter to the BVA stating why you believe you were denied due process of law during your appeal. For example, you were denied your right to representation through action or inaction by VA personnel, you were not provided a Statement of the Case or Supplemental Statement of the Case, or you did not get a personal hearing that you requested. You can also file a motion to vacate any part of this decision on the basis that the Board allowed benefits based on false or fraudulent evidence.",
"Send this motion to the address above for the Director, Management and Administration, at the Board. Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a motion to vacate, and you can do this at any time. However, if you also plan to appeal this decision to the Court, you must file your motion within 120 days from the date of this decision. How do I file a motion to revise the Board's decision on the basis of clear and unmistakable error? You can file a motion asking that the Board revise this decision if you believe that the decision is based on \"clear and unmistakable error\" (CUE). Send this motion to the address above for the Director, Management and Administration, at the Board. You should be careful when preparing such a motion because it must meet specific requirements, and the Board will not review a final decision on this basis more than once.",
"You should carefully review the Board's Rules of Practice on CUE, 38 C.F.R. 20.1400 -- 20.1411, and seek help from a qualified representative before filing such a motion. See discussion on representation below. Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a CUE review motion, and you can do this at any time. How do I reopen my claim? You can ask your local VA office to reopen your claim by simply sending them a statement indicating that you want to reopen your claim. However, to be successful in reopening your claim, you must submit new and material evidence to that office. See 38 C.F.R.",
"3.156(a). Can someone represent me in my appeal? Yes. You can always represent yourself in any claim before VA, including the BVA, but you can also appoint someone to represent you. An accredited representative of a recognized service organization may represent you free of charge. VA approves these organizations to help veterans, service members, and dependents prepare their claims and present them to VA. An accredited representative works for the service organization and knows how to prepare and present claims. You can find a listing of these organizations on the Internet at: www.va.gov/vso. You can also choose to be represented by a private attorney or by an \"agent.\" (An agent is a person who is not a lawyer, but is specially accredited by VA.) If you want someone to represent you before the Court, rather than before VA, then you can get information on how to do so by writing directly to the Court. Upon request, the Court will provide you with a state-by-state listing of persons admitted to practice before the Court who have indicated their availability to represent appellants. This information is also provided on the Court's website at www.vetapp.uscourts.gov.",
"Do I have to pay an attorney or agent to represent me? Except for a claim involving a home or small business VA loan under Chapter 37 of title 38, United States Code, attorneys or agents cannot charge you a fee or accept payment for services they provide before the date BVA makes a final decision on your appeal. If you hire an attorney or accredited agent within 1 year of a final BVA decision, then the attorney or agent is allowed to charge you a fee for representing you before VA in most situations. An attorney can also charge you for representing you before the Court. VA cannot pay fees of attorneys or agents. Fee for VA home and small business loan cases: An attorney or agent may charge you a reasonable fee for services involving a VA home loan or small business loan.",
"For more information, read section 5904, title 38, United States Code. In all cases, a copy of any fee agreement between you and an attorney or accredited agent must be sent to: Office of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman (012) Board of Veterans' Appeals 810 Vermont Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20420 The Board may decide, on its own, to review a fee agreement for reasonableness, or you or your attorney or agent can file a motion asking the Board to do so. Send such a motion to the address above for the Office of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman at the Board.",
"VA FORM JUN 2003 (RS) 4597 Page 2"
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* Ollie G. Rose, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, RespondentRose v. CommissionerDocket No. 5263-68United States Tax Court56 T.C. 185; 1971 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 141; April 27, 1971, Filed *141 Decision will be entered under Rule 50. Petitioner as part-owner of certain real property entered into a contract with the grantee. Although the contract was couched in the form of a sale of minerals "in place" it was in substance an agreement on the part of the grantee to pay royalties based upon the quantity and quality of sand and gravel which he was to remove from said property. Held, the substance of the agreement governs its Federal tax consequences. The payments received by the petitioner for sand and gravel were ordinary income subject to the 5-percent allowance for percentage depletion under sec. 613(b)(6)(A), I.R.C. 1954, rather than capital gains. The petitioner retained an "economic interest" within the meaning of Rutledge v. United States, 428 F. 2d 347 (C.A. 5, 1970) and Wood v. United States, 377 F. 2d 300 (C.A. 5, 1967). Harry G. Weeks, for the petitioner.John W. Dierker, for the respondent. Sterrett, Judge. STERRETT*185 OPINIONThe respondent determined deficiencies in the Federal income tax of the petitioner for the taxable years 1964, 1965, and 1966 in the amounts of $ 6,413.63, $ 7,178.99, and $ 1,623.46, respectively. Due to concessions of the parties the sole issue remaining for decision is whether certain payments under a document styled "Sand and Gravel Deed" are long-term capital gain or, as the respondent contends, ordinary income subject to a 5-percent allowance for depletion under section 613(b)(6)(A), I.R.C. 1954. 1All of the facts were stipulated. The stipulation and the exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein*143 by this reference.*186 Ollie G. Rose (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) resided in Tarrant County, Tex., at the time her petition was filed herein. She filed Federal individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 with the district director of internal revenue at Dallas, Tex.On July 1, 1963, the petitioner joined in the execution of the following document, only irrelevant passages of which have been deleted:The State of TexasSand and Gravel DeedCounty of TarrantMade this 1st day of July, A.D. 1963, by and between BERTA ROSE BROWN and husband J. O. BROWN, OLLIE G. ROSE, a widow, and MARGARET R. MAY, who has elected under Article 4614, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St., to manage and control her separate property, all of the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, hereinafter referred to as GRANTOR, and RICHARD C. PRATER AND R. W. DIAL, both of the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, hereinafter collectively referred to as GRANTEE,WitnessethWhereas, GRANTOR is the owner in fee simple of that certain lot, tract or parcel of land hereinafter more particularly described and situated in Tarrant County, Texas, andWhereas, said land contains certain deposits of sand*144 and gravel which GRANTEE desires to purchase and GRANTOR desires to sell and convey same to GRANTEE, andWhereas, it is the intention by these presents to sell and convey said deposits rather than in any manner lease said premises for the extraction of said sand and gravel,Now, Therefore, Know All Men By These Presents:That GRANTOR, in consideration of $ 10,000.00, and such other consideration as hereinafter mentioned, payable as follows: (a) $ 1,250.00 paid simultaneously with the execution of this deed, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged(b) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1964(c) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1965(d) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1966(e) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1967(f) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1968(g) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1969(h) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1970has granted, sold and conveyed, and does by these presents grant, sell and convey unto GRANTEE all sand and gravel upon and underlying all that property described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes, together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of extracting sand and gravel, and removing*145 the same therefrom.*187 1GRANTEE is to have the privilege of removing without additional payment during each of the following periods: July 1, 1963-June 30, 1964July 1, 1964-June 30, 1965July 1, 1965-June 30, 1966July 1, 1966-June 30, 1967July 1, 1967-June 30, 1968July 1, 1968-June 30, 1969July 1, 1969-June 30, 1970July 1, 1970-June 30, 19712,500 cubic yards of sand and gravel.2As additional consideration for the conveyance herein made, GRANTEE shall pay to GRANTOR a sum equivalent to the total sand and gravel removed from the premises in any one yearly period in excess of 2,500 cubic yards, such sum to be computed in accordance with the amounts set opposite the following classifications:Amount per cubic yardClassifications1. $ 0.50Good and washable (pit)2. $ 0.35Road gravel (white)3. $ 0.10Other nonmetallic earth materialFollowing the extraction of 2,500 cubic yards in any one yearly period as set forth in the preceding paragraph, GRANTEE shall pay the additional consideration, if any, to GRANTOR monthly, on or before the 10th day of each succeeding month during such yearly period.GRANTEE shall keep accurate records as to the amount and classification*146 of sand and gravel removed from the premises, and on or before the 10th day of each month, shall deliver to GRANTOR or GRANTOR [sic] representative, statements showing the classifications and the amounts of sand and gravel removed from the premises during the preceding monthly period. GRANTOR or GRANTOR'S representative shall at all times have access to GRANTEE'S records for the purpose of verifying the amount of sand and gravel removed from the premises under the terms hereof.3In the event GRANTEE should fail to make payment when due of any of the consideration called for by this deed, then in such event, GRANTOR may notify GRANTEE in writing of such default and if such default is not cured within fifteen (15) days after such notification, the title to all sand and gravel conveyed to GRANTEE by this deed not theretofore extracted shall automatically revert to GRANTOR without further action on the part of GRANTOR AND GRANTEE agrees, upon request of GRANTOR, to execute such deed or other instrument as may when filed of record reasonably evidence the fact that the title to such sand and gravel has reverted to GRANTOR.4At the expiration of eight (8) years from the date hereof, title*147 to all sand and gravel not theretofore extracted from the premises shall automatically revert to *188 GRANTOR without further action on the part of GRANTOR, and GRANTEE binds and obligates himself upon request of GRANTOR, to immediately execute such deed as when filed of record shall reasonably evidence the fact that title has so reverted to GRANTOR.5To Have and to Hold all sand and gravel upon and underlying the above described property, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging unto the said GRANTEE, for the term stated and subject to the conditions and covenants aforesaid, GRANTOR does hereby bind himself, his heirs, executors and administrators to Warrant and Forever Defend all and singular said sand and gravel upon and underlying the above described property unto said GRANTEE, his heirs and assigns, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof.* * * *7GRANTEE joins herein to evidence his acceptance of title under all of the terms and conditions of the foregoing, and agrees to pay the consideration set forth above.This instrument is executed by the parties hereto, the day and*148 year first above written in four (4) counterparts, any one of which may be deemed an original:Berta Rose BrownJ. O. BrownOllie G. RoseMargaret R. May, GrantorRichard C. PraterR. W. Dial, GranteeThe respondent has conceded that only one-third of the total proceeds received under the above contract were includable in the petitioner's income, therefore the amounts in question are as follows:One-third of totalYearproceeds from contract1964$ 13,074.04196510,294.7819664,102.50On her Federal income tax returns for 1964, 2 1965, and 1966, petitioner reported these amounts as long-term capital gain from the sale of real estate.*189 In his statutory notice the respondent stated*149 that the proceeds received by the petitioner were ordinary income subject to the 5-percent depletion allowance, "because it has not been established that the transaction giving rise to receipt * * * was not a lease nor that you did not retain an economic interest."This case presents the frequently litigated issue of whether the income realized by a landowner upon the removal and sale of a mineral deposit should be characterized as capital gain or ordinary income. See Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065">35 T.C. 1065, 1069 (1961), for some of the decided cases. The question to be answered is whether the petitioner, by contract, has sold the sand and gravel on her property "in place," thereby, selling part of the realty or whether she has retained an "economic interest" in these minerals to which she must look for payment. Wood v. United States, 377 F.2d 300">377 F. 2d 300, 304 (C.A. 5, 1967), affirming an unreported case (N.D. Tex. 1967, 19 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1542">19 A.F.T.R. 2d 1542, 67-2U.S.T.C. par. 9522).As we stated in Samuel L. Green, supra at 1070:where the owner does not part with his entire*150 interest in the deposits until removed or where he does not sell part of his property "in place," but in effect merely enters into a lease for the exploitation of his land reserving a royalty with respect to the materials extracted * * *any payments received as a result of this exploitation are taxable as ordinary income. Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F. 2d 49, 51 (C.A. 5, 1957), affirming in part 24 T.C. 903">24 T.C. 903 (1955).As the petitioner argues on brief, we are bound by virtue of our decision in Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), to decide this case under the law as it exists in the Fifth Circuit, for, an appeal from our determination herein would be to that Court of Appeals. The petitioner urges that Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F. 2d 864 (C.A. 5, 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 223">25 T.C. 223 (1955), is dispositive. We do not agree. In Crowell "strong emphasis was placed upon the wording of the instrument as contract of sale." Wood v. United States, supra at 310. The Court of Appeals*151 in Crowell reasoned that the contract there in question unambiguously revealed the true intent of the parties. "Looking to the actual circumstances as well as the language of the contract" the court determined that the instrument represented a bona fide sale. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 866; Wood v. United States, supra at 311, fn. 24 and accompanying text. In contrast, the instant facts do not indicate that the parties intended a sale.The contract, in question here, was drafted using terms of sale, however, in this instance it is necessary that we look beyond the language of the instrument. Rutledge v. United States, 428 F. 2d 347 (C.A. 5, *190 1970), reversing an unreported case (W.D. La. 1969, 23 A.F.T.R. 2d 1221, 69-1U.S.T.C. par. 9427). If it is the contention of the petitioner that we must limit our investigation to the phraseology of her agreement she is in error. We are not of the opinion that the Court of Appeals decision in Crowell mandates this limitation. Further, more recent decisions*152 in this area of the law by the Fifth Circuit indicate that the mere wording of an agreement is not properly determinative of whether an "economic interest" was retained. Rutledge v. United States, supra at 353; Wood v. United States, supra at 311, see fn. 26 and accompanying text.The essence of the agreement "is determined not by subtleties of draftsmanship but by * * * total effect." Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260">356 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1958). The total effect of this agreement is that the so-called grantee under the contract agreed to pay to the grantor royalties based upon the quality and quantity of the minerals removed from the grantor's property for the 8 years immediately subsequent to the date of execution and agreed to make certain payments in advance.The agreement states that the collective grantor sold all sand and gravel on and under certain property for $ 10,000, payable in eight annual installments. For this $ 10,000 the grantee was given the privilege of removing a total of 20,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel, at the rate of 2,500 cubic yards annually for*153 the 8 years corresponding to the period for the payment of $ 10,000. After having extracted 2,500 cubic yards in any year the grantee was required to make an additional payment, based on a fixed scale, 3 for any gravel or sand removed in excess of 2,500 cubic yards. The agreement, further, provided that upon default by the grantee "title to all sand and gravel * * * not theretofore extracted shall automatically revert to Grantor." After the expiration of 8 years from the time of contracting title to all unextracted sand and gravel was to "revert" to the grantor.The above-described provisions are a transparent attempt to metamorphose a royalty agreement into a sale. These provisions simply give the petitioner a royalty of from 10- to 50-cents per cubic yard on all sand and gravel extracted. The payment of $ 1,250 per year for*154 8 years is simply an advance payment at 50-cents per cubic yard for the first 2,500 yards removed; this is tantamount to a minimum guaranteed royalty provision. See Wood v. United States, supra at 307.The provisions of the agreement calling for reversion of all sand and gravel to the grantor is merely an obfuscated method of providing for termination. An automatic reversion after 8 years is no different *191 than the provision for a term for years commonly found in leases or royalty agreements. Here it is merely another instance of an attempt to couch this agreement in the language of conveyance.Perhaps the least artful device of all is contained in the paragraphs referring to the intent of the parties to the agreement. It suffices to say that the parties' written assertion that a sale was intended cannot determine questions of Federal taxation when more objective manifestations of intent are available.On brief the petitioner argues that there was no provision in the contract which required the grantee to do other than make fixed installment payments aggregating $ 10,000. The grantee could have retained title to all sand and gravel for*155 8 years without removing any of it. It would be unrealistic, to say the least, to assume that the grantee would not exercise its contractual right, for which they paid a minimum of $ 10,000, to remove the prescribed amount of sand and gravel. Furthermore the contract obviously contemplates payments in excess of $ 10,000. The petitioner had an "economic interest" in removal of as much sand and gravel as possible by the grantee. The amounts to be received by the petitioner were of course directly dependent on extraction of deposits. We are not limited to consideration of the agreement in vacuo. In point of fact the amounts received by the grantor indicate that the grantee intended to and did remove in excess of 2,500 cubic yards in each of the years in question.As the Supreme Court said in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, supra at 266-267, "These arrangements seem to us transparent devices. Their forms do not control." The substance of the agreement, when revealed, makes clear that the petitioner retained an "economic interest" and was, thereby, in receipt of ordinary income subject to the 5-percent allowance for depletion provided by section*156 613(b)(6)(A).In order to reflect concessions by the respondent with respect to the amounts of the payments received by the petitioner,Decision will be entered under Rule 50. Footnotes*. Caption changed by Court order dated June 4, 1971, to Estate of Ollie G. Rose, Deceased, Berta Rose Brown, Executrix, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.↩1. All references by section are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise stated.↩2. On her 1964 return the petitioner reported the amount of $ 13,074.03, while the parties have stipulated that $ 13,074.04 is in issue. This discrepancy was not explained to the Court, but, we feel certain the parties can work it out in a Rule 50 computation.↩3. E.g., 50 cents per cubic yard of "good and washable -- pit." We note that 2,500 cubic yards at 50 cents per yard equals $ 1,250, the amount that the grantee was required to pay annually.↩ | 11-20-2020 | [
"* Ollie G. Rose, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, RespondentRose v. CommissionerDocket No. 5263-68United States Tax Court56 T.C. 185; 1971 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 141; April 27, 1971, Filed *141 Decision will be entered under Rule 50. Petitioner as part-owner of certain real property entered into a contract with the grantee. Although the contract was couched in the form of a sale of minerals \"in place\" it was in substance an agreement on the part of the grantee to pay royalties based upon the quantity and quality of sand and gravel which he was to remove from said property. Held, the substance of the agreement governs its Federal tax consequences. The payments received by the petitioner for sand and gravel were ordinary income subject to the 5-percent allowance for percentage depletion under sec. 613(b)(6)(A), I.R.C. 1954, rather than capital gains. The petitioner retained an \"economic interest\" within the meaning of Rutledge v. United States, 428 F. 2d 347 (C.A.",
"5, 1970) and Wood v. United States, 377 F. 2d 300 (C.A. 5, 1967). Harry G. Weeks, for the petitioner.John W. Dierker, for the respondent. Sterrett, Judge. STERRETT*185 OPINIONThe respondent determined deficiencies in the Federal income tax of the petitioner for the taxable years 1964, 1965, and 1966 in the amounts of $ 6,413.63, $ 7,178.99, and $ 1,623.46, respectively. Due to concessions of the parties the sole issue remaining for decision is whether certain payments under a document styled \"Sand and Gravel Deed\" are long-term capital gain or, as the respondent contends, ordinary income subject to a 5-percent allowance for depletion under section 613(b)(6)(A), I.R.C. 1954. 1All of the facts were stipulated. The stipulation and the exhibits attached thereto are incorporated herein*143 by this reference. *186 Ollie G. Rose (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) resided in Tarrant County, Tex., at the time her petition was filed herein. She filed Federal individual income tax returns for the years 1964, 1965, and 1966 with the district director of internal revenue at Dallas, Tex.On July 1, 1963, the petitioner joined in the execution of the following document, only irrelevant passages of which have been deleted:The State of TexasSand and Gravel DeedCounty of TarrantMade this 1st day of July, A.D. 1963, by and between BERTA ROSE BROWN and husband J. O.",
"BROWN, OLLIE G. ROSE, a widow, and MARGARET R. MAY, who has elected under Article 4614, Vernon's Ann. Civ. St., to manage and control her separate property, all of the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, hereinafter referred to as GRANTOR, and RICHARD C. PRATER AND R. W. DIAL, both of the County of Tarrant, State of Texas, hereinafter collectively referred to as GRANTEE,WitnessethWhereas, GRANTOR is the owner in fee simple of that certain lot, tract or parcel of land hereinafter more particularly described and situated in Tarrant County, Texas, andWhereas, said land contains certain deposits of sand*144 and gravel which GRANTEE desires to purchase and GRANTOR desires to sell and convey same to GRANTEE, andWhereas, it is the intention by these presents to sell and convey said deposits rather than in any manner lease said premises for the extraction of said sand and gravel,Now, Therefore, Know All Men By These Presents:That GRANTOR, in consideration of $ 10,000.00, and such other consideration as hereinafter mentioned, payable as follows: (a) $ 1,250.00 paid simultaneously with the execution of this deed, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged(b) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1964(c) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1965(d) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1966(e) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1967(f) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1968(g) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1969(h) $ 1,250.00 on or before July 1, 1970has granted, sold and conveyed, and does by these presents grant, sell and convey unto GRANTEE all sand and gravel upon and underlying all that property described in Exhibit \"A\" attached hereto and made a part hereof for all purposes, together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of extracting sand and gravel, and removing*145 the same therefrom.",
"*187 1GRANTEE is to have the privilege of removing without additional payment during each of the following periods: July 1, 1963-June 30, 1964July 1, 1964-June 30, 1965July 1, 1965-June 30, 1966July 1, 1966-June 30, 1967July 1, 1967-June 30, 1968July 1, 1968-June 30, 1969July 1, 1969-June 30, 1970July 1, 1970-June 30, 19712,500 cubic yards of sand and gravel.2As additional consideration for the conveyance herein made, GRANTEE shall pay to GRANTOR a sum equivalent to the total sand and gravel removed from the premises in any one yearly period in excess of 2,500 cubic yards, such sum to be computed in accordance with the amounts set opposite the following classifications:Amount per cubic yardClassifications1. $ 0.50Good and washable (pit)2.",
"$ 0.35Road gravel (white)3. $ 0.10Other nonmetallic earth materialFollowing the extraction of 2,500 cubic yards in any one yearly period as set forth in the preceding paragraph, GRANTEE shall pay the additional consideration, if any, to GRANTOR monthly, on or before the 10th day of each succeeding month during such yearly period.GRANTEE shall keep accurate records as to the amount and classification*146 of sand and gravel removed from the premises, and on or before the 10th day of each month, shall deliver to GRANTOR or GRANTOR [sic] representative, statements showing the classifications and the amounts of sand and gravel removed from the premises during the preceding monthly period.",
"GRANTOR or GRANTOR'S representative shall at all times have access to GRANTEE'S records for the purpose of verifying the amount of sand and gravel removed from the premises under the terms hereof.3In the event GRANTEE should fail to make payment when due of any of the consideration called for by this deed, then in such event, GRANTOR may notify GRANTEE in writing of such default and if such default is not cured within fifteen (15) days after such notification, the title to all sand and gravel conveyed to GRANTEE by this deed not theretofore extracted shall automatically revert to GRANTOR without further action on the part of GRANTOR AND GRANTEE agrees, upon request of GRANTOR, to execute such deed or other instrument as may when filed of record reasonably evidence the fact that the title to such sand and gravel has reverted to GRANTOR.4At the expiration of eight (8) years from the date hereof, title*147 to all sand and gravel not theretofore extracted from the premises shall automatically revert to *188 GRANTOR without further action on the part of GRANTOR, and GRANTEE binds and obligates himself upon request of GRANTOR, to immediately execute such deed as when filed of record shall reasonably evidence the fact that title has so reverted to GRANTOR.5To Have and to Hold all sand and gravel upon and underlying the above described property, together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging unto the said GRANTEE, for the term stated and subject to the conditions and covenants aforesaid, GRANTOR does hereby bind himself, his heirs, executors and administrators to Warrant and Forever Defend all and singular said sand and gravel upon and underlying the above described property unto said GRANTEE, his heirs and assigns, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof. * * * *7GRANTEE joins herein to evidence his acceptance of title under all of the terms and conditions of the foregoing, and agrees to pay the consideration set forth above.This instrument is executed by the parties hereto, the day and*148 year first above written in four (4) counterparts, any one of which may be deemed an original:Berta Rose BrownJ.",
"O. BrownOllie G. RoseMargaret R. May, GrantorRichard C. PraterR. W. Dial, GranteeThe respondent has conceded that only one-third of the total proceeds received under the above contract were includable in the petitioner's income, therefore the amounts in question are as follows:One-third of totalYearproceeds from contract1964$ 13,074.04196510,294.7819664,102.50On her Federal income tax returns for 1964, 2 1965, and 1966, petitioner reported these amounts as long-term capital gain from the sale of real estate. *189 In his statutory notice the respondent stated*149 that the proceeds received by the petitioner were ordinary income subject to the 5-percent depletion allowance, \"because it has not been established that the transaction giving rise to receipt * * * was not a lease nor that you did not retain an economic interest. \"This case presents the frequently litigated issue of whether the income realized by a landowner upon the removal and sale of a mineral deposit should be characterized as capital gain or ordinary income. See Samuel L. Green, 35 T.C. 1065\">35 T.C. 1065, 1069 (1961), for some of the decided cases. The question to be answered is whether the petitioner, by contract, has sold the sand and gravel on her property \"in place,\" thereby, selling part of the realty or whether she has retained an \"economic interest\" in these minerals to which she must look for payment.",
"Wood v. United States, 377 F.2d 300\">377 F. 2d 300, 304 (C.A. 5, 1967), affirming an unreported case (N.D. Tex. 1967, 19 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1542\">19 A.F.T.R. 2d 1542, 67-2U.S.T.C. par. 9522).As we stated in Samuel L. Green, supra at 1070:where the owner does not part with his entire*150 interest in the deposits until removed or where he does not sell part of his property \"in place,\" but in effect merely enters into a lease for the exploitation of his land reserving a royalty with respect to the materials extracted * * *any payments received as a result of this exploitation are taxable as ordinary income. Albritton v. Commissioner, 248 F. 2d 49, 51 (C.A. 5, 1957), affirming in part 24 T.C. 903\">24 T.C. 903 (1955).As the petitioner argues on brief, we are bound by virtue of our decision in Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), to decide this case under the law as it exists in the Fifth Circuit, for, an appeal from our determination herein would be to that Court of Appeals. The petitioner urges that Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, 242 F. 2d 864 (C.A.",
"5, 1957), reversing 25 T.C. 223\">25 T.C. 223 (1955), is dispositive. We do not agree. In Crowell \"strong emphasis was placed upon the wording of the instrument as contract of sale.\" Wood v. United States, supra at 310. The Court of Appeals*151 in Crowell reasoned that the contract there in question unambiguously revealed the true intent of the parties. \"Looking to the actual circumstances as well as the language of the contract\" the court determined that the instrument represented a bona fide sale. Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Commissioner, supra at 866; Wood v. United States, supra at 311, fn. 24 and accompanying text. In contrast, the instant facts do not indicate that the parties intended a sale.The contract, in question here, was drafted using terms of sale, however, in this instance it is necessary that we look beyond the language of the instrument. Rutledge v. United States, 428 F. 2d 347 (C.A. 5, *190 1970), reversing an unreported case (W.D.",
"La. 1969, 23 A.F.T.R. 2d 1221, 69-1U.S.T.C. par. 9427). If it is the contention of the petitioner that we must limit our investigation to the phraseology of her agreement she is in error. We are not of the opinion that the Court of Appeals decision in Crowell mandates this limitation. Further, more recent decisions*152 in this area of the law by the Fifth Circuit indicate that the mere wording of an agreement is not properly determinative of whether an \"economic interest\" was retained. Rutledge v. United States, supra at 353; Wood v. United States, supra at 311, see fn. 26 and accompanying text.The essence of the agreement \"is determined not by subtleties of draftsmanship but by * * * total effect.\"",
"Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260\">356 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1958). The total effect of this agreement is that the so-called grantee under the contract agreed to pay to the grantor royalties based upon the quality and quantity of the minerals removed from the grantor's property for the 8 years immediately subsequent to the date of execution and agreed to make certain payments in advance.The agreement states that the collective grantor sold all sand and gravel on and under certain property for $ 10,000, payable in eight annual installments. For this $ 10,000 the grantee was given the privilege of removing a total of 20,000 cubic yards of sand and gravel, at the rate of 2,500 cubic yards annually for*153 the 8 years corresponding to the period for the payment of $ 10,000. After having extracted 2,500 cubic yards in any year the grantee was required to make an additional payment, based on a fixed scale, 3 for any gravel or sand removed in excess of 2,500 cubic yards. The agreement, further, provided that upon default by the grantee \"title to all sand and gravel * * * not theretofore extracted shall automatically revert to Grantor.\"",
"After the expiration of 8 years from the time of contracting title to all unextracted sand and gravel was to \"revert\" to the grantor.The above-described provisions are a transparent attempt to metamorphose a royalty agreement into a sale. These provisions simply give the petitioner a royalty of from 10- to 50-cents per cubic yard on all sand and gravel extracted. The payment of $ 1,250 per year for*154 8 years is simply an advance payment at 50-cents per cubic yard for the first 2,500 yards removed; this is tantamount to a minimum guaranteed royalty provision. See Wood v. United States, supra at 307.The provisions of the agreement calling for reversion of all sand and gravel to the grantor is merely an obfuscated method of providing for termination. An automatic reversion after 8 years is no different *191 than the provision for a term for years commonly found in leases or royalty agreements. Here it is merely another instance of an attempt to couch this agreement in the language of conveyance.Perhaps the least artful device of all is contained in the paragraphs referring to the intent of the parties to the agreement. It suffices to say that the parties' written assertion that a sale was intended cannot determine questions of Federal taxation when more objective manifestations of intent are available.On brief the petitioner argues that there was no provision in the contract which required the grantee to do other than make fixed installment payments aggregating $ 10,000. The grantee could have retained title to all sand and gravel for*155 8 years without removing any of it.",
"It would be unrealistic, to say the least, to assume that the grantee would not exercise its contractual right, for which they paid a minimum of $ 10,000, to remove the prescribed amount of sand and gravel. Furthermore the contract obviously contemplates payments in excess of $ 10,000. The petitioner had an \"economic interest\" in removal of as much sand and gravel as possible by the grantee. The amounts to be received by the petitioner were of course directly dependent on extraction of deposits. We are not limited to consideration of the agreement in vacuo. In point of fact the amounts received by the grantor indicate that the grantee intended to and did remove in excess of 2,500 cubic yards in each of the years in question.As the Supreme Court said in Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, supra at 266-267, \"These arrangements seem to us transparent devices.",
"Their forms do not control.\" The substance of the agreement, when revealed, makes clear that the petitioner retained an \"economic interest\" and was, thereby, in receipt of ordinary income subject to the 5-percent allowance for depletion provided by section*156 613(b)(6)(A).In order to reflect concessions by the respondent with respect to the amounts of the payments received by the petitioner,Decision will be entered under Rule 50. Footnotes*. Caption changed by Court order dated June 4, 1971, to Estate of Ollie G. Rose, Deceased, Berta Rose Brown, Executrix, Petitioner v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent.↩1. All references by section are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise stated.↩2. On her 1964 return the petitioner reported the amount of $ 13,074.03, while the parties have stipulated that $ 13,074.04 is in issue. This discrepancy was not explained to the Court, but, we feel certain the parties can work it out in a Rule 50 computation.↩3. E.g., 50 cents per cubic yard of \"good and washable -- pit.\" We note that 2,500 cubic yards at 50 cents per yard equals $ 1,250, the amount that the grantee was required to pay annually.↩"
]
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DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Response to Arguments Applicant’s amendments and remarks filed 01/18/2022 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive.
Applicant alleges the use of entropy as claimed is different as to what is claimed, in pg. 9: “…To the extent this rejection applies to amended independent claims 1, 10, and 19, the rejection is respectfully traversed. Amended independent claim 1 recites, inter alia, “selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature; and selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature.” As acknowledged on page 18 of the Office Action, Ski and Ara do not expressly teach the above features. The Office Action asserts that Kam teaches the above features. Applicant respectfully disagrees at least because the use of the entropy in Kam is different from the use of the entropy in the amended claim 1….”
The relevant claim limitation(s) appear to be “selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature; and selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature”
Specifically, Ara teaches the features of text/language documents from data sources can be used in learning and modeling judgements as claimed in the limitation, in : wherein selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data comprises: calculating an … of each of the at least one candidate news feature; and selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data based on the … of each of the at least one candidate news feature. (Ara teaches in 00135: In some embodiments, the fact checking system has the ability to learn. The learning is able to be in terms of context, detecting items like sarcasm, cheating or manipulation of data sources and other items [claimed features characterizing news quality discriminability from claimed selection candidate features as training data used for learning including claimed calculating process] that would help the fact checking process [claimed selecting process of claimed feature]. In some embodiments, a database is used to track people's comment habits or history and other information…) While Ski teaches the selection of news features to discriminability characterize news quality using machine learning as disclosed previously in the dependent claims; and Ara teaches the use of Bayes classifiers as probabilistic based machine learning algorithms, in pg. 1010 : Left Col: Last para.: [21] is something of an anomaly, as it, like Latent Credibility Analysis, models the credibility problem as a graphical model (a Bayesian network)….; and Sec. 3.7.2: 1st para.: A key benefit of LCA is its flexibility and transparency relative to fact-finders. Bayesian priors over the parameters, claims, and other phenomena (such as the mistake distribution, Pe) provide a straightforward way of encoding domain knowledge, but many extensions are also possible… Ski and Ara do not expressly teach the use of a machine learning computing process using entropy measures as recited by the limitation: wherein selecting the … feature characterizing … quality discriminability from the at least one … feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the … feature; and selecting … feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one … feature. Kam does expressly teach the claim limitation that entropy can be used in machine learning for selecting features for making judgments in text/language documents that have as sentiments characterizing the text features selected to be used as part of the training sentiment analysis. Further Kam taches that the Bayes learning technique disclosed in Ara can be employed using entropy as claimed by applicant’s claim limitation: wherein selecting the … feature characterizing … quality discriminability from the at least one … feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the … feature; and selecting … feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one … feature. (Kam teaches in pg. 609: Left Col. Sec. A : In document level classification, machine-learning techniques can be employed to carry out sentiment analysis. As presented in [17] supervised methods like support vector machine (SVM), Naïve Bayes, Maximum entropy can be used… Maximum Entropy Classifiers: Learning in a Naive Bayes classifier involves counting the number of co-occurrences of features and classes. In a maximum entropy classifier [claimed calculating entropy for selecting features as the training data], the weights, which are typically maximized using Maximum-a-Posteriori (MAP) estimation, must be learned. Unsupervised methods make use of PMI (Point wise mutual information) for co-occurrence of a word with positive or negative word…)
It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to integrate the method assessing the quality of online content using statistical based approaches as disclosed by Kam with the method for automatic assessment of information dispersed using automated learning methods as collectively disclosed by Ski and Ara. One of ordinary skill in the arts would have been motivated to integrate the disclosed methods by Ski, Ara, and Kam in order to assess the and characterize natural language articles using sentiment analysis to select text features for training machine learning classifiers; doing so will help users in making sense of huge volume of unstructured Web data, and help in using natural language processing techniques for the purpose of decision making and understanding online content (Kam, Abstract).
