The Honorable John Raymond Tunheim
Chairman
Assassination Records
Review Board
600 E. Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Judge Tunheim:

(C) I have just received informal word of the decisions the JFK Board made at its 17 November 1997 meeting. Most of the Board's decisions--those relating to the CIA presence (in Warrenton), CIA's involvement in various non-governmental organizations, and the details of CIA funding of the Cuban Revolutionary Council--are very welcome. I must, however, urge the Board to reconsider its decision to release documents in a form that would reveal the Agency's use of State Department cover.

(C) We stand behind the position that we have presented in writing and in discussions with the Board on previous occasions. I would welcome an opportunity to have a senior CIA representative meet with the Board at your convenience to explain why the Agency considers this information so sensitive and to answer any questions you may have. Meanwhile, I offer the following summary of our fundamental concerns.

(S) Effective official cover is necessary to enable our officers to work overseas in often hostile and volatile environments. Official cover also enables the Agency to conduct its business with allied liaison services in countries where host governments would find it politically unacceptable to acknowledge a cooperative relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency. In all such settings, State Department cover is critically important because its use affords our officers the rights and privileges set forth in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic and Consular Immunity--diplomatic immunity, in particular. Indeed, the effectiveness of the Agency's use of State Department cover...
Judge Tunheim

clearly illustrates the purpose behind the Director's statutory obligation to protect intelligence methods from unnecessary and inappropriate disclosure.

(S) No other cover mechanism can provide our officers the operational utility and personal security that State Department cover does. Achieving effective cover requires that our officers be fully integrated into State Department entities, offices, and functions. Our officers are routinely assigned State Department duties to make it harder for hostile services and others who might try to harm or expose our officers to identify them as Agency employees. Official acknowledgment of even the fact of Agency use of State Department cover would increase dramatically the risks that both Agency officers and our State Department colleagues encounter in serving US interests around the world.

(S) State Department cover continues to be an important intelligence method. Its use is undiminished since the 1960s, and it will remain essential for the foreseeable future. I urge the Board to reconsider its recent decision insofar as it concerns the Agency's use of State Department cover. In this regard, we will be forwarding a more comprehensive memorandum addressing the damage issue prior to the next Board meeting, and we would also like to offer the Board the opportunity for a personal appearance by a senior CIA representative should that be appropriate.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey


SECRET

13 May 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: CIA Proposal on Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses in Assassination Records

I. (U) Background and Recommendation

1. (C) Alias documentation includes materials carried on the person of any CIA officer or foreign asset traveling and conducting business under a fictitious identity. Aliases are widely used by CIA officers working under both official and non-official cover. They are also used by those on TDY status traveling to or from Headquarters as well as between field stations.

2. (S) This package contains five kinds of information relating to cover methods currently in use in connection with aliases:

A) Foreign government forgeries (the Mexican and Panamanian passports used by David Morales under various aliases);

B) US federal and state documents (social security cards, drivers licenses, and birth certificates);

C) Business documents used with the prior agreement of the company, organization, or association they represent;

D) Forged business documents;

E) Accommodation addresses ("residences of record" for anyone working under alias).

3. (S) Many of the specific forms of alias documentation represented in this package are identical to those used today by Agency officers and assets using aliases and operating under both official and non-official cover. Moreover, certain aspects of their use in support of non-official cover cause CIA particular concern in the event of disclosure:

SECRET

1
SECRET

- Use of non-official cover is expanding rapidly in response to changes in CIA targets following the collapse of the USSR.

- The use by CIA of non-official cover and the details of how it is employed are less well known than our use of official cover.

- Some of our most uniquely valuable human intelligence comes from this method.

- Non-official cover affords its user no diplomatic immunity. Since some of CIA’s most hostile targets necessitate the use of non-official cover, our officers and assets working against these targets run the risk of being arrested, imprisoned, or worse.

4. (S) The likelihood of damage from disclosure of specific information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses runs the gamut from “certain” to “unpredictable.” Based on past evidence, public release of references to the forged Mexican and Panamanian passports would be virtually certain to draw a reaction from those governments that would harm US diplomatic relations and deny CIA its use of a currently valuable tool. The probability of litigation from disclosure of business documents is also quite high.

- The damage from release of 25–30 year-old addresses and specifics on seemingly innocuous pocket litter is less predictable. Nonetheless, it has broad implications for both the current use of non-official cover and for the safety of individuals associated with these methods in the past, and therefore CIA can not afford to ignore it. To manage the risk, if denied the option of postponing the release, would require an extremely time consuming review of each piece of information on a case-by-case basis.

5. (U) None of the information being considered for release adds significantly to the historical record on the Kennedy assassination. The minimal added value from its release is small in comparison to the damage, both certain and potential, that would result. Since the cost-benefit ratio is so skewed, we recommend that release of specific information on alias documentation and accommodation addresses be postponed and that generic substitute language be used in its place.

II. (U) Discussion of Potential Damage

6. (C) Disclosure of information relating to the five categories discussed in paragraph 2 above can reasonably be expected to cause the following types of damage:

a) Damage to diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama;

b) Litigation from private sector firms;

c) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method;

SECRET

2
d) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets;

e) Potential threats to CIA’s agreements with other US government entities.

7. Category by category, the specific kinds of damage most likely to result from disclosure of the five types of information outlined in section 2 above are:

→ A) Foreign government forgeries.
(The Mexican and Panamanian passports carried by David Morales.)

a) (S) Damage to US diplomatic relations with Mexico and Panama would result from release of information on Morales’s passport documentation. In the past, CIA’s production and use of various countries’ passports, birth certificates, and other official documents have been done both with and without specific agreement from those countries. With respect to the documents in this package reflecting our use of Mexican passports, the latter was undoubtedly the case. Moreover, CIA still continues to provide its assets and officers with forged Mexican passports without the agreement of the Mexican government.

- The Mexican government has always been extremely sensitive to issues of national sovereignty and would almost certainly express official public resentment at CIA’s usurping of its unique authority by producing false passports and birth certificates of Mexican citizens.

(S) There are concrete examples of past incidents involving disclosure which have resulted in strong censure and the threat of diplomatic action: In the aftermath of the Iranian takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1978, among the papers the Iranians discovered were forged Belgian and West German identification documents including passports. Upon reading this in the Iranian media, Belgian intelligence officials summoned our people and threatened that if all such documents were not destroyed immediately and the practice ended, there would be exceptionally dire consequences in the spheres of both diplomatic relations and intelligence cooperation.

- Besides the insult to its sovereignty, at least one additional strong factor in the Belgian government’s acrimonious representation was the desire to avoid any association with CIA, however spurious, of Belgian citizens living, working, or traveling abroad.

(S) The Germans also registered their ire in strong terms, noting that in using German passports outside the Warsaw Pact theater we had exceeded our negotiated right to reproduce their documentation for use by our officers. During this demarche, similar threats were made to end the liaison relationship with their intelligence service.
• As a result of such flaps, CIA has little recourse but to accede to direct demands that we cease using a given country’s documentation, which narrows our range of options for providing officers with operational aliases.

→B) Federal and state documents
(Social security cards, FAA documentation, driver’s licenses, birth certificates)

e) (C) Potential threat to CIA’s agreements with other US government entities
At present, sixteen states assist CIA in providing documentation for alias identities, including drivers licenses. There is an unwritten understanding with each that CIA will do all it can to protect the confidentiality of this agreement. Although the immediate damage from release of this would certainly be less severe than the harm done to US diplomatic relations from the release of information on passport forgery, these arrangements could be terminated if they receive too much publicity and state officials or politicians were publicly embarrassed.

• Termination of any of such agreements would curtail CIA’s options for providing its officers with solid cover.

→C) and D) Business documents
(either forged or produced with prior negotiated agreement)
(Rotary club, record and book club membership, AAA, specific bank cards, travel club, Continental Insurance Co.)

b) Litigation from private sector firms;
c) Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method; and
d) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.

b) (C) Litigation from private sector firms. The same probability of litigation applies to both forged documents and those produced with the permission of certain companies. Many of these firms conduct business abroad in a variety of political environments that range from friendly to hostile. For reasons relating to loss of revenue and physical threats to their employees and other assets, they cannot afford to have even the public hint of an association with CIA, let alone official disclosure of this fact.

• The likelihood of litigation from such disclosure would be high. CIA’s Office of General Counsel has on file a number of letters from private sector firms setting forth their right to take legal action in the event of the disclosure of their relationship with CIA.

• In the past, some firms have taken legal action against CIA for disclosure of an association that adversely affected their business.
c) **Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method.** Firms which assist CIA by permitting the use of their documentation in support of non-official cover do so voluntarily and without remuneration. In addition, CIA generally requests that the companies sign secrecy agreements. Therefore, the unilateral release by CIA of information about this association would complicate future negotiations by creating the perception that we are an unreliable partner.

- The official disclosure of one such secret arrangement, even at a 30-year remove, would almost certainly be noted in the corporate board rooms of all firms that have an association with CIA.

(S) Release of information on private sector alias documentation would reduce CIA’s range of options for supporting its increasing use of non-official cover. The magnitude of the threat this carries is unpredictable. Because of the versatility of non-official cover as well as its unique applicability to certain types of targets, CIA’s apprehensions about giving up information that could help adversaries are substantial.

- Non-official cover is the most productive way to gather human intelligence on terrorist organizations, weapons proliferators, narcotics traffickers, members of international organized crime and money launderers, and countries with which we have no diplomatic relations. Almost all of our intelligence on weapons proliferation, for example, comes from NOC officers and assets.

**d) (C) Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.** Adding to an adversary’s knowledge of specific forms of alias documentation used in non-official cover could help unmask CIA officers or assets by the profile of typical documentation CIA is known to carry. With the increased availability of sophisticated statistical analysis, the threat from “profiling” would increase exponentially as more information is released. This is of particular concern when working against hostile targets such as terrorists and narco-traffickers.

- Intelligence collection against targets like these requires a watertight alias documentation mechanism that allows our officers to operate as safely and freely as possible.

→E) **Accommodation addresses**

c) **Potential damage to a growing intelligence collection method;** and
d) **Potential physical danger to CIA officers and assets.**

(C) Accommodation addresses were and still are used in support of a wide variety of covert operations involving both official and non-official cover. The potential damage
from disclosure of specific addresses relates both to present and past users as well as to those individuals who grant, or granted, CIA the right to use their addresses.

- The people who give us the right to use their addresses are in many cases not directly associated with CIA. They may be relatives of CIA employees or simply private citizens. Disclosure of addresses could complicate the search for individuals willing to assist CIA.

- The release of a specific accommodation address, even if it is no longer in use, could enable an adversary to make positive identifications of an entire series of aliases of individuals who used that address in support of their cover package.

- Conversely, an alias that is released can be traced through local postal records to a corresponding accommodation address.

- It is possible to endanger those individuals, including foreign assets, known to have been associated with a given alias, even if the individual who bore the alias is no longer living.


13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the
Assassination Records Review Board

1. The attached memorandum and attachments are in
response to questions raised by ARRB members during the 16
October 1996 briefing. They are provided to the Review Board
for background purposes only. We request that the memorandum
and its attachments be returned to CIA once the Review Board
has completed its deliberations on these issues.

2. Please note that the author of the memorandum is
under cover and her name is classified.

John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

This memorandum is unclassified
when separated from attachments
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira
Historical Review Group

FROM: Linda A. Jasper
Deputy Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

1. During the OCC briefing of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board on 16 October 1996, members of the Board asked three questions to which OCC said it would respond after additional research. Following are the questions and the responses:

   a. How many real businesses or contrived facilities in the commercial cover program are connected to the publications industry? Response: A few real businesses are loosely connected with the publications industry, and the names of a few contrived facilities could be perceived as being associated.

   b. How many companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and how many participate today? Response: Approximately 500 companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and circa 1,800 are currently in the program.
SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

c. Could a copy of the secrecy agreement which is signed by company officials participating in the commercial cover program be made available, and has it changed since the 1960s? Response: Attached is a copy of the secrecy agreement used from 1955 to 1988 and a copy of the agreement used from 1988 to the present. The only difference is an addendum on the reverse which was added in 1991 pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991.

2. This memorandum and its attachments are for background information only and must be returned to the Central Intelligence Agency after review by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board.

Attachment: as stated

cc: Fredrick Wickham, IMS
SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

DC/OCC(lh/LJasper, 32435 18Nov96 file:jfkboard)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DC/OCC (Ljasper)
1 - His. Review Board(BHarrelson)
1 - OCC/EXO (EMathias)
1 - OGC (Ciprinal)
SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________  SIGNATURE: ____________________________

/REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

DATE: ____________________________  ORGANIZATION: ____________________________

DATE: ____________________________
SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________  SIGNATURE: ____________________________

REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

DATE: ____________________________  ORGANIZATION: ____________________________

DATE: ____________________________
ADDENDUM

Pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991, the following language shall be incorporated into and considered a part of the attached nondisclosure agreement:

"These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 USC 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that would expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling."


CSI-0042/95
27 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Executive Director
General Counsel

FROM: Brian Latell
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

SUBJECT: JFK Review Board Actions on CIA Records

REFERENCE: Letter to DCI fr Executive Director, ARRB dtd 21 June, 1995, Same Subject

1. Action Requested. That you disapprove the DO recommendation for you to sign the attached letter to the President. The letter recommends that the President postpone the release by the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB) of the names of two CIA employees who retired under cover. (C)

2. Background. On 7 June 1995, the ARRB made a formal determination to release in full to the National Archives 16 CIA documents from Lee Harvey Oswald's 201 file. The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 stipulates that the President has 30 days after written notification of such determinations to either request the disclosure or postponement of disclosure of documents. Appeals procedures also require that the Agency advise the White House Counsel within seven days of notification of Board actions, if we wish to appeal. The Agency was notified on 21 June 1995 (see reference). OGC will unofficially notify White House Counsel within the seven-day period of the DO objection to release. (U)

3. This Center has worked closely with the Board and its staff and has declassified about 220,000 pages of Agency records that have been sent to the National Archives. A large percentage contain redactions, however, and it is those excisions that are now being systematically reviewed by the Board which has full access to the unredacted records. The Board will meet more or less monthly and is likely to press for lifting a significant percentage of CIA's redactions. The pending determination is the first taken by the Board involving Agency records. (U)
SUBJECT: JFK Review Board Actions on CIA Records

4. The DO Position: The Acting Deputy Director for Operations reluctantly acquiesces to the release in full of the 16 documents with the exception of two that contain the names of two Agency employees who retired in covert status. The DO argues that acknowledging these officers could expose them to physical danger, possibly threaten past operations and individuals with whom they worked, and abrogate our agreement to protect their identities. The two documents (#104-10015-10052 and #104-1005-10153) and the DO's argument for the continued protection of the two former employees are attached. (S)

5. CSI Position: After consultation with OGC, we do not believe the DO's damage argument would merit Presidential reversal of the Board's decision. The Board's staff has advised that in the absence of "clear and convincing evidence" of a threat to the personal safety of a retired officer if his or her employment were revealed, the Board does not believe the JFK Act permits withholding names. The DO does not cite evidence that the two officers would be in physical danger. Furthermore, OGC advises that the DO's current policy of liberally rolling back cover for career covert officers who ask to be retired overt would seriously undermine the credibility of such an appeal. (S)

6. Recommendation: That you not appeal the JFK Board's decision to the President and thus that you disapprove the DO's recommendation. (U)

Attachments:
A. Documents 104-10015-10052 and 104-1005-10153
B. DO Document

DISAPPROVED:

Director of Central Intelligence Date
SUBJECT: JFK Review Board Actions on CIA Records

DCI/CSI/BLatell:aw/30214 (27 June 95)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/atts)
1 - DDCI (w/atts)
1 - ExDir (w/atts)
1 - Executive Registry (w/atts)
1 - Executive Secretariat (w/atts)
1 - General Counsel (w/atts)
1 - ADDO (w/atts)
1 - D/CSI (w/atts)
1 - C/HRG/CSI (w/atts)
1 - C/HS/CSI (w/atts)
1 - CSI file (w/atts)
1 - CSI chrono (w/atts)
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Under the "President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992," this agency has been reviewing and forwarding to the National Archives all of its records relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a part of that process, those records and specific information within records which were determined to require continuing protection were postponed from release under the guidelines of the Act.