There appears to be no distinction between what the applicant has claimed and what the combination of references teaches. The applicant’s claim limitation(s) fails to appropriately disclose how the use of entropy in learning features in machine learning is distinguished from what is know by one of ordinary skill in the art. Applicant is encouraged to further limit claims to appropriately clarify how the use of entropy in learning features in machine learning is distinguished from what is know by one of ordinary skill in the art.
Lastly, the examiner notes that one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references, see MPEP 2145(IV); and arguing limitation which are not claimed, see MPEP 2145(VI) are arguments considered insufficient to
Applicant’s arguments directed to other independent claims amended to include the analyzed limitation in claim 1 above and dependent claims are considered addressed, as there were no noted deficiencies found in the cited references analyzed above.
For at least these reasons, the rejection(s) under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are maintained.
Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to OLUWATOSIN ALABI whose telephone number is (571)272-0516. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday, 8:00am-5:00pm EST.. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Michael Huntley can be reached on (303) 297-4307. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300. Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional
/O.O.A./Examiner, Art Unit 2129 /MICHAEL J HUNTLEY/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2129 | 2022-02-17T15:30:58 | [
"DETAILED ACTION Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Response to Arguments Applicant’s amendments and remarks filed 01/18/2022 have been fully considered but they are not persuasive. Applicant alleges the use of entropy as claimed is different as to what is claimed, in pg. 9: “…To the extent this rejection applies to amended independent claims 1, 10, and 19, the rejection is respectfully traversed. Amended independent claim 1 recites, inter alia, “selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature; and selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature.” As acknowledged on page 18 of the Office Action, Ski and Ara do not expressly teach the above features.",
"The Office Action asserts that Kam teaches the above features. Applicant respectfully disagrees at least because the use of the entropy in Kam is different from the use of the entropy in the amended claim 1….” The relevant claim limitation(s) appear to be “selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature; and selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one candidate news feature” Specifically, Ara teaches the features of text/language documents from data sources can be used in learning and modeling judgements as claimed in the limitation, in : wherein selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data comprises: calculating an … of each of the at least one candidate news feature; and selecting the news feature characterizing the news quality discriminability from the at least one candidate news feature as the training data based on the … of each of the at least one candidate news feature. (Ara teaches in 00135: In some embodiments, the fact checking system has the ability to learn. The learning is able to be in terms of context, detecting items like sarcasm, cheating or manipulation of data sources and other items [claimed features characterizing news quality discriminability from claimed selection candidate features as training data used for learning including claimed calculating process] that would help the fact checking process [claimed selecting process of claimed feature].",
"In some embodiments, a database is used to track people's comment habits or history and other information…) While Ski teaches the selection of news features to discriminability characterize news quality using machine learning as disclosed previously in the dependent claims; and Ara teaches the use of Bayes classifiers as probabilistic based machine learning algorithms, in pg. 1010 : Left Col: Last para. : [21] is something of an anomaly, as it, like Latent Credibility Analysis, models the credibility problem as a graphical model (a Bayesian network)…. ; and Sec. 3.7.2: 1st para. : A key benefit of LCA is its flexibility and transparency relative to fact-finders. Bayesian priors over the parameters, claims, and other phenomena (such as the mistake distribution, Pe) provide a straightforward way of encoding domain knowledge, but many extensions are also possible… Ski and Ara do not expressly teach the use of a machine learning computing process using entropy measures as recited by the limitation: wherein selecting the … feature characterizing … quality discriminability from the at least one … feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the … feature; and selecting … feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one … feature.",
"Kam does expressly teach the claim limitation that entropy can be used in machine learning for selecting features for making judgments in text/language documents that have as sentiments characterizing the text features selected to be used as part of the training sentiment analysis. Further Kam taches that the Bayes learning technique disclosed in Ara can be employed using entropy as claimed by applicant’s claim limitation: wherein selecting the … feature characterizing … quality discriminability from the at least one … feature as the training data comprises: calculating an entropy of each of the … feature; and selecting … feature as the training data based on the entropy of each of the at least one … feature. (Kam teaches in pg. 609: Left Col. Sec.",
"A : In document level classification, machine-learning techniques can be employed to carry out sentiment analysis. As presented in [17] supervised methods like support vector machine (SVM), Naïve Bayes, Maximum entropy can be used… Maximum Entropy Classifiers: Learning in a Naive Bayes classifier involves counting the number of co-occurrences of features and classes. In a maximum entropy classifier [claimed calculating entropy for selecting features as the training data], the weights, which are typically maximized using Maximum-a-Posteriori (MAP) estimation, must be learned.",
"Unsupervised methods make use of PMI (Point wise mutual information) for co-occurrence of a word with positive or negative word…) It would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to integrate the method assessing the quality of online content using statistical based approaches as disclosed by Kam with the method for automatic assessment of information dispersed using automated learning methods as collectively disclosed by Ski and Ara. One of ordinary skill in the arts would have been motivated to integrate the disclosed methods by Ski, Ara, and Kam in order to assess the and characterize natural language articles using sentiment analysis to select text features for training machine learning classifiers; doing so will help users in making sense of huge volume of unstructured Web data, and help in using natural language processing techniques for the purpose of decision making and understanding online content (Kam, Abstract). There appears to be no distinction between what the applicant has claimed and what the combination of references teaches. The applicant’s claim limitation(s) fails to appropriately disclose how the use of entropy in learning features in machine learning is distinguished from what is know by one of ordinary skill in the art. Applicant is encouraged to further limit claims to appropriately clarify how the use of entropy in learning features in machine learning is distinguished from what is know by one of ordinary skill in the art. Lastly, the examiner notes that one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually where the rejections are based on combinations of references, see MPEP 2145(IV); and arguing limitation which are not claimed, see MPEP 2145(VI) are arguments considered insufficient to Applicant’s arguments directed to other independent claims amended to include the analyzed limitation in claim 1 above and dependent claims are considered addressed, as there were no noted deficiencies found in the cited references analyzed above.",
"For at least these reasons, the rejection(s) under 35 U.S.C. § 103 are maintained. Conclusion Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to OLUWATOSIN ALABI whose telephone number is (571)272-0516. The examiner can normally be reached Monday-Friday, 8:00am-5:00pm EST.. Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Michael Huntley can be reached on (303) 297-4307. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.",
"Information regarding the status of published or unpublished applications may be obtained from Patent Center. Unpublished application information in Patent Center is available to registered users. To file and manage patent submissions in Patent Center, visit: https://patentcenter.uspto.gov. Visit https://www.uspto.gov/patents/apply/patent-center for more information about Patent Center and https://www.uspto.gov/patents/docx for information about filing in DOCX format. For additional /O.O.A./Examiner, Art Unit 2129 /MICHAEL J HUNTLEY/Supervisory Patent Examiner, Art Unit 2129"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-02-20.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: ACCEPTANCE OF ATTORNEY TRIAL REFEREE REPORT The plaintiff George E. O'Connell, and the defendant, Murphy's Law, LLC, have each filed objections to the acceptance of the report of the attorney trial referee. The referee herd evidence and made findings and recommendations with respect to the plaintiffs claim for unpaid wages and the defendant's claim for a set-off. For the reasons stated below, judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $6,500.00. The referee's report was filed in compliance with Practice Book §19-8. The referee found, inter alia, that the plaintiff was due the sum of $7,800.00, that the amended complaint claims "unpaid commission in the amount of $5,000.00," and that "the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover from the defendant the sum of $5,000.00 with interest at the statutory rate from June 30, 1999." The attorney trial referee recommended "that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $5,000.00; and that judgment enter for the plaintiff on the defendant's set off" The plaintiff objects to a portion of the report and presents the following arguments: (1) the referee applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing whether the plaintiff was entitled to enhanced damages; (2) the referee applied an incorrect interpretation of the statutory provision for enhanced damages; (3) the referee committed legal error in failing to conclude that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable; (4) and the referee incorrectly weighed the effect of the defendant's CT Page 8294 offering of $1,600.00 to resolve the dispute. The plaintiff wants this court to increase the award to $15,600.00 and to award an attorney's fee. The defendant objects to an award of interest. It claims that judgment should enter against the defendant for $5,000.00 without interest. The applicable standards for this court's review have been discussed by our Supreme Court, see Meadows v. Higgins, 249 Conn. 155, 162, 733 A.2d 172 (1999), and our Appellate Court, see Post Road Iron Works v. LexingtonDev. Group, 54 Conn. App. 534, 539, 736 A.2d 923 (1999). The court has reviewed the attorney trial referee's report, the exhibits, the transcript of the proceeding before the attorney trial referee, the briefs that have been filed by the parties, and the pleadings. The referee' s report shows that referee was aware of the appropriate legal standard for the assessment of enhanced damages and that he correctly applied the standard. There is evidence in the record to support the findings of fact. The legal conclusions are supported by the subordinate facts. At the time this case was referred to an attorney trial referee, the plaintiff claimed $5,000.00 in unpaid wages. He sought to recover twice the amount of wages, with attorney's fee, as allowed under General Statutes § 31-72. His prayer for relief also requested "such additional legal and equitable relief as the court may deem just." It would be unfair at this time to award the plaintiff $7,800.00 for unpaid wages since the matter was referred to the attorney trial referee with the understanding that the wage claim, in the absence of enhanced damages, was for $5,000.00. With respect to an award of interest, the plaintiffs prayer for relief together with the nature of the claim placed the defendant on notice that interest could be awarded. The interest on $5,000.00 from June 30, 1999, to June 30, 2002, is $1,500.00. See Gen. Stat. § 37-3a. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $6,500.00. Judgment shall enter for the plaintiff on the defendant's set-off THIM, J. | 07-05-2016 | [
"[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.] MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: ACCEPTANCE OF ATTORNEY TRIAL REFEREE REPORT The plaintiff George E. O'Connell, and the defendant, Murphy's Law, LLC, have each filed objections to the acceptance of the report of the attorney trial referee. The referee herd evidence and made findings and recommendations with respect to the plaintiffs claim for unpaid wages and the defendant's claim for a set-off. For the reasons stated below, judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $6,500.00. The referee's report was filed in compliance with Practice Book §19-8. The referee found, inter alia, that the plaintiff was due the sum of $7,800.00, that the amended complaint claims \"unpaid commission in the amount of $5,000.00,\" and that \"the plaintiff is therefore entitled to recover from the defendant the sum of $5,000.00 with interest at the statutory rate from June 30, 1999.\"",
"The attorney trial referee recommended \"that judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $5,000.00; and that judgment enter for the plaintiff on the defendant's set off\" The plaintiff objects to a portion of the report and presents the following arguments: (1) the referee applied an incorrect legal standard in assessing whether the plaintiff was entitled to enhanced damages; (2) the referee applied an incorrect interpretation of the statutory provision for enhanced damages; (3) the referee committed legal error in failing to conclude that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable; (4) and the referee incorrectly weighed the effect of the defendant's CT Page 8294 offering of $1,600.00 to resolve the dispute. The plaintiff wants this court to increase the award to $15,600.00 and to award an attorney's fee. The defendant objects to an award of interest. It claims that judgment should enter against the defendant for $5,000.00 without interest. The applicable standards for this court's review have been discussed by our Supreme Court, see Meadows v. Higgins, 249 Conn. 155, 162, 733 A.2d 172 (1999), and our Appellate Court, see Post Road Iron Works v. LexingtonDev.",
"Group, 54 Conn. App. 534, 539, 736 A.2d 923 (1999). The court has reviewed the attorney trial referee's report, the exhibits, the transcript of the proceeding before the attorney trial referee, the briefs that have been filed by the parties, and the pleadings. The referee' s report shows that referee was aware of the appropriate legal standard for the assessment of enhanced damages and that he correctly applied the standard. There is evidence in the record to support the findings of fact. The legal conclusions are supported by the subordinate facts. At the time this case was referred to an attorney trial referee, the plaintiff claimed $5,000.00 in unpaid wages. He sought to recover twice the amount of wages, with attorney's fee, as allowed under General Statutes § 31-72. His prayer for relief also requested \"such additional legal and equitable relief as the court may deem just.\" It would be unfair at this time to award the plaintiff $7,800.00 for unpaid wages since the matter was referred to the attorney trial referee with the understanding that the wage claim, in the absence of enhanced damages, was for $5,000.00.",
"With respect to an award of interest, the plaintiffs prayer for relief together with the nature of the claim placed the defendant on notice that interest could be awarded. The interest on $5,000.00 from June 30, 1999, to June 30, 2002, is $1,500.00. See Gen. Stat. § 37-3a. Judgment shall enter in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $6,500.00. Judgment shall enter for the plaintiff on the defendant's set-off THIM, J."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/3349453/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/2970790/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
OPINION BURGESS, Justice. This is a Trespass to Try Title case. Temple-Eastex, as record owner, brought suit against C.S. Busby and wife Alice Ma-rie Busby and H.A. Davison for title and possession of an approximate 33.7 acre tract of land in Newton County, Texas. Mr. Davison executed a disclaimer, the actions were severed and a judgment entered against him. A jury trial proceeded against the Busbys. Mr. and Mrs. Busby pleaded and proved, to the jury’s satisfaction, their claim of adverse possession under TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958), more commonly referred to as the ten-year limitation statute. Judgment was entered on the jury’s verdict and Temple-Eastex brings forth six points of error. Point of error number one avers the trial court erred in that there was no evidence to support the finding that the Busby’s had satisfied the requirement of ten years of adverse possession. This contention is based upon the Busbys having obtained a temporary restraining order against Temple-Eastex’s predecessor in title and thus suspending the running of the ten year limitation period. Mr. and Mrs. Busby received a deed purporting to convey to them the 33.7 acres on July 30, 1968. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Busby entered into an oral lease agreement with Mr. Davison whereby Mr. Davison could use the land for grazing purposes and in return would take care of the property and see that no one went on the property. In 1969, Mr. and Mrs. Busby became aware that someone had removed a portion of their fence, entered the land and begin to remove the timber. They filed a suit against Eastex Incorporated, Temple-Eas-tex’s predecessor in title, and obtained a temporary restraining order on October 21, 1969, restraining Eastex from interfering with the Busby’s peaceful use, possession and enjoyment of the land. Thereafter, on October 30, 1969, Eastex’s attorneys requested the hearing on the application for a temporary injunction be postponed and reset. The trial court entered an order continuing the temporary restraining orders in effect until the application for a temporary injunction was heard. No further hearings were held and the Busbys took a non-suit on January 11, 1974. Temple-Eastex takes the position that the period from the granting of the temporary restraining order until the non-suit should be excluded from the ten-year limitation period as a matter of law and thus the Busbys could not have satisfied the ten-year requirement. If the period should be excluded, Temple-Eastex is correct, because there would be only nine years and 286 days from the date the Bus-bys are claiming possession until the filing of the suit by Temple-Eastex. Both parties cite Gibbs v. Lester, 41 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Comm’n App.1931, judgmt adopted) as being supportive of their positions. Temple-Eastex brings forth Gibbs, supra, for the general proposition: “Where the character of legal proceedings is such that the law restrains one of the parties from exercising a legal remedy against another, the running of the statute of limitations applicable to the remedy is postponed, or, if it has com*611menced to run, is suspended, during the time the restraint incident to the proceeding continues.” “If a party commences legal proceedings, the character of which is such that the law restrained one of the parties from exercising the legal remedy against another, common justice demands that these legal proceedings being of such character, should not have the legal effect to protect the person who commenced them, and thereby prevent his adversary from exercising his legal remedy against him.” They allege that the Busbys’ prior suit judicially prevented Eastex from exercising its legal right, as record owner, to enter the land or utilize the land jointly, which would have interrupted the running of the ten-year period. The Busbys bring forth Gibbs, supra, for its specific holdings. As stated: One may also acquire a title by limitation, under the ten-year statute, by having peaceable and adverse possession of a tract of land described by an instrument of writing, properly recorded, cultivating, using, and enjoying the same for ten years. In order to stop the running of the statute of limitation, and interrupt the peaceable and adverse possession mentioned in the statute, the suit not only must be to recover “the estate,” but it must be an adverse suit. That is to say, a suit by some one claiming adversely to the person who, being in possession of the property, is claiming a title under the statute of limitations. Such a suit, as is mentioned in article 5514, must not only be “adverse” to the parties claiming the title under the statutes of limitation, that is, conflicting, antagonistic and hostile, to such person, but such suit must be duly prosecuted to final judgment, [citations omitted] While the limitation is interrupted by suit, an abandonment of the suit will have the same effect as if the suit had never been instituted. In our instance, the Busbys’ suit in 1969, was neither adverse to one claiming under adverse possession nor was it prosecuted to final judgment. See Dalo v. Laughlin, 636 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1982, no writ). We find the specific holdings in Gibbs, supra, to be persuasive and overrule point of error number one. Points of error numbers two through five question the sufficiency of the evidence as to the jury’s finding that the Busbys had held exclusive, peaceable and adverse possession of the land continuously cultivating, using or enjoying it for a period of ten years prior to the filing of the suit by Temple-Eastex. In this regard, the jury was properly instructed as to “adverse possession”, “claim of right”, “hostile”, “peaceable possession”, “exclusive possession” and the requirement that in order for granting to constitute adverse possession the land must be enclosed by fences capable of turning livestock of ordinary disposition. The evidence showed that the Busbys never actually used or cultivated the land, but all of their use was through their lessee, Mr. Davison. The testimony showed that shortly after July 30, 1968, Mr. Busby, with the help of Mr. Davison’s sons, completely enclosed the 33.7 acre tract by erecting fences on the northern and eastern boundaries. Fences on the western and southern boundaries were previously erected by other land owners. Thereafter, Mr. Davison began to “run” about twenty head of horses on the land. In 1969, Mr. Davison began to run cattle on the land and did so until he sold them in 1979. He further testified he put goats on the land after he sold cattle in 1979. Mr. Davison had a hog pen on the land and raised hogs all during the period in question and up until trial. In addition, he had constructed some cow feeders, a little shed to put minerals out for the animals, a salt lick and a shed to feed the horses. Mr. Davison also testified he had placed an old school bus on the property so his sons could camp in it and he could store feed. Mr. Davison testified that after the land was fenced in 1968, the northern fence had been disturbed twice, once in 1969, and once later. The fence had been replaced in 1969, but had *612not been later because he had leased the adjoining land from a third party and it was not necessary to restrict the movement of the cattle. There was some dispute as to when the fences had been erected and as to their ability to turn back cattle. It is true that a mere casual enclosure will not suffice nor will grazing without a designed enclosure, McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1971). This is not the Busbys’ case. Here, the land was specifically enclosed for the purpose of grazing. In addition, Mr. Davison, as the lessee of Mr. Busby, satisfied the requirements of the ten year statute. See Cook v. Winter, 207 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1947, writ ref’d n.r.e.) Temple-Eastex urges one final attack on the lack of evidence of Mr. Davison’s use of the land for a ten-year period. Because the northern fence line was not replaced after the second time it had been removed and Davison allowed his cattle to graze both the 33.7 tract and his leased property, Temple-Eastex categorizes this as casual grazing of the 33.7 acre tract. They would have us adopt an analogous rule to that announced in Welch v. Mathews, 642 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, no writ). This rule states: “The courts have repeatedly taken the stance that when one enters into possession of land under a deed his possession is referable to the deed and in order to acquire title by adverse possession of additional land outside the boundaries of his conveyance, he must have actual possession of such additional land of such character as .will give notice of adverse possession and mature into title after the statutory period.” But their analogy fails. The use of the 33.7 acres by Mr. Davison was of such a character to give notice of adverse possession. In fact, the suit for the temporary injunction by Mr. and Mrs. Busby in 1969, was the ultimate notice of adverse possession. Points of error numbers two and five are overruled. Point of error number six complains of the trial judge excluding Davison’s disclaimer. Temple-Eastex sought to introduce the disclaimer as an admission inconsistent with and contrary to Mr. Davison’s testimony and for impeachment purposes. The disclaimer stated: DISCLAIMER OF H.A. DAVISON H.A. Davison, one of the defendants in this cause of action, neither owns, claims, nor asserts any right, title, interest or right of possession in or to the premises described in the plaintiff’s original petition, and says that as far as he is concerned the plaintiff has all right, title, interest and right of possession to the premises. Therefore, the defendant H.A. Davison enters his disclaimer, and prays that no costs be adjudged against him. /s/ H.A. Davison H.A. Davison Nowhere in Mr. Davison’s testimony did he assert any interest in the land other than the leasehold from Mr. Busby. At no time did Mr. Davison express an opinion as to which party had the right, title, interest and right of possession of the land. Mr. Davison simply testified to facts concerning his use of the land and the fencing of the land. Thus, there was nothing inconsistent between his testimony and the disclaimer. The trial court did not err in this regard. Point of error number six is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. | 10-01-2021 | [
"OPINION BURGESS, Justice. This is a Trespass to Try Title case. Temple-Eastex, as record owner, brought suit against C.S. Busby and wife Alice Ma-rie Busby and H.A. Davison for title and possession of an approximate 33.7 acre tract of land in Newton County, Texas. Mr. Davison executed a disclaimer, the actions were severed and a judgment entered against him. A jury trial proceeded against the Busbys. Mr. and Mrs. Busby pleaded and proved, to the jury’s satisfaction, their claim of adverse possession under TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 5510 (Vernon 1958), more commonly referred to as the ten-year limitation statute. Judgment was entered on the jury’s verdict and Temple-Eastex brings forth six points of error. Point of error number one avers the trial court erred in that there was no evidence to support the finding that the Busby’s had satisfied the requirement of ten years of adverse possession. This contention is based upon the Busbys having obtained a temporary restraining order against Temple-Eastex’s predecessor in title and thus suspending the running of the ten year limitation period. Mr. and Mrs. Busby received a deed purporting to convey to them the 33.7 acres on July 30, 1968. Sometime thereafter, Mr. Busby entered into an oral lease agreement with Mr. Davison whereby Mr. Davison could use the land for grazing purposes and in return would take care of the property and see that no one went on the property.",
"In 1969, Mr. and Mrs. Busby became aware that someone had removed a portion of their fence, entered the land and begin to remove the timber. They filed a suit against Eastex Incorporated, Temple-Eas-tex’s predecessor in title, and obtained a temporary restraining order on October 21, 1969, restraining Eastex from interfering with the Busby’s peaceful use, possession and enjoyment of the land. Thereafter, on October 30, 1969, Eastex’s attorneys requested the hearing on the application for a temporary injunction be postponed and reset. The trial court entered an order continuing the temporary restraining orders in effect until the application for a temporary injunction was heard. No further hearings were held and the Busbys took a non-suit on January 11, 1974. Temple-Eastex takes the position that the period from the granting of the temporary restraining order until the non-suit should be excluded from the ten-year limitation period as a matter of law and thus the Busbys could not have satisfied the ten-year requirement. If the period should be excluded, Temple-Eastex is correct, because there would be only nine years and 286 days from the date the Bus-bys are claiming possession until the filing of the suit by Temple-Eastex. Both parties cite Gibbs v. Lester, 41 S.W.2d 28 (Tex.",
"Comm’n App.1931, judgmt adopted) as being supportive of their positions. Temple-Eastex brings forth Gibbs, supra, for the general proposition: “Where the character of legal proceedings is such that the law restrains one of the parties from exercising a legal remedy against another, the running of the statute of limitations applicable to the remedy is postponed, or, if it has com*611menced to run, is suspended, during the time the restraint incident to the proceeding continues.” “If a party commences legal proceedings, the character of which is such that the law restrained one of the parties from exercising the legal remedy against another, common justice demands that these legal proceedings being of such character, should not have the legal effect to protect the person who commenced them, and thereby prevent his adversary from exercising his legal remedy against him.” They allege that the Busbys’ prior suit judicially prevented Eastex from exercising its legal right, as record owner, to enter the land or utilize the land jointly, which would have interrupted the running of the ten-year period.",
"The Busbys bring forth Gibbs, supra, for its specific holdings. As stated: One may also acquire a title by limitation, under the ten-year statute, by having peaceable and adverse possession of a tract of land described by an instrument of writing, properly recorded, cultivating, using, and enjoying the same for ten years. In order to stop the running of the statute of limitation, and interrupt the peaceable and adverse possession mentioned in the statute, the suit not only must be to recover “the estate,” but it must be an adverse suit. That is to say, a suit by some one claiming adversely to the person who, being in possession of the property, is claiming a title under the statute of limitations. Such a suit, as is mentioned in article 5514, must not only be “adverse” to the parties claiming the title under the statutes of limitation, that is, conflicting, antagonistic and hostile, to such person, but such suit must be duly prosecuted to final judgment, [citations omitted] While the limitation is interrupted by suit, an abandonment of the suit will have the same effect as if the suit had never been instituted.",
"In our instance, the Busbys’ suit in 1969, was neither adverse to one claiming under adverse possession nor was it prosecuted to final judgment. See Dalo v. Laughlin, 636 S.W.2d 585 (Tex.App.— San Antonio 1982, no writ). We find the specific holdings in Gibbs, supra, to be persuasive and overrule point of error number one. Points of error numbers two through five question the sufficiency of the evidence as to the jury’s finding that the Busbys had held exclusive, peaceable and adverse possession of the land continuously cultivating, using or enjoying it for a period of ten years prior to the filing of the suit by Temple-Eastex. In this regard, the jury was properly instructed as to “adverse possession”, “claim of right”, “hostile”, “peaceable possession”, “exclusive possession” and the requirement that in order for granting to constitute adverse possession the land must be enclosed by fences capable of turning livestock of ordinary disposition.",
"The evidence showed that the Busbys never actually used or cultivated the land, but all of their use was through their lessee, Mr. Davison. The testimony showed that shortly after July 30, 1968, Mr. Busby, with the help of Mr. Davison’s sons, completely enclosed the 33.7 acre tract by erecting fences on the northern and eastern boundaries. Fences on the western and southern boundaries were previously erected by other land owners. Thereafter, Mr. Davison began to “run” about twenty head of horses on the land. In 1969, Mr. Davison began to run cattle on the land and did so until he sold them in 1979. He further testified he put goats on the land after he sold cattle in 1979. Mr. Davison had a hog pen on the land and raised hogs all during the period in question and up until trial.",
"In addition, he had constructed some cow feeders, a little shed to put minerals out for the animals, a salt lick and a shed to feed the horses. Mr. Davison also testified he had placed an old school bus on the property so his sons could camp in it and he could store feed. Mr. Davison testified that after the land was fenced in 1968, the northern fence had been disturbed twice, once in 1969, and once later. The fence had been replaced in 1969, but had *612not been later because he had leased the adjoining land from a third party and it was not necessary to restrict the movement of the cattle. There was some dispute as to when the fences had been erected and as to their ability to turn back cattle.",
"It is true that a mere casual enclosure will not suffice nor will grazing without a designed enclosure, McDonnold v. Weinacht, 465 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. 1971). This is not the Busbys’ case. Here, the land was specifically enclosed for the purpose of grazing. In addition, Mr. Davison, as the lessee of Mr. Busby, satisfied the requirements of the ten year statute. See Cook v. Winter, 207 S.W.2d 145 (Tex.Civ.App.— Amarillo 1947, writ ref’d n.r.e.) Temple-Eastex urges one final attack on the lack of evidence of Mr. Davison’s use of the land for a ten-year period. Because the northern fence line was not replaced after the second time it had been removed and Davison allowed his cattle to graze both the 33.7 tract and his leased property, Temple-Eastex categorizes this as casual grazing of the 33.7 acre tract. They would have us adopt an analogous rule to that announced in Welch v. Mathews, 642 S.W.2d 829 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1982, no writ).",
"This rule states: “The courts have repeatedly taken the stance that when one enters into possession of land under a deed his possession is referable to the deed and in order to acquire title by adverse possession of additional land outside the boundaries of his conveyance, he must have actual possession of such additional land of such character as .will give notice of adverse possession and mature into title after the statutory period.” But their analogy fails. The use of the 33.7 acres by Mr. Davison was of such a character to give notice of adverse possession. In fact, the suit for the temporary injunction by Mr. and Mrs. Busby in 1969, was the ultimate notice of adverse possession.",
"Points of error numbers two and five are overruled. Point of error number six complains of the trial judge excluding Davison’s disclaimer. Temple-Eastex sought to introduce the disclaimer as an admission inconsistent with and contrary to Mr. Davison’s testimony and for impeachment purposes. The disclaimer stated: DISCLAIMER OF H.A. DAVISON H.A. Davison, one of the defendants in this cause of action, neither owns, claims, nor asserts any right, title, interest or right of possession in or to the premises described in the plaintiff’s original petition, and says that as far as he is concerned the plaintiff has all right, title, interest and right of possession to the premises. Therefore, the defendant H.A. Davison enters his disclaimer, and prays that no costs be adjudged against him. /s/ H.A.",
"Davison H.A. Davison Nowhere in Mr. Davison’s testimony did he assert any interest in the land other than the leasehold from Mr. Busby. At no time did Mr. Davison express an opinion as to which party had the right, title, interest and right of possession of the land. Mr. Davison simply testified to facts concerning his use of the land and the fencing of the land. Thus, there was nothing inconsistent between his testimony and the disclaimer. The trial court did not err in this regard. Point of error number six is overruled.",
"The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED."