The Assassination Records Review Board appointed by you is responsible for reviewing the postponed materials not only of this agency, but all government departments involved in this effort. The Board then makes a determination that a particular postponement was justified under the Act or that it was not. If the latter occurs, the agency then has thirty days in which to present its case to you and ask you to concur in the continued postponement.

We are now at the point where the Board has made a determination to release the names of two former Agency officers who served in a covert status during their Agency careers in a number of overseas posts. The position of the Acting Deputy Director of Operations and one in which I concur, is that release of these two names would do harm to the Agency and its operations and, postponement is proper under the Act. In addition, the revelation of these two names would not add to public understanding of assassination issues in any substantial way. Thus, I recommend that you direct the continued postponement of the two names.

On behalf of the Agency, I thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

John Deutch
Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

Unclassified When Separated
From Enclosure

SECRET
The President

DCI/CSI/HRG/BHarrelson:pn/x30210  (27 Jun 95)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/enc)
1 - DCI (w/enc)
1 - DDCI (w/enc)
1 - ExDir (w/enc)
1 - Executive Secretariat (w/enc)
1 - Executive Registry (w/enc)
1 - General Counsel (w/enc)
1 - ADDO (w/enc)
1 - D/CSI (w/enc)
1 - C/HRG/CSI (w/enc)
1 - C/HS/CSI (w/enc)
1 - CSI file (w/enc)
1 - CSI chrono (w/enc)
26 June 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: L. Kay Oliver
Brian Latell

FROM: William H. McNair
DO/IRO

SUBJECT: JFK Information Release

Per SA to ADDO, please consider this as the official DDO response and include it in your memo.

The DDO reluctantly acquiesces to release of documents cited in ARRB Memo of 21 June 1995 with the following exceptions:

Document No. 104-10015-10052, CIA Cable, DIR 74673: C. Bustos, originated the cable and testified about it using her pseudo. She retired in a covert status and resides in the United States. Release of her name as a CIA employee will damage cover credibility, expose her to the public as a CIA employee subject to any physical threats which might ensue, and abrogate our agreement with her as to our willingness to protect her identify in return for her willingness to engage in clandestine operations on behalf of the CIA. We would also point out that she was later assigned in several overseas locations including Mexico City and a posting as COS in Trinidad. Exposure of her as a CIA employee would also endanger any operations in which she might have been engaged. Substitution of her pseudo in lieu of true name would allow the identification of a person yet protect the persona itself.

Document No. 104-10015-10153, CIA Cable, DIR 85039: R.W. Herbert was chief of WH Div at the time and signed off on this cable as authenticating officer. He was an "integrated State Officer" who retired in a cover status. His present residence is unknown but his overseas assignments as an U.S. State Department officer would be compromised by exposure of him as a CIA officer. It is believed that exposing him as a CIA officer would not only endanger his operations and those associated with the operations, but would also place him in physical danger in that his field of operations involved anti-Cuban operations.


SECRET
CSI - Internal Use Only

3 January 1996

Note To: D/CSI

Subject: JFK Appeal

1. Attached is an advance copy of the memorandum for the DCI being prepared by DO/IMS (with OGC's help) requesting an appeal of certain ARRB decisions. The memorandum is currently (this a.m.) being redone in DO/IMS for technical reasons (wrong font, distribution, etc.). The DDO is expected to see it this afternoon or tomorrow. After DO approval, the memorandum will pass through OGC (Smith) and CSI for comments before going to the DCI.

2. HRG reviewers are not convinced that the "LICRYPT issue" (Attachment A) should be appealed. While the DO makes a good case on the particular document in question, given the extensive information on [liaison with the Mexicans] that has been released in documents dated after November 22 1963, HRG reviewers question this as an appeal issue. I discussed the issue with John, but we did not come to a final HRG position.

3. HRG reviewers support the appeal in Attachment B and John agrees.

4. HRG reviewers can support the appeal of the four stations in Attachment C. However, we believe that opening a Nov/Dec 1963 window for Oswald related documents might be a better approach. We are concerned that the State Department has not been part of the discussion--the impact on cover and foreign relations of acknowledging stations. Although the DO is appealing the release of these four stations, it has agreed to acknowledge all of the South and Central American stations plus London, Paris, Ottawa, Bonn and the German bases. I raised the State issue with OGC ([Linda Cipriani]). She agreed on the need to include State in the discussion; once the decision is made to appeal, she will contact her counterpart at State. I have not had an opportunity to discuss the State issue with John.

CC: C/HRG

Administrative Internal Use Only
When Separated From Attachment


SECRET

CSI-0353/96
8 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

VIA: Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination Records Review Board, 16 October 1996

REFERENCE: Memo for DCI fr C/HRG, dtd 13 June 96, Same Subject

(U) This memorandum provides background information for a meeting between you and the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), which is scheduled for 16 October 1996 in your office between 9:00 and 10:00 a.m. The meeting was requested by ARRB Chairman, John Tunheim as a courtesy call.

(U) Background: Mr. Tunheim, recently appointed a federal judge in Minnesota, asked that he and the other four Board members have an opportunity to provide you with a brief description of the Board’s purpose and activities. The Board’s Executive Director, David Marwell, and General Counsel, Jeremy Gunn will also participate. The ARRB members were appointed by President Clinton in 1993 as required by statute. Their principal responsibility is to ensure public disclosure of all government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.

(FOUO) Topics the Board May Discuss: The Board probably will discuss their concern about whether they will be able to complete their work by the congressionally-imposed deadline of October 1997. This concern relates to the very time-consuming process that the ARRB and its 30-person staff is obliged to use in reviewing all of the thousands of relevant documents that are redacted, which for CIA comprise the bulk of our documents.

(FOUO) The Board may also seek your personal commitment to continue the Agency’s dedication of resources--people and computer capability--to the review of JFK documents. CIA has worked closely with the Board and its staff from the beginning.
SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination Records Review Board, 16 October 1996

We have succeeded thus far in working out cooperative arrangements for resolving differences of opinion as to what information can be released to the public and what should be withheld because of sensitivities.

(U) The Board may also express interest in gaining access to records that are not part of the JFK records (the sequestered collection), but which the Board regards as possibly containing useful background information or leads for further inquiry. We have released some 227,000 pages of relevant Agency records thus far and are continuing to collaborate with the Board to identify additional information that can be released.

(U) Suggested Talking Points: You may want to emphasize the Agency’s commitment to continuing the very positive relationship with the Board, including making people and computer expertise available to process relevant documents.

(S) You may want to assure the Board that CIA is determined to give the Board and designated staff full access to all assassination records, as required by the JFK statute. At the same time, it would be helpful to stress that there are certain categories of sensitive information that require continued protection and should not be released. Among the types of information contained in the JFK records that we need to protect are:

- Identities of agents and CIA officers who retired under cover.

- The Agency’s relationships with liaison services, and information received from foreign governments.

  -- A specific example in this category is the Agency’s current request to the Board to protect the liaison relationship with Australia, and to withhold documents received from Australia.

- Need to protect non-official cover.

  -- The Board is planning at its 15-16 October meeting to review documents that identify companies that provided commercial cover. We are arranging to have the DO brief the Board on the potential damage to the non-official cover program and companies involved if such cover is compromised.
SECRET

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination Records Review Board

- Locations of certain stations and facilities.

-- In this latter connection, the Board is expected to consider at its 15-16 October meeting our request that the Warrenton Training Center not be disclosed as a CIA facility.

John F. Pereira

Attachments:
A. Memo to DCI, 13 June 96
B. List of Board Members
C. Biographies of Board members
   Executive Director
   General Counsel
SECRET

SUBJECT: Courtesy Visit of JFK Assassination Records Review Board, 16 October 1996

DCI/CSI/HRG/JPereira:bas/30373 (8 Oct 96)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee (w/atts)
1 - Executive Registry (w/atts)
1 - Executive Director (w/atts)
1 - D/CSI (w/atts)
1 - C/HRG (w/atts)
1 - CSI/Chrono (w/atts)
1 - HRG file (w/atts)
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

CSI 0327/96
13 June 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
     Executive Director
     Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John F. Pereira
      Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Request of JFK Assassination Records
         Review Board for Courtesy Visit with DCI

1. Action Requested: Paragraph 4 below contains a recommendation for your approval. The Chairman of the JFK Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB), John Tunheim, has requested that you meet with him and the other four Board members at Headquarters Building some time in the next several months. He asks that the meeting be arranged to coincide with one of their monthly sessions, which are held in Washington. (The schedule of their meetings is attached.) The Board’s Executive Director, David Marwell, would also participate.

2. Background: Mr. Tunheim, recently appointed a federal judge in Minnesota, would like to provide you with a brief description of the Board’s purpose and activities. The Board has paid similar visits to the FBI, where they met with Director Freeh, and to NSA and the Secret Service. The ARRB members were appointed by President Clinton in 1993 as required by statute. Their principal responsibility is to ensure public disclosure of government records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The statute grants the Board full access to all documents that are related to either the assassination or past investigations into the assassination.

3. CIA has worked closely with the Board and its staff from the beginning. The Board’s Executive Director and we have worked out cooperative arrangements for resolving differences of opinion as to what information can be released to the public and what should be withheld because of sensitivities. We have released approximately 227,000 pages of relevant Agency records
SUBJECT: Request of JFK Assassination Records Review Board for Courtesy Visit with DCI

thus far, and are continuing to collaborate with the Board to identify additional information that can be released.

4. **Recommendation:** That you agree to meet with the JFK Assassination Records Review Board at a date to be determined.

[Signature]

John F. Pereira

Attachments:
A: ARRB Meeting Schedule
B: Biographies of Board Members

APPROVED:

[Signature]

Director of Central Intelligence

Date
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SUBJECT: Request for JFK Assassination Records
Review Board for Courtesy Visit with DCI

DCI/CSI/HRG/JPereira:bas/30373 (13 June 96)

Distribution:
Original - Addressee
1 - Executive Registry
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - D/CSI
1 - C/HRG
Assassination Records Review Board

Members:

Chair: John R. Tunheim (Federal judge, Minnesota)

Dr. Henry Graff (Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University)

Dr. Kermit L. Hall (Dean, College of Humanities, Ohio State University)

Dr. William L. Joyce (Associate University Librarian, Princeton University)

Dr. Anna K. Nelson (Adjunct Professor of History, American University)

Dr. David G. Marwell ARRB Executive Director

Dr. T. Jeremy Gunn ARRB General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board

The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair

Experience
State of Minnesota, Chief Deputy Attorney General, 1986-Present

State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Solicitor General, 1985-86

State of Minnesota, Office of the Attorney General, Manager, Public Affairs Litigation Division, 1984-85

Law Firm of Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard and Donnelly, Associate Attorney, 1981-84

Senior U.S. District Judge Earl Larson in Minneapolis, Law Clerk, 1980-81

United States Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Staff Assistant, 1975-77

Education
J.D., University of Minnesota Law School, 1980

B.A., Concordia College, 1975

Dr. Henry F. Graff

Experience
Columbia University, Professor Emeritus of History, 1991-Present

Freedom Forum Media Studies Center, Senior Fellow, 1991-92

Columbia University, Department of History, Instructor to Full Professor, 1946-91, Chairman, 1961-64

Education
Ph.D., Columbia University, 1949

M.A., Columbia University, 1942

B.S., City College, 1941
Dr. Kermit L. Hall

Experience
The Ohio State University, Dean, College of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, 1994 - Present

The University of Tulsa, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences and Professor of History and Law, 1992-94

University of Florida, Associate/Full Professor of History and Law, 1981-92

Wayne State University, Assistant/Associate Professor, Department of History, 1976-81

Vanderbilt University, Assistant Professor, Department of History, 1972-76

Education
Master of Study of Law, Yale University Law School, 1980

Ph.D., The University of Minnesota, 1972

M.A., Syracuse University, 1967

B.A., The University of Akron, 1966

Dr. William L. Joyce

Experience
Princeton University, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections, 1986-Present

The New York Public Library, Assistant Director for Rare Books and Manuscripts, 1981-1985

American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, Curator of Manuscripts, 1972-81, Education Officer, 1988-81

William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Manuscripts Librarian, 1968-72

Education
Ph.D., The University of Michigan, 1974
M.A., St John's University (N.Y.), 1966

B.A., Providence College, 1964

Dr. Anna K. Nelson

Experience
The American University, Adjunct Professor of History, 1992-Present, 1986-88

Arizona State University, Distinguished Visiting Professor, 1992

The American University, Associate Professor in History, 1991

Tulane University, Adjunct Associate Professor in History, 1988-90

George Washington University, Instructor to Adjunct Associate Professor, 1972-85

George Washington University, Director, History and Public Policy Program, 1980-82

Education
Ph.D., George Washington University, 1972

M.A., University of Oklahoma, 1956

B.A., University of Oklahoma, 1954
DAVID G. MARWELL

Biographical Information

On July 1, 1994, the Berlin Document Center (BDC) was transferred to the German Federal Archives (Bundesarchiv) marking the end of nearly 48 years of American control of this unique organization. With an estimated 25 million Nazi-era personnel-related files, the BDC was once a crucial source of evidence for the Nuremberg Trials and is today an incalculably important source for the study of the Third Reich. The transfer also marked the end of David Marwell’s tenure as Director of the BDC.

A well-trained scholar with a Ph.D. in History, Marwell came to Berlin in 1988 from the Office of Special Investigations (OSI), U.S. Department of Justice where he held the position of Chief of Investigative Research. At OSI, he was involved in researching and preparing cases against accused Nazi war criminals residing in the United States. In addition, he was selected to participate in the Klaus Barbie Investigation (1983) and played a major role in the Josef Mengele investigation (1985), both of which received international attention.

In connection with the Joseph Mengele and Klaus Barbie investigations, Marwell was in charge of assembling all relevant documentary evidence relating to any possible connection between these individuals and U.S. institutions or personnel. The investigations were two of the most unusual ever undertaken and through them he gained significant experiences in the identifying and locating documentary resources. The former Director of OSI, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., in his book Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in America, described Marwell as “an experienced and careful historian who could find documents in archives when no one else could.”

When Marwell arrived at the Document Center, the institution had been rocked by a scandal involving a significant theft of documents. The resulting focus on the Center revealed that it had been neglected in many areas for many years and suffered from an outmoded administrative structure, a disaffected and undertrained staff and a lack of professional guidance. It was Marwell’s job to bring the Center up to standard and prepare it for turnover to the German government.

The challenges facing Marwell were not only to manage a complex institution (with an annual budget of eight million deutschmarks) and repair past deficiencies, but also to define a future for an institution in transition. He prepared a “five year plan” for the BDC that set five goals, developed a corresponding program to meet each goal, and designed a system to monitor the progress. In achieving all of the goals, Marwell:

- Introduced computer technology (there was not a single computer at the BDC when he arrived) and developed a sophisticated, integrated information retrieval system that has been described as a model for archive administration;
- Created a fully professional document conservation and restoration program;
- Developed a staff (50 Germans and 20 Americans).
T. Jeremy Gunn
1652 Wild Pine Way
Reston, Virginia 20194
(703) 481-8196

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Harvard University, Committee on the Study of Religion, 1991
Field: Religion and Society
Affiliation: Graduate Associate, Center for European Studies
Awards: French Government Grant; Krupp Foundation Fellow, Gilbert Chinard Award,
Institut Français de Washington; Center for European Studies Grant

J.D. Boston University School of Law, 1987, Magna cum laude
Awards: Hennessey and Liacos Distinguished Scholar

A.M. University of Chicago, General Studies in Humanities, 1978
Award: University Fellowship

B.A. Brigham Young University, International Relations and Humanities, 1974, High Honors
with Distinction (highest 1%)
Awards: several scholarships

EMPLOYMENT

General Counsel and Associate Director for Research and Analysis, JFK Assassination
Records Review Board, Washington, D.C., 1994-present

Covington & Burling, Associate Attorney, Washington, D.C., 1988-94
Practice Areas: international law (public and private); civil litigation (including class
action and other complex cases); appellate (including Supreme Court) litigation; extensive
church-state litigation; and six month full-time work in poverty law for Neighborhood Legal
Services Corporation.