]
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McMahan, J. The errors, upon which appellant relies for reversal, depend wholly upon a special finding of facts and conclusions of law. Appellees contend that no question is presented by the assignment of errors for the reason that no duly authenticated special finding of facts is in the record. The original record filed in this cause shows that the parties at the proper time requested the court to make a special finding of facts and to state its conclusions of law thereon. The cause was submitted to the court for *610trial, and after all the evidence was introduced, the cause was taken under advisement. Under date of January 19, 1918, there is'a record of what purports to be and which has the appearance of a special finding of facts, but no signature of the judge is attached to this purported finding of facts. There is no statement in the record that it was ever filed or ordered to be filed or that it was brought in by a bill of exceptions. February 2, 1918, appellant filed its motion to modify the special finding of facts. April 16, 1918, the court entered an order reading as follows: “Come the parties and the court being sufficiently advised sustains the motion of plaintiff to modify special findings heretofore made herein as to plaintiff and proposed findings Nos. 1, 16, 14, 58, 59, to which ruling the defendants at the time except: and the court overrules said motion as to all other proposed findings, to which ruling plaintiff at the time excepts. And now the court modifies the special findings theretofore made by amending the same as follows.” Then follows a record setting- out what appears to be findings Nos. 9, 13, 15a, 15b and 17a. No signature of the judge is attached thereto, and there is no record showing that they were filed or ordered to be filed or brought into the record by a bill of exceptions. The next order appears under the date of September 17, 1918, and reads as follows: “Come again the* parties by counsel and the court being advised now here render its conclusions of law upon the special findings of fact heretofore made herein as follows.” Then follows what purports to be two conclusions of law, followed by the statement r “To each of which conclusions of law each of the parties at the time excepts.” After the transcript was filed in this court, appellant applied for a writ of certiorari which was granted. The return of the clerk to this writ sets out the record *611in relation to the special finding of facts, heretofore referred to, as being entered on record January 19, 1918, and that immediately following said finding on the record are the words, “And now this cause is taken under advisement by the court as to its conclusions of law herein. Theophilus J. Moll, Judge.” Under date of April 16, 1918, the order modifying the special finding and the purported additional and supplemental findings Nos. 9,18,15a, 15b and 17a are set out and are followed in typewriting by the words, “Theophilus J. Moll, Judge.” The clerk by his certificate certifies that the original special finding of facts and the original amended and supplemental finding of facts were both on file in his office, that neither of them were signed by the trial judge, that the signature of the judge appears on the order book at the close of the special finding of facts in the trial judge’s handwriting and that the signature of the judge also appears on the order book at the end of the record of the amended and supplemental special finding as above stated. He also certifies that there is no closing clause after the record of the special finding of facts, under date of January 19, 1918, and that the judge signed the record at the close of the special finding of the facts without any such closing clause, that there is no closing clause after the record of the amended supplemental finding under date of April 16, 1918, and that the trial judge signed the record following the amended supplemental finding without any closing clause. After the condition of the record and failure of the judge to sign the special and supplemental finding and the conclusions of law were called to the attention of the court by appellees, appellant filed its petition in the trial court asking that the judge of that court be required to sign said finding of facts and conclusions of law nunc pro tunc. Appellees appeared to this petition *612and filed a motion to dismiss the petition. This motion was overruled and such further proceedings had as resulted in the court making an order that the original special finding of facts, the supplemental finding of facts, and the conclusions of law should be signed by the judge, and he so signed them. Appellees have appealed from the action of the court in ordering said finding of facts and conclusions of law signed and have brought the proceedings in relation thereto into the record on appeal by a certiorari. 1. Appellant’s petition for the order mine pro tunc and the evidence introduced in support thereof show that the trial judge had prior to that time signed neither the special finding of facts, the amended and supplemental special finding of facts, nor the conclusions of law. Appellant on the oral argument of this cause frankly conceded that the action of the trial court in making the order for the signing of said findings and conclusions nunc pro-tunc was unauthorized and could not be upheld. As said by this court in Walter v. Uhl, Admr. (1891), 3 Ind. App. 219, 28 N. E. 733, “The office of an entry mine pro tunc is to make the record speak the truth with regard to acts already performed, but not recorded. ■ Courts have the power, always, to make their own records conform to what was actually done. But it is not the office of an entry nunc pro tunc to so amend a record as to let it show an act to have been done which was, in fact, not done, although it should have been done.” See also, Lengelsen v. McGregor (1903), 162 Ind. 258, 67 N. E. 524, 70 N. E. 248; Kirby v. Bowland (1879), 69 Ind. 290; Cole Carriage Co. v. Hornbeck (1909), 45 Ind. App. 61, 89 N. E. 379; Bottorff v. Bottorff (1910), 45 Ind. App. 692, 91 N. E. 617. Appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s application for the nunc pro tunc order should have been sustained. *613Holcomb v. Norman (1909), 43 Ind. App. 506, 509, 87 N. E. 1057. 2. It is the settled law in this state that a special finding which has not been signed by the judge, or made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions, or filed and made a part of the record by order of the court, can only be regarded as a general finding. Smith v. State (1895), 140 Ind. 343, 39 N. E. 1060; Martin v. Marks (1900), 154 Ind. 549, 57 N. E. 249; Service v. Gambrel (1887), 110 Ind. 349, 11 N. E. 240; Lillard v. Mather (1902), 28 Ind. App. 583, 63 N. E. 479; Chapin v. Du Shane (1903), 32 Ind. App. 1, 69 N. E. 174. As evidence of its genuineness on appeal a special finding of facts should be signed by the judge or incorporated in a bill of exceptions signed by him or filed and spread on record by order of court. This practice is too well established to be overthrown now. Shane v. Lowry (1874), 48 Ind. 205; Conner v. Town of Marion (1887), 112 Ind. 517, 14 N. E. 488; Ferris v. Udell (1894), 139 Ind. 579, 38 N. E. 180; McCray v. Humes (1888), 116 Ind. 103, 18 N. E. 500. 3. Appellant, however, contends that the special finding of facts and the modification thereof are sufficiently authenticated by the act of the judge in signing his name on the record as heretofore stated. In Smith v. Davidson (1873), 45 Ind. 396, the special finding of facts was entered upon the order book among other proceedings of the day and at the end of the orders for the day the record was signed by the judge. The finding was not otherwise signed by him, was not incorporated in a bill of exceptions or made a part of the record by an order of the court. The appellant, there as here, insisted that inasmuch as the finding was written in full upon the order book ■ as the finding of the court before the orders were signed, signing the orders was equivalent to signing the special *614finding as such. The court held otherwise and refused to reconsider and overrule, Peoria, etc., Co. v. Walser (1864), 22 Ind. 73, and other cases following it, holding that a special finding was not a part of the record because it was not signed by the judge or ordered made a part of the record. The reason given by the court why the special finding must be signed was that it was required to be in writing, so that an exception could be taken and that it must be filed with the clerk, so that he can enter it on the record. It will be observed that the record now before us, in so far as the amended and supplemental finding of facts is concerned, is identical with the record in Smith v. Davidson, supra, in that, after such finding had been spread on the record and preceding the signature of the judge, there is an order of the court to the effect that the question as to the conclusions of law was taken under advisement. The signature of the judge does not appear on the record immediately following the record of the special finding. While the transcript shows that the special finding in this case was spread at length upon the order book, there is no entry showing that it was in fact ever filed or ordered to be filed and made a part of the record. 4. The object of a special finding of facts is to bring into the record the facts therein stated. When the facts proven are correctly stated all that remains is for’ the trial court to correctly apply the law by stating its conclusions of law ast drawn from the facts found and render judgment in accordance with the conclusions of law as stated. No bill of exceptions bringing the evidence into the record is necessary in such case in order to present the correctness of such conclusions of law based upon the facts found. So when a litigant on appeal desires to present the correctness of the legal conclusions of the trial court as *615applied to the facts found, he does so by excepting to each conclusion of law as stated by the trial court and making the proper assignment of errors on appeal. In applying the law. to the facts, the special finding takes the place of a bill of exceptions containing the evidence. It imports absolute verity, but in order to do so it must measure up to all the requirements of a special finding. It must be authenticated by the signature of the trial judge in manner recognized by law. A special finding when properly authenticated becomes one of the papers in the case, that is, a part of the record. On appeal it needs no further identification than the certificate of the clerk. 5. When the judge signs his name on the order book at the close of the day’s proceedings, it will be presumed he does so pursuant to §1450 Burns 1914, Acts 1885 p. 124, which requires the judge to sign the day’s proceedings after they have been read in open court, and not for the purpose of identifying any or all of the papers that may have been spread at length upon the order book. 6. The special finding of facts set out in the instant case not having been properly authenticated amounts to no more than a general finding. It follows that the assignment that the court erred in its conclusions- of law does not present any question for our determination. The order of the court correcting the record is reversed at appellant’s costs, with directions to sustain appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s petition. The judgment of the trial court from which appellant appeals is affirmed. | 07-24-2022 | [
"McMahan, J. The errors, upon which appellant relies for reversal, depend wholly upon a special finding of facts and conclusions of law. Appellees contend that no question is presented by the assignment of errors for the reason that no duly authenticated special finding of facts is in the record. The original record filed in this cause shows that the parties at the proper time requested the court to make a special finding of facts and to state its conclusions of law thereon. The cause was submitted to the court for *610trial, and after all the evidence was introduced, the cause was taken under advisement. Under date of January 19, 1918, there is'a record of what purports to be and which has the appearance of a special finding of facts, but no signature of the judge is attached to this purported finding of facts. There is no statement in the record that it was ever filed or ordered to be filed or that it was brought in by a bill of exceptions. February 2, 1918, appellant filed its motion to modify the special finding of facts. April 16, 1918, the court entered an order reading as follows: “Come the parties and the court being sufficiently advised sustains the motion of plaintiff to modify special findings heretofore made herein as to plaintiff and proposed findings Nos.",
"1, 16, 14, 58, 59, to which ruling the defendants at the time except: and the court overrules said motion as to all other proposed findings, to which ruling plaintiff at the time excepts. And now the court modifies the special findings theretofore made by amending the same as follows.” Then follows a record setting- out what appears to be findings Nos. 9, 13, 15a, 15b and 17a. No signature of the judge is attached thereto, and there is no record showing that they were filed or ordered to be filed or brought into the record by a bill of exceptions. The next order appears under the date of September 17, 1918, and reads as follows: “Come again the* parties by counsel and the court being advised now here render its conclusions of law upon the special findings of fact heretofore made herein as follows.” Then follows what purports to be two conclusions of law, followed by the statement r “To each of which conclusions of law each of the parties at the time excepts.” After the transcript was filed in this court, appellant applied for a writ of certiorari which was granted. The return of the clerk to this writ sets out the record *611in relation to the special finding of facts, heretofore referred to, as being entered on record January 19, 1918, and that immediately following said finding on the record are the words, “And now this cause is taken under advisement by the court as to its conclusions of law herein. Theophilus J. Moll, Judge.” Under date of April 16, 1918, the order modifying the special finding and the purported additional and supplemental findings Nos.",
"9,18,15a, 15b and 17a are set out and are followed in typewriting by the words, “Theophilus J. Moll, Judge.” The clerk by his certificate certifies that the original special finding of facts and the original amended and supplemental finding of facts were both on file in his office, that neither of them were signed by the trial judge, that the signature of the judge appears on the order book at the close of the special finding of facts in the trial judge’s handwriting and that the signature of the judge also appears on the order book at the end of the record of the amended and supplemental special finding as above stated.",
"He also certifies that there is no closing clause after the record of the special finding of facts, under date of January 19, 1918, and that the judge signed the record at the close of the special finding of the facts without any such closing clause, that there is no closing clause after the record of the amended supplemental finding under date of April 16, 1918, and that the trial judge signed the record following the amended supplemental finding without any closing clause. After the condition of the record and failure of the judge to sign the special and supplemental finding and the conclusions of law were called to the attention of the court by appellees, appellant filed its petition in the trial court asking that the judge of that court be required to sign said finding of facts and conclusions of law nunc pro tunc.",
"Appellees appeared to this petition *612and filed a motion to dismiss the petition. This motion was overruled and such further proceedings had as resulted in the court making an order that the original special finding of facts, the supplemental finding of facts, and the conclusions of law should be signed by the judge, and he so signed them. Appellees have appealed from the action of the court in ordering said finding of facts and conclusions of law signed and have brought the proceedings in relation thereto into the record on appeal by a certiorari. 1.",
"Appellant’s petition for the order mine pro tunc and the evidence introduced in support thereof show that the trial judge had prior to that time signed neither the special finding of facts, the amended and supplemental special finding of facts, nor the conclusions of law. Appellant on the oral argument of this cause frankly conceded that the action of the trial court in making the order for the signing of said findings and conclusions nunc pro-tunc was unauthorized and could not be upheld. As said by this court in Walter v. Uhl, Admr. (1891), 3 Ind. App. 219, 28 N. E. 733, “The office of an entry mine pro tunc is to make the record speak the truth with regard to acts already performed, but not recorded. ■ Courts have the power, always, to make their own records conform to what was actually done. But it is not the office of an entry nunc pro tunc to so amend a record as to let it show an act to have been done which was, in fact, not done, although it should have been done.” See also, Lengelsen v. McGregor (1903), 162 Ind.",
"258, 67 N. E. 524, 70 N. E. 248; Kirby v. Bowland (1879), 69 Ind. 290; Cole Carriage Co. v. Hornbeck (1909), 45 Ind. App. 61, 89 N. E. 379; Bottorff v. Bottorff (1910), 45 Ind. App. 692, 91 N. E. 617. Appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s application for the nunc pro tunc order should have been sustained. *613Holcomb v. Norman (1909), 43 Ind. App. 506, 509, 87 N. E. 1057. 2. It is the settled law in this state that a special finding which has not been signed by the judge, or made a part of the record by a bill of exceptions, or filed and made a part of the record by order of the court, can only be regarded as a general finding. Smith v. State (1895), 140 Ind. 343, 39 N. E. 1060; Martin v. Marks (1900), 154 Ind.",
"549, 57 N. E. 249; Service v. Gambrel (1887), 110 Ind. 349, 11 N. E. 240; Lillard v. Mather (1902), 28 Ind. App. 583, 63 N. E. 479; Chapin v. Du Shane (1903), 32 Ind. App. 1, 69 N. E. 174. As evidence of its genuineness on appeal a special finding of facts should be signed by the judge or incorporated in a bill of exceptions signed by him or filed and spread on record by order of court. This practice is too well established to be overthrown now. Shane v. Lowry (1874), 48 Ind. 205; Conner v. Town of Marion (1887), 112 Ind. 517, 14 N. E. 488; Ferris v. Udell (1894), 139 Ind.",
"579, 38 N. E. 180; McCray v. Humes (1888), 116 Ind. 103, 18 N. E. 500. 3. Appellant, however, contends that the special finding of facts and the modification thereof are sufficiently authenticated by the act of the judge in signing his name on the record as heretofore stated. In Smith v. Davidson (1873), 45 Ind. 396, the special finding of facts was entered upon the order book among other proceedings of the day and at the end of the orders for the day the record was signed by the judge. The finding was not otherwise signed by him, was not incorporated in a bill of exceptions or made a part of the record by an order of the court.",
"The appellant, there as here, insisted that inasmuch as the finding was written in full upon the order book ■ as the finding of the court before the orders were signed, signing the orders was equivalent to signing the special *614finding as such. The court held otherwise and refused to reconsider and overrule, Peoria, etc., Co. v. Walser (1864), 22 Ind. 73, and other cases following it, holding that a special finding was not a part of the record because it was not signed by the judge or ordered made a part of the record. The reason given by the court why the special finding must be signed was that it was required to be in writing, so that an exception could be taken and that it must be filed with the clerk, so that he can enter it on the record.",
"It will be observed that the record now before us, in so far as the amended and supplemental finding of facts is concerned, is identical with the record in Smith v. Davidson, supra, in that, after such finding had been spread on the record and preceding the signature of the judge, there is an order of the court to the effect that the question as to the conclusions of law was taken under advisement.",
"The signature of the judge does not appear on the record immediately following the record of the special finding. While the transcript shows that the special finding in this case was spread at length upon the order book, there is no entry showing that it was in fact ever filed or ordered to be filed and made a part of the record. 4. The object of a special finding of facts is to bring into the record the facts therein stated. When the facts proven are correctly stated all that remains is for’ the trial court to correctly apply the law by stating its conclusions of law ast drawn from the facts found and render judgment in accordance with the conclusions of law as stated.",
"No bill of exceptions bringing the evidence into the record is necessary in such case in order to present the correctness of such conclusions of law based upon the facts found. So when a litigant on appeal desires to present the correctness of the legal conclusions of the trial court as *615applied to the facts found, he does so by excepting to each conclusion of law as stated by the trial court and making the proper assignment of errors on appeal. In applying the law.",
"to the facts, the special finding takes the place of a bill of exceptions containing the evidence. It imports absolute verity, but in order to do so it must measure up to all the requirements of a special finding. It must be authenticated by the signature of the trial judge in manner recognized by law. A special finding when properly authenticated becomes one of the papers in the case, that is, a part of the record.",
"On appeal it needs no further identification than the certificate of the clerk. 5. When the judge signs his name on the order book at the close of the day’s proceedings, it will be presumed he does so pursuant to §1450 Burns 1914, Acts 1885 p. 124, which requires the judge to sign the day’s proceedings after they have been read in open court, and not for the purpose of identifying any or all of the papers that may have been spread at length upon the order book. 6.",
"The special finding of facts set out in the instant case not having been properly authenticated amounts to no more than a general finding. It follows that the assignment that the court erred in its conclusions- of law does not present any question for our determination. The order of the court correcting the record is reversed at appellant’s costs, with directions to sustain appellees’ motion to dismiss appellant’s petition. The judgment of the trial court from which appellant appeals is affirmed."
]
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Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 1 of 10
EXHIBIT 12 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 2 of 10
DECLARATION OF NILSON FERNANDO BARAHONA MARRIAGA
I, Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga, hereby declare under the penalty of perjury
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746:
1. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to sign this declaration. I make
this declaration based on my personal knowledge except where I have indicated
otherwise. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently and
truthfully to these matters.
2. I am thirty-eight years old and a citizen of Honduras. I am currently detained at
Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC) in Ocilla, Georgia. I have been detained
here since approximately October 2019.
3. I have been married to a United States citizen for over six years and we have a
six-year-old son. My wife has been an anchor in my life because I have learned
how to be a husband, a father and an overall better human being by her side. I am
the primary breadwinner in our family.
4. My family and I have the support of my father, who is a United States citizen,
and of my mother, who is a legal permanent resident. We also have the support
of my two sisters, who are United States citizens.
5. I am eligible for adjustment of status, as my wife and I have a pending I-130,
Petition for Alien Relative. I also applied for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal
because I have been in the United States continuously for longer than ten years,
1 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 3 of 10
I have had good moral character for over ten years, I have not been convicted of
any disqualifying offenses. If I were deported, it would cause exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to my United States citizen spouse and son, and
permanent resident mother. I may also be eligible for a U-Visa because I was
kidnapped in 2011 and was helpful to law enforcement in the investigation of the
crime. I don’t have an attorney to help me apply for immigration relief, but the
attorney who helped me apply for parole and bond has sent me a lot of
information so that I can understand these types of relief and apply for them by
myself. My request for bond has been denied and my parole request based on my
medical vulnerability to coronavirus was also denied.
6. Before I was detained by ICE, I was diagnosed as a diabetic and was able to
manage the condition without medication. Since being transferred to ICDC, they
told me that they can’t provide me with the necessary diet and access to exercise
that I need in order to manage my diabetes. Their solution is basically to increase
the amount of medicine I take.
7. My diabetic and hypertension condition deteriorated so much in detention to the
point that, on one occasion in November 2019, a small blood vessel in my nose
burst open and it caused me to bleed a lot. I woke up with my nose bleeding and
I was shaking because of my high blood pressure.
8. It is not safe to be a diabetic detained at ICDC. The living situation is scary. There
2 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 4 of 10
are a lot of people who are sick, and some of them may already have coronavirus
based on their symptoms. It is nearly impossible to practice social distancing
here. There are around 22 of us in Echo-9 right now. We mostly have two people
per cell. In other dorms, there are 3-4 people per cell. However, nothing is worse
than the open dorms, where there are 40-50 bunk beds all 3-4 feet apart from each
other. It is only a matter of time for the coronavirus outbreak to get worse.
9. At ICDC, there are 70-80 of us in very crowded spaces at any given moment.
When we are taken to the library or to recreation, we are often asked to wait in
the hallway for a long time, where we just stand right next to the other. The same
thing happens when we have court hearings. The staff here mixes people from all
the dorms in one waiting room. Even though we have a soap dispenser outside
our dorms, we don’t have access to hand sanitizers at all. We can’t even buy that
in the commissary.
10. The way management operates the facility is alarming. I work in the kitchen at
ICDC, along with detainees from other dorms. I help prepare the food. The
facility does not give us protective face masks while we are working, even though
we are preparing food for everyone else. Even though we are now using
disposable plates, we continue to use the same plastic cups everyone uses. The
cleaning process of the cups we use is also not sanitary. The food cart we use to
transport the food from the kitchen to all the dorms almost never gets disinfected.
3 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 5 of 10
That food cart even goes to the Fox building, where the people in quarantine are
being held, and comes back to the kitchen without being wiped down or anything.
11. The cells get cleaned with bleach only once a week or so, and this is only because
of the coronavirus pandemic. Before that, they would never clean our cells like
that. Also, the detainees that do the cleaning are asked to only spray the Lysol
disinfectant in the shower and in the toilet. This is not enough. They do not
disinfect the tablets, phones, or tables where we usually spend most of our time.
The detainees who do the cleaning are not given gloves nor face masks.
Sometimes, those of us who work in the kitchen, bring gloves for them to use,
even though we are not allowed to. We also know that they have not been trained
on hygiene measures in order to limit the spread of the virus.
12. In fact, neither ICDC nor ICE has provided us with any information on the
coronavirus. We have received no guidance at all. There has been no formal
education on hygiene or social distancing. We don't know how to protect
ourselves or how to prevent the virus from spreading. We don’t even know what
kinds of symptoms to look for. We get most of our information from TV.
13. Also, the guards at the facility do not regularly wear gloves when they enter our
living spaces and touch what is around us. I have never seen a guard wear a face
mask. The ICE officials that visit ICDC never wear gloves. It is scary to think
that any of them can be spreading the virus inside the detention center. It is clear
4 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 6 of 10
to me that the individuals running this facility have not taken this pandemic
seriously. ICE is also not taking this seriously.
14. My experience with seeking medical services at ICDC for diabetes has been very
bad. To see the nurse here, we have to submit many requests. There are no actual
doctors here. Most of our requests get ignored. There have been times when I
have a headache, chest pain, and dizziness, or I simply want to get my blood
pressure checked, and my medical requests have gone unanswered. The facility
ignores our requests or simply tell us that we have been added to the sick call list.
While being at ICDC, my blood sugar reading has been as high as over 300.
15. Recently, a man who is housed next to my cell went to see the nurse at ICDC
because he had problems breathing and his throat was sore. His eyes were also
irritated. He did not get any medication from the clinic. Many people are starting
to be afraid to go to the clinic because they do not want to catch the virus. The
clinic is inside of the detention center, next to the kitchen. Everyone knows that
the facility does not properly clean the waiting room of the clinic.
16. I know there are people in quarantine at ICDC, and many of us believe there are
detainees here who have tested positive for the coronavirus. There are guards
who make comments about “not spreading a virus” that sounds like the virus is
already here. There were also two people who were housed across from me. Both
were tested. One of them tested negative and came back to our dorm and he said
5 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 7 of 10
that the other person tested positive was sent to quarantine. I know that there are
people in quarantine because I work in the kitchen and I know food is sent to the
quarantine section. The facility knows there are many people who are sick in
here, and they have not taken the necessary steps to increase medical staff or
screen people who are currently sick. They have especially forgotten about those
of us who are vulnerable to the virus. I was never given a medical exam,
information, or protective equipment relating to coronavirus as a person who is
at high-risk for coronavirus.
17. If I am released from detention, I will comply with any applicable conditions of
release including attending check-ins and immigration court hearings.
18. Upon release, I would reside with my wife and child in Lawrenceville, Georgia.
I will self-quarantine in order to protect myself and others from the coronavirus.
19. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of
arranging visitation and travel in light of the current COVID-19 pandemic. If
required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on April 1, 2020 at Stone Mountain, Georgia.
______________________________________
6 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 8 of 10
Lorilei Williams, Esq., on behalf of Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga
7 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 9 of 10
ATTORNEY DECLARATION
I, Lorilei Williams, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1746 as follows:
1. My name is Lorilei Williams. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in the
state of New York. I am an inactive attorney in good standing in the state of
Texas. I am an attorney of record in this litigation.
2. I represent the declarant, Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga. Out of
necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I signed Nilson Fernando
Barahona Marriaga’s declaration on his behalf and with his express consent.
3. ICE is oftentimes requiring legal visitors to provide and wear personal
protective equipment, including disposable vinyl gloves, surgical masks, and
eye protection while visiting any detention facility. These supplies are not
easily accessible, given the increase in demand. Any available supplies are
prioritized to hospitals and other medical facilities that are experiencing
dangerous shortages.
4. There are documented cases of COVID-19 in all fifty U.S. states and most
inhabited U.S. territories. The Center for Disease Control and Protection
(CDC) issued statements warning that individuals are at a higher risk of
infection when traveling. I have Hashimoto’s Thyroiditis, an autoimmune
disease, and asthma, which put me at a higher risk for COVID-10
8 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 10 of 10
complications.
5. In light of the above, to protect public health, I am not able to travel to Ocilla,
Georgia, to obtain my client’s signature.
6. I spoke with Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga via phone call and read the
declaration to him and confirmed the accuracy of the information therein.
Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga has confirmed that I can sign on his
behalf, as reflected in his declaration.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America
that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed on April 1, 2020 at Stone Mountain, Georgia.
______________________________________
Lorilei Williams, Esq.,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Southern Poverty Law Center
T. 404.858.2567
lorilei.williams@splcenter.org
9 | 2020-04-03 | [
"Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 1 of 10 EXHIBIT 12 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 2 of 10 DECLARATION OF NILSON FERNANDO BARAHONA MARRIAGA I, Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga, hereby declare under the penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746: 1. I am at least 18 years of age and am competent to sign this declaration. I make this declaration based on my personal knowledge except where I have indicated otherwise. If called as a witness, I could and would testify competently and truthfully to these matters. 2. I am thirty-eight years old and a citizen of Honduras. I am currently detained at Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC) in Ocilla, Georgia. I have been detained here since approximately October 2019. 3. I have been married to a United States citizen for over six years and we have a six-year-old son.",
"My wife has been an anchor in my life because I have learned how to be a husband, a father and an overall better human being by her side. I am the primary breadwinner in our family. 4. My family and I have the support of my father, who is a United States citizen, and of my mother, who is a legal permanent resident. We also have the support of my two sisters, who are United States citizens. 5. I am eligible for adjustment of status, as my wife and I have a pending I-130, Petition for Alien Relative. I also applied for Non-LPR Cancellation of Removal because I have been in the United States continuously for longer than ten years, 1 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 3 of 10 I have had good moral character for over ten years, I have not been convicted of any disqualifying offenses.",
"If I were deported, it would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to my United States citizen spouse and son, and permanent resident mother. I may also be eligible for a U-Visa because I was kidnapped in 2011 and was helpful to law enforcement in the investigation of the crime. I don’t have an attorney to help me apply for immigration relief, but the attorney who helped me apply for parole and bond has sent me a lot of information so that I can understand these types of relief and apply for them by myself. My request for bond has been denied and my parole request based on my medical vulnerability to coronavirus was also denied. 6. Before I was detained by ICE, I was diagnosed as a diabetic and was able to manage the condition without medication. Since being transferred to ICDC, they told me that they can’t provide me with the necessary diet and access to exercise that I need in order to manage my diabetes.",
"Their solution is basically to increase the amount of medicine I take. 7. My diabetic and hypertension condition deteriorated so much in detention to the point that, on one occasion in November 2019, a small blood vessel in my nose burst open and it caused me to bleed a lot. I woke up with my nose bleeding and I was shaking because of my high blood pressure. 8. It is not safe to be a diabetic detained at ICDC. The living situation is scary. There 2 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 4 of 10 are a lot of people who are sick, and some of them may already have coronavirus based on their symptoms. It is nearly impossible to practice social distancing here. There are around 22 of us in Echo-9 right now. We mostly have two people per cell. In other dorms, there are 3-4 people per cell. However, nothing is worse than the open dorms, where there are 40-50 bunk beds all 3-4 feet apart from each other. It is only a matter of time for the coronavirus outbreak to get worse. 9. At ICDC, there are 70-80 of us in very crowded spaces at any given moment. When we are taken to the library or to recreation, we are often asked to wait in the hallway for a long time, where we just stand right next to the other.",
"The same thing happens when we have court hearings. The staff here mixes people from all the dorms in one waiting room. Even though we have a soap dispenser outside our dorms, we don’t have access to hand sanitizers at all. We can’t even buy that in the commissary. 10. The way management operates the facility is alarming. I work in the kitchen at ICDC, along with detainees from other dorms. I help prepare the food.",
"The facility does not give us protective face masks while we are working, even though we are preparing food for everyone else. Even though we are now using disposable plates, we continue to use the same plastic cups everyone uses. The cleaning process of the cups we use is also not sanitary. The food cart we use to transport the food from the kitchen to all the dorms almost never gets disinfected. 3 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 5 of 10 That food cart even goes to the Fox building, where the people in quarantine are being held, and comes back to the kitchen without being wiped down or anything. 11. The cells get cleaned with bleach only once a week or so, and this is only because of the coronavirus pandemic.",
"Before that, they would never clean our cells like that. Also, the detainees that do the cleaning are asked to only spray the Lysol disinfectant in the shower and in the toilet. This is not enough. They do not disinfect the tablets, phones, or tables where we usually spend most of our time. The detainees who do the cleaning are not given gloves nor face masks. Sometimes, those of us who work in the kitchen, bring gloves for them to use, even though we are not allowed to. We also know that they have not been trained on hygiene measures in order to limit the spread of the virus.",
"12. In fact, neither ICDC nor ICE has provided us with any information on the coronavirus. We have received no guidance at all. There has been no formal education on hygiene or social distancing. We don't know how to protect ourselves or how to prevent the virus from spreading. We don’t even know what kinds of symptoms to look for. We get most of our information from TV. 13. Also, the guards at the facility do not regularly wear gloves when they enter our living spaces and touch what is around us. I have never seen a guard wear a face mask. The ICE officials that visit ICDC never wear gloves. It is scary to think that any of them can be spreading the virus inside the detention center.",
"It is clear 4 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 6 of 10 to me that the individuals running this facility have not taken this pandemic seriously. ICE is also not taking this seriously. 14. My experience with seeking medical services at ICDC for diabetes has been very bad. To see the nurse here, we have to submit many requests. There are no actual doctors here. Most of our requests get ignored. There have been times when I have a headache, chest pain, and dizziness, or I simply want to get my blood pressure checked, and my medical requests have gone unanswered. The facility ignores our requests or simply tell us that we have been added to the sick call list.",
"While being at ICDC, my blood sugar reading has been as high as over 300. 15. Recently, a man who is housed next to my cell went to see the nurse at ICDC because he had problems breathing and his throat was sore. His eyes were also irritated. He did not get any medication from the clinic. Many people are starting to be afraid to go to the clinic because they do not want to catch the virus. The clinic is inside of the detention center, next to the kitchen. Everyone knows that the facility does not properly clean the waiting room of the clinic.",
"16. I know there are people in quarantine at ICDC, and many of us believe there are detainees here who have tested positive for the coronavirus. There are guards who make comments about “not spreading a virus” that sounds like the virus is already here. There were also two people who were housed across from me. Both were tested. One of them tested negative and came back to our dorm and he said 5 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 7 of 10 that the other person tested positive was sent to quarantine. I know that there are people in quarantine because I work in the kitchen and I know food is sent to the quarantine section.",
"The facility knows there are many people who are sick in here, and they have not taken the necessary steps to increase medical staff or screen people who are currently sick. They have especially forgotten about those of us who are vulnerable to the virus. I was never given a medical exam, information, or protective equipment relating to coronavirus as a person who is at high-risk for coronavirus. 17. If I am released from detention, I will comply with any applicable conditions of release including attending check-ins and immigration court hearings.",
"18. Upon release, I would reside with my wife and child in Lawrenceville, Georgia. I will self-quarantine in order to protect myself and others from the coronavirus. 19. I have authorized my attorney to sign on my behalf given the difficulty of arranging visitation and travel in light of the current COVID-19 pandemic. If required to do so, I will provide a signature when I am able to do so. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.",
"Executed on April 1, 2020 at Stone Mountain, Georgia. ______________________________________ 6 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 8 of 10 Lorilei Williams, Esq., on behalf of Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga 7 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 9 of 10 ATTORNEY DECLARATION I, Lorilei Williams, declare the following under penalty of perjury pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 as follows: 1. My name is Lorilei Williams. I am a licensed attorney in good standing in the state of New York. I am an inactive attorney in good standing in the state of Texas.",
"I am an attorney of record in this litigation. 2. I represent the declarant, Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga. Out of necessity in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, I signed Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga’s declaration on his behalf and with his express consent. 3. ICE is oftentimes requiring legal visitors to provide and wear personal protective equipment, including disposable vinyl gloves, surgical masks, and eye protection while visiting any detention facility. These supplies are not easily accessible, given the increase in demand. Any available supplies are prioritized to hospitals and other medical facilities that are experiencing dangerous shortages. 4. There are documented cases of COVID-19 in all fifty U.S. states and most inhabited U.S. territories. The Center for Disease Control and Protection (CDC) issued statements warning that individuals are at a higher risk of infection when traveling. I have Hashimoto’s Thyroiditis, an autoimmune disease, and asthma, which put me at a higher risk for COVID-10 8 Case 1:20-cv-01449-SDG Document 4-13 Filed 04/03/20 Page 10 of 10 complications. 5.",
"In light of the above, to protect public health, I am not able to travel to Ocilla, Georgia, to obtain my client’s signature. 6. I spoke with Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga via phone call and read the declaration to him and confirmed the accuracy of the information therein. Nilson Fernando Barahona Marriaga has confirmed that I can sign on his behalf, as reflected in his declaration. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on April 1, 2020 at Stone Mountain, Georgia. ______________________________________ Lorilei Williams, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiffs Southern Poverty Law Center T. 404.858.2567 lorilei.williams@splcenter.org 9"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/129580073/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Citation Nr: 1537633
Decision Date: 09/02/15 Archive Date: 09/10/15
DOCKET NO. 12-25 600 ) DATE
)
)
On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Jackson, Mississippi
THE ISSUE
Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of temporomandibular (TMJ) repair.
ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD
S. Keyvan, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
This appeal was processed using the Veteran's Benefits Management System (VBMS). Accordingly, any future consideration of this Veteran's case should take into consideration the existence of this electronic record. In addition to the VBMS file, there is a Virtual VA paperless claims file associated with the claim.
The Veteran had active service from April 1983 to April 1987.
This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2010 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Jackson, Mississippi.