United States District Court, Law Clerk to the Honorable Douglas P. Woodlock, Boston, MA,
1987-88

Ropes & Gray, Summer Associate, Boston, MA, 1987

Goodwin, Procter & Hoar, Summer Associate, Boston, MA, 1986

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Harvard University, Graduate Teaching Fellow, 1980-84
Ethics and International Relations (Stanley Hoffmann)
Rise of American Power (Ernest May)
Art and Politics (Simon Schama)
T. Jeremy Gunn
Page 2

Paris and London in the Nineteenth Century (John Clive)
Moral Values in European Thought (James Wilkinson)
French Society and Politics 1715-1815 (Patrice Higonnet)
French Society and Politics 1815-1945 (Patrice Higonnet)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, instructor in History, 1980-81; 1981-82

Brigham Young University, Instructor in History and Humanities on overseas study program in Paris, France 1975

PUBLICATIONS

Book

A Standard for Repair: The Establishment Clause, Equality, and Natural Rights (New York and London, 1992)

Articles

“Freedom of Religion or Belief, Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection,” American Journal of International Law (1996) (book review) (forthcoming)

“Adjudicating Rights of Conscience Under the European Convention on Human Rights,” in Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives (John Witte and Johan van der Vyver, eds., 1996), 305

“The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki Process, and American Foreign Policy,” 88 American Journal of International Law 854 (1994) (book review)

“Neutrality, Expression, and Oppression,” 23 Journal of Law & Education 391 (1994)

“Applying Coercion: The Latest Element of Establishment,” in Why We Need Public Schools: Church/State Relations and Visions of Democracy (Art Must, ed., 1992)

RECENT PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Chair, Committee on Human Rights, District of Columbia Bar (1995-present)
Co-Chair, Committee on Public International Law, District of Columbia Bar (1994-95)
General Counsel, National Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty (1990-94)
Member, Board of Directors, Washington Council of Lawyers (1993-present)
International Advisory Board, World Report on Freedom of Conscience and Belief
U.S. Institute of Peace Working Group on Religion, Ideology, and Peace (1994-present)
Who’s Who of American Lawyers (8th ed.)


MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira
Historical Review Group

FROM: Linda A. Jasper
Deputy Chief, Office of Central Cover.

SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

1. During the OCC briefing of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board on 16 October 1996, members of the Board asked three questions to which OCC said it would respond after additional research. Following are the questions and the responses:

   a. How many real businesses or contrived facilities in the commercial cover program are connected to the publications industry? Response: A few real businesses are loosely connected with the publications industry, and the names of a few contrived facilities could be perceived as being associated.

   b. How many companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and how many participate today? Response: Approximately 500 companies participated in the commercial cover program in the 1960s, and circa 1,800 are currently in the program.
SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

C. Could a copy of the secrecy agreement which is signed by [company] officials participating in the [commercial] cover program be made available, and has it changed since the 1960s? Response: Attached is a copy of the secrecy agreement used from 1955 to 1988 and a copy of the agreement used from 1988 to the present. The only difference is an addendum on the reverse which was added in 1991 pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991.

2. This memorandum and its attachments are for background information only and must be returned to the Central Intelligence Agency after review by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board.

Attachment:

as stated

cc: Fredrick Wickham, IMS
SUBJECT: Response to Questions Posed by the John F. Kennedy Assassination Review Board

DC/OCC (lh/Jasper, 32435 18Nov96 file:jfkboard)

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DC/OCC (Jasper)
1 - His. Review Board (BHarrelson)
1 - OCC/EXO (EMathias)
1 - OGC (Ciprinal)
SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE: ____________________________  SIGNATURE: ____________________________

REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

DATE: ____________________________  ORGANIZATION: ____________________________

DATE: ____________________________
SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. I acknowledge the fact that because of the confidential relationship between myself and the U.S. Government, I will be the recipient of information which, in itself, or by the implications to be drawn therefrom, will be such that its unlawful disclosure or loose handling may adversely affect the interest and the security of the United States. I realize that the methods of collecting and of using this information, as well as the identity of persons involved, are as secret as the substantive information itself and, therefore, must be treated by me with an equal degree of secrecy.

2. I shall always recognize that the U.S. Government has the sole interest in all information which I or my organization may possess, compile or acquire pursuant to this understanding. No advantage or gain will be sought by me as a result of the added significance or value such information may have, due to the Government's interest in it.

3. I solemnly pledge my word that I will never divulge, publish, nor reveal either by word, conduct, or by any other means such information or knowledge, as indicated above, unless specifically authorized to do so, by the U.S. Government.

4. Nothing in this understanding is to be taken as imposing any restriction upon the normal business practices of myself or my organization: i.e., information normally possessed by us or gathered in the regular course of business will continue to be utilized in accordance with our normal practices.

SIGNATURE

SIGNATURE

REPRESENTATIVE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT

DATE

ORGANIZATION

DATE
ADDENDUM

Pursuant to the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government Appropriations Act of 1991, the following language shall be incorporated into and considered a part of the attached nondisclosure agreement:

"These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of title 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to Congress); section 1034 of title 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosure to Congress by members of the military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 USC 421 et seq.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential Government agents), and the statutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activities Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling."


11 December 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point for ARRB

SUBJECT: DO Position on Identification of ERTHYROID/3

1. The DO strongly opposes the release by the ARRB of the phrase “a good KUBARK asset” that was previously withheld in Attachment. The CIA asked the Nicaraguan Service to send ERTHYROID/3 to Mexico City to help in the interrogation of Alvarado. Because this was during the Samoza regime, we have admitted that we had a liaison relationship with the Nicaraguans and we also have released the cryptonym ERTHYROID. ERTHYROID/3 became well known to the Mexicans as the Nicaraguan interrogator and, of course, was known by his own service. The phrase “a good KUBARK asset,” however, identifies him as a unilateral source of the Managua Station unbeknownst to the Nicaraguan and Mexican Services.

2. The DO often recruits officers, such as ERTHYROID/3, who are members of intelligence and police services with which it has a liaison relationship. These assets provide us valuable information without the knowledge of the service and in many cases they provide information about the service itself and its activities. To reveal ERTHYROID/3’s identity and his special relationship with the CIA would not only personally endanger ERTHYROID/3 but could cast suspicion on other recruited officers of other liaison services and compel them to reevaluate their unilateral relationships with the CIA.

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

CL BY 0695930
REASON 1.5(c)
DECL X1
DRV HUM 2-82

SECRET
SUBJECT: DO Position on Identification of ERTHYROID/3

IMS/ESG/J. Goins/44447/11 Dec 95

Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - DO/IRO
1 - ESG/HCS
1 - C/ESG


SECRET - Working Paper

8 January 1997

DRAFT

Memo for the Record

Subject: "Compliance" Meeting with ARRB Staff

Date: 7 January 1997
Location: ARRB offices
Attendees: CIA: Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG
          Eileen Wukitch, DO/IMS/JFK team
          ARRB: Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel
          Other members of ARRB's CIA team

Purpose: To discuss CIA's response to ARRB's
          Compliance letter dated 27 November, 1996

1. Gunn stressed that the objective of the ARRB is to assure the American public that every attempt has been made to locate JFK assassination related files/materials and that no "secret" files remained. He realizes that it is not possible for the Agency to say with certainty that all documents had been located. In the ARRB's final report, he wants to be able to say that all reasonable searches were made, and where documents were not found, ARRB staff was given appropriate access to ensure the validity of the respond.

2. Gunn divided records into three categories:

   a) Sequestered records and Oswald 201 -- not an issue in terms of identifying records.

   b) Additional information/special requests -- official and informal. The responses should include tasking and response memos plus search strategy and files searched if appropriate. In cases of "no records" additional documentation may be required.

   [Note: I have already requested the DO, etc., to provide specifics on search strategy/files searched in future responses; in most cases there should not be a problem including this information into responses to ARRB staff.]

   c) Records not previously identified -- in addition to releasing HSCA records (sequestered/201 file/etc.), the ARRB seeks to ensure that all relevant files have been searched and that all assassination records (as defined today) have been identified. The ARRB staff has identified Agency components/files that they feel may contain relevant records and should be (or have been) searched. Gunn said he planned to send a formal letter listing these offices/files but wanted to discuss with HRG first.

SECRET - Working paper
[Note: Category 3 led to a long discussion on agency records. The focus was on how the ARRB staff could be confident that files were searched.]