In January 2014, the Board remanded the claim for additional evidentiary development. Specifically, the claim was remanded to obtain the Veteran's updated VA and non-VA medical records, and to obtain an addendum medical opinion addressing the etiology of the Veteran's sleep apnea. The Veteran's outstanding VA treatment records issued at the Jackson and Memphis VA medical centers (VAMCs) have since been associated with the paperless claims file. Also, the AOJ referred the Veteran's claims file to the same VA examiner who evaluated him in July 2012 for an addendum medical opinion. The VA examiner provided an opinion in May 2014, the report of which has been associated with the claims file. The claims file has since been returned to the Board.
The appeal is REMANDED to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ). VA will notify the appellant if further action is required.
REMAND
The Veteran contends that his obstructive sleep apnea was caused or aggravated by his service-connected residuals of temporomandibular joint (TMJ) repair.
Service connection may be granted for a disability that is proximately due to, the result of, or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2014); Harder v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 183, 187 (1993). Additional disability resulting from the aggravation of a nonservice-connected condition by a service-connected condition is also compensable under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 439, 448 (1995).
The evidence of record reflects that the Veteran has a diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnea. See July 2012 VA examination report. In addition, by way of the May 2009 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for the Veteran's residuals of TMJ repair.
The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in connection to his claimed sleep apnea in July 2012, at which time the examiner confirmed a diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnea and concluded that "[t]he claimed condition is less likely than not (less than 50 percent probability) proximately due to or the result of the Veteran's service connected condition." Although the examiner provided a thorough rationale in support of his conclusion, he did not address whether the Veteran's currently diagnosed sleep apnea was aggravated by his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. Pursuant to the January 2014 remand, the Board remanded the Veteran's claim for an addendum medical opinion addressing the etiology of the currently diagnosed obstructive sleep apnea, to include whether the sleep apnea was aggravated by the service-connected residuals of TMJ repair.
The Veteran's claims file was referred to the same VA examiner who evaluated him at the July 2012 VA examination. Based on his review of the claims file and medical articles, the VA examiner concluded that the claimed condition was less likely than not incurred in or caused by the claimed in-service injury, event or illness. In reaching this opinion, the examiner explained that review of the claims file was absent any "documentation of [complaints of] sleep apnea or evaluation while on active duty." He did note that bite guards sometimes aggravate sleep apnea symptoms, referencing a citation for one of the medical articles submitted by the Veteran. He (the examiner) also referenced another study issued through the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, which indicated that "[a]n association exists between bruxism, tension headache, and sleep disorders, particularly sleep apnea, in the cramomandibular dysfunction patient" and "[obstructive sleep apnea] is not classified as a sleep disordered breathing related condition. After reviewing the medical internet and journal articles provided by the Veteran in support of his claim, as well as his claims file, the examiner stated that he would not make any changes to the previous July 2012 VA opinion. The examiner went on to list several factors that contribute and cause sleep apnea.
Unfortunately, the examiner did not address whether the Veteran's sleep apnea was aggravated as a result of his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. Although he noted that bite guards can occasionally aggravate sleep apnea symptoms, he appeared to be referencing a medical article rather than specific facts of the Veteran's case when making this assertion. Although the examiner at the July 2010 VA examination in connection to his TMJ residuals noted that the Veteran has to wear an oral appliance to decrease stiffness, the record does not specifically indicate, and the Veteran has not stated, that he currently wears "bite guards." Moreover, in the May 2014 opinion, the VA examiner appears to be making a general statement rather than referring to specific facts derived from the Veteran's case. At this juncture, the Board finds that the evidence of record is insufficient to render a determination regarding whether the Veteran's sleep apnea is secondary to his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair as the examiner still has not addressed whether the Veteran's sleep apnea was aggravated by his residuals of TMJ repair. The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held "that a remand by this Court or the Board confers on the Veteran or other claimant, as a matter of law, a right to compliance with the remand orders." Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). As such, compliance with the terms of the remand is necessary prior to further appellate review, and if not, "the Board itself errs in failing to ensure compliance." Id. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran's claim should be remanded once again for an additional VA medical opinion specifically addressing whether the Veteran's obstructive sleep apnea was aggravated as a result of his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair.
On remand, ongoing medical records should also be obtained. 38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2014). Bell v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (VA medical records are in constructive possession of the agency and must be obtained if pertinent).
Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action:
1. After obtaining the appropriate release of information forms where necessary, procure records of any outstanding treatment for obstructive sleep apnea that the Veteran may have received. The Board is particularly interested in records of treatment that the Veteran may have received at any VA facility since March 2014. All such available documents should be associated with the claims file.
2. The AOJ should refer the claims file (to include both the VBMS and Virtual VA folder), and a copy of this Remand, to the same examiner who evaluated the Veteran in July 2012 and provided the May 2014 addendum opinion, or another appropriate VA physician with appropriate expertise if this examiner is unavailable. Following a review of the record, the examiner should express an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not, a 50 percent probability or greater, that the Veteran's sleep apnea was proximately due to, or aggravated by his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. In providing an opinion, the examiner should discuss whether the Veteran currently wears any oral appliances, to include bite guards, for his TMJ residuals, and if so, whether any of these devices may have aggravated his sleep apnea. If aggravated, specify the baseline of sleep apnea prior to aggravation, and the permanent, measurable increase in sleep apnea resulting from the aggravation. A complete rationale should be provided for all opinions expressed.
The VA examiner must provide a thorough and well-reasoned rationale for all opinions provided. If the VA examiner finds that the Veteran's sleep apnea was not caused or aggravated by his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair, then he or she must provide a complete rationale upon which his or her opinion is based, and must include a discussion of the medical principles as applied to the medical evidence and facts used in establishing his or her opinion.
If the VA examiner determines that he/she cannot provide an opinion without resorting to speculation, the VA examiner should explain the inability to provide an opinion, identifying precisely what facts could not be determined. In particular, he/she should comment on whether an opinion could not be provided because the limits of medical knowledge have been exhausted or whether additional testing or information could be obtained that would lead to a conclusive opinion. Jones v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 382, 389 (2010).
(If the examiner determines that another examination is necessary to arrive at any requested opinion, an examination should be scheduled with a VA physician and the Veteran notified that failure to report to any scheduled examination, without good cause, could result in a denial of his claims. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(b) (2014). The VA examiner should provide the opinions requested above.)
3. After completing the above, and undertaking any additional evidentiary development deemed necessary, readjudicate the issue on appeal. If any benefit sought is not granted, the Veteran and his representative should be provided with a supplemental statement of the case. An appropriate period of time should be allowed for response before the case is returned to the Board.
The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App. 369 (1999).
This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the Court for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West 2014).
_________________________________________________
J. A. MARKEY
Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals
Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2014), only a decision of the Board is appealable to the Court. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2014). | 09-02-2015 | [
"Citation Nr: 1537633 Decision Date: 09/02/15 Archive Date: 09/10/15 DOCKET NO. 12-25 600 ) DATE ) ) On appeal from the Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Jackson, Mississippi THE ISSUE Entitlement to service connection for sleep apnea, to include as secondary to service-connected residuals of temporomandibular (TMJ) repair. ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD S. Keyvan, Counsel INTRODUCTION This appeal was processed using the Veteran's Benefits Management System (VBMS). Accordingly, any future consideration of this Veteran's case should take into consideration the existence of this electronic record. In addition to the VBMS file, there is a Virtual VA paperless claims file associated with the claim. The Veteran had active service from April 1983 to April 1987. This matter comes before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board) on appeal from an August 2010 rating decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in Jackson, Mississippi. In January 2014, the Board remanded the claim for additional evidentiary development.",
"Specifically, the claim was remanded to obtain the Veteran's updated VA and non-VA medical records, and to obtain an addendum medical opinion addressing the etiology of the Veteran's sleep apnea. The Veteran's outstanding VA treatment records issued at the Jackson and Memphis VA medical centers (VAMCs) have since been associated with the paperless claims file. Also, the AOJ referred the Veteran's claims file to the same VA examiner who evaluated him in July 2012 for an addendum medical opinion. The VA examiner provided an opinion in May 2014, the report of which has been associated with the claims file. The claims file has since been returned to the Board. The appeal is REMANDED to the Agency of Original Jurisdiction (AOJ).",
"VA will notify the appellant if further action is required. REMAND The Veteran contends that his obstructive sleep apnea was caused or aggravated by his service-connected residuals of temporomandibular joint (TMJ) repair. Service connection may be granted for a disability that is proximately due to, the result of, or aggravated by a service-connected disability. 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a) (2014); Harder v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 183, 187 (1993). Additional disability resulting from the aggravation of a nonservice-connected condition by a service-connected condition is also compensable under 38 C.F.R. § 3.310(a); Allen v. Brown, 7 Vet. App.",
"439, 448 (1995). The evidence of record reflects that the Veteran has a diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnea. See July 2012 VA examination report. In addition, by way of the May 2009 rating decision, the RO granted service connection for the Veteran's residuals of TMJ repair. The Veteran was afforded a VA examination in connection to his claimed sleep apnea in July 2012, at which time the examiner confirmed a diagnosis of obstructive sleep apnea and concluded that \"[t]he claimed condition is less likely than not (less than 50 percent probability) proximately due to or the result of the Veteran's service connected condition.\" Although the examiner provided a thorough rationale in support of his conclusion, he did not address whether the Veteran's currently diagnosed sleep apnea was aggravated by his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. Pursuant to the January 2014 remand, the Board remanded the Veteran's claim for an addendum medical opinion addressing the etiology of the currently diagnosed obstructive sleep apnea, to include whether the sleep apnea was aggravated by the service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. The Veteran's claims file was referred to the same VA examiner who evaluated him at the July 2012 VA examination. Based on his review of the claims file and medical articles, the VA examiner concluded that the claimed condition was less likely than not incurred in or caused by the claimed in-service injury, event or illness.",
"In reaching this opinion, the examiner explained that review of the claims file was absent any \"documentation of [complaints of] sleep apnea or evaluation while on active duty.\" He did note that bite guards sometimes aggravate sleep apnea symptoms, referencing a citation for one of the medical articles submitted by the Veteran. He (the examiner) also referenced another study issued through the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey, which indicated that \"[a]n association exists between bruxism, tension headache, and sleep disorders, particularly sleep apnea, in the cramomandibular dysfunction patient\" and \"[obstructive sleep apnea] is not classified as a sleep disordered breathing related condition. After reviewing the medical internet and journal articles provided by the Veteran in support of his claim, as well as his claims file, the examiner stated that he would not make any changes to the previous July 2012 VA opinion. The examiner went on to list several factors that contribute and cause sleep apnea.",
"Unfortunately, the examiner did not address whether the Veteran's sleep apnea was aggravated as a result of his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. Although he noted that bite guards can occasionally aggravate sleep apnea symptoms, he appeared to be referencing a medical article rather than specific facts of the Veteran's case when making this assertion. Although the examiner at the July 2010 VA examination in connection to his TMJ residuals noted that the Veteran has to wear an oral appliance to decrease stiffness, the record does not specifically indicate, and the Veteran has not stated, that he currently wears \"bite guards.\" Moreover, in the May 2014 opinion, the VA examiner appears to be making a general statement rather than referring to specific facts derived from the Veteran's case. At this juncture, the Board finds that the evidence of record is insufficient to render a determination regarding whether the Veteran's sleep apnea is secondary to his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair as the examiner still has not addressed whether the Veteran's sleep apnea was aggravated by his residuals of TMJ repair.",
"The United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court) has held \"that a remand by this Court or the Board confers on the Veteran or other claimant, as a matter of law, a right to compliance with the remand orders.\" Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268, 271 (1998). As such, compliance with the terms of the remand is necessary prior to further appellate review, and if not, \"the Board itself errs in failing to ensure compliance.\" Id. Therefore, the Board finds that the Veteran's claim should be remanded once again for an additional VA medical opinion specifically addressing whether the Veteran's obstructive sleep apnea was aggravated as a result of his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. On remand, ongoing medical records should also be obtained.",
"38 U.S.C.A. § 5103(a) (West 2014). Bell v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 611 (VA medical records are in constructive possession of the agency and must be obtained if pertinent). Accordingly, the case is REMANDED for the following action: 1. After obtaining the appropriate release of information forms where necessary, procure records of any outstanding treatment for obstructive sleep apnea that the Veteran may have received. The Board is particularly interested in records of treatment that the Veteran may have received at any VA facility since March 2014.",
"All such available documents should be associated with the claims file. 2. The AOJ should refer the claims file (to include both the VBMS and Virtual VA folder), and a copy of this Remand, to the same examiner who evaluated the Veteran in July 2012 and provided the May 2014 addendum opinion, or another appropriate VA physician with appropriate expertise if this examiner is unavailable. Following a review of the record, the examiner should express an opinion as to whether it is at least as likely as not, a 50 percent probability or greater, that the Veteran's sleep apnea was proximately due to, or aggravated by his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair. In providing an opinion, the examiner should discuss whether the Veteran currently wears any oral appliances, to include bite guards, for his TMJ residuals, and if so, whether any of these devices may have aggravated his sleep apnea. If aggravated, specify the baseline of sleep apnea prior to aggravation, and the permanent, measurable increase in sleep apnea resulting from the aggravation.",
"A complete rationale should be provided for all opinions expressed. The VA examiner must provide a thorough and well-reasoned rationale for all opinions provided. If the VA examiner finds that the Veteran's sleep apnea was not caused or aggravated by his service-connected residuals of TMJ repair, then he or she must provide a complete rationale upon which his or her opinion is based, and must include a discussion of the medical principles as applied to the medical evidence and facts used in establishing his or her opinion. If the VA examiner determines that he/she cannot provide an opinion without resorting to speculation, the VA examiner should explain the inability to provide an opinion, identifying precisely what facts could not be determined. In particular, he/she should comment on whether an opinion could not be provided because the limits of medical knowledge have been exhausted or whether additional testing or information could be obtained that would lead to a conclusive opinion.",
"Jones v. Shinseki, 23 Vet. App. 382, 389 (2010). (If the examiner determines that another examination is necessary to arrive at any requested opinion, an examination should be scheduled with a VA physician and the Veteran notified that failure to report to any scheduled examination, without good cause, could result in a denial of his claims. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.655(b) (2014). The VA examiner should provide the opinions requested above.) 3.",
"After completing the above, and undertaking any additional evidentiary development deemed necessary, readjudicate the issue on appeal. If any benefit sought is not granted, the Veteran and his representative should be provided with a supplemental statement of the case. An appropriate period of time should be allowed for response before the case is returned to the Board. The Veteran has the right to submit additional evidence and argument on the matter or matters the Board has remanded. Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet. App.",
"369 (1999). This claim must be afforded expeditious treatment. The law requires that all claims that are remanded by the Board or by the Court for additional development or other appropriate action must be handled in an expeditious manner. See 38 U.S.C.A. §§ 5109B, 7112 (West 2014). _________________________________________________ J. A. MARKEY Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals Under 38 U.S.C.A. § 7252 (West 2014), only a decision of the Board is appealable to the Court. This remand is in the nature of a preliminary order and does not constitute a decision of the Board on the merits of your appeal.",
"38 C.F.R. § 20.1100(b) (2014)."
]
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Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 1 of 5
EXHIBIT K Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 2 of 5
WOODBRIDGE LIQUIDATION TRUST Michael I. Goldberg, Liquidation Trustee 350 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1600 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301
VIA U.S. MAIL & WEB POSTING
September 13, 2019
Dear Beneficiaries,
As Trustee of the Woodbridge Liquidation Trust (the “Trust”), I write to update you on: (i) the status of Robert Shapiro’s criminal sentencing; (ii) the status of the Trust’s registration of its Class A Liquidation Trust Interests (“Class A Interests”) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”); and (iii) updated estimates regarding beneficiary recoveries. I also write to remind you of the Trust’s website, www.woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com. I will endeavor to continue posting periodic updates on the website, and I encourage you to check the site regularly.
Robert Shapiro Criminal Sentencing
In March 2019, Robert Shapiro was charged with ten criminal counts stemming from his orchestration of the Woodbridge fraud. After initially pleading not guilty, in August 2019 Shapiro changed his plea to a guilty plea, and pleaded guilty to counts of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, and tax evasion. Shapiro’s sentencing hearing is scheduled to take place on October 15, 2019 at 8:30 a.m. The hearing will take place before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga, at 400 North Miami Avenue, Courtroom 12-2, Miami, Florida 33128. The sentencing hearing is open to the public.
Registration of the Class A Interests with the SEC
Pursuant to the Woodbridge plan of liquidation (the “Plan”) and the Trust’s governing document (the “Trust Agreement”), the Trust interests that you hold are, with certain uncommon exceptions, not presently allowed to be transferred (i.e. sold to somebody else). Because the Trust interests are generally not yet transferable, at the present time there is no trading market for the Trust interests.
However, the Plan and Trust Agreement do require that the Trust endeavor to cause the Class A Interests to be registered with the SEC under the section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). When registration becomes effective, the transfer restriction on the Class A Interests will terminate and, at that time, the Class A Interests will become transferable to the extent otherwise permissible under applicable law. The termination of the transfer restriction will, in most cases, mean that you will be permitted, but not required, to sell your Class A Interests to another person or otherwise change the way you hold title to your Class A Interests. I will notify you in writing that the Class A Interests have become transferable
50153705;1 Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 3 of 5
Letter to Beneficiaries September 13, 2019 Page 2
promptly after the effective date of the registration. I also will post the notice on the Trust’s website at https://woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com.
The registration process includes the following steps, among others. The Trust, with input from its subsidiary, the “Wind-Down Entity,” is currently in the process of drafting a document, known as a “Registration Statement,” which will be filed with the SEC. The Registration Statement is required to contain a substantial amount of very specific information about the Trust and the Class A Interests, including, among other things, the nature, history, operations and properties of the Trust and its subsidiaries, the business experience of the governing bodies and management of the Trust and the Wind-Down Entity, specified financial data and results, and audited financial statements. I anticipate that the Registration Statement will be filed with the SEC on or before October 28, 2019. The Registration Statement is expected to be publicly available for viewing and copying at https://sec.gov/edgar.shtml as soon as it has been filed. Through the Trust’s website at https://woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com, I plan to make the Registration Statement available, free of charge, as soon as reasonably practicable after we electronically file it with the SEC.
After the Registration Statement is filed, I anticipate that the SEC will review the information in the Registration Statement to ensure that the disclosure contained in the Registration Statement is adequate. Based on the SEC’s typical review time, we would expect to receive any comments or questions that the SEC may have within about 30 days of the filing. We will then work with the SEC to address any such comments or questions, which may require the preparation and filing of an amendment to the Registration Statement. Assuming that all SEC comments and questions are satisfactorily addressed, we expect that the Registration Statement, as it may be amended, will be declared or allowed to become effective and the Class A Interests will then become transferable to the extent otherwise permissible under applicable law. My goal is to have this process conclude by the end of this calendar year, but there are no assurances that this will happen.
Once the Class A Interests have become transferable, you should be able to effect the transfer of your Class A Interests to another person simply by completing and submitting the applicable transfer forms, which are expected to be available from our Transfer Agent, Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company.
There is a difference between the Class A Interests being transferable and there actually being an organized securities market in which prices for the Class A Interests are quoted and on which your securities broker can buy or sell Class A Interests on your behalf. The Trust is not required to list the Class A Interests on any national securities exchange (such as the NYSE, the NASDAQ Stock Market, or the NASDAQ National Market), and there are no plans to do that. But the Plan and Trust Agreement do require the Trust to make efforts to cause the Class A Interests to be traded on an over-the-counter market, and we are making preparations for the Class A Interests to be traded on the Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB). To be traded on the OTCBB, the Class A Interests will need a “ticker symbol,” which is an abbreviation used to uniquely identify publicly traded shares of a particular security on a particular market. To obtain a ticker symbol, a special application, called a Form 211, must be submitted to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the organization that is responsible for assigning over-the-counter ticker symbols. The
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Letter to Beneficiaries September 13, 2019 Page 2
Trust cannot apply for a ticker symbol on the OTCBB; only a securities broker-dealer that is a FINRA member can submit the Form 211. In order to submit a Form 211 for the Class A Interests, the securities dealer must be ready, willing and able to “make a market” in these securities—that is, to buy or sell the Class A Interests at the quoted bid and ask price. We are currently working to identify at least one securities broker-dealer who is willing to act as a market maker for the Class A Interests and to submit the required Form 211 application to FINRA. There can be no assurance that the Trust will be successful in doing so on or before the time that the Registration Statement is effective, or at all.
Once we identify a sponsoring broker-dealer, it will be necessary for us to provide the broker- dealer with the information necessary for the broker-dealer to (a) determine that it is interested in acting as a market maker and (b) complete and submit the Form 211. I am optimistic that the Trust can provide the necessary information, but there can be no assurances that this will be the case. In any event, over-the-counter trading will not commence until sometime after the Registration Statement has become effective. For the most part, this delay is because FINRA is not expected to assign a ticker symbol for the Class A Interests until it can confirm that the Registration Statement has become effective and that the Class A Interests are compliant with FINRA standards. It is possible that there may also be delays as a result of the need for the Class A Interests to be determined by Depository Trust Company to be eligible for electronic book-entry transfers through the Direct Registration System (DRS).
What does this mean? It means that the Class A Interests are expected to be transferable promptly after the Registration Statement becomes effective, which is expected later this calendar year. But because the Class A Interests will not be traded on the OTCBB after the Class A Interests have become transferable, there will be some period (which I hope to be a short period), during which holders will be able to sell their Class A Interests but will not enjoy the benefits of an organized trading market in which to carry out their sales. During that period, for example, you will still be able, if you wish, to sell your Class A Interests, but you would need find a direct buyer instead of merely instructing your securities broker to sell in an “open market” transaction. You would then need to negotiate with that buyer regarding the price and other terms of the sale, without being able to refer to price quotations for the Class A Interests on any organized trading market. I urge you to exercise caution in making any buy or sell decisions during any period between the commencement of transferability and the commencement of OTCBB trading.
Please note that the Trust is not seeking registration of the Class B Liquidation Trust Interests, which are expected to remain non-transferable indefinitely.
The effectiveness of the Registration Statement will cause the Trust to become subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act and to be obligated to file annual reports on Form 10- K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K. These reports, which contain a great deal of valuable information about the Class A Interests, will be publicly available for viewing and copying at https://sec.gov/edgar.shtml. In addition, through the Trust’s website at https://woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com, I plan to make these reports available, free of charge, as
176101.1 DOCS_LA:324355.2 94811/003 50153705;1 Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 5 of 5
Letter to Beneficiaries September 13, 2019 Page 2
soon as reasonably practicable after we electronically file them with the SEC. I urge you to carefully review all such reports for a complete understanding of the Class A Interests.
Updated estimates regarding beneficiary recoveries
In conjunction with preparing the financial information required in the Registration Statement, the Trust and the Wind-Down Entity have approved a revised business plan for the liquidation of the real properties formerly owned by the Woodbridge debtors and now owned by the Trust’s subsidiaries. The revised business plan takes into account updated financial circumstances and the current state of the Los Angeles real estate market, which has substantially changed during the past 12-18 months. As many of you know, the vast majority of the projected recovery is from real properties located in Los Angeles; accordingly, estimated recoveries are heavily dependent on the state of the Los Angeles real estate market.
Pursuant to the revised business plan, the Trust estimates the following approximate recoveries by Noteholders, Unitholders and General Unsecured Creditors:
Class 3 Note Claims 40%-63% of Allowed Claims
Class 4 General Unsecured Claims 40%-60% of Allowed Claims
Class 5 Unit Claims 29%-46% of Allowed Claims
The foregoing numbers are estimates, and are not guarantees of recovery, and it is projected to take approximately two years to realize these results. The actual results and the estimated timeline may vary from these estimates. Variations may be based on numerous factors, including, but not limited to, continued changes in the Los Angeles real estate market. The foregoing estimates do not include any significant recoveries from litigation brought or to be brought by or on behalf of the Trust, as such recoveries are highly unpredictable at this time.
Please continue to check the website at www.woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com. I will endeavor to continue providing periodic updates.
Sincerely,
Michael Goldberg Trustee of the Woodbridge Liquidation Trust
176101.1 DOCS_LA:324355.2 94811/003 50153705;1 | 2021-05-10 | [
"Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 1 of 5 EXHIBIT K Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 2 of 5 WOODBRIDGE LIQUIDATION TRUST Michael I. Goldberg, Liquidation Trustee 350 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 1600 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33301 VIA U.S. MAIL & WEB POSTING September 13, 2019 Dear Beneficiaries, As Trustee of the Woodbridge Liquidation Trust (the “Trust”), I write to update you on: (i) the status of Robert Shapiro’s criminal sentencing; (ii) the status of the Trust’s registration of its Class A Liquidation Trust Interests (“Class A Interests”) with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”); and (iii) updated estimates regarding beneficiary recoveries.",
"I also write to remind you of the Trust’s website, www.woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com. I will endeavor to continue posting periodic updates on the website, and I encourage you to check the site regularly. Robert Shapiro Criminal Sentencing In March 2019, Robert Shapiro was charged with ten criminal counts stemming from his orchestration of the Woodbridge fraud. After initially pleading not guilty, in August 2019 Shapiro changed his plea to a guilty plea, and pleaded guilty to counts of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and wire fraud, and tax evasion. Shapiro’s sentencing hearing is scheduled to take place on October 15, 2019 at 8:30 a.m. The hearing will take place before Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga, at 400 North Miami Avenue, Courtroom 12-2, Miami, Florida 33128. The sentencing hearing is open to the public. Registration of the Class A Interests with the SEC Pursuant to the Woodbridge plan of liquidation (the “Plan”) and the Trust’s governing document (the “Trust Agreement”), the Trust interests that you hold are, with certain uncommon exceptions, not presently allowed to be transferred (i.e.",
"sold to somebody else). Because the Trust interests are generally not yet transferable, at the present time there is no trading market for the Trust interests. However, the Plan and Trust Agreement do require that the Trust endeavor to cause the Class A Interests to be registered with the SEC under the section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”). When registration becomes effective, the transfer restriction on the Class A Interests will terminate and, at that time, the Class A Interests will become transferable to the extent otherwise permissible under applicable law. The termination of the transfer restriction will, in most cases, mean that you will be permitted, but not required, to sell your Class A Interests to another person or otherwise change the way you hold title to your Class A Interests.",
"I will notify you in writing that the Class A Interests have become transferable 50153705;1 Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 3 of 5 Letter to Beneficiaries September 13, 2019 Page 2 promptly after the effective date of the registration. I also will post the notice on the Trust’s website at https://woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com. The registration process includes the following steps, among others. The Trust, with input from its subsidiary, the “Wind-Down Entity,” is currently in the process of drafting a document, known as a “Registration Statement,” which will be filed with the SEC. The Registration Statement is required to contain a substantial amount of very specific information about the Trust and the Class A Interests, including, among other things, the nature, history, operations and properties of the Trust and its subsidiaries, the business experience of the governing bodies and management of the Trust and the Wind-Down Entity, specified financial data and results, and audited financial statements. I anticipate that the Registration Statement will be filed with the SEC on or before October 28, 2019. The Registration Statement is expected to be publicly available for viewing and copying at https://sec.gov/edgar.shtml as soon as it has been filed.",
"Through the Trust’s website at https://woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com, I plan to make the Registration Statement available, free of charge, as soon as reasonably practicable after we electronically file it with the SEC. After the Registration Statement is filed, I anticipate that the SEC will review the information in the Registration Statement to ensure that the disclosure contained in the Registration Statement is adequate. Based on the SEC’s typical review time, we would expect to receive any comments or questions that the SEC may have within about 30 days of the filing. We will then work with the SEC to address any such comments or questions, which may require the preparation and filing of an amendment to the Registration Statement. Assuming that all SEC comments and questions are satisfactorily addressed, we expect that the Registration Statement, as it may be amended, will be declared or allowed to become effective and the Class A Interests will then become transferable to the extent otherwise permissible under applicable law. My goal is to have this process conclude by the end of this calendar year, but there are no assurances that this will happen. Once the Class A Interests have become transferable, you should be able to effect the transfer of your Class A Interests to another person simply by completing and submitting the applicable transfer forms, which are expected to be available from our Transfer Agent, Continental Stock Transfer & Trust Company.",
"There is a difference between the Class A Interests being transferable and there actually being an organized securities market in which prices for the Class A Interests are quoted and on which your securities broker can buy or sell Class A Interests on your behalf. The Trust is not required to list the Class A Interests on any national securities exchange (such as the NYSE, the NASDAQ Stock Market, or the NASDAQ National Market), and there are no plans to do that. But the Plan and Trust Agreement do require the Trust to make efforts to cause the Class A Interests to be traded on an over-the-counter market, and we are making preparations for the Class A Interests to be traded on the Over-The-Counter Bulletin Board (OTCBB). To be traded on the OTCBB, the Class A Interests will need a “ticker symbol,” which is an abbreviation used to uniquely identify publicly traded shares of a particular security on a particular market. To obtain a ticker symbol, a special application, called a Form 211, must be submitted to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), the organization that is responsible for assigning over-the-counter ticker symbols. The 176101.1 DOCS_LA:324355.2 94811/003 50153705;1 Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 4 of 5 Letter to Beneficiaries September 13, 2019 Page 2 Trust cannot apply for a ticker symbol on the OTCBB; only a securities broker-dealer that is a FINRA member can submit the Form 211.",
"In order to submit a Form 211 for the Class A Interests, the securities dealer must be ready, willing and able to “make a market” in these securities—that is, to buy or sell the Class A Interests at the quoted bid and ask price. We are currently working to identify at least one securities broker-dealer who is willing to act as a market maker for the Class A Interests and to submit the required Form 211 application to FINRA. There can be no assurance that the Trust will be successful in doing so on or before the time that the Registration Statement is effective, or at all.",
"Once we identify a sponsoring broker-dealer, it will be necessary for us to provide the broker- dealer with the information necessary for the broker-dealer to (a) determine that it is interested in acting as a market maker and (b) complete and submit the Form 211. I am optimistic that the Trust can provide the necessary information, but there can be no assurances that this will be the case. In any event, over-the-counter trading will not commence until sometime after the Registration Statement has become effective. For the most part, this delay is because FINRA is not expected to assign a ticker symbol for the Class A Interests until it can confirm that the Registration Statement has become effective and that the Class A Interests are compliant with FINRA standards.",
"It is possible that there may also be delays as a result of the need for the Class A Interests to be determined by Depository Trust Company to be eligible for electronic book-entry transfers through the Direct Registration System (DRS). What does this mean? It means that the Class A Interests are expected to be transferable promptly after the Registration Statement becomes effective, which is expected later this calendar year. But because the Class A Interests will not be traded on the OTCBB after the Class A Interests have become transferable, there will be some period (which I hope to be a short period), during which holders will be able to sell their Class A Interests but will not enjoy the benefits of an organized trading market in which to carry out their sales.",
"During that period, for example, you will still be able, if you wish, to sell your Class A Interests, but you would need find a direct buyer instead of merely instructing your securities broker to sell in an “open market” transaction. You would then need to negotiate with that buyer regarding the price and other terms of the sale, without being able to refer to price quotations for the Class A Interests on any organized trading market. I urge you to exercise caution in making any buy or sell decisions during any period between the commencement of transferability and the commencement of OTCBB trading. Please note that the Trust is not seeking registration of the Class B Liquidation Trust Interests, which are expected to remain non-transferable indefinitely. The effectiveness of the Registration Statement will cause the Trust to become subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act and to be obligated to file annual reports on Form 10- K, quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and current reports on Form 8-K. These reports, which contain a great deal of valuable information about the Class A Interests, will be publicly available for viewing and copying at https://sec.gov/edgar.shtml.",
"In addition, through the Trust’s website at https://woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com, I plan to make these reports available, free of charge, as 176101.1 DOCS_LA:324355.2 94811/003 50153705;1 Case 19-50329-JKS Doc 56-11 Filed 05/10/21 Page 5 of 5 Letter to Beneficiaries September 13, 2019 Page 2 soon as reasonably practicable after we electronically file them with the SEC. I urge you to carefully review all such reports for a complete understanding of the Class A Interests. Updated estimates regarding beneficiary recoveries In conjunction with preparing the financial information required in the Registration Statement, the Trust and the Wind-Down Entity have approved a revised business plan for the liquidation of the real properties formerly owned by the Woodbridge debtors and now owned by the Trust’s subsidiaries. The revised business plan takes into account updated financial circumstances and the current state of the Los Angeles real estate market, which has substantially changed during the past 12-18 months. As many of you know, the vast majority of the projected recovery is from real properties located in Los Angeles; accordingly, estimated recoveries are heavily dependent on the state of the Los Angeles real estate market. Pursuant to the revised business plan, the Trust estimates the following approximate recoveries by Noteholders, Unitholders and General Unsecured Creditors: Class 3 Note Claims 40%-63% of Allowed Claims Class 4 General Unsecured Claims 40%-60% of Allowed Claims Class 5 Unit Claims 29%-46% of Allowed Claims The foregoing numbers are estimates, and are not guarantees of recovery, and it is projected to take approximately two years to realize these results.",
"The actual results and the estimated timeline may vary from these estimates. Variations may be based on numerous factors, including, but not limited to, continued changes in the Los Angeles real estate market. The foregoing estimates do not include any significant recoveries from litigation brought or to be brought by or on behalf of the Trust, as such recoveries are highly unpredictable at this time. Please continue to check the website at www.woodbridgeliquidationtrust.com. I will endeavor to continue providing periodic updates. Sincerely, Michael Goldberg Trustee of the Woodbridge Liquidation Trust 176101.1 DOCS_LA:324355.2 94811/003 50153705;1"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/169356747/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA .
Continuity/Reexam Information for 15/667569
Parent Data15667569, filed 08/02/2017 and having 1 RCE-type filing thereinClaims Priority from Provisional Application 62429649, filed 12/02/2016 Claims Priority from Provisional Application 62370673, filed 08/03/2016 Claims 11 and 13-35 are pending. No claim is allowed. No amendments were filed.
35 USC § 103(a) Rejection
The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made. The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness.
This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary. Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103(a).
Claims 11 and 13-35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cianchetta et al. (US Patent 9,732,062 also published as US 20130190287), Kim et al. (2015, 892 dated 10/01/2020), Cazzola et al. (Cazzola M et al. The genetic basis of myelodysplasia and its clinical relevance. Blood. 2013 Dec 12; 122(25):4021-34. Doi: 10.1182/blood-2013-09-381665. Epub 2013 Oct 17. PMID: 24136165; PMCID: PMC3862275.2013), 892 dated 10/01/2020) and Ganguly et al. (Mutat Res Rev Mutat Res Jul-Sep 2016; 769:47-62, doi: 10.1016/j.mrrev.2016.04.009. Epub 2016 Jun 23, Mutations of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS): An update, 892 dated 10/01/2020). Applicant’s claims are drawn using the same compound for treating myelodysplastic syndrome wherein the myelodysplastic syndrome is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 and a mutant allele of at least one second gene, wherein the second gene is selected from the group consisting of ASXL1 and SRSF2.TP53 and KRAS. See the entire documents. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art.
In regards to claims 11, 13-18, and 30-35, Cianchetta et al teaches claimed compound for IDH2 inhibitory activity and teaches Myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), myeloproliferative neoplasm (MPN), acute myelogenous leukemia (AML), sarcoma, melanoma, non-small cell lung cancer, chondrosarcoma, cholangiocarcinoma or angioimmunoblastic non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL). (See claim 18). It teaches a method of treating a cancer characterized by the presence of an IDH2 mutation, wherein the IDH2 mutation results in a new ability of the enzyme to catalyze the NAPH-dependent reduction of .alpha.-ketoglutarate to R (-)-2-hydroxyglutarate in a patient, comprising the step of administering to the patient in need thereof a composition of claim 10. It teaches the IDH2 mutation is an IDH2 R140Q or R172K mutation. (Claim 16) and the method of claim 16, wherein the IDH2 mutation is an IDH2 R140Q mutation (claim 17). Cianchetta et al. teaches compound 1 as IDH2 inhibitor, its pharmaceutical composition and treatment of acute myelogenous leukemia and non-small lung cancer. Page 36, compound 409, 68, 69 [0179], page 70 [0190] and 99 [0495]. Cianchetta et al teaches claimed compound for IDH2 inhibitory activity.
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RN 1446505-70-9 HCAPLUS In regards to claims 19-24, 28 and 29 drawn to dosage and method of administration, Cianchetta teaches compounds can be administered; orally, with a dosage ranging from about 0.5 to about 100 mg/kg of body weight, alternatively dosages between 1 mg and 1000 mg/dose, every 4 to 120 hours, or according to the requirements of the particular drug. The amounts are taught by the prior art. The pharmaceutical compositions of one aspect of this invention will be administered from about 1 to about 6 times per day or alternatively, as a continuous infusion. Such administration can be used as a chronic or acute therapy. [0174]. It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed to reduce and increase the doses than those recited above may be required. A person skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed would have guidance from Cianchetta which teaches that specific dosage and treatment regimens for any particular subject will depend upon a variety of factors, including the activity of the specific compound employed, the age, body weight, general health status, sex, diet, time of administration, rate of excretion, drug combination, the severity and course of the disease, condition or symptoms, the subject's disposition to the disease, condition or symptoms, and the judgment of the treating physician. [0175]. A person skilled in art would be able to decide suitable doses because Cianchetta teaches that upon improvement of a subject's condition, a maintenance dose of a compound, composition or combination of one aspect of this invention may be administered, if necessary. Subsequently, the dosage or frequency of administration, or both, may be reduced, as a function of the symptoms, to a level at which the improved condition is retained when the symptoms have been alleviated to the desired level. Subjects may, however, require intermittent treatment on a long-term basis upon any recurrence of disease symptoms. [0176]. In regards to oral dosage as in claim 28, Cianchetta teaches oral administered for treatment of cancer. [0177]. In regards to claim 11, are methods of treating a cancer characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 compound 1, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, or (b) a pharmaceutical composition comprising (a) and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier. [0180]. In regards to claims 17 and 18, Cianchetta teaches inhibitory activities of the compounds provided herein against IDH2 mutation R140Q, R170K (e.g., IDH2R140Q and IDH2R172K), (Example 12) [0178]. The cancer to be treated is characterized by a mutant allele of IDH2 wherein the IDH2 mutation results in a new ability of the enzyme to catalyze the NAPH-dependent reduction of .alpha.-ketoglutarate to R(-)-2-hydroxyglutarate the mutant IDH2 has an R140X mutation, R140X mutation is a R140Q mutation, R140W mutation, R140L mutation, R172X mutation and others [0179], [0181] and claims 16 and 17). The compounds and methods of one aspect of this invention are useful to treat any type of cancer that is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 imparting such activity and in particular an IDH2 R140Q and/or R172K mutation. [0182]. In regards to claims 33-35, Cianchetta teaches a method of treating a cancer selected from glioblastoma (glioma), myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), myeloproliferative neoplasm (MPN), acute myelogenous leukemia (AML), (See claim 18 and [0190]. In regards to claim 32, when the MDS is untreated. A person skilled while using the compound would expect to treat MDS in absence of a mutant allele of at least one other gene as in claim 11, however, depending on patients condition age and severity of the disease, the treatment may not be successful as expected to one skilled in the art. In regards to claim 30 drawn to mesylate salt of compound 1, Cianchetta et al. teaches various salts including mesylate salt. [0163]. It teaches pharmaceutically acceptable salts. [0160] to [0162]. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. While Cianchetta et al. teaches compound 1, same as in instant claims as IDH2 inhibitor, its pharmaceutical composition and treatment of acute myelogenous leukemia, MDS and various other cancers, does not teach explicitly the specific absence of a mutant gene of at least one other gene as in claim 11 as instantly claimed. (Claim 18) Instant claims differ from the reference in using the same compound as in claim for treating myelodysplastic syndrome wherein the myelodysplastic syndrome is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 and a mutant allele of at least one second gene, wherein the second gene is selected from the group consisting of KRAS, TP53, SETBPI, U2AFI, ASXL1 and SRSF2. It appears that “absence a mutation allele of TP53” , tp53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers. The limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). In regards to “absence of mutation allele” as in claims 11, 13-18, and 31 Kim et al. was added because it teaches mutations affecting spliceosomal proteins are the most common class of mutations in patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), t that mutations affecting the splicing factor SRSF2 directly impair hematopoietic differentiation in vivo, which is not due to SRSF2 loss of function. By contrast, SRSF2 mutations alter SRSF2’s normal sequence-specific RNA binding activity, thereby altering recognition of specific exonic splicing enhancer motifs to drive recurrent mis-splicing of key hematopoietic regulators. This includes SRSF2 mutation-dependent splicing of EZH2 that triggers nonsense-mediated decay, which, in turn, results in impaired hematopoietic differentiation. These data provide a mechanistic link between a mutant spliceosomal protein, alterations in splicing of key regulators, and impaired hematopoiesis. (Summary) Somatic mutations in genes encoding components of the spliceosome have been identified in a spectrum of human malignancies, including ~60% of patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). These mutations occur most commonly in SF3B1 (Splicing Factor 3b Subunit 1), SRSF2 (Serine/arginine-Rich Splicing Factor 2), and U2AF1 (U2 Small Nuclear RNA Auxiliary Factor 1) and almost always as heterozygous missense mutations that are mutually exclusive While the genetic data in MDS suggests that these alterations are critical to disease pathogenesis, it remains unknown how these mutations contribute to MDS and if they are sufficient to induce MDS. Kim et al teaches gene expression in primary patient samples with and without U2AF1 mutations. It teaches gene mutations are sufficient to drive MDS, and mutations in SRSF2. SRSF2 mutations occur in 20–30% of MDS and ~50% of chronic myelomonocytic leukemia (CMML) patients. Kim et al. teaches SRSF2 mutations are consistently associated with adverse outcome amongst MDS and AML patients. Despite the clinical importance of SRSF2 mutations, to date there have been no studies of the functional impact of SRSF2 mutations on hematopoiesis or splicing. Here, we studied the biological and transcriptional effects of somatic expression of the common SRSF2 P95H mutation in the hematopoietic compartment. (Introduction) See (Figure 1B). Kim et al. teaches the effect of the SRSF2 P95H mutation distinct from loss of SRSF2, and reveal that mutations in SRSF2 confer an alteration in function that results in key aspects of MDS. Transcriptional analysis of SRSF2 mutant cells revealed that SRSF2 mutations result in genome-wide alterations in ESE preference in both human and murine cells. It teaches genomic and biochemical assays indicate that SRSF2 mutations cause alteration, rather than loss-of-function, driving preferential recognition of cassette exons containing C- versus G-rich ESEs. In addition to the effects of mutant SRSF2 on EZH2 splicing and protein expression, a number of other genes of known importance in hematopoiesis and malignancy were also consistently differentially spliced in isogenic human cells, primary patient samples, and murine cells bearing mutant SRSF2. These include additional genes mutated in MDS (such as BCOR), genes with importance in hematopoietic stem cell self-renewal (such as IKAROS), and genes critical for cell survival (such as CASPASE 8). The functional effects of each of these specific splicing events are important in further delineating the effects of mutant SRSF2 on MDS pathogenesis as well as possibly providing novel means for therapeutic targeting of SRSF2-mutant cells. (Introduction). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to recognize mutant SRSF2 on MDS as SRSF2 mutations result in genome-wide alterations in ESE preference in both human and murine cells and genomic and biochemical assays indicate that SRSF2 mutations cause alteration, rather than loss-of-function. One skilled in the art would have the knowledge that in absence a certain mutation allele such as a P53 a p53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers. Similar reasons apply to other mutant allele related to MDS. A person skilled in the art would consider the limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). Kim et al. teaches SRSF2 mutations cause alteration. In regards to claims 11, 14-18 and 31, Cazzola et al. was added to show more about the role of common driver genes in patients with MDS and MDS/MPN. Cazzola teaches .RNA splitting –SRSF2, U2AF1, IDH1/IDH2, ASXLI. (See table 3 and figure 3). Cazzola et al. teaches myelodysplasia is a diagnostic feature of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDSs) but is also found in other myeloid neoplasms. Its molecular basis has been recently elucidated by means of massive parallel sequencing studies. About 90% of MDS patients carry ≥1 oncogenic mutations, and two thirds of them are found in individuals with a normal karyotype. Driver mutant genes include those of RNA splicing (SF3B1, SRSF2, U2AF1, and ZRSR2), DNA methylation (TET2, DNMT3A, and IDH1/2), chromatin modification (ASXL1 and EZH2), transcription regulation (RUNX1), DNA repair (TP53), signal transduction (CBL, NRAS, and KRAS), and cohesion complex (STAG2). Only 4 to 6 genes are consistently mutated in ≥10% MDS patients, whereas a long tail of ∼50 genes are mutated less frequently. (Abstract). Cazzola et al. teaches that MDSs are defined as clonal hematopoietic stem cell disorders characterized by cytopenia, myelodysplasia, ineffective hematopoiesis, and increased risk of progression to acute myeloid leukemia (AML) . Figure 1. (Introduction). Cazzola teaches that myelodysplasia driver genes are recurrently mutated also in another myeloid neoplasms. The driver genes whose mutations are responsible for MDS (Table 3) are frequently mutated also in other myeloid neoplasms listed in Table 1. This is primarily true for AML, although, as underlined by Walter et al some genes are overrepresented in MDS compared with AML and vice versa. Cazzola teaches and refers to Cancer Genome Atlas Research Network, the 20 most recurrently mutated genes were FLT3, NPM1, DNMT3A, IDH1/2, TET2, RUNX1, TP53, N/KRAS, CEPBPA, WT1, PTPN11, KIT, U2AF1, SMC1A, SMC3, PHF6, STAG2, and RAD21. Only half of these genes are within the 20 most recurrently mutated ones in MDS. Although the molecular pathophysiology of MDS is different from that of AML, some AML driver genes might behave as sub clonal drivers in MDS and thereby drive leukemic transformation. (See Table 3 shows most common driver genes in patients with MDS and MDS/MPN). See figure 3 and table 3
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Somatic mutations of CBL, TET2, ASXL1, and IDH/IDH2 was detected in the advanced phase of chronic myeloid leukemia. (Lines last 6 lines on page 9, cont., to page 10). Ganguly was added because it adds about the mutations of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) and that the now plethora of knowledge gained on myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), a heterogeneous pre-malignant disorder of hematopoietic stem cells, through sequencing of several pathway genes has unveiled molecular pathogenesis and its progression to AML. Recent discoveries on mutations in RNA-splicing machinery (SF3B1, SRSF2, ZRSR2, U2AF1, U2AF2); DNA methylation (TET2, DNMT3A, IDH1/2); chromatin modification (ASXL1, EZH2); transcription factor (TP53, RUNX1); signal transduction/kinases (FLT3, JAK2); RAS pathway (KRAS, NRAS, CBL, NF1, PTPN11); cohesin complex (STAG2, CTCF, SMC1A, RAD21); DNA repair (ATM, BRCC3, DLRE1C, FANCL); and other pathway genes have given insights into the independent effects and interaction of co-occurrence of mutations on disease-phenotype. RNA-splicing and DNA methylation mutations appeared to occur early and are reported as 'founder' mutations in over 50% MDS patients. TET2 mutation, through altered DNA methylation, has been found to have independent prognostic response to hypomethylating agents. Moreover, presence of DNMT3A, TET2 and ASXL1 mutations in normal elderly individuals forms the basis of understanding that accumulation of somatic mutations may not cause direct disease-development; however, cooperation with other mutations in the genes that are frequently mutated in myeloid and other hematopoietic cancers might result in clonal expansion through self-renewal and/or proliferation of hematopoietic stem cells. (Abstract). MDS represents heterogeneous clonal pre-malignant hematopoietic changes that are typically associated with peripheral blood cytopenia, infective hematopoiesis, hypercelluler bone marrow with morphologically defined dysplasia of one or more lineages and increased risk of progression to acute myeloid leukemia (AML). Mutated genes includes tumor suppressors (TP53) and KRAS. (Introduction). See table 1 where TP53 (Tumor protein p53) protein function, multiple DNA repair, apoptosis IDH2 mutation impact adverse prognosis, RNA splicing ID2AF1, high risk, enriched in patients with del20q11 and ASXL1 mutations and SETBRP1 (pages 50-51). Ganguly et al. teaches that IDH2 is located in the mitochondria. (Section 2.2.3.). It teaches Ganguly et al. teaches that unlike other myeloid malignancies, mutation in tyrosine kinase signalling pathways are described in 5% to 10% of MDS only, with mutations in NRAS and KRAS being the most frequent during transformation to AML. (2.4). TP53 mutation in association with isolated del (5q) at early stage of the disease disturbs treatment outcome due to loss of p53 protein function and predisposes to evolution to AML. (2.5.3. (17p13). Ganguly et al additionally, the emerging discovery of small molecules as inhibitors of mutations in genes of epigenetic DNA methylation, chromatin modeling and RNA-splicing mechanism has established significant hope in management of heterogeneous hematological malignancies. Identification of drug targets and elucidation of expression of mutated genes at pre-clinical and disease states would further lead to better understanding and control of the stages of disease progression. Individualized gene expression and genome wide association study would further promise to develop personalized therapeutic modules with pharmaceutical tailoring of targeted drugs. (Conclusion). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to use compound of claim 1 as taught by the teachings of Cianchetta et al., Kim et al., Cazzola et al and Ganguly which teaches at the time the invention was filed with reasonable expectation of success to treat myelodysplastic syndrome and acute myeloid leukemia in absence of a mutant allele of at least one gene as is claim 11. One skilled in the art would understand that in “absence a mutation allele of TP53” is that p53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers. Similarly a person skilled in the art would consider the limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). Cazzola teaches that only 4 to 6 genes are consistently mutated in ≥10% MDS patients, whereas a long tail of ∼50 genes are mutated less frequently. Therefore, in view of the teachings of prior art it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed to remove at least one mutant allele of at least one other gene to get better results so that treatment is expected to be more specie. Claimed invention is considered obvious to one skilled in the art over Cianchetta et al, Kim et al., Cazzola et al. and Ganguly et al. for the reasons cited above. In regards to administration timings, doses, duration is considered obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art would have been readily optimized effective dosages and concurrent administration regimens as determined by good medical practice and the clinical condition of the individual patient. Determination of the appropriate dosage, amounts and amounts in combination for treatment involving each of the above mentioned formulations of specific compounds as in claim 11 would have been routinely made by those of ordinary skill in the art and is within the ability of tasks routinely performed by them without undue experimentation, especially in light of the dosage information disclosed prior art and depending on variety of factors including the severity of the condition to be treated, the desired effect, possible of adverse reaction, and individual patient including age, sex, body weight, etc. The dosage is also adjusted by severity of the disease. Absent any evidence to the contrary, and based upon the teachings of the prior art, there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in practicing the instantly claimed invention. Therefore, the invention as a whole would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Obviousness can be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). KSR, instructs courts to take a more “expansive and flexible approach” in determining whether a patented invention was obvious at the time it was made. 550 U.S. at 415. In particular, the Court emphasized the role of “common sense”. “Rigid preventative rules that deny fact finders recourse to common sense … are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” Id. at 421. See Wyers v. Master Lock Co, 95 USPQ2d 1525, (Fed. Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon applicants to show that instantly claimed subject matter is different and unobvious over those taught by prior art. See In re Brown, 173 USPQ 685, 688; In re Best, 195 USPQ 430 and In re Marosi, 218 USPQ 289, 293.
In the light of the forgoing discussion, the Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion is that the subject matter defined by the instant claims would have been obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 103(a). Double Patenting The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159. See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b). The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens. An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/guidance/eTD-info-I.jsp.
Claims 11 and 13-35 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-16 of U.S. Patent No. 10,137,130. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because Amatangelo et al. teaches a method of treating acute myeloid leukemia in a subject comprising administering to the subject a mutant isocitrate dehydrogenase 2 (IDH2) inhibitor 2-methyl-1-[(4-[6-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-2-yl]-6- {[2-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-4-yl ]amino }-1,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino]propan-2-ol having the following formula: or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt, solvate, or tautomer thereof, wherein the acute myeloid leukemia is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 and the absence of a mutant allele of FLT3 using the same compound which is used in instant claims.
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Claim 2 is drawn to a method of treating a acute myeloid leukemia in a subject comprising administering to the subject a mutant isocitrate dehydrogenase 2 (IDH2) inhibitor 2-methyl-1-[(4-[6-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-2-yl ]-6- {[2-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-4-yl amino }-1,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino]propan-2-ol by the compound of claim 1 or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt, solvate, or tautomer, in combination with quizartinib wherein the acute myeloid leukemia is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2and a mutant allele of FLT3. In regards to mesylate salt of the compound, as in instant claim 30, U.S. Patent No. 10,137,130, claim 16 of the patent is drawn to mesylate salt of the compound. Claimed invention as in claim 11 and 13-18 is considered obvious to one skilled in the art for the same reason as cited in the office action. All claims were not copied here.
Response to Remarks
Applicant’s response after final response was filed on 02/3/202 2is acknowledged. Applicant’s arguments were fully considered but were not found persuasive. Claims were not amended. Rejection is maintained for the same reasons as set forth in our previous office action. Applicants argument were fully considered but were not persuasive. It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed considering the references cited available would have the knowledge the specific interaction IDH1, IH2, ASXLI and others known by the prior art. Cazzola et al. was added to show more. No new refence was added. about the role of common driver genes in patients with MDS and MDS/MPN. Cazzola teaches .RNA splitting –SRSF2, U2AF1, IDH1/IDH2, ASXLI. (See table 3 and figure 3). Cazzola et al. teaches myelodysplasia is a diagnostic feature of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDSs) but is also found in other myeloid neoplasms. About 90% of MDS patients carry ≥1 oncogenic mutations, and two thirds of them are found in individuals with a normal karyotype. Driver mutant genes include those of RNA splicing (SF3B1, SRSF2, U2AF1, and ZRSR2), DNA methylation (TET2, DNMT3A, and IDH1 It appears that the limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). Also, the “absence a mutation allele of TP53” is that p53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers. In previous communication affidavit was filed on 05/20/2019 was considered, but was found insufficient to overcome the rejection
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The Court has held that "the test of obviousness is not express suggestion of the claimed invention in any or all of the references but rather what the references taken collectively would suggest to those of ordinary skill in the art presumed to be familiar with them." See In re Rosselet, 146 USPQ 183, 186 (CCPA 1965). "There is no requirement (under 35 USC 103(a)) that the prior art contain an express suggestion to combine known elements to achieve the claimed invention. Rather, the suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art." Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 43 USPQ2d 1481, 1489 (Fed. Cir.1997). An obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some combinations would have been obvious where others would not. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1385 (U.S. 2007) ("The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results."). Another reference was added.
Election of Invention Previously, Applicants filed a response to the Restriction Requirement on 04/20/2018.was acknowledged. Applicant elected Group II, claims 11 and 13-16, drawn to methods of treating myelodysplastic syndrome in a subject, comprising administering to the subject a therapeutically effective amount of 2-methyl-l-[(4-[6-(tri fluoromethyljpyridin-2-yl]-6-{ [2-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-4-yl]amino}-l,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino]propan-2-ol having the following formula: (Compound 1), Enasidenib
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Conclusion
THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action.
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Idhifa (Enasidenib)
Correspondence Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SABIHA NAIM QAZI whose telephone number is (571)272-0622. The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 9-5 . Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Kortney L. Klinkel can be reached on 571-270-5239. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system. Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. Sabiha N. Qazi, Ph.D. /SABIHA N QAZI/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1627 | 2022-06-09T11:42:25 | [
"Notice of Pre-AIA or AIA Status The present application, filed on or after March 16, 2013, is being examined under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . Continuity/Reexam Information for 15/667569 Parent Data15667569, filed 08/02/2017 and having 1 RCE-type filing thereinClaims Priority from Provisional Application 62429649, filed 12/02/2016 Claims Priority from Provisional Application 62370673, filed 08/03/2016 Claims 11 and 13-35 are pending. No claim is allowed. No amendments were filed. 35 USC § 103(a) Rejection The following is a quotation of 35 U.S.C. 103(a) which forms the basis for all obviousness rejections set forth in this Office action: (a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.",
"The factual inquiries set forth in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 USPQ 459 (1966), that are applied for establishing a background for determining obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) are summarized as follows: 1. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. 2. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. 3. Resolving the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 4. Considering objective evidence present in the application indicating obviousness or nonobviousness. This application currently names joint inventors. In considering patentability of the claims under 35 U.S.C. 103(a), the examiner presumes that the subject matter of the various claims was commonly owned at the time any inventions covered therein were made absent any evidence to the contrary.",
"Applicant is advised of the obligation under 37 CFR 1.56 to point out the inventor and invention dates of each claim that was not commonly owned at the time a later invention was made in order for the examiner to consider the applicability of 35 U.S.C. 103(c) and potential 35 U.S.C. 102(e), (f) or (g) prior art under 35 U.S.C. 103(a). Claims 11 and 13-35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103(a) as being unpatentable over Cianchetta et al. (US Patent 9,732,062 also published as US 20130190287), Kim et al. (2015, 892 dated 10/01/2020), Cazzola et al. (Cazzola M et al. The genetic basis of myelodysplasia and its clinical relevance. Blood. 2013 Dec 12; 122(25):4021-34. Doi: 10.1182/blood-2013-09-381665. Epub 2013 Oct 17. PMID: 24136165; PMCID: PMC3862275.2013), 892 dated 10/01/2020) and Ganguly et al. (Mutat Res Rev Mutat Res Jul-Sep 2016; 769:47-62, doi: 10.1016/j.mrrev.2016.04.009. Epub 2016 Jun 23, Mutations of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS): An update, 892 dated 10/01/2020).",
"Applicant’s claims are drawn using the same compound for treating myelodysplastic syndrome wherein the myelodysplastic syndrome is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 and a mutant allele of at least one second gene, wherein the second gene is selected from the group consisting of ASXL1 and SRSF2.TP53 and KRAS. See the entire documents. Determining the scope and contents of the prior art. In regards to claims 11, 13-18, and 30-35, Cianchetta et al teaches claimed compound for IDH2 inhibitory activity and teaches Myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), myeloproliferative neoplasm (MPN), acute myelogenous leukemia (AML), sarcoma, melanoma, non-small cell lung cancer, chondrosarcoma, cholangiocarcinoma or angioimmunoblastic non-Hodgkin's lymphoma (NHL). (See claim 18). It teaches a method of treating a cancer characterized by the presence of an IDH2 mutation, wherein the IDH2 mutation results in a new ability of the enzyme to catalyze the NAPH-dependent reduction of .alpha.-ketoglutarate to R (-)-2-hydroxyglutarate in a patient, comprising the step of administering to the patient in need thereof a composition of claim 10.",
"It teaches the IDH2 mutation is an IDH2 R140Q or R172K mutation. (Claim 16) and the method of claim 16, wherein the IDH2 mutation is an IDH2 R140Q mutation (claim 17). Cianchetta et al. teaches compound 1 as IDH2 inhibitor, its pharmaceutical composition and treatment of acute myelogenous leukemia and non-small lung cancer. Page 36, compound 409, 68, 69 [0179], page 70 [0190] and 99 [0495]. Cianchetta et al teaches claimed compound for IDH2 inhibitory activity. PNG media_image1.png 227 288 media_image1.png Greyscale PNG media_image2.png 146 264 media_image2.png Greyscale RN 1446505-70-9 HCAPLUS In regards to claims 19-24, 28 and 29 drawn to dosage and method of administration, Cianchetta teaches compounds can be administered; orally, with a dosage ranging from about 0.5 to about 100 mg/kg of body weight, alternatively dosages between 1 mg and 1000 mg/dose, every 4 to 120 hours, or according to the requirements of the particular drug.",
"The amounts are taught by the prior art. The pharmaceutical compositions of one aspect of this invention will be administered from about 1 to about 6 times per day or alternatively, as a continuous infusion. Such administration can be used as a chronic or acute therapy. [0174]. It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed to reduce and increase the doses than those recited above may be required. A person skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed would have guidance from Cianchetta which teaches that specific dosage and treatment regimens for any particular subject will depend upon a variety of factors, including the activity of the specific compound employed, the age, body weight, general health status, sex, diet, time of administration, rate of excretion, drug combination, the severity and course of the disease, condition or symptoms, the subject's disposition to the disease, condition or symptoms, and the judgment of the treating physician. [0175]. A person skilled in art would be able to decide suitable doses because Cianchetta teaches that upon improvement of a subject's condition, a maintenance dose of a compound, composition or combination of one aspect of this invention may be administered, if necessary.",
"Subsequently, the dosage or frequency of administration, or both, may be reduced, as a function of the symptoms, to a level at which the improved condition is retained when the symptoms have been alleviated to the desired level. Subjects may, however, require intermittent treatment on a long-term basis upon any recurrence of disease symptoms. [0176]. In regards to oral dosage as in claim 28, Cianchetta teaches oral administered for treatment of cancer. [0177]. In regards to claim 11, are methods of treating a cancer characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 compound 1, or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt thereof, or (b) a pharmaceutical composition comprising (a) and a pharmaceutically acceptable carrier. [0180]. In regards to claims 17 and 18, Cianchetta teaches inhibitory activities of the compounds provided herein against IDH2 mutation R140Q, R170K (e.g., IDH2R140Q and IDH2R172K), (Example 12) [0178].",
"The cancer to be treated is characterized by a mutant allele of IDH2 wherein the IDH2 mutation results in a new ability of the enzyme to catalyze the NAPH-dependent reduction of .alpha.-ketoglutarate to R(-)-2-hydroxyglutarate the mutant IDH2 has an R140X mutation, R140X mutation is a R140Q mutation, R140W mutation, R140L mutation, R172X mutation and others [0179], [0181] and claims 16 and 17). The compounds and methods of one aspect of this invention are useful to treat any type of cancer that is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 imparting such activity and in particular an IDH2 R140Q and/or R172K mutation.",
"[0182]. In regards to claims 33-35, Cianchetta teaches a method of treating a cancer selected from glioblastoma (glioma), myelodysplastic syndrome (MDS), myeloproliferative neoplasm (MPN), acute myelogenous leukemia (AML), (See claim 18 and [0190]. In regards to claim 32, when the MDS is untreated. A person skilled while using the compound would expect to treat MDS in absence of a mutant allele of at least one other gene as in claim 11, however, depending on patients condition age and severity of the disease, the treatment may not be successful as expected to one skilled in the art.",
"In regards to claim 30 drawn to mesylate salt of compound 1, Cianchetta et al. teaches various salts including mesylate salt. [0163]. It teaches pharmaceutically acceptable salts. [0160] to [0162]. Ascertaining the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue. While Cianchetta et al. teaches compound 1, same as in instant claims as IDH2 inhibitor, its pharmaceutical composition and treatment of acute myelogenous leukemia, MDS and various other cancers, does not teach explicitly the specific absence of a mutant gene of at least one other gene as in claim 11 as instantly claimed. (Claim 18) Instant claims differ from the reference in using the same compound as in claim for treating myelodysplastic syndrome wherein the myelodysplastic syndrome is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 and a mutant allele of at least one second gene, wherein the second gene is selected from the group consisting of KRAS, TP53, SETBPI, U2AFI, ASXL1 and SRSF2. It appears that “absence a mutation allele of TP53” , tp53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers.",
"The limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). In regards to “absence of mutation allele” as in claims 11, 13-18, and 31 Kim et al. was added because it teaches mutations affecting spliceosomal proteins are the most common class of mutations in patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), t that mutations affecting the splicing factor SRSF2 directly impair hematopoietic differentiation in vivo, which is not due to SRSF2 loss of function. By contrast, SRSF2 mutations alter SRSF2’s normal sequence-specific RNA binding activity, thereby altering recognition of specific exonic splicing enhancer motifs to drive recurrent mis-splicing of key hematopoietic regulators.",
"This includes SRSF2 mutation-dependent splicing of EZH2 that triggers nonsense-mediated decay, which, in turn, results in impaired hematopoietic differentiation. These data provide a mechanistic link between a mutant spliceosomal protein, alterations in splicing of key regulators, and impaired hematopoiesis. (Summary) Somatic mutations in genes encoding components of the spliceosome have been identified in a spectrum of human malignancies, including ~60% of patients with myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). These mutations occur most commonly in SF3B1 (Splicing Factor 3b Subunit 1), SRSF2 (Serine/arginine-Rich Splicing Factor 2), and U2AF1 (U2 Small Nuclear RNA Auxiliary Factor 1) and almost always as heterozygous missense mutations that are mutually exclusive While the genetic data in MDS suggests that these alterations are critical to disease pathogenesis, it remains unknown how these mutations contribute to MDS and if they are sufficient to induce MDS. Kim et al teaches gene expression in primary patient samples with and without U2AF1 mutations.",
"It teaches gene mutations are sufficient to drive MDS, and mutations in SRSF2. SRSF2 mutations occur in 20–30% of MDS and ~50% of chronic myelomonocytic leukemia (CMML) patients. Kim et al. teaches SRSF2 mutations are consistently associated with adverse outcome amongst MDS and AML patients. Despite the clinical importance of SRSF2 mutations, to date there have been no studies of the functional impact of SRSF2 mutations on hematopoiesis or splicing. Here, we studied the biological and transcriptional effects of somatic expression of the common SRSF2 P95H mutation in the hematopoietic compartment. (Introduction) See (Figure 1B). Kim et al. teaches the effect of the SRSF2 P95H mutation distinct from loss of SRSF2, and reveal that mutations in SRSF2 confer an alteration in function that results in key aspects of MDS.",
"Transcriptional analysis of SRSF2 mutant cells revealed that SRSF2 mutations result in genome-wide alterations in ESE preference in both human and murine cells. It teaches genomic and biochemical assays indicate that SRSF2 mutations cause alteration, rather than loss-of-function, driving preferential recognition of cassette exons containing C- versus G-rich ESEs. In addition to the effects of mutant SRSF2 on EZH2 splicing and protein expression, a number of other genes of known importance in hematopoiesis and malignancy were also consistently differentially spliced in isogenic human cells, primary patient samples, and murine cells bearing mutant SRSF2. These include additional genes mutated in MDS (such as BCOR), genes with importance in hematopoietic stem cell self-renewal (such as IKAROS), and genes critical for cell survival (such as CASPASE 8). The functional effects of each of these specific splicing events are important in further delineating the effects of mutant SRSF2 on MDS pathogenesis as well as possibly providing novel means for therapeutic targeting of SRSF2-mutant cells.",
"(Introduction). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to recognize mutant SRSF2 on MDS as SRSF2 mutations result in genome-wide alterations in ESE preference in both human and murine cells and genomic and biochemical assays indicate that SRSF2 mutations cause alteration, rather than loss-of-function. One skilled in the art would have the knowledge that in absence a certain mutation allele such as a P53 a p53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers.",
"Similar reasons apply to other mutant allele related to MDS. A person skilled in the art would consider the limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). Kim et al. teaches SRSF2 mutations cause alteration. In regards to claims 11, 14-18 and 31, Cazzola et al. was added to show more about the role of common driver genes in patients with MDS and MDS/MPN. Cazzola teaches .RNA splitting –SRSF2, U2AF1, IDH1/IDH2, ASXLI.",