3. I explained that the Agency would not be able to say that all records had been located (lack of a central file system). Also it may not be possible to provide documentation that explained the disposition of 1963 records in all cases. I agreed that it would be useful to have additional briefings on the records to address their specific requests and concerns. I asked him not to send a formal request until I had the opportunity to discuss his request with C/HRG and the Directorate focal points. He agreed.

[Note: There were numerous questions on how and where -- do we have a record center in Indiana? -- the Agency stores records. Do inventories of all record at the centers exist? Are there individuals who could address specific office records and what type of records existed in 1963? ]

4. Specific Offices/Files mentioned by Gunn as part of Category 3:

DCI files for the 1958-63 timeframe; specifically chrono or subject files of John McCone
Richard Helms (chrono/subject files as DCI, DDCI and DDP.
IG
OGC
DO offices (CI, SAS, Cuba, WH/LA)
DI (OCI, other analysis and finished Intel)
TSD files on Mexico City; where was TSD in the organization
DA (what type of pay records would exist 1958-63;
Angleton's accounting records; agents' records)
OS (types of records that existed)
DS&T (U2 files)
Specific Stations - explanation of types of records maintained and disposition of those records -
Mexico City, Moscow, Helsinki, JMWave, Tokyo
Commo - types of records maintained in 1963; where are they now
DCD/00

5. Gunn also included CSI on his list of offices to be searched -- what other relevant records did we have (histories, working files, etc.) I explained that when agency components/review projects located JFK related records they were forwarded directly to HRG JFK team. We had four boxes of LA records (located in Ex Order survey),
individual documents located in other project (example Bay of Pigs) or activities. The current automated declassification effort under the Ex. Order is setup to refer any assassination records to HRG/JFK team. We have not done any work on these materials since the sequestered collection and specific ARRB requests are our first priority. A discussion of the History staff's identification of the Agency's JFK collection followed. He would like more information.

6. Additional questions/issues raised:

Is there a "records" person at the Agency who can address their concerns?

Gunn ask if he can go to [WTC] and/or other Records Centers and look at shelf lists and the files around a topic of special interest?

What is on the shelf lists? Would they say, for instance, these are the files regarding JFK from Sheffield Edwards?

What are the steps taken in a name trace?

Are records around the specific hit searched?

Is it possible to provide an explanation of the routing indicators in the collection?


15 January 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

OFFICE: CSI/HRG

SUBJECT: ARRB 22 January Meeting -- Agenda

REFERENCE:

1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:

(S) A. Reconsideration of the [State Cover]. The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA and/or State officials are not required. However, the Agency and State are welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the "evidence memorandum". The evidence memorandum must be at ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee Strickland and me to be available at 600 E. St. NW. to answer any questions.

(AIIO) B. Office of Personnel Files in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend to the Board that personnel files be declared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story, and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HRP is preparing five OP files for review by Board members. The ARRB staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

(AIIO) C. Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by CIA during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR and released in 2017. If the recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

D. Other possible items:

(AIIO) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1 -- The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.
ii. Crypt LINLUX -- ARRB staff did not find our evidence memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to recommend that the Board reaffirm its decision to release.

iii. 1967 IG report on "Castro Assassination Plots" -- ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the agenda. HRP and DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.

2. If you have any questions about any of these items please call me.

CC: Eileen Wukitch @ DO
    Becky Rant @ DA
    Linda Cipriani @ DCI

Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 PM


6 February 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fred Wickham
DO Focal Point for JFK Board

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
DCI/CSI/HRG, JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: ARRB Request for Additional Information and Records No. CIA-7

REFERENCE: ARRB Memo dtd 8 Nov 95, same subj, sub-para (2), The Mexico City Station (attached)

1. In his review of the history of the Mexico City Station, Jeremy Gunn, ARRB Staff, cited the five footnotes annotated below as possible assassination-related records and requested copies of the source documents. For your assistance in identifying the documents, following the footnote citation is the text (in italics) to which it refers.

Footnote 39. HMMA-17494, 4 Aug 61, sub: Data on Case Officer work and Operational Projects at the Mexico City Station, WH/HO.

pg 38/39, Vol I. "The Cuban task force and related activities caused an increase in the Mexico City Station to 76 Americans (40 were located inside the Embassy using official cover, and 36 were outside under nonofficial cover.) Indigenous agents numbered over 200."

Footnote 55. Ibid. (Ft. 54. Isthmus No. 62, 6 Dec 63, WH/HO.)

pg 44, Vol I. "Later in the year Diaz became the PRI candidate (tantamount to election) which assured LIENVOY of an extended six years under virtually the same management." (54)

"In 1963 the routine reporting of an operational lead by LIENVOY developed into a long investigation. A man with a US accent, speaking broken Russian, telephoned both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies on 26 September and 6 October 1963. He identified himself as Lee Oswald and Harvey Oswald."
This information was cabled to Headquarters for traces and identifying data. After the assassination of President Kennedy on 22 November 1963 in Dallas, Texas, the Mexico City Station spent several months investigating leads in connection with Oswald's visit to Mexico. (55)"

Footnote 61. I&R Report, Dec 64, 185215 TS.

pg 47/48, Vol I. "A team from the Inspection and Review (I&R) Staff at Headquarters conducted a thorough review of the Mexico City Station administrative and operational program in July 1964. They wrote: 'The Mexico City Station approaches the classic type station in opportunities and in operations.' [It had high-level liaison operations, unilateral operations, and joint operations with the host government, as well as Soviet, Satellite, Cuban, and indigenous Communist Party operations. There was local collaborative liaison with other US agencies (the State Department, the FBI, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS), and the military attaches). To accomplish this wide range of tasks, the station was organized into Soviet, Cuban, Satellite, Covert Action, Communist Party, and Operational Support Branches. The last branch was an operational catch-all responsible for direction of all technical, surveillance, and liaison operations. In reality, operational support operations were an extension of the chief of station's personal clandestine capabilities, particularly those projects involving Mexican officials. (61)"

Footnote No. 139. Isthmus No. 29, 8 Mar 61, WH/HO.

pg 229, Vol II. "During February 1961, the first transmitter was installed in the office of the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico.* (139)"

"*Between 1961 and 1968, at least a dozen audio installations were made in Cuban installations and residences, but all of them eventually failed. LI-ROMANCE and LISAMPAN are two projects which provided for short-term multiple audio installations."

Footnote No. 190. Project LILINK, File Nos. 201-226902 and 50-6-99/1, Job No. 68-494/28, Space 60793.

pg 353 Vol II. "LILINK"
2. Mr. Gunn will be at IP the week of 24 February to review additional material related to CIA-7. Please provide the documents, or a status of the search, by 20 February 1997.

J. Barry Harrison

Att: Ref Document
CSI/HRG/MAQ (3 Feb 97) (BKH-6Feb97)
Distribution:
Orig - Adse w/att
X - HRG w/o att
1 - JBH w/o att
1 - DO JFK Team w/att
1 - ARRB Request File


Notes from meeting with ARRB staff, 20 March 1998.
re Board Issues (attendees Gunn, Skwirot, Combs)

I. NEW ISSUE: Covert Actions -- Document 178-10002-10415
[Rockefeller Commission document]

This document went before the Board in November as part of a group of documents from the Ford Presidential Library. It refers to Agency (covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian and Brazilian elections) and support to labor union in France and Italy. The ARRB staff viewed the highlighted material (all references to covert action) as not germane to the assassination and had not anticipated a problem. The Board instead questioned the deletions and asked for more evidence before agreeing to protect. The sense of the staff is that the Board is leaning toward release. The DO team prepared a response for the staff in February, however, it is not strong enough to take to the Board.

Given that the next Board meeting is only 3 weeks away, we discussed a two step process:

1. At the 13 April meeting, have a senior official (Ed?) appear before the Board to a) underscore the importance of this issue to Agency and Intelligence Community; b) ask why these covert actions are important to the JFK assassination? They obviously have interest to historians but seem beyond the charter.

[Key points to make: this is not just Agency decision, NSC and/or WH will have to be consulted; the protection / classification has been has up-held by ...... (ISCAP?). If Ed went down, it would also serve as an opportunity to meet the other Board members. We could also make available to ARRB any material previously prepared defending protection of covert actions if appropriate.]

2. If the Board remains inclined to release, prepare full evidence package, etc. for May 12 meeting.

According to Gunn, there is no way to avoid sending this document to the Board. Once the Board has expressed an interest in an issue, they expect to see it again.