"(See table 3 and figure 3). Cazzola et al. teaches myelodysplasia is a diagnostic feature of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDSs) but is also found in other myeloid neoplasms. Its molecular basis has been recently elucidated by means of massive parallel sequencing studies. About 90% of MDS patients carry ≥1 oncogenic mutations, and two thirds of them are found in individuals with a normal karyotype. Driver mutant genes include those of RNA splicing (SF3B1, SRSF2, U2AF1, and ZRSR2), DNA methylation (TET2, DNMT3A, and IDH1/2), chromatin modification (ASXL1 and EZH2), transcription regulation (RUNX1), DNA repair (TP53), signal transduction (CBL, NRAS, and KRAS), and cohesion complex (STAG2). Only 4 to 6 genes are consistently mutated in ≥10% MDS patients, whereas a long tail of ∼50 genes are mutated less frequently. (Abstract). Cazzola et al.",
"teaches that MDSs are defined as clonal hematopoietic stem cell disorders characterized by cytopenia, myelodysplasia, ineffective hematopoiesis, and increased risk of progression to acute myeloid leukemia (AML) . Figure 1. (Introduction). Cazzola teaches that myelodysplasia driver genes are recurrently mutated also in another myeloid neoplasms. The driver genes whose mutations are responsible for MDS (Table 3) are frequently mutated also in other myeloid neoplasms listed in Table 1. This is primarily true for AML, although, as underlined by Walter et al some genes are overrepresented in MDS compared with AML and vice versa. Cazzola teaches and refers to Cancer Genome Atlas Research Network, the 20 most recurrently mutated genes were FLT3, NPM1, DNMT3A, IDH1/2, TET2, RUNX1, TP53, N/KRAS, CEPBPA, WT1, PTPN11, KIT, U2AF1, SMC1A, SMC3, PHF6, STAG2, and RAD21.",
"Only half of these genes are within the 20 most recurrently mutated ones in MDS. Although the molecular pathophysiology of MDS is different from that of AML, some AML driver genes might behave as sub clonal drivers in MDS and thereby drive leukemic transformation. (See Table 3 shows most common driver genes in patients with MDS and MDS/MPN). See figure 3 and table 3 PNG media_image3.png 271 476 media_image3.png Greyscale Somatic mutations of CBL, TET2, ASXL1, and IDH/IDH2 was detected in the advanced phase of chronic myeloid leukemia. (Lines last 6 lines on page 9, cont., to page 10). Ganguly was added because it adds about the mutations of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) and that the now plethora of knowledge gained on myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), a heterogeneous pre-malignant disorder of hematopoietic stem cells, through sequencing of several pathway genes has unveiled molecular pathogenesis and its progression to AML. Recent discoveries on mutations in RNA-splicing machinery (SF3B1, SRSF2, ZRSR2, U2AF1, U2AF2); DNA methylation (TET2, DNMT3A, IDH1/2); chromatin modification (ASXL1, EZH2); transcription factor (TP53, RUNX1); signal transduction/kinases (FLT3, JAK2); RAS pathway (KRAS, NRAS, CBL, NF1, PTPN11); cohesin complex (STAG2, CTCF, SMC1A, RAD21); DNA repair (ATM, BRCC3, DLRE1C, FANCL); and other pathway genes have given insights into the independent effects and interaction of co-occurrence of mutations on disease-phenotype. RNA-splicing and DNA methylation mutations appeared to occur early and are reported as 'founder' mutations in over 50% MDS patients. TET2 mutation, through altered DNA methylation, has been found to have independent prognostic response to hypomethylating agents. Moreover, presence of DNMT3A, TET2 and ASXL1 mutations in normal elderly individuals forms the basis of understanding that accumulation of somatic mutations may not cause direct disease-development; however, cooperation with other mutations in the genes that are frequently mutated in myeloid and other hematopoietic cancers might result in clonal expansion through self-renewal and/or proliferation of hematopoietic stem cells.",
"(Abstract). MDS represents heterogeneous clonal pre-malignant hematopoietic changes that are typically associated with peripheral blood cytopenia, infective hematopoiesis, hypercelluler bone marrow with morphologically defined dysplasia of one or more lineages and increased risk of progression to acute myeloid leukemia (AML). Mutated genes includes tumor suppressors (TP53) and KRAS. (Introduction). See table 1 where TP53 (Tumor protein p53) protein function, multiple DNA repair, apoptosis IDH2 mutation impact adverse prognosis, RNA splicing ID2AF1, high risk, enriched in patients with del20q11 and ASXL1 mutations and SETBRP1 (pages 50-51). Ganguly et al. teaches that IDH2 is located in the mitochondria. (Section 2.2.3.). It teaches Ganguly et al. teaches that unlike other myeloid malignancies, mutation in tyrosine kinase signalling pathways are described in 5% to 10% of MDS only, with mutations in NRAS and KRAS being the most frequent during transformation to AML.",
"(2.4). TP53 mutation in association with isolated del (5q) at early stage of the disease disturbs treatment outcome due to loss of p53 protein function and predisposes to evolution to AML. (2.5.3. (17p13). Ganguly et al additionally, the emerging discovery of small molecules as inhibitors of mutations in genes of epigenetic DNA methylation, chromatin modeling and RNA-splicing mechanism has established significant hope in management of heterogeneous hematological malignancies. Identification of drug targets and elucidation of expression of mutated genes at pre-clinical and disease states would further lead to better understanding and control of the stages of disease progression. Individualized gene expression and genome wide association study would further promise to develop personalized therapeutic modules with pharmaceutical tailoring of targeted drugs.",
"(Conclusion). It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to use compound of claim 1 as taught by the teachings of Cianchetta et al., Kim et al., Cazzola et al and Ganguly which teaches at the time the invention was filed with reasonable expectation of success to treat myelodysplastic syndrome and acute myeloid leukemia in absence of a mutant allele of at least one gene as is claim 11. One skilled in the art would understand that in “absence a mutation allele of TP53” is that p53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers. Similarly a person skilled in the art would consider the limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS). Cazzola teaches that only 4 to 6 genes are consistently mutated in ≥10% MDS patients, whereas a long tail of ∼50 genes are mutated less frequently.",
"Therefore, in view of the teachings of prior art it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed to remove at least one mutant allele of at least one other gene to get better results so that treatment is expected to be more specie. Claimed invention is considered obvious to one skilled in the art over Cianchetta et al, Kim et al., Cazzola et al. and Ganguly et al.",
"for the reasons cited above. In regards to administration timings, doses, duration is considered obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art would have been readily optimized effective dosages and concurrent administration regimens as determined by good medical practice and the clinical condition of the individual patient. Determination of the appropriate dosage, amounts and amounts in combination for treatment involving each of the above mentioned formulations of specific compounds as in claim 11 would have been routinely made by those of ordinary skill in the art and is within the ability of tasks routinely performed by them without undue experimentation, especially in light of the dosage information disclosed prior art and depending on variety of factors including the severity of the condition to be treated, the desired effect, possible of adverse reaction, and individual patient including age, sex, body weight, etc. The dosage is also adjusted by severity of the disease. Absent any evidence to the contrary, and based upon the teachings of the prior art, there would have been a reasonable expectation of success in practicing the instantly claimed invention. Therefore, the invention as a whole would have been prima facie obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made. Obviousness can be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art.",
"See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). KSR, instructs courts to take a more “expansive and flexible approach” in determining whether a patented invention was obvious at the time it was made. 550 U.S. at 415. In particular, the Court emphasized the role of “common sense”. “Rigid preventative rules that deny fact finders recourse to common sense … are neither necessary under our case law nor consistent with it.” Id. at 421. See Wyers v. Master Lock Co, 95 USPQ2d 1525, (Fed. Cir. 2010).",
"Accordingly, the burden of proof is upon applicants to show that instantly claimed subject matter is different and unobvious over those taught by prior art. See In re Brown, 173 USPQ 685, 688; In re Best, 195 USPQ 430 and In re Marosi, 218 USPQ 289, 293. In the light of the forgoing discussion, the Examiner’s ultimate legal conclusion is that the subject matter defined by the instant claims would have been obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 103(a). Double Patenting The nonstatutory double patenting rejection is based on a judicially created doctrine grounded in public policy (a policy reflected in the statute) so as to prevent the unjustified or improper timewise extension of the “right to exclude” granted by a patent and to prevent possible harassment by multiple assignees. A nonstatutory double patenting rejection is appropriate where the conflicting claims are not identical, but at least one examined application claim is not patentably distinct from the reference claim(s) because the examined application claim is either anticipated by, or would have been obvious over, the reference claim(s). See, e.g., In re Berg, 140 F.3d 1428, 46 USPQ2d 1226 (Fed.",
"Cir. 1998); In re Goodman, 11 F.3d 1046, 29 USPQ2d 2010 (Fed. Cir. 1993); In re Longi, 759 F.2d 887, 225 USPQ 645 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Van Ornum, 686 F.2d 937, 214 USPQ 761 (CCPA 1982); In re Vogel, 422 F.2d 438, 164 USPQ 619 (CCPA 1970); In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 163 USPQ 644 (CCPA 1969). A timely filed terminal disclaimer in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(c) or 1.321(d) may be used to overcome an actual or provisional rejection based on nonstatutory double patenting provided the reference application or patent either is shown to be commonly owned with the examined application, or claims an invention made as a result of activities undertaken within the scope of a joint research agreement. See MPEP § 717.02 for applications subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA as explained in MPEP § 2159.",
"See MPEP § 2146 et seq. for applications not subject to examination under the first inventor to file provisions of the AIA . A terminal disclaimer must be signed in compliance with 37 CFR 1.321(b). The USPTO Internet website contains terminal disclaimer forms which may be used. Please visit www.uspto.gov/patent/patents-forms. The filing date of the application in which the form is filed determines what form (e.g., PTO/SB/25, PTO/SB/26, PTO/AIA /25, or PTO/AIA /26) should be used. A web-based eTerminal Disclaimer may be filled out completely online using web-screens.",
"An eTerminal Disclaimer that meets all requirements is auto-processed and approved immediately upon submission. For more information about eTerminal Disclaimers, refer to www.uspto.gov/patents/process/file/efs/guidance/eTD-info-I.jsp. Claims 11 and 13-35 are rejected on the ground of nonstatutory double patenting as being unpatentable over claims 1-16 of U.S. Patent No. 10,137,130. Although the claims at issue are not identical, they are not patentably distinct from each other because Amatangelo et al. teaches a method of treating acute myeloid leukemia in a subject comprising administering to the subject a mutant isocitrate dehydrogenase 2 (IDH2) inhibitor 2-methyl-1-[(4-[6-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-2-yl]-6- {[2-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-4-yl ]amino }-1,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino]propan-2-ol having the following formula: or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt, solvate, or tautomer thereof, wherein the acute myeloid leukemia is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2 and the absence of a mutant allele of FLT3 using the same compound which is used in instant claims. PNG media_image4.png 308 664 media_image4.png Greyscale Claim 2 is drawn to a method of treating a acute myeloid leukemia in a subject comprising administering to the subject a mutant isocitrate dehydrogenase 2 (IDH2) inhibitor 2-methyl-1-[(4-[6-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-2-yl ]-6- {[2-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-4-yl amino }-1,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino]propan-2-ol by the compound of claim 1 or a pharmaceutically acceptable salt, solvate, or tautomer, in combination with quizartinib wherein the acute myeloid leukemia is characterized by the presence of a mutant allele of IDH2and a mutant allele of FLT3.",
"In regards to mesylate salt of the compound, as in instant claim 30, U.S. Patent No. 10,137,130, claim 16 of the patent is drawn to mesylate salt of the compound. Claimed invention as in claim 11 and 13-18 is considered obvious to one skilled in the art for the same reason as cited in the office action. All claims were not copied here. Response to Remarks Applicant’s response after final response was filed on 02/3/202 2is acknowledged. Applicant’s arguments were fully considered but were not found persuasive. Claims were not amended. Rejection is maintained for the same reasons as set forth in our previous office action. Applicants argument were fully considered but were not persuasive. It would have been obvious to one skilled in the art at the time the invention was filed considering the references cited available would have the knowledge the specific interaction IDH1, IH2, ASXLI and others known by the prior art.",
"Cazzola et al. was added to show more. No new refence was added. about the role of common driver genes in patients with MDS and MDS/MPN. Cazzola teaches .RNA splitting –SRSF2, U2AF1, IDH1/IDH2, ASXLI. (See table 3 and figure 3). Cazzola et al. teaches myelodysplasia is a diagnostic feature of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDSs) but is also found in other myeloid neoplasms. About 90% of MDS patients carry ≥1 oncogenic mutations, and two thirds of them are found in individuals with a normal karyotype. Driver mutant genes include those of RNA splicing (SF3B1, SRSF2, U2AF1, and ZRSR2), DNA methylation (TET2, DNMT3A, and IDH1 It appears that the limitation “absence of a mutation allele of KRAS and TP53” is intended to exclude those mutations that increase the likelihood of myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS) progression to myeloid leukemia (AML). In other words, the selected set of mutations would be more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS).",
"Also, the “absence a mutation allele of TP53” is that p53 is a tumor suppressor and its mutation is involved in development of many cancers. Therefore, excluding “a mutation allele of TP53” would make the selected set of mutations more specific to myelodysplastic syndromes (MDS), not any other cancers. In previous communication affidavit was filed on 05/20/2019 was considered, but was found insufficient to overcome the rejection PNG media_image5.png 250 558 media_image5.png Greyscale The Court has held that \"the test of obviousness is not express suggestion of the claimed invention in any or all of the references but rather what the references taken collectively would suggest to those of ordinary skill in the art presumed to be familiar with them.\" See In re Rosselet, 146 USPQ 183, 186 (CCPA 1965). \"There is no requirement (under 35 USC 103(a)) that the prior art contain an express suggestion to combine known elements to achieve the claimed invention.",
"Rather, the suggestion to combine may come from the prior art, as filtered through the knowledge of one skilled in the art.\" Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 43 USPQ2d 1481, 1489 (Fed. Cir.1997). An obviousness determination is not the result of a rigid formula disassociated from the consideration of the facts of a case. Indeed, the common sense of those skilled in the art demonstrates why some combinations would have been obvious where others would not. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1385 (U.S. 2007) (\"The combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results.\").",
"Another reference was added. Election of Invention Previously, Applicants filed a response to the Restriction Requirement on 04/20/2018.was acknowledged. Applicant elected Group II, claims 11 and 13-16, drawn to methods of treating myelodysplastic syndrome in a subject, comprising administering to the subject a therapeutically effective amount of 2-methyl-l-[(4-[6-(tri fluoromethyljpyridin-2-yl]-6-{ [2-(trifluoromethyl)pyridin-4-yl]amino}-l,3,5-triazin-2-yl)amino]propan-2-ol having the following formula: (Compound 1), Enasidenib PNG media_image6.png 130 228 media_image6.png Greyscale Conclusion THIS ACTION IS MADE FINAL. Applicant is reminded of the extension of time policy as set forth in 37 CFR 1.136(a). A shortened statutory period for reply to this final action is set to expire THREE MONTHS from the mailing date of this action. In the event a first reply is filed within TWO MONTHS of the mailing date of this final action and the advisory action is not mailed until after the end of the THREE-MONTH shortened statutory period, then the shortened statutory period will expire on the date the advisory action is mailed, and any extension fee pursuant to 37 CFR 1.136(a) will be calculated from the mailing date of the advisory action. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of this final action. PNG media_image7.png 139 310 media_image7.png Greyscale Idhifa (Enasidenib) Correspondence Any inquiry concerning this communication or earlier communications from the examiner should be directed to SABIHA NAIM QAZI whose telephone number is (571)272-0622.",
"The examiner can normally be reached on Monday-Friday 9-5 . Examiner interviews are available via telephone, in-person, and video conferencing using a USPTO supplied web-based collaboration tool. To schedule an interview, applicant is encouraged to use the USPTO Automated Interview Request (AIR) at http://www.uspto.gov/interviewpractice. If attempts to reach the examiner by telephone are unsuccessful, the examiner’s supervisor, Kortney L. Klinkel can be reached on 571-270-5239. The fax phone number for the organization where this application or proceeding is assigned is 571-273-8300.Information regarding the status of an application may be obtained from the Patent Application Information Retrieval (PAIR) system.",
"Status information for published applications may be obtained from either Private PAIR or Public PAIR. Status information for unpublished applications is available through Private PAIR only. For more information about the PAIR system, see http://pair-direct.uspto.gov. Should you have questions on access to the Private PAIR system, contact the Electronic Business Center (EBC) at 866-217-9197 (toll-free). If you would like assistance from a USPTO Customer Service Representative or access to the automated information system, call 800-786-9199 (IN USA OR CANADA) or 571-272-1000. Sabiha N. Qazi, Ph.D. /SABIHA N QAZI/Primary Examiner, Art Unit 1627"
]
| https://dh-opendata.s3.amazonaws.com/bdr-oa-bulkdata/weekly/bdr_oa_bulkdata_weekly_2022-06-12.zip | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D. C. 20549 FORM 10-Q (Mark One) x QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the quarterly period ended March 31, 2013 OR o TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to Commission file number 1-367 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) MASSACHUSETTS 04-1866480 (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.) , ATHOL, MASSACHUSETTS 01331-1915 (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code) Registrant's telephone number, including area code 978-249-3551 Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days. YES xNO o Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files). YES xNO o Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. See definition of “accelerated filer,” “large accelerated filer” and “smaller reporting company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act.(Check One): Large Accelerated Filer oAccelerated Filer xNon-Accelerated Filer oSmaller Reporting Company o Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act). YES oNO x Common Shares outstanding as of April 30, 2013 Class A Common Shares Class B Common Shares 1 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY CONTENTS Page No. Part I. Financial Information: Item 1. Financial Statements Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets - March 31, 2013 (unaudited) and June 30, 2012 3 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations - three and nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 4 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss) – three and nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 5 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity - nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 6 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows - nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 7 Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 8-12 Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 13-15 Item 3. Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk 15 Item 4. Controls and Procedures 15 Item 5. Other Information 15 Part II. Other Information: Item 1A. Risk Factors 15 Item 6. Exhibits 16 SIGNATURES 17 2 PART I.FINANCIAL INFORMATION ITEM 1.FINANCIAL STATEMENTS THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets (in thousands except share data) March 31, (unaudited) June 30, ASSETS Current assets: Cash $ $ Short-term investments Accounts receivable (less allowance for doubtful accounts of $729 and $965, respectively) Inventories Current deferred income tax asset Prepaid expenses and other current assets Total current assets Property, plant and equipment, net Taxes receivable Deferred tax asset, net Intangible assets, net Goodwill Other assets Total assets $ $ LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY Current liabilities: Notes payable and current maturities $ $ Accounts payable and accrued expenses Accrued compensation Total current liabilities Deferred tax liabilities Other tax obligations Long-term debt Postretirement benefit and pension obligations Total liabilities Stockholders' equity: Class A Common stock $1 par (20,000,000 shares authorized); 6,064,353 outstanding at 3/31/2013 and 6,017,227 outstanding at 6/30/2012 Class B Common stock $1 par (10,000,000 shares authorized); 741,982 outstanding at 3/31/2013 and 753,307 outstanding at 6/30/2012 Additional paid-in capital Retained earnings Accumulated other comprehensive loss ) Total stockholders' equity Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ $ See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 3 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations (in thousands except per share data) (unaudited) 3 Months Ended 9 Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Net sales $ Cost of goods sold Gross margin % of Net sales % Selling, general and administrative expenses Operating (loss)/income ) ) Other income (expense) ) Earnings (loss) before income taxes ) ) Income tax expense Net earnings (loss) $ ) $ $ ) $ Basic and diluted earnings (loss) per share $ ) $ $ ) $ Average outstanding shares used in per share calculations: Basic Diluted Dividends per share $ See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 4 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss) (in thousands) (unaudited) 3 Months Ended 9 Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Net earnings (loss) $ ) $ $ ) $ Other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax: Translation gain (loss) Pension and postretirement plans (9 ) 29 ) (2 ) Other comprehensive income (loss) Total comprehensive income (loss) $ ) $ $ ) $ ) See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 5 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity For the Nine Months Ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (in thousands except per share data) (unaudited) Common Stock Outstanding Addi- tional Paid-in Retained Accumulated Other Com-prehensive Class A Class B Capital Earnings Loss Total Balance June 30, 2011 $ ) $ Net earnings Other comprehensive loss ) ) Dividends ($0.30 per share) ) ) Issuance of stock under ESOP 23 Issuance of stock under ESPP 9 72 81 Stock-based compensation Conversion 51 ) - Balance March 31, 2012 $ ) $ Balance June 30, 2012 $ ) $ Net loss ) ) Other comprehensive loss ) ) Dividends ($0.30 per share) ) ) Purchase of stock (5 ) ) ) Issuance of stock under ESOP 21 Issuance of stock under ESPP 20 Stock-based compensation Conversion 31 ) - Balance March 31, 2013 $ ) $ Cumulative Balance: Translation loss $ ) Pension and postretirement plans net of taxes ) $ ) See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 6 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (in thousands of dollars) (unaudited) 9 Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Cash flows from operating activities: Net earnings (loss) $ ) $ Non-cash operating activities: Depreciation Amortization Other tax obligations ) ) Deferred taxes Unrealized transaction gain (9 ) ) Equity gain on investment ) ) Working capital changes: Receivables Inventories ) Other current assets ) Other current liabilities ) ) Postretirement benefit and pension obligations Other 75 Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities ) Cash flows from investing activities: Business acquisition, net of cash acquired - ) Additions to property, plant and equipment ) ) Increase in short-term investments ) - Net cash used in investing activities ) ) Cash flows from financing activities: Proceeds from short-term borrowings - Short-term debt repayments ) ) Proceeds from long-term borrowings Long-term debt repayments ) ) Proceeds from common stock issued Shares purchased ) - Dividends paid ) ) Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities ) Effect of exchange rate changes on cash ) ) Net decrease in cash ) ) Cash, beginning of period Cash, end of period $ $ Supplemental cash flow information: Interest paid $ $ Income taxes paid, net See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 7 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements March 31, 2013 Note 1:Basis of Presentation and Summary of Significant Account Policies The condensed balance sheet as of June 30, 2012, which has been derived from audited financial statements, and the unaudited interim condensed financial statements have been prepared by The L.S. Starrett Company (the “Company”) in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America for interim financial reporting.Accordingly, they do not include all of the information and notes required by generally accepted accounting principles for complete financial statements.These unaudited condensed financial statements, which, in the opinion of management, reflect all adjustments (including normal recurring adjustments) necessary for a fair presentation, should be read in conjunction with the financial statements and notes thereto included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2012.Operating results are not necessarily indicative of the results that may be expected for any future interim period or for the entire fiscal year. As discussed further in Note 2, on November 22, 2011, the Company acquired all the assets of Bytewise Development Corporation.The results of operations for this acquired business are included in the Company’s results of operations as presented herein since such date. The preparation of financial statements and related disclosures in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America requires management to make judgments, assumptions and estimates that affect amounts reported in the consolidated financial statements and accompanying notes.Note 2 to the Company’s Consolidated Financial Statements included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2012 describes the significant accounting policies and methods used in the preparation of the consolidated financial statements. There were no changes in any of the Company’s significant accounting policies during the nine months ended March 31, 2013. Note 2:Acquisition On November 22, 2011 a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company entered into an asset purchase agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) with Bytewise Development Corporation (“Bytewise”) pursuant to which the wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company purchased all of the assets of Bytewise for $15.4 million in cash plus the assumption of certain liabilities.The asset purchase was financed through a term loan under the Company’s existing security agreement.The Purchase Agreement contains customary representations, warranties and covenants.Under the Purchase Agreement, the former owners of Bytewise are entitled to a 40% share of any profits from Bytewise’s operations over each of the three years following consummation of the transaction so long as they remain employed by the Company.The Company has accrued for such profit sharing as an expense based on Bytewise’s results ofoperations since the date of acquisition. Bytewise designs, develops and manufactures non-contact, industrial measurement systems and software that capture the external geometric profile of a product and analyze that data to meet measurement and/or quality control requirements. The acquisition was accounted for under the acquisition method of accounting.The total purchase price was allocated to Bytewise’s net tangible assets and identifiable intangible assets based on their estimated fair value as of November 22, 2011.The allocation of the purchase price was finalized in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2012. The table below presents the allocation of the purchase price to the acquired net assets of Bytewise (in thousands): Cash $ Accounts receivable Inventories Other current assets 74 Intangibles Goodwill Other long-term assets 69 Accounts payable ) Accrued compensation costs ) Accrued expenses ) Cash paid to sellers $ 8 The allocation for definite-lived amortizable intangible assets acquired include approximately $4.95 million for customer relationships, $1.48 million for trademarks and trade names, $2.0 million for completed technology, $0.6 million for non-compete agreements and $0.26 million for order backlog. The acquisition was completed on November 22, 2011 and,accordingly, results of operations from such date have been included in the Company’s Statements of Operations. Supplemental Pro Forma Information The following information reflects the Bytewise acquisition as if the transaction had occurred as of the beginning of the Company’s fiscal 2012.The unaudited pro forma information does not necessarily reflect the actual results that would have occurred had the Company and Bytewise been combined during the periods presented, nor is it necessarily indicative of the future results of operations of the combined companies. The following table represents selected unaudited consolidated pro forma data (in thousands except per share amounts): 9 Months Ended 3/31/2012 Unaudited consolidated pro forma revenue $ Unaudited consolidated pro forma net earnings $ Unaudited consolidated pro forma diluted earnings per share $ Note 3:Stock-based Compensation During the quarter endedDecember 31, 2012, the Company implemented The L.S. Starrett Company 2012 Long Term Incentive Plan (the “2012 Stock Plan”), which was adopted by the Board of Directors September 5, 2012 and approved by shareholders October 17, 2012. The 2012 Stock Plan permits the granting of the following types of awards to officers, other employees and non-employee directors: stock options; restricted stock awards; unrestricted stock awards; stock appreciation rights; stock units including restricted stock units; performance awards; cash-based awards; and awards other than previously described that are convertible or otherwise based on stock. The 2012 Stock Plan provides for the issuance of up to 500,000 shares of common stock. Options granted vest in periods ranging from one year to three years and expire ten years after the grant date. Restricted stock units (“RSU”) granted generally vest from one year to three years. Vested restricted stock units will be settled in shares of common stock. As of March 31, 2013, there were 20,500 stock options and 8,200 restricted stock units outstanding. In addition, there were 471,300 shares available for grant under the 2012 Stock Plan as of March 31, 2013. For the stock option grant, the fair value of each grant was estimated at the date of grant using the Binomial Options pricing model. The Binomial Options pricing model utilizes assumptions related to stock volatility, the risk-free interest rate, the dividend yield and employee exercise behavior. Expected volatilities utilized in the model are based on the historic volatility of the Company’s stock price. The risk free interest rate is derived from the U.S. Treasury Yield curve in effect at the time of the grant. The fair value of stock options granted during the nine months ended March 31, 2013 of $3.82 was estimated using the following weighted-average assumptions: Risk-free interest rate % Expected life (years) Expected stock volatility % Expected dividend yield % The weighted average contractual term for stock options outstanding as of March 31, 2013 was 9.75 years. The aggregate intrinsic value of stock options outstanding as of March 31, 2013 was $0.1 million. There were no options exercisable as of March 31, 2013. The Company accounts for RSU awards by recognizing the expense of the fair value ratably over vesting periods generally ranging from one year to three years. The related expense is included in selling, general and administrative expenses.During the nine months ended March 31, 2013 the Company granted 8,200 RSU awards with approximate fair values of $10.08 per RSU award. There were no RSU awards prior to December 17, 2012. There were no RSU awards settled during the nine months ended March 31, 2013. The aggregate intrinsic value of RSU awards outstanding as of March 31, 2013 was $0.1 million. There were no RSU awards vested as of March 31, 2013. 9 Compensation expense related to stock-based plans (including the ESPP) for the nine month period ended March 31, 2013 was $0.1 million and was recorded as selling, general and administrative expense. As of March 31, 2013, there was $0.1 million of total unrecognized compensation costs related to outstanding stock-based compensation arrangements. The cost is expected to be recognized over a weighted average period of 2.7 years. Note 4:Inventories Inventories consist of the following (in thousands): 3/31/2013 6/30/2012 Raw material and supplies $ $ Goods in process and finished parts Finished goods LIFO Reserve ) ) Inventories $ $ LIFO inventories were $15.2 million and $19.7 million at March 31, 2013 and June 30, 2012, respectively, or approximately $31.6 million and $27.5 million, respectively, less than their respective balances accounted for on a FIFO basis. The use of LIFO, as compared to FIFO, resulted in a $4.1 million increase in cost of sales for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 compared to a $0.7 million increase in cost of sales in the nine months ended March 31, 2012. The use of LIFO, as compared to FIFO, resulted in a $3.1 million increase in cost of sales for the three months ended March 31, 2013 compared to a $0.9 million increase in cost of sales in the three months ended March 31, 2012. Note 5:Goodwill and Intangibles The Company performed a qualitative analysis in accordance with ASU 2011-08 for its Bytewise reporting unit for its October1, 2012 annual assessment of goodwill (commonly referred to as “Step Zero”). From a qualitative perspective, in evaluating whether it is more likely than not that the fair value of the reporting units is not less than their respective carrying amount, relevant events and circumstances were taken into account, with greater weight assigned to events and circumstances that most affect the fair value ofBytewise or the carrying amounts of its assets. Items that were considered included, but were not limited to, the following: macroeconomic conditions, industry and market conditions, cost factors, overall financial performance, changes in management or key personnel, and other Bytewise specific events. After assessing these and other factors the Company determined that it was more likely than not that the fair value of the Bytewise reporting unit was not less than the carrying amount as of October 1, 2012. Amortizable intangible assets consist of the following (in thousands): 3/31/2013 6/30/2012 Non-compete agreement $ $ Trademarks and trade names Completed technology Customer relationships Backlog - Software development - Other intangible assets Total $ $ Accumulated amortization ) ) Total net balance $ $ Amortizable intangible assets are being amortized on a straight-line basis over the period of expected economic benefit. The estimated useful lives of the intangible assets subject to amortization are 14 years for trademarks and trade names, 8 years for non-compete agreements, 10 years for completed technology,8 years for customer relationships and 5 years for software development. The estimated aggregate amortization expense for the remainder of fiscal 2013, for each of the next five years and thereafter, is as follows (in thousands): 2013 (Remainder of year) $ Thereafter $ 10 Note 6:Pension and Post-retirement Benefits Net periodic benefit costs for the Company's defined benefit pension plans consist of the following (in thousands): Three Months Ended Nine Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Service cost $ Interest cost Expected return on plan assets ) Amortization of prior service cost 59 59 Amortization of net gain - (1 ) - (3 ) $ Net periodic benefit costs for the Company's postretirement medical plan and life insurance consists of the following (in thousands): Three Months Ended Nine Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Service cost $ $ 96 $ $ Interest cost Amortization of prior service credit ) Amortization of accumulated loss 40 4 14 $ $ 29 $ $ 90 The Company’s pension plans use fair value as the market-related value of plan assets and recognize net actuarial gains or losses in excess of ten percent (10%) of the greater of the market-related value of plan assets or of the plans’ projected benefit obligation in net periodic (benefit) cost as of the plan measurement date, which is the same as the fiscal year end of the Company. Net actuarial gains or losses that are less than 10% of the thresholds noted above are accounted for as part of the accumulated other comprehensive income (loss). Note 7:Debt Debt, including capitalized lease obligations, is comprised of the following (in thousands): 3/31/2013 6/30/2012 Notes payable and current maturities Loan and Security Agreement $ $ Short-term foreign credit facility 43 Capitalized leases $ $ Long-term debt Loan and Security Agreement $ Capitalized leases $ $ The Company completed the negotiations for an amended Loan and Security Agreement (Line of Credit) and executed the agreement as of April 25, 2012. The Line of Credit is effective for three years commencing April 25, 2012 and expires on April 30, 2015. The agreement continues the previous line of $23.0 million and interest rate of LIBOR plus 1.5%. On September 7, 2012, the Company completed another amendment to change the financial covenants. The material financial covenants of the amended Loan and Security Agreement are: 1) funded debt to EBITDA, excluding non-cash and retirement benefit expenses (“maximum leverage”), cannot exceed 1.45 to 1, 2) annual capital expenditures cannot exceed $15.0 million, 3) maintain a Debt Service Coverage Rate of a minimum of 1.25 to 1 and 4) maintain consolidated cash plus liquid investments of not less than $10.0 million at any time. The effective interest rate on the Line of Credit under the Loan and Security Agreement for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 and 2012 was 1.80% and 1.91%, respectively. 11 On November 22, 2011, in conjunction with the Bytewise acquisition, the Company entered into a $15.5 million term loan (the “Term Loan”) under the existing Loan and Security Agreement with TD Bank N.A.The term loan is a ten year loan bearing a fixed interest rate of 4.5% and is payable in fixed monthly payments of principal and interest of $160,640.The term loan, which had a balance of $13.8 million at March 31, 2013, is subject to the same financial covenants as the Loan and Security Agreement. As of March 31, 2013, the Company was in compliance with three of the four financial covenants.However, the Company was not in compliance with the maximum leverage covenant.The Company received a waiver of default of this covenant as of March 31, 2013.On May 9, 2013, the Company executed a new amendment to the Loan and Security Agreement.The new amendment changes the current funded debt to EBITDA ratio from 1.45 to 1, to 2.25 to 1 for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013 and the first quarter of fiscal 2014.Thereafter, and through the end of the agreement on April 30 of 2015, the funded debt to EBITDA covenant reverts to 1.45 to 1.The Company expects to be able to meet this covenant in future periods. Note 8: Income Tax The Company is subject to U.S. federal income tax and various state, local and foreign income taxes in numerous jurisdictions.The Company’s domestic and foreign tax liabilities are subject to the allocation of revenues and expenses in different jurisdictions and the timing of recognizing revenues and expenses.Additionally, the amount of income taxes paid is subject to the Company’s interpretation of applicable tax laws in the jurisdictions in which it files. The Company provides for income taxes on an interim basis based on an estimate of the effective tax rate for the year.This estimate is reassessed on a quarterly basis.Discrete tax items are accounted for in the quarterly period in which they occur. The tax expense for the third quarter of fiscal 2013 was $249,000 on a loss before tax for the quarter of $1,236,000 (an effective tax rate of (20.1%)). The tax expense for the third quarter of 2012 was $661,000 on income before tax of $2,231,000 (an effective tax rate of 29.6%).For the first nine months of 2013, tax expense was $507,000 on a loss before tax of $853,000 (an effective tax rate of (59.4%)) and for the nine months ended March 31, 2012 it was $3,682,000 on income before tax of $9,216,000 (an effective tax rate of 40%).The primary reasons for the negative effective tax rate in the third quarter of fiscal 2013 are as follows:1.no tax benefit has been recognized for losses in certain foreign subsidiaries;2.there was a cash dividend from the Company’s subsidiary in Australia which caused a discrete increase to tax expense of $178,000; 3. there was a reduction in the effective state tax rate applied to deferred tax balances (based on both actual and expected future state tax apportionments and profitability) which caused a discrete tax expense of $675,000;4.the changes on the fiscal 2012 tax return from amounts estimated at provision, including the impact of a changed position on the 2012 and prior year returns to take the foreign tax credit rather than a deduction , created a discrete tax benefit of $414,000; and5.other discrete taxes increased tax expense by $66,000In the first quarter of fiscal 2013, a discrete tax benefit was booked reducing the Company’s net tax liability for uncertain tax positions of $91,000. U.S. Federal tax returns through fiscal 2008 are generally no longer subject to review by tax authorities; however, tax loss carryforwards from years before fiscal 2009 are still subject to review.As of March 31, 2013, the Company has substantially resolved all open income tax audits.There were no other local or federal income tax audits in progress as of March 31, 2013.In international jurisdictions including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, UK, Germany, New Zealand, Singapore, Japan and Mexico, which comprise a significant portion of the Company’s operations, the years that may be examined vary by country.The Company’s most significant foreign subsidiary in Brazil is subject to audit for the years 2008 – 2012. The Company has identified no new uncertain tax positions during the nine month period year ended March 31, 2013 for which it is currently likely that the total amount of unrecognized tax benefits will significantly increase or decrease within the next twelve months. No valuation allowance has been recorded for the Company’s domestic federal net operating loss (NOL) carry forwards. The Company continues to believe that due to forecasted future taxable income and certain tax planning strategies available, it is more likely than not that it will be able to utilize the federal NOL carry forwards. Note 9:Contingencies The Company is involved in some legal matters which arise in the normal course of business, which are not expected to have a material impact on the Company’s financial condition, results of operations or cash flows. 12 ITEM 2. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Three Months Ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 Overview A slower than anticipated domestic economy and continued weakness in the global economy depressed demand for the Company’s products to the industrial sector. Net sales declined $4.6 million or 7% from $64.5 million in fiscal 2012 to $59.9 million in fiscal 2013 as a result of reduced demand for saw and capital equipment products, a weakening Brazilian Real and a recession in Europe. An operating loss of$1.8 million was a $4.5 million decline compared to fiscal 2012 as a $5.5 million reduction in gross margin was only partially offset by a $1.0 million reduction in selling, general and administrative expenses. Net Sales North American sales declined $1.0 million or 3% from $33.3 million in fiscal 2012 to $32.3 million in fiscal 2013 as softening demand for capital equipment in the semi-conductor sector offset a rebound in precision tool revenue. International sales declined $3.6 million from $31.2 million in fiscal 2012 to $27.6 million in fiscal 2013 with a weakening Brazilian Real representing $2.5 million of the decrease.Economic slowdowns in Latin America and Asia accounted for the remaining $1.1 million deficit. Gross Margin Gross margin declined $5.5 million or 25% from 33.2% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 26.6% of sales in fiscal 2013 with lower revenues and margin erosion representing $1.5 million and $4.0 million, respectively.Unfavorable exchange rates and LIFO inventory valuation were the key drivers in the $4.0 million margin decline. North American gross margins declined $3.3 million from $10.8 million or 32% of sales in fiscal 2012 to $7.5 million or 23% of sales in fiscal 2013.An increase in the LIFO reserve represented $2.2 million of the comparative decline with higher manufacturing costs and an unfavorable product mix accounting for the remaining $1.1 million decline. International gross margins declined $2.1 million from 34% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 31% of sales in fiscal 2013 with unfavorable exchange rates contributing $0.9 million of the decrease.Lower revenues in Latin America and Asia contributed the remaining $1.2 million to the shortfall. Selling, General and Administrative Expenses Selling, general and administrative expense declined $1.0 million or 5% from $18.7 million in fiscal 2012 to $17.7 million in fiscal 2013. North American expenses declined $0.9 million from $9.9 million in fiscal 2012 to $9.0 million in fiscal 2013 as a result of savings in salaries, benefits, professional fees and sales commissions. International expenses declined $0.1 million as a $0.7 million increase in local currency spending was offset by a favorable currency exchange of $0.8 million. Other Income (Expense) Other income/(expense) improved to income of $0.5 million in fiscal 2013 compared to a loss of $0.5million in fiscal 2012 principally due to exchange rate variations in U. S. dollar denominated transactions and unsettled balances in Scotland and Brazil. Net Earnings (Loss) The Company recorded a net loss of $1.5 million or $0.22 per share in the third quarter of fiscal 2013 compared to net earnings of $1.6 million or $0.23 per share in fiscal 2012 principally due to lower sales, the unfavorable impact of LIFO inventory valuation and a higher effective tax rate. Nine Months Ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 Overview The continued impact of a sluggish domestic economy, the debt crisis in Europe and the strengthening of the U. S. dollar weighed heavily on the Company’s performance for the first nine months of fiscal 2013. Net sales declined $13.5 million or 7% from $190.1 million in fiscal 2012 to $176.6 million in fiscal 2013 with unfavorable exchange contributing $10.2 million or 76% of the decline.An operating loss of $1.8 million was a $9.7 million decline compared to fiscal 2012 as a gross margin decline of $12.7 million was only partially offset by a $3.0 million reduction in selling, general and administrative expenses. Net Sales North American sales declined $2.9 million or 3% from $94.9 million in fiscal 2012 to $92.0 million in fiscal 2013 as demand for capital equipment products slowed and demand for saw products weakened.Bytewise, acquired in the second quarter of fiscal 2012, contributed a comparative revenue increase of $4.0 million.International sales declined $10.6 million or 11% from $95.2 million in fiscal 2012 to $84.6 million in fiscal 2013 with the weakening Brazilian Real representing $10.1 million of the deficit.Revenue in local currencies was flat in Latin America, Southeast Asia and China. 13 Gross Margin Gross margin declined $12.7 million or 20% from 34.3% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 29.7% of sales in fiscal 2013 with lower revenues and margin erosion representing $4.6 million and $8.1 million, respectively.Unfavorable exchange rates accounted for $3.4 million while an increase in the LIFO reserve resulting from higher production costs due to a planned reduction in inventory levels accounted for $4.7 million of the margin erosion. North American gross margins declined $4.7 million from $30.2 million or 32% of sales in fiscal 2012 to $25.5 million or 28% of sales in fiscal 2013.An unfavorable LIFO inventory swing of $4.7 million caused by the aforementioned higher production costs was the principal factor contributing to the lower gross margins.International gross margins declined $8.0 million from 37% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 32% of sales in fiscal 2013 with lower revenues and margin erosion accounting for $3.9 million and $4.1 million, respectively.Unfavorable exchange rates resulted in $3.4 million or 83% of the margin erosion. Selling, General and Administrative Expenses Selling, general and administrative expense declined $3.0 million or 5% from $57.2 million in fiscal 2012 to $54.2 million in fiscal 2013.North American expenses decreased $0.6 million despite a $1.5 million increase in expenses for the Bytewise division, acquired in the second quarter of fiscal 2012.The $1.9 million reduction was the result of reduced salaries, benefits, professional fees and sales commissions.International expenses declined $2.4 million as a $0.8 million increase in local currency spending was more than offset by a favorable currency exchange of $3.2 million. Other Income (Expense) Other income declined $0.4 million to $0.9 million in fiscal 2013 compared to $1.3 million in fiscal 2012 principally due to exchange rate variations in U. S. dollar denominated transactions and unsettled balances in Scotland and Brazil. Net Earnings (Loss) The Company recorded a net loss of $1.4 million or $0.20 per share in the first nine months of fiscal 2013 compared to net earnings of $5.5 million or $0.82 per share in fiscal 2012 principally due to lower sales, the unfavorable impact ofincreases in the LIFO inventory reserve and a higher effective tax rate. LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Cash flows (in thousands) Nine Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ $ ) Cash used in investing activities ) ) Cash provided by (used in) financing activities ) Effect of exchange rate changes on cash ) ) Net decrease in cash $ ) $ ) Net cash for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 declined $4.7 million as a $9.2 million contribution from operations was more than offset by $5.5 million in loan repayments, $6.1 million for capital equipment and $2.0 million for dividends. The change in net cash for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 improved $2.5 million compared to fiscal 2012 duetosignificant improvements in the use of cash for working capital purposes, particularly inventory, which negated the unfavorable impact of lower profits. Liquidity and Credit Arrangements The Company believes it maintains sufficient liquidity and has the resources to fund its operations.In addition to its cash and investments, the Company maintains a $23 million line of credit in connection with its Loan and Security Agreement, of which, $12.7 million was outstanding as of March 31, 2013.Availability under the agreement is further reduced by open letters of credit totaling $0.2 million. The Loan and Security Agreement matures in April of 2015.The Loan and Security Agreement was modified in the first quarter of fiscal 2013 at which time certain financial covenants were amended.As of March 31, 2013, the Company was not in compliance with all debt covenants related to its Loan and Security Agreement.The Company received a waiver on the non-conformance with one debt covenant and has amended the loan agreement as described in Note 7 of the Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements. 14 The effective interest rate on the short term borrowings under the Loan and Security Agreement during the nine months ended March 31, 2013 was 1.80%. INFLATION The Company has experienced modest inflation relative to its material cost, much of which cannot be passed on to the customer through increased prices. OFF-BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS The Company has no off-balance sheet arrangements, other than operating leases, that have or are reasonably likely to have a current or future material effect on our financial condition, changes in financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, or capital resources. ITEM 3.QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURE ABOUT MARKET RISK There have been no material changes in qualitative and quantitative disclosures about market risk from what was reported in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2012. ITEM 4.CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES The Company’s management, under the supervision and with the participation of the Company’s President and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, has evaluated the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures as of March 31, 2013. After considering the matter disclosed in the following paragraph, they have concluded that our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of March 31, 2013 in providing reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. A material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting was identified in the preparation of our unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements as of March 31, 2013, which led to an adjustment of the change in the LIFO reserve for the three and nine month periods then ended. The Company’s management believes that the control weakness which led to the adjustment involved an inadequate review of the information prepared to record the LIFO reserve as of March 31, 2013. Since March 31, 2013, Company management has initiated additional review controls which are designed to prevent errors in the reporting of its interim LIFO reserve. These controls are expected to be implemented in connection with the Company’s next month-end closing. There have been no other changes in internal control over financial reporting during the quarter that materially affected, or are reasonably likely materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. ITEM 5.OTHER INFORMATION The Board of directors adopted The L.S. Starrett Company 2013 Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust Agreement during the quarter ended March 31, 2013.The purpose of the plan is to supplement existing company programs through an employer funded individual account plan dedicated to investment in common stock of the Company, thereby encouraging increased ownership of the Company while providing an additional source of retirement income.The plan is intended as an employee stock ownership plan within the meaning of section 4975 (e) (7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.The foregoing description does not purport to be complete and is qualified in its entirety by the complete test of the plan, a copy of which is attaché hereto as Exhibit 10.7. PART II. OTHER INFORMATION ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 This Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q contains forward-looking statements about the Company’s business, competition, sales, expenditures, foreign operations, plans for reorganization, interest rate sensitivity, debt service, liquidity and capital resources, and other operating and capital requirements. In addition, forward-looking statements may be included in future Company documents and in oral statements by Company representatives to securities analysts and investors.The Company is subject to risks that could cause actual events to vary materially from such forward-looking statements. You should carefully review and consider the information regarding certain factors which could materially affect our business, financial condition or future results set forth under Item1A. “Risk Factors” in our Form10-K for the year endedJune 30, 2012. There have been no material changes from the factors disclosed in our Form10-K for the year ended June 30, 2012. 15 ITEM 6.EXHIBITS The L. S. Starrett Company 2013 Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust Agreement. 31a Certification of Principal Executive Officer pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, filed herewith. 31b Certification of Principal Financial Officer pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, filed herewith. 32 Certifications of the Principal Executive Officer and the Principal Financial Officer pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The following materials from The L. S. Starrett Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2013 are furnished herewith, formatted in XBRL (Extensible Business Reporting Language): (i) the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets, (ii) the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations, (iii) the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss), (iv) the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity, (v)the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows, and (vi) Notes to Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements, tagged as blocks of text. 16 SIGNATURES Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized. THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY (Registrant) Date May 10, 2013 /S/R. Douglas A. Starrett Douglas A. Starrett - President and CEO Date May 10, 2013 /S/R. Francis J. O’Brien Francis J. O’Brien - Treasurer and CFO 17 | [
"UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D. C. 20549 FORM 10-Q (Mark One) x QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the quarterly period ended March 31, 2013 OR o TRANSITION REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 For the transition period from to Commission file number 1-367 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter) MASSACHUSETTS 04-1866480 (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation or organization) (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.) , ATHOL, MASSACHUSETTS 01331-1915 (Address of principal executive offices) (Zip Code) Registrant's telephone number, including area code 978-249-3551 Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.",
"YES xNO o Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files). YES xNO o Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company.",
"See definition of “accelerated filer,” “large accelerated filer” and “smaller reporting company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. (Check One): Large Accelerated Filer oAccelerated Filer xNon-Accelerated Filer oSmaller Reporting Company o Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act). YES oNO x Common Shares outstanding as of April 30, 2013 Class A Common Shares Class B Common Shares 1 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY CONTENTS Page No. Part I. Financial Information: Item 1. Financial Statements Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets - March 31, 2013 (unaudited) and June 30, 2012 3 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations - three and nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 4 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss) – three and nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 5 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity - nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 6 Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows - nine months ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (unaudited) 7 Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 8-12 Item 2. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations 13-15 Item 3.",
"Quantitative and Qualitative Disclosures About Market Risk 15 Item 4. Controls and Procedures 15 Item 5. Other Information 15 Part II. Other Information: Item 1A. Risk Factors 15 Item 6.",
"Exhibits 16 SIGNATURES 17 2 PART I.FINANCIAL INFORMATION ITEM 1.FINANCIAL STATEMENTS THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets (in thousands except share data) March 31, (unaudited) June 30, ASSETS Current assets: Cash $ $ Short-term investments Accounts receivable (less allowance for doubtful accounts of $729 and $965, respectively) Inventories Current deferred income tax asset Prepaid expenses and other current assets Total current assets Property, plant and equipment, net Taxes receivable Deferred tax asset, net Intangible assets, net Goodwill Other assets Total assets $ $ LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY Current liabilities: Notes payable and current maturities $ $ Accounts payable and accrued expenses Accrued compensation Total current liabilities Deferred tax liabilities Other tax obligations Long-term debt Postretirement benefit and pension obligations Total liabilities Stockholders' equity: Class A Common stock $1 par (20,000,000 shares authorized); 6,064,353 outstanding at 3/31/2013 and 6,017,227 outstanding at 6/30/2012 Class B Common stock $1 par (10,000,000 shares authorized); 741,982 outstanding at 3/31/2013 and 753,307 outstanding at 6/30/2012 Additional paid-in capital Retained earnings Accumulated other comprehensive loss ) Total stockholders' equity Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ $ See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 3 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations (in thousands except per share data) (unaudited) 3 Months Ended 9 Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Net sales $ Cost of goods sold Gross margin % of Net sales % Selling, general and administrative expenses Operating (loss)/income ) ) Other income (expense) ) Earnings (loss) before income taxes ) ) Income tax expense Net earnings (loss) $ ) $ $ ) $ Basic and diluted earnings (loss) per share $ ) $ $ ) $ Average outstanding shares used in per share calculations: Basic Diluted Dividends per share $ See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 4 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss) (in thousands) (unaudited) 3 Months Ended 9 Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Net earnings (loss) $ ) $ $ ) $ Other comprehensive income (loss), net of tax: Translation gain (loss) Pension and postretirement plans (9 ) 29 ) (2 ) Other comprehensive income (loss) Total comprehensive income (loss) $ ) $ $ ) $ ) See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 5 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity For the Nine Months Ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 (in thousands except per share data) (unaudited) Common Stock Outstanding Addi- tional Paid-in Retained Accumulated Other Com-prehensive Class A Class B Capital Earnings Loss Total Balance June 30, 2011 $ ) $ Net earnings Other comprehensive loss ) ) Dividends ($0.30 per share) ) ) Issuance of stock under ESOP 23 Issuance of stock under ESPP 9 72 81 Stock-based compensation Conversion 51 ) - Balance March 31, 2012 $ ) $ Balance June 30, 2012 $ ) $ Net loss ) ) Other comprehensive loss ) ) Dividends ($0.30 per share) ) ) Purchase of stock (5 ) ) ) Issuance of stock under ESOP 21 Issuance of stock under ESPP 20 Stock-based compensation Conversion 31 ) - Balance March 31, 2013 $ ) $ Cumulative Balance: Translation loss $ ) Pension and postretirement plans net of taxes ) $ ) See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 6 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows (in thousands of dollars) (unaudited) 9 Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Cash flows from operating activities: Net earnings (loss) $ ) $ Non-cash operating activities: Depreciation Amortization Other tax obligations ) ) Deferred taxes Unrealized transaction gain (9 ) ) Equity gain on investment ) ) Working capital changes: Receivables Inventories ) Other current assets ) Other current liabilities ) ) Postretirement benefit and pension obligations Other 75 Net cash provided by (used in) operating activities ) Cash flows from investing activities: Business acquisition, net of cash acquired - ) Additions to property, plant and equipment ) ) Increase in short-term investments ) - Net cash used in investing activities ) ) Cash flows from financing activities: Proceeds from short-term borrowings - Short-term debt repayments ) ) Proceeds from long-term borrowings Long-term debt repayments ) ) Proceeds from common stock issued Shares purchased ) - Dividends paid ) ) Net cash provided by (used in) financing activities ) Effect of exchange rate changes on cash ) ) Net decrease in cash ) ) Cash, beginning of period Cash, end of period $ $ Supplemental cash flow information: Interest paid $ $ Income taxes paid, net See Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements 7 THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements March 31, 2013 Note 1:Basis of Presentation and Summary of Significant Account Policies The condensed balance sheet as of June 30, 2012, which has been derived from audited financial statements, and the unaudited interim condensed financial statements have been prepared by The L.S.",
"Starrett Company (the “Company”) in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America for interim financial reporting.Accordingly, they do not include all of the information and notes required by generally accepted accounting principles for complete financial statements.These unaudited condensed financial statements, which, in the opinion of management, reflect all adjustments (including normal recurring adjustments) necessary for a fair presentation, should be read in conjunction with the financial statements and notes thereto included in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2012.Operating results are not necessarily indicative of the results that may be expected for any future interim period or for the entire fiscal year. As discussed further in Note 2, on November 22, 2011, the Company acquired all the assets of Bytewise Development Corporation.The results of operations for this acquired business are included in the Company’s results of operations as presented herein since such date. The preparation of financial statements and related disclosures in conformity with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America requires management to make judgments, assumptions and estimates that affect amounts reported in the consolidated financial statements and accompanying notes.Note 2 to the Company’s Consolidated Financial Statements included in the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended June 30, 2012 describes the significant accounting policies and methods used in the preparation of the consolidated financial statements.",
"There were no changes in any of the Company’s significant accounting policies during the nine months ended March 31, 2013. Note 2:Acquisition On November 22, 2011 a wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company entered into an asset purchase agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”) with Bytewise Development Corporation (“Bytewise”) pursuant to which the wholly-owned subsidiary of the Company purchased all of the assets of Bytewise for $15.4 million in cash plus the assumption of certain liabilities.The asset purchase was financed through a term loan under the Company’s existing security agreement.The Purchase Agreement contains customary representations, warranties and covenants.Under the Purchase Agreement, the former owners of Bytewise are entitled to a 40% share of any profits from Bytewise’s operations over each of the three years following consummation of the transaction so long as they remain employed by the Company.The Company has accrued for such profit sharing as an expense based on Bytewise’s results ofoperations since the date of acquisition. Bytewise designs, develops and manufactures non-contact, industrial measurement systems and software that capture the external geometric profile of a product and analyze that data to meet measurement and/or quality control requirements. The acquisition was accounted for under the acquisition method of accounting.The total purchase price was allocated to Bytewise’s net tangible assets and identifiable intangible assets based on their estimated fair value as of November 22, 2011.The allocation of the purchase price was finalized in the fourth quarter of fiscal 2012.",
"The table below presents the allocation of the purchase price to the acquired net assets of Bytewise (in thousands): Cash $ Accounts receivable Inventories Other current assets 74 Intangibles Goodwill Other long-term assets 69 Accounts payable ) Accrued compensation costs ) Accrued expenses ) Cash paid to sellers $ 8 The allocation for definite-lived amortizable intangible assets acquired include approximately $4.95 million for customer relationships, $1.48 million for trademarks and trade names, $2.0 million for completed technology, $0.6 million for non-compete agreements and $0.26 million for order backlog.",
"The acquisition was completed on November 22, 2011 and,accordingly, results of operations from such date have been included in the Company’s Statements of Operations. Supplemental Pro Forma Information The following information reflects the Bytewise acquisition as if the transaction had occurred as of the beginning of the Company’s fiscal 2012.The unaudited pro forma information does not necessarily reflect the actual results that would have occurred had the Company and Bytewise been combined during the periods presented, nor is it necessarily indicative of the future results of operations of the combined companies. The following table represents selected unaudited consolidated pro forma data (in thousands except per share amounts): 9 Months Ended 3/31/2012 Unaudited consolidated pro forma revenue $ Unaudited consolidated pro forma net earnings $ Unaudited consolidated pro forma diluted earnings per share $ Note 3:Stock-based Compensation During the quarter endedDecember 31, 2012, the Company implemented The L.S.",
"Starrett Company 2012 Long Term Incentive Plan (the “2012 Stock Plan”), which was adopted by the Board of Directors September 5, 2012 and approved by shareholders October 17, 2012. The 2012 Stock Plan permits the granting of the following types of awards to officers, other employees and non-employee directors: stock options; restricted stock awards; unrestricted stock awards; stock appreciation rights; stock units including restricted stock units; performance awards; cash-based awards; and awards other than previously described that are convertible or otherwise based on stock. The 2012 Stock Plan provides for the issuance of up to 500,000 shares of common stock. Options granted vest in periods ranging from one year to three years and expire ten years after the grant date. Restricted stock units (“RSU”) granted generally vest from one year to three years.",
"Vested restricted stock units will be settled in shares of common stock. As of March 31, 2013, there were 20,500 stock options and 8,200 restricted stock units outstanding. In addition, there were 471,300 shares available for grant under the 2012 Stock Plan as of March 31, 2013. For the stock option grant, the fair value of each grant was estimated at the date of grant using the Binomial Options pricing model. The Binomial Options pricing model utilizes assumptions related to stock volatility, the risk-free interest rate, the dividend yield and employee exercise behavior. Expected volatilities utilized in the model are based on the historic volatility of the Company’s stock price. The risk free interest rate is derived from the U.S. Treasury Yield curve in effect at the time of the grant. The fair value of stock options granted during the nine months ended March 31, 2013 of $3.82 was estimated using the following weighted-average assumptions: Risk-free interest rate % Expected life (years) Expected stock volatility % Expected dividend yield % The weighted average contractual term for stock options outstanding as of March 31, 2013 was 9.75 years.",
"The aggregate intrinsic value of stock options outstanding as of March 31, 2013 was $0.1 million. There were no options exercisable as of March 31, 2013. The Company accounts for RSU awards by recognizing the expense of the fair value ratably over vesting periods generally ranging from one year to three years. The related expense is included in selling, general and administrative expenses.During the nine months ended March 31, 2013 the Company granted 8,200 RSU awards with approximate fair values of $10.08 per RSU award. There were no RSU awards prior to December 17, 2012. There were no RSU awards settled during the nine months ended March 31, 2013. The aggregate intrinsic value of RSU awards outstanding as of March 31, 2013 was $0.1 million. There were no RSU awards vested as of March 31, 2013. 9 Compensation expense related to stock-based plans (including the ESPP) for the nine month period ended March 31, 2013 was $0.1 million and was recorded as selling, general and administrative expense.",
"As of March 31, 2013, there was $0.1 million of total unrecognized compensation costs related to outstanding stock-based compensation arrangements. The cost is expected to be recognized over a weighted average period of 2.7 years. Note 4:Inventories Inventories consist of the following (in thousands): 3/31/2013 6/30/2012 Raw material and supplies $ $ Goods in process and finished parts Finished goods LIFO Reserve ) ) Inventories $ $ LIFO inventories were $15.2 million and $19.7 million at March 31, 2013 and June 30, 2012, respectively, or approximately $31.6 million and $27.5 million, respectively, less than their respective balances accounted for on a FIFO basis. The use of LIFO, as compared to FIFO, resulted in a $4.1 million increase in cost of sales for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 compared to a $0.7 million increase in cost of sales in the nine months ended March 31, 2012. The use of LIFO, as compared to FIFO, resulted in a $3.1 million increase in cost of sales for the three months ended March 31, 2013 compared to a $0.9 million increase in cost of sales in the three months ended March 31, 2012. Note 5:Goodwill and Intangibles The Company performed a qualitative analysis in accordance with ASU 2011-08 for its Bytewise reporting unit for its October1, 2012 annual assessment of goodwill (commonly referred to as “Step Zero”). From a qualitative perspective, in evaluating whether it is more likely than not that the fair value of the reporting units is not less than their respective carrying amount, relevant events and circumstances were taken into account, with greater weight assigned to events and circumstances that most affect the fair value ofBytewise or the carrying amounts of its assets.",
"Items that were considered included, but were not limited to, the following: macroeconomic conditions, industry and market conditions, cost factors, overall financial performance, changes in management or key personnel, and other Bytewise specific events. After assessing these and other factors the Company determined that it was more likely than not that the fair value of the Bytewise reporting unit was not less than the carrying amount as of October 1, 2012.",
"Amortizable intangible assets consist of the following (in thousands): 3/31/2013 6/30/2012 Non-compete agreement $ $ Trademarks and trade names Completed technology Customer relationships Backlog - Software development - Other intangible assets Total $ $ Accumulated amortization ) ) Total net balance $ $ Amortizable intangible assets are being amortized on a straight-line basis over the period of expected economic benefit. The estimated useful lives of the intangible assets subject to amortization are 14 years for trademarks and trade names, 8 years for non-compete agreements, 10 years for completed technology,8 years for customer relationships and 5 years for software development. The estimated aggregate amortization expense for the remainder of fiscal 2013, for each of the next five years and thereafter, is as follows (in thousands): 2013 (Remainder of year) $ Thereafter $ 10 Note 6:Pension and Post-retirement Benefits Net periodic benefit costs for the Company's defined benefit pension plans consist of the following (in thousands): Three Months Ended Nine Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Service cost $ Interest cost Expected return on plan assets ) Amortization of prior service cost 59 59 Amortization of net gain - (1 ) - (3 ) $ Net periodic benefit costs for the Company's postretirement medical plan and life insurance consists of the following (in thousands): Three Months Ended Nine Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Service cost $ $ 96 $ $ Interest cost Amortization of prior service credit ) Amortization of accumulated loss 40 4 14 $ $ 29 $ $ 90 The Company’s pension plans use fair value as the market-related value of plan assets and recognize net actuarial gains or losses in excess of ten percent (10%) of the greater of the market-related value of plan assets or of the plans’ projected benefit obligation in net periodic (benefit) cost as of the plan measurement date, which is the same as the fiscal year end of the Company.",
"Net actuarial gains or losses that are less than 10% of the thresholds noted above are accounted for as part of the accumulated other comprehensive income (loss). Note 7:Debt Debt, including capitalized lease obligations, is comprised of the following (in thousands): 3/31/2013 6/30/2012 Notes payable and current maturities Loan and Security Agreement $ $ Short-term foreign credit facility 43 Capitalized leases $ $ Long-term debt Loan and Security Agreement $ Capitalized leases $ $ The Company completed the negotiations for an amended Loan and Security Agreement (Line of Credit) and executed the agreement as of April 25, 2012. The Line of Credit is effective for three years commencing April 25, 2012 and expires on April 30, 2015.",
"The agreement continues the previous line of $23.0 million and interest rate of LIBOR plus 1.5%. On September 7, 2012, the Company completed another amendment to change the financial covenants. The material financial covenants of the amended Loan and Security Agreement are: 1) funded debt to EBITDA, excluding non-cash and retirement benefit expenses (“maximum leverage”), cannot exceed 1.45 to 1, 2) annual capital expenditures cannot exceed $15.0 million, 3) maintain a Debt Service Coverage Rate of a minimum of 1.25 to 1 and 4) maintain consolidated cash plus liquid investments of not less than $10.0 million at any time. The effective interest rate on the Line of Credit under the Loan and Security Agreement for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 and 2012 was 1.80% and 1.91%, respectively. 11 On November 22, 2011, in conjunction with the Bytewise acquisition, the Company entered into a $15.5 million term loan (the “Term Loan”) under the existing Loan and Security Agreement with TD Bank N.A.The term loan is a ten year loan bearing a fixed interest rate of 4.5% and is payable in fixed monthly payments of principal and interest of $160,640.The term loan, which had a balance of $13.8 million at March 31, 2013, is subject to the same financial covenants as the Loan and Security Agreement.",