ACTION: We need to advise Gunn next week if we are going to have someone address the issue at the April meeting. If not, the document will be scheduled for action at the May meeting and our "evidence package" should be available for the ARRB staff no later than the week of May 4.
II. Alias documentation and accommodation addresses
[Multiple documents -- I briefed you earlier on this issue].

ARRB staff proposed compromise:

Documentation (driver permits, SSN, membership cards, etc.)-

a. If documentation can be obtained by anyone (pocket litter: National Rifle Association card, club memberships cards, etc.), the presumption will be to release.

b. If documentation would be expected to require agreement of another government entity (Federal, State or Local) or private company or organization, the presumption will be to protect.

c. Items that are considered by the ARRB staff to be important to the story, or that do not fall clearly into one of the above categories, will be considered on a case-by-case base. The Agency may be required to provide additional evidence to protect in these cases.

Accommodation Addresses:

Release as much of the address as possible without identifying a specific location or otherwise providing information that could lead to identification of an individual cooperating with the Agency. For example delete house number, release street.

Aliases [when true name is released]

If outside of the JFK timeframes (generally 1960-1964), the presumption is protect.

If within a JFK timeframe, presumption is to release; additional evidence will be required to protect.

Action: The HRP and DO JFK teams will re-review the documents applying the proposed compromise guidelines. If we conclude that the Agency's equities can be protected under this compromise, the ARRB staff will present the guidelines to the Board at the April meeting with the recommendation that be adopted. The staff will describe the new guidelines as much preferable to the case-by-case approach which requires extensive research by the Agency consume an inordinate amount of staff time.


SECRET

8 April 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee Strickland
Chief, IRG/OIM

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB Issues for EXDIR Info Brief

(S) 1. Covert Actions. Within the Ford Presidential Library referred materials is a document which raises concerns. It is a Helms' MFR on a PIFAB Meeting. Within it there are references to CIA covert financial support to political parties in Peru, Greece, Italy and Brazil and to labor unions in France and Italy.

Status and Issues: The ARRB staff has agreed to recommend to the Board that the information related to those covert actions be considered non-related and the documents designated "Not Believed Related" (NBR). The document will be grouped with similar "NBR" documents and be presented to the Board for action at its 13 April or 12 May meeting.

(AIIO) 2. Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses. The security file of former Agency employee, David Morales (deceased -- true name already released), within the sequestered collection contains documentation on five of his aliases. We anticipate similar problems as we re-review other security files within the sequestered collection. The ARRB staff has proposed a compromise resolution to this problem as follows:

-- Protect all references to official documents reflecting the alias such as SSN, Drivers Permit, etc.;

-- Release items designated as pocket litter such as club cards, etc.;

-- Protect elements of accommodation addresses to avoid identifying specific locations; and

-- Then make a decision to actually release or protect the alias itself depending on the timeframe and its importance to the JFK story.

CL BY: 0611637
CL REASON: 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: Multiple

SECRET
Status and Issues: The DO JFK Team is currently reviewing this proposal. If they agree with, the Agency and ARRB will spell out the guidelines which will be submitted to the Board at the 13 April meeting accompanied by a staff recommendation to accept. If the DO has problems with the proposed guidelines, I will request that the issue be postponed until the May meeting.

(AIIO) 3. ARRB Request, CIA-1. Organizational Materials. This request asked for organization charts on various Agency directorates/components for the years 1958-1968. All Agency directorates provided material responsive to the request. The ARRB staff has reviewed the material and selected items to be incorporated into the JFK collection. All selected material has been reviewed by appropriate components/IROs and can be released, either in full or in sanitized form except for the DO material. The DO has advised the ARRB staff that all of the DO items selected will be denied in full.

Status and Issues: The ARRB will present the selected material, including a DO JMWAVE chart, to the Board to be declared Assassination Records at the 13 April meeting. They will also propose that a generic DO organization chart be prepared in lieu of the records in contention. The chart would include those components that were involved in the Oswald story and anti-Castro activities. These JMWAVE and DO organization charts have been the subject of several discussions and meetings with the ARRB staff over the past few months. The ARRB staff is clearly leaning toward recommending that the JMWAVE chart be released; an actual vote on these records by the Board will not take place until the May meeting.

(S) 4. ARRB Request, CIA-IR-15. Mexico City Tapes. This request asked for a thorough search of Agency files and documents for and CIA "surveillance 'take' from Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination." Among the items provided by the DO were five boxes containing audio tapes from tel-tap on Cuban and Russian embassies and facilities. A number of the tapes are dated 22 November 1963; many others are dated 23 November 1963 through December 1963.

Status and Issues: The ARRB staff has asked the question, what could possibly be sensitive or classified on the tapes given that we have acknowledge a unilateral tap on the embassies and the existence of the tapes is public knowledge. Barring any additional information from the DO, the ARRB staff plans to present the issue to the Board at the 13 April meeting and request that it declare at least
the tapes from 22 and 23 November to be Assassination Records. A vote on releasing the tapes will be delayed until the May meeting.

(S) 5. LITAMIL-9 -- a CIA Penetration of the Cuban Embassy. The identity of LITAMIL-9 was inadvertently released in 1993. He is now identified in true name as a CIA agent in John Newman's book, Oswald and the CIA. As of 1993, LITAMIL-9 was still alive, living in Mexico City and he has family in Cuba. Up to now, the ARRB Board has agreed to protect his identity and crypt and delay the release of his 201 file until the Agency could make some judgments about the potential damage created by the release on additional documents with his name/crypt in them.

Status and Issues: The ARRB has requested that we address LI-9 issue at the May meeting. The DO has confirmed that LI-9 is still alive and living in Mexico City. The HRP/DO JFK teams are currently reviewing the 201 and other LI-9 material in the file. It is unlikely that the Board would agree to delay release until 2017, however, there is precedent for delaying release of records on individuals for shorter periods or until death.

(S) 6. Richard Gibson, CIA asset. Gibson, who presently lives in England, is a left wing journalist who was associated with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee (FPFCC), an entity to which Oswald wrote letters and claimed to be a member. Gibson did not become an Agency asset until after the assassination, however, he had been of interest to the FBI when he headed the FPFCC. Unfortunately a combination of previous releases and release by the Board led to press reports in 1994/1995 about his relationship with the CIA. At that time, CIA officers were dispatched to advise him about the possible compromise and promise him the very best attempt at protecting the relationship. ARRB also agreed to delay the release of any additional information until the Agency and FBI had determined the full extent of the files on Gibson and the potential damage.

Status and Issues: The Gibson documents are scheduled for ARRB action at the May meeting. It appears to be possible to release Gibson's role in the JFK assassination story and protect his relationship with the Agency in our JFK assassination records; however, the FBI has a four volumes file which covers both FBI interest and Gibson's relationship with the Agency. The HRP/DO JFK teams are currently reviewing the Gibson material and I will be meeting with the FBI to review what they are releasing on Gibson and the disposition of their file.
(AIUO) 7. ARRB Request, CIA-IR-34, Files of CIA Officials and/or Officers. This is a major request. The board has asked for "the office files of the individual occupying the following positions during the period 1959-1964."

The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
General Charles Cabell 1953-1962
General Marshall Carter 1962-1965
The Office of the Deputy director for Plans
Richard Bissell 1958-1965
Richard Helms 1962-1965
The chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959-1964
Office of General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, 1959-1964
Operational Diaries of William Harvey 1962-1963.

Status and Issues: This request will by its very breadth require lots of time on behalf of directorate and DCI records officers. And, while it may seem overly broad, HRP has developed a methodology with the ARRB which provides the access required by the Board and guarantees that their review is focused. The request is for access to review the files for possible assassination related material and the Board has no interest in reviewing multiple files which have nothing to do with the assassination story. A meeting is held between the ARRB staff, HRP JFK team and the appropriate IRO to discuss the scope of the request. Usually, the ARRB staff are first provided shelf lists, indexes, records lists, etc. for the purpose of narrowing/selection what they think is important. HRP assist the IRO or component representatives in reviewing the selected files to ensure they deal with appropriate subjects and timeframes. Once access is approved, the appropriate IRO and component sets up a file review session with the ARRB staff. If material requested is particularly sensitive, access can be limited to the ARRB Executive Director or members of the Board. Any records selected as Assassination Records are subject to review under the JFK Act. This process has been used for numerous requests for access including DCI McCon File, Family Jewels materials, histories and security files.


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Executive Director

VIA: Director of Information Management

FROM: Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group/OIM

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

1. (AIUO) Per your request at our 1 April bi-weekly meeting, we have summarized below the significant issues which are under deliberation and negotiation with the JFK Board. Our approach on protecting Agency equities is multi-step:

- First, with the staff, we argue relevance although the statute and implementing regulations define "assassination records" very broadly as including
  - (1) any records related to the assassination or Oswald,
  - (2) any records concerning the various conspiracy theories, and
  - (3) any records within the scope of previous investigations including the Church Committee, Pike Committee, Warren Commission, or House Select Committee on Assassinations (HSCA),

- Second, with the staff, we argue that release would cause current damage although the exemptions under the JFK statute are much narrower than the corresponding exemptions under the FOIA, and

- Third, if we fail to convince the staff, we must proceed to a more detailed and formal presentation to the Board.

---

1 (AIUO) It is the materials collected by the HSCA which are the most numerous and often the most troublesome in terms of sensitive equities. They are generally referred to as the "sequestered collection."
SECRET

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

ISSUE 1 -- Unacknowledged Covert Actions

2. (S) Within records surfaced by the Ford Library is a document -- a Helms Memorandum for the Record on a PFIAB meeting -- which contains references to CIA covert financial support to political parties in Peru, Greece, Italy and Brazil and to labor unions in France and Italy.²

3. (S) After much negotiation, the ARRB staff has agreed to recommend to the Board that the information related to those covert actions be considered non-related and the documents designated "Not Believed Related" (NBR). The document will be grouped with similar "NBR" documents and be presented to the Board for final action at the 13 April or 12 May meeting.

ISSUE 2 -- Alias Documentation and Accommodation Addresses

4. (S) The security file of former Agency employee, David Morales (deceased -- true name already released), within the sequestered collection contains documentation on five of his aliases.³ We anticipate similar problems as we re-review other security files within the sequestered collection. We are attempting to work a compromise with the following elements but details have yet to be finalized:

- protect all references to official documents reflecting the alias such as social security cards, drivers licenses,
- release items designated as pocket litter such as club cards,
- protect elements of accommodation addresses to avoid identifying specific locations, and
- lastly, make a decision to actually release or protect the alias itself depending on the timeframe and its importance to the JFK story.

5. (S) However, disagreements on the actual implementation (e.g., protect house number but release street name of

² (S) See Attachment 1.
³ (S) See Attachment 2.
SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

accommodation address) have prevented a final resolution at this time. We are also exploring with the DO senior management whether the blanket release of pocket litter (whether lawfully obtained or forged) might present media or operational issues today. Accordingly, we have requested that the issue be postponed until the May meeting.

ISSUE 3 -- Organizational Materials

6. (S) This request (one of the earliest and known as CIA-1) asked for organization charts on various Agency directorates and/or components for the years 1958-1968. All Agency directorates provided material responsive to the request and the ARRB staff has selected items for inclusion in the JFK collection. Remaining at issue are three DO charts -- a 1961 generic DDP organization, a 1963 generic DDP organization, and a detailed JMWAVE organization. The DO has agreed to release the first two and remain adamantly opposed to the release of the JMWAVE chart given its similarity to current organizational plans.

7. (S) This issue will be presented by ARRB staff to the Board at the 13 April meeting where they will recommend that the DDP generic charts be accepted (good for CIA) and that the JMWAVE chart be declared as an assassination record (bad for CIA); an actual vote by the Board will not take place until the May meeting.

ISSUE 4 -- Mexico City Tapes

8. (S) This request asked for a thorough search of Agency files and documents for and CIA "... surveillance 'take' from Cuban and Soviet facilities in Mexico City at the time of the Oswald visit and in the immediate wake of the assassination." Among the items provided by the DO were five boxes containing audio tapes from telephone taps on the Cuban and Russian embassies and facilities. A number of the tapes are dated 22

---

4 (S) See Attachment 3.
SECRET

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

November 1963; many others are dated 23 November 1963 through December 1963.

9. (S) This is one of the most complex requests because of the following facts:

- at one time, there was a tape of Oswald in existence but it has since been lost or erased;
- the relevance of these tapes is argued to be only to prove that no tape in existence today contains the Oswald conversation;
- this was not an unilateral operation but rather a joint operation with the Mexican Government;
- there is a confidential request from the ARRB to the Mexican Government for any copies of the actual Oswald conversation they may possess; and,
- quite obviously, the sensitivity is not so much the mere fact that we possess such tapes but our confirmation of the extent and our release of the actual conversations captured.

10. (S) The good news, at least at this time, is that the ARRB staff has agreed to postpone Board consideration until May and, in the interim, the Agency will have an opportunity to review (i.e., listen and transcribe) and determine the sensitivity and provide detailed arguments in this regard.

ISSUE 5 -- Protection of LITAMIL-9

11. (S) LITAMIL-9 was a CIA penetration of the Cuban Embassy. Unfortunately, his identity was indirectly and inadvertently released in 1993 and, as a result, he was identified in true name as a CIA agent in John Newman's book, Oswald and the CIA. As of 1993, LITAMIL-9 was still alive and living in Mexico City with family in Cuba. To date, the ARRB Board has agreed to protect his identity and crypt and delay the release of his 201 file until the Agency could make some judgments about the potential damage created by the release on

(S) The scope of this request is quite significant; it includes five boxes of 185 tapes from operations against both the Cuban and Russian Embassy.

- 4 -

SECRET
SECRET

SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

additional documents with his name/crypt in them. That will now occur at the May meeting of the Board. It is, however, unlikely that the Board would agree to delay release until 2017, however, there is precedent for delaying release of records on individuals for shorter periods or until death.

ISSUE 6 -- Richard Gibson (CIA Asset)

12. (S) Richard Gibson, who presently lives in England, is a left wing journalist who was associated with the Fair Play For Cuba Committee (PFCC), an entity to which Oswald wrote letters and claimed to be a member. Gibson did not become an Agency asset until after the assassination, however, he had been of interest to the FBI when he headed the PFCC. Unfortunately, a combination of previous releases led to press reports in 1994/1995 about his relationship with the CIA. At that time, CIA officers were dispatched to advise him about the possible compromise and promise him the very best attempt at protecting the relationship.

13. (S) Since then, the ARRB has agreed to delay the release of any additional information until the Agency and FBI had determined the full extent of the files on Gibson and the potential damage. The issue is scheduled for ARRB action at the May meeting and our objective is to release Gibson's role in the JFK assassination story while protecting his relationship with the Agency; however, the FBI has a four volumes file which covers both FBI interest and Gibson's relationship with the Agency. We will be working in detail with the ARRB staff and the FBI on this approach.

ISSUE 7 -- Certain Files of CIA Officials

14. (S) This is a major request encompassing "... the office files of the individual occupying the following positions during the period 1959-1964."

- The Office of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- General Charles Cabell 1953-1962
- General Marshall Carter 1962-1965
- The Office of the Deputy director for Plans
- Richard Bissell 1958-1965
- Richard Helms 1962-1965

SECRET
SUBJECT: Pending ARRB (JFK Board) Issues

- The chronological files of C. Tracy Barnes, 1959-1964
- Office of General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, 1959-1964
- Operational Diaries of William Harvey 1962-1963.

This request will by its very breadth require significant time on the part of the directorate (and DCI) IROs. While it may appear overly broad, we have developed a methodology with the ARRB staff which provides the access required by the Board but guarantees that their review is focused: In sum, we work from shelf lists to narrow the selection and then conduct file review sessions with the ARRB staff; if material requested is particularly sensitive, access can be limited to the ARRB Executive Director or members of the Board. This effort will continue for some time.

Conclusion

15. (AIUO) At the present time, over 40 persons are involved in the JFK records review and we anticipate that this level of effort may increase by 25% in the coming months as we near the statutory end of the Board (30 September 1998). However, even if the Board is not extended (and it has been extended previously), there are statutory tasks for CIA which will extend 12-18 months beyond the end of the Board's existence. Your continued support is critical.

Lee S. Strickland