"As of March 31, 2013, the Company was in compliance with three of the four financial covenants.However, the Company was not in compliance with the maximum leverage covenant.The Company received a waiver of default of this covenant as of March 31, 2013.On May 9, 2013, the Company executed a new amendment to the Loan and Security Agreement.The new amendment changes the current funded debt to EBITDA ratio from 1.45 to 1, to 2.25 to 1 for the fourth quarter of fiscal 2013 and the first quarter of fiscal 2014.Thereafter, and through the end of the agreement on April 30 of 2015, the funded debt to EBITDA covenant reverts to 1.45 to 1.The Company expects to be able to meet this covenant in future periods. Note 8: Income Tax The Company is subject to U.S. federal income tax and various state, local and foreign income taxes in numerous jurisdictions.The Company’s domestic and foreign tax liabilities are subject to the allocation of revenues and expenses in different jurisdictions and the timing of recognizing revenues and expenses.Additionally, the amount of income taxes paid is subject to the Company’s interpretation of applicable tax laws in the jurisdictions in which it files. The Company provides for income taxes on an interim basis based on an estimate of the effective tax rate for the year.This estimate is reassessed on a quarterly basis.Discrete tax items are accounted for in the quarterly period in which they occur.",
"The tax expense for the third quarter of fiscal 2013 was $249,000 on a loss before tax for the quarter of $1,236,000 (an effective tax rate of (20.1%)). The tax expense for the third quarter of 2012 was $661,000 on income before tax of $2,231,000 (an effective tax rate of 29.6%).For the first nine months of 2013, tax expense was $507,000 on a loss before tax of $853,000 (an effective tax rate of (59.4%)) and for the nine months ended March 31, 2012 it was $3,682,000 on income before tax of $9,216,000 (an effective tax rate of 40%).The primary reasons for the negative effective tax rate in the third quarter of fiscal 2013 are as follows:1.no tax benefit has been recognized for losses in certain foreign subsidiaries;2.there was a cash dividend from the Company’s subsidiary in Australia which caused a discrete increase to tax expense of $178,000; 3. there was a reduction in the effective state tax rate applied to deferred tax balances (based on both actual and expected future state tax apportionments and profitability) which caused a discrete tax expense of $675,000;4.the changes on the fiscal 2012 tax return from amounts estimated at provision, including the impact of a changed position on the 2012 and prior year returns to take the foreign tax credit rather than a deduction , created a discrete tax benefit of $414,000; and5.other discrete taxes increased tax expense by $66,000In the first quarter of fiscal 2013, a discrete tax benefit was booked reducing the Company’s net tax liability for uncertain tax positions of $91,000.",
"U.S. Federal tax returns through fiscal 2008 are generally no longer subject to review by tax authorities; however, tax loss carryforwards from years before fiscal 2009 are still subject to review.As of March 31, 2013, the Company has substantially resolved all open income tax audits.There were no other local or federal income tax audits in progress as of March 31, 2013.In international jurisdictions including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, UK, Germany, New Zealand, Singapore, Japan and Mexico, which comprise a significant portion of the Company’s operations, the years that may be examined vary by country.The Company’s most significant foreign subsidiary in Brazil is subject to audit for the years 2008 – 2012. The Company has identified no new uncertain tax positions during the nine month period year ended March 31, 2013 for which it is currently likely that the total amount of unrecognized tax benefits will significantly increase or decrease within the next twelve months. No valuation allowance has been recorded for the Company’s domestic federal net operating loss (NOL) carry forwards.",
"The Company continues to believe that due to forecasted future taxable income and certain tax planning strategies available, it is more likely than not that it will be able to utilize the federal NOL carry forwards. Note 9:Contingencies The Company is involved in some legal matters which arise in the normal course of business, which are not expected to have a material impact on the Company’s financial condition, results of operations or cash flows. 12 ITEM 2. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Three Months Ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 Overview A slower than anticipated domestic economy and continued weakness in the global economy depressed demand for the Company’s products to the industrial sector. Net sales declined $4.6 million or 7% from $64.5 million in fiscal 2012 to $59.9 million in fiscal 2013 as a result of reduced demand for saw and capital equipment products, a weakening Brazilian Real and a recession in Europe.",
"An operating loss of$1.8 million was a $4.5 million decline compared to fiscal 2012 as a $5.5 million reduction in gross margin was only partially offset by a $1.0 million reduction in selling, general and administrative expenses. Net Sales North American sales declined $1.0 million or 3% from $33.3 million in fiscal 2012 to $32.3 million in fiscal 2013 as softening demand for capital equipment in the semi-conductor sector offset a rebound in precision tool revenue.",
"International sales declined $3.6 million from $31.2 million in fiscal 2012 to $27.6 million in fiscal 2013 with a weakening Brazilian Real representing $2.5 million of the decrease.Economic slowdowns in Latin America and Asia accounted for the remaining $1.1 million deficit. Gross Margin Gross margin declined $5.5 million or 25% from 33.2% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 26.6% of sales in fiscal 2013 with lower revenues and margin erosion representing $1.5 million and $4.0 million, respectively.Unfavorable exchange rates and LIFO inventory valuation were the key drivers in the $4.0 million margin decline. North American gross margins declined $3.3 million from $10.8 million or 32% of sales in fiscal 2012 to $7.5 million or 23% of sales in fiscal 2013.An increase in the LIFO reserve represented $2.2 million of the comparative decline with higher manufacturing costs and an unfavorable product mix accounting for the remaining $1.1 million decline.",
"International gross margins declined $2.1 million from 34% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 31% of sales in fiscal 2013 with unfavorable exchange rates contributing $0.9 million of the decrease.Lower revenues in Latin America and Asia contributed the remaining $1.2 million to the shortfall. Selling, General and Administrative Expenses Selling, general and administrative expense declined $1.0 million or 5% from $18.7 million in fiscal 2012 to $17.7 million in fiscal 2013. North American expenses declined $0.9 million from $9.9 million in fiscal 2012 to $9.0 million in fiscal 2013 as a result of savings in salaries, benefits, professional fees and sales commissions. International expenses declined $0.1 million as a $0.7 million increase in local currency spending was offset by a favorable currency exchange of $0.8 million. Other Income (Expense) Other income/(expense) improved to income of $0.5 million in fiscal 2013 compared to a loss of $0.5million in fiscal 2012 principally due to exchange rate variations in U. S. dollar denominated transactions and unsettled balances in Scotland and Brazil. Net Earnings (Loss) The Company recorded a net loss of $1.5 million or $0.22 per share in the third quarter of fiscal 2013 compared to net earnings of $1.6 million or $0.23 per share in fiscal 2012 principally due to lower sales, the unfavorable impact of LIFO inventory valuation and a higher effective tax rate. Nine Months Ended March 31, 2013 and March 31, 2012 Overview The continued impact of a sluggish domestic economy, the debt crisis in Europe and the strengthening of the U. S. dollar weighed heavily on the Company’s performance for the first nine months of fiscal 2013.",
"Net sales declined $13.5 million or 7% from $190.1 million in fiscal 2012 to $176.6 million in fiscal 2013 with unfavorable exchange contributing $10.2 million or 76% of the decline.An operating loss of $1.8 million was a $9.7 million decline compared to fiscal 2012 as a gross margin decline of $12.7 million was only partially offset by a $3.0 million reduction in selling, general and administrative expenses. Net Sales North American sales declined $2.9 million or 3% from $94.9 million in fiscal 2012 to $92.0 million in fiscal 2013 as demand for capital equipment products slowed and demand for saw products weakened.Bytewise, acquired in the second quarter of fiscal 2012, contributed a comparative revenue increase of $4.0 million.International sales declined $10.6 million or 11% from $95.2 million in fiscal 2012 to $84.6 million in fiscal 2013 with the weakening Brazilian Real representing $10.1 million of the deficit.Revenue in local currencies was flat in Latin America, Southeast Asia and China. 13 Gross Margin Gross margin declined $12.7 million or 20% from 34.3% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 29.7% of sales in fiscal 2013 with lower revenues and margin erosion representing $4.6 million and $8.1 million, respectively.Unfavorable exchange rates accounted for $3.4 million while an increase in the LIFO reserve resulting from higher production costs due to a planned reduction in inventory levels accounted for $4.7 million of the margin erosion.",
"North American gross margins declined $4.7 million from $30.2 million or 32% of sales in fiscal 2012 to $25.5 million or 28% of sales in fiscal 2013.An unfavorable LIFO inventory swing of $4.7 million caused by the aforementioned higher production costs was the principal factor contributing to the lower gross margins.International gross margins declined $8.0 million from 37% of sales in fiscal 2012 to 32% of sales in fiscal 2013 with lower revenues and margin erosion accounting for $3.9 million and $4.1 million, respectively.Unfavorable exchange rates resulted in $3.4 million or 83% of the margin erosion. Selling, General and Administrative Expenses Selling, general and administrative expense declined $3.0 million or 5% from $57.2 million in fiscal 2012 to $54.2 million in fiscal 2013.North American expenses decreased $0.6 million despite a $1.5 million increase in expenses for the Bytewise division, acquired in the second quarter of fiscal 2012.The $1.9 million reduction was the result of reduced salaries, benefits, professional fees and sales commissions.International expenses declined $2.4 million as a $0.8 million increase in local currency spending was more than offset by a favorable currency exchange of $3.2 million.",
"Other Income (Expense) Other income declined $0.4 million to $0.9 million in fiscal 2013 compared to $1.3 million in fiscal 2012 principally due to exchange rate variations in U. S. dollar denominated transactions and unsettled balances in Scotland and Brazil. Net Earnings (Loss) The Company recorded a net loss of $1.4 million or $0.20 per share in the first nine months of fiscal 2013 compared to net earnings of $5.5 million or $0.82 per share in fiscal 2012 principally due to lower sales, the unfavorable impact ofincreases in the LIFO inventory reserve and a higher effective tax rate.",
"LIQUIDITY AND CAPITAL RESOURCES Cash flows (in thousands) Nine Months Ended 3/31/2013 3/31/2012 Cash provided by (used in) operating activities $ $ ) Cash used in investing activities ) ) Cash provided by (used in) financing activities ) Effect of exchange rate changes on cash ) ) Net decrease in cash $ ) $ ) Net cash for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 declined $4.7 million as a $9.2 million contribution from operations was more than offset by $5.5 million in loan repayments, $6.1 million for capital equipment and $2.0 million for dividends. The change in net cash for the nine months ended March 31, 2013 improved $2.5 million compared to fiscal 2012 duetosignificant improvements in the use of cash for working capital purposes, particularly inventory, which negated the unfavorable impact of lower profits.",
"Liquidity and Credit Arrangements The Company believes it maintains sufficient liquidity and has the resources to fund its operations.In addition to its cash and investments, the Company maintains a $23 million line of credit in connection with its Loan and Security Agreement, of which, $12.7 million was outstanding as of March 31, 2013.Availability under the agreement is further reduced by open letters of credit totaling $0.2 million. The Loan and Security Agreement matures in April of 2015.The Loan and Security Agreement was modified in the first quarter of fiscal 2013 at which time certain financial covenants were amended.As of March 31, 2013, the Company was not in compliance with all debt covenants related to its Loan and Security Agreement.The Company received a waiver on the non-conformance with one debt covenant and has amended the loan agreement as described in Note 7 of the Notes to Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements. 14 The effective interest rate on the short term borrowings under the Loan and Security Agreement during the nine months ended March 31, 2013 was 1.80%.",
"INFLATION The Company has experienced modest inflation relative to its material cost, much of which cannot be passed on to the customer through increased prices. OFF-BALANCE SHEET ARRANGEMENTS The Company has no off-balance sheet arrangements, other than operating leases, that have or are reasonably likely to have a current or future material effect on our financial condition, changes in financial condition, revenues or expenses, results of operations, liquidity, capital expenditures, or capital resources. ITEM 3.QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DISCLOSURE ABOUT MARKET RISK There have been no material changes in qualitative and quantitative disclosures about market risk from what was reported in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2012. ITEM 4.CONTROLS AND PROCEDURES The Company’s management, under the supervision and with the participation of the Company’s President and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, has evaluated the Company’s disclosure controls and procedures as of March 31, 2013.",
"After considering the matter disclosed in the following paragraph, they have concluded that our disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of March 31, 2013 in providing reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States of America. A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. A material weakness in our internal control over financial reporting was identified in the preparation of our unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements as of March 31, 2013, which led to an adjustment of the change in the LIFO reserve for the three and nine month periods then ended. The Company’s management believes that the control weakness which led to the adjustment involved an inadequate review of the information prepared to record the LIFO reserve as of March 31, 2013.",
"Since March 31, 2013, Company management has initiated additional review controls which are designed to prevent errors in the reporting of its interim LIFO reserve. These controls are expected to be implemented in connection with the Company’s next month-end closing. There have been no other changes in internal control over financial reporting during the quarter that materially affected, or are reasonably likely materially affect, the Company’s internal control over financial reporting. ITEM 5.OTHER INFORMATION The Board of directors adopted The L.S. Starrett Company 2013 Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust Agreement during the quarter ended March 31, 2013.The purpose of the plan is to supplement existing company programs through an employer funded individual account plan dedicated to investment in common stock of the Company, thereby encouraging increased ownership of the Company while providing an additional source of retirement income.The plan is intended as an employee stock ownership plan within the meaning of section 4975 (e) (7) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.The foregoing description does not purport to be complete and is qualified in its entirety by the complete test of the plan, a copy of which is attaché hereto as Exhibit 10.7. PART II. OTHER INFORMATION ITEM 1A. RISK FACTORS SAFE HARBOR STATEMENT UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 This Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q contains forward-looking statements about the Company’s business, competition, sales, expenditures, foreign operations, plans for reorganization, interest rate sensitivity, debt service, liquidity and capital resources, and other operating and capital requirements. In addition, forward-looking statements may be included in future Company documents and in oral statements by Company representatives to securities analysts and investors.The Company is subject to risks that could cause actual events to vary materially from such forward-looking statements.",
"You should carefully review and consider the information regarding certain factors which could materially affect our business, financial condition or future results set forth under Item1A. “Risk Factors” in our Form10-K for the year endedJune 30, 2012. There have been no material changes from the factors disclosed in our Form10-K for the year ended June 30, 2012. 15 ITEM 6.EXHIBITS The L. S. Starrett Company 2013 Employee Stock Ownership Plan and Trust Agreement. 31a Certification of Principal Executive Officer pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, filed herewith. 31b Certification of Principal Financial Officer pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, filed herewith. 32 Certifications of the Principal Executive Officer and the Principal Financial Officer pursuant to Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The following materials from The L. S. Starrett Company’s Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2013 are furnished herewith, formatted in XBRL (Extensible Business Reporting Language): (i) the Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets, (ii) the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations, (iii) the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Comprehensive Income (Loss), (iv) the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Stockholders' Equity, (v)the Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows, and (vi) Notes to Condensed Consolidated Financial Statements, tagged as blocks of text. 16 SIGNATURES Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the registrant has duly caused this report to be signed on its behalf by the undersigned thereunto duly authorized.",
"THE L. S. STARRETT COMPANY (Registrant) Date May 10, 2013 /S/R. Douglas A. Starrett Douglas A. Starrett - President and CEO Date May 10, 2013 /S/R. Francis J. O’Brien Francis J. O’Brien - Treasurer and CFO 17"
]
| https://applica-public.s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/contract-discovery/edgar.txt.xz | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
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COMPTON, Chief Justice. This appeal presents common questions of fact and law heretofore considered in the case of Padilla v. Franklin, N.M., 372 P.2d 820. All errors complained of in this case were fully considered in the case referred to and, for the reasons set forth therein, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. It is so ordered. CARMODY and CHAVEZ, JJ., concur. MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., not participating. | 06-26-2022 | [
"COMPTON, Chief Justice. This appeal presents common questions of fact and law heretofore considered in the case of Padilla v. Franklin, N.M., 372 P.2d 820. All errors complained of in this case were fully considered in the case referred to and, for the reasons set forth therein, the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. It is so ordered. CARMODY and CHAVEZ, JJ., concur. MOISE and NOBLE, JJ., not participating."
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/opinions/6469425/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Case 20-12738-RAM Doc 44 Filed 07/29/20 Page 1 of 1
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA RE: Luis Perez Hernandez Case Number20-12738 -RAM
TRUSTEE'S NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY FOR CONFIRMATION AND RECOMMENDATION
The Trustee reviewed this case and found the following deficiencies remain unresolved from the Trustee’s letter requesting documents and prior deficiencies and thus objects as follows (If this case is dismissed, this deficiency is an objection to reinstatement until all documents are received or all issues are addressed): WRITTEN RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED AND/OR DOCUMENTS REQUESTED MUST BE RECEIVED BY 5PM AT LEAST FIFTEEN DAYS (NOT INCLUDING HOLIDAYS) PRIOR TO THE CONFIRMATION HEARING TO AVOID DISMISSAL. Please note: documents that were not timely filed/received by the trustee may not be considered as there is not sufficient time for an additional review of this case. Call the Trustee's case administration department prior to “re-sending” documents. The Trustee reserves the right to raise additional objections UNTIL all documents are timely provided to the Trustee and reviewed for possible issues raised and additional documents needed.
The debtor or debtor’s attorney must appear at the confirmation hearing even if they pre-hear with the Trustee. The debtor may be dismissed for failure to fund the plan if they are delinquent in payments. The Court may dismiss this case if no one appears to represent the debtor at the confirmation hearing. IMPORTANT NOTICE: IF THE DEBTOR(S) OBJECTS TO THE TRUSTEE'S RECOMMENDATION, THE DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY MUST CONTACT THE TRUSTEE'S OFFICE AND SPEAK TO AN ATTORNEY BEFORE 2PM THE LAST BUSINESS DAY PRIOR TO THE CONFIRMATION HEARING TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OR THE RECOMMENDATION WILL BE DEEMED UNCONTESTED BY THE DEBTOR. =============================================================================== Recommendation for AUGUST 11, 2020 hearing. All amendments and documents for the AUGUST 11, 2020 continued confirmation hearings were due as of JULY 24, 2020. (Call the Trustee's case administration department prior to "re-sending" documents) REVIEWED documents received/filed as of July 27, 2020
3AP served 7/20 (LATE) If Counsel for the Debtor(s) appears and agrees on the record and confirms service of the plan: If actual consent of creditor (US Bank/Select Portfolio - ReShanudra Suggs) on record and motion to value granted, Confirm 3 A Plan If not Cont to 9/22 (material change)
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served through ECF on the debtor’s attorney or by U.S. First Class pre-paid Mail on the pro se debtor on the same day filed with the Court.
Submitted by NANCY K. NEIDICH, ESQ, STANDING CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE P.O. BOX 279806, MIRAMAR, FL 33027, (954) 443-4402
****The Trustee objects to the appearance of coverage counsel if her recommendation is contested**** | 2020-07-29 | [
"Case 20-12738-RAM Doc 44 Filed 07/29/20 Page 1 of 1 UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA RE: Luis Perez Hernandez Case Number20-12738 -RAM TRUSTEE'S NOTICE OF DEFICIENCY FOR CONFIRMATION AND RECOMMENDATION The Trustee reviewed this case and found the following deficiencies remain unresolved from the Trustee’s letter requesting documents and prior deficiencies and thus objects as follows (If this case is dismissed, this deficiency is an objection to reinstatement until all documents are received or all issues are addressed): WRITTEN RESPONSE TO ISSUES RAISED AND/OR DOCUMENTS REQUESTED MUST BE RECEIVED BY 5PM AT LEAST FIFTEEN DAYS (NOT INCLUDING HOLIDAYS) PRIOR TO THE CONFIRMATION HEARING TO AVOID DISMISSAL.",
"Please note: documents that were not timely filed/received by the trustee may not be considered as there is not sufficient time for an additional review of this case. Call the Trustee's case administration department prior to “re-sending” documents. The Trustee reserves the right to raise additional objections UNTIL all documents are timely provided to the Trustee and reviewed for possible issues raised and additional documents needed. The debtor or debtor’s attorney must appear at the confirmation hearing even if they pre-hear with the Trustee. The debtor may be dismissed for failure to fund the plan if they are delinquent in payments. The Court may dismiss this case if no one appears to represent the debtor at the confirmation hearing. IMPORTANT NOTICE: IF THE DEBTOR(S) OBJECTS TO THE TRUSTEE'S RECOMMENDATION, THE DEBTOR'S ATTORNEY MUST CONTACT THE TRUSTEE'S OFFICE AND SPEAK TO AN ATTORNEY BEFORE 2PM THE LAST BUSINESS DAY PRIOR TO THE CONFIRMATION HEARING TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OR THE RECOMMENDATION WILL BE DEEMED UNCONTESTED BY THE DEBTOR.",
"=============================================================================== Recommendation for AUGUST 11, 2020 hearing. All amendments and documents for the AUGUST 11, 2020 continued confirmation hearings were due as of JULY 24, 2020. (Call the Trustee's case administration department prior to \"re-sending\" documents) REVIEWED documents received/filed as of July 27, 2020 3AP served 7/20 (LATE) If Counsel for the Debtor(s) appears and agrees on the record and confirms service of the plan: If actual consent of creditor (US Bank/Select Portfolio - ReShanudra Suggs) on record and motion to value granted, Confirm 3 A Plan If not Cont to 9/22 (material change) I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served through ECF on the debtor’s attorney or by U.S. First Class pre-paid Mail on the pro se debtor on the same day filed with the Court. Submitted by NANCY K. NEIDICH, ESQ, STANDING CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE P.O. BOX 279806, MIRAMAR, FL 33027, (954) 443-4402 ****The Trustee objects to the appearance of coverage counsel if her recommendation is contested****"
]
| https://www.courtlistener.com/api/rest/v3/recap-documents/140779000/ | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
Title: To Alexander Hamilton from William R. Davie, 7 April 1800 From: Davie, William R. To: Hamilton, Alexander
Dear Sir, Paris, April 7th. 1800
Your letter with its inclosures were duly received. I have sent you the État militaire de la République Française for the present year. We hear nothing from the U States. The campaign had not opened on the Rhine the second of this month; all is, as yet, tranquil here. I am with the most sincere respect and esteem Your mo obt
Wm. R Davie | 04-07-1800 | [
"Title: To Alexander Hamilton from William R. Davie, 7 April 1800 From: Davie, William R. To: Hamilton, Alexander Dear Sir, Paris, April 7th. 1800 Your letter with its inclosures were duly received. I have sent you the État militaire de la République Française for the present year. We hear nothing from the U States. The campaign had not opened on the Rhine the second of this month; all is, as yet, tranquil here.",
"I am with the most sincere respect and esteem Your mo obt Wm. R Davie"
]
| https://founders.archives.gov/API/docdata/Hamilton/01-24-02-0318 | Legal & Government | https://huggingface.co/datasets/pile-of-law/pile-of-law |
451 A.2d 887 (1982) Daryle R. MACKEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. No. 81-1238. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Submitted August 27, 1982. Decided October 7, 1982. *888 Gregory Collins, appointed by the court, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, and Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., for appellee. Before NEBEKER and BELSON, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired. PER CURIAM: Appellant, following a jury trial was convicted of two counts of petit larceny and one count of carrying a deadly weapon, D.C.Code 1981, §§ 22-2202, -3204. In urging reversal, he claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm the convictions for carrying a deadly weapon and the first count of petit larceny and reverse and remand for resentencing for the second count of petit larceny.
I At approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 8, 1980, Tanya Williams left a nightclub in Northwest Washington and walked across the street to a parking lot where she had left her car. She immediately discovered that it had been broken into and that her wallet containing ten dollars in cash was missing. At the same time, Geraldine Daniels and LeRoy Talley left the club and walked toward Talley's car, which was parked next to Williams' vehicle. En route, a man clenching a ten dollar bill in his hand passed them. Upon reaching his car, Talley discovered that it too had been broken into. Suspicious of the man whom he had seen moments earlier, Talley immediately pursued him to inquire about the breaking. The suspect, later identified as Owens, made no verbal response but threatened Talley with a machete-type knife. At this point, Talley and Daniels reentered the club to call the police. They returned to the parking lot with their friend Baucum to wait for the police. Baucum discovered that his pocketbook was missing from Talley's car. At around 4:00 a.m., Talley, Daniels and Baucum, from their vantage point in Talley's car, saw Owens leave the club and approach appellant and Michael Bennett. The three observers watched the activities of these men for the next hour. The observers testified that appellant and his cohorts would take turns leaving the area in front of the club, return and then place unidentified objects into two large shoulder bags. When the police had not arrived by 5:30 a.m., Talley flagged down a patrol car to report the break-ins and the suspects' activities. Shortly thereafter, the suspects were located in a nearby parking lot. Appellant and Owens were sitting next to each other with a shoulder bag between them. Baucum's pocketbook was among the contents in the bag. Owens was immediately placed under arrest. At this time and without the knowledge of the arresting officer, the three complainants saw Owens slip appellant a large machete-type knife. Appellant attempted to conceal the weapon in his clothing. This exchange was pointed out to a second officer who frisked appellant and removed the knife[1] from his waistband. Following his arrest, appellant told the police that he had found the knife on the ground and was carrying it for his protection.
II Appellant claims that the government failed to sustain its burden of proof that he aided and abetted Owens in the commission of the theft of ten dollars from Williams and of the pocketbook from Baucum. We find that there is insufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for theft of the ten dollar bill since he came onto the scene well after the Williams theft and when Owens was seen with the bill. We reverse as to this count only. Cf. Bailey v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 98, 416 F.2d 1110, 1113 (1969). *889 It is well-established that an individual who knowingly participates in the commission of a criminal act by assisting the principal is equally liable. The elements to establish aiding and abetting are (1) that an offense was committed by someone, (2) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission, and (3) that he did so with guilty knowledge. Byrd v. United States, D.C.App., 364 A.2d 1215, 1219 (1976). To ascertain whether an accused is liable as an aider and abettor, a reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government. See Ellis v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 404, 411 (1978). The facts and circumstances of this case reveal that each of these elements has been satisfied. Appellant, shortly after the thefts, was found sitting next to a shoulder bag containing one of the stolen items. Appellant's possession of the stolen pocketbook, coupled with the testimony regarding his interaction with Owens and Bennett, permitted the jury to infer that the theft of Baucum's pocketbook was part of a joint endeavor and that appellant was a participant in the crimes. See Creek v. United States, D.C.App., 324 A.2d 688, 689 (1974); Pendergrast v. United States, 135 U.S.App. D.C. 20, 31, 416 F.2d 776, 787 (1969). Appellant's involvement in the crime was further evidenced by his attempt to conceal the knife which Owens had passed to him. In view of these facts, we find that there was sufficient evidence to establish that appellant aided and abetted in the theft of the pocketbook. We find no error.
III Additionally, appellant challenges his weapons conviction, D.C.Code 1981, § 22-3204, on the theory that a reasonable juror could not conclude that he intended to possess the knife for use as a deadly or a dangerous weapon. This argument is without merit. Contrary to appellant's claim, proof of intent to use a weapon for an unlawful purpose is not an element of a § 22-3204 violation. Mitchell v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 216, 217 (1973); Leftwich v. United States, D.C.App., 251 A.2d 646 (1969). Although criminal intent is an essential element in crimes derived from the common law, carrying a concealed weapon was not a crime at common law and the only required proof of this section is an intent to do the proscribed act. See McMillen v. United States, D.C.App., 407 A.2d 603, 605 (1979). Here, appellant's actions establish the requisite general intent to uphold his conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction of petit larceny charging theft from Williams. We affirm the other convictions. Given the general sentence (one year probation under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act), we remand for resentencing as the trial court may deem appropriate. So ordered. NOTES [1] The knife measured approximately 12 inches in length and had an eight-inch blade. | 10-30-2013 | [
"451 A.2d 887 (1982) Daryle R. MACKEY, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee. No. 81-1238. District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Submitted August 27, 1982. Decided October 7, 1982. *888 Gregory Collins, appointed by the court, Washington, D.C., for appellant. Stanley S. Harris, U.S. Atty., John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, and Michael W. Farrell, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., for appellee. Before NEBEKER and BELSON, Associate Judges, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired. PER CURIAM: Appellant, following a jury trial was convicted of two counts of petit larceny and one count of carrying a deadly weapon, D.C.Code 1981, §§ 22-2202, -3204. In urging reversal, he claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. We affirm the convictions for carrying a deadly weapon and the first count of petit larceny and reverse and remand for resentencing for the second count of petit larceny.",
"I At approximately 3:00 a.m. on June 8, 1980, Tanya Williams left a nightclub in Northwest Washington and walked across the street to a parking lot where she had left her car. She immediately discovered that it had been broken into and that her wallet containing ten dollars in cash was missing. At the same time, Geraldine Daniels and LeRoy Talley left the club and walked toward Talley's car, which was parked next to Williams' vehicle. En route, a man clenching a ten dollar bill in his hand passed them. Upon reaching his car, Talley discovered that it too had been broken into. Suspicious of the man whom he had seen moments earlier, Talley immediately pursued him to inquire about the breaking. The suspect, later identified as Owens, made no verbal response but threatened Talley with a machete-type knife. At this point, Talley and Daniels reentered the club to call the police.",
"They returned to the parking lot with their friend Baucum to wait for the police. Baucum discovered that his pocketbook was missing from Talley's car. At around 4:00 a.m., Talley, Daniels and Baucum, from their vantage point in Talley's car, saw Owens leave the club and approach appellant and Michael Bennett. The three observers watched the activities of these men for the next hour. The observers testified that appellant and his cohorts would take turns leaving the area in front of the club, return and then place unidentified objects into two large shoulder bags. When the police had not arrived by 5:30 a.m., Talley flagged down a patrol car to report the break-ins and the suspects' activities.",
"Shortly thereafter, the suspects were located in a nearby parking lot. Appellant and Owens were sitting next to each other with a shoulder bag between them. Baucum's pocketbook was among the contents in the bag. Owens was immediately placed under arrest. At this time and without the knowledge of the arresting officer, the three complainants saw Owens slip appellant a large machete-type knife. Appellant attempted to conceal the weapon in his clothing. This exchange was pointed out to a second officer who frisked appellant and removed the knife[1] from his waistband. Following his arrest, appellant told the police that he had found the knife on the ground and was carrying it for his protection.",
"II Appellant claims that the government failed to sustain its burden of proof that he aided and abetted Owens in the commission of the theft of ten dollars from Williams and of the pocketbook from Baucum. We find that there is insufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction for theft of the ten dollar bill since he came onto the scene well after the Williams theft and when Owens was seen with the bill. We reverse as to this count only. Cf. Bailey v. United States, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 95, 98, 416 F.2d 1110, 1113 (1969). *889 It is well-established that an individual who knowingly participates in the commission of a criminal act by assisting the principal is equally liable.",
"The elements to establish aiding and abetting are (1) that an offense was committed by someone, (2) that the accused assisted or participated in the commission, and (3) that he did so with guilty knowledge. Byrd v. United States, D.C.App., 364 A.2d 1215, 1219 (1976). To ascertain whether an accused is liable as an aider and abettor, a reviewing court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the government. See Ellis v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 404, 411 (1978). The facts and circumstances of this case reveal that each of these elements has been satisfied.",
"Appellant, shortly after the thefts, was found sitting next to a shoulder bag containing one of the stolen items. Appellant's possession of the stolen pocketbook, coupled with the testimony regarding his interaction with Owens and Bennett, permitted the jury to infer that the theft of Baucum's pocketbook was part of a joint endeavor and that appellant was a participant in the crimes. See Creek v. United States, D.C.App., 324 A.2d 688, 689 (1974); Pendergrast v. United States, 135 U.S.App. D.C. 20, 31, 416 F.2d 776, 787 (1969). Appellant's involvement in the crime was further evidenced by his attempt to conceal the knife which Owens had passed to him. In view of these facts, we find that there was sufficient evidence to establish that appellant aided and abetted in the theft of the pocketbook.",
"We find no error. III Additionally, appellant challenges his weapons conviction, D.C.Code 1981, § 22-3204, on the theory that a reasonable juror could not conclude that he intended to possess the knife for use as a deadly or a dangerous weapon. This argument is without merit. Contrary to appellant's claim, proof of intent to use a weapon for an unlawful purpose is not an element of a § 22-3204 violation. Mitchell v. United States, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 216, 217 (1973); Leftwich v. United States, D.C.App., 251 A.2d 646 (1969). Although criminal intent is an essential element in crimes derived from the common law, carrying a concealed weapon was not a crime at common law and the only required proof of this section is an intent to do the proscribed act. See McMillen v. United States, D.C.App., 407 A.2d 603, 605 (1979). Here, appellant's actions establish the requisite general intent to uphold his conviction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction of petit larceny charging theft from Williams. We affirm the other convictions.",
"Given the general sentence (one year probation under 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1976) of the Federal Youth Corrections Act), we remand for resentencing as the trial court may deem appropriate. So ordered. NOTES [1] The knife measured approximately 12 inches in length and had an eight-inch blade."
]
